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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA**

ASHLEY CRUZ, individually, and on behalf
of other members of the general public
similarly situated;

Plaintiff,

v.

WELLNESSMART M.D., A
PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL
CORPORATION, a California corporation;
and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive;

Defendants.

Case No.: 24CV440175

Assigned for All Purposes to:
Honorable Charles F. Adams
Department 7

CLASS ACTION

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT,
CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION,
APPROVAL OF CLASS NOTICE,
SETTING OF FINAL APPROVAL
HEARING DATE; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT THEREOF**

[Declaration of Proposed Class Counsel
(Douglas Han); Declaration of Julie Green;
and [Proposed] Order filed concurrently
herewith]

Hearing Date: February 19, 2026
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.
Hearing Place: Department 7

Complaint Filed: May 30, 2024
FAC Filed: July 7, 2025
Trial Date: None Set

1 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on February 19, 2026 at 1:30 p.m., or as soon as the
2 matter may be heard, before the Honorable Charles F. Adams in Department 7 of the Santa Clara
3 Superior Court located at 191 North First Street, San Jose, California 95113, Plaintiffs Ashley
4 Cruz and Breenea Walker (“Plaintiffs,” “Plaintiff Cruz,” and “Plaintiff Walker”) moves for an
5 order:

- 6 • Granting Preliminary Approval of the class action settlement described herein and
7 as set forth in the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement
8 Agreement,” “Settlement,” or “Agreement”), attached as **Exhibit 2** to the
9 Declaration of Douglas Han, including, and not limited to, the means of allocation
10 and distribution of funds, the allocations for payments under the Private Attorneys
11 General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel
12 Litigation Expenses Payment, Class Representative Service Payments, and
13 Settlement Administration Expenses;
- 14 • Approving the Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action and Hearing Date
15 (“Class Notice”) attached as **Exhibit A** to the Settlement Agreement and
16 [Proposed] Order Preliminarily Approving Class Action Settlement;
- 17 • Directing the mailing of the Class Notice with a postage-paid return envelope to
18 the Class;
- 19 • Approving the deadlines for the notice and settlement administration process;
- 20 • Conditionally certifying the Class for settlement purposes only;
- 21 • Appointing Justice Law Corporation as Class Counsel;
- 22 • Approving CPT Group, Inc. as the Administrator;
- 23 • Appointing Plaintiffs as the class representatives;
- 24 • Approving the settlement of the PAGA claims; and
- 25 • Scheduling a hearing to consider whether to grant Final Approval of the Settlement
26 Agreement, at which time the Court will also consider whether to grant Final
27 Approval of the request for the Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel
28

1 Litigation Expenses Payment, Class Representative Service Payments, Settlement
2 Administration Expenses, and allocation of the PAGA Penalties.

3 This motion is based upon the following memorandum of points and authorities;
4 Declaration of Proposed Class Counsel (Douglas Han); Declaration of the Proposed
5 Administrator (Julie Green); [Proposed] Order filed concurrently with this motion; pleadings and
6 other records on file with the Court in this matter; and such documentary evidence and oral
7 argument as may be presented at the hearing on this motion.

8
9 Dated: August 5, 2025

JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION

10 By: 
11 Douglas Han
12 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 This motion seeks preliminary approval of a non-reversionary wage-and-hour class and
3 representative action settlement by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all current and former
4 hourly-paid or non-exempt employees of Defendant Wellnessmart M.D., a Professional Medical
5 Corporation (“Defendant”) within the State of California at any time during the period from May
6 30, 2020, through June 17, 2025 (“Class,” “Class Members,” and “Class Period”). At the time of
7 this filing, the number of Class Members confirmed by Defendant is estimated to be five hundred
8 sixteen (516). (Declaration of Douglas Han In Support of Motion For Preliminary Approval of
9 Class Action Settlement (“Han Decl.”), ¶¶ 8, 9.)

10 **II. BACKGROUND**

11 On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff Cruz filed a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit in the Superior
12 Court of California, County of Santa Clara, alleging eight (8) causes of action. (Han Decl., *supra*,
13 at ¶ 10.)

14 After engaging in discovery, investigations, and negotiation, on April 29, 2025, the Parties
15 attended mediation with the mediator Michael Ludwig, ultimately resulting in the Parties reaching
16 a settlement via a mediator’s proposal. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 11.)

17 On June 20, 2025, Plaintiff Walker provided written notice to the California Labor and
18 Workforce Development Agency and Defendant. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 12; Exhibit 3.)

19 On July 7, 2025, Plaintiff Cruz filed a First Amended Complaint that updated the “class”
20 definition, added Plaintiff Walker as a named plaintiff, and added the following cause of action:
21 violation of Labor Code section 2698 (PAGA). (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 13; Exhibit 4.)

22 **III. INVESTIGATION/ LITIGATION HISTORY**

23 **a. Discovery, Investigation, and the Parties’ Staunchly Conflicting Positions**

24 After initiating this lawsuit, the Parties engaged in discovery. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 15.)
25 Plaintiffs drafted and propounded special interrogatories and requests for production of
26 documents, and Defendant responded to the formal discovery requests. (*Ibid.*) The Parties met
27 and conferred and agreed to engage in an informal exchange of information and then eventually
28

attended mediation. (*Ibid.*)

Prior to mediation, the Parties conducted significant investigation and discovery of the facts and law. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 16.) Defendant produced documents relating to the policies, practices, and procedures. (*Ibid.*) As part of Defendant’s production, Plaintiffs reviewed time records, wage statements, and information relating to the size and scope of the Class. (*Ibid.*) Putative class members were also located and interviewed to attain a better understanding of the alleged day-to-day violations. (*Ibid.*)

Based upon the information provided by Defendant and interviews with putative class members, Plaintiffs contend – and Defendant denies – Defendant: (1) failed to provide employees with legally mandated meal and rest breaks; (2) failed to pay employees for all hours worked; (3) failed to factor non-discretionary bonuses into employees’ regular rate; (4) maintained illegal rounding practices; (5) failed to reimburse employees for necessary business expenses; (6) issued noncompliant wage statements; and (7) is liable for waiting time penalties. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 18-25.)

b. The Parties Were Able to Reach an Agreement

i. The Parties Attended Mediation Which Led to the Settlement

The Parties attended mediation with an experienced mediator. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 27.) During the mediation, the Parties discussed the risks of continued litigation, likelihood of certification, and merits of the claims and defenses versus the benefits of settlement. (*Ibid.*) With the assistance of the mediator, the Parties reached a settlement via a mediator’s proposal, the terms of which were memorialized in the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 27; Exhibits 2, 5.)

ii. The Settlement Was Reached as a Result of Arm’s-length Negotiations

The Settlement was reached because of arm’s-length negotiations. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 30.) Though cordial and professional, the settlement negotiations have always been adversarial and non-collusive in nature. (*Ibid.*) At the mediation, the Parties’ counsel conducted arm’s-length settlement negotiations until an agreement was reached after mediation. (*Ibid.*)

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1 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe in the merits of the case but recognize the expense
2 and length of additional proceedings necessary to continue the litigation. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶
3 31.) Plaintiffs and Class Counsel considered the uncertainty and risk of further litigation, potential
4 outcome, and difficulties and delays inherent in such litigation. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiffs and Class
5 Counsel believe that the settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate, and
6 reasonable and is in the best interests of the Class Members. (*Ibid.*)

7 **iii. The Settlement Is the Result of Thorough Investigation**

8 The Parties investigated and evaluated the factual strengths and weaknesses of the claims
9 and defenses and engaged in sufficient investigation, research, and discovery. (Han Decl., *supra*,
10 at ¶ 32.) The Settlement was only possible following significant investigation and evaluation of
11 the relevant policies and procedures. (*Ibid.*) This information permitted Class Counsel to engage
12 in a comprehensive analysis of liability and potential damages. This case has reached the stage
13 the Parties understand “the strength of the case; the reasonableness of the settlement in light of
14 the attendant risks of litigation, and in light of the best possible recovery” sufficient to support
15 the reasonableness, adequacy, and fairness of the Settlement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 32; *Boyd v.*
16 *Bechtel Corp.* (N.D.Cal. 1979) 485 F.Supp. 610, 617.)

17 **c. Terms of the Settlement**

18 **i. Deductions from the Settlement**

19 The Parties agreed (subject to the Court’s approval) this matter be settled for the total sum
20 of \$400,000, which includes the: (1) Class Counsel Fees Payment of up to \$140,000 (35% of the
21 Gross Settlement Amount); (2) Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of up to \$25,000; (3)
22 Class Representative Service Payments totaling \$20,000; (4) Administration Expenses Payment
23 of up to \$15,000; and (5) PAGA Penalties of \$25,000. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 28.)

24 **ii. Calculation of the Settlement Payments**

25 If the Court approves the deductions from the Gross Settlement Amount, it is estimated
26 that \$175,000 will be distributed to Participating Class Members, resulting in a gross *average*
27 Individual Class Payment of \$339.15. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 29.)

1 The Administrator will calculate and pay the Individual Class Payments for the
2 Participating Class Members using the formula set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (Han Decl.,
3 *supra*, at ¶ 27; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § III(5).) The Administrator shall also calculate and pay the
4 Individual PAGA Payments to the Aggrieved Employees using the formula set forth in the
5 Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at § 4(d).)

6 **iii. The Allocation of 20% to Wages and 80% to Interests and Penalties Is**
7 **Justified Under the Claims of this Action**

8 The Individual Class Payments will be apportioned twenty percent (20%) in the settlement
9 of wage claims and eighty percent (80%) in the settlement of claims for interest and penalties.
10 (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 27; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § III(6).)

11 The allocation of wages and penalties was based on the approximate realistic exposure
12 that Plaintiffs could expect to receive for meal and rest break premiums and unpaid and underpaid
13 wages. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 52.) Plaintiffs first added the realistic exposure for rest break
14 premiums and meal break premiums ($\$42,902.93 + \$13,650.78 = \$56,553.71$). (*Ibid.*) Plaintiffs
15 then added the $\$56,553.71$ to the low end realistic exposure for unpaid wages due to off-the-clock
16 work, underpaid wages, and rounding ($\$56,553.71 + \$126,919.32 + \$1,009.83 + \$3,254.06 =$
17 $\$187,736.92$). (*Ibid.*) The realistic exposure of $\$237,980.94$ that Plaintiffs can expect to receive
18 if they were to prevail at trial for meal and rest break premiums, low end unpaid wages due to
19 off-the-clock work, underpaid wages, and rounding represents about twenty-one percent
20 (21.23%) of the low end total realistic exposure and PAGA penalties ($\$187,736.92 \div \$884,432.96$
21 $= 0.21227 \times 100 = 21.23\%$). (*Ibid.*) Because this represents almost twenty percent (20%) of wages,
22 it is appropriate to allocate twenty percent (20%) as wages and eighty percent (80%) as interest
23 and penalties. (*Ibid.*)

24 **iv. Notice to the Class**

25 No later than fourteen (14) calendar days after the Court grants preliminary approval,
26 Defendant will deliver the Class Data to the Administrator. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 27; Exhibit 2,
27 *supra*, at § III(10)(b)(i).) No later than fourteen (14) calendar days after receiving the Class Data,
28

the Administrator will mail the Class Notices to all the Class Members via first-class regular U.S. Mail. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 27; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § III(10)(b)(ii).)

v. Distribution of Funds

The Gross Settlement Amount will be funded and distributed pursuant to the timeline and manner set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 27; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § III(2).) The uncashed settlement checks will be paid to the California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund. (*Id.* at § III(8).)

vi. Release of Claims

Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, the Participating Class Members will release the Released Parties from the Released Class Claims. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 27; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at §§ I(31), III(11)(a).)

Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments Plaintiffs, State of California, and Aggrieved Employees will release the Released Parties from the Released PAGA Claims. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 27; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at §§ I(32), III(11)(b).)

Plaintiffs and their former and present spouses, representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns generally release and discharge the Released Parties from the Plaintiffs’ Release. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 27; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § III(11)(c).) Plaintiffs also expressly waive and relinquish the provisions, rights, and benefits, if any, of section 1542 of the Civil Code. (*Ibid.*)

With regards to class action releases, “[A] court may release not only those claims alleged in the complaint and before the court, but also claims which ‘could have been alleged by reason of or in connection with any matter or fact set forth or referred to in’ the complaint.” (Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 537.) The scope of the releases in this case are acceptable because they are limited to the scope of the allegations in the operative complaints. The released claims are “based on the identical factual predicate as that

underlying the claims in the settled class action.””” (Ibid.) In other words, the released claims do not “““go beyond the scope of the allegations in the operative complaint””” (Ibid.)

d. Counsel for Both Parties Are Experienced in Similar Litigation

Counsel for the Parties are experienced in wage-and-hour employment law and class actions. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 2-7; Exhibit 1.) Class Counsel have prosecuted numerous cases on behalf of employees for Labor Code violations. (Ibid.) Thus, Class Counsel are experienced and qualified to evaluate the class claims, advantages, and disadvantages of settlement versus trial, and viability of the defenses. (Ibid.) Class Counsel’s experience guided their determination to endorse the Settlement.¹ (Ibid.)

IV. ARGUMENT

a. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Court Review

Rules of Court, rule 3.769 requires court approval for class action settlements.² “Before final approval, the court must conduct an inquiry into the fairness of the proposed settlement.” (Rules of Court, rule 3.769(g).) Rule 3.769 further requires a noticed motion for preliminary approval of class settlements:

- (a) A settlement or compromise of an entire class action, or a cause of action in a class action, or as to a party, requires the approval of the court after hearing.
- ...
- (c) Any party to a settlement agreement may serve and file a written notice of motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. The settlement agreement and proposed notice to class members must be filed with the motion, and the proposed order must be lodged with the motion.

¹ The final factor mentioned in *Dunk* – the number of objectors – is not determinable until the Class Notice has been provided to the Class Members, and the Class Members have had an opportunity to respond. This information will be provided to the Court in conjunction with the Motion for Final Approval.

² The California Supreme Court has also authorized California’s trial courts to use Federal Rule 23 and cases applying it for guidance in considering class issues. (*Vasquez v. Superior Court* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 821; *Green v. Obledo* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 145-146.) Where appropriate, the Parties cite Federal Rule 23 and federal case law in addition to California law.

Courts have discretion to approve settlements that are fair, not collusive, and consider “all the normal perils of litigation as well as the additional uncertainties inherent in complex class actions.” (*In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation* (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 167, 179, cert. den. *sub nom. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Ass’n* (1981) 452 U.S. 905.)

b. The Settlement Is a Reasonable Compromise of Claims

An understanding of the amount in controversy is an important factor in whether the settlement “of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129; see also *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 409.) The most important factor in this regard is “the strength of the case for Plaintiff on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement.” (*Kullar*, at p. 130; see also *Munoz*, at p. 409.)

Kullar’s instruction to the court is not to “decide the merits of the case or to substitute its evaluation of the most appropriate settlement for that of the attorneys.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, *supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.) *Kullar* does not require an explicit statement of the maximum amount the class could recover if the plaintiff prevailed on all his claims, provided there is a record that allows “an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*, *supra*, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.) Put differently, “as the court does when it approves a settlement as in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6, the court must at least satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the ‘ballpark’ of reasonableness.” (*Kullar*, at p. 133.)

i. The Gross Settlement Amount of \$400,000 Is Fair and Reasonable

The Settlement was only possible following significant investigation and evaluation of the relevant policies and procedures in place and the data provided for the putative class, as referenced in Section III(b) above, permitting Class Counsel to engage in a comprehensive analysis of liability and potential damages. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 32.)

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1 The claims are predicated on the alleged: (1) failure to pay overtime wages; (2) failure to
2 pay minimum wages; (3) failure to provide meal and rest breaks and pay applicable premium
3 wages; (4) failure to timely pay wages; (5) failure to issue compliant wage statements; (6) failure
4 to reimburse business expenses; (7) violation of PAGA; and (8) violation of Business &
5 Professions Code section 17200. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 33.) Defendant vehemently denies the
6 theories of liability. (*Id.* at ¶ 34.)

7 While Plaintiffs believe that the case is suitable for certification, uncertainties with respect
8 to certification are always present. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 35.) As the California Supreme Court
9 ruled in *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, class certification is
10 a matter of the trial court's sound discretion. (*Ibid.*) Decisions following *Sav-On Drug Stores,*
11 *Inc.* have reached different conclusions regarding certification of wage-and-hour claims.³ (*Ibid.*)
12 These factors led to the discounting of the calculations for the potential damages.

13 **ii. The PAGA Penalties of \$25,000 Are Reasonable**

14 The provisions of the Labor Code potentially triggering PAGA penalties include Labor
15 Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 218.5, 221, 226(a), 226.3, 226.7, 229, 246(l), 510, 512(a), 558,
16 1174(d), 1174.5, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 45.)
17 Defendant asserts that PAGA penalties are not mandatory but permissive and discretionary.
18 (*Ibid.*) Defendant maintains that it had a strong argument it would be unjust to award maximum
19 PAGA penalties given the law's unsettled state. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 45; *Thurman v. Bayshore*
20 *Transit Mgmt.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 [reducing penalties by 30% under this authority].)
21 Defendant argued that without stacking and limited to the initial violation, the PAGA penalties
22 would be limited to **\$21,000** (210 employees x \$100 initial violation) on the low end and **\$147,000**

23 _____
24 ³ (See e.g. *Harris v. Superior Court* (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 164 [reversing decertification
25 of class claiming misclassification and ordering summary adjudication in favor of employees],
26 review granted Nov. 28, 2007, (2007) 171 P.3d 545 [not cited as precedent, but rather for
27 illustrative purposes only]; *Walsh v. IKON Office Solutions, Inc.* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1440
28 [affirming decertification of class claiming misclassification]; *Aguiar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 121 [reversing denial of certification]; *Dunbar v. Albertson's Inc.* (2006)
141 Cal.App.4th 1422 [affirming denial of certification].)

(210 employees x \$100 initial violation x 7 theories of recovery) on the high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 46-49.)

Plaintiffs recognized the risk that any PAGA award could be reduced. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 50.) Many of the causes of action brought were duplicative of the statutory claims, such as Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 226.7, 510, 512(a), 1194, 1197, 1198, 2800, and 2802. (*Ibid.*) Thus, allocating \$25,000 as the PAGA Penalties was reasonable given that Defendant is paying an additional \$375,000 in the class settlement. (*Ibid.*) When PAGA penalties are negotiated in good faith and “there is no indication that [the] amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other Class Members,” such amounts are considered reasonable.⁴ (*Ibid.*)

Considering the defenses, supporting evidence, and position that the case is not suitable for class treatment, the settlement is reasonable, adequate, and fair.

c. Discount Analysis Justifies the Settlement

Excluding the civil penalties, which could be completely discretionary, the total estimated potential exposure, assuming certification and prevailing at trial, would be about **\$4,106,742.78** on the low end and **\$4,420,225.20** on the high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 51.)

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⁴ (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) No. 08-00844, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *24; see e.g. *Nordstrom Com. Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 579, “[T]rial court did not abuse its discretion in approving a settlement which does not allocate any damages to the PAGA claims”).

Category	Potential Exposure	Certification Risk	Merits Risk	Realistic Exposure
Rest Break Premiums	\$490,319.15	75%	65%	\$42,902.93
Meal Break Premiums	\$86,671.64	65%	55%	\$13,650.78
Overtime/Minimum Wage: Off-the-Clock Work	\$626,762.07 to \$940,244.49	55%	55%	\$126,919.32 to \$190,399.51
Rounding	\$4,080.12	45%	55%	\$1,009.83
Regular Rate	\$11,125	35%	55%	\$3,254.06
Unreimbursed Business Expenses	\$173,560	35%	75%	\$28,203.50
Wage Statement Penalty	\$325,500	65%	65%	\$39,873.75
Waiting Time Penalty	\$2,388,724.80	65%	65%	\$292,618.79
MAXIMUM TOTAL EXPOSURE	\$4,106,742.78 to \$4,420,225.20⁵			\$548,432.96 to \$611,913.15⁶

Based on this analysis, the realistic recovery is **\$548,432.96** on the low end and **\$611,913.15** on the high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 61.) The Gross Settlement Amount is about nine percent (9.05%) of the maximum potential exposure and sixty-five percent (65.37%) of the maximum realistic exposure at trial, which is a reasonable settlement. (*Ibid.*)

The only question at preliminary approval is whether the settlement is within the range of possible approval. (*In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation* (7th Cir. 1979) 594 F.2d 1106, 1124; *Acosta v. TransUnion, LLC* (C.D. Cal. 2007) 240 F.R.D. 564, 575.) “The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved.” (*Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.* (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 455; see also *Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership* (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 1234, 1242, “[I]t is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements. The proposed settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative

⁵ (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 36-44.)

⁶ (*Id.* at ¶¶ 53-60.)

measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators”). The Settlement Agreement is in line with the realistic exposure if Plaintiffs had prevailed at trial and provides significant recovery for the Class Members.

d. Conditional Certification of the Class Is Appropriate

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 “authorizes class actions ‘when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.’” (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) California courts certify class actions if the plaintiff can identify “both [1] an ascertainable class and [2] a well-defined community of interest among class members.” (*Ibid.*)

The Class is ascertainable and numerous as to make it impracticable to join all the Class Members, and there are common questions of law and fact amongst the Class. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 62.) Plaintiffs contend that, as former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees of Defendant, their claims are typical of the claims of the Class, and Class Counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiffs assert that the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. (*Ibid.*)

i. The Class Is Ascertainable and Sufficiently Numerous

“Ascertainability is required in order to give notice to putative class members as to whom the judgment in the action will be res judicata.” (*Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp.* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 914.) “A class is ascertainable if it identifies a group of unnamed Plaintiff by describing a set of common characteristics sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify himself or herself as having a right to recover based on the description.” (*Bartold v. Glendale Federal Bank* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 816, 828.) The proposed class must also be sufficiently numerous. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.)

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1 This case involves about five hundred sixteen (516) Class Members, meaning the Class is
2 sufficiently numerous. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 63; *Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.* (2008) 169
3 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1531, n.5 [finding a proposed class of “as many as 190 current and former
4 employees” is sufficiently numerous].)

5 **ii. The Class Members Share a Well-defined Community of Interest**

6 The community of interest requirement “embodies three factors: (1) predominant common
7 questions of law or fact; (2) Class Representative with claims or defenses typical of the class; and
8 (3) Class Representative who can adequately represent the class.” (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v.*
9 *Superior Court*, *supra*, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) “[T]he community of interest requirement for
10 certification *does not mandate that class members have uniform or identical claims.*” (*Capitol*
11 *People First v. Department of Developmental Services* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 692
12 (emphasis in original).) Rather, courts focus on the defendant’s internal policies and “pattern and
13 practice . . . in order to assess whether that common behavior toward similarly situated Plaintiff
14 renders class certification appropriate.” (*Ibid.*)

15 **1. Common Issues Predominate**

16 The “common issues” requirement “involves analysis of whether the proponent’s ‘theory
17 of recovery’ is likely to prove compatible with class treatment.” (*Capitol People First v.*
18 *Department of Developmental Services*, *supra*, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 690.) Courts determine
19 whether the elements necessary to establish liability are susceptible to common proof, even if the
20 class members must individually prove their damages. (*Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior*
21 *Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1024). These types of claims are regularly granted class
22 certification when the plaintiff can present evidence of common policies. (See e.g. *Jones v. JGC*
23 *Dallas LLC* (N.D.Tex. Nov. 29, 2012, Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-2743-O) 2012 U.S.Dist.LEXIS
24 185042 [certified collective action involving 190 dancers]; *Espinoza v. Galardi South Enters.*
25 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 11, 2016, No. 14-21244-CIV-GOODMAN) 2016 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 2904 [court
26 certified class of dancers on state law claims].)

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1 Plaintiffs assert that common issues of fact and law predominate as to each of the claims
2 alleged. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 64.) Plaintiffs contend that all Class Members were subject to the
3 same or similar employment practices, policies, and procedures described in detail above. (*Ibid.*)

4 **2. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical of the Class Claims**

5 Typical claims rely on legal theories and facts that are substantially like those of other
6 class members. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 46.)

7 Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant and allege that they and Class Members,
8 were employed by the same company and injured by the common policies and practices related
9 to the claims described above. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 65.) Plaintiffs seek relief for these claims
10 and derivative claims on behalf of the Class. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiffs' claims arise from the same
11 employment practices and are based on the same legal theories applicable to the Class. (*Ibid.*)

12 **3. Plaintiffs Are Adequate to Represent the Class**

13 Plaintiffs have proven to be adequate representatives. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 66.)
14 Plaintiffs have conducted themselves diligently and responsibly in representing the Class,
15 understand the fiduciary obligations, and have actively participated in the prosecution of this case.
16 (*Ibid.*) Plaintiffs also have no interests that are adverse to those of the Class Members. (*Ibid.*)

17 **4. Class Action Is Superior for the Fair and Efficient** 18 **Adjudication of this Controversy**

19 A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication
20 of this controversy. Plaintiffs contend that the joinder of all Class Members is impractical and
21 that class treatment will permit many similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims
22 for settlement purposes simultaneously in a single forum without the duplication of effort and
23 expense. Because several Class Members are current employees, Plaintiffs believe that fear of
24 retaliation further supports the superiority of class-wide relief as this fear deters legal redress.

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1 **e. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate**

2 In deciding whether to approve a proposed class action settlement under Code of Civil
3 Procedure section 382, the Court must find a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate and
4 reasonable.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) A proposed class
5 action settlement is presumed fair under the following circumstances: (1) the parties reached
6 settlement after arm’s-length negotiations; (2) investigation and discovery were sufficient to
7 allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation;
8 and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, *supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at
9 p. 1802.) All these elements are present here.

10 **f. Notice to Class Members Complies with Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f)**

11 Rules of Court, rule 3.769(f), provides:

12 If the court has certified the action as a class action, notice of the final approval
13 hearing must be given to class members in the manner specified by the court. The
14 notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for
15 class members to follow in filing written objections to it and in arranging to appear
16 at the settlement hearing and state any objections to the proposed settlement.


17 The Class Notice meets all these requirements. The Class Notice advises the Class
18 Members of their right to participate in the Settlement; how and when to object to or request
19 exclusion from the Settlement; and date, time, and location of the Final Approval Hearing.

20 **V. CONCLUSION**

21 Plaintiffs submit that the Settlement is in the best interests of the Class. Plaintiffs submit
22 that the Settlement should be preliminarily approved by the Court, Class should be conditionally
23 certified for purposes of settlement only, and Class Notice should be approved.

24 Dated: August 5, 2025

25 **JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION**

26 By: 
27 Douglas Han
28 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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**PROOF OF SERVICE
1013A(3) CCP**

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 751 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 101, Pasadena, CA 91103 and my electronic service address is jtorrez@justicelawcorp.com

On August 5, 2025, I served the foregoing document described as

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT, CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION, APPROVAL OF CLASS NOTICE, SETTING OF FINAL APPROVAL HEARING DATE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF

for the following case: **Cruz v. Wellnessmart M.D., a Professional Medical Corporation**
LWDA/Court Case No.: **LWDA Case No.: CM-1106624-25**
Court Case No.: 24CV440175
Santa Clara County Superior Court

on interested parties in this action by electronically submitting as follows:

State of California
Labor & Workforce Development Agency
800 Capitol Mall, MIC-55
Sacramento, California 95814


[X] BY ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION

Pursuant to California Senate Bill No. 836, I caused the documents described above to be electronically submitted by and through the procedure stated on the website of the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency.

[X] STATE

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on August 5, 2025, at Pasadena, California.


Jessica Torrez