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individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO**

DANIELLE ERVIN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

WELCOME SACRAMENTO LLC,
a California Limited Liability Company dba
Courtyard by Marriott Sacramento Cal Expo
and DBA Fairfield Inn Sacramento Cal-Expo;
WELCOME GROUP MANAGEMENT, LLC,
a California Limited Liability Company; and
WELCOME GROUP, INC., a California
Corporation and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 34-2022-00332108

ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO:
Honorable Jill Talley, Dept. 23

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT;
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS,
ENHANCEMENT AWARD AND
ADMINISTRATION COSTS;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF
CLASS COUNSEL; DECLARATION
OF PLAINTIFF ERVIN**

Date: March 21, 2025

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept.: 23

By Order of the Court on October 25, 2024


1 **TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND COUNSEL OF RECORD:**
2 **NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN** that on March 21, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the
3 matter may be heard in Department 23 before the Honorable Jill Talley of the Sacramento County
4 Superior Court, Plaintiff DANIELLE ERVIN (“Plaintiff”), by and through Plaintiff’s counsels of
5 record, will and hereby moves the Court for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement and
6 Stipulation To Resolve Class Action And PAGA Claims, awarding attorneys’ fees, litigation costs,
7 Named Plaintiff Enhancement Award, Settlement Administration Costs, and entering final
8 approval and judgment.

9 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court and Labor
10 Code section 2699(1). This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached
11 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the accompanying Declarations of James R. Hawkins
12 (“Hawkins”), the declaration of Ryan McNamee of Apex Class Action, LLC, the declaration of
13 Plaintiff Danielle Ervin, the Settlement Agreement and Stipulation To Resolve Class Action And
14 PAGA Claims (the “Settlement Agreement”), attached to the Hawkins, argument of counsel, all
15 papers and pleadings filed in the action, and upon any further information or evidence requested
16 by the Court at the time of hearing on this Motion.
17

18
19 Dated: February 19, 2025

JAMES HAWKINS APLC

20
21 BY:



James Hawkins
Gregory Mauro
Michael Calvo
Lauren Falk
Ava Issary

Attorneys for Plaintiff Danielle Ervin and
the Proposed Class

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 This Court preliminary approved the settlement on or about October 25, 2024. (James
4 Hawkins Decl. “Hawkins”, **Exhibit A** - Preliminary Approval Order). Plaintiff Ervin
5 (“Plaintiff”), now respectfully request that this Court grant final approval of the settlement
6 agreement attached to the Hawkins Declaration as **Exhibit B**, which seeks to resolve claims
7 against WELCOME SACRAMENTO, LLC; WELCOME GROUP MANAGEMENT, LLC; and
8 WELCOME GROUP, INC. (“Defendants”) in exchange for a non-reversionary Gross Settlement
9 Amount of (“GSA”) of Eight Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
10 (\$850,000.00).

11 The Class Members overwhelmingly supported the Settlement, as there is a 100%
12 participation rate, with zero objections and zero opt outs resulting in all 374 a full participation
13 from all Class Members. The highest Individual Settlement Amount to a Participating Class
14 Member is currently estimated to be approximately \$8,230.67, the average Individual Settlement
15 Amount is currently estimated to be approximately \$1,287.49, and the lowest Individual
16 Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be approximately \$46.09. These amounts are subject
17 to employee-side tax and withholdings. (Administrator Decl. of Ryan McNamee-hereinafter
18 “McNamee”, ¶ 15).

19 Additionally, there are 265 Aggrieved Employees who worked a total of
20 5,173 weeks during the PAGA Period. The highest individual PAGA share to an Aggrieved
21 Employee is approximately \$178.81, the average individual PAGA share is approximately
22 \$47.17, and the lowest individual PAGA share is approximately \$2.42. (McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 16-
23 17).

24 Plaintiff also moves for final approval of attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$283,305.00
25 which is one third of GSA. As will be demonstrated herein, Class Counsel’s attorney fee request
26 is supported using the percentage fee method and the lodestar method. Second, Plaintiff moves
27 for final approval of payment of the litigation costs in the amount of \$15,973.18, all of which
28 was incurred in litigating this matter. Third, Plaintiff moves for final approval of the Named

1 Plaintiff Enhancement Award to Plaintiff in the sum of \$10,000.00, to compensate the Class
2 Representative for their service as the Class Representative and providing a general release of his
3 claims against Defendants – a release significantly greater than the Class Members provided –
4 and for the risks absorbed and time spent litigating the case. Plaintiff played a vital role in
5 representing Class Members in this case and spearheading the lawsuit to seek monetary relief on
6 behalf of all Class Members. Fourth, Plaintiff moves for final approval of the payment of
7 \$9,200.00 in administrative costs to Apex Class Action, LLC. Fifth, Plaintiff moves for final
8 approval of the \$50,000.00 PAGA Payment and the payment to the Labor and Work
9 Development Agency (“LWDA”) for its share of the PAGA Payment (\$37,500.00, which is 75%
10 of \$50,000.00; with the remaining \$12,500.00 payable to Aggrieved Employees).

11 This case required many hours of attorney and Plaintiff time who sought relief on behalf
12 of 374 potential class members within the State of California defined all current and former non-
13 exempt employees who were employed by Defendants WELCOME SACRAMENTO, LLC;
14 WELCOME GROUP MANAGEMENT, LLC; and WELCOME GROUP, INC. at any time
15 between December 28, 2018, through August 1, 2024¹.

16 This litigation involved the review and analysis of documents, policies, and practices, as
17 well as a full day of mediation. Most importantly, the Settlement and all its terms received
18 overwhelming support from Class Members, as there were no objections and only one request
19 for exclusion. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully request the Court grant final approval of the
20 Settlement, attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, Named Plaintiff Enhancement Award, Settlement
21 Administration Costs, and payment to the LWDA in the amounts preliminarily approved by the
22 Court and as fully disclosed to Class Members.

23 II. BACKGROUND, INVESTIGATION, DISCOVERY

24 On December 28, 2022 Plaintiff files a putative class action complaint entitled *Danielle*
25 *Ervin, et al. v. Welcome Sacramento LLC, et al.*, Sacramento County Superior Court No. 34-
26

27 ¹ Defendant elected to shorten the class period to August 1, 2024 pursuant to ¶51 of the Settlement
28 Agreement. As a result, the total number of class members is 374, with a total workweek count of
10,448.00. Additionally, the class member population at the final approval stage was 374 members. (See McNamee
Declaration ¶¶ 13-15)

2022-00332108 seeking damages for Defendants’ alleged: failure to pay minimum and overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide rest periods, failure to pay all wages earned and owed upon separation from Defendants’ employ, failure to pay wages timely during employment, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failure to reimburse necessary business expenses, improper use of consumer credit reports, failure to pay reporting time pay, and issuing payment of wages in the form of a non-labor code-compliant instrument, and violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq. (Hawkins Decl. ¶¶ 3-6).

On December 28, 2022, Named Plaintiff submitted a PAGA Notice to the LWDA. (*Id.*)

On March 6, 2023 Plaintiff on behalf of the general public as private attorney general filed a PAGA representative action entitled *Danielle Ervin, et al. v. Welcome Sacramento LLC, et al.*, Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 34-2023-00335704 seeking damages for Defendants’ alleged failure to pay minimum and overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide rest periods, failure to pay all wages earned and owed upon separation from Defendants’ employ, failure to pay wages timely during employment, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failure to reimburse necessary business expenses, improper use of consumer credit reports, failure to pay reporting time pay, failure to provide suitable seating and issuing payment of wages in the form of a non-labor code-compliant instrument. *Id.*

On February 6, 2024, the Parties engaged in private mediation with a well-respected wage and hour class action mediator, Louis Marlin. In preparation for the mediation Defendants provided Class Counsel with hire and term dates for all employees, time and payroll records and relevant policies for Class Members during the Class Period.

The settlement discussions were conducted at arm’s-length, and the settlement is the result of an informed and detailed analysis of Defendants’ potential liability in relation to the costs and risks associated with continued litigation. Based on the documents produced, as well as Class Counsel’s own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel believes that the Settlement with Defendants for the consideration and on the terms set forth in this Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interest of the Class Members in light of all

1 known facts and circumstances, including the risk of significant delay and uncertainty associated
2 with litigation and various defenses asserted by Defendants. (Hawkins Decl. ¶ 4-12, Ex. 1.)

3 In reaching the proposed settlement, Plaintiff counsel's negotiation efforts took into
4 consideration relevant factors such as the size of the class, the information, data, and documents
5 obtained in the litigation and/or otherwise exchanged pursuant to the mediation privilege; the
6 experience of the named Plaintiff; the strengths and weaknesses of the case; the uncertain
7 outcome and risk of litigating complex actions; the time and expense in litigating a case through
8 trial; Defendants' defenses; and the non-reversionary nature of the settlement.

9 **1. The Settlement Provides Reasonable Compensation to Class Members**

10 As a result of the mediation, the parties agreed to settle this matter for a Gross Settlement
11 Amount ("GSA") of \$850,000.00 (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 5, McNamee Decl., ¶ 14). Based on their
12 own respective independent investigations and evaluations, and after taking into account the
13 sharply disputed factual and legal issues involved in this matter, the risks attending further
14 prosecution of the case, and the monetary benefits received under the Settlement despite the
15 questionable nature of the claims, Plaintiff's counsel is of the opinion that Settlement for the
16 consideration and on the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement remains fair, reasonable and
17 adequate and is in the best interests of the Class Members. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 5-13).

18 Even without the presumption of fairness and reasonableness, the settlement is clearly
19 within the range of reasonableness as thoroughly discussed in detail in the motion for
20 preliminary approval, and as considered by the Court in granting preliminary approval, (Hawkins
21 Decl., ¶¶ 9-18; Ex. A- Order Granting Preliminary Approval).

22 Accounting for the risks of continued litigation and impediments to discovery, Plaintiff
23 determined that a settlement amounting to \$850,000.00 was fair and reasonable and the court
24 preliminarily agreed. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 11-23). *See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.*, 212
25 F.R.D. 231, 256-58 (D. Del. 2002) (recognizing that a reasonable settlement amount can be 1.6% to 14%
26 of the total estimated damages); *In Re Armored Car Antitrust Litig.*, 472 F. Supp. 1357, 1373 (N.D. Ga.
27 1979) (settlements with a value of 1% to 8% of the estimated total damages were approved); *In Re Four*
28 *Seasons Secs. Laws Litig.*, 58 F.R.D. 19, 37 (W.D. Okla.1972) (approving 8% of damages); *Balderas v.*

1 *Massage Envy Franchising, LLP*, 2014 WL 3610945, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (finding that
2 settlement which amounted to 8% of maximum recovery “[fell] within the range of possible initial
3 approval based on the strength of plaintiff’s case and the risk and expense of continued litigation.”); *In re*
4 *Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (approving settlement of 6% to 8%
5 of estimated damages).² (*Id.*)

6 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AND THE CLASS MEMBERS’ RESPONSE**

7 **A. Terms of the Settlement**

8 The GSA is (\$850,000.00). This amount includes, the Settlement Administration Costs of
9 \$9,200.00; the Named Plaintiff Enhancement Award of up to \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff; Court-
10 approved attorneys’ fees up to \$283,305.00, litigation costs to Class Counsel in the amount of
11 \$15,973.18; and PAGA penalties of \$50,000.00 with 75% of that amount paid to the LWDA and
12 the remaining 25% paid to the Aggrieved Employees. The Net Settlement Amount (“NSA”) is
13 approximately \$481,521.82. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 14).

14 The Settlement is a common fund settlement with no reversion to Defendants. Thus, each
15 of the participating Settlement Class Members will be paid his or her pro-rata share of the NSA.

16 **B. Released Claims**

17 Subject to approval by this Court, and in exchange for the consideration recited in the
18 Settlement Agreement, the Released Claims are all claims that have been or could have been
19 reasonably alleged or asserted in the PAGA Notices and as defined in the Settlement. (Hawkins
20 Decl., Ex. B- Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 24-30).

21
22 ² See also *In re Uber FCRA Litig.*, No. 14-cv-05200-EMC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101552, at *23- 24 (N.D. Cal.
23 June 29, 2017) (granting preliminary approval to class action settlement where gross settlement fund, prior to
24 deducting attorneys’ fees and services awards, was valued at 7.5% or less of total possible verdict); *Viceral v.*
25 *Mistras Grp., Inc.*, No. 15-cv-02198-EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140759, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016)
26 (granting preliminary approval to class action settlement representing “8.1% of the full verdict value” with net
27 settlement amount representing approximately 5.3% of full verdict value); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*,
28 No. 13-cv-02540-HSG, 2015 WL 3776765, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (granting final approval to settlement
with net recovery to Plaintiff valued at 7.3% of potential maximum recovery); *Cruz v. Sky Chefs, Inc.*, No. 12-cv-
02705-DMR, 2014 WL 7247065, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014) (granting final approval where gross settlement
amount represented 8.6% of the maximum potential recovery from the class claims and estimated amount
distributable to class after accounting for attorneys’ fees and other deductions represented approximately 6.1% of
maximum potential recovery); *In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig.*, No. 07-cv-05182-WHA, 2010 WL 3001384, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. July 29, 2010) (granting final approving where “[t]he proposed settlement amount is [. . .] only about five
percent of the estimated damages before fee and costs—even before any reduction thereof for attorney’s fees and
costs.”).

1 **C. The Class Members Support the Settlement – Zero (0) Objections and**
2 **Zero (0) Opt-Outs**

3 On October 25, 2024, the Court granted Preliminary Approval of the Settlement,
4 conditionally certified the class for settlement purposes, appointed Apex Class Action, LLC to act
5 as the administrator, approved the Notice to be sent to the Class, and directed that the Notice be
6 mailed to the Class via U.S. First Class Mail. (Hawkins Decl., Ex. A- Order Granting Preliminary
7 Approval). On or about December 3, 2024, Apex mailed the Notices to 374 Class Members.
8 (McNamee Decl., ¶7). Out of the 374 Notices, only 15 were deemed undeliverable after attempts
9 to ascertain the addresses. (McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 7-11). As a result of the mailing, there is a 100%
10 participation rate and 374 Class Members will be mailed a settlement check. (*Id.* ¶ 13).

11 If a Participating Class Member’s or Aggrieved Employee’s check is returned to the
12 Settlement Administrator, the Settlement Administrator will make reasonable efforts to re-mail it
13 to the Participating Class Member or Aggrieved Employee at the correct address. It is expressly
14 understood and agreed that the checks for the Individual Settlement Payments, including the
15 Individual PAGA Payments, will become void and no longer available if not cashed within 180
16 calendar days after mailing. The funds from uncashed and voided checks will be transferred to
17 the State of California’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Participating Class
18 Member/Aggrieved Employee. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 59(e)).

19 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE**

20 **D. The Settlement Satisfies the Standard for Final Approval**

21 California Rule of Court, Rule 3.769, requires court approval for class action settlements.
22 Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(g). California courts favor settlement. *Stambaugh v. Superior Court* (1976) 62
23 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236, *Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. of Cal.* (1951) 37 Cal. 2d 592, 602
24 (“[T]he law wisely favors settlements”). Accordingly, the Court must give “[due] regard to what
25 is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer,*
26 *Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245.

27 In deciding whether to approve a class settlement, a court evaluates whether the proposed
28 settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th

1794, 1801 (citing *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cnty. Of S.F.* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625). A court enjoys broad discretion to make its fairness determination. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801. However, “a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arms-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” *Id.* at 1802; *accord Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 245. In addition, a court should consider additional relevant factors, including the strength of the Plaintiff’s case compared to the settlement amount; the risk, expenses, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; and the fair treatment of class members in relation to each other. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802.

At the time of preliminary approval, the Court was provided with sufficient information to satisfy three of the four *Dunk* factors, leaving the fourth factor, the number of objectors, unknown until after the Class had an opportunity to respond to the Settlement as explained in the Notice. Subject only to the Class’s reaction to the Settlement, the Court preliminarily presumed the Settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. Following dissemination of the Notice, and adequate time provided to the Class to object to the Settlement, no class member submitted objections and no Class Member excluded themselves from the settlement, **resulting in a 100% participation rate from the Class**. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 13). Thus, the proposed Settlement is entitled to the presumption that it is fair and in all other respects proper and should be finally approved.

V. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUESTED FEES AND COSTS

E. The Requested Fee Award is Fair and Reasonable, Calculated as a Percentage of a Common Fund

Class Counsel applies for an award of attorneys’ fees in the sum of \$283,305.00 of the GSA, and litigation costs of \$15,973.18 (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 24-28, Ex. C). When a settlement results in a common fund for the benefit of a class, class counsel may be awarded fees as a percentage of the common fund. *See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 254 (recognizing the “percentage of recovery” method). The California Supreme Court confirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert*

1 *Half Int'l, Inc.* that “[t]he percentage of fund method survives in California class action cases.” 1
2 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016), in stating:

3 The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of
4 calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better
5 approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
6 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging
7 the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not
8 be denied our trial courts.

9 *Id.* at 503 (internal citation omitted); *see also e.g., Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34
10 (1977) (“when a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action
11 brought by a plaintiff or Plaintiff for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that
12 fund, such plaintiff or Plaintiff may be awarded attorney’s fees out of the fund.”); *Serrano v.*
13 *Unruh*, 32 Cal.3d 621, 627 (1982) (in awarding a fee from the common fund obtained for the
14 benefit of all parties, the trial court acts within its equitable power to prevent the other parties’
15 unjust enrichment.); *Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc.*, 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir.
16 1993) (the percentage of the fund method for calculating attorney’s fees more accurately reflects
17 the results achieved for the putative class than the lodestar method and “establishes reasonable
18 expectations on the part of Plaintiff’s attorneys as to their expected recovery; and it encourages
19 early settlement, which avoids protracted litigation.”); *In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities Litigation*,
20 396 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The percentage-of-recovery method is generally favored in
21 common fund cases because it allows courts to award fees from the fund ‘in a manner that rewards
22 counsel for success and penalizes it for failure.’”).³

23 The purpose of the common fund/percentage approach is to “spread litigation costs
24 proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire
25 burden alone.” *Vincent, supra*, 557 F.2d at 769. In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d
26 162, 167, the Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a
27 fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share
28

³ *Laffitte* also held trial courts have discretion to assess reasonableness of fee awards with tools
such as the lodestar cross-check, although they need not do so. *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506 (“We hold
further that trial courts have discretion to conduct a lodestar cross-check on a percentage fee . . .
they also retain the discretion to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the
reasonableness of a requested percentage fee”).

of the litigation costs.” Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 110, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” The reasons for applying the common fund doctrine include: “...fairness to the successful litigant, who might otherwise receive no benefit because his recovery might be consumed by the expenses; correlative prevention of an unfair advantage to the others who are entitled to share in the fund and who should bear their share of the burden of its recovery; encouragement of the attorney for the successful litigant, who will be more willing to undertake and diligently prosecute proper litigation for the protection or recovery of the fund if he is assured that he will be properly and directly compensated should his efforts be successful.” *Id.* Because there is a defined and clearly traceable benefit to the Class, the Court can base an award of attorneys’ fees using a ‘common fund’ approach to compensate Class Counsel.

1. The Requested Attorneys’ Fee is Within the Range of Fees Approved in Comparable Common Fund Cases

Assessing an appropriate fee based on a percentage of the fund involves considering “all of the circumstances of the case.” Appellate cases addressing fees arise almost exclusively where awards were challenged by Defendants or objectors – the only parties with standing to appeal. *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 236.

The requested fee falls in the mid-range of percentage class fee awards, which generally range from 20% to 50% of a common fund, and it constitutes fair compensation for undertaking complex, risky, expensive, and time-consuming litigation on a contingent basis and compensates Class Counsel for their efforts, as well as the result achieved for the benefit of the Class. Numerous courts in California routinely approve fee requests equal to or greater than 35% of the common fund. *See Martin v. Ameripride Servs.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61796, *22-23 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (collecting cases); *Birch v. Office Depot, Inc.*, USDC Southern District, Case No. 06cv1690 DMS (WMC) (awarding 40% fee on a \$16 million wage and hour class action settlement); *Rippee v. Boston Mkt. Corp.*, USDC Southern District, Case No. 05cv1359 BTM (JMA) (awarding a 40% fee on a \$3.75 million wage and hour class action settlement). In fact, the Sacramento County

1 Superior Court has awarded fees of 35% of the common fund in wage and hour class actions.
2 (*McMahon v. Airco Mechanical, Inc.*, Case No. 34-2019-00259269; *Uribe v. EcoGuard Pest*
3 *Management, Inc.*, Case No. 34-2021-00300650; *Arroyo v. Epic Home Solar*, Case No. 34-2021-
4 00310634; *Blair v. Clark Wagaman Designs*, Case No. 34-2021-00313156).

5 In short, Class Counsels' fee request of \$283,305.00 (33.33% of the common fund) is in
6 line with awards in similar cases in California and demonstrates that Class Counsels' fee request
7 is consistent with market rates and is reasonable.

8 **2. A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the Requested Fee**

9 Class Counsels' fee request is reasonable when calculated using the lodestar method.
10 Under the lodestar method, a base fee amount is calculated from a compilation of time reasonably
11 spent on the case and the reasonable hourly compensation of the attorney. *Serrano*, 20 Cal. 3d at
12 48. The court then may enhance this lodestar figure by a "multiplier" to account for a range of
13 factors, such as the novelty and difficulty of the case, its contingent nature, and the degree of
14 success achieved. *Id.* at 49; *see also Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-36 (2001); *Thayer*
15 *v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834 (2001), ["[t]here is no...rule limiting the factors
16 that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to [adjust the] lodestar"].

17 As of the date of filing, Class Counsel worked approximately 164 combined documented
18 hours on this case. All of the work and tasks performed by Class Counsel were reasonable and
19 necessary for the prosecution of this case. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶25-28).

20 **3. Class Counsel's Hourly Rates are Reasonable**

21 Class Counsels' hourly rates are between \$200 and \$950 and are in line with rates typically
22 approved in wage and hour class action litigation and which rates have been approved by Courts
23 in California in the Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Francisco, Alameda, Orange and San Diego
24 County Superior Courts. (Hawkins Decl., ¶24); *Children's Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Bonta*, 97
25 Cal.App.4th 740, 746 (2002) (noting rates were reasonable where they were "within the range of
26 reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work").

27 A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and
28 experience in the relevant community. *PLCM Group, Inc v. Drexler* (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.

1 When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts may consider factors such as skill and
2 experience, the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise and the attorney's
3 customary billing rates. *Flannery v. California Highway Patrol* (1998) 61 Cal. App. 4th 629, 632.
4 Class Counsels' skill and experience support their hourly rates. Our practices are limited
5 exclusively to litigation, focusing on the representation of employees in wage and hour and
6 consumer class action matters. (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 24). As prominent attorneys in the field of wage
7 and hour class action litigation, Class Counsel continually monitors the prevailing market rates
8 charged by both defense and plaintiff law firms and set the billing rates of their attorneys and
9 paralegals to be consistent with the prevailing market rates in the private sector for attorneys and
10 staff of comparable skill, qualifications and experience. Other wage and hour attorneys working
11 as class counsel before California courts charge comparable if not higher rates. Therefore, as they
12 are in line with those of the relevant community, Class Counsels' hourly rates are reasonable.

13 **4. Class Counsel's Total Hours are Reasonable**

14 In determining a lodestar fee, reasonable hours include, in addition to time spent during
15 litigation, the time spent before the action was filed, including time spent interviewing clients,
16 investigating the facts and the law, and preparing the initial pleadings. *See New York Gaslight*
17 *Club, Inc. v. Carey* (1980) 447 U.S. 54, 62. The fee award should include fees incurred to establish
18 and defend the attorneys' fee claim. *Serrano v. Priest* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.

19 Class Counsel expended a combined total of approximately 164 hours on this case. The
20 work performed to achieve a settlement that will provide valuable consideration to the Class is
21 summarized by Class Counsel in the declaration submitted herewith. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 25-28);
22 *Syers Props. III, Inc. v. Rankin*, 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 699 (2014) ("Because time records are not
23 required under California law ..., there is no required level of detail that counsel must achieve.")
24 (internal quotations omitted). All tasks and work performed were reasonable and necessary for the
25 prosecution of this case. The work performed was justified considering the result achieved.

26 **5. Costs of Litigation are Reasonable**

27
28

1 Class Counsel seeks reimbursement of the litigation costs and expenses of \$15,973.18.
2 These costs were reasonable and necessary to prosecute this case, and the results achieved are fair,
3 and reasonable. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 25-28, Ex. C).

4 **VI. THE NAMED PLAINTIFF ENHANCEMENT AWARD IS REASONABLE**

5 Class Counsel seeks approval of a \$10,000.00 Named Plaintiff Enhancement Award to the
6 named Plaintiff/Class Representative. The requested enhancement award is reasonable in light of
7 the general release of all claims Plaintiff agreed to, greater than the release given by Class
8 Members, the benefits Plaintiff conferred upon the entire Class resulting in payments to all Class
9 Members, the time spent assisting counsel with the investigation and prosecution of these claims
10 and consenting to the proposed Settlement. Furthermore, in pursuing this action on behalf of the
11 Class, Plaintiff risked a judgment for attorneys' fees and costs in the event this matter had been
12 lost. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 29-30; *See also* declaration of Plaintiff Ervin filed concurrently herewith)

13 Courts routinely approve service payments, or incentive awards, to compensate named
14 Plaintiff for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class litigation. *See In re*
15 *Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1393; *see also Bell v. Farmers*
16 *Ins. Exch.* (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 725-26 (upholding service payments to class
17 representatives); Manual § 21.62 n.971 (noting that service payments are warranted). Based on the
18 foregoing, the \$10,000.00 Named Plaintiff Enhancement Award is fair, appropriate, and justified
19 as part of the overall settlement.

20 **VII. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE REASONABLE**

21 The Parties agreed to hire Apex Class Action, LLC as the administrator, and the Court
22 approved this choice. The Administrator was responsible for formatting, printing and mailing the
23 Notice. It was also responsible for updating addresses and re-mailing Notices returned as
24 undeliverable, responding to Class Member inquiries, answering questions from Counsel for the
25 Parties, and providing a declaration to document its duties and responsibilities under the
26 settlement. Plaintiff now requests that the Court approve the \$9,200.00 fee to Apex Class Action,
27 LLC for services rendered and to be rendered. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 19). Following the grant of final
28 approval, the Administrator's duties will continue in order to calculate and mail the Individual

1 Settlement Payment checks to Class Members, perform tax reporting obligations, disburse other
2 payments as ordered by the Court, and perform such other duties as set forth in the Settlement
3 Agreement. The fee of \$9,200.00 for services rendered and to be rendered is fair and reasonable
4 and should be granted.

5 **VIII. THE SETTLEMENT PENALTIES UNDER PAGA ARE REASONABLE**

6 The PAGA payment of \$50,000.00 with 75% of to the LWDA and 25% to the aggrieved
7 employees is reasonable under the circumstances. The Parties negotiated a good faith amount for
8 PAGA penalties. The PAGA penalties allocation is not the result of self-interest at the expense of
9 other Class Members. The LWDA was also provided notice of the Settlement with the concurrent
10 filing of the preliminary approval motion and the instant motion. Plaintiff did not receive a
11 response or objection to the Settlement from the LWDA. Thus, Plaintiff requests the Court finally
12 approve the PAGA allocation in the amount of \$50,000.00 with 75% being paid to the LWDA and
13 25% being distributed to the aggrieved employees.

14 **IX. CONCLUSION**

15 Based on the foregoing, Class Counsel respectfully requests the Court grant final approval
16 of the Class Action Settlement, award (1) Class Counsels' fees in the sum of \$283,305.00 and
17 litigation costs of \$15,973.18; (2) award the named Plaintiff an Named Plaintiff Enhancement
18 Award in the sum of \$10,000.00; (3) award \$9,200.00 to Apex Class Action, LLC, for settlement
19 administration services, and (4) approve the PAGA Payment of \$50,000.00 with a \$37,500.00 of
20 that sum paid to the LWDA and the remaining \$12,500.00 paid to the Aggrieved Employees.

21
22 Dated: February 7, 2025

JAMES HAWKINS APLC

23
24 BY:



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26 Gregory Mauro
27 Michael Calvo
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Class