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13 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

14 **COUNTY OF ORANGE**

15 JOHNNY GARCIA, as an individual on
16 behalf of himself and on behalf of all others
17 similarly situated,

18 Plaintiff,

19 v.

20 WIN-DOR, INC., a California corporation;
21 and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

22 Defendants.

Case No.: 30-2022-01290278-CU-OE-CXC

Assigned for All Purposes to:

Hon. Peter Wilson

Dept. CX-101

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORTIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

[Filed Concurrently with Notice of Motion and
Motion; Declarations of Nikki Trenner and
Jodey Lawrence; [Proposed] Order]

Date: December 14, 2023

Time: 2:00 p.m.

Dept.: CX-101

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiff Johnny Garcia hereby moves the Court for an order granting preliminary approval
3 to a proposed non-reversionary class action settlement to resolve wage and hour claims on behalf
4 of approximately 1,145 individuals employed by Defendant Win-Dor, Inc. (“WDI” or
5 “Defendant”) as non-exempt employees, either directly or via a staffing agency, in California
6 during the period of November 4, 2018 through July 24, 2023. The proposed \$1,025,000
7 settlement will provide approximately \$605,833 in cash payments to the class, with an average
8 award estimated at about \$529. The balance of approximately \$419,167 will cover reasonable
9 attorney’s fees and actual litigation costs, settlement administration costs, an enhancement award
10 to the named plaintiff, and payment of civil penalties to the State. The settlement is the product of
11 Plaintiff’s pre-filing investigation, informal discovery and a pre-mediation exchange of
12 information, and arms-length negotiations overseen by experienced mediator Steve Mehta, Esq.

13 The proposed settlement is within the “range of reasonableness” for approval and.
14 Plaintiff’s counsel believes the settlement is a fair result for the class given the substantial risks
15 inherent in this matter. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests the Court enter an order: (1) granting
16 preliminary approval to the proposed class action settlement; (2) conditionally certifying the
17 settlement class as defined below; (3) appointing Zachary M. Crosner, Jamie Serb, and Nikki
18 Trenner, and Crosner Legal, P.C. as Class Counsel; (4) appointing Plaintiff Johnny Garcia as the
19 Class Representative; (5) appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Settlement
20 Administrator; (6) approving the form of notice to the class and the notice procedure; and (7)
21 scheduling a final fairness hearing.

22 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE**

23 Defendant WDI manufactures windows and doors for homes and businesses throughout
24 Southern California, and is based in Brea. WDI employed Plaintiff Garcia as a non-exempt
25 general warehouse worker from May 2022 to 2023. Plaintiff typically worked 8-11 hours per day,
26 five days per week. [Declaration of Nikki Trenner (“Trenner Decl.” ¶ 4.)]

27 Plaintiff alleges WDI committed a number of Labor Code violations. First, he alleges WD
28 rounds all time punches to nearest quarter hour, and that rounding favored WDI in its overall

1 application and systematically deprived Plaintiff and the class members of compensable hours
2 worked. Plaintiff also alleges WDI required employees to don and doff protective gear while off
3 the clock, and that WDI “auto deducted” 30 minutes for employee meal breaks even though
4 employees did not always receive a fully 30 minute lunch break. Plaintiff also alleges meal break
5 violations based on an alleged failure to maintain a compliant written policy for at least part of the
6 class period, and “de facto” violations for missed lunch breaks (especially 2nd meal periods), as
7 well as short and late lunches. He also contends WDI’s policies prevented employees from
8 receiving their breaks completely free from all employer control, and they were prohibited from
9 inter alia using social media, taking a nap, leaving the premises, etc., while clocked out on a lunch
10 break. For these same reasons, Plaintiff also contends WDI did not provide proper rest breaks as
11 well. Finally, he alleges he had to purchase his own protective equipment, and us his personal
12 phone for work purposes, all without any reimbursement. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 5.]

13 Based on these allegations, on November 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint
14 brining claims for (1) unpaid minimum and overtime wages, (2) meal and rest break violations, (3)
15 failure to reimburse expenses, and (4) derivative claims for inaccurate wage statements, failure to
16 pay wages due on separation of employment, and Unfair Competition. On February 16, 2023,
17 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint that added claims under PAGA based on the same alleged
18 Labor Code violations. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 6; Exh. 2.]

19 WDI has at all times denied Plaintiff’s allegations and maintained its payroll policies and
20 procedures comply with California law, that it paid the class members all wages due and that its
21 compensation policies properly compensate the class members for all hours worked. WDI further
22 maintains its and meal/rest break policies likewise comply with California law, and that it
23 provided its employees with all required breaks on a fully compliant basis. WDI likewise argues
24 there was no need for any employee to use a cell phone for work purposes, and no reimbursement
25 is owed for basic work equipment such as boots or gloves. Defendant also strongly contends the
26 case cannot be maintained as any kind of class or representative action, arguing determining the
27 number of potential off the clock hours worked by each class member, or the reasons for any
28

1 alleged missed or non-compliant breaks, would result in individualized issues predominating and
2 that a trial on a representative basis would be unmanageable. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 7.]

3 Once the case was at issue, the Parties engaged in meet and confer discussions about
4 discovery and law and motion issues, as well as the merits of the case. Following these
5 discussions, the Parties agreed to attempt early mediation, and further agreed on a protocol for an
6 informal exchange of additional documents and information before the mediation. Consequently,
7 Plaintiff's counsel reviewed payroll records, personnel policies/handbooks, personnel files, and a
8 random of sampling paystubs and time records for about 12% of the class. Plaintiff had those
9 records analyzed by Berger Consulting Group to look for, inter alia, violation rates and potential
10 damages for the alleged off the clock work, violation rates for meal and rest break violations, etc.
11 [Trenner Decl., ¶ 8.]

12 The Parties then engaged Steve Mehta, Esq., a highly respected mediator with substantial
13 wage and hour and class action experience, and in April 2023, participated in a full day mediation
14 with Mr. Mehta. Throughout the day, the arms-length negotiations were hard-fought and
15 adversarial as the Parties exchanged extensive information on their legal and factual positions, and
16 made numerous offers and counter-offers. By the end of the day the Parties reached agreement on
17 all major issues. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 9.] They then collaboratively drafted the Class Action and
18 PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice ("Settlement Agreement") setting forth the full
19 and final settlement terms now before the Court for approval, and a true and correct copy of the
20 Settlement Agreement is attached to the Trenner Declaration as Exhibit 1.

21 Furthermore, in order to fully effectuate the proposed settlement, the Parties agreed
22 Plaintiff would amend his complaint to add additional claims to ensure the operative complaint
23 comports fully with the allegations raised in Plaintiff's PAGA notice letter. After obtaining leave
24 of court, Plaintiff accordingly filed his Second Amended Complaint on August 18, 2023, and the
25 SAC is the operative pleading for purposes of settlement. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 10.]

26 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT TERMS**

27 Under the settlement, WDI will pay \$1,025,000 into a common fund, the Gross Settlement
28 Amount ("GSA"). Attorney's fees of up to \$341,666.67 (1/3 of the GSA), litigation costs of up to

1 \$20,000, settlement administration costs of no more than \$20,000, a service award to Plaintiff¹ of
2 no more than \$7,500, and \$30,000 for alleged civil penalties under PAGA,² all will be paid from
3 the GSA. The remainder of around \$605,833 will be allocated pro rata among the Class Members
4 based on their total weeks worked during the Class Period. No portion of the GSA will revert to
5 WDI. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 11.]

6 **A. Certification of the Settlement Class**

7 The settlement provides for conditional certification of a settlement class including all
8 current and former non-exempt employees that worked either directly or via a staffing agency for WDI
9 at any location in California at any time during the Class Period of November 4, 2018 through July 24,
10 2023. The Settlement Class consisted of approximately 1,145 individuals. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 12.]

11 **B. The Benefit Conferred on the Settlement Class**

12 As noted, the settlement obligates WDI to pay \$1,025,000 to resolve the claims of the
13 Settlement, inclusive of attorney's fees and costs. A minimum of approximately \$605,833 from the
14 GSA will be distributed to the Participating Class Members. This is a cash settlement that does not
15 require Participating Class Members to submit a claim form to receive their settlement share.
16 Participating Class Members will receive their settlement checks automatically via First Class U.S.
17 Mail. Twenty Four (24%) percent of each settlement share will be allocated to wages and the
18 remaining Seventy Six (76%) percent will be allocated to expenses, penalties, and interest, which
19 allocation is consistent with WDI's potential liability as discussed below. WDI will pay any and all
20 applicable employer-side payroll taxes separately and in addition to the GSA. Subject to the Court's
21 approval, any amounts not claimed (because a class member does not cash a settlement check) will
22 be forwarded to the State Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 13.]

23 Each participating Class Member will receive a share of the Net Settlement Amount based
24 on his or her total weeks worked for WDI during the Class Period while employed in a non-exempt
25

26 ¹ Plaintiff also entered into a separate, confidential Separation Agreement with Defendant, which can be
27 made available for *in camera* review by the Court. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 11.]

28 ² Per PAGA, this will be allocated \$22,500 (75%) to the Labor & Workforce Development Agency, and the
remaining \$7,500 (25%) will go to the eligible Aggrieved Employee (as defined in the Settlement
Agreement).

1 position. Thus, each individual Settlement Payment will be calculated using criteria typically used
2 in determining appropriate amounts of unpaid wages, premium wages for meal/rest break violations,
3 unreimbursed expenses, etc., under applicable law. These methods will ensure each Class Member
4 receives a portion of the settlement funds relative to the value of their potential claims. The proposed
5 allocation provides a reasonable way to compensate Class Members based on the amount of time
6 they worked for WDI and the potential hours worked lost due to off the clock work, the number of
7 missed or non-compliant breaks, and so forth. The average gross award is estimated to be
8 approximately \$529, and the awards will range from approximately \$15 to \$3,880. The average
9 PAGA award will be about \$12.40. Plaintiff's individual settlement share is estimated at about \$150.
10 [Trenner Decl., ¶ 14.]

11 As discussed below, the overall settlement amount is reasonable in light of the considerable
12 risks associated with Plaintiff's claims, and the delay and risk posed by continuing to litigate such
13 disputed allegations. In counsel's judgment, the total value recovered for the class is substantial and
14 within the range of reasonableness.

15 **C. Settlement Administration**

16 Subject to Court approval, the Parties have agreed on Phoenix Settlement Administrators as
17 the Settlement Administrator. Phoenix is qualified and has significant experience administering
18 class action settlements, including numerous wage and hour matters. Phoenix's fees and costs will
19 not exceed \$20,000.00. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 15; Declaration of Jodey Lawrence, ¶¶ 2-16.]

20 **D. The Class Notice**

21 The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement)
22 sets out information about this case and explains the basic settlement terms in plain language, and
23 will go out in both English and Spanish. The Notice also sets forth the individualized information
24 used to calculate Class Members' Individual Settlement Payments and each Class Member's
25 estimated settlement award. The Notice likewise details the procedures for Class Members to
26 dispute their individual information, the procedure for submitting an objection to the Settlement,
27 the procedure to request exclusion, and the fact that any final judgment will bind all class
28 members who do not opt out. Cal. Rules of Court 3.769(f) and 3.766(d). In sum, the Notice

1 provides the Class Members with the information necessary to evaluate the Settlement and decide
2 to participate in, opt out of, or object, and meets all requirements imposed by the California Rules
3 of Court. Coupled with the notice procedure, the Notice provides the best notice practicable.

4 [Trenner Decl., ¶ 16.]

5 **E. Right to Correct Information, Opt Out, or Object**

6 Class Members will have forty five (45) days to dispute the information in their Notice
7 used to calculate their settlement award, and also have 45 days to submit any objections to the
8 settlement or to request exclusion. If a Class Member disputes their individual information, the
9 Settlement Administrator will review the Class Member's records and any other information
10 submitted, and make a final determination. The Class Notice will be accompanied by an exclusion
11 form and workweek dispute form (Exhibits B and C to the Settlement Agreement), for use by the
12 Class Members. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 17.]

13 **F. Release of Claims**

14 All Participating Class Members will release WDI from all claims alleged in the Operative
15 Complaint, or that could have been brought based on the factual allegations in the operative
16 complaint, including FLSA and PAGA claims, during the Class Period. The class and PAGA
17 releases are limited to the claims that were actually pleaded or could have been pleaded based on
18 the alleged facts in the Operative Complaint. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 18.]

19 **G. Plaintiff's Enhancement**

20 A modest incentive award for Plaintiff is appropriate under applicable law. See Staton v.
21 Boeing (9th Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 977 (collecting cases awarding class representatives service
22 and incentive payments ranging from \$2,000 to \$25,000). He devoted time and resources to the
23 litigation, provided documents, assisted Class Counsel with investigating the claims asserted and
24 in preparing for mediation. The service payment provided to Plaintiff as the class representative is
25 typical in class action cases and reasonable. Rodriguez v. W Publ'g Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d
26 948, 958-59 (incentive awards are "intended to compensate class representatives for work done on
27 behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action,
28 and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.").

1 Here, the Settlement Agreement provides for an enhancement of up to \$7,500.00 to
2 Plaintiff. This request is reasonable given the risks he undertook on behalf of the Class Members.
3 By contacting and retaining counsel to pursue these claims, Plaintiff helped make this settlement
4 possible for the absent Class Members, while shouldering the risk of being liable for Defendant's
5 litigation costs. Plaintiff also exposed himself to unwanted notoriety related to filing a public
6 lawsuit (discoverable even through a simple google search) for the benefit of other employees,
7 placing himself at risk of discrimination by future prospective employers. Among taking many
8 other actions assisting in the successful litigation of this case, Plaintiff provided substantial factual
9 information and documents to counsel, attended numerous meetings/phone conferences with
10 counsel to discuss the case, and kept abreast of all significant developments. He will provide the
11 Court with a detailed declaration for the Final Approval Hearing. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 19.]

12 **H. Attorney's Fees and Costs**

13 The terms of the Parties' settlement also allow Plaintiff's counsel to apply for an award of
14 attorney's fees of up to 1/3 of the GSA, or \$341,666.67, and reimbursement of actual costs up to
15 \$20,000.00. In advance of the Final Approval Hearing, Plaintiff's counsel will submit a request
16 for attorney's fees and actual litigation costs per the terms of the Settlement Agreement and
17 applicable law, and will provide the Court with appropriate information and evidence regarding
18 hourly rates, tasks performed, and time expended on the case. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 20.]

19 **I. PAGA Claims and Notice to the LWDA**

20 The Parties allocated \$30,000 of the GSA to payment of civil penalties under PAGA, as
21 addressed below. Per Labor Code section 2699(l)(2), Plaintiff gave notice of the settlement and the
22 approval hearing to the LWDA via its online portal. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 21; Exh. 3.]

23 **IV. ARGUMENT**

24 **A. Standard of Review for a Class Action Settlement**

25 The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions where substantial resources can be
26 conserved by avoiding the time, costs and rigors of formal litigation. H. Newberg & A. Conte, 4
27 Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002) § 11.41; Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle (9th Cir. 1992)
28 955 F.2d 1268, 1276, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953; Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37

1 Cal.2d 592, 602. Nevertheless, to ensure the rights of absent class members are not unjustly
2 compromised, settlement of a class action requires court approval. Cal. Rule of Court. 3.769;
3 Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48
4 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. This judicial review protects against fraud or collusion, and ensures
5 fairness to the absent class members. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1800-01. Judicial review occurs via
6 a two-step process to determine, under all the circumstances, if the proposed settlement is fair,
7 reasonable and adequate. Id. at 1801; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.

8 The first step is a motion for preliminary approval, through which the parties present the
9 court with the proposed settlement and seek a determination that it is sufficiently fair and reasonable
10 to warrant notice to the class and further proceedings as to its fairness and adequacy. Cal. Rule of
11 Court 3.769(c). This preliminary evaluation determines if the proposed settlement is within the
12 “range of reasonableness” and if notice should be provided to the class regarding the settlement’s
13 proposed terms and conditions, and whether a final fairness hearing should be scheduled. Wershba,
14 91 Cal.App.4th at 234-35; North County Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Servs. (1994)
15 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089-90. Considering the strong judicial policy favoring settlement of class
16 actions, courts apply a presumption of fairness to class action settlements when (1) the settlement
17 results from arms-length bargaining, (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel
18 and the court to act intelligently, (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and (4) the
19 percentage of objectors is small. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.

20 If the court grants preliminary approval, it then orders the class be given notice in an
21 appropriate manner, establishes a schedule and procedures for class members to request exclusion
22 or object, and sets the matter for a final fairness hearing. Typically, any motion for attorney’s fees
23 and costs is filed subsequent to preliminary approval and heard with the motion for final approval,
24 as part of the second step of the two-step approval process. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1800; Wershba,
25 91 Cal.App.4th at 232. The proposed settlement in this matter warrants preliminary approval under
26 the liberal standard discussed above, as it is fair, reasonable and adequate under all the
27 circumstances, and represents a favorable result for the class.

28 /////

1 **B. The Proposed Settlement Class Should Be Conditionally Certified**

2 The purpose of conditional class certification for purposes of settlement is to facilitate
3 provision of notice of the proposed settlement’s terms, and the date and time of the final fairness
4 hearing. In this context, courts apply lesser scrutiny than they would otherwise in the context of
5 certifying a class. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1807, n.19; Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v.
6 Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 839 (“[I]t is well established that trial courts should
7 use different standards to determine the propriety of a settlement class.”)

8 In the present matter, conditional certification is proper since this matter satisfies all
9 requirements for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. First, the class is
10 both sufficiently numerous, consisting of at least 1,145 individuals, and ascertainable by reference
11 to Defendant’s personnel and payroll records. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 22.] Next, Plaintiff is an adequate
12 class representative, as his claims do not conflict with and are not antagonistic to the claims of
13 other class members. Further, his claims are typical given he is a member of the class and his
14 claims arise from the same employment practices giving rise to the claims of the other class
15 members. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 23.] Lastly, his counsel are experienced and adequate class counsel.
16 [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 38-43.]

17 Next, common questions of law and fact predominate – particularly for purposes of a
18 settlement class – as the Class Members all were subject to the same payroll scheme and policies,
19 same meal and rest break policies, etc., that Plaintiff contends violate California labor law. Since
20 the focus of the claims against WDI concerns the legality of common policies applied uniformly
21 to the entire class, common issues predominate over individualized inquiries concerning liability.
22 For instance, whether WDI’s time rounding and “auto-deduct” policies raise common questions
23 that will decide liability for all class members one way or another. Similarly, whether WDI had
24 policies that unduly restricted how employees were able to spend their break time raises another
25 common issue, determination of which will help decide liability for all Class Members one way or
26 the other. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 24.]

27 By now it is well-settled a theory of recovery asserting the existence of a uniform policy
28 violating California law is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for class certification. Jones v.

1 Farmers Ins. Exch. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986, 996 (“Claims alleging that a uniform policy
2 consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the
3 sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment”); Williams v. Superior Court
4 (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353 (“A company-wide practice can sustain a common question of fact
5 or law that supports commonality for class certification”). Lastly, a class action is superior to
6 other means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 25.]

7 C. **The Proposed Settlement Meets the Kullar Factors and is within the Range of**
8 **Reasonableness**

9 The proposed settlement resulted from serious, arms-length negotiations facilitated by
10 respected mediator, Steve Mehta, Esq., who has considerable experience mediating wage and hour
11 class action cases. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 9.] Plaintiff’s counsel Zachary M. Crosner, Jamie Serb, and
12 Nikki Trnner of Crosner Legal, P.C. have years of experience litigating wage and hour class actions.
13 Plaintiff’s counsel are well-qualified to evaluate the risks and benefits of further litigation versus
14 settling the matter. [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 38-43.]

15 Next, California law recognizes several factors bearing on the fairness, adequacy, and
16 reasonableness of a proposed class settlement. Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168
17 Cal.App.4th 116, 128. In relevant part, these factors include: 1) the amount offered in settlement 2)
18 the strength of plaintiff’s case; 3) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
19 litigation; 4) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout trial; and 5) the experience and
20 views of counsel. Id. Here, the proposed settlement satisfies these requirements.

21 Prior to mediation, the parties engaged in formal and informal discovery to facilitate
22 settlement discussions. Thus, Plaintiff reviewed documents and information regarding GGUSD’s
23 payroll practices, a random sampling of pay stubs and time records for sampling of about 12% of
24 the class members, applicable compensation plans, etc., and information from Defendant regarding
25 class size and breakdown, work weeks/pay periods, rates of pay, and other relevant information.
26 Plaintiff then had that information analyzed by a consulting expert to assist in determining potential
27 violation rates and other data used to formulate a damages model. Plaintiff’s counsel are confident
28

1 they obtained sufficient information to understand the law and facts of this case and make an
2 informed decision regarding the proposed settlement. [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 8, 26.]

3 Using that data, Plaintiff's experts estimated WDI's likely maximum exposure
4 approximately \$9,775,500, including about \$160,000 on the unpaid wage claims, about
5 \$1,868,000 on the meal break claims, about \$2,940,000 for the rest break violations, around
6 \$186,500 for unreimbursed expenses, \$1,505,000 for inaccurate wage statements, and about
7 \$3,116,000 in waiting time penalties. [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 27-28.] Plaintiff and his counsel
8 substantially discounted the value of these claims, however, in light of the multiple and
9 considerable risks posed by proceeding with the litigation, as Defendant raised numerous defenses
10 and vigorously defended against these claims.

11 On the minimum wage issue, Plaintiff claims that he and class members were not paid for
12 all hours worked because WDI's time rounding, donning and doffing, and other de facto policies
13 resulted in "off the clock" work with a corresponding loss of pay. For example, Plaintiff's expert's
14 analysis suggests the time rounding policy favored WDI around 66% of the time, resulting in the
15 loss of over 3,200 compensable hours to the class. In response, WDI argued is timekeeping and
16 payroll practices comply with California law and that any rounding was completely neutral in
17 effect and thus permissible under the law. See's Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210
18 Cal.App.4th 889. It also argued any donning and doffing of safety equipment, consisting of
19 gloves, goggles, and reflective vests, did not result in any compensable time, and that it otherwise
20 properly paid all non-exempt employees for all hours worked consistent with California law. Per
21 Defendant, any off the clock work the clock was against company policy and done without the
22 WDI's knowledge. White v. Starbucks Corp. (N.D. Cal. 2007) 497 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1083
23 (employer must have actual or constructive knowledge of the off the clock work). WDI also
24 argued, individualized inquiries would be required to determine if any such time was
25 compensable, and class certification would be inappropriate and any PAGA trial would be
26 unmanageable. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 29.]

27 On the meal break issue, prior to about September 2021, Plaintiff contends WDI's meal
28 policy wasn't compliant and did not inform employees as to the number and timing of their meal

1 periods, nor did it specify 30 minute uninterrupted meal periods. Even after WDI revised that
2 policy, Plaintiff contends it remained problematic in that it still didn't advise employees of the
3 duty-free nature of their meal periods. Coupled with WDI's policies restricting employees from
4 accessing social media while at work, from taking a nap at any point in a shift, from leaving the
5 premises, etc., Plaintiff contends he and the class members received non-compliant meal periods.
6 Plaintiff's expert's analysis supported this conclusion and found approximately a 62-63%
7 violation rate for meal periods. Thus, even if WDI's policies were compliant, it still faced
8 significant exposure for "de facto" violations. For the same reasons, Plaintiff contends WDI's rest
9 break policy likewise was non-compliant and that he and the class members did not receive proper
10 breaks. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 30.]

11 Defendant denies Plaintiff's contentions, claiming they made meal and rest breaks
12 available to Class Members in compliance with California law, including implementing a Bell
13 Schedule system. Defendant contends their meal and rest break policies are lawful and that Class
14 Members were frequently reminded via training and supervisors, that they were required to take
15 all meal and rest breaks. Defendant also contends that time records and signed declarations
16 demonstrate that Class Members took duty-free, timely meal and rest breaks. Defendant contends
17 their meal and rest break policies and practices comported with the flexibility the *Brinker* court
18 held was integral to California's meal and rest period requirements. Finally, Defendant argued that
19 Plaintiff's meal and rest break claims are not susceptible to common proof, as the claims would
20 require individualized inquiry, including whether there was an unlawful companywide policy,
21 whether employees had the opportunity to take meal and rest periods, whether they voluntarily
22 chose to forego their meal and rest periods, and whether Defendant ever prevented them from
23 taking meal and rest periods. Accordingly, Defendant contends these claims are vulnerable to a
24 ruling that class treatment is not appropriate. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 31.]

25 On the expense reimbursement claims, Plaintiff alleges he and class members were
26 required to purchase their own safety gear such as steel-toed boots, grip gloves, safety goggles,
27 and a reflective vest, without reimbursement. WDI requires employees to use their personal cell
28 phones to access company information and communicate with supervisors but has failed to

1 reimburse them for the use of their personal cell phones. Per WDI, however, the “safety gear” is
2 nothing more than basic work boots, gloves, etc. and not any kind of specialized gear for which an
3 employer must provide reimbursement. As far as cell phone use, WDI argued there would be no
4 conceivable requirement for employees to use their own phone while at work and, to the extent
5 they did, it would have been purely for personal convenience and therefore not reimbursable.

6 [Trenner Decl., ¶ 32.]

7 Plaintiff’s claims for inaccurate wage statements and waiting time penalties are derivative
8 of the unpaid wage claims. Should those claims fail, Plaintiff’s claim for inaccurate wage statements
9 and waiting time penalties would also fail. Defendant also contends they would not be liable for
10 waiting time penalties because a “good faith dispute” exists over the payment of past wages. Cal.
11 Code Regs. Tit. 8 § 13520; Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1201.
12 Further, Defendant contends Plaintiff would have to prove that Defendant “willfully” failed to pay
13 Class Members appropriate wages due upon separation of employment. Defendant contends that
14 any failure to pay wages upon separation was not willful. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 33.]

15 As far as potential PAGA liability, the theoretical penalties totaled at least \$5.8 million
16 should Plaintiff prevail and establish the alleged minimum wage violations at issue for each pay
17 period. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 34.] As with the class claims, Plaintiff discounted the potential PAGA
18 penalties for the multi-layered defenses proffered by Defendant on the merits, and further
19 discounted these claims since the Court possesses wide discretion to reduce such penalties even if
20 Plaintiff ultimately prevailed. Labor Code § 2699(e)(2); Fleming v. Covidien (C.D. Cal. 2011)
21 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154590, *8-9 (court reduced the potential penalties by over 82% after a
22 bench trial); Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504 (after a bench trial, the trial
23 court awarded penalties of just \$5 per pay period, a 90% reduction, which decision was upheld on
24 appeal); In re Taco Bell Wage and Hour Actions (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis
25 48557 (PAGA penalties denied after trial).

26 Accordingly, the Parties allocated \$30,000 to PAGA penalties, which amount is reasonable
27 and in line with comparable settlements in other class actions in California. Van Kempen v.
28 Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137182 (granting final

1 approval of \$5,000 PAGA penalty from \$370,000 settlement, or 1.4 percent of total settlement);
2 Slavkov v. First Water Heater Partners I (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116303
3 (finding a \$7,500 PAGA payment reasonable when measured against the overall settlement of
4 \$345,000 and the possible weaknesses in plaintiffs' case, or 2.2 percent of total settlement).
5 Additionally, the LWDA has been informed of the terms of the PAGA portion of the settlement,
6 and will be able to weigh in as necessary. Jennings v. Open Door Mktg. Inc. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
7 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171356, at *27 (approving settlement with PAGA penalties of 0.6%
8 where "[p]laintiffs [have] submitted the settlement agreement to the LWDA, and the LWDA has
9 not objected to the settlement").

10 Thus, Defendant raised significant procedural and merits defenses to Plaintiff's claims, any
11 one of which, if successful, could have derailed Plaintiff's case. Accordingly, Plaintiff faced risky
12 issues going forward with this litigation, and given the need to secure class certification, try the
13 case, and deal with post-trial appeals, it would have taken years to realize any recovery in this
14 action. Plaintiff's counsel discounted the value of the class claims consistent with the risks
15 discussed above, and carefully weighed the likelihood of the class receiving substantially greater
16 benefit if the litigation continued. Plaintiff's counsel concluded – in light of these very real and
17 substantial risks – settlement on the proposed terms and without prolonged and costly litigation
18 was in the best interests of the class. The overall \$1,025,000 recovery represents a significant
19 percentage of Defendant's potential exposure and given these risks addressed above, a total
20 recovery for the class of \$1,025,000 is a fair result within the range of reasonableness considering
21 all potential outcomes. [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 35-37.]

22 Importantly, the mere fact that a settlement does not provide the same recovery as might be
23 achieved at trial is not a proper indicator of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
24 adequate. Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250 ("even if the relief afforded by the proposed
25 settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated,
26 this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary
27 settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation"); 7-Eleven
28 Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1150 ("The fact that

1 a proposed settlement may amount to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of
2 itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved”); Lane
3 v. Facebook, Inc. (9th Cir. 2012) 696 F.3d 811, 819 (“[T]he question whether a settlement is
4 fundamentally fair . . . is different from the question whether the settlement is perfect in the
5 estimation of the reviewing court”); White v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (C.D. Cal.
6 2011) 803 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1098 (rejecting contention settlement was not fair and reasonable even
7 though it represented 99% discount off the maximum value of the claims). Importantly as well,
8 the proposed settlement is non-reversionary and will provide benefits to the Class Members
9 without a claims process. White, 803 F.Supp.2d at 1098; c.f., Federal Judicial Center, Managing
10 Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges (3d ed. 2010) at 20, available at
11 www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf (reversionary provisions and/or cumbersome
12 claims process may indicate lack of fairness). Plaintiff and her counsel submit the settlement is
13 within the “range of reasonableness,” and is fair and adequate for the Class.

14 **V. CONCLUSION**

15 For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion,
16 conditionally certify the settlement class, grant preliminary approval to the proposed class action
17 settlement, and enter the [Proposed] Order filed herewith.

18 Dated: September 08, 2023

CROSNER LEGAL, PC

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21 By: _____



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