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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JOHNATHAN SATELE, an individual, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated

PLAINTIFF,

v.

KSARIA SERVICE CORPORATION; and
DOES 1 thru 50, inclusive,

DEFENDANTS.

CASE NO. 37-2023-00002198-CU-OE-CTL

[Case Assigned for All Purposes to Hon.
Gregory W. Pollack in Dept. C-71]

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF**

*[Filed concurrently with Declarations of
Liane Katzenstein Ly, Johnathan Satele and
Makenna Snow, Proposed Order, and
Proposed Judgment]*

Date: January 17, 2025
Time: 9:30 AM
Dept.: C-71

Complaint Filed: January 17, 2023
FAC Filed: March 24, 2023
Trial Date: None Set

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**


2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 17, 2025 at 9:30 AM in Department C-71 of the
3 above-entitled court, Plaintiff Johnathan Satele (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move the Court
4 for an Order granting final approval of Class Counsel’s Attorneys’ Fees and Costs pursuant to the
5 Parties’ Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement. Plaintiff also respectfully requests that
6 the Court award an enhancement of \$5,000.00.

7 Good cause exists for the granting of this Motion because the work of Plaintiff and Class
8 Counsel resulted in an excellent settlement that created a common fund that compensates Class
9 Members. Class Counsel seek compensation from the common fund.

10 The Motion will be based on this Notice of Motion; the accompanying Memorandum of
11 Points and Authorities; the Declarations of Liane Katzenstein Ly; Plaintiff Johnathan Satele;
12 William Zev Abramson, and Makenna Snow of ILYM Group, Inc.; all other papers and records
13 on file in this action; and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing
14 on this Motion.

15 DATED: December 9, 2024

KINGSLEY SZAMET & LY

16
17 By: 

18 Liane Katzenstein Ly
19 Attorneys for Plaintiff JOHNATHAN SATELE and
20 the proposed class
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.769 (b) and California Code of Civil
4 Procedure section 382, Plaintiff Johnathan Satele (“Plaintiff”) moves this Court for approval of an
5 award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses to Class Counsel, pursuant to the terms
6 of the preliminary-approved Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”)
7 between named Plaintiff and Defendant KSARIA Service Corporation (“Defendant”). Class
8 Counsel also respectfully requests that the Court award an enhancement for the named Plaintiff of
9 \$5,000.00.

10 **II. STATUS OF THE SETTLEMENT**

11 In an effort to conserve the Court’s time and resources, Plaintiff will not repeat the
12 Procedural History set forth in the concurrently-filed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
13 Settlement.

14 The Agreement has been preliminarily-approved by the Court and the Notice of Class
15 Action Settlement disseminated pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. (Declaration of Liane
16 Katzenstein Ly ¶11 (“Ly Decl.”); Declaration of Makenna Snow of ILYM Group, Inc. ¶8 (“Snow
17 Decl.”).)

18 As discussed in the Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Class Counsel
19 worked diligently on behalf of the preliminarily certified Class Members in order to obtain this
20 Settlement.

21 **III. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR AN AWARD**
22 **OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES**

23 A. Class Counsel are Entitled to a Fee From the Common Fund

24 On August 11, 2016, the California Supreme Court decided *Laffitte v. Robert Half*
25 *International*, which addressed the correct methodology for awarding fees in a class action
26 settlement. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.* (Cal. 2016) 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 555, 573.) The *Laffitte*
27 Court approved awarding fees as a percentage of the settlement fund in cases like the present one,
28 where a settlement results in the creation of a common fund on behalf of a class:

1 We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts in holding that when
2 class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
3 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards Class Counsel a fee out
4 of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing
5 an appropriate percentage of the fund created.

6 (*Id.* at p. 573.) The Court then set out several reasons why the percentage-of-the-fund method is
7 preferred over the alternative lodestar-multiplier approach in California courts:

8 The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of
9 calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better
10 approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
11 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging
12 the litigation [citations]—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that
13 should not be denied our trial courts.

14 (*Id.* at p. 573.)

15 An award of 1/3 of the common fund is appropriate here under the “substantial benefit”
16 theory. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; *Wershba v. Apple Computer,*
17 *Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 254.) That theory permits a litigant who has sued in a
18 representative capacity to recover fees when the litigant’s efforts have created a substantial, actual,
19 and concrete benefit for members of an ascertainable class and the court’s jurisdiction over the
20 subject matter makes possible an award which spreads the cost proportionately among the
21 members of the benefitted class. (*See Ciani v. San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th
22 563, 578.)

23 This doctrine rests on the understanding that attorneys should normally be paid by their
24 clients, and that unless attorneys’ fees are paid out of the common fund, those who benefitted from
25 the fund would be unjustly enriched. (*Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council* (1979)
26 23 Cal.3d 917, 943; *Save El Toro Ass’n v. Days* (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 544, 548-49.) To prevent
27 this unfair result, courts exercise their inherent equitable powers to assess attorneys’ fees against
28 the entire fund, thereby spreading the cost of those fees among all those who benefitted. (*Serrano*
III, 20 Cal.3d at p. 35.) “A court, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, may decree that those
receiving the benefit should contribute to the costs of its production.” (*Save El Toro Assn., supra*,
98 Cal.App.3d at p. 548.) As this approach “better approximates the workings of the marketplace
than the lodestar approach,” there is “a greater judicial willingness to evaluate a fee award as a

percentage of the recovery” in common fund cases. (*Lealao v. Beneficial Calif., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 19, 31, 48.)

As detailed fully in the Agreement and set forth above, the Agreement provides for Defendant to create a Gross Settlement Amount of \$70,000.00. From that fund, Plaintiff requests an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$23,333.33, or 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount created on behalf of members of the Class. (Ly Decl. ¶56.) This litigation resulted in “a substantial, actual and concrete . . . benefit on the members of an ascertainable class,” *Save El Toro Assn., supra*, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 548, namely a non-reversionary settlement fund of \$70,000.00. Because none of the Class Members have paid fees to Class Counsel for their efforts during the litigation, equity requires that they pay a fair and reasonable fee based on what the market would traditionally require, no less than if they had hired private counsel to litigate their cases individually. Class Counsel is therefore entitled to a reasonable contingency fee of 1/3 from the Settlement fund as a whole.

B. The Attorneys’ Fees Requested By Class Counsel Are Well Within the Range of Fees in Comparable Cases

Courts historically award fees in the twenty-to-fifty-percent range, depending on the circumstances of the case. As stated in Newberg:

No general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the Class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented.

(Newberg on Class Actions, 3rd Ed., 1992, § 14.03; and see *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, fn 11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”] Thus, Class Counsel’s requested fee of 33.3% is not only well within the range of reasonableness, but is fair compensation for undertaking this complex, risky, expensive, and time-consuming litigation on a contingent basis.

C. The Contingency Fee of 1/3 Requested By Class Counsel Is Reasonable Based on the Risks of Litigation and the Diligent Efforts of Counsel that Led to an

1 Outstanding Settlement for the Class

2 In the present case, Class Counsel asks the Court to award a fee of 1/3 of the common fund,
3 or \$23,333.33, as provided in the Agreement. This amount is reasonable because Class Counsel's
4 diligent litigation efforts and experience led to an outstanding settlement, with an average net
5 recovery of over \$218.88 per Class Member (*See* Snow Decl. ¶17), based on cognizable risks
6 which are discussed in detail in Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

7 Additionally, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an attorney fee
8 award in cases such as this are the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. As observed in *City of*
9 *Detroit v. Grinnell Corporation* (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 470:

10 No one expects a lawyer whose compensation is contingent upon his success to
11 charge, when successful, as little as he would charge a client who had agreed to pay
12 for his services, regardless of success. Nor, particularly in complicated cases
producing large recoveries, is it just to make a fee depend solely on the reasonable
amount of time expended.

13 Class Counsel extensively addressed the perceived risks in this case in the concurrently
14 filed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and will not repeat that analysis here.
15 In addition to the complexity of this case, Class Counsel has borne the entire risk and costs of this
16 litigation during the entire time that it has been pending, all on a pure contingency basis. (Ly Decl.
17 ¶57.) Through the investment of substantial effort and resources, Class Counsel has secured an
18 outstanding Settlement of behalf of the Class Members. (*Id.*) Defendant vigorously contested
19 liability, the amount of claimed damages, and the propriety of class certification. (*Id.*) It is this
20 kind of situation, involving complex issues, that has been recognized as justifying a substantial
21 attorney fee award. (*Id.*)

22 **IV. CLASS COUNSEL'S FEE REQUEST IS REASONABLE UNDER A LODESTAR**
23 **CROSSCHECK**

24 Courts may "cross-check" the results of the common fund method against the lodestar
25 method. (*See, e.g., In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.) The lodestar
26 is calculated by multiplying the reasonable hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate. (*Serrano*
27 *v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49 ("*Serrano III*").) Those rates reflect "the general local hourly
28 rate for a fee-bearing case" and do "not include any compensation for contingent risk,

extraordinary skill, or any other factors.” (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.) The court may then enhance the lodestar with a multiplier. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 254; *Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1347; *Serrano III, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.)

A. Requested Multiplier

The purpose of using the lodestar/multiplier method is to mirror the legal marketplace. Counsel will not handle cases for straight hourly fees payable only if they win; therefore, an enhancement is often awarded so that the fee received is commensurate with what attorneys could expect to be compensated for services in similar circumstances. (*See San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc., Inc. v. County of San Bernardino* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 738, 755 [an award must be large enough “to entice competent counsel to undertake difficult public interest cases”].) No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations are required. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 254; *Rebney, supra*, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1349.) “The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the ‘lodestar’ or ‘touchstone’ approach.” (*Ibid.*)

Here, a lodestar cross-check confirms that the percentage requested is reasonable. Class Counsel’s aggregate lodestar amounts to \$30,325.00 (without future hours)¹, which represents 37.5 hours of attorney work on this litigation incurred from its inception through the filing of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval. (Ly Decl. ¶65.) As such, Class Counsel is not asking for a multiplier. (Ly Decl. ¶66.) Typically, the lodestar is merely the starting point of the calculation of a reasonable fee, and courts often multiply the lodestar by a factor to account for the risk of non-payment, delay in payment, the quality of work, and the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved. (*See Radar v. Thrasher* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 244, 253; *Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1419; *Coal. for L.A. County Planning v. Bd. of Supervisors* (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 241, 251.)

B. The Number of Hours Claimed is Reasonable

Plaintiff’s counsel are entitled to be compensated “for all time reasonably expended in

¹ Though Class Counsel will certainly continue to spend time working on this matter for tasks such as preparing for and attending the final approval hearing, overseeing the administration process, and communicating with Class Members, Plaintiff’s Counsel are not requesting approval of future hours.

pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in the same manner that an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client for all time reasonably expended on a matter.” (*Hensley v. Eckerhart* (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 431 [internal quotations omitted]; *accord Serrano v. Unruh* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 633 [“Serrano IV”] [parties should recover for all hours reasonably spent]; *Meister v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 447-48 [same].)

The amount of time spent on this case (over 37.5 hours), which culminated in a very favorable proposed Settlement for the Class Members, is reasonable given the complexity and novelty of the issues involved, the vigorous defense, the length and intensity of the litigation, and the exceptional results obtained. (Ly Decl. ¶67.) Class Counsel litigated this action with great efficiency in light of the amount of work required to achieve the Settlement. (Ly Decl. ¶68.) Class Counsel has submitted a declaration evidencing the reasonable hourly rate for their services and establishing the number of hours spent working on the case. (Ly Decl. ¶¶69-78.) Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to full compensation for the hours claimed by Class Counsel.

C. The Hourly Rates Requested Are Reasonable

Class Counsel is entitled to be compensated at hourly rates that reflect the reasonable market value of their legal services, based on their experience and expertise. (*See Serrano IV, supra*, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 640-43, n.31.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (*PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) Payment at full market rates is essential to entice well-qualified counsel to undertake difficult cases, such as this one. (*San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc’y v. County of San Bernardino* (1984) 155 Cal. App. 3d 738, 755.) Additionally, calculation of a lodestar based on current hourly rates is appropriate as a means of compensating for delay in payment. (*Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei* (1989) 491 U.S. 274, 283-84.)

The requested hourly rates in this case range from \$450.00 per hour to \$1,100.00. (Ly Decl. ¶69.) Class Counsel’s hourly rates are fully supported by their experience and reputation in handling complex employment litigation, including wage and hour class actions. (Ly Decl. ¶70; ¶¶71-78.)

Mr. Kingsley is a 28-year attorney with expertise in wage and hour class action lawsuits.

(Ly Decl. ¶71.) He has litigated several hundred such cases, including at the appellate level at the U.S. Supreme Court, California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the California Court of Appeal. (Ly Decl. ¶72.) He is also a prolific speaker at various seminars on employment law and has contributed to legal publications on employment topics. (Ly Decl. ¶73.) Biographical information for the other handling attorneys is included in the concurrently filed Declaration of Liane Katzenstein Ly. (Ly Decl. ¶¶74-78.)

Abramson Labor Group is a seasoned law firm with extensive expertise with wage and hour class actions lawsuits.² (*See* Declaration of William Zev Abramson ¶¶2-7.)

Class Counsel's charged rates are commensurate with the prevailing market rates in San Diego County for attorneys of comparable experience and skill handling complex litigation. (Ly Decl. ¶80.) Furthermore, Class Counsel's rates in calculating the lodestar are the same rates charged to non-contingent hourly clients and thus necessarily reflect the current market value of counsel's legal services.³ (Ly Decl. ¶81.) Class Counsel has made all reasonable attempts to avoid duplication of assignments and to assign tasks to timekeepers at the appropriate billing rates. (Ly Decl. ¶82.)

Finally, Class Counsel's rates are in line with the 2024-2025 Laffey Matrix, which is a fee scale that courts often consult in determining the reasonableness of hourly rates. Under the adjusted Laffey Matrix, a reasonable rate for an attorney with 20+ years of experience, such as Mr. Kingsley, is \$1141, a reasonable rate for an attorney with 16 years of experience, such as Ms. Ly, is \$948, and a reasonable rate for an attorney with 3 or less years of experience, such as Ms. Bulaon is \$473. (Ly Decl. ¶83; Ex. 4 [2024-2025 Adjusted Laffey Matrix].)

D. The Fees Requested Are Reasonable

The trial court has substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors inadequately reflected therein. (*See Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 40-45.) A lodestar

² Kingsley Szamet & Ly and Abramson Labor Group have entered into a written fee sharing agreement that was also signed by the named Plaintiff. (Ly Decl. ¶78.)

³ The Court should also note that other California courts approved many of these same rates over 15 years ago. (*See, e.g., Bihun v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc.* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 997, disapproved on other grounds, 6 Cal.4th 644, 664 [\$450 hourly rate was a reasonable fee based on counsel's knowledge, skill, experience and reputation].)

multiplier is recognized as earned compensation: “The adjustment to the lodestar, e.g., to provide a fee enhancement reflecting the risk the attorney will not receive payment if the suit does not succeed, constitutes earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous.” (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1138.)

In California, courts regularly use a multiplier of 2.0 or greater in statutory fee cases to approximate market fees.⁴ In fact, “[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.” (*Van Vracken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D.Cal.1995) 901 F.Supp. 294, 298; *see also, Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 [“Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.”].) Here, Class Counsel is not requesting a multiplier. (Ly Decl. ¶86.)

V. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUEST FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS

In addition to their request for fees, Class Counsel further request reimbursement of the reasonable out-of-pocket expenses advanced and/or incurred by them in connection with this litigation, in the amount of \$10,000.00. (Ly Decl. ¶88.) To date, Kingsley Szamet & Ly has incurred \$6,837.95 in costs. (Ly Decl. ¶89.) Class Counsel anticipates incurring an additional \$600.00 in costs to file, serve, and copy this motion; to prepare for and attend the hearing; and for future copy charges, however, pursuant to the Agreement, Class Counsel shall not seek an amount in excess of \$10,000.00 for litigation costs. (Ly Decl. ¶90; Ex. 1 ¶3.22.) As such, Class Counsel is requesting a cost reimbursement of \$7,437.95. (Ly Decl. ¶91; Ex. 1 ¶3.22.)

All of the requested costs are reasonable in amount and were necessarily incurred by Class Counsel in prosecuting this litigation. (Ly Decl. ¶92; Ex. 5 [Cost Report].)

Expenses in this matter to date include costs for filing fees, research, mediation, employment of a database expert to synthesize the tens of thousands of lines of payroll and timekeeping data produced by Defendant to assist with preparation of Plaintiff’s damage model,

⁴ See, for example, *Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n*, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1995) (2.0); *City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 78, 82-85 (2.34); *Coal. for L.A. County Planning v. Bd. of Supervisors* (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 241, 251 (slightly above 2.0); *Crommie v. State of Cal. Public Utilities Comm’n* (N.D. Cal. 1994) 840 F.Supp.719, 726 (2.0 multiplier in employment case).

1 and additional costs for the prosecution of this case evidenced in the costs spreadsheet attached to
2 the Declaration of Liane Katzenstein Ly. All of these costs have been incurred in the course of
3 this litigation, and all costs advanced have already been paid by Class Counsel. (Ly Decl. ¶93.)

4 Accordingly, the requested reimbursement of the reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
5 advanced and/or incurred is appropriate and justified as part of the overall settlement and the Court
6 should approve the request for reimbursement in the amount of \$7,437.95.

7 **VI. THE NAMED PLAINTIFF’S ENHANCEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED**

8 Finally, Plaintiff’s Counsel request an enhancement of \$5,000.00 to the named Plaintiff
9 Johnathan Satele for his work on behalf of the Class. (Ly Decl. ¶94.) As set forth in detail in
10 Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement and Johnathan Satele’s declaration,
11 Plaintiff invested significant time and effort in this case. (Ly Decl. ¶95; Satele Decl. ¶¶6-9.)

12 Plaintiff was also at risk of for paying Defendant’s legal fees and costs in the event that
13 Defendant prevailed at trial. (Ly Decl. ¶99.)

14 The Class has benefited from Mr. Satele’s action in stepping forward on their behalf to
15 bring this lawsuit. (Ly Decl. ¶100.) The average settlement payment is \$218.88 for a Class
16 Member with a high of \$621.38. (Snow Decl. ¶17.)

17 Further, The Class Notice disclosed the enhancement award. (*See* Agreement Ex. 1 [class
18 notice], p. 3.) (Ly Decl. ¶101.) As of today, no Class Member has objected to the proposed
19 enhancement. (Ly Decl. ¶102.)

20 Under the circumstances, a representative payment of \$5,000.00 is justified and the Court
21 should award this payment to Johnathan Satele from the Gross Settlement Amount as provided in
22 the Agreement. (Ly Decl. ¶103.)

23 **VII. PROOF OF SUBMISSION TO THE LABOR AND WORKFORCE** 24 **DEVELOPMENT AGENCY**

25 As indicated on the Proof of Service, Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of Attorneys’ Fees
26 and Costs (“Motion”) was uploaded to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency’s
27 (“LWDA”) website on the date this Motion was filed as required by statute. Proof of submission
28 of Plaintiff’s Motion, all related documents, and copy of the email from the LWDA confirming


1 receipt is attached to the Declaration of Liane Katzenstein Ly as Exhibit “6”. (Ly Decl. ¶104.)

2 **VIII. CONCLUSION**

3 Class Counsel respectfully requests that the Court award a fee equal to 1/3 of the gross
4 settlement amount, or \$23,333.33 and reimbursement of costs of \$7,437.95. Class Counsel also
5 respectfully requests that the Court award an enhancement for the named Plaintiff of \$5,000.00.
6 For the above reasons, all of these requests are appropriate and justified as part of the overall
7 Settlement, and the Court should approve them as reasonable and fair.

8 DATED: December 9, 2024

KINGSLEY SZAMET & LY

9
10 By: 

Liane Katzenstein Ly
Attorneys for Plaintiff Johnathan Satele and the
proposed class

(PROOF OF SERVICE)
[CCP 1013(a)(3)]
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action. My business address is 16133 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1200, Encino, California 91436.

On December 9, 2024, I served all interested parties in this action the following documents described as: **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF** by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN, P.C.
Chelsea Hadaway
Emily T. Patajo
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Los Angeles, CA 90067-2506
CHadaway@ebglaw.com
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Attorneys for Defendant

ABRAMSON LABOR GROUP
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Studio City, CA 91604


Attorneys for Plaintiff

[XX] BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: I caused a true and correct copy thereof to be electronically filed using the Labor and Workforce Development Agency Electronic Filing ("EF") System (<https://dir.tfaforms.net/315>) and service was completed by electronic means by transmittal of the documents referenced herein on the EF System.

[XX] BY ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION: I caused the document to be send to the persons at the e-mail address(es) listed on the attached service list. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. A pdf copy of which was sent via email to the below email address(es).

[XX] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on December 9, 2024, at Woodland Hills, California.



Michelle Tanzer