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as an individual and on behalf of all employees similarly situated

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

WILLIAM MOJICA, as an individual and on behalf of
all employees similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

MILROSE CONSULTANTS, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company; PERMIT ADVISORS,
LLC; a Delaware Limited Liability Company; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants.

Case No.: 25STCV24736

[Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Elihu
M. Berle]

**CLASS AND PAGA REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION**

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS AND PAGA
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Date: September 2, 2026
Time: 10 a.m.
Courtroom: Dept. 6
Judge: Hon. Elihu M. Berle

Action Filed: August 21, 2025
Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 2, 2026, at 10 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the
3 matter may be heard, in Department 6 of the above-captioned Court, located at 312 North Spring Street,
4 Los Angeles, California 90012, Plaintiff WILLIAM MOJICA (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move
5 this Court for an order:

6 1. Granting class certification of the Class, solely for settlement purposes pursuant to
7 Code of Civil Procedure § 382;

8 2. Preliminarily approving the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT
9 AGREEMENT (“Settlement” or “Agreement”);

10 3. Appointing counsel for Plaintiff, Tunyan Law, APC, as Class Counsel;

11 4. Appointing Plaintiff as the Class Representative;

12 5. Approving the use of the proposed notice procedure and related notice form;

13 6. Approving Phoenix Class Administration Solutions as the third-party administrator;

14 7. Directing that notice be mailed to the Class; and,

15 8. Scheduling a hearing date for motions for final approval of class action settlement
16 and awards of attorneys’ fees and costs.

17 Good cause exists to grant this Motion because:

18 1. The Class meets all of the requirements for class certification for settlement
19 purposes under Code of Civil Procedure § 382;

20 2. The Settlement Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the
21 disputed wage and hour claims asserted by Plaintiff;

22 3. Plaintiff and Class Counsel are adequate to represent the Class;

23 4. The proposed notice procedures and related forms comply with California Rules of
24 Court 3.766(d) and (e), adequately apprise Class Members of their rights, and fully comport
25 with due process; and

26 5. Based on the foregoing, notice should be directed to the Class Members and a final
27 fairness hearing should be scheduled (Plaintiff suggests about 140 days after preliminary
28 approval is granted).

1 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 and Rule 3.1113(e) of the California Rules of Court,
2 which require approval by the Court of a class action settlement and permit the Court to extend the page
3 limit for memoranda.

4 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points
5 and Authorities, the Declarations of Plaintiff's counsel, Plaintiff, Defendants' counsel and the Settlement
6 Administrator in support thereof, all papers and pleadings on file with the Court in this action, all matters
7 judicially noticeable, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented in connection with
8 the hearing on the Motion.

9 Respectfully submitted,

10 Dated: July 20, 2026

TUNYAN LAW, APC

11
12 By: _____


Lilit Tunyan
Artur Tunyan

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14 Attorneys for Plaintiff WILLIAM MOJICA
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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiff WILLIAM MOJICA
3 (“Plaintiff”) respectfully requests that this Court preliminarily approve the proposed class action
4 settlement set forth in the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
5 (“Settlement”, “Settlement Agreement” or “Agreement”) with Defendants MILROSE
6 CONSULTANTS, LLC and PERMIT ADVISORS, LLC (“Defendants”). The CLASS ACTION AND
7 PAGA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT used by the Parties is based upon the model agreement template
8 made available by the Los Angeles Superior Court.

9 After informal discovery, the exchange of documents, and an arm’s-length mediation session
10 with an experienced mediator Kevin Barnes, Esq. Plaintiff and Defendants (collectively referred to
11 herein as the “Parties”) reached a proposed class action settlement with a gross settlement amount
12 (“GSA”) of **\$155,000.00** in compromise of disputed claims asserted on behalf of the below-defined Class
13 consisting of approximately **68** class members during the Class Period. Plaintiff believes that this
14 settlement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the disputed claims for alleged unpaid wage
15 and hour violations and penalties asserted in this case.

16 Plaintiff now submits this Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA
17 Settlement, along with the Settlement (attached to the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan [“Tunyan Decl.”],
18 **Exhibit 1** thereto). For the Court’s convenience, below is a summary of the key provisions of the
19 Settlement.

20 **II. THE MAJOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT**

21 The provisions of the proposed Settlement include the following:

- 22 • Defendants agree not to oppose certification of a Class for purposes of Settlement only
23 (Settlement, ¶ 12.1);
- 24 • Class or Class Members: (1) all current and former non-exempt, hourly
25 employees of Defendants who worked for Defendants in California at any time
26 from August 21, 2021 to May 27, 2026 or as modified under Paragraph 8 (“Non-
27 exempt employees’ sub-class”), and (2) all current and former employees of
28 Defendants classified as exempt who worked for Defendants in California at any

time from January 1, 2022 to June 16, 2023 and were paid less than twice the state minimum wage (“Exempt employees’ sub-class”). (Settlement, ¶ 1.5.)

“Participating Class Members” are those Class Members who do not submit timely exclusion requests to the Settlement Administrator. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.9, 1.35);

- Class Period: the period from August 21, 2021 to May 27, 2026 for Non-exempt employees’ sub-class and the period from January 1, 2022 to June 16, 2023 for Exempt employees’ sub-class, or as modified under Paragraph 8. (Settlement, ¶ 1.12);
- Settlement Amount: Defendants will pay a maximum of **\$155,000.00** except as provided in Paragraph 8 of the Agreement, referred to as the Gross Settlement Amount (or GSA herein), resulting in an estimated average **gross** payment per Class Member of approximately **\$2,279.42** (Settlement, ¶ 1.22);
- Class Size: approximately **58** Non-exempt employees’ sub-class who worked **3,083** workweeks from August 21, 2021 to May 27, 2026, and **10** Exempt employees’ sub-class who worked **240** workweeks from January 1, 2022 to June 16, 2023 totalling **3, 323** workweeks. (Settlement, ¶ 4.1, 8);
- PAGA Employees or Aggrieved Employees: All current and former non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants who worked for Defendants in California at any time during the PAGA Period. (Settlement, ¶ 1.4);
- PAGA Group Size: approximately **16** employees who worked **913** PAGA pay periods during the PAGA Period (Settlement, ¶ 4.1);
- PAGA Period: the period from August 21, 2024 to May 27, 2026, or as modified under Paragraph 8. (Settlement, ¶ 1.31);
- Escalator Clause: Based on their records, Defendants estimate that, that the number of workweeks worked by the Non-exempt employees’ sub-class from August 21, 2021 to May 27, 2026 is 3,016 and the number of workweeks worked by the Exempt employees’ sub-class during which they were paid less than twice the state minimum wage from January 1, 2022 to June 16, 2023 is 318 workweeks with the total number of workweeks of 3,334. The parties stipulate to a 10% escalation of the estimated workweeks without any increase to the GSA. If the number of actual

workweeks during the Class Period exceeds 10% of the estimated workweeks (i.e., exceeds 3,668 workweeks), Defendants shall have the option to either: (1) end the class and PAGA period on the date on which the Class Members worked no more than 3,668 workweeks; or (2) increase the GSA by a pro-rata dollar value equal to the number of workweeks in excess of 3,668 workweeks. For example, if Defendants select Option (2) and there is a 1% increase over 10% (over 3,668 workweeks) then the GSA increases by 1%. Ten calendar (10) calendar days prior to Class Counsel's deadline to file the preliminary approval motion, Defendants' Counsel shall advise Plaintiff's counsel (i) whether Defendants intend to end the Class Period prior to May 27, 2026 or on May 27, 2026; or (ii) whether Defendants anticipate triggering of the escalator clause in this Paragraph. Based on Defendants' election, Plaintiff shall assure that the approval motion, Plaintiff's counsel's declaration and proposed order all incorporate the selected Class Period end date. (the "Escalator Clause"). (Settlement, ¶ 8); ***Defendants' counsel represented that as of May 27, 2026 there were 3,323 workweeks worked by Class Members. Therefore, the Escalator Clause will not be triggered, and the Class and PAGA Periods for Non-Exempt employees' sub-class will end on May 27, 2026.***

- Kullar/Munoz Analysis: Plaintiff addresses the claims analysis herein, at Part V.B.3, and in more detail the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan, at Paragraph 18;
- No Reversion: The Settlement is a ***non-reversionary*** settlement (Settlement, ¶ 3.1);
- Certification: Plaintiff addresses certification requisites herein, at Part V.A., and in the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan, at Paragraphs 34-40;
- No Claim Form: No claim form is required (Settlement., ¶ 3.1);
- Class Release: The Settlement will release specified wage-and-hour claims for Class Members (those Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement) (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.39, 5.2);
- PAGA Release: The Class Members will release the PAGA Claims set forth in this Action, that were identified in the First Amended Complaint and Plaintiff's LWDA Notice Letter, regardless of whether they opt out of the class portion of the Settlement (Settlement, ¶¶

1.40, 5.3);

- Release Effective Date: The Release is not active until Defendants tender all payments required under the Settlement to the Settlement Administrator (Settlement, ¶ 5);
- Net Settlement Amount Available to the Class: After deducting Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs, service award to Plaintiff, administration costs, and the payment to the LWDA, the remainder will be available for distribution to Class Members who do not opt out, with each Class Member receiving a share based on the number of workweeks each Class Member worked for Defendants within the Class Period. The Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be at least **\$65,583.33** inclusive of PAGA allocation to PAGA Employees, resulting in an average **net** payment per Class Member of at least **\$964.46** before any tax withholdings. (Settlement, ¶ 3);
- Tax Allocation: The amounts distributed to Class Members will be characterized as 20% alleged unpaid wages, 80% to penalties and interest, and PAGA Settlement Payments will be allocated as 100% penalties. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.1, 3.2.5.2);
- Employer's Portion of Payroll Taxes Paid Separately: Defendants' portion of payroll taxes (e.g., FICA, FUTA, etc.) owed on any settlement payments to Class Members that constitute wages will be paid separate and apart from the GSA (Settlement, ¶ 3.1);
- Settlement Administrator: The notice portion of the Settlement will be administered by a third-party Administrator, Phoenix Class Administration Solutions and the Parties estimated that the costs of administration should not reasonably exceed \$5,000.00. Phoenix Class Administration Solutions' low bid for settlement administration services in the amount of **\$5,000.00** was selected as the lowest bid from a competitive bidding process. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.3);
- Class Data for Administration: The Settlement Administrator will receive the Class List within 14 calendar days of Preliminary Approval, use the NCOA database to update the Class List, and then use skip tracing on returned Notices (Settlement, ¶ 4.2);
- Notice: The Notice will issue within 14 days of receipt of the Class List (Settlement, ¶ 7.4.2). The Notice describes how to dispute workweeks, submit an objection in writing, in

person, or through an attorney, or request exclusion (Settlement, ¶¶ 7.4 – 7.7);

- Notice Language: Notice will issue in English (Settlement, ¶ 1.11);
- Objections: Objections can be submitted in person, through an attorney, or in writing to the Settlement Administrator (Settlement, ¶ 7.7);
- Exclusion Requests: The procedure for exclusion requests, mailing a request to the Settlement Administrator, is the same as the procedure for submitting a written objection (Settlement, ¶¶ 7.5 and 7.7);
- PAGA Allocation: From the GSA, **\$15,000.00** will be allocated to settle claims brought pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 *et seq.* (“PAGA”), and sixty-five percent (65%), or **\$9,750.00**, will be paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.34, 3.2.5.);
- Notice to LWDA: Notice was provided prior to the filing of this Motion. Evidence is attached to the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan;
- Enhancement/Service Award to Plaintiff: Defendants will not oppose the application for Class Representative Service Award of up to **\$5,000.00** for Plaintiff, to be paid from the GSA (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.1);
- Fees and Costs: Defendants will not oppose Class Counsel’s application for fees not to exceed 33 1/3% of the GSA (**\$51,666.67**), and actual costs, in an amount not to exceed **\$18,000.00**, to be paid out of the GSA (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.2);
- Check Void Period: Settlement checks will be valid for 180 days (Settlement, ¶ 4.4.3);
- Uncashed Checks: Any settlement checks that are mailed to the Class Members and remain uncashed after 180 days of the date of issuance will be cancelled, and the moneys will be directed to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund (Settlement, ¶¶ 4.4.1, 4.4.3);
- Judgment Notice: Settlement Agreement, Class Notice and Judgment will be posted on the Settlement Administrator’s website after entry (Settlement, ¶ 7.8.1);
- Confidentiality Provisions: The Settlement permits Class Counsel to discuss the Settlement with Class Members (Settlement ¶ 12.2).

(Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 10-11 and Exhibit 1 thereto.)

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's Claims

2.1. On August 21, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this Action by filing a complaint alleging causes of action against Defendants for: (1) Failure to Pay All Wages and Sick Pay; (2) Failure to Provide Meal Periods; (3) Failure to Provide Rest Periods; (4) Failure to Keep Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; (5) Failure to Pay Wages Upon Termination of Employment; (6) Failure to Reimburse For Necessary Expenditures); and (7) Unfair Business Practices. On October 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint adding a cause of action for Civil Penalties Under PAGA. The First Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in the Action (the "Operative Complaint.") (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 3.)

Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3(a), Plaintiff gave timely written notice to Defendants and the LWDA by sending the PAGA Notice. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 4.)

B. Pre-Settlement Data Production and Analysis

The Parties have conducted informal discovery and investigation of the facts and law. Such discovery and investigation have included, inter alia, the exchange of data and discoverable information in preparation for the settlement negotiations. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 5.) The Parties have analyzed payroll and other data pertaining to Plaintiff and the Class during the relevant Class Period, including but not limited to the numbers of former and current members of the Class, average workweeks, class members' time and pay records and average rate of hourly pay, wage and hour policies. (*Id.*)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendants' wage and hour policies and practices and other information obtained during the exchange of discovery, Class Counsel were able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and the reasonably obtainable maximum monetary exposure for all claims. Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to engaging in settlement negotiations. Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 6.)

C. Settlement

On May 27, 2026, the Parties mediated before a mediator Kevin Barnes, Esq. who is a highly experienced and well-regarded mediator for wage and hour class action litigation. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 7.)

At the mediation, the Parties discussed at length the burdens and risks of continuing with the litigation considering Defendants’ defenses and executed by some class members arbitration agreements. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 7.) The Parties have been able to reach a settlement based on the mediator’s proposal. The Parties have reached an agreement regarding the substantive terms of a class-wide settlement, pending the Parties’ agreement on a long-form class settlement agreement. The Parties then signed a long form settlement agreement (“Agreement”). (*Id.*)

Plaintiff and Class Counsel are aware of the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability for the claims asserted in the Action, both generally and in response to Defendants’ defenses thereto. Plaintiff and Class Counsel have also taken into account Defendants’ agreement to enter into a Settlement that confers substantial relief upon the Class. (Tunyan Decl., ¶8.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth in this Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable Settlement and is in the best interests of the Class. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 9.) Solely for the purpose of settling this case, the parties agree that the requirements for establishing class action certification with respect to this class have been met and are met. (*Id.*) If this Settlement is not approved by the Court for any reason, Defendants reserve their right to contest class certification. (*Id.*) This Settlement, if approved by the Court, will result in the entry of the Judgment and the release of all Released Claims for all Class Members, including all within the class definition who have not elected to exclude themselves from the Class. (*Id.*)

IV. CLASS DEFINITION

The Class is defined as follows:

All current and former non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants who worked for Defendants in California at any time from August 21, 2021 to May 27, 2026 (“Non-exempt employees’ sub-class”), and all current and former employees of Defendants classified as exempt who worked for Defendants in California at any time from January 1, 2022 to June 16, 2023 and were paid less than twice the state minimum wage (“Exempt employees’ sub-class”). “Participating Class Members” are those Class Members who do not submit timely exclusion requests to the Settlement Administrator. (Settlement, ¶¶1.5, 1.12, 1.35.) (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 34 and Exhibit 1.)

The PAGA Group Members or PAGA Employees are defined as follows:

All current and former non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants who worked for Defendants in California at any time during the PAGA Period (the “PAGA Period” is the period from August 21, 2024 to May 27, 2026.) PAGA Group Members cannot opt out of the settlement of the PAGA claim. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.4, 1.31.)

1 **V. DISCUSSION**

2 **A. The Court Should Conditionally Certify the Class Because It Meets All the**
3 **Requirements for Certification for Settlement Purposes Under CCP § 382**

4 The Class should be provisionally certified for settlement because: (1) the Class is ascertainable
5 and sufficiently numerous; (2) there exists a well-defined community of interest; and (3) a class action is
6 the superior method of adjudication for this settlement. Code of Civ. Proc. § 382; *Brinker Rest. Corp. v.*
7 *Super. Ct.*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021 (2012); *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435 (2000).

8 Under Code of Civil Procedure § 382, class certification is warranted so long as there is a
9 numerous and ascertainable class with a well-defined community of interest among its members and a
10 “class action proceeding is superior to other means for a fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.”
11 *See, e.g., Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 332 (2004). For purposes of
12 this Settlement *only*, Defendants stipulated to conditional certification. (Settlement ¶ 12.1.)

13 “The certification question is ‘essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is
14 legally or factually meritorious.’” *Id.*, at 326, quoting *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 439-440
15 (2000). Indeed, the certification question simply asks whether the theory of recovery advanced by the
16 plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment. *See, e.g., Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal.
17 App. 4th 1286, 1298 (2010). “[I]t is also well established that trial courts should use different standards
18 to determine the propriety of a settlement class, as opposed to a litigation class certification. Specifically,
19 a lesser standard of scrutiny is used for settlement cases.” *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior*
20 *Court*, 113 Cal. App. 4th 836, 859 (2003), citing *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1807 n.
21 19 (1996). As the court noted in *Dunk*, although certification requirements are intended “to protect the
22 interests of the non-representative class members,” that concern is “protected by the trial court’s fairness
23 review of the settlement.” *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1807 n.19.

24 In view of these standards, and as shown below, the Class should be certified for purposes of
25 settlement. Code Civ. Proc. § 382; Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c).

26 **1. The Members of the Class Are Both Objectively Ascertainable and**
27 **Sufficiently Numerous.**

28 Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size of

1 the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. *See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal. App. 3d
2 862, 873 (1983). In this case, Plaintiff contends that all three considerations favor class certification.

3 A class is ascertainable when “it is defined ‘in terms of objective characteristics and common
4 transactional facts’ that make ‘the ultimate identification of class members possible when that
5 identification becomes necessary.’” *Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal. 5th 955, 980 (2019). No set
6 number of class members is required to maintain a class action. *Hebbard v. Colgrove*, 28 Cal. App. 3d
7 1017, 1030 (1972). In fact, the California Supreme Court has upheld a class of as few as ten members.
8 *Bowles v. Superior Court*, 44 Cal. 2d 574 (1955).

9 The class definition is sufficiently specific to enable the Parties, Class Members, and the Court to
10 readily determine the parameters of the class. *See Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.*, 191 Cal. App. 3d
11 605, 617 (1987). In this case, there are approximately 68 Class Members, all of whom may be identified
12 by reference to Defendants’ records that pertain to non-exempt status and dates of employment. In
13 addition, to facilitate the administration of the Settlement, Defendants have agreed to share the
14 information from their records and have already demonstrated that they can do so when providing class-
15 wide discovery to Plaintiff to facilitate settlement discussions and respond to discovery. Accordingly,
16 the Class is not only ascertainable, but also sufficiently numerous. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 35.)

17 **2. There Are Common Questions That Predominate Over Any Questions That**
18 **May Be Unique to Individual Class Members.**

19 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of law
20 and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
21 representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1806; *Richmond*, 29
22 Cal. 3d at 473-75. A question of law or fact is common to the members of a class if it may be resolved
23 through common proof. *See, Jaimez*, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1305. As for predominance, it “is a comparative
24 concept, and ‘the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility and damages does not
25 mean individual fact questions predominate.’” *Sav-on*, 34 Cal. 4th at 334, quoting *Reyes v. Los Angeles*
26 *County Bd. of Supervisors*, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1278 (1979).

27 In this case, common questions include, but are not limited to: i. Whether or not Defendants
28 misclassified project managers and paid proper wages and sick pay to the Class; ii. Whether or not

1 Defendants provided meal periods to the Class; iii. Whether or not Defendants provided rest periods to
2 the Class; iv. Whether or not Defendants paid compensation timely upon separation of employment to
3 former Class Members; v. Whether or not Defendants paid compensation timely throughout Class
4 Members' employment; vi. Whether or not Defendants provided accurate itemized wage statements to
5 the Class; vii. Whether or not Defendants reimbursed necessary business expenses in compliance with
6 California Labor Code §2802; viii. Whether or not waiting-time penalties are available to the Class for
7 violation of California Labor Code § 203; ix. Whether or not Defendants engaged in unlawful or unfair
8 business practices affecting the Class in violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-
9 17208; and x. Whether or not Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to penalties pursuant to PAGA (Tunyan
10 Decl., ¶¶ 37-38.)

11 In the Action, Plaintiff's claims present sufficient common issues of law and fact that
12 predominate over individual issues and warrant class certification. From their review of the
13 documentation provided, Class Counsel determined that for purposes of these claims, Defendants
14 policies and practices are either identical, or sufficiently similar, to raise the same questions of liability,
15 and applied to all Class Members. Because Class Members would have to prove the same issues of law
16 and fact to prevail, and because their potential legal remedies are identical, it would be preferable to
17 resolve all Class Members' claims by means of the Settlement than to require each Class Member to
18 litigate his or her individual claims. Therefore, common questions predominate over any questions that
19 may be unique to individual Class Members, and class-wide settlement is superior to any other method
20 of resolution.

21 3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of Those of the Class.

22 Typicality "requires a showing that the class representative has claims or defenses typical of the
23 class." See, e.g., *Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1534 (2008), citing
24 *Fireside Bank v. Superior Court*, 40 Cal. 4th 1069, 1089 (2007), and *Sav-On*, 34 Cal. 4th at 326,
25 approved by *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012). California law does not require
26 that plaintiffs have claims identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class
27 representative is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on
28 conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured

1 by the same course of conduct. *Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal. App. 4th 1496, 1502 (2007).

2 In light of these standards, Plaintiff is typical of class members. Like other Class Members,
3 Defendants employed Plaintiff in both exempt and non-exempt positions during the Class Period, and
4 Plaintiff claims that he was subject to the same policies alleged to have impacted the entire class.
5 (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that he and other Class Members share the same claims stemming
6 from Defendants' alleged violations of the Labor Code and relevant wage order. In addition,
7 Defendants' main defenses, including that the wage and hour policies and practices fully comply with
8 California law, apply equally to the claims of all Class Members. Thus, Plaintiff is typical of the Class.

9 **4. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class.**

10 The adequacy requirement is met where the plaintiff is represented by counsel qualified to
11 conduct the litigation and the plaintiff's interest in the litigation is not antagonistic to class members'
12 interests. *McGhee v. Bank of America*, 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451(1976). In other words, where the plaintiff
13 has adequate counsel, the plaintiff may represent the entire class absent any disabling conflicts of interest
14 that might hinder the plaintiff's ability to represent the class. *Id.*

15 In the Action, Plaintiff has no conflicts of interest with other Class Members and has agreed to
16 place Class interests above Plaintiff's own. (Mojica Decl., ¶¶ 4-21; Tunyan Decl., ¶ 39.) Moreover,
17 Plaintiff's counsel are experienced in wage and hour class action litigation and have no conflicts of
18 interest with absent Class Members. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 20-26, 39.) As such, this Court should appoint
19 Plaintiff as Class Representative for the Class and appoint Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel.

20 **5. Proceeding as a Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions**

21 Plaintiff contends that proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute,
22 as the Class Members and the Court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would serve as
23 the only means to deter and redress the alleged Labor Code violations. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* 23
24 Cal. 4th at 434. Furthermore, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would unduly
25 burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results, which may be avoided by class certification.

26 **6. The Proposed Class Notice Complies with Rule 3.766(d) and (e)**

27 Notice requirements are set forth in Rules of Court, Rule 3.766. In determining the manner of
28 the notice, the court must consider the interests of the class, the type of relief requested, the stake of the

individual class members, the cost of notifying class members, the resources of the parties, the possible prejudice to class members who do not receive notice, and the *res judicata* effect on class members. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766(e).

a) The Notice Procedure Satisfies Due Process

The proposed procedure for distributing the Proposed Notice is robust and more than meets the minimal requirement that it have “a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members.” *Cartt v. Sup. Ct.*, 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974 (1975). There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the Class Members will receive direct mailed notice. Here, the proposed procedure includes safeguards, including, but not limited to, mailing notice to Class Members’ last known addresses; skip tracing; searches for address changes; and the re-mailing of returned notices to any forwarding addresses. This manner of giving notice complies with Rule of Court 3.766(c) because it provides a reasonable chance that Class Notice will reach most if not all Class Members.

b) The Notice is Accurate and Informative

The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement should be approved for dissemination to the Class Members because its content complies with Rule of Court 3.766(d) in that it contains a brief explanation of the case, including the basic contentions or denials of the Parties, detailed information about Class Members’ rights to be excluded from the Settlement and object to the Settlement; a statement that the Settlement will bind all members who do not timely opt-out. Thus, the Notice also satisfies Rule of Court 3.769(f) regarding the contents of settlement notices.

The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. 3 NEWBERG § 8.39. It summarizes the proceedings and the terms and conditions of the proposed Settlement, in an informative and coherent manner, in compliance with the Manual for Complex Litigation (“MANUAL”), (2d Ed. 1993), which states that “the notice should be accurate, objective, and understandable to Class Members . . .” MANUAL, § 30.211. It makes clear that the Settlement does not constitute an admission of liability by Defendants and recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. Accordingly, the Notice complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

1 **B. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair,**
2 **Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage Claims in View of**
3 **Defendants’ Potential Liability Exposure and the Risks of Continued Litigation**

4 California courts favor settlement. *See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Superior Court*, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231,
5 236 (1976). Unlike most settlements, class action settlements involve a court approval process that exists
6 to prevent fraud, collusion, and unfairness to class members. *Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v.*
7 *Superior Court*, 103 Cal.App.3d 573, 578-579 (1980). This approval process consists of preliminary
8 settlement approval, notice being given to class members, and a final fairness and approval hearing being
9 held at which class members may be heard with respect to the settlement. *Id.* For the reasons discussed
10 below, this Court should preliminarily approve the Settlement, allow the Parties to give notice to the
11 Class as proposed, and schedule a final fairness and final approval hearing.

12 **1. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Review and Approval.**

13 Any settlement of class litigation must be reviewed and approved by the presiding court. Rules
14 of Court, Rule 3.769(a). Approval occurs in two steps: (1) an early (preliminary) review by the trial
15 court and (2) a subsequent (final) review after notice has been distributed to the class members. The
16 Preliminary Approval Hearing and Final Approval Hearing coincide with these two steps. The present
17 motion seeks *preliminary approval* and the setting of a Final Approval Hearing.

18 To evaluate a settlement, the trial court must receive “basic information about the nature and
19 magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the
20 release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.
21 App. 4th 116, 133 (2008). However, the record need *not* contain an explicit statement of the maximum
22 theoretical amount that the class could recover. *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*,
23 186 Cal. App. 4th 399, 409 (2010).

24 **2. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arms’ Length Negotiations**
25 **Between Experienced Counsel After Sufficient Data Was Exchanged to**
26 **Evaluate Settlement.**

27 A settlement is presumptively fair where it is reached through arms’ length bargaining, based on
28 sufficient discovery and investigation to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, counsel is

1 experienced in similar litigation, and the percentage of objectors is small.¹ *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802;
2 *In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006); *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v.*
3 *Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1146 (2000). In deciding whether to approve a settlement, a
4 trial court has broad powers to determine whether it is fair under the circumstances of the case. *See, e.g.,*
5 *Mallick v. Superior Court*, 89 Cal. App. 3d 434, 438 (1979). In exercising these powers, the overriding
6 concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk*, at 1801,
7 quoting *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).

8 Relevant factors in making this determination, include, but are not limited to:

9 [T]he complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
10 action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery
11 completed and the state of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the
presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
proposed settlement.

12 *Id.* These factors require balancing, are non-exhaustive, and, as such, trial courts should tailor the factors
13 considered to each case and give due regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
14 between the parties.” *Id.*

15 Here, the Settlement resulted from thorough, arms’ length negotiations between experienced
16 counsel with the assistance of highly regarded mediator. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 7-9.) With respect to the
17 claims at issue in this case, Plaintiff obtained employees’ pay and time data from Defendants and then
18 carefully reviewed that information. Counsel for Plaintiff also examined relevant policies.

19 Based on the totality of that review, Plaintiff estimated the potential exposure and then estimated
20 risk factors to adjust the reasonable expected outcome. The investigation and discovery that Plaintiff’s
21 counsel conducted were sufficient to provide them with enough information to intelligently evaluate the
22 estimated exposure in this action for purposes of negotiating the Settlement in view of the risks discussed
23 below and are also sufficient to allow this Court to do the same. *See, e.g., Wershba v. Apple Computer,*
24 *Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001).

27 ¹ Because the fourth prerequisite for the presumption to arise cannot be addressed until the final
28 approval hearing, only the first three prerequisites are relevant at this preliminary stage of the settlement
approval process.

1 **3. The Settlement Represents a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise**
2 **of Class Members’ Claims Based on Defendants’ Estimated Liability**
3 **Exposure Given the Risks Continued Litigation Would Entail.**

4 A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at
5 trial and does not have to provide 100% of damages sought to be fair and reasonable. “In the context of a
6 settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the
7 complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances.” *Wershba*, 91
8 Cal. App. 4th at 250. Accordingly, because settlements involve compromise, even one that provides for
9 substantially narrower relief than would likely be obtained if the suit were successfully litigated can be
10 reasonable given that “the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each
11 side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.” *Id.*, quoting *Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses*
12 *Ass’n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc.*, 455 F.2d 101, 109 (7th Cir. 1972).

13 With respect to the claims asserted on behalf of the Class in this case, there are serious risks that
14 support the reduced compromise amount. These risks include, but are not limited to: (i) the risk that
15 Plaintiff would be unable to establish liability for unpaid straight time or overtime wages, *see Duran v.*
16 *US Bank Nat’l Ass’n*, 59 Cal. 4th 1, 39 & n. 33 (2014) (“*Duran*”), citing *Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC*
17 2014 WL 205039 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing certified off-the-clock claims based on proof at trial); (ii)
18 the risk that Defendant’s meal and rest period policies might not ultimately support class certification or
19 a class-wide liability finding, *see Duran*, 59 Cal. 4th at 14, n. 28 (citing Court of Appeal decisions
20 favorable on class certification issue without expressing opinion as to ultimate viability of proposition);
21 (iii) the risk that uncertainties pertaining to the ultimate legality of Defendants’ policies and practices
22 could preclude class-wide awards of statutory penalties under Labor Code §§ 203 and 226(e); (iv) the
23 risk that individual differences between Class Members could be construed as pertaining to liability and
24 not solely to damages, *see Duran*, 59 Cal. 4th at 19; (v) the risk that any civil penalties award under the
25 PAGA could be reduced by the Court in its discretion, *see Labor Code § 2699(e)(1)*; (vi) the risk that
26 class treatment could be deemed improper as to one or more claims, except for settlement purposes; and,
27 (vii) the risk that appellate litigation could ensue; (viii) the risk that violation rate estimates would prove
28 much lower than expected. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 15.) These risks are non-exhaustive.

1 In light of the uncertainties of protracted litigation, the settlement amount reflects a fair and
2 reasonable recovery for the Class Members. (Tunyan Decl. ¶¶ 12-19.) The settlement amount is, of
3 course, a compromise figure. (Tunyan Decl. ¶ 16.) By necessity it took into account risks related to
4 liability, damages, and the defenses asserted by Defendants. (*Id.*) Moreover, each Class Member will be
5 given the opportunity to opt-out of the Settlement, allowing those who feel they have claims that are
6 greater than the benefits they can receive under this Settlement to pursue their own claims. (*Id.*) For the
7 approximately **68** members of the Class, the average **gross** recovery is at least **\$2,279.42** per Class
8 Member, and the estimated average **net** recovery for each Class Member inclusive of PAGA allocation is
9 approximately **\$964.46**. (*Id.*) Given that Defendants could challenge certification and liability, this is a
10 significant sum to have achieved in settlement. Moreover, a Class Member who worked a greater
11 number of weeks for Defendants will receive a larger share of the Settlement than a Class Member who
12 worked for a shorter amount of time during the class period. (*Id.*)

13 After analyzing the claims in this matter, Plaintiff has concluded that the Gross Settlement
14 Amount of **\$155,000.00** is about 75% of the **\$206,775.18** estimate of *risk-adjusted* recovery (excluding
15 interest) at this stage in the litigation. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 17.) This assessment is based on a carefully
16 constructed model of the current fair value of the case, using estimated risks, average wage rates,
17 numbers of employees, and the amount of time covered by the class period. (*Id.*) The maximum
18 calculated reasonable exposure is **\$1,221,892.90**, including PAGA penalties. (*Id.*)

- 19 • A reasonably estimated exposure for unpaid off-the-clock work was calculated, with the
20 assistance of an expert, to be approximately **\$147,208.90**. However, with the risk factor
21 discounts for certification and liability proof, the value of that claim is estimated by
22 Plaintiff's counsel to be approximately **\$17,665.07**, assuming certification probability of 40%
23 and merits success at 30%.
- 24 • A reasonably estimated exposure for unpaid wages as a result of misclassification, time
25 rounding and regular rate violation in calculation of wages and sick pay was calculated, with
26 the assistance of an expert, to be approximately **\$62,378.00**. However, with the risk factor
27 discounts for certification and liability proof, the value of that claim is estimated by
28 Plaintiff's counsel to be approximately **\$12,475.60**, assuming certification probability of 50%

and merits success at 40%.

- A reasonably estimated exposure for rest break violations over the class period was calculated at **\$196,721.6**, but with chances of certification and proof of liability (40% and 30% respectively) for a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$23,606.59**.
- A reasonably estimated exposure for meal break violations over the class period was calculated at **\$295,082.4** with chances of certification and liability risks (60% and 50% respectively) resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$88,524.72**.
- Risk-adjusted penalty recoveries for wage statement and Labor Code § 203 penalties were estimated to be approximately **\$9,050.00** (with chances of certification and liability risks of 50% and 20% respectively) and **\$30,547.20** (with chances of certification and liability risks of 50% and 20% respectively), respectively, on maximum exposures of **\$90,500.00** and **\$305,472.00**.
- A reasonably estimated exposure for unreimbursed expenses was calculated at **\$33,230.00**, with chances of certification and liability risks (50% and 40% respectively) resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$6,646.00**.
- Performing risk-adjusted valuations for all claims yields a total value in the range of **\$188,515.18**, excluding PAGA. (Id.)
- PAGA penalties were calculated as having a maximum realistic exposure of **\$91,300.00**, but a risk adjusted value of **\$18,260.00**, after factoring in risks of reduction in penalties pursuant to Court discretion and the high risk of the inability to prove violations for all aggrieved employees.

The concurrently filed Declaration of Lilit Tunyan sets forth claim valuation in additional detail. (See, Tunyan Decl., ¶ 17.)

This result here is fully supportable as reasonable. First, it is important to recognize the wilfulness finding required for Labor Code §§ 203 and 226 is challenging to establish. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 18.) Second, rest break and meal period claims have been challenging to certify for many years, even after *Brinker*. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 18.) Third, the certification rates in California are lower than conventional wisdom holds. See, H. Scott Leviant, *Second Interim Report on class actions in California*

1 *sheds new light on certification* (February 19, 2010), www.thecomplexlitigator.com, available at
2 [http://www.thecomplexlitigator.com/post-data/2010/2/19/second-interim-report-on-class-actions-in-](http://www.thecomplexlitigator.com/post-data/2010/2/19/second-interim-report-on-class-actions-in-california-sheds-n.html)
3 [california-sheds-n.html](http://www.thecomplexlitigator.com/post-data/2010/2/19/second-interim-report-on-class-actions-in-california-sheds-n.html); *see also*, *Findings of the Study of California Class Action Litigation, 2000-2006*,
4 available at <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf> (finding, at page
5 5, and in Table 9, at page 15, that only 21.4% of all class actions were certified either as part of a
6 settlement **or** as part of a contested certification motion).

7 Here, the estimated certification probabilities are **above** the average rate at which cases were
8 certified in California over the study years, based upon data available through the California Courts
9 websites. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 18.) In sum, well *under* 20% of all cases filed as proposed class actions are
10 ultimately certified by way of a *contested* motion. (*Id.*) The recovery is roughly **13%** of the maximum
11 plausible recovery (estimated to be approximately **\$1,221,892.90** including PAGA), which falls within
12 the expected outcome under the likelihood of success metric. (*Id.*) This Settlement achieves the goals of
13 the litigation.

14 **4. The Proposed Method for Allocating Settlement Funds Is Fair, Adequate,**
15 **and Reasonable.**

16 The proposed method of allocating the Settlement Fund to Class Members also is fair and
17 reasonable. As noted, the parties agreed to allocate the Settlement Fund between all Class Members
18 based on time worked by the Class Member during the Class Period, in relation to the total amount of
19 time worked by all participating Class Members collectively during the class period. This proposed
20 method is fair and reasonable because each Class Member's actual potential damages vary based on the
21 number of workweeks he or she actually worked (e.g., Lab. Code § 226.7 provides for an extra hour of
22 pay at the employee's regular rate of pay for each violation, resulting in a higher potential damage when
23 a higher number of incidents occur). A Class Member who worked a greater number of weeks for
24 Defendants will receive a larger payment under the Settlement than a Class Member who worked for a
25 shorter amount of time during the relevant period. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 11, 17.)

26 **5. The Proposed Enhancement Award to Plaintiff Is Fair, Adequate, and**
27 **Reasonable and Warrants Preliminary Approval.**

28 The proposed enhancement payment to Plaintiff is intended to recognize the substantial initiative

1 and significant efforts on behalf of the Class. Courts routinely approve incentive awards to compensate
2 named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class action litigation, often
3 in much higher amounts than that sought here. *See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange*, 115 Cal. App.
4 4th 715, 726 (2004) (upholding “service payments” to named plaintiffs for their efforts in bringing the
5 case); *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 901 F. Supp. 294 (N.D.Cal. 1995) (approving a \$50,000
6 enhancement award). Plaintiff contributed time to the prosecution of this matter, including assistance
7 prior to the settlement negotiations and during settlement negotiations with information and substantial
8 time conferring with counsel over the course of this litigation and before it was filed. (Mojica Decl., ¶¶ 4-
9 21; Tunyan Decl., ¶ 32.) The enhancement also recognizes the considerable risks Plaintiff undertook on
10 behalf of the Class as well as the personal risk of facing intrusive discovery and potential disclosure to
11 future employers that Plaintiff sued a former employer, making future employment prospects uncertain
12 and general release of all claims beyond wage-and-hour claims released in this action.

13 **6. The Proposed Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Is Also Fair, Adequate,**
14 **and Reasonable and Merits Preliminary Approval.**

15 The California Supreme Court removed any lingering doubt about the use of the percentage of
16 the fund method to award attorney’s fees in California Courts:

17 We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts in holding that when
18 class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members,
19 and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
20 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate
21 percentage of the fund created. The recognized advantages of the percentage method—
22 including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
23 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the
24 encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily
25 prolonging the litigation (See pt. I, *ante*; *Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 48–49, 97
26 Cal.Rptr.2d 797; *Rawlings v. Prudential–Bache Properties, Inc., supra*, 9 F.3d at p.
27 516)—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied
28 our trial courts.

24 *Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016).² Thus, this Court may and, pursuant to
25 *Laffitte*, should award fees to Plaintiff’s counsel based upon the percentage of the fund methodology.

27 ² The Supreme Court also corrected the misconception that *Dunk* should be viewed as expressing
28 doubt about the use of the percentage method: “The *Dunk* court, while finding the percentage method
inapplicable to the settlement before it due to the lack of a readily valued common fund, did not purport
to bar its usage generally in common fund cases.” *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 501.

Setting *Laffitte* aside, whether the once-again-confirmed percentage of the fund method or the lodestar method is used, the outcome is roughly the same: “[F]ee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery’ regardless of ‘whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used.’” *Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC*, 69 Cal. App. 5th 521 (2021). This is also consistent with counsels’ experience in class cases. Here, Plaintiff’s attorneys intend to request attorneys’ fees of up to \$51,666.67 (one-third of the GSA), and costs capped at \$18,000 (which includes payment for filing fees, service of process fees, mediation fees, expert fees and other standard expenses). (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 31.) Given the efforts and risks involved in this case, as well as the results achieved, these amounts are within the range of reasonableness and warrant *preliminary approval*.

7. The Proposed Payment to the Administrator Is Fair and Reasonable

In deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, a trial court must determine if the proposed settlement is fair under the circumstances of the case. *Mallick*, 89 Cal.App.3d at 438. In exercising this power, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted). Phoenix Class Administration Solutions, which has been selected due to its competitive bid, estimates that administration can be performed for **\$5,000.00**. In counsel’s experience, based on similar wage-and-hour actions, an estimated cost of **\$5,000.00** is a fair and reasonable amount for administration fees and should be preliminarily approved. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 33.)

8. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable

The ultimate decision as to the amount of PAGA penalties is always up to the discretion of the Court. Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) states: “In any action by an aggrieved employee seeking recovery of a civil penalty available under subdivision (a) or (f), a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”

Prior to the issuance of *Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.*, 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021), the only sources of persuasive guidance as to how to assess the reasonableness of a PAGA allocation were found in federal court decisions addressing that question. In their view, a PAGA allocation, even if a small portion of the total settlement, could be reasonable if the settlement of the underlying wage and hour

claims is robust and serves the deterrent purpose of the PAGA statute. *O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“By providing fair compensation to the class members as employees and substantial monetary relief, a settlement not only vindicates the rights of class members as employees, but may have a deterrent effect upon the Defendants employer and other employers, an objective of PAGA.”); *see also Viceria v. Mistras Group*, 2016 WL 5907869 *9 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Applying O’Connor’s sliding scale approach, settlement of the PAGA claim may be substantially reduced below its standalone settlement value without sacrificing its statutory purposes because the non PAGA settlement is relatively substantial.”)

Moniz then provided explicit confirmation that this was an appropriate yardstick by which to measure reasonableness of a PAGA settlement. *Moniz* said:

[W]hile PAGA does not require the trial court to act as a fiduciary for aggrieved employees, adoption of a standard of review for settlements that prevents “ ‘ ‘ ‘fraud, collusion or unfairness’ ” (Dunk, *supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1800–1801, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 483), and protects the interests of the public and the LWDA in the enforcement of state labor laws is warranted. Because many of the factors used to evaluate class action settlements bear on a settlement’s fairness—including the strength of the plaintiff’s case, the risk, the stage of the proceeding, the complexity and likely duration of further litigation, and the settlement amount—these factors can be useful in evaluating the fairness of a PAGA settlement.

Given PAGA’s purpose to protect the public interest, we also agree with the LWDA and federal district courts that have found it appropriate to review a PAGA settlement to ascertain whether a settlement is fair in view of PAGA’s purposes and policies. (*O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1132–1134; *Jordan v. NCI Group, Inc.* (Jan. 5, 2018, No. EDCV 16-1701-JVS) 2018 WL 1409590, at *1–*2, 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25297, at *3–*4; *Chamberlain v. Baker Hughes, a GE Co., LLC*, *supra*, 2020 WL 4350207 at *3–*4, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 134582 at *10–*11; *see Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 46, 59, 61–62, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 [where the Legislature required court approval of private settlements of Proposition 65 actions brought to vindicate the public interest, court must evaluate the resulting consent decree to determine if it is “just” and “serves the public interest”].) We therefore hold that a trial court should evaluate a PAGA settlement to determine whether it is fair, reasonable, and adequate in view of PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws. (*See Williams, supra*, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 472, 398 P.3d 69 [PAGA “sought to remediate present violations and deter future ones”]; *Arias, supra*, 46 Cal.4th at p. 980, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 [the declared purpose of PAGA was to augment state enforcement efforts to achieve maximum compliance with labor laws].) The trial court below used this standard.

Moniz, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 77. *Moniz*, in agreeing with the federal courts that have considered how to evaluate a PAGA settlement, concluded that the class action factors are appropriately considered, along

1 with a consideration of whether the settlement furthers “PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law
2 violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws.”

3 As to the first set of elements (the class-type analysis), it is embodied in Plaintiff’s discussion of
4 the adequacy of the settlement generally. Using class settlements as a source of analogous settlement
5 review standards, to assess the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of a settlement, the court should
6 also consider the expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at
7 1801. Here, the expense, complexity and likely duration of future litigation as it pertained to Plaintiff’s
8 PAGA claims was to some extent an unknown. However, what is certain is that to adequately establish
9 the foundational violations that would support a substantial penalty award, tremendous time and expense
10 would be invested. To adequately establish that aggrieved employees experience the alleged violations,
11 and at what frequency, most of the aggrieved employees would need to be interviewed in a systematic
12 fashion and their testimony cataloged in way sufficiently meaningful to permit the submission of
13 summary evidence at trial, such as via survey. *First*, the burdensome nature of such a process would be
14 expensive and time-consuming. *Second*, substantial risk that the Court would either substantially reduce
15 any penalty ultimately awarded *or* conclude that the conduct was insufficient to support a penalty award.
16 *Third*, it would be essentially impossible to formulate an objectively reliable means of summarizing
17 testimonial experiences, other than by an extraordinarily detailed survey. And formulating such a survey
18 would have been important, since frequency of violations would need to be established before any
19 penalties could be recovered. At least as to claims such as meal period and rest break violations, the
20 decisions of aggrieved employees are a major factor in assessing liability. In sum, the evidence collected
21 to date leads Plaintiff to conclude that, direct testimony would have been required from as many of the
22 roughly 460 aggrieved employees as could be obtained, which would be, at best, very difficult. Proof of
23 this sort gives rise to a manageability argument that could substantially reduce the size of the aggrieved
24 employee group.

25 The second element (the PAGA purposes element) is also satisfied here. As held by *Moniz*,
26 PAGA’s purposes include (1) remediation of present labor law violations, (2) deterrence of future
27 violations, and (3) maximization of enforcement of state labor laws. Here the allocation of a major
28 portion of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of labor law violation remediation.

1 Class members benefit from payments intended to offset the harm of alleged violations of wage and hour
2 requirements. The allocation of a major portion of settlement funds to class members also deters future
3 violations, since, from the perspective of an employer, where settlement funds go is less significant than
4 the fact that settlement funds are issuing at all. Finally, allocation of a major portion of settlement funds
5 to class members still advances the goal of enforcement of state labor law. This settlement is, by
6 definition, a response to alleged violations of state labor laws, balanced against the competing factors of
7 uncertainty of proof and other risks.

8 A final note on the analysis discussion in *Moniz* is appropriate. *Moniz* was concerned with the
9 standard applied to a standalone PAGA action, not a settlement in which money was allocated between
10 class and PAGA claims. Here, the adequacy of the settlement as a whole impacts the factors approved of
11 by *Moniz*. It would be misleading to examine only the PAGA portion of the settlement without asking
12 how this Settlement as a whole is consistent with the purposes of PAGA. Second, the discussion of
13 “fairness” to those impacted by the settlement in *Moniz* does not play a role in this matter. In *Moniz*, the
14 Court found the record lacked any support for the disparate allocation of PAGA penalties between
15 different types of employees: “[T]he settlement’s allocation of shares of civil penalties to Colleagues that
16 are fifteen times greater than the shares allocated to Associates does not seem to have been justified
17 below and may be contrary to PAGA’s purposes.” *Moniz*, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 87. Here, PAGA
18 penalties are allocated by pay period, irrespective of job classification, an equitable method of allocation.

19 In addition, there is no evidence that a court or a commissioner had informed Defendants that any
20 conduct violated the Labor Code. *Amaral v. Cintas Corp.*, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1209 (2008); *Willis*
21 *v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC*, 2013 WL 6053831, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“Under California law, courts have
22 held that employers are not subject to heightened penalties for subsequent violations until and unless a
23 court or commissioner notified the employer that it is in violation of the Labor Code.”) And in *Cotter*,
24 the court found a significant reduction of the PAGA claim would be appropriate because “[t]his does not
25 appear to be a case where a company has deliberately sought to evade the law.” *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 176
26 F. Supp. 3d 930, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Here, Defendants can state a strong case that, as the Court
27 concluded in *Cotter*, the efforts to devise compliant operational policies do not indicate an organization
28 that has deliberately sought to evade the law. This is a very significant risk factor.

1 Finally, the PAGA allocation is fair. The LWDA is receiving \$9,750.00. The Class is receiving,
2 net, an estimated \$65,583.33 for the releases for eight theories of recovery (including the \$5,250.00 share
3 of the PAGA Allocation). An allocation to the LWDA equal to roughly 14% of the Net Settlement
4 Amount is not unfair and satisfies the policies underlying California's wage and hour laws.

5 **VI. THE COURT SHOULD SCHEDULE A FINAL FAIRNESS HEARING**

6 The last step in the settlement approval process is the fairness hearing, where the Court makes a
7 final determination about the propriety of settlement. Plaintiff requests that the fairness hearing in this
8 case be scheduled for about 140 days after issuance of the Court's Order granting preliminary approval
9 of the Settlement. Under the Settlement, the Defendants will have 14 days to provide the mailing data to
10 the Settlement Administrator, which will then have 14 days to mail out class notice. Class Members
11 have 60 days after mailing of the notice to submit exclusions or objections (with a 14-day extension
12 available for late-returned and re-mailed notices). Therefore, Plaintiff proposes a final approval hearing
13 scheduled for the first available hearing date that is about 140 days after preliminary approval is granted.

14 **VII. CONCLUSION**

15 For all the foregoing reasons, because the Class meets the requirements for certification, because
16 the Settlement bears all requisite indicia of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, and because the
17 proposed notice procedure and forms comport with Rule 3.766 and due process, this Court should grant
18 this Motion for Preliminary Approval, adopt the [Proposed] Order Granting Preliminary Approval of
19 Class Action Settlement submitted herewith, and schedule a Final Fairness Hearing.

20 Respectfully submitted,

21 Dated: July 20, 2026

TUNYAN LAW, APC



23 By: _____

24 Lilit Tunyan

25 Artur Tunyan

26 Attorneys for Plaintiff WILLIAM MOJICA

1 **PROOF OF SERVICE**

2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
3) ss
4 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

5 I am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a
6 party to the within action; my business address is 535 N. Brand Blvd., Suite 285, Glendale, CA
7 91203.

8 On the date indicated below, I served the document described as: **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF**
9 **MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS AND PAGA**
10 **REPRESENTATIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND**
11 **AUTHORITIES** on the interested parties in this action by sending a true copy thereof to interested
12 parties as follows and as stated on the attached service list:

13 Matt Drenan
14 matt.drenan@quarles.com

15 Nora Steinhagen
16 nora.steinhagen@quarles.com

17 Fred Plevin
18 fred.plevin@quarles.com

19 Grace Martin Welter
20 grace.welter@quarles.com

21 **QUARLES & BRADY LLP**

22 101 West Broadway, Suite 1500

23 San Diego, CA 92101-8285

24 Tel: (619) 822-1508

25 **Attorneys for Defendants MILROSE CONSULTANTS, LLC**
26 **and PERMIT ADVISORS, LLC**

27 [✓] **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties
28 to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the
electronic service addresses listed above via third-party cloud service
CASEANYWHERE. I did not receive an error message.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
above is true and correct.

Executed on July 20, 2026 at Glendale, California.

Natalia Zevallos

Name

Signature