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on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
and aggrieved

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF KERN

CINDY PEREZ, an individual and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

PRO SAFETY & RESCUE, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: BCV-22-103333-TSC
(RELATED WITH CASE NO. BCV-23-
103227-BCB)

[Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Thomas S.
Clark in Dept 17]

**DECLARATION OF VEDANG J. PATEL
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION SETTLEMENT**

DECLARATION OF VEDANG J. PATEL

1. I am an attorney at law, duly licensed to practice before all the Courts of the State of California, a senior attorney at Bibiyan Law Group, P.C., counsel for plaintiff Cindy Perez (“Plaintiff”), and all others similarly situated and aggrieved. As such, I am familiar with the file in this matter and, if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to the following facts of my own personal knowledge.

2. On or around December 13, 2022, Plaintiff commenced this Action by filing a Class Action Complaint against Defendant Pro Safety & Rescue, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, Case No. BCV-22-103333, alleging wage and hour violations including, without limitation, failure to pay overtime and minimum wages; failure to provide meal breaks, rest breaks, or compensation in lieu thereof; waiting time penalties; wage statement violations; failure to timely pay wages; failure to indemnify; failure to pay interest on deposits; and unfair competition. (the “Class Action”)

3. On or around December 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed with the LWDA and served on Defendant a notice under Labor Code section 2699.3, stating Plaintiff intended to serve as a proxy of the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) to recover civil penalties on behalf of Aggrieved Employees for alleged Labor Code violations (“PAGA Notice”). A true and correct copy of the PAGA Notice is attached to the Declaration of Vedang J. Patel as Exhibit “2.”

4. On or around September 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a separate action against Defendant for alleged civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Kern County Superior Court Case No. BCV-23-103227. (the “PAGA Action”)

5. Prior to mediation, Plaintiff obtained, through informal discovery: (1) time and payroll records for a sample of 40 putative Class Members; (2) Defendant’s 2024 employee handbook; (3) meal period waivers and on duty agreements for some of the 40 non-randomly sampled putative Class Members; and (4) Plaintiff’s personnel file.

6. Plaintiff's investigation was sufficient to satisfy the criteria for court approval set forth in *Dunk v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801 and *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 129-130 (*Dunk/Kullar*).

7. On or around December 11, 2024, the Parties participated in an all-day mediation presided over by Tagore Subramaniam, Esquire. The mediation was successful, and the Parties agreed to globally resolve all class and PAGA claims in the Action. As part of this Agreement, the Parties agree to stipulate to Plaintiff’s filing of a First Amended Complaint in the Class Action, adding all allegations brought in the PAGA Action, and to request for dismissal without prejudice of the PAGA Action, thereby effectively consolidating the two actions for purposes of Settlement (hereinafter, the “Action”). The First Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in the Action (“Operative Complaint”).

8. Class Counsel have conducted significant investigation of the law and facts relating to the claims asserted in the Action and the PAGA Notice, and have concluded that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class, taking into account the sharply contested issues involved, the expense and time necessary to litigate the Actions through trial and any appeals, the risks and costs of further litigation of the Actions, the risk of an adverse outcome, the uncertainties of complex litigation, the information learned through formal and informal discovery regarding Plaintiff's allegations, and the substantial benefits to be received by Settlement Class Members.

The Proposed Settlement

9. Subject to Court approval pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.679, *et seq.*, the Parties have agreed to settle the Action by agreement upon the terms and conditions and for the consideration set forth in the Settlement Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “1” thereto. A summary of the terms of the settlement is as follows:

Defendant will stipulate, for purpose of this settlement only, as follows:

- 1 • Certification of a settlement class Member (“Settlement Class Members” or “Class
2 Members”) for the purpose of settlement only: all persons employed by Defendant Pro
3 Safety & Rescue, Inc. (“Defendant”) in California and classified as a non-exempt,
4 hourly-paid employee who worked for Defendant during the period from December 13,
5 2018, through February 9, 2025 (“Class Period”).
- 6 • Defendant will pay \$205,000.00 (“Gross Settlement Amount”) to resolve the matter.
- 7 • Defendant represents that there are no more than 8,475 workweeks during the Class
8 Period. In the event the number of Workweeks during the Class Period increases by
9 more than 10%, or 848 Workweeks, then, at Defendant’s election: (1) the Gross
10 Settlement Amount shall be increased proportionally by the Workweeks in excess of
11 9,323 Workweeks multiplied by the Workweek Value; or (2) the Class Period shall end
12 on the date the number of Workweeks reaches 9,323. The Workweek Value shall be
13 calculated by dividing the originally agreed-upon Gross Settlement Amount
14 (\$205,000.00) by 8,475, which amounts to a Workweek Value of \$24.19. Thus, for
15 example, should there be 9,350 Workweeks in the Class Period, and Defendant elections
16 option 1 above, then the Gross Settlement Amount shall be increased by \$653.13 ((9,350
17 Workweeks – 9,323 Workweeks) x \$23.19 per Workweek. Defendant shall make its
18 election no later than 14 days after receiving sufficient information from the
19 Administrator that the number of Workweeks during the Class Period has exceeded
20 9,323. Should Defendant fail to make its decision within 14 days, then it will be
21 presumed Defendant has selected option (1) above.
- 22 • Defendant will pay the employer’s share of payroll taxes separate and apart from the
23 Gross Settlement Amount.
- 24 • This is a non-reversionary settlement.
- 25 • Settlement Class Members will be paid their *pro rata* share of the class action
26 settlement based on the total number of Workweeks¹ worked during the Class Period.

27 ¹ “Workweek” means any week during which a Class Member worked for Defendant, for at least one day during the
28 Class Period, based on hire dates, re-hire dates (as applicable), and termination dates (as applicable).

- The Settlement Administration costs, estimated not to exceed \$10,500.00, will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.
- Class Counsel, comprised of David D. Bibiyan, and Vedang J. Patel of Bibiyan Law Group, P.C., may apply for, and Defendant will not oppose, attorneys’ fees of not more than thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount, which, unless escalated pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, amounts to \$71,750.00, and actual costs, not to exceed \$30,000.00, all of which will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.
- Class Counsel hereby apply for, and Defendant will not oppose, a service award of up to \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff, which will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.
- “Aggrieved Employees” means all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee who worked for Defendant during the period from December 13, 2021, through the end of the Class Period (“PAGA Period”).
- Defendant has agreed to pay \$20,500.00 as PAGA penalties, seventy-five percent (75%) or \$15,375.00 of which will be paid to the LWDA out of the Gross Settlement Amount, and twenty-five percent (25%) or \$5,125.00 of which will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees.
- For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the *cy pres* recipient, Legal Aid at Work, for use in San Francisco.

Settlement Agreement and Accompanying Documents

10. Attached hereto as Exhibit “1” is the Settlement Agreement. Attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit A is the proposed “Class Notice” to be distributed to Class Members in English and Spanish.

11. Class Counsel has selected to use Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions (“Phoenix”), an experienced Settlement Administrator, to administer the settlement.

1 12. On or about August 10, 2026, I submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement to the
2 California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) in compliance with Labor Code
3 section 2699, subdivision (l)(2). A true and correct copy of each confirmation from the LWDA in
4 connection with Plaintiff is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.

5 **The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable Based Upon Objective Evidence**

6 **The Settlement was Negotiated at Arm’s-Length and is not Collusive**

7 13. The Settlement that has been reached, subject to this Court’s approval, is a product
8 of substantial efforts by the Parties and their counsel. The Settlement was reached after extensive
9 factual and legal investigation and research; the exchange of informal discovery; substantial
10 negotiation regarding the scope of informal discovery; exchange of documents and information that
11 included review of time and pay records and analysis thereof with the aid of Plaintiff and expert
12 consultant; analysis of shifts and Workweeks worked by Class Members in the Class Period,
13 analysis of the number of pay periods and number of Aggrieved Employees in the PAGA Period for
14 calculating PAGA penalties, number of Class Members eligible for wage statement penalties and
15 waiting time penalties; an analysis of Defendant’s financial ability to fund the settlement; an analysis
16 of Plaintiff’s employment records; extensive correspondence and communication between counsel;
17 a review of pleadings, evidence and rulings in similar actions litigated elsewhere in the state; a
18 review of similar cases in the same industry elsewhere in the country; and preparation for and
19 attendance at a full-day mediation, followed by further discussions and coordination to finalize the
20 terms and conditions of the general settlement parameters agreed to by the Parties.

21 14. While Class Counsel believes in the chance of success of certifying the claims, Class
22 Counsel recognized the potential risk, expense and complexity posed by further litigation.
23 Moreover, litigating Plaintiff’s claims in this litigation—claims that involve approximately 400
24 Class Members during the Class Period—would require substantial preparation and discovery and
25 ultimately would involve the deposition and presentation of numerous more witnesses (including
26 Class Members and expert witnesses), as well as the consideration, preparation and analysis of
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1 expert reports. Therefore, should litigation have progressed any further, there would have been
2 significant expense incurred by each side (above and beyond the expense already incurred).

3 **The Settlement Amount is Well Within Range of Reasonableness**

4 15. The settlement amount reached in this case provides significant recovery to Class
5 Members and Aggrieved Employees and easily falls within the range of reasonableness. Class
6 Counsel's theories at mediation were based on upon extrapolation of the documents and information
7 provided by Defendant, which were deficient and severely limited in scope. Class Counsel
8 understand there are approximately 400 Class Members who collectively worked a total of no more
9 than 8,475 Workweeks during the Class Period, and 346 Aggrieved Employees who worked a total
10 of 4,238 PAGA Pay Periods.

11 **Recovery of Damages for Failure to Pay Wages for All Time Worked**

12 16. Class Counsel theorized, based on Plaintiff's narrative evidence and documents
13 produced by Defendant, that Defendant failed to pay all wages due to Class Members because
14 Defendant required Class Members to work off-the-clock or Class Members spent time working
15 off-the-clock under Defendant's control and direction. Class Counsel theorized that Class Members
16 worked off the clock by, (1) checking their work schedules on their own time; (2) washing their
17 company owned uniforms. Class Counsel further theorized that Defendant rounded time entries in
18 a manner detrimental to the Class Members interest and Defendant rounded time entries to the
19 quarter hour throughout every shift. Class Counsel also theorized that Defendant's rounding practice
20 resulted in unpaid overtime for shifts that were recorded as exactly eight hours, and resulted in
21 unpaid double time for shifts that were recorded as exactly 12 hours. Class Counsel also theorized
22 that Defendant's time records were entirely synthetic, false, and did not accurately track Class
23 Members' time worked.

24 17. One theory advanced by Class Counsel, based on Plaintiff's narrative evidence, was
25 that Class Members worked off-the-clock for approximately five (5) minutes each shift throughout
26 the Class Period, without pay. Class Counsel also theorized that time worked above eight (8) hours,
27 which occurred essentially all shifts, was not paid at the overtime rate of pay. The average rate of
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1 pay during the Class Period, Plaintiff believes based on information available, was approximately
2 \$15 per hour. The overtime premium would thus be \$7.50. If: 1) Plaintiff were to assume only a
3 half-hour of unpaid overtime per workweek, along with one hour of overtime work paid at the
4 regular rate, for each workweek; 2) at an average rate of pay of \$15 per hour; 3) with an
5 understanding that there were approximately 8,475 Workweeks in the Class Period, one calculation
6 performed by Class Counsel resulted in Defendant's exposure for unpaid wages due to failure to
7 track and pay for all time worked in an amount of approximately **\$158,907**. ((8,475 workweeks x .5
8 hours x \$15.00/hr x 1.5 overtime rate) + (8,475 workweeks x 1 hour x \$7.50).

9 18. Class Counsel understand that Defendant explicitly denies these contentions and
10 make the following defenses in connection with this claim: Defendant contends that their policies
11 specifically prohibit off-the-clock work. Defendant contends that they did not require Class
12 Members to work off-the-clock, they were paid for all time suffered or permitted to work. Class
13 Members' time entries were not rounded in a manner detrimental to Class Members interest. Finally,
14 Defendant contends that any allegations that Class Members were required to be under Defendant's
15 control off-the-clock would necessitate an individualized inquiry into when and why, making this
16 claim not subject to class treatment and any trial in this litigation unmanageable. Thus, Defendant
17 contends that no damages can be recovered here, and, even if, *arguendo*, they could, an estimate of
18 five (5) minutes of unpaid work off-the-clock of Class Members for *every single shift* during the
19 Class Period is a wild exaggeration of time spent working off-the-clock if *any* such time was spent.

20 **Recovery of Damages for Non-Compliant Meal Periods**

21 19. Class Counsel theorized that Defendant's meal period practices throughout the Class
22 Period were non-compliant. Class Counsel theorized that Defendant's meal period practices were
23 non-compliant because, based on Plaintiffs' narrative evidence and Defendant's records, Class
24 Members did not receive full thirty (30) minute meal periods, were late, or missed. Class Counsel
25 also theorized that many meal periods were synthetic, or fictional because they rounded to exactly
26 thirty (30) minutes. Class Counsel also theorized that Defendant's supervisors would interrupt Class
27 Members during their meal periods and that employees were forced to cut their meal breaks short
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1 in order to return back to the store and relieve other employees so they may take their meal breaks.
2 Class Counsel also theorized that Defendant required plaintiff not to take her meal breaks at the
3 same time and present someone in the store to attend the customers.

4 20. Thus, one calculation performed by Class Counsel at mediation, assuming Class
5 Members worked five shifts per workweek with a 40% violation rate, resulted in **Defendant's**
6 **exposure for failure to provide compliant meal periods in a conservative amount of \$254,250**
7 (8,475 workweeks x 5 shifts per workweek x \$15/hour x .40 violation rate).

8 21. Class Counsel understands from the mediator and the mediation process that
9 Defendant makes the following defenses in connection with this claim: Defendant argued that it had
10 compliant meal period policies and practices and that its policy requires their employees to take
11 timely and full meal periods. Defendant also argued that many Class Members signed valid meal
12 period waivers, and thus there were no violations of the Labor Code for those individuals. Defendant
13 argued that Class Members took timely and full meal periods or received the required meal period
14 premium for each instance of meal period violations. Defendant further contends that any instance
15 of a Class Member failing to take a compliant meal period was voluntary, in violation of its meal
16 period policy, would necessitate an individualized inquiry and would not lend itself to a manageable
17 trial. Finally, Defendant contends that many Class Members signed enforceable arbitration
18 agreements and thus no class action is even tenable here. Thus, Defendant contends that *no* monies
19 are owed for this account but, even if any amounts were due, the amount calculated by Class Counsel
20 is excessive.

21 **Recovery of Damages for Non-Compliant Rest Periods**

22 22. Class Counsel theorized, based on documents and information produced by
23 Defendant and Plaintiff's narrative evidence, that Defendant's rest period policies and practices
24 throughout the Class Period were non-compliant. Class Counsel understand from Defendant's
25 policy documents, including the collective bargaining agreement, that, from Monday through
26 Friday, the first rest periods were combined with the meal periods and the second rest periods were
27 moved at the end of the shift, and on Saturdays, rest and meal periods were combined, giving rise
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1 to a rebuttable presumption that all rest periods throughout the Class Period were non-compliant.
2 Class Counsel theorized at mediation, on the same bases, that Defendant's rest period practices
3 throughout the Class Period were non-compliant due to the time needed for Class members to walk
4 back and be at their workstations prior to the end of their rest periods, necessarily resulting in short
5 rest periods. Notably, there were no rest period premiums ever issued throughout the Class Period.

6 23. Thus, one calculation performed by Class Counsel at mediation, assuming Class
7 Members worked five (5) shifts per workweek and a 40% violation rate, resulted in **Defendant's**
8 **exposure for failure to provide compliant rest periods in a conservative amount of \$254,250**
9 (8,475 workweeks x 5 shifts per workweek x \$15/hour x .40 violation rate).

10 24. Class Counsel understand that Defendant makes the following defenses in
11 connection with this claim: Defendant argues that it had compliant rest period policies and practices.
12 Defendant argues that Class Members took timely and full rest periods. Defendant contends that its
13 policy requires their employees to take timely and full rest periods. Defendant further contends that
14 any instance of a Class Member failing to take a compliant rest period was voluntary, in violation
15 of their rest period policy, would necessitate an individualized inquiry and would not lend itself to
16 a manageable trial. Finally, Defendant contends that a 40% violation rate is a wild exaggeration of
17 non-compliant rest periods, if there were any. Thus, Defendant contends that *no* monies are owed
18 for this account but, even if any amounts were due, the amount calculated by Class Counsel is
19 excessive.

20 **Wage Statement Violations**

21 25. Class Counsel theorized that Class Members are entitled to recover penalties for
22 Defendant's alleged failure to issue compliant wage statements under Labor Code section 226,
23 subdivision (e), for the derivative impact of the failure to pay all wages owed on providing accurate
24 information on wage statements. Specifically, Class Counsel theorized that penalties are owed under
25 Labor Code section 226 due to, at minimum, Defendant's failure to pay premium wages. A non-
26 exempt employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to
27 comply with Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a), is entitled to recover the greater of all actual
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1 damages or fifty dollars (\$50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred
2 dollars (\$100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period. Class Counsel understand
3 from the data provided by Defendant that there were 4,238 pay periods during the relevant statutory
4 time period for Class Members. If, in fact, Class Members worked every off-the-clock every shift
5 as set forth above, and no rest premiums were paid, every wage statement would thus, Class Counsel
6 theorized, violate Labor Code section 226. However, due to the derivative nature of wage statement
7 penalties, as well as the requirement that Defendant's failure to comply with Labor Code section
8 226 be knowing and intentional, one calculation performed by Class Counsel at mediation, based
9 on the initial penalty of fifty dollars (\$50) in light of Defendant's defenses, assuming a 40% violate
10 rate, resulted in **Defendant's maximum exposure for wage statement violations in the amount**
11 **of \$84,760** (4,238 pay periods x \$50/pay period x .40 violation rate).

12 26. Class Counsel understand that Defendant makes the following defenses in
13 connection with this claim: Defendant contends that the wage statements issued to the employees
14 fully complied with Labor Code section 226. Defendant contends that because it believes no wages
15 are unpaid that, thus, there can be no derivative penalties. However, Class Counsel also understand
16 the risks inherent in this claim if the above claims were not certified. Class Counsel also had to
17 factor in, and did factor in, the risk that the Court would find there was no injury to Class Members
18 even if the wage statements were inaccurate or that Defendant's conduct was not intentional, both
19 of which are requirements of Labor Code section 226 before penalties can issue. Class Counsel also
20 note that the calculation used does not take into account the fact that all Class Members did not work
21 all pay periods and, therefore, Class Counsels' calculation does not take into account the maximum
22 penalty of \$4,000 in Plaintiff's exposure model used at mediation.

23 **Waiting Time Penalties**

24 27. Pursuant to Labor Code sections 201, 202 and 203, each employee in the relevant
25 statutory period (*i.e.*, three years before the filing of the initial Complaint) is entitled to 30 days'
26 worth of wages as waiting time penalty for not being paid all wages due upon separation from
27 employment. Class Counsel theorized at mediation, based on relevant documents provided by
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1 Defendant, that, under Labor Code section 203, Defendant is liable to pay each Class Member, who
2 was terminated during the relevant statutory period, a full 30-day worth of wages as waiting time
3 penalty for failure to pay compensation in lieu of compliant meal and rest periods, and failure to
4 timely pay all wages due at the time of termination or resignation. Based on relevant documents
5 provided by Defendant, there were approximately 346 separated Class Members who were
6 terminated or resigned during the relevant statutory period. Thus, one calculation performed at
7 mediation by Class Counsel, assuming a 50 % violation rate, resulted in **Defendant's exposure for**
8 **waiting time penalties to be approximately \$498,240** (346 separated Class Members x \$15/hour
9 x 8 hours x 30 days x .40 violation rate).

10 28. Class Counsel understand that Defendant contends that there is no credence to
11 Plaintiff's off-the-clock theory and that, thus, no waiting time penalties are owed based on that
12 theory. Finally, Defendant contends that its actions were not "willful" and that, thus, waiting time
13 penalties cannot be awarded. Thus, Defendant argued that no waiting time penalties are owed.

14 **PAGA Penalties**

15 29. Class Counsel understand from the time and payroll data provided by Defendant that
16 there are approximately 346 Aggrieved Employees who collectively worked 4,238 pay periods in
17 the PAGA Period. Plaintiff's claims in the Action under PAGA are substantially similar to those
18 described herein. PAGA penalties include penalties for initial violations and subsequent violations.
19 Defendant contends that only initial violation rates may be used instead of the subsequent violation
20 rates initially used by Class Counsel. With this in mind and because Class Counsel through
21 investigation and discovery did not come to the conclusion that Defendant at any time was notified
22 by any governmental entity that they violated any Labor Code sections presented in the PAGA
23 Notice and PAGA claims, Class Counsel adjusted the exposure model for Defendant to include only
24 initial violation rates.

25 30. While Class Counsel are informed and believe that reasonable minds differ with
26 regard to calculation of PAGA penalties, Class Counsel believe it is reasonable to calculate
27 Defendant's maximum exposure in PAGA penalties as follows:
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1 31. a. Overtime Violations: Labor Code section 558 prescribes penalties of \$50
2 for an initial violation and \$100 for each subsequent violation. Using the initial pay period rate
3 for all violations, and a violation every single pay period for every single non-exempt employee
4 in the PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$211,900 (4,238 pay periods x \$50).

5 32. b. Minimum Wage Violations: Labor Code section 1197.1 prescribes penalties
6 of \$100 for an initial violation and \$250 for each subsequent violation. Using the initial pay period
7 rate for all violations and a violation every single pay period for every single Aggrieved Employee
8 in the PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$423,800 (4,238 pay periods x
9 \$100).

10 33. c. Meal Period Violations: Labor Code section 558 prescribes penalties of
11 \$50 for an initial violation and \$100 for each subsequent violation. Using the initial pay period
12 rate for all violations and a violation every single pay period for every single non-exempt
13 employee in the PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$211,900 (4,238 pay
14 periods x \$50).

15 34. d. Rest Period Violations: Labor Code section 558 prescribes penalties of \$50
16 for an initial violation and \$100 for each subsequent violation. Using the initial pay period rate
17 for all violations and a violation every single pay period for every single non-exempt employee in
18 the PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$211,900 (4,238 pay periods x \$50).

19 35. e. Wage Statement Violations: According to *Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.*
20 (2021) 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 229, in this instance, Labor Code section 2699 would be the appropriate
21 penalty for wage statement violations that are inaccurate, which prescribes penalties of \$100 for
22 an initial violation and \$200 for each subsequent violation (*Id.* at 247-248). Using the initial pay
23 period rate for all violations and a violation every single pay period for every single Aggrieved
24 Employee in the PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$423,800 (4,238 pay
25 periods x \$100).

26 36. f. Waiting Time Penalties: Labor Code section 2699 prescribes penalties of
27 \$100 for an initial violation and \$200 for each subsequent violation. Because this violation is
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1 merited only at separation of employment, a 100% violation rate would likely include just one
2 violation per employee. The data produced by Defendant indicate that there were 346 Aggrieved
3 Employees whose employment was separated during the PAGA Period. This amounts to a
4 maximum exposure of \$34,600 (346 Aggrieved Employees x \$100).

5 37. g. Conclusion: In sum, Class Counsel calculated Defendant's total maximum
6 exposure for PAGA violations if the Court were to find a 100% violation rate for every Aggrieved
7 Employee every pay period and not exercise its discretion to reduce any of those penalties to be
8 **\$1,517,900**. Class Counsel understand from the mediator and the mediation process that
9 Defendant argued the following in connection with this claim: Defendant contends that no PAGA
10 penalties are likely to be awarded and, even if they were, the maximum exposure calculated by
11 Class Counsel is vastly overstated. First, Defendant defends that PAGA penalties cannot and
12 should not be stacked. Second, Defendant asserts that individualized issues predominate the
13 PAGA claims, making the claims unmanageable for trial. Third, Defendant denies that a violation
14 for each pay period can be established. Fourth, Defendant contends that a Court is unlikely to
15 exercise its discretion to award civil penalties under PAGA where, as here, there is no conduct
16 shown by Plaintiff that would show any Labor Code violation by Defendant is knowing and
17 intentional. Defendant insists that this is especially true in this Action where class action damages
18 are available to Class Members, rendering an award of PAGA penalties in addition to class action
19 damages to be double recovery.

20 38. Class Counsel maintain that it is possible to recover the subsequent violation rate for
21 penalties, that stacking is permissible, and that there is no manageability requirement under PAGA
22 (citing *Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc.*). As such, Class Counsel believe a 90% discount of this
23 claim to be reasonable, resulting in a valuation of **\$151,790** as a reasonable estimate of the likelihood
24 of what Plaintiff may recover at trial for PAGA penalties (\$1,517,900 x .10).

25 **Conclusion**

26 39. When including derivative penalties, such as waiting time penalties, wage statement
27 violations, and discretionary PAGA penalties, Class Counsel theorized Defendant's maximum
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1 exposure to be approximately **\$1,402,197**. In all, Class Counsel obtained a Gross Settlement
2 Amount of **\$205,000.00**. Particularly in light of the risks involving obstacles to class certification,
3 all issues and risks related to liability, the issues with manageability at trial, the discretionary nature
4 of PAGA penalties, and considering the case law regarding fair, reasonable and adequate
5 settlements, Class Counsel strongly believe that the settlement reached is fair, reasonable and
6 adequate, and in the best interest of Class Members.

7 40. Moreover, \$20,500.00 of the Gross Settlement Amount was attributed to PAGA
8 penalties. This allocation was decided mutually by the Parties and the mutual decision was based
9 on: (1) the fact that damages are available for the failure to pay wage claims while only penalties
10 are available for the PAGA claims; (2) the risk that the Court may exercise its discretion to decline
11 to stack PAGA penalties; (3) the risk that the Court may exercise its discretion to not award the full
12 amount of PAGA penalties available; and (4) the risk that the Court may decline to award any PAGA
13 penalties at all in light of the fact that damages are available for Class Members and it may find any
14 further liability against Defendant unnecessarily punitive.

15 **Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

16 41. Class Counsel seeks an attorneys' fees award of not more than thirty-five percent
17 (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount, which, unless escalated pursuant to this Agreement, would
18 amount to \$71,750.00. Class Counsel also seek reimbursement of costs not to exceed \$30,000.00.

19 **The Requested Enhancement Award to The Named Plaintiffs and Class Representative Is**
20 **Reasonable**

21 42. Class Counsel believe plaintiff is entitled to an enhanced award for her service as
22 class representative, for answering extensive questions by Class Counsel, for being available and
23 answering questions during mediation, for the risks in being the named plaintiff and for providing
24 Defendant with a more expansive release of claims, including a waiver based upon California Civil
25 Code section 1542, in exchange for the enhancement award.

1 43. I am informed and believe Defendant does not oppose the requested enhancement to
2 Plaintiff. Plaintiff risked intrusive discovery and the payment of employer costs. Class Counsel
3 seeks an extremely limited enhancement of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff for its service.

4 **Conditional Certification for Settlement Purposes**

5 **Ascertainability**

6 44. The Settlement Class Members definition (i.e., all persons employed by Defendant
7 in California and classified as a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee who worked for Defendant
8 during the Class Period) is derived from the operative complaint, which complains of alleged
9 violations of Labor Code sections that are chiefly and, in some instances, solely applicable to non-
10 exempt, hourly paid employees.

11 **Numerosity**

12 45. Class Counsel understand from documents provided that Defendant identified at least
13 400 Class Members.

14 **Commonality**

15 46. This litigation is brought to resolve common issues that include whether Defendant
16 failed to pay for all hours worked; whether Defendant provided full, timely and un-interrupted meal
17 and rest periods, whether Class Members are entitled to premium pay for incomplete, untimely or
18 interrupted meal or rest periods, among other claims as set forth above.

19 **Typicality**

20 47. I believe Plaintiff: (1) is a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee like other Settlement
21 Class Members; (2) complains of not being paid for all time under Defendant's control or suffered
22 and/or permitted to work for Defendant; (3) alleges that she did not receive full premium pay for
23 meal periods that were not compliant with the Labor Code; and (4) alleges that she did not receive
24 premium pay for rest periods that were not provided, among others as set forth above. The Parties
25 agree for settlement purposes only that Plaintiff's claims regarding policies and practices that are
26 at the core of the lawsuit are typical of the Settlement Class.

27 ///

1 **Adequacy of Plaintiff**

2 48. Class Counsel believe no conflicts, disabling or otherwise, exists between Plaintiff
3 and Class Members because Plaintiff alleges to have been damaged by the same alleged conduct of
4 Defendant (i.e., Plaintiff was classified as non-exempt employees, was not paid premium pay, etc.)
5 and thus have the incentive to fairly represent all Class Members' claims to achieve the maximum
6 possible recovery.

7 **Qualifications**

8 49. I graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics from the University of
9 California, Davis in 2016.

10 50. I received my Juris Doctorate from the UCLA School of Law in 2019.

11 51. After graduating from law school, I practiced law as a member of Murchison &
12 Cumming, LLP on a variety of matters on behalf of defendants.

13 52. Thereafter, I joined Bibiyan Law Group, P.C., practicing law on behalf of plaintiffs
14 in matters of employment law, and specifically on issue of unpaid wages and class action
15 settlements.

16 53. I am currently a senior attorney at Bibiyan Law Group, P.C. and head of the
17 Settlement Department. Among other tasks, I oversee and manage all settlements at Bibiyan Law
18 Group, P.C. I also oversee several attorneys, paralegals, and legal assistants and have overseen
19 the settlement of over one hundred (100) class and PAGA matters while with Bibiyan Law Group,
20 P.C.

21 54. I have also been appointed as Class Counsel in the past in the following actions:

22 • *Ramirez v. Sea-win*, Case No. 21STCV22026, California Superior Court, County of Los
23 Angeles, Honorable Lawrence P. Riff presiding;

24 • *Ortega Chavez v. Winpak Lane, Inc.* Case No. CIVSB2202274, California Superior
25 Court, County of San Bernardino, Honorable Jessica Morgan presiding;

26 • *Taat v. Acell. Inc.* Case No. 37-2022-00005437-CU-OE-CTL, California Superior
27 Court, County of San Diego, Honorable Matthew Brainer presiding;

1 • *Jordan v. The Martin-Brower Company*. Case No. 21STCV41435, California Superior
2 Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Stuart Rice presiding;
3 • *Williams v. Marrs*. Case No. 21STCV23775, California Superior Court, County of Los
4 Angeles, Honorable Stuart Rice presiding;
5 • *Russell v. Staffmark*. Case No. CVRI2103921, California Superior Court, County of
6 Riverside, Honorable Harold Hopp presiding;
7 • *Ortega Chavez v. Winpak Lane, Inc., et al.* Case No. CIVSB2202274, California
8 Superior Court, County of San Bernardino, Honorable Jessica Morgan presiding;
9 • *Carrasco v O.H. Barkhordar D.D.S., Inc., et al.* Case No. 22STCV21188, California
10 Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Lawrence Riff presiding;
11 • *Correia v. Gallo Glass Company, et al.* Case No. CV-21-006459, California Superior
12 Court, County of Stanislaus, Honorable Sonny S. Sandhu presiding;
13 • *Hernandez v Bromley Foods, Inc., et al.* Case No. 56-2021-00561326-CU-OE-VTA,
14 California Superior Court, County of Ventura, Honorable Henr Walsh presiding;
15 • *Moreno v. Infiniti Group LLC., et al.* Case No. CIVSB2223551, California Superior
16 Court, County of San Bernardino, Honorable Joseph T. Ortiz presiding;
17 • *Kelley v. Applus Technologies, Inc., et al.* Case No. CIVSB2204889, California Superior
18 Court, County of San Bernardino, honorable Jessica Morgan presiding;
19 • *Helaire, et al. v. Smithfield Packaged Meats Corp., et al.* Case No. JCCP5244, California
20 Superior Court, County of San Bernardino, Honorable Jesica Morgan, presiding;
21 • *Davood v. NKSFB, LLC*. Case No. 22STCV17305, California Superior Court, County of
22 Los Angeles, Honorable Christopher Lui presiding.
23 • *Flores v. United Maintenance Company, Inc., et al.* Case No. 21STCV07008, California
24 Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Carolyn B. Kuhl presiding;
25 • *Cabral v. Laser Care Specialists, A Professional Medical Corporation, et al.* Case No.
26 21STCV25443, California Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Carolyn B. Kuhl
27 presiding;
28

- 1 • *Lopez Cabrera v. South Valley Almond Company, LLC, et al.* Case No. BCV-2-100722,
2 California Superior Court, County of Kern, Honorable Bernard C. Barmann, Jr. presiding;
- 3 • *Portillo Sanchez v. Paragon Services Janitorial Orange County, LLC, et al.* Case No.
4 20STCV38562, California Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable William F.
5 Highberger presiding;
- 6 • *Trigueros Garcia v. Highland Plastics, Inc., et al.*, Case No. CVRI2202836, California
7 Superior Court, County of Riverside, Honorable Harold Hopp presiding;
- 8 • *Magana Ramirez v. 360 Support Services, et al.* Case No. 22STCV20456, California
9 Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Lawrence P. Riff presiding;
- 10 • *Helaire v. Smithfield Packaged Meats Corp, et al.* Case No. JCCP5244, California
11 Superior Court, County of San Bernardino, Honorable Jessica Morgan presiding;
- 12 • *Hernandez v. Bromley Foods, Inc., et al.* Case No. 56-2021-00561326-CU-OE-VTA,
13 California Superior Court, County of Ventura, Honorable Henry Walsh presiding;
- 14 • *Hernandez v. Central Valley Recovery Services, et al.* Case No. VCU290220, California
15 Superior Court, County of Tulare, Honorable Brett Hillman presiding;
- 16 • *Kelley v Applus Technologies, Inc., et al.* Case No. CIVSB2204889, California Superior
17 Court, County of San Bernardino, Honorable Jessica Morgan presiding;
- 18 • *Mcintosh v. WWL Vehicle Services Americas Inc., et al.* Case No. 56-2022-00562544-
19 CU-OE-VTA, California Superior Court, County of Ventura, Honorable Benjamin Coats
20 presiding;
- 21 • *Moore v. Dnata US Inflight Catering LLC, et al.* Case No. CGC-20-586512, California
22 Superior Court, County of San Francisco, Honorable Curtis Karnow presiding;
- 23 • *Peterson v. Sorenson Engineering, Inc., et al.* Case No. CIVDS2023994, California
24 Superior Court, County of San Bernardino, Honorable David Cohn presiding;
- 25 • *Torres v. Laurel Avenue, LLC, et al.* Case No. CIVSB2202708, California Superior
26 Court, County of San Bernardino, Honorable David Cohn presiding;
- 27 • *Ruiz v. Kleen Harvest, Inc., et al.* Case No. 21CV002319, California Superior Court,
28

1 County of Monterey, Honorable Thomas W. Wills presiding;

2 • *Russell v. Staffmark Investment LLC, et al.* Case No. CVRI12103921, California

3 Superior Court, County of Riverside, Honorable Harold Hopp presiding;

4 • *Vargas-Flores v. Barbor Bay Club, Inc., et al.* Case No. 21CV002396, California

5 Superior Court, County of Alameda, Honorable Michael Markman presiding;

6 • *Low v. Triple Canopy, Inc., et al.* Case No. 37-2023-0007078-CU-OE-CTL, California

7 Superior Court, County of San Diego, Honorable Carolyn Caietti presiding;

8 • *Lopez v. Bachem Americas, Inc., et al.* Case No. 23STCV04258, California Superior

9 Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Laura Seigle presiding;

10 • *Romero v. Armstrong Installation Service, et al.* Case No. 22CV022519, California

11 Superior Court, County of Alameda, Honorable Noel Wise presiding;

12 • *Sarmiento, et al. v. Neil Jones Food Company* Case No. 21CECG03825, California

13 Superior Court, County of Fresno, Hon. Kristi Culver Kapetan presiding

14 • *Mendoza Cendejas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, et al.* Case No. CV-22-005396, California

15 Superior Court, County of Stanislaus, Honorable Sonny S. Sandhu presiding; and

16 • *Garcia v. Nature Fresh Farms, LLC, et al.* Case No. ECU001961, California Superior

17 Court, County of Imperial, Honorable Jeffery B. Jones presiding.

18 55. I have also settled matters on a “PAGA Only” basis for aggrieved employees in the
19 past, including in:

20 *Bailey v. Cannon Constructors*, Case No. 21STCV38274, California Superior Court,

21 County of Los Angeles, Honorable Carolyn Kuhl presiding.

22 • *Johns v. Whelan Security of California, Inc., et al.* Case No. 22STCV68687, California

23 Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Laura Seigle presiding;

24 • *Carrion v. Clutter, Inc., et al.* Case No. 23STCV06709, California Superior Court,

25 County of Los Angeles, Honorable Kerry Bensinger presiding;

26 • *Juarez v. Calmet Services, Inc., et al.* Case No. 21STCV33668, California Superior

27 Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Kenneth R. Freeman presiding;

28

• *Pattingale v. Laird Family Estate, LLC et al.* Case No. 22CV000048, California Superior Court, County of Napa, Honorable Cynthia P. Smith presiding;

• *London Young v. Amazon.com LLC, et al.* Case No. 21STCV38280, California Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Elaine Lu presiding; and

• *Latrice Ackles v. Brinker Restaurant Corporation, et al.* Case No. 22STCV19068, California Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Gail Killefer presiding.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true and correct this August 10, 2026, at Los Angeles, California.

/s/ Vedang J. Patel

VEDANG J. PATEL