

Benjamin H. Haber (SBN 315664)
benjamin.haber@wilshirelawfirm.com
Daniel J. Kramer (SBN 314625)
daniel.kramer@wilshirelawfirm.com
Alan Wilcox (SBN 287476)
alan.wilcox@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC
660 S. Figueroa Street, Sky Lobby
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: (213) 381-9988
Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE

PAUL PAPEL, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

MCNIB CORPORATION DBA MCDONALD'S,
a California corporation; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 30-2023-01304958-CU-OE-CXC

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. William
Claster, Dept. CX101]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: October 3, 2025
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: CX101

Complaint filed: January 31, 2023
FAC filed: June 21, 2023
Trial date: Not set

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 3, 2025 at 9:00 a.m., in Department CX101 of the Orange County Superior Court, located at 751 West Santa Ana Blvd. Santa Ana, CA 92701, Plaintiff Paul Papel (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move for an order as follows:

1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
3. Appointing Plaintiff Paul Papel as Class Representative for settlement purposes, and approving a Class Representative Service Award of \$15,000.00 to Plaintiff Paul Papel;
4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Benjamin H. Haber, Daniel J. Kramer, and Alan Wilcox of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes, and approving payment of \$720,000.00 in attorneys’ fees, which is 30% of the Gross Settlement Amount as based on this Court’s prior guidance regarding attorneys’ fees;
5. Approving costs in the amount of \$24,850.71 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator in the amount of \$26,950.00;
7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the Parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or enforcing the terms of the judgment.

This Motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Benjamin H. Haber and Cassandra Polites, and such oral argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

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
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1 Dated: September 10, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

3 By: 
4 Benjamin H. Haber
5 Daniel J. Kramer
6 Alan Wilcox

7 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Paul Papel (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a proposed \$2,400,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant McNib Corporation dba McDonald’s (“Defendant”, and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 3,823 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery, which allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage and hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$386.62*, with the *highest individual estimated net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$2,474.80*. (Declaration of Cassandra Polites Regarding Notice and Settlement Administration [“Polites Decl.”], ¶ 16.) As of filing this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Motion”), there **no objections to the settlement and no requests for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11-12.) Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law as demonstrated in the instant motion and the previously-filed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, which included additional supplemental briefing to address points raised by this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff now requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

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II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff's Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") (Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant a McDonald's franchise that, based on Plaintiff's analysis, has operated at least 20 locations in Southern California throughout the class period. (Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement ["Haber Decl."], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under the PAGA. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 3.)

On January 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) unfair business practices. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 4.) On February 13, 2023, Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act "PAGA" (Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*) On June 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding claims for civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.*)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and

1 information before mediating this action. (Haber Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant produced a sample of
2 time and pay records for the class members. Defendant also provided employee handbooks
3 outlining its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period and information regarding
4 the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.*)

5 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices
6 and analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
7 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary
8 exposure for all claims. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law
9 regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these
10 records and prepared a damage analysis assessing Defendant's potential liability prior to
11 mediation. (*Id.*) The damages model was based on a sample size of 544,346 shifts out of an
12 estimated 1,336,857 total shifts worked by class members. (*Id.*)

13 **C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement**

14 On February 8, 2024, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
15 action mediator, Steve Cerveris, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via
16 Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a
17 professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore
18 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their
19 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
20 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and
21 Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are
22 encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, **Ex. 1** [Amended Class Action Settlement
23 Agreement and Class Notice].)

24 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
25 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
26 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
27 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
28 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and

on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 8.)

D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement

On January 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (“MPA”). (Haber Decl., at ¶ 9.) On February 21, 2025, the Court continued Plaintiff’s MPA to April 18, 2025 to allow the Parties time to address several issues requested by the Court. (*Id.*) The Parties met and conferred and agreed to incorporate the Court’s requested changes in the Settlement Agreement. Following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on April 24, 2025. (*Id.*) The Class Notices were mailed on May 26, 2025 and the deadline for class members to opt out or object to the Settlement was July 25, 2025. (*Polites Decl.*, ¶¶ 8-13.) The reaction of the Class to the settlement so far has been overwhelmingly positive; indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, **no Class Member has opted out of the settlement and no Class Member has objected to the settlement.** (*Id.*)

E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay \$2,400,000.00 to resolve this litigation. The key terms include:

1. Settlement Class: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, the Parties agree to the certification of the classes pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California during the Class Period.” (Settlement, ¶ 1.5.)

2. Class Period: “mean the period from January 31, 2019 to April 8, 2024.” (Settlement, ¶ 1.12.)

3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, ¶ 1.35.)

4. Aggrieved Employee: “means all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California during the PAGA Period.” (Settlement, ¶ 1.4.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: “means \$2,400,000.00 which is the total amount Defendant agrees to pay under the Settlement except as provided in Paragraph 9 below. The

Gross Settlement Amount will be used to pay Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Service Payment and the Administrator's Expenses." (Settlement, ¶ 1.22.)

6. Uncashed Checks: "For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no 'unpaid residue' subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b)." (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

7. Release by Participating Class Members: "All Settlement Class Members who do not timely opt out of the Settlement will release Defendant and its past, present and/or future, direct and/or indirect, officers, directors, members, managers, employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, insurers, partners, investors, shareholders, administrators, parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, predecessors, successors, assigns, and joint venturers from all causes of action and claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the operative Complaint, including claims for failure to provide meal premiums and/or unpaid meal period premiums; failure to authorize and permit rest breaks and/or unpaid rest break premiums; failure to timely pay final wages; failure to provide accurate wage statements; failure to reimburse business expenses;; failure to timely pay wages; all claims for any penalties or any other amounts that could be potentially owed to Participating Class Members arising out of and/or related to the allegations in the operative Complaint and/or PAGA Notice; and based on violations of Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 512, 558, 1174, 2802, applicable sections of the relevant Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order(s), or Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq., or any other Labor Code sections alleged or that could have been reasonably alleged in the operative Complaint , and applicable Cal. Code Regs. (the "Released Class Claims"). The operative release period for the Released Class Claims is the Class Period. Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful

1 termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance,
2 disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside
3 the Class." (Settlement, ¶ 6.2.)

4 8. Release by Aggrieved Employees: "All Aggrieved Employees will release
5 Defendant and its past, present and/or future, direct and/or indirect, officers, directors, members,
6 managers, employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, insurers, partners, investors,
7 shareholders, administrators, parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, predecessors,
8 successors, assigns, and joint venturers from all causes of action and claims for civil penalties
9 under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 that were alleged in the
10 operative complaint in the Action and/or the underlying LWDA Exhaustion Letter or reasonably
11 could have been alleged based on the facts and legal theories contained in the operative
12 complaint in the Action, including claims for civil penalties based on the following: (i) failure
13 to pay all regular rate wages, minimum wages, and overtime wages due; (ii) failure to provide
14 compliant meal periods; (iii) failure to provide compliant rest breaks; (iv) failure to timely pay
15 wages during employment; (v) failure to provide complete, accurate wage statements and/or
16 maintain accurate payroll records; (vi) failure to pay wages timely at time of termination or
17 resignation; (vii) failure to reimburse or indemnify necessary business expenses; (viii) failure
18 to maintain adequate records; and/or (ix) claims, causes of action or legal theories of relief
19 seeking civil penalties under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004
20 plead in the operative complaint and/or the underlying LWDA Exhaustion Letter." (Settlement,
21 ¶ 6.3.)

22 9. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$50,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff's
23 claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$37,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25%
24 (\$12,500.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement ¶ 3.2.5.) Class Counsel
25 submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing the Motion for Preliminary
26 Approval. (Haber Decl., ¶ 11.)

27 10. Net Settlement Amount: "means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following
28 payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA

1 Payment, Class Representative Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation
2 Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to
3 Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments.” (Settlement, ¶ 1.28.)

4 11. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing
5 the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class
6 Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
7 Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate
8 each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25%
9 share of PAGA Penalties \$12,500.00 by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked
10 by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each
11 Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods. Aggrieved Employees assume full
12 responsibility and liability for any taxes owed on their Individual PAGA Payment.” (Settlement
13 ¶ 3.2.5.1.)

14 12. Tax Allocation: 33% of each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class
15 Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the “Wage Portion”). The Wage
16 Portions are subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. The remaining
17 67% of each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class Payment will be allocated to
18 settlement of claims for interest and penalties (the Non-Wage Portion”). The Non-Wage Portions
19 are not subject to wage withholdings and will be reported on IRS 1099 Forms. Participating
20 Class Members assume full responsibility and liability for any employee taxes owed on their
21 Individual Class Payment. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.1.)

22 13. Class Representative Service Award: “payment to the Class Representative of not
23 more than \$15,000.00 (in addition to any Individual Class Payment and any Individual PAGA
24 Payment the Class Representative is entitled to receive as a Participating Class Member).”
25 (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.1.)

26 14. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: the Settlement provides that Defendant will not
27 oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$800,000.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus
28 out of pocket costs not to exceed \$30,000.00. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.2.) However, Plaintiff is

1 seeking fees of up to 30% (\$720,000.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount in light of this Court’s
2 prior guidance on this issue, and costs of \$24,850.71. Notably, Defendant does not object to
3 and no class members have objected to higher amounts for the attorneys’ fees and costs.

4 15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms,
5 a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of
6 attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement
7 allocations are calculated. (Polites Decl., ¶ 2, Settlement, Ex. A.) Class Members were notified
8 by first-class mail of the settlement. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 6-8.) ILYM Group, Inc. undertook its best efforts
9 to ensure that the notice was provided to the current addresses of class members, including
10 conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses.
11 (*Id.*)

12 **III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL**

13 The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex
14 cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors
15 to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the
16 risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
17 action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
18 government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar*
19 *v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is
20 fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: “(1) the settlement
21 is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow
22 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4)
23 the percentage of objectors is small.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
24 224, 245.)

25 Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial
26 court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give
27 “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk*
28 *v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent

1 necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or
2 overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a
3 whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

4 **A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise**

5 A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had he or she prevailed
6 at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and
7 reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and
8 necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
9 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
10 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
11 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

12 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or
13 some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Haber Decl., ¶ 10.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his
14 claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognizes
15 that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-
16 consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification
17 of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible
18 appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

19 Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief
20 and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the
21 uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish
22 liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of
23 \$2,400,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and settlement approval is appropriate.
24 ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit of approximately***
25 ***\$386.62, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$2,474.80.*** (Polites
26 Decl., ¶ 16.)

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1 **B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following**
2 **Formal and Informal Discovery**

3 The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced
4 employment mediator, Steve Cerveris, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were
5 at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The
6 Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but
7 each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement
8 had not been reached. (*Id.*)

9 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
10 the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
11 records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
12 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
13 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
14 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
15 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
16 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
17 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
18 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

19 **C. Plaintiff's Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience**

20 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
21 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 27-36.) Class Counsel has substantial
22 experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion,
23 trial, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on
24 behalf of plaintiffs and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling
25 responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

26 Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class
27 Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of
28 Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and

the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 [“The court undoubtedly should give considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms’ length transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct”].)

D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement

To date, no class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class member has requested exclusion from the Settlement. (Polites Decl., ¶¶ 11-12.) The overwhelmingly positive response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the “class members overwhelmingly support[ed] the settlement” where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in the settlement, “only nine objections were submitted”, and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, “these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23”], *citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the “fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class

Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of \$800,000.00, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, costs up to \$30,000.00 for litigating this action, and enhancement awards of \$15,000.00 to named Plaintiff Paul Papel. However, Plaintiff agrees to seek attorneys' fees in the amount of \$720,000.00, which is 30% of the Gross Settlement Amount, based on this Court's prior guidance. (Haber Decl., ¶ 17.) Defendant has also agreed that it would not oppose an application for these payments addressed above, including the higher 33 1/3% portion, and no class member has objected to these amounts. (Politics Decl., ¶ 12.)

In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for calculating attorneys' fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, the California Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage and hour class action settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court explained:

As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override the trial court's primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable percentage to apply.

(*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard

According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented." (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)

Attorneys' fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with *thirty to forty percent* commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50% was awarded involved "smaller" settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions. Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ["Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery."].) Thus, Plaintiff's fee request is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the attorneys' fees requested herein.

B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.

Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check fee awards. "It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to "cross-check" or adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation." (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. "The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services." (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) "Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis." (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Detailed timesheets are not necessary to a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) As the California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.”

(5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., supra*, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”]; *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.* (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451 [“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method, it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s hours.”].)

(*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$282,145 based on over 337 hours of work performed thus far. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 18-19.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$720,000.00 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 2.55. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 [“[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”].) Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm, PLC’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of

1 the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate
2 determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are
3 satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps*
4 *Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of
5 their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

6 **2. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate.**

7 Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other
8 “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seeks a negative multiplier of
9 2.55 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request is underscored by the fact that a
10 significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

11 Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently
12 with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A
13 lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the
14 fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid
15 no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.)
16 Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important
17 rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a
18 windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-
19 level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment
20 or delay in payment of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

21 “Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at
22 p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512
23 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162
24 Cal.App.4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft*
25 *Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier
26 of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11, *citing* a
27 study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and
28 finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be “per se reasonable.”) The intermediate court in

1 *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check,
2 affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82.)
3 The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new
4 decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

5 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
6 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
7 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
8 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
9 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
10 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a
11 multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

12 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
13 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
14 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
15 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
16 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133,
17 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter
18 and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel’s
19 outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

20 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have
21 had success in wage and hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent
22 lawyers and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant’s contentions underscore the
23 risk of prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented
24 recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of
25 this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals.
26 Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so
27 many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other
28 meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but

were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to achieve favorable results. (Haber Decl., ¶ 25.) Considered against the risks of continued litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

C. Costs Are Reasonable.

As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$24,850.71 in costs, and Defendant has agreed that they will not oppose any cost award request up to \$30,000.00. (Haber Decl., ¶ 26.) Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$24,850.71 in costs. The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber, and these costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee paying client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills, meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval. (*See Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

D. The Enhancement Payment to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The

1 California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory
2 rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect
3 employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiff should therefore be
4 rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman*
5 *Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

6 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
7 a Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$15,000.00 to Plaintiff Paul Papel. This
8 amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general releases of all claims against Defendant, for
9 which other class members are not bound. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration demonstrating his
10 devotion to this case, including his efforts assisting counsel in the case, communicating with
11 counsel frequently for litigation, preparing for mediation, and reviewing case-related documents.
12 (*See, generally*, Declaration of Plaintiff submitted in support of Motion for Preliminary Approval.)

13 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
14 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive
15 award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class
16 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
17 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
18 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award
19 for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno, supra*, 2021 WL 3673845 at *3
20 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez, supra*, 2024 WL
21 150721 at p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

22 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may
23 be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC*
24 (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive
25 awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have
26 incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at p. 806.) “An incentive
27 award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’”
28 (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394, *quoting Clark*, 175

Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.) Plaintiff’s declaration provided at preliminary approval describes how each of the five *Cellphone Termination* factors are present here.

E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.

ILYM Group, Inc., the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it has and will incur a total of \$26,950.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Polites Decl., ¶ 19, Ex. B.) These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and Class Member payment processing.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed settlement.

Dated: September 10, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC



Benjamin H. Haber
Daniel J. Kramer
Alan Wilcox

Attorneys for Plaintiff

