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individually, and on behalf of Aggrieved Employees
pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

MARK TRAHAN, individually, and on behalf of
Aggrieved Employees pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CELEBRITY CASINOS, INC. dba CRYSTAL
CASINO; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 25STCV30655

Honorable Jerrold Abeles
Department 510

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS,
SERVICE AWARD, AND SETTLEMENT
ADMINISTRATION COSTS**

Date: June 10, 2026
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Department: 510
Reservation ID: 039081447717

Complaint Filed: October 20, 2025
Trial Date: Not Set

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT** on June 10, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 510 of the
3 above-captioned Court located at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles,
4 California 90012, Plaintiff Mark Trahan (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move the Court for an Order
5 granting approval of the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California
6 Labor Code sections 2698, et seq. (“PAGA”) settlement. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court
7 enter an Order:

- 8 1. Granting approval pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(s)(2) of the Private
9 Attorneys General Act Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement,” “Agreement,”
10 or “Settlement Agreement”) attached as **Exhibit 2** to the Declaration of James S. Winn Jr.
11 in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement and Award of
12 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Service Award, and Settlement Administration Costs (“Winn
13 Decl.”);
- 14 2. Directing the distribution of the Gross Settlement Amount of Two Hundred Thirty-Five
15 Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$235,000.00) pursuant to the terms of the Agreement;
- 16 3. Approving the Net Settlement Amount, estimated to be One Hundred Nineteen Thousand
17 One Hundred Ninety-Four Dollars and Fifty-Two Cents (\$119,194.52), of which sixty-
18 five percent (65%) will be distributed to the California Labor and Workforce
19 Development Agency (“LWDA”) and thirty-five percent (35%) of which will be
20 distributed to the Aggrieved Employees;
- 21 4. Approving an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross
22 Settlement Amount (i.e., \$82,250.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$235,000.00) to
23 Plaintiff’s Counsel;
- 24 5. Approving the amount of Twenty-Four Thousand One Hundred Five Dollars and Forty-
25 Eight Cents (\$24,105.48) to Plaintiff’s Counsel for reimbursement of actual litigation
26 expenses payment pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(k)(1);
- 27 6. Approving the award of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) to Plaintiff as
28 a Service Award;

7. Appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
8. Approving an award of up to Four Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents (\$4,450.00) in anticipated costs to ILYM Group, Inc. for its settlement administration services.

In accordance with California Labor Code sections 2699 *et. seq.*, on August 13, 2025, a copy of the proposed Settlement Agreement was submitted to LWDA via online submission through the LWDA's website. (Winn Decl., ¶ 13 and Exh. 3).

This Motion is based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of James S. Winn Jr., Plaintiff Mark Trahan, and the Settlement Administrator Lisa Mullins of ILYM Group, Inc., the pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this matter, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: May 18, 2026

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

By: James Winn
James S. Winn Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Mark Trahan

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Pursuant to the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code
4 sections 2698, et seq. (“PAGA”), Plaintiff Mark Trahan (“Plaintiff”) seeks approval of the Private
5 Attorneys General Act Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement,” “Agreement,” or
6 “Settlement Agreement”) entered into with Defendant Celebrity Casinos Inc. dba Crystal Casino
7 (“Defendant”) (together, with Plaintiff, the “Parties”), which is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration
8 of James S. Winn Jr. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, Attorney’s
9 Fees and Costs, Service Award, and Settlement Administration Costs (“Winn Decl.”). The Agreement
10 terms are outlined as follows:

- 11 • Gross Settlement Amount: Two Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
12 (\$235,000.00).
- 13 • Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: Attorneys’ fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross
14 Settlement Amount (i.e., \$82,250.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount \$235,000.00) and
15 reimbursement of actual litigation costs and expenses in the amount of Twenty-Four
16 Thousand One Hundred Five Dollars and Forty-Eight Cents (\$24,105.48), to be paid from
17 the Gross Settlement Amount..
- 18 • Service Award: Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) to Plaintiff, to be paid
19 from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 20 • Settlement Administration Costs: Up to Four Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Dollars and
21 Zero Cents (\$4,450.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 22 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: One Hundred Nineteen Thousand One Hundred
23 Ninety-Four Dollars and Fifty-Two Cents (\$119,194.52), of which sixty-five percent
24 (65%) (\$77,476.44) will be paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development
25 Agency (“LWDA”) and the remaining thirty-five percent (35%) (\$41,718.08) will be paid
26 to the Aggrieved Employees.

27 As set forth herein, the Settlement Agreement is the product of informed discovery, arms-
28 length negotiations, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the State of California
and Aggrieved Employees. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that the Court grant approval of

1 the proposed Settlement Agreement, among other requested relief.

2 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

3 Defendant operates a casino at 123 East Artesia Blvd, Compton, California 90220. (Winn
4 Decl., ¶ 2). Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, non-exempt Surveillance Technician
5 from approximately September 2024 to approximately April 2025. (Winn Decl., ¶ 2; Declaration of
6 Mark Trahan in Support of Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement and Award of Attorneys' Fees
7 and Costs, Service Award, and Settlement Administration Costs ["Trahan Decl.,"] ¶ 2).

8 On August 13, 2025, Plaintiff provided written notice by electronic submission to the LWDA
9 and by U.S. Certified Mail to Defendant, pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, of the specific
10 provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated by Defendant ("PAGA Notice").
11 (Winn Decl., ¶ 3 and Exh. 1).

12 On August 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in the action entitled *Mark*
13 *Trahan v. Celebrity Casinos, Inc. dba Crystal Casino*, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No.
14 25STCV24346 ("Class Action"), thereby commencing a putative class action against Defendant. (*Id.*,
15 ¶ 4).

16 On October 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Enforcement Action Under the Private
17 Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698 *Et Seq.* ("Operative Complaint") in the action entitled
18 *Mark Trahan v. Celebrity Casinos, Inc. dba Crystal Casino*, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case
19 No. 25STCV30655 ("Action"). (*Id.*, ¶ 5). The Operative Complaint asserts a single cause of action
20 for civil penalties under PAGA for violations of multiple provisions of the California Labor Code and
21 the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. (*Ibid.*).

22 On December 17, 2025, the Parties participated in a formal mediation conducted by Brandon
23 McKelvey, Esq., a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and
24 hour matters. (*Id.*, ¶ 6). With the aid of the mediator's evaluation, the Parties ultimately reached an
25 agreement to resolve the Action in its entirety. (*Ibid.*).

26 On January 16, 2026, pursuant to Plaintiff's request due to an enforceable arbitration
27 agreement with a class action waiver, the Court dismissed the Class Action without prejudice. (*Id.*, ¶
28 7).

1 On April 10, 2026, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 8 and Exh. 2).

2 During the course of informal discovery in the Action, Plaintiff’s Counsel conducted an intense
3 investigation into the facts of the Action. (*Id.*, ¶ 9). This included obtaining data, information, and
4 documents relating to the underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, a twenty-five
5 percent (25%) sampling of Aggrieved Employees’ time and payroll data, relevant wage and hour
6 policies, and Aggrieved Employees’ data points so that Plaintiff could assess the number of alleged
7 potential violations and value of the recoverable penalties, as well as evaluate the strengths and
8 weaknesses of his claims. (*Ibid.*).

9 Based on the data, information, and documents received, as well as thorough discussions with
10 Defendant’s counsel, Plaintiff’s Counsel was able to (i) determine the total number of distinct
11 individuals falling within the definition of “Aggrieved Employees” for the relevant statutory period,
12 (ii) the number of affected pay periods at issue among them, and (iii) construct a damages model that
13 calculated the maximum realistic amount of PAGA penalties that could be levied against Defendant
14 within the relevant statutory period. (*Id.*, ¶ 10). Defendant, however, disputed Plaintiff’s claims and
15 disputed both the existence of and extent of liability as alleged by Plaintiff, which allowed Plaintiff’s
16 Counsel to further assess the strength of Plaintiff’s claims. (*Ibid.*). Plaintiff’s Counsel’s experience in
17 litigating similar representative wage and hour claims, the degree of investigation that was conducted
18 here, and the amount of data, information, and documents that was obtained, was sufficient to
19 determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of these claims for
20 purposes of settlement. (*Ibid.*).

21 The Parties believe the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Id.*, ¶ 11).
22 The Parties understand, acknowledge, and agree that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a
23 compromise of Plaintiff’s PAGA claims, and that it is the desire and intention of the Parties to affect
24 a final and complete resolution of the Action. (*Ibid.*).

25 Defendant denies all of the claims in the Action, and does not waive, but rather expressly
26 reserves, all rights to challenge all such claims and allegations upon all legal, procedural, and factual
27 grounds should the Settlement Agreement not become final. (*Id.*, ¶ 13). The Settlement Agreement
28 reflects a compromise reached to end litigation in the Action. (*Ibid.*). Following significant

1 investigation and extensive settlement negotiations, Plaintiff now seeks approval of the proposed
2 Settlement Agreement, which will resolve all claims alleged in the Action. (Ibid).

3 **III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

4 **A. Definition of the Aggrieved Employees**

5 For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the “Aggrieved Employees” shall
6 be defined as “all current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees who worked for
7 Defendant in the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period.” (Winn Decl., ¶ 14;
8 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 1(c)). The “PAGA Period” is the period from August 13, 2024 through
9 January 28, 2026. (Winn Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 1(o)). There are approximately two
10 hundred and eighty-three (283) Aggrieved Employees who worked nine thousand two hundred and
11 twenty-eight (9,228) pay periods during the PAGA Period (“Pay Periods”)¹. (Winn Decl., ¶ 14).

12 **B. Amount of Settlement**

13 The Parties have agreed to settle the PAGA claims at issue in the Action for a non-reversionary
14 Gross Settlement Amount of Two Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
15 (\$235,000.00). (Winn Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 1(i)).

16 **C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Amount**

17 The Gross Settlement Amount is a common fund and therefore includes all requested costs,
18 fees, and other allocations. (Winn Decl., ¶ 15). The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) attorneys’
19 fees in the amount of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$82,250.00 if
20 the Gross Settlement Amount is \$235,000.00); (2) attorneys’ actual litigation costs and expenses in
21 the amount of up to Twenty-Four Thousand One Hundred Five Dollars and Forty-Eight Cents
22 (\$24,105.48); (3) Service Award in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00)
23 to Plaintiff; and (4) Settlement Administration Costs, not to exceed Four Thousand Four Hundred Fifty
24 Dollars and Zero Cents (\$4,450.00). (Winn Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 4(a)(1)-(3)).

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26 ///

27 _____
28 ¹ At the time of this filing, Defendant has represented that there are 9,228 Pay Periods. Accordingly, the Escalator Clause
in Section 4(a)(6) of the Settlement Agreement has not been triggered.

After the above-estimated amounts are deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount, the Net Settlement Amount will amount to One Hundred Nineteen Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Four Dollars and Fifty-Two Cents (\$119,194.52), of which sixty-five percent (65%), or Seventy-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Six Dollars and Forty-Four Cents (\$77,476.44), will be paid to the LWDA (“LWDA Payment”), and thirty-five percent (35%), or Forty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Eighteen Dollars and Eight Cents (\$41,718.08), will be distributed and paid to Aggrieved Employees (“Employees’ Portion”) on a *pro rata* basis based on their number of Pay Periods. (Winn Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 4(a)(5) and 6(b)).

No later than seven (7) calendar days after the Court’s order granting approval of the Settlement, Defendant shall provide the Settlement Administrator with a list containing each Aggrieved Employee’s (i) first and last name; (ii) last known address; (iii) last known telephone number; (iv) Social Security number; (v) start and end dates of employment; and (vi) number of Pay Periods (collectively, “PAGA List”). (Winn Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 1(n) and 6(c)(1)).

Within thirty (30) calendar days of the Court’s order granting approval of the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will transmit the Gross Settlement Amount to a qualified settlement account established by the Settlement Administrator. (Winn Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6(a)).

No later than seven (7) calendar days after the Settlement Administrator receives the PAGA List and Gross Settlement Amount, the Settlement Administrator will distribute the Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA Payment, the Service Award, the Settlement Administration Costs, and the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. (Winn Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6(c)(3) and 6(c)(5)-(8)).

Each Individual PAGA Payment check will be valid and negotiable for one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and thereafter, will be canceled. (Winn Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6(c)(4)). Any funds associated with such canceled checks will be distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the State Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the Aggrieved Employee(s) at issue and in the amount of their respective Individual PAGA Payment(s). (Winn Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6(c)(4)).

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1 If the actual number of Pay Periods is more than ten percent (10%) above 8,920, the Gross
2 Settlement Amount will be increased by the percentage that the actual number exceeds 9,812 Pay
3 Periods². (Winn Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 4(a)(6)).

4 IV. STANDARD FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT

5 The settlement of a PAGA claim requires court approval. (California Labor Code (“Lab.
6 Code”) § 2699(l)). The Court must be mindful that a “[s]ettlement is a compromise, which balances
7 the possible recovery against the risks inherent in litigating further.” (*In re TD Ameritrade Account*
8 *Holder Litig.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103222 at *24 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2011)). “[T]he very essence
9 of a settlement is ... ‘a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes,’” as “it is the very
10 uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce
11 consensual settlements.” (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com.*, 688 F.2d 615, 624-26 (9th Cir.
12 1982)). As such, “the settlement or fairness hearing is not to be turned into a trial or rehearsal for trial
13 on the merits,” or “judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been
14 achieved.” (*Ibid*).

15 Although the California Labor Code does not set forth the criteria by which a PAGA settlement
16 is to be evaluated, it is presumed that a reviewing court may take into consideration some of the factors
17 that courts use when reviewing a class action settlement. However, “a PAGA claim asserted on a non-
18 class representative basis...is not considered a class action but a law enforcement action, and therefore
19 does not have to meet the requirements of [a class action].” (*Casida v. Sears Holdings Corp.*, 2012
20 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9302 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012)).

21 A court’s review of a PAGA settlement necessarily implicates the following unique features
22 that render the approval process distinct from approval of a class action settlement under Code of Civil
23 Procedure Section 382 and California Rules of Court Rule 3.769. First, in evaluating the adequacy of
24 the settlement amount, the Court’s focus is not concerned with the amount aggrieved employees are
25 to receive, but rather, must focus on the total settlement amount in achieving PAGA’s objective.
26 Indeed, “[t]he remedy sought in a PAGA suit consists of civil penalties, not individual or class
27

28 ² See n.1.

1 damages,” and while a “[PAGA] action is ... designed to protect the public and penalize the employer
2 for past illegal conduct,” a reviewing court must be mindful of the fact that settlement of a PAGA
3 claim involves a compromise. (*Mendez v. Tween Brands, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66454 at *11
4 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2010)). “Unlike class actions, these civil penalties are not meant to compensate
5 unnamed employees because the action is fundamentally a law enforcement action.” (*Ochoa-
6 Hernandez v. Cjaders Foods, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32774 at *12 (Apr. 2, 2010)). The Court
7 should not lose sight of the fact that, “[u]nlike a class action seeking damages or injunctive relief for
8 injured employees, the purpose of PAGA is to incentivize private parties to recover civil penalties for
9 the government that otherwise may not have been assessed and collected by overburdened state
10 enforcement agencies.” (*Ibid*).

11 Second, consistent with the fact that unnamed employees have no property interest in a PAGA
12 claim, “[u]nnamed employees need not be given notice of the PAGA claim, nor do they have the
13 ability to opt-out of the representative PAGA claim.” (*Ochoa-Hernandez*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14 32774 at *13). Indeed, “[PAGA] does not create property rights or any other substantive rights” as
15 “[i]t is simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover civil penalties – for
16 Labor Code violations – that otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies.”
17 (*Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 (2009)). This
18 renders the approval process of a PAGA settlement distinct from a class action settlement, as there is
19 no need for the Court to employ the “two-step approval process” required under California Rules of
20 Court Rule 3.769.

21 Finally, unlike class action settlements, the scope of release permitted in a PAGA settlement
22 is limited. While “judgment in [a PAGA] action is binding not only on the named employee plaintiff
23 but also on government agencies and any aggrieved employee not a party to the proceeding...the
24 nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to
25 be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*Arias v.
26 Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 969, 985-87 (2009)). Thus, the scope of a release in a PAGA settlement is
27 confined to the PAGA penalties alleged in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA
28 and to the claims that were, or could have been, alleged pursuant to PAGA based on the factual

1 allegations in the complaint and/or the plaintiff's notice to the LWDA. In the case at hand, as the only
2 claims at issue are PAGA claims, those will be the only claims extinguished through the Settlement.

3 **V. THE AGREEMENT IS FAIR AND SHOULD BE APPROVED**

4 **A. The Agreement is Presumed to Be Fair**

5 California courts recognize that "a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is
6 reached through arm's-length bargaining." (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224,
7 245 (2001); *see also Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 799 (2009)). Here,
8 the Agreement is presumptively fair because: (1) it occurred after counsel for the Parties engaged in
9 significant investigation to evaluate the strength and potential value of the PAGA claims, and the risks
10 of litigating these claims through trial; and (2) it was negotiated at great length and effort by counsel
11 with significant experience in similar complex labor and employment matters. (Winn Decl., ¶ 22).

12 **B. The Agreement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' Respective**
13 **Legal Positions and Recovery Risks**

14 In deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, a trial court has broad powers to
15 determine if it is fair given the circumstances of the case. (*Mallick v. Sup. Ct.*, 89 Cal.App.3d 434,
16 438 (1979)). In exercising these powers, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement
17 is "fair, adequate, and reasonable." (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted)). A
18 settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor
19 does the settlement have to obtain one hundred percent of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
20 (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250). In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court
21 must consider "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of
22 further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
23 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and
24 views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to
25 the proposed settlement."³ (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)).
26 Even though a *Kullar* analysis is not required for approval of a PAGA settlement, a brief analysis is
27

28 ³ As this is not a class action, the *Kullar* factors pertaining to the risk of maintaining class action status through trial and the reaction of class members to the proposed settlement are inapplicable.

1 included to support approval of the Settlement Agreement. (*See* Winn Decl., ¶¶ 24-42).

2 These factors require balancing and are non-exhaustive. Trial courts should therefore tailor
3 the factors to each case and give due regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
4 between the parties.” (*Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801).

5 1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

6 In order to prevail at trial, Plaintiff would have to prove violations of the California Labor
7 Code underlying his PAGA claims, demonstrate that Aggrieved Employees suffered, and demonstrate
8 that Defendant’s conduct gives rise to penalties. (*See Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC*, 572
9 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2008) [“Plaintiff’s claim under [PAGA] is wholly dependent
10 upon her other claims. Because all of Plaintiff’s other claims fail as a matter of law, so does her PAGA
11 claim.”]).

12 Here, Plaintiff’s core allegations are that Defendant systematically violated the California
13 Labor Code by, *inter alia*, failing to properly pay wages for all hours worked, failing to pay overtime
14 at the correct rate, failing to provide compliant meal and rest periods, failing to pay premiums at the
15 correct rate of pay, failing to timely pay wages during employment and upon termination, failing to
16 maintain accurate payroll records, failing to provide accurate wage statements, and failing to reimburse
17 necessary business expenses. (Winn Decl., ¶ 23).

18 Defendant maintained several defenses to Plaintiff’s theories of liability, which, if successfully
19 argued and proven, had the potential to eliminate or substantially reduce recovery. (*Id.*, ¶ 24).
20 Throughout this litigation, Defendant maintained, and continues to maintain, that it had, and continues
21 to have, compliant employment policies and practices throughout the time period at issue. (*Ibid*).
22 Defendant denies that it ever violated any provision of the California Labor Code, including, but not
23 limited to, those sections for which Plaintiff seeks penalties under PAGA. (*Ibid*). Defendant further
24 denied, and continues to deny, that the lawsuit is appropriate for representative treatment for any
25 purpose other than settlement. (*Ibid*). Defendant also challenged Plaintiff’s standing as an aggrieved
26 employee and denied that any of Defendant’s other employees whom Plaintiff seeks to represent are
27 aggrieved. (*Ibid*).

28 ///

1 Defendant also argued that an important feature of PAGA is that the Court retains discretion
2 to lower the penalties if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise
3 would result in an award that is “unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” (Ibid; Lab. Code
4 § 2699(e)(2); *see also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1136
5 (2012) [holding that a court may reduce the amount of PAGA penalties awarded to an employee based
6 upon discretionary factors]).

7 Even if violations of the California Labor Code occurred, which Defendant denies, Defendant
8 contended that said violations would only be considered “initial violations” and thus heightened
9 “subsequent violation” penalties were not warranted. (Winn Decl., ¶ 25; Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2); *see*
10 *also Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1208-09 (2008) [“Until the employer has
11 been notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision [...], the employer cannot be presumed to be
12 aware that its continuing underpayment of employees is a ‘violation’ subject to penalties.”]).

13 Defendant also contended that, with respect to PAGA claims, the Court was unlikely to assess
14 cumulative penalties for the maximum number of possible, separate California Labor Code violations,
15 because it would be unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, and/or confiscatory, especially where certain conduct
16 may be regulated by multiple provisions of the California Labor Code that are interrelated and work
17 in tandem. (Winn Decl., ¶ 26). While the PAGA does provide the potential for a heightened penalty
18 for subsequent violations, courts are often hesitant to award a heightened penalty where there is no
19 prior citation by the Labor Commissioner, as is the case here. (*See Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc.*, 3
20 F.4th 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding no heightened penalty where defendant was not notified by
21 Labor Commissioner or any court that it was subject to the California Labor Code)). The Ninth
22 Circuit’s holding in *Bernstein* also supports that a settlement valuation that does not “stack” penalties.
23 (Ibid).

24 While Plaintiff maintains that his PAGA claims have merit, in reaching the Agreement,
25 Plaintiff and his counsel took into account the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s position, and
26 the uncertainty of how the case might have concluded as litigation continued, at trial, and/or upon
27 appeal. (Winn Decl., ¶ 27). Based on these disputes, which had the potential to completely eliminate
28 Plaintiff’s recovery, the range of realistic “litigation outcomes” on Plaintiff’s PAGA claims was

1 defined by a “maximum possible liability” amount of approximately \$892,000 and a “risk-adjusted
2 realistic value” amount of approximately \$267,600. (*Id.*, ¶ 42). In light thereof, the Gross Settlement
3 Amount of \$235,000 is a significant settlement. (*Ibid.*).

4 2. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

5 Approval of the Settlement Agreement is also appropriate in light of the risk, expense, and
6 complexity of further litigation. As discussed above, the Settlement Agreement takes into
7 consideration the specific factual and legal hurdles faced by Plaintiff in establishing Defendant’s
8 penalty-liability in this case, which may have resulted in a net-zero recovery. Any recovery on these
9 claims is not certain. And even when liability is found, PAGA claims are discretionary, such that the
10 Court could decline to award their full value. Some of Plaintiff’s claims are also derivative, and as
11 such, Plaintiff must prevail on his underlying California Labor Code claims in order to prevail on the
12 derivative claims. These risks – when balanced with the fact that the Agreement achieved a very
13 significant recovery (as demonstrated below), and that further litigation posed a risk of diminishing
14 such recovery by increasing litigation expenses – weigh strongly in favor of settlement approval.

15 3. The Benefits Conferred by the Agreement Balance in Favor of Approval

16 The Settlement Agreement provides a *significant* monetary benefit that falls well within the
17 range of an acceptable settlement under the circumstances, which is the standard on which the instant
18 Agreement must be judged. As held by the Ninth Circuit: “The proposed settlement is not to be judged
19 against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.”
20 (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n*, 688 F.2d at 625 (emphasis in original)). As the Second
21 Circuit has pointed out: “The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the
22 potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate
23 and should be disapproved.” (*City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448, 455 & n.2 (2nd Cir.
24 1974)).

25 The Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be One Hundred Nineteen Thousand One
26 Hundred Ninety-Four Dollars and Fifty-Two Cents (\$119,194.52). After all deductions are made from
27 the Gross Settlement Amount for the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, the Service Award, and the Settlement
28 Administration Costs, Seventy-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Six Dollars and Forty-Four

1 Cents (\$77,476.44) (i.e., 65% of the Net Settlement Amount) will go to the LWDA, and Forty-One
2 Thousand Seven Hundred Eighteen Dollars and Eight Cents (\$41,718.08) (i.e., 35% of the Net
3 Settlement Amount) will go to the Aggrieved Employees, as required by California Labor Code §
4 2699(m) (“civil penalties recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 65 percent
5 to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency . . . and 35 percent to the aggrieved employees.”).
6 (Winn Decl., ¶ 43). There is no reason to doubt the fairness of the proposed plan of allocation of the
7 Net Settlement Amount as it fully complies with California Labor Code section 2699(m). (Ibid).

8 The Settlement Agreement is a compromise of highly disputed claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 44). Plaintiff
9 and his counsel recognize the expense and length of continued proceedings necessary to litigate the
10 matter through trial and any possible appeals. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel have also taken into
11 account the uncertainty and risk of the outcome of further litigation, and the difficulties and delays
12 inherent in such litigation. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel are also aware of the burdens of proof
13 necessary to establish liability, both generally and in response to Defendant’s defenses thereto, and
14 the difficulties in establishing Defendant’s liability for, and the right to recover, penalties on behalf of
15 Plaintiff, the State of California, and other Aggrieved Employees. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel
16 have also taken into account Defendant’s agreement to enter into a settlement that confers significant
17 relief upon the Aggrieved Employees and the State of California. (Ibid). Considering all of the facts
18 in this case, Plaintiff and his counsel have determined that the Agreement represents a fair, adequate,
19 and reasonable resolution of the PAGA claims, and that it is in the best interests of the Aggrieved
20 Employees and the State of California. (Ibid).

21 The result achieved in this case is well within the range of what is considered an acceptable
22 settlement under the circumstances, especially when compared to the settlement of PAGA claims in
23 other cases. (*Id.*, ¶ 45). (*See, e.g., DCH Auto Wage and Hour Cases*, Los Angeles Superior Court,
24 Case No. JCCP4833 (May 2017) [approving \$15,000 out of \$4 million toward settlement of PAGA
25 claims]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160052, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
26 2012) [approving \$10,000 out of \$3.7 million toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Schiller v. David’s*
27 *Bridal, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80776, at *40 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) [approving \$7,500 out of
28 \$518,245 toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC*, 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 15821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (approving \$10,000 out of \$6.9 million toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Franco v. Ruiz Food Prods.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169057, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2021) [approving \$10,000 out of \$2.5 million toward settlement of PAGA claims]). Here, the value obtained for settlement of the PAGA claims is significant, and it will be distributed in accordance with and in fulfillment of the objectives of the PAGA statute.

4. The Scope of the Release is Narrowly Tailored

As discussed above, the California Supreme Court has concluded that in the context of PAGA “the nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*See Arias*, 46 Cal. 4th, at 987). Thus, the scope of the limited release provided in exchange for the foregoing consideration is limited to the civil penalties asserted in the Action and the LWDA Notice, under California Labor Code §§ 2698 *et seq.* (*See Settlement Agreement*, at ¶¶ 1(m) and 7(a)).

As such, this factor balances strongly in favor of approval of the Agreement.

5. Experience and Views of Counsel Favor Approval

Plaintiff’s Counsel is experienced in complex representative and class action wage-and-hour litigation. (Winn Decl., ¶ 51). In the view of Plaintiff’s Counsel, the benefits conferred by the Agreement are eminently fair and reasonable, and in the best interests of the State of California and the Aggrieved Employees in light of the risk, delay, and uncertainty of continued litigation and the substantial monetary benefits provided for by the Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 46). Furthermore, courts have acknowledged that “the interests of a plaintiff, counsel, and other potentially aggrieved employees are largely aligned. All stand to gain from proving as convincingly as possible as many Labor Code violations as the evidence will sustain[.]” (*Williams v. Superior Court*, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 548-549 (2017) [citing Labor Code § 2699(g)(1)(i)]).

6. The Extent of Discovery and Stage of Proceedings Favor Approval

In evaluating this element, the Court should be mindful that “‘formal discovery is not a necessary ticket to the bargaining table’” [*Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239], as the relevant consideration is “whether ‘the parties have sufficient information to make an informed decision about settlement.’” (*See Sandoval v. Roadlink United States Pac., Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist.

1 LEXIS 130378, at 26 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011)).

2 Here, the extent of informal discovery conducted was sufficient to enable Plaintiff's Counsel
3 to evaluate the strength and value of the PAGA claims for purposes of settlement. (Winn Decl., ¶ 47).
4 Prior to mediation, Defendant provided Plaintiff with data, information, and documents relating to the
5 underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, a twenty-five percent (25%) sampling of
6 Aggrieved Employees' time and payroll data, relevant wage and hour policies, and Aggrieved
7 Employees' data points. (*Id.*, ¶ 9). As discussed above, Plaintiff's Counsel's investigation was
8 sufficient to, among other things, tabulate with precision the total number of alleged California Labor
9 Code violations at issue during the relevant statutory period and identify the total number of
10 individuals falling within the definition of "Aggrieved Employees" for the relevant statutory period.
11 (*Id.*, ¶ 10).

12 Based on Plaintiff's Counsel's experience litigating wage and hour claims, such investigation
13 was sufficient to determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of
14 these claims for purposes of settlement. (*Ibid.*).

15 VI. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE

16 As the prevailing party in settlement, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys' fees for bringing
17 his PAGA claims. (Lab. Code § 2699(k) ["Any employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled
18 to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs."]). Plaintiff's Counsel is also entitled to attorneys'
19 fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5(a), as the instant action has resulted in the
20 enforcement of important rights benefitting the public and secures monetary recovery for the State of
21 California as well as the Aggrieved Employees. A fee award is justified where the legal action has
22 produced its benefits by way of a voluntary settlement. (*See, e.g., Maria P. v. Riles*, 43 Cal.3d 1281,
23 1290-91 (1987); *Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo*, 33 Cal.3d 348, 352-53
24 (1983); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977) ["when a number of persons are entitled in common
25 to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff ... for the benefit of all results in the creation or
26 preservation of that fund, such plaintiff ... may be awarded attorney's fees out of the fund.])).

27 ///

28 ///

1 In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016), the California Supreme Court
2 confirmed that “[t]he percentage of fund method survives in California class action cases.”
3 Specifically, the *Laffitte* Court held:

4 The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation,
5 alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market
6 conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early
7 settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—convince us the percentage
8 method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.
9 (*Id.*, at 503 [internal citation omitted]).

10 While trial courts have discretion to apply either a lodestar method or percentage-of-the-fund
11 method, the California Supreme Court has taken the position that trial courts also “retain the discretion
12 to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested
13 percentage fee.” (*Lafitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506; *see also Wershba*, 91 Cal.App. 4th at 253). Courts award
14 fees to serve as an economic incentive for lawyers to undertake litigation, and thereby enhance and
15 facilitate access to the judicial system for adjudication of meritorious claims, and to deter wrongdoing.
16 This is especially true in situations where multiple similar alleged wrongs would not be economically
17 feasible to pursue individually, such as here. Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value
18 of attorneys’ fees and their decisions will “not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of
19 discretion.” (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.*, 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000); *see also Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th
20 at 506 [holding that “trial court did not abuse its discretion in using [the percentage of fund method],
21 in part to approve the fee request”]). Indeed, it is long settled that the “experienced trial judge is the
22 best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (*Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th
23 1122, 1132 (2001)).

24 The percentage method is particularly appropriate where a monetary settlement has been
25 recovered and “the benefit [recovered can be] easily quantified.” (*In re Bluetooth Headset Prods.*
26 *Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011)). Where the amount of a settlement is a “certain or
27 easily calculable sum of money,” California courts may calculate attorneys’ fees as a reasonable
28 percentage of the settlement created. (Weil and Brown, California Practice Guide, *Civil Procedure*

1 *Before Trial*, Chapter 14, section 14:145; *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1808). The percentage fee
2 method is preferred in representative actions because “it better approximates the workings of the
3 marketplace than the lodestar approach.” (*Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 49). California law
4 provides that the award for attorneys’ fees should be equivalent to fees freely negotiated in the legal
5 marketplace and paid in comparable litigation based on the result achieved and risk incurred. (*See*
6 *Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 47-50; *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th 480 at 503). In cases where the settlement
7 agreement provides that the defendant will pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys a percentage of the fund created
8 by the settlement, use of that percentage method is appropriate. (*Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 32). Fee
9 awards that are too small will “chill the private enforcement essential to the vindication of many legal
10 rights and obstruct the representative actions that often relieve the courts of the need to separately
11 adjudicate numerous claims.” (*Id.* at 53). Therefore, fees in representative actions should approximate
12 the probable terms of a contingent fee contract negotiated by a sophisticated attorney and client in
13 comparable litigation. (*Id.* at 48). “The ultimate goal ... is the award of a ‘reasonable’ fee to
14 compensate counsel for their efforts, irrespective of the method of calculation.” (*Consumer Privacy*
15 *Cases*, 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557-58 (2009) [quoting *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra*,
16 126 Cal.App.4th at 1270]).

17 Plaintiff’s Counsel’s application for attorneys’ fees in light of the facts and circumstances
18 surrounding the case is within the range of reasonableness. Historically, courts have awarded fees as
19 high as fifty percent (50%) of the settlement in complex actions, depending on the circumstances of
20 the case. (*See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.*, 526 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1981) [awarding attorneys’
21 fees in the amount of 45% of the \$7.3 million total settlement amount]; *Beech Cinema, Inc. v.*
22 *Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.* 480 F.Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) [awarding approximately 53%
23 of the settlement as attorneys’ fees]).

24 Here, Plaintiff’s Counsel’s request of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement
25 Amount (i.e., \$82,250.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$235,000.00) is fair and reasonable based
26 on the percentage of the recovery method. Plaintiff’s Counsel has vigorously litigated this case since
27 it was commenced, with the very real possibility of an unsuccessful outcome and no fee recovery of
28 any kind. (Winn Decl., ¶ 48). Counsel for Plaintiff undertook significant investigation and invested

1 a significant amount of time analyzing relevant documents and data to evaluate the nature and extent
2 of the alleged underlying California Labor Code violations and calculation of the potential monetary
3 recovery as they relate to Plaintiff's PAGA claims under PAGA. (Winn Decl., ¶ 52). Plaintiff's
4 Counsel possesses combined extensive experience litigating wage and hour and other complex
5 litigation matters, and the attorneys who worked on this matter have been approved as class counsel
6 and/or have had their billable rates approved in the settlement of other class and PAGA actions,
7 numerous times. (*Id.*, ¶ 51).

8 In the present case, Plaintiff's Counsel has borne all of the risks and costs of litigation and will
9 not receive any compensation until recovery is obtained. Plaintiff's Counsel is experienced in complex
10 wage-and-hour litigation and used that experience to obtain a favorable result for Plaintiff, the
11 Aggrieved Employees, and the State of California. (Winn Decl., ¶ 49). Considering the amount of
12 fees requested, work performed, risks incurred, and experience of Plaintiff's Counsel in handling
13 similar matters, Plaintiff maintains that the requested attorneys' fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of
14 the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$82,250.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$235,000.00) are
15 reasonable and should be awarded. (*Ibid.*).

16 **VII. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' COSTS AND EXPENSES ARE FAIR AND**
17 **REASONABLE**

18 The Agreement provides for reimbursement of Plaintiff's Counsel's actual litigation costs and
19 expenses up to the amount of Thirty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$30,000.00). (Winn Decl., ¶
20 54; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 4(a)(1)). However, Plaintiff's Counsel only seeks reimbursement of a
21 total of Twenty-Four Thousand One Hundred Five Dollars and Forty-Eight Cents (\$24,105.48) in
22 litigation costs and expenses. (Winn Decl., ¶ 54 and Exh. 5). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel
23 respectfully requests that the Court reimburse it for actual litigation costs and expenses in the amount
24 of Twenty-Four Thousand One Hundred Five Dollars and Forty-Eight Cents (\$24,105.48).

25 **VIII. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE FAIR AND**
26 **REASONABLE**

27 As set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the Parties have agreed to retain, subject to approval
28 by the Court, ILYM Group, Inc., to handle the administration of the Agreement. (Winn Decl., ¶ 55;

1 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 4(a)(3)). The fees and expenses of the Settlement Administrator are
2 estimated not to exceed Four Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents (\$4,450.00).
3 (Winn Decl., ¶ 55; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 4(a)(3)). These costs include, but are not limited to,
4 expenses for preparing, printing, and mailing the Cover Letter and Individual PAGA Payment checks
5 to the Aggrieved Employees, re-mailing the returned Individual PAGA Payment checks to any new
6 addresses obtained, and handling inquiries from Aggrieved Employees regarding the Agreement,
7 among other things. (Winn Decl., ¶ 55). Accordingly, the Court should grant approval of the
8 Settlement Administration Costs in the amount of *up to* Four Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Dollars
9 and Zero Cents (\$4,450.00) to ILYM Group, Inc., a necessary third-party for handling the settlement
10 process. (Ibid).

11 **IX. THE REQUESTED SERVICE AWARD IS FAIR AND REASONABLE**

12 The purpose of an enhancement award is to incentivize aggrieved employees to step into the
13 shoes of the state labor agency and undertake the responsibilities associated with initiating a lawsuit
14 and serving in a representative capacity. (*See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715,
15 726 (2004) (upholding “service payments” to named plaintiffs for their efforts in bringing the action);
16 *Clark v. Am. Residential Servs., LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804 (2009) (“an incentive award is
17 appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit’”). Plaintiff initiated
18 this litigation on behalf of the State of California and his former co-workers who will now be entitled
19 to receive payment from the Agreement. By initiating and pursuing the Action, Plaintiff stepped into
20 the shoes of the State of California and undertook the responsibilities of serving in a representative
21 capacity. (Winn Decl., ¶ 57; *See generally* Trahan Decl.). Plaintiff was available whenever Plaintiff’s
22 Counsel needed him and actively tried to obtain information that would benefit the prosecution of the
23 Action. (Winn Decl., ¶ 57; Trahan Decl., ¶¶ 4-5). The Service Award for Plaintiff is eminently
24 reasonable given the time and effort Plaintiff spent on this matter, his services on behalf of the State
25 of California and the Aggrieved Employees, and his broader, general release of claims. (Winn Decl.,
26 ¶ 56).

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1 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that it is appropriate and just for Plaintiff to receive
2 a Service Award in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) in addition to
3 the Individual PAGA Payment he will receive as an Aggrieved Employee, for his services on behalf
4 of the State of California and the other Aggrieved Employees, as well as for the broader, general
5 release of claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 59).

6 **X. CONCLUSION**

7 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff's
8 Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, Attorney's Fees and Costs, Service Award, and Settlement
9 Administration Costs and grant the relief requested herein.

10 Respectfully submitted,

11 Dated: May 18, 2026

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

12 By: James Winn
13 James S. Winn Jr.
14 Attorneys for Plaintiff Mark Trahan
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Make a Reservation

MARK TRAHAN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO THE CALIFORNIA PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT vs CELEBRITY CASINOS, INC. DBA CRYSTAL CASINO

Case Number: 25STCV30655 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Other Employment Complaint Case
Date Filed: 2025-10-20 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 510

Reservation

Case Name:

MARK TRAHAN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO THE CALIFORNIA PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT vs CELEBRITY CASINOS, INC. DBA CRYSTAL CASINO

Case Number:

25STCV30655

Type:

Motion for Order (MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS, SERVICE AWARD, AND SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS)

Status:

RESERVED

Filing Party:

MARK TRAHAN, individually, and on behalf of Aggrieved Employees pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act (Plaintiff)

Location:

Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 510

Date/Time:

06/10/2026 8:30 AM

Number of Motions:

1

Reservation ID:

039081447717

Confirmation Code:

CR-EUF2VPB7T9QNWJDC

Fees

Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion for Order (name extension)	0.00	1	0.00
TOTAL			\$0.00

Payment

Chat

Amount: \$0.00	Type: NOFEE
Account Number: n/a	Authorization: n/a
Payment Date: n/a	



Print Receipt



Reserve Another Hearing



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