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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE

NICOLE FRITCH, on behalf of the
State of California, as a private
attorney general,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, a
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: **30-2023-01313737-CU-OE-CXC**

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT**

Hearing Date: September 20, 2024
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.

Judge: Hon. Lon Hurwitz
Dept.: CX103

Action Filed: March 21, 2023
Trial Date: Not set

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTLEMENT.....	2
III.	CASE BACKGROUND.....	4
IV.	THE SETTLEMENT MEETS THE CRITERIA NECESSARY FOR THIS COURT TO GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL	5
A.	The Role Of The Court In Preliminary Approval Of A Class Action Settlement	6
B.	Factors To Be Considered In Granting Preliminarily Approval.....	6
1.	The Settlement is the Product of Serious, Informed and Arm's Length Negotiations by Experienced Counsel.....	7
2.	The Settlement Has No "Obvious Deficiencies" and Falls Within the Range for Approval.....	9
3.	The Settlement Does Not Improperly Grant Preferential Treatment To Class Representatives or Segments Of The Class	12
4.	The Stage Of The Proceedings Are Sufficiently Advanced To Permit Preliminary Approval Of The Settlement	13
V.	THE CLASS IS PROPERLY CERTIFIED FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES	14
A.	California Code of Civil Procedure §382.....	14
B.	The Proposed Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous	15
C.	Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate.....	15
D.	The Claims of the Plaintiff Are Typical of the Class Claims	16
E.	The Class Representation Fairly and Adequately Protected the Class	16
F.	The Superiority Requirement Is Met.....	17
VI.	THE PROPOSED METHOD OF CLASS NOTICE IS APPROPRIATE	17
VII.	CONCLUSION.....	18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

<u>Cases:</u>	<u>Page:</u>
<i>Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.</i> , 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183 (C.D. Cal. 2022)	13
<i>Bowles v. Superior Court</i> , 44 Cal.2d 574 (1955)	15
<i>Brinker v. Superior Court</i> , 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012)	11
<i>Cellphone Termination Fee Cases</i> , 180 Cal.App.4th 1110 (2009)	5
<i>Cho v. Seagate Tech. Holdings, Inc.</i> , 177 Cal. App. 4th 734 (2009)	6
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> , 48 Cal.App.4th 1794 (1996)	5, 6, 8
<i>Dunleavy v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)</i> , 213 F.3d 454 (9 th Cir. 2000)	11, 12
<i>Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.</i> , 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014)	12
<i>Frazier v. City of Richmond</i> , 184 Cal.App.3d 1491 (1986)	5
<i>Gautreaux v. Pierce</i> , 690 F.2d 616 (7 th Cir. 1982)	5
<i>Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.</i> , 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524 (2008)	15
<i>Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.</i> , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D.Cal. 2007)	11, 12, 13
<i>Green v. Obledo</i> , 29 Cal.3d 126 (1981)	5
<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i> , 150 F.3d 1011 (9 th Cir. 1998)	11, 16
<i>In re Tableware Antitrust Litig.</i> , 484 F.Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2007)	7
<i>In re Wash. Public Power Supply System Sec. Litig.</i> , 720 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Ariz. 1989)	9
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker</i> , 168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008)	7, 8

1	<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> ,	15
2	23 Cal. 4th 429 (2003)	
3	<i>Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.</i> ,	13
4	2008 WL 4473183 (S.D.Cal. Oct. 06, 2008)	
5	<i>Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.</i> ,	11
6	2014 WL 2472316 (C.D. Cal. 2014).....	
7	<i>Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.</i> ,	13
8	2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018).....	
9	<i>Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.</i> ,	6
10	221 F.R.D. 523 (C.D. Cal. 2004).....	
11	<i>Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.</i> ,	10, 11
12	15 Cal. 5th 1056 (2024)	
13	<i>Nordstrom Comm'n Cases</i> ,	5
14	186 Cal. App. 4th 576 (2010)	
15	<i>Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n, etc.</i> ,	5, 6
16	688 F.2d. 615 (9th Cir. 1982)	
17	<i>Reaves v. Ketoro, Inc.</i> ,	17
18	2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 167926 (C.D. Cal. 2020).....	
19	<i>Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.</i> ,	13
20	2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865 (N.D. Cal. 2019).....	
21	<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i> ,	15
22	126 Cal.App.3d 926 (1981)	
23	<i>Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court</i> ,	14, 15, 17
24	34 Cal. 4th 319 (2004)	
25	<i>Sayaman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.</i> ,	6
26	2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151997 (C.D. Cal. 2010).....	
27	<i>Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.</i> ,	11
28	2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671 (N.D. Cal. 2015).....	
	<i>Tate v. Weyerhaeuser Co.</i> ,	16
	723 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1983)	
	<i>Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.</i> ,	17
	97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996)	
	<i>Vasquez v. Superior Court</i> ,	5
	4 Cal.3d 800 (1971).....	
	<i>Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.</i> ,	11
	2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016)	

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiff Nicole Fritch (“Plaintiff”) respectfully submits this memorandum in support of the
3 unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement with Defendant The
4 Coca-Cola Company (“Defendant”), and seeks entry of an order: (1) preliminarily approving the
5 proposed settlement of this class action with Defendant; (2) for settlement purposes only, conditionally
6 certifying the Class, which is comprised of “all individuals currently or formerly employed by
7 Defendant in California and classified as an hourly, non-exempt employee at any time during the Class
8 Period, excluding any *Flores* Settlement Members who worked from February 1, 2019 to February 23,
9 2022, and whose employment terminated on or before February 23, 2022 and who has not been since
10 rehired by Defendant The Coca-Cola Company;” (3) provisionally appointing Plaintiff as the
11 representative of the Class; (4) provisionally appointing Norman B. Blumenthal, Kyle R. Nordrehaug,
12 Aparajit Bhowmik, Nicholas J. De. Blouw, Victoria Rivapalacio, Piya Mukherjee, Jeffrey S. Herman,
13 and Charlotte James of Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP as Class Counsel; (5)
14 approving the form and method for providing class-wide notice; (6) directing that notice of the proposed
15 settlement be given to the class; (7) appointing ILYM Group as Administrator; and (8) scheduling a
16 final approval hearing date, proposed for March 14, 2025, to consider Plaintiff’s motion for final
17 approval of the settlement and for approval of attorneys' fees and expenses. Plaintiff and Defendant
18 (collectively the “Parties”) have reached a full and final settlement of the above-captioned action, which
19 is embodied in the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) filed concurrently
20 with the Court.¹ A copy of the fully executed Agreement is attached as Exhibit #1 to the Declaration
21 of Kyle Nordrehaug (“Decl. Nordrehaug”), served and filed herewith. The form of the Agreement is
22 based upon the Los Angeles County Superior Court model form for a class and PAGA settlement.

23 As consideration for this Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount is One Million Five Hundred
24 Thousand Dollars (\$1,500,000) (the “Gross Settlement Amount”) to be paid by Defendant, as set forth
25 in the Agreement. The Gross Settlement Amount will settle all issues pending in the Action between
26 the Parties and will be made in full and final settlement of the Released Class Claims in exchange for
27

28 ¹ Capitalized terms shall have the same meaning as defined in the Agreement.

the payments to Participating Class Members from the Net Settlement Amount, and includes (a) the costs of administration of the settlement, (b) all attorneys' fees and costs, (c) Class Representative Service Payment, and (d) the PAGA Penalties payment allocated 75% to the LWDA and 25% to the Aggrieved Employees. (Agreement at ¶ 1.23.) The Gross Settlement Amount does not include the employer's share of payroll taxes which will be separately paid by Defendant. (Id.) The Settlement is all-in with no reversion to Defendant and no need to submit a claim form. (Id.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶3. The following is a table of the key financial terms of the Settlement and the proposed deductions:

\$1,500,000 (Gross Settlement Amount)

- \$10,000 (Plaintiff's proposed service award not to exceed amount)
- \$50,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
- \$500,000 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed 1/3 of settlement)
- \$30,000 (PAGA Payment - 75% to LWDA / 25% to Aggrieved Employees)
- \$12,000 (Administration Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)

\$898,000 (Net Settlement Amount)

Based upon 927 Class Members who collectively worked 107,411 Workweeks, the Gross Settlement Amount provides an average value of \$1,618 per Class Member and \$13.96 per Workweek and after deductions the Net Settlement Amount provides an average recovery of \$968.71 per Class Member and a recovery of \$8.36 per Workweek. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶6.

On April 3, 2024, the Parties participated in an all-day mediation session presided over by Tripper Ortman, a respected and experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions. Following the mediation, the Parties agreed on the basic terms of a settlement pursuant to a mediator's proposal which was memorialized in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶5. The Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be preliminarily approved because there is a substantial monetary payment, and there are significant litigation and class-certification risks. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant preliminary approval of the Agreement and enter the proposed order submitted herewith.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTLEMENT

The Gross Settlement Amount is One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$1,500,000). (Agreement at ¶ 1.23.) Under the Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount consists of the following elements: (1) payment of the Individual Class Payments to the Participating Class Members; (2) Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment; (3) Administration Expenses

1 Payment; (4) the Class Representative Service Payment to the Plaintiff; and (5) the PAGA Penalties
2 payment. (Agreement at ¶ 1.23.) The Gross Settlement Amount does not include Defendant's share
3 of payroll taxes. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) The Gross Settlement Amount shall be all-in with no reversion
4 to Defendant. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶15.

5 Defendant shall fully fund the Gross Settlement Amount, and also fund the amounts necessary
6 to fully pay Defendant's share of payroll taxes by transmitting the funds to the Administrator no later
7 than 10 calendar days after the Effective Date. (Agreement at ¶ 4.3.) The distribution of Individual
8 Class Payments to Participating Class Members along with the other Court-approved distributions shall
9 be made by the Administrator within fourteen (14) days after Defendant funds the Gross Settlement
10 Amount. (Agreement at ¶ 5.1.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶16.

11 The amount remaining in the Gross Settlement Amount after the deduction of Court-approved
12 amounts for Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, the Class Representative Service
13 Payment, the Class Counsel Fees Payment, the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the
14 Administration Expenses Payment (called the "Net Settlement Amount") shall be allocated to Class
15 Members as their Individual Class Payments. (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.29 and 3.2.) From the Net Settlement
16 Amount, the Individual Class Payment for each Participating Class Member will be calculated by (a)
17 dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating
18 Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
19 Member's Workweeks. The Workweek calculation will exclude, for any *Flores* Settlement Members,
20 those workweeks worked from February 1, 2019 and February 23, 2022. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(e).)
21 Workweeks will be based on Defendant's records, however, Class Members can challenge their number
22 of Workweeks. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶17.

23 Class Members may choose to opt-out of the Settlement by following the directions in the Class
24 Notice. (Agreement at ¶ 8.5, Ex. A.) All Class Members who do not "opt out" will be deemed
25 Participating Class Members who will be bound by the Settlement and will be entitled to receive an
26 Individual Class Payment. (Agreement at ¶ 8.5(c).) All Aggrieved Employees, including those who
27 submit an opt-out request, will still be paid their allocation of the PAGA Penalties and will remain
28 subject to the release of the Released PAGA Claims regardless of their request for exclusion.

(Agreement at ¶¶ 6.3 and 8.5(d).) Finally, the Class Notice will advise the Class Members of their right to object to the Settlement and/or dispute their Workweeks. (Agreement at ¶¶ 8.6 and 8.7, Ex. A.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶18.

A Participating Class Member must cash his or her Individual Class Payment check within 180 days after it is mailed. (Agreement at ¶ 5.2.) Any settlement checks not cashed within 180 days will be voided and any funds represented by such checks to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of C.C.P. § 384(b). (Agreement at ¶ 5.4.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶19.

Subject to Court approval, the Parties have agreed on ILYM Group to administer the settlement in this action ("Administrator"). (Agreement at ¶ 1.2.) The Administrator will be paid for settlement administration in an amount not to exceed \$12,000. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(c).) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶20.

Subject to Court approval, the Agreement provides for Class Counsel to be awarded a sum not to exceed one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount, as the Class Counsel Fees Payment. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(b).) Class Counsel will also be allowed to apply separately for an award of Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment in an amount not to exceed \$50,000. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(b).) Subject to Court approval, the Agreement provides for a payment of no more than \$10,000 to the Plaintiff as the Class Representative Service Payment. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶21.

Subject to Court approval, the PAGA Penalties will be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount for PAGA penalties under the California Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code Section 2698, *et seq.* ("PAGA"). The PAGA Penalties are \$30,000. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(d).) Pursuant to the express requirements of Labor Code § 2699(i), the PAGA Payment shall be allocated as follows: 75% shall be allocated to the Labor Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") as its share of the civil penalties and 25% allocated to the Individual PAGA Payments to be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees based on the number of their respective PAGA Pay Periods. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(d).) As set forth in the accompany proof of service, the LWDA has been served with this motion and the Agreement. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶22.

III. CASE BACKGROUND

The description of the case and claims, along with the procedural history is set forth in the

1 Declaration of Kyle Nordrehaug at ¶¶ 7-14. The Parties engaged in thorough investigation and the
2 exchange of documents and information in connection with the Action over one year which permitted
3 Class Counsel to perform a thorough analysis of the claims. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶¶ 10 and 14. The
4 Parties participated in mediation on April 3, 2024 with Tripper Ortman, which after arms' length
5 negotiations, resulted in this Settlement. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶12.

6 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT MEETS THE CRITERIA NECESSARY FOR THIS COURT TO**
7 **GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

8 California "[p]ublic policy generally favors the compromise of complex class action litigation."
9 *Nordstrom Comm'n Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 581 (2010) quoting *Cellphone Termination Fee*
10 *Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117-18 (2009). Class action settlements are approved where the
11 proposed settlement is "fair, adequate and reasonable." *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794,
12 1801 (1996) (citing *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
13 denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983)).

14 Preliminary approval is the first of three steps that comprise the approval procedure for
15 settlements of class actions. The second step is the dissemination of notice of the settlement to all class
16 members. The third step is a final settlement approval hearing, at which evidence and argument
17 concerning the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement may be presented, and class
18 members may be heard regarding the settlement. *See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794,
19 1801 (1996); *Manual for Complex Litigation, Second* §30.44 (1993); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769.

20 The primary question presented on an application for preliminary approval of a proposed class
21 action settlement is whether the proposed settlement is "within the range of possible approval." *Manual*
22 *for Complex Litigation, Second* §30.44 at 229; *Gautreaux v. Pierce*, 690 F.2d 616, 621 n.3 (7th Cir.
23 1982).² Preliminary approval is merely the prerequisite to giving notice so that "the proposed
24 settlement... may be submitted to members of the prospective Class for their acceptance or rejection."

25
26 ² California courts look to federal authority on class actions. *Vasquez v. Superior Court*, 4 Cal.3d
27 800, 821 (1971). "It is well established that in the absence of relevant state precedents trial courts are
28 urged to follow the procedures prescribed in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
conducting class actions." *Frazier v. City of Richmond*, 184 Cal. App.3d 1491, 1499 (1986), citing
Green v. Obledo, 29 Cal.3d 126, 145-146 (1981).

1 *Sayaman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151997, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2010). There is
2 "a presumption of fairness . . . where . . . [a] settlement is reached through arms-length bargaining."
3 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245 (2001) (citation omitted); see also *Cho v.*
4 *Seagate Tech. Holdings, Inc.*, 177 Cal. App. 4th 734, 742-45 (2009) (upholding trial court's
5 determination that settlement was "fair, reasonable and adequate" where the settlement "provided
6 valuable benefits to the class . . . that were 'particularly valuable in light of the risks plaintiff would have
7 faced if she proceeded to litigate her case.'"); *Newberg*, 3d Ed., §11.41, p.11-88. However, the ultimate
8 question of whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate is made after notice of the
9 settlement is given to the class members and a final settlement hearing is held by the Court.

10 **A. The Role Of The Court In Preliminary Approval Of A Class Action Settlement**

11 The approval of a proposed settlement of a class action is a matter within the broad discretion
12 of the trial court. *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 234-235; *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794. In
13 considering a potential settlement for preliminary approval purposes, the trial court does not have to
14 reach any ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the dispute,
15 and need not engage in a trial on the merits. *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 239-40; *Dunk, supra*,
16 48 Cal.App. 4th at 1807. The Ninth Circuit explains, "the very essence of a settlement is compromise,
17 'a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.'" *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 624.
18 Thus, when analyzing the settlement, the amount is "not to be judged against a hypothetical or
19 speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators." *Officers for Justice*, 688
20 F.2d at 625, 628.

21 With regard to class action settlements, the opinions of counsel should be given considerable
22 weight both because of counsel's familiarity with this litigation and previous experience with cases such
23 as these. *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625. As a result, courts hold that the recommendation of
24 counsel is entitled to significant weight. *Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D.
25 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

26 **B. Factors To Be Considered In Granting Preliminary Approval**

27 A number of factors are to be considered in evaluating a settlement for purposes of preliminary
28 approval. In determining whether to grant preliminary approval, the court considers whether the "(1)

1 the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, (2)
2 has no obvious deficiencies, (3) does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives
3 or segments of the class, and (4) falls within the range of possible approval." *In re Tableware Antitrust*
4 *Litig.*, 484 F.Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Courts hold that "a presumption of fairness exists
5 where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery
6 are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar
7 litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small." *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.
8 App. 4th 116, 128 (2008). Here, the Settlement meets all of these criteria for preliminary approval and
9 therefore the presumption applies.

10 **1. The Settlement is the Product of Serious, Informed and**
11 **Arm's Length Negotiations by Experienced Counsel**

12 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations before
13 an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continues to deny any
14 wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiff and Class
15 Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released Class
16 Claims of the Class in accordance with this Settlement.³

17 ³ The release applicable to the Class is appropriately tethered to allegations in the Action and the
18 "Released Class Claims" are narrowly defined as "all claims set forth in the Operative Complaint that
19 occurred during the Class Period, including: (1) unfair competition; (2) failure to pay minimum wages;
20 (3) failure to pay overtime wages; (4) failure to provide meal periods; (5) failure to provide rest periods;
21 (6) failure to provide accurate itemized statements; (7) failure to reimburse employees for required
22 expenses; (8) failure to provide wages when due; and (9) failure to pay sick wages; as well as any claims
23 that could have been pled from the same or similar facts pled in the Operative Complaint, including
24 those claims for interest, penalties (including waiting time penalties), as well as any claims under the
25 California Labor Code for violations of Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 218, 221, 226,
26 226.7, 233, 246, 247, 510, 512, 558, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2802,
27 2810.5; Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.; the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
28 201, et seq. ("FLSA"); and the applicable California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. The
Released Class Claims include any claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, restitution, alleged
or which could have been alleged under the facts, allegations and/or claims pleaded in the Operative
Complaint that occurred during the Class Period. The Released Class Claims exclude all class claims
outside of the Class Period, including Plaintiff's individual claims that are subject to a separate release,
claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act,
unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or class claims based on
facts occurring outside the Class Period, and, for *Flores* Settlement Class Members, the claims that were

1 Class Counsel are experienced and qualified to evaluate the class claims, the defenses asserted,
2 and the risks and benefits of trial and settlement, and Class Counsel are particularly experienced in wage
3 and hour employment class actions, as Class Counsel has previously litigated and certified similar
4 claims against other employers. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶31. The view of qualified and well-informed
5 counsel that a class action settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable is entitled to significant weight.
6 *See Kullar v. Foot Locker*, 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 133 (2008) (the trial court "undoubtedly should
7 continue to place reliance on the competence and integrity of counsel, the involvement of a qualified
8 mediator, and the paucity of objectors to the settlement."); *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802.

9 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Tripper Ortman, a respected and
10 experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions, in order to reach this Settlement. In preparation
11 for the mediation, Defendant provided Class Counsel with payroll and employment data and other
12 information regarding the Class Members, various internal documents, and other compensation and
13 employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the data with the assistance of damages expert
14 Berger Consulting and prepared and submitted a mediation brief to the mediator. The final settlement
15 terms were negotiated and set forth in the Agreement now presented for this Court's approval. Decl.
16 Nordrehaug at ¶ 5. Importantly, Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that this Settlement is fair,
17 reasonable and adequate.

18 As consideration for this Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid by Defendant is
19 One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$1,500,000). The Settlement is all-in with no reversion
20 to Defendant and no need to submit a claim form. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶ 3.

21 Class Counsel has conducted an investigation into the facts of the class action. Both formal and
22 informal discovery was performed along with the production of hundreds of pages of relevant
23 documents. Class Counsel engaged in a thorough review and analysis of the relevant documents and
24 data with the assistance of an expert. Accordingly, the agreement to settle did not occur until Class
25 Counsel possessed sufficient information to make an informed judgment regarding the likelihood of

26
27
28 already resolved and released in the *Flores* settlement for the period between July 31, 2018 and
February 23, 2022." (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.40 and 6.2.)

1 success on the merits and the results that could be obtained through further litigation. In addition, Class
2 Counsel previously negotiated settlements with other employers in actions involving nearly identical
3 issues and analogous defenses. Based on the foregoing data and their own independent investigation,
4 evaluation and experience, Class Counsel believes that the settlement with Defendant on the terms set
5 forth in the Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interest of the Class in light
6 of all known facts and circumstances, including the risk of significant delay, defenses asserted by
7 Defendant, and potential appellate issues. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶ 14.

8 Plaintiff and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of continuing to litigate and trying
9 this Action against Defendant through possible appeals which could take several years. Class Counsel
10 has also taken into account the uncertain outcome and risk of litigation, especially in complex class
11 actions such as this Action. Class Counsel is also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of
12 proof under, and alleged defenses to, the claims asserted in the Action. Based upon their evaluation,
13 Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth in the Agreement is in the best
14 interest of the Class Members. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶ 23.

15 Here, there can be no dispute that the litigation has been hard-fought with aggressive and
16 capable advocacy on both sides. The Parties were represented by experienced counsel who zealously
17 advocated their positions. Accordingly, “[t]here is likewise every reason to conclude that settlement
18 negotiations were vigorously conducted at arms’ length and without any suggestion of undue influence.”
19 *In re Wash. Public Power Supply System Sec. Litig.*, 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (D. Ariz. 1989).

20 **2. The Settlement Has No "Obvious Deficiencies" and Falls Well Within** 21 **the Range for Approval**

22 The proposed Settlement herein has no "obvious deficiencies" and is well within the range of
23 possible approval. All Class Members will receive an opportunity to participate in the Settlement and
24 receive payment according to the same formula. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(e).) Based upon 927 Class
25 Members who collectively worked 107,411 Workweeks, the Gross Settlement Amount provides an
26 average value of \$1,618 per Class Member and \$13.96 per Workweek and after deductions the Net
27 Settlement Amount provides an average recovery of \$968.71 per Class Member and a recovery of \$8.36
28 per Workweek. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6.

1 The calculations to compensate for the amount due for the Class at the time of the mediation
2 were calculated by Berger Consulting, Plaintiff's damages expert. As to the Class whose claims are at
3 issue in this Action, Plaintiff used the expert to analyze the data and determine the potential unpaid
4 wages for the employees. The maximum potential damages as calculated by Plaintiff's expert were
5 calculated to be \$4,392,741 for the alleged unpaid wages due to off-the-clock work based upon 1 hour
6 per week, \$99,078 for the alleged unpaid overtime due to miscalculation of the regular rate, \$8,910 in
7 alleged underpaid meal premiums and sick pay due to the miscalculation of the regular rate, \$1,503,424
8 for alleged meal period damages based upon a 10.7% potential violation rate observed in the time
9 records for shifts worked and after deducting meal premiums already paid by Defendant, \$1,557,946
10 for alleged rest period damages based on the same 10.7% potential violation rate observed for meal
11 periods, and \$139,235 for alleged unreimbursed business expenses for personal cell phone usage at \$5
12 per month. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6. As a result, the total damage valuation was calculated that Defendant
13 was subject to a maximum damage claim in the amount of \$7,701,334. As to potential penalties,
14 Plaintiff calculated that potential waiting time penalties were a maximum of between \$2,528,693 and
15 \$2,918,288, depending on the predicate violation, and potential wage statement penalties were
16 \$2,472,000. Defendant vigorously disputed Plaintiff's calculations and exposure theories. Decl.
17 Nordrehaug, ¶6.

18 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$1,500,000 is equivalent to the maximum
19 damages in this Action, and represents more than 19% of the maximum value of the alleged damages
20 at issue in this case at the time this Settlement was negotiated.⁴ Importantly, the recent decision that
21 good faith belief of compliance by the employer in *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th
22 1056, 1065 (2024), could completely negate the claims for waiting time and wage statement penalties,
23 even if wages were owed to the Class. The above maximum calculations should then be adjusted in
24 consideration for both the risk of class certification and the risk of establishing class-wide liability on
25 all claims. Given the amount of the settlement as compared to the potential value of claims in this case

27 ⁴ Because the PAGA claim is not a class claim and primarily is paid to the State of California,
28 Plaintiff has not included the PAGA claim in this discussion of the value of the class claims. The
PAGA claim is addressed in the Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶33.

1 and the defenses asserted by Defendant, this settlement is fair and reasonable.⁵ Clearly, the goal of this
2 litigation has been met. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6.

3 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
4 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by
5 Defendant present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiff and the other Class Members. Defendant
6 asserted that Defendant's practices complied with all applicable Labor laws. Defendant argued that
7 Class Members were paid for all time worked and that all work time was properly recorded. Defendant
8 argued that there was no miscalculation of the regular rate. Defendant contended that its meal and rest
9 period policies fully complied with California law and Defendant did not fail to provide the opportunity
10 for legally required meal and rest breaks. Defendant contended that there was no failure to pay for
11 business expenses, and that a company cell phone was provided to Plaintiff (and other employees), so
12 any cell phone usage was merely convenient and voluntary such that reimbursement was not legally
13 required. Finally, Defendant could argue that the Supreme Court decision in *Brinker v. Superior Court*,
14 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), weakened Plaintiff's claims, on liability, value, and class certifiability as to
15 the meal and rest period claims. Defendant also argues that based on its facially lawful practices,
16 Defendant acted in good faith and without willfulness, which if accepted would negate the claims for
17 waiting time penalties and/or inaccurate wage statements. See e.g. *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs.,*
18 *Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024) ("if an employer reasonably and in good faith believed it was
19 providing a complete and accurate wage statement in compliance with the requirements of section 226,
20 then it has not knowingly and intentionally failed to comply with the wage statement law.") If
21

22 ⁵ See *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving a
23 settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated overtime
24 damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12
25 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where "the proposed Total Settlement Amount represents
26 approximately 10% of what class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Dunleavy v.*
27 *Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming approval of
28 a class settlement which represented "roughly one-sixth of the potential recovery".) See also *Viceral v.*
Mistras Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action
settlement amounting to 8.1% of full value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%"
of maximum valuation).

1 successful, Defendant's defenses could eliminate or substantially reduce any recovery to the Class.
2 While Plaintiff believes that these defenses could be overcome, Defendant maintains these defenses
3 have merit and therefore present a serious risk to recovery by the Class. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶ 24.

4 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiff would be unable
5 to obtain a certified class and maintain the certified class through trial, and thereby not recover on behalf
6 of any other employees. At the time of the mediation, Defendant forcefully opposed the propriety of
7 class certification, arguing that individual issues precluded class certification. Further, as demonstrated
8 by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.*, 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014),
9 there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery even where the class has been
10 certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and hour claims, class
11 certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified class through trial was
12 by no means a foregone conclusion. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶ 25.

13 After arm's length negotiations between experienced and informed counsel, the Parties
14 recognized the potential risks and agreed on the Settlement with a Gross Settlement Amount of
15 \$1,500,000. As the Court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar to those here:

16 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,
17 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of how
18 this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely
19 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of
20 litigating an appeal. 'The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be
21 considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement.'

22 2007 WL 221862, at *4 (quoting *In re Mego Financial Corp. Securities Litigation*, 213 F.3d 454, 458
23 (9th Cir. 2000)).

24 **3. The Settlement Does Not Improperly Grant Preferential Treatment To** 25 **Class Representatives or Segments Of The Class**

26 The relief provided in the Settlement will benefit all members of the Class. The Settlement does
27 not grant preferential treatment to Plaintiff or segments of the Class in any way. Payments to the Class
28 Members are all determined under a neutral methodology. Each Participating Class Member will
receive the same opportunity to participate in and receive payment through a neutral formula that is
based upon the Workweeks for that individual. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶4.

Plaintiff will apply to the Court for a Class Representative Service Payment in consideration for

her service and for the risks undertaken on behalf of the Class. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).) Plaintiff performed her duties admirably by working with Class Counsel for over one year. The Declaration of the Plaintiff is submitted herewith in support. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶27. At this stage, the requested service award of \$10,000 is well within the accepted range of awards for purposes of preliminary approval. *See e.g. Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (the requested service awards of \$15,000 each are appropriate); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865, at *19 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting request for \$12,500 service award); *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500); *Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 WL 4473183, *7 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (awarding \$25,000 service award to each of six plaintiffs); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 WL 221862, *16-17 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (awarding \$25,000 service award in overtime class action). As explained in *Glass*, service awards are routinely awarded to class representatives to compensate the employees for the time and effort expended on the case, for the risk of litigation, for the fear of suing an employer and retaliation there from, and to serve as an incentive to vindicate the statutory rights of all employees. 2007 WL 221862 at *16-17.

4. The Stage Of The Proceedings Are Sufficiently Advanced To Permit Preliminary Approval Of The Settlement

The stage of the proceedings at which this Settlement was reached also militates in favor of preliminary approval and ultimately, final approval of the Settlement. Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of the class action. Class Counsel began investigating the Class Members' claims before the Action were filed, and during the course of litigation, Class Counsel performed both formal and informal discovery which included the production of hundreds of pages of documents. Class Counsel conducted a review and analysis of the relevant documents and data. Class Counsel was also experienced with the claims at issue here, as Class Counsel previously litigated and settled similar claims in other actions. Accordingly, the agreement to settle did not occur until Class Counsel possessed sufficient information to make an informed judgment regarding the likelihood of success on the merits and the results that could be obtained through further litigation. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶28.

1 Based on the foregoing data and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
2 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement with Defendant for the consideration and on the terms set
3 forth in the Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interest of the Class in light
4 of all known facts and circumstances, including the risk of significant delay, defenses asserted by
5 Defendant, and numerous potential appellate issues. There can be no doubt that Counsel for both
6 Parties possessed sufficient information to make an informed judgment regarding the likelihood of
7 success on the merits and the results that could be obtained through further litigation. Decl. Nordrehaug
8 at ¶29.

9 **V. THE CLASS IS PROPERLY CERTIFIED FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY**

10 Plaintiff contends that the proposed settlement meets all of the requirements for class
11 certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 as demonstrated below, and therefore, the
12 Court may appropriately approve the Class as defined in the Agreement. This Court should
13 conditionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only, defined as follows:

14 All individuals currently or formerly employed by Defendant in California and
15 classified as an hourly, non-exempt employee at any time during the Class Period,
16 excluding any *Flores* Settlement Members who worked from February 1, 2019 to
February 23, 2022, and whose employment terminated on or before February 23, 2022
and who has not been since rehired by Defendant The Coca-Cola Company.

17 (Agreement at ¶ 1.4.)

18 The Class Period is February 1, 2019, through August 3, 2024. (Agreement at ¶ 1.12.)

19 **A. California Code of Civil Procedure § 382**

20 Plaintiff seeks certification of this Class for settlement purposes under California Code of Civil
21 Procedure § 382. The California Supreme Court has summarized the standard for determining whether
22 class certification is appropriate as follows:

23 Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 authorizes class actions “when the question is one
24 of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and
25 it is impracticable to bring them all before the court....” The party seeking certification
26 has the burden to establish the existence of both an ascertainable class and a well-
27 defined community of interest among class members. (*citations omitted*). The
“community of interest” requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common
28 questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the
class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.

Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 326 (2004).

1 While Defendant reserves all rights to dispute that the Plaintiff can satisfy these requirements,
2 the Parties agree that Defendant will not dispute that these requirements may be satisfied in this case
3 for purposes of settlement only and therefore, the proposed Class should be certified for purposes of
4 settlement only. (Agreement at ¶ 2.13.)

5 **B. The Proposed Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous**

6 Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class of hourly, non-exempt employees of Defendant
7 during the Class Period. Plaintiff asserts that all of these individuals are ascertainable because the class
8 members can readily be determined through examination of Defendant's files. Given that the Class
9 consists of approximately 927 members, Plaintiff maintains that numerosity is clearly satisfied. *See*
10 *Bowles v. Superior Court*, 44 Cal.2d 574 (1955) (class with 10 members sufficiently numerous); *Rose*
11 *v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981) (class of 48 members satisfies numerosity
12 requirement.) Here, Plaintiff asserts that the 927 current and former employees that comprise the Class
13 can be identified based on Defendant's records and are sufficiently numerous for class certification.
14 Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶30.

15 **C. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate**

16 Predominance of common issues of law or fact does not require that the common issues be
17 dispositive of the entire controversy or even that they be dispositive of all liability issues. 1 *Newberg*
18 *on Class Actions*, Section 4.25 at 4-82, 4-83 (1992). "Predominance is a comparative concept, and 'the
19 necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility and damages does not mean individual
20 fact questions predominate.'" *Sav-On*, 34 Cal. 4th at 334.

21 Commonality exists if there is a predominant common legal question regarding how an
22 employer's policies impact its employees. *Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524,
23 1536 (2008) ("[T]he common legal question remains the overall impact of Diva's policies on its
24 drivers.") Whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on their theory of recovery is irrelevant at the
25 certification stage since the question is "essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action
26 is legally or factually meritorious." *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 439-440 (2003).

27 Here, Plaintiff contends that common questions of law and fact are present, specifically the
28 common questions of whether Defendant's employment practices were lawful, whether Defendant

1 failed to provide meal and rest periods to Class Members, whether Defendant miscalculated the regular
2 rate when paying wages to the Class, whether Class members were lawfully compensated for all hours
3 worked, whether Defendant failed to provide required expense reimbursement, and whether Class
4 Members are entitled to damages and penalties as a result of these practices. Plaintiff contends that
5 certification of this Class is appropriate because Defendant allegedly engaged in uniform practices with
6 respect to the Class Members. As a result, these common questions of liability could be answered on
7 a class wide basis. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶30. Defendant disputes that common questions predominate
8 but will not oppose such a finding for purposes of this Settlement only.

9 **D. The Claims of the Plaintiff Are Typical of the Class Claims**

10 The typicality requirement requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the members of the class
11 have the same or similar claims as the Plaintiff. “The typicality requirement is met when the claims of
12 the [p]laintiff arise from the same event or are based on the same legal theories.” *Tate v. Weyerhaeuser*
13 *Co.*, 723 F.2d 598, 608 (8th Cir. 1983). In *Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at 1020, the Ninth Circuit held that
14 “[u]nder the rule's permissive standards, representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably
15 coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.”

16 In the instant case, Plaintiff contends that the typicality requirement is fully satisfied. Plaintiff,
17 like every other member of the Class, was employed by Defendant during the Class Period, and, like
18 every other member of the Class, was subject to the same employment practices. Plaintiff, like every
19 other member of the Class, also claim owed compensation as a result of the Defendant’s uniform
20 company policies and practices. Thus, the claims of Plaintiff and the members of the Class arise from
21 the same course of conduct by Defendant, involve the same issues, and are based on the same legal
22 theories. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶30. For purposes of settlement, Plaintiff asserts that the typicality
23 requirement is met as to the common issues presented in this case. Defendant does not oppose a finding
24 of typicality for purposes of this Settlement only.

25 **E. The Class Representation Fairly and Adequately Protected the Class**

26 Plaintiff contends that the Class Members are adequately represented here because Plaintiff and
27 representing counsel (a) do not have any conflicts of interest with other class members, and (b) will
28 prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of the class. *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020. This requirement is

1 met here. First, Plaintiff is well aware of her duties as the representative of the Class and has actively
2 participated in the prosecution of this case to date. Plaintiff effectively communicated with Class
3 Counsel, provided documents and information to Class Counsel, and participated in the investigation
4 and resolution of the Action. The personal involvement of the Plaintiff was essential to the prosecution
5 of the Action and the monetary settlement reached. Second, Plaintiff retained competent counsel who
6 are experienced in employment class actions and who have no conflicts. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶ 31.
7 Third, there is no antagonism between the interests of the Plaintiff and those of the Class. Both the
8 Plaintiff and the Class Members seek monetary relief under the same set of facts and legal theories.
9 Under such circumstances, there can be no conflicts of interest, and adequacy of representation is
10 satisfied. *Reaves v. Ketoro, Inc.*, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 167926, *23 (C.D. Cal. 2020). Defendant
11 disputes that the adequacy requirement is satisfied but will not oppose such a finding for purposes of
12 this Settlement only.

13 **F. The Superiority Requirement Is Met**

14 To certify a class, the Court must also determine that a class action is superior to other available
15 methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. “Where classwide litigation of
16 common issues will reduce litigation costs and promote greater efficiency, a class action may be
17 superior to other methods of litigation.” *Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.*, 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir.
18 1996). As courts have previously observed:

19 Absent class treatment, each individual plaintiff would present in separate, duplicative
20 proceedings the same or essentially the same arguments and evidence, including expert
21 testimony. The result would be a multiplicity of trials conducted at enormous expense
22 to both the judicial system and the litigants.

23 *Sav-On*, 34 Cal. 4th at 340.

24 Here, Plaintiff contends that a class action is the superior mechanism for resolution of the claims
25 as pled by the Plaintiff. While Defendant disputes that class treatment is superior, Defendant does not
26 dispute a finding of superiority in this action for purposes of this Settlement only.

27 **VI. THE PROPOSED METHOD OF CLASS NOTICE IS APPROPRIATE**

28 The Court has broad discretion in approving a practical notice program. The Parties have agreed
upon procedures by which the Class Members will be provided with written notice of the Settlement

1 similar to that approved and utilized in hundreds of class action settlements. In accordance with the
2 Agreement, Defendant will provide to the Administrator a confidential electronic spreadsheet
3 containing the Class Data. (Agreement at ¶ 4.2.) Within 14 days after receiving the Class Data, the
4 Administrator will mail the Class Notice Packet to all Class Members via first-class U.S. Mail using
5 the most current mailing address information available. (Agreement at ¶ 8.4(b).) The Class Notice
6 Packet will include a Request for Exclusion form and a Dispute form in the mailing. (Agreement at ¶
7 1.11.)

8 The Class Notice, drafted jointly and agreed upon by the Parties through their respective counsel
9 and to be approved by the Court, includes all relevant information. (See Exhibit “A” to the Agreement.)
10 The Class Notice will include, among other information: (i) information regarding the Action; (ii) the
11 impact on the rights of the Class Members if they do not opt out, including a description of the
12 applicable release; (iii) information to the Class Members regarding how to opt out and how to object
13 to the Settlement; (iv) the estimated Individual Class Payment for each of the Class Members; (iii) the
14 amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses to be sought; (v) the amount of the Plaintiff’s service award
15 request; and (vi) the anticipated expenses of the Administrator. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶32.

16 The Class Notice will state that the Class Members shall have forty-five (45) days from the date
17 that the Class Notice is mailed to them (the “Response Deadline”) to request exclusion (opt-out) or to
18 submit a written objection. (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.44, 8.5, 8.7.) Class Members shall be given the
19 opportunity to object to the Settlement and/or requests for attorneys’ fees and expenses and to appear
20 at the Final Approval Hearing. (Agreement at ¶ 8.7.) Class Members who do not submit a timely and
21 proper request to opt-out will automatically receive a payment of their Individual Class Payment. This
22 notice program was designed to meaningfully reach the Class Members and it advises them of all
23 pertinent information concerning the Settlement. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶32. The mailing and
24 distribution of the Class Notice satisfies the requirements of due process and is the best notice
25 practicable under the circumstances and complies with Rules of Court 3.766 and 3.769(f).

26 **VII. CONCLUSION**

27 Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed settlement and
28 sign the proposed Preliminary Approval Order, and schedule the final approval hearing for the proposed

1 date of March 14, 2025, which is a date that is at least one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of
2 Preliminary Approval.

3 Dated: August 23, 2024

**BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK
DE BLOUW LLP**

By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug
Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
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