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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

JOSHUA OLIVARES, individually, and on  
behalf of all others similarly situated,

*Plaintiff,*

v.

NAB GALE INC. DBA WABA GRILL #216, a  
California corporation; BAJWA GROUP OF  
COMPANIES INC., a stock corporation; NAB  
2SB INC., a stock corporation; JBNK  
RESTAURANTS, INC., a stock corporation;  
WABA GRILL FRANCHISE CORP., a stock  
corporation; JERRY BAJWA, an individual; and  
DOES 3 through 10, inclusive,

*Defendants.*

Case No.: 22STCV37427

**CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION**

*[Assigned for all purposes to Judge William  
F. Highberger, Dept. 10]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION  
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY  
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION  
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF  
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

**PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING**

Date: May 11, 2026

Time: 2:30 p.m.

Dept: 10

Complaint filed: November 29, 2022

FAC filed: December 12, 2022

SAC filed: October 11, 2023

Trial date: Not Set

**TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 11, 2026 at 2:30 p.m., in Department 10 of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, located at Spring Street Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiff Joshua Olivares (collectively “Plaintiff”) will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendants Nab Gale, Inc. dba Waba Grill #216, Bajwa Group of Companies, Inc, Nab 2SB Inc., JBNK Restaurants, Inc., Waba Grill Franchise Corp. and Jerry Bajwa (“Defendants”). Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement;
2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
4. Appointing Plaintiff Joshua Olivares as Class Representative for settlement purposes;
5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Thiago M. Coelho, Rachel Vinson, Alan Wilcox, Lucy Nguyen and Conor Gomez of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
6. Appointing Apex Class Action Administration as the Settlement Administrator; and
7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the Declarations of Thiago M. Coelho and Joshua Olivares, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: February 10, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

By: 

Thiago M. Coelho  
Rachel Vinson  
Alan Wilcox  
Lucy Nguyen  
Conor Gomez  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff*

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**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Plaintiff Joshua Olivares (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$175,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Nab Gale, Inc. dba Waba Grill #216, Bajwa Group of Companies, Inc, Nab 2SB Inc., JBNK Restaurants, Inc., Waba Grill Franchise Corp. and Jerry Bajwa (collectively, “Defendants,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 263 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Nikki Tolt, Esq, over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants’ defenses, the Parties reached a settlement in December 2025. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

**II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

**A. Plaintiff’s Claims**

1. This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendants during the class period. Mr. Bajwa is an individual that operates various fast food, gas station and convenience store franchise locations throughout the state of California and elsewhere. Upon information and belief, Mr. Bajwa operates these franchise locations through the Bajwa Group and its subsidiaries. Nab Gale is a management entity which Mr. Bajwa uses to operate the Waba Grill restaurant located at 18201 Gale Ave #A, City of Industry, CA 91748. (Declaration of Thiago M. Coelho in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Coelho Decl.”], ¶ 3.)



1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices  
2 resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay for all hours  
3 worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants failed to: provide employees with legally  
4 compliant meal and rest periods; and Defendants failed to reimburse business expenses. Based  
5 on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to pay wages during employment,  
6 failure to pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure  
7 to keep requisite payroll records, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA.  
8 (Coelho Decl., ¶ 4.)

9 2. On November 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action  
10 complaint against Defendant for: (1) Failure to Pay Minimum and Straight Time Wages (Cal.  
11 Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages (Cal. Lab. Code  
12 §§1194 and 1198); (3) Failure to Provide Meal Periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512); (4)  
13 Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods (Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7); (5) Failure to Timely  
14 Pay Final Wages at Termination (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203); (6) Failure to Provide Accurate  
15 Itemized Wage Statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226); (7) Failure to Indemnify Employees for  
16 Expenditures (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802); (9) Failure to Produced Requested Employment Records  
17 (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226 and 1198.5); and (9) Unfair Business Practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code  
18 §§ 17200, *et seq.*) (“UCL”), and (10) civil penalties under PAGA. (Coelho Decl., ¶ 5.) On  
19 December 12, 2022, Plaintiff provided notice to the California Labor & Workforce  
20 Development Agency (“LWDA”) and Defendant of the violations described above, as required  
21 by Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(1). (Coelho Decl., ¶ 6.) Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(2)(A),  
22 the LWDA had 65 calendar days to notify Plaintiff and Defendant whether it intended to  
23 investigate the alleged violations. (*Id.*) However, the LWDA did not do so. On October 11,  
24 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint to include addition cause of action for civil penalties  
25 under the Private Attorneys General Act (Cal. Lab. Code §§2698, *et seq.*) (“PAGA”). Finally,  
26 on November 26, 2024, Plaintiff executed a DOE amendment to his complaint to add the Bajwa  
27 Group and Jerry Bajwa as defendants. (*Id.*)  
28

1           **B. Discovery and Investigation**

2           Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties engaged in formal written  
3           discovery and informal discovery and exchanged documents and information before mediating  
4           this action. (Coelho Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendants produced a sample of time and pay records for  
5           class members. Defendants also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices  
6           during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former  
7           employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.*)

8           After reviewing documents regarding Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices  
9           and analyzing Defendants’ timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate  
10          the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendants’ maximum monetary  
11          exposure for all claims. (Coelho Decl., ¶ 8.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law  
12          regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these  
13          records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*) This extensive investigation  
14          and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the  
15          Settlement. Additionally, Olivares was deposed on June 29, 2025. (*Id.*)

16           **C. Settlement Negotiations**

17          On August 21, 2025, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class  
18          action mediator, Nikki Tolt, Esq. (Coelho Decl., ¶ 9.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom.  
19          The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional  
20          manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential  
21          for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through  
22          trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) The Parties accepted a mediator’s  
23          proposal that day and agreed on general settlement terms. The Parties memorialized their  
24          agreement in a Memorandum of Understanding on October 22, 2025. After extensive  
25          negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and  
26          Defendants’ defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are  
27          encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 10, Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement.)

28          Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based

on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendants both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (Coelho Decl., ¶ 16.)

Indeed, the \$175,000.00 Settlement represents approximately **61%** of the **realistic maximum recovery** of \$286,869.04. (Coelho Decl., ¶ 25.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendants’ maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$1.4 million, when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendants’ realistic exposure was \$286,869.04, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-25.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (Coelho Decl., ¶ 26.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

**D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

The Settlement’s key terms include:

3. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all individuals who provided labor or services for Defendant in California during the Class Period for remuneration, as more fully defined in Labor Code section 2775, *et seq.*, including current and former employees (“Class Member(s)).” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

4. Class Period: “means the period from November 29, 2018, through October 31, 2025, inclusive. (Settlement, § 1.12.)

5. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

6. Aggrieved Employees: “all individuals who provided labor or services for Defendant in California during the PAGA Period for remuneration, as more fully defined in Labor Code

1 section 2775, *et seq.*, including current and former employees (“Aggrieved Employees(s)”).”  
2 (Settlement, § 1.4.)

3 7. PAGA Period: “means the period from December 12, 2021, through October 31, 2025,  
4 inclusive.” (Settlement, § 1.33.)

5 8. Gross Settlement Amount: “means \$175,000.00 which is the total amount Defendant  
6 agrees to pay under the Settlement, except as provided in Paragraph 8, Escalator Clause.”  
7 (Settlement, § 1.22.)

8 9. Uncashed Checks: “For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or  
9 Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator  
10 shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California Controller’s Unclaimed  
11 Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no “unpaid residue” subject to the  
12 requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b).” (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

13 10. Released Class Claims: “Upon Defendant’s payment in full of the GSA and the  
14 employer’s taxes for the portion of the Settlement allocated to settlement of wage claims, the  
15 claims waived, released, and discharged by Class Members (other than those who submit timely  
16 and valid requests for exclusion) as to the Released Parties are all claims arising during the Class  
17 Period which were asserted against Defendant in the operative complaint filed in the Action or  
18 which reasonably could have been asserted against Defendant based on the factual allegations  
19 stated in the operative complaint filed in the Action.” (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release will be  
20 deemed effective when Defendant fully funds the Gross Settlement Amount and all employer  
21 payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, Plaintiff, Class  
22 Members. (Settlement, § 5.)

23 11. Release by Aggrieved Employees: “Upon Defendant’s payment in full of the GSA and  
24 the employer’s taxes for the portion of the Settlement allocated to the settlement of wage claims,  
25 the claims waived, released, and discharged by Aggrieved Employees and the State of California  
26 as to the Released Parties are all claims under PAGA arising during the PAGA Period (a) which  
27 were asserted against Defendant in Plaintiff’s LWDA notice letter(s) preceding the Action and/or  
28 the operative complaint filed in the Action or (b) which reasonably could have been asserted

against Defendant based on the factual allegations stated in Plaintiff's LWDA notice letter preceding the Action and/or the operative complaint filed in the Action." (Settlement, § 5.3.)

12. No Reversion: "The Gross Settlement Amount is non-reversionary." (Settlement, § 3.1.)

13. PAGA Allocation: "PAGA Penalties in the amount of \$5,000.00 to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount, with 75% (\$3,750.00) allocated to the LWDA PAGA Payment and 25% (\$1,250.00) allocated to the Individual PAGA Payments." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Coelho Decl., ¶ 11.)

14. Net Settlement Amount: "means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: PAGA Payment, Enhancement, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Costs Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments." (Settlement, § 1.28.)

15. Distribution Formula: "An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member's Workweeks." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: "The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of Aggrieved Employees' 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$1,250.00) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee's PAGA Period Pay Periods." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

16. Tax Allocation: "Twenty percent (20%) of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the "Wage Portion"). The Wage Portions are subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. The remaining 80% of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for interests and penalties (the "Non-Wage Portion"). The Non-Wage

Portions are not subject to wage withholdings and will be reported on IRS 1099 Forms.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

17. Class Representative Service Awards: “A payment for the Enhancement Award to Plaintiff of not more than \$10,000.00 in addition to any Individual Class Payment and any Individual PAGA Payment the Class Representative is entitled to receive as a Participating Class Member.” (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

18. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: “A Class Counsel Fees Payment of not more than one-third (1/3) of the GSA. which is currently estimated to be \$58,327.50 and a Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment for actual costs. Defendant will not oppose requests for these payments provided that do not exceed these amounts.” (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

19. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 4.4.1.) Apex Class Action Administration, the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Coelho Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. 2 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

### III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant

factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff’s case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

**A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

**1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.”].)

The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of mediation with experienced employment mediator, Nikki Tolt, Esq. (Coelho Decl., ¶ 9.) The

1 settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner,  
2 were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a  
3 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through  
4 trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and  
5 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendants' defenses,  
6 the Parties reached an agreement. (Coelho Decl., ¶ 8.)

7 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted formal written and informal  
8 discovery concerning the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member  
9 timekeeping and payroll records, Defendants' policies and procedures concerning the payment of  
10 wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages  
11 at separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix  
12 of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest  
13 period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 7-8.) In conjunction with their extensive  
14 factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and  
15 defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently  
16 and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

17 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with  
18 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-50.) Again, this supports the position that the  
19 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed  
20 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this  
21 action.

## 22 2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' 23 Respective Legal Positions

24 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor  
25 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.  
26 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 ["Compromise is inherent  
27 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement  
28 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no



1 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement  
2 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

3 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.  
4 (Coelho Decl., ¶ 27.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate  
5 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving  
6 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and  
7 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

8 The proposed settlement of \$175,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when  
9 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.) Because of the proposed  
10 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an  
11 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in  
12 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability  
13 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$175,000.00 is within  
14 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***  
15 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***  
16 ***\$253.55.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 28.)

### 17 3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation

18 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.  
19 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are  
20 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Coelho Decl., ¶¶ 40-50.)  
21 Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,  
22 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

#### 23 B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved

24 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved  
25 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of  
26 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object  
27 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and  
28

be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

**C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$58,327.50, which is one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, and up to \$27,500.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

**1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund" Method**

California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the

1 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the  
2 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage  
3 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the  
4 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement  
5 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—  
6 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”  
7 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

## 8 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

9 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on  
10 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on  
11 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a  
12 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages  
13 are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)  
14 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty  
15 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*  
16 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most  
17 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10  
18 million].)

19 Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount,  
20 which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic  
21 literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162  
22 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method  
23 or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the  
24 recovery.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees  
25 as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

## 26 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

27 Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime  
28 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this

section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys' fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendants while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Coelho Decl., ¶¶ 38-39.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

#### 4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Coelho Decl., ¶¶ 40-50) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendants and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

#### D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable

Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and "there is no indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other" class members, such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr.

3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at \*1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for  
PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement.  
(*Id.* [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or \$1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D.  
Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at \*6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v.*  
*Fed. Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at \*5 [acknowledging that courts  
approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here,  
the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved  
by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia*  
*v. Shamrock Foods Co.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431,  
at \*14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson, supra*, 2008 WL 3385452, at \*1  
[approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal.  
Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at \*3 [approving a PAGA  
settlement of 0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of \$5,000.00, 75% percent  
of which (\$3,750.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$1,250.00) to be distributed to the  
Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) The \$5,000.00 settlement amount equates to  
approximately 3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which far exceeds amounts that are routinely  
approved. The Parties negotiated to allocate 3% of the Settlement to PAGA penalties in good faith  
and this amount is reasonable considering that the maximum PAGA penalties were estimated at  
\$181,000.00 (which assumed \$100 per pay period). (Coelho Decl., ¶ 24.)

**E. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff is Reasonable**

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to  
compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other  
members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval  
of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which  
are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the  
class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.  
2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

1 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they  
2 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is  
3 codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously  
4 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to  
5 work under substandard unlawful conditions . . . .” Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has  
6 noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is  
7 widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*  
8 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for  
9 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*  
10 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

11 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendants agreed to pay  
12 Service Awards in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Joshua Olivares. This amount is also in  
13 exchange for Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendants. Courts routinely approve  
14 enhancement awards in excess of \$10,000.00 for plaintiff represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g.,*  
15 *Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, \*3 [“The Court  
16 concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National*  
17 *Association* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at \*4 [“The court  
18 approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].) Class Counsel represent that Plaintiff  
19 devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel  
20 very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and were frequently in contact with  
21 Class Counsel during the mediation. (*See generally* Plaintiff’s declaration; Coelho Decl., ¶¶ 30-  
22 34.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated  
23 for all class members. (*Id.*)

24 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount  
25 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive  
26 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class  
27 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg  
28 & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev.

1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

#### IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

##### A. Legal Standard

The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1) [t]here must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device. (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to

the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

**B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for Settlement Purposes.**

**1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous**

The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable and includes approximately 263 employees of Defendants.

Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

“The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

**2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.)



1 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendants had legally compliant  
2 policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendants had  
3 legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether  
4 Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees  
5 to take rest periods; whether Defendants reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether  
6 payment of wages during employment was timely; whether final payment of wages was untimely  
7 and excluded unpaid wages, including meal and rest period premium wages; whether wage  
8 statements were consequently non-compliant; and whether Defendants failed to keep requisite  
9 payroll records. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the  
10 identified class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek  
11 redress for, the same alleged injuries.

### 12 **3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

13 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances  
14 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the  
15 typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendants' conduct and  
16 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that  
17 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly  
18 situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they  
19 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal  
20 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendants; as  
21 such, they allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated  
22 employees.

### 23 **4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

24 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a  
25 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,  
26 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*  
27 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)  
28

1 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel  
2 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that  
3 previously settled. (Coelho Decl., ¶¶ 40-50.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified,  
4 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148  
5 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,  
6 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication.  
7 Plaintiff’s willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates his serious commitment to bringing  
8 about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

9 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

10 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class  
11 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.  
12 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the  
13 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of  
14 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-  
15 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a  
16 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to  
17 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th  
18 Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns  
19 are essentially non-existent.

20 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

21 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

22 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,  
23 Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an  
24 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no  
25 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,  
26 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he  
27 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class  
28 Members . . . .” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided

by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

**B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the Defendants, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

**VI. CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing on October 13, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

Dated: February 10, 2026

By:



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