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on behalf of himself and others similarly situated

[Additional counsel listed on following page]

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF KERN**

ANTHONY ANGLIN, an individual on
behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ALLY ENTERPRISES, a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: BCV-23-100411

CLASS ACTION

Assigned for All Purposes To:
Hon. Bernard C. Barmann, Jr.

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION AND PAGA
SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

Date: September 5, 2025
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: H

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9
10 on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
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1 **TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL INTERESTED PARTIES, AND THEIR**
2 **RESPECTIVE COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT** on September 5, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon
4 thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Department H of the Kern County Superior Court,
5 located at 1215 Truxtun Ave., Bakersfield, CA 93301, Plaintiff Anthony Anglin will move for an
6 Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement and Release.

7 The Motion will be made on the grounds that the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate,
8 reasonable, and in the best interest of the Plaintiff and all Class Members.

9 The Motion will be based on this Notice of Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points
10 and Authorities, the Declaration of Enoch J. Kim, the Declaration of Mayra Gonzalez for the
11 Settlement Administrator, and all other papers and records on file in this action, and on such oral
12 and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this Motion.

13 Dated: August 13, 2025

D.LAW, INC.

14
15 By: _____
16 Emil Davtyan, Esq.
17 Natalie Haritounian, Esq.
18 Enoch J. Kim
19 Matthew Carraher, Esq.
20 Antonia McKee, Esq.
21 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Class Counsel has achieved an excellent result in this litigation, reflected in the Class
4 Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”). The response
5 of Class Members shows that the Settlement is in the best interests of the class: no Class Member
6 opted out of or objected to the Settlement. **The average Class Member will receive a settlement**
7 **payment of approximately \$148.98, and the highest settlement payment will be**
8 **approximately \$826.13.** The settlement of this action is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
9 Accordingly, final approval should be granted.

10 **II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND**

11 This is a wage and hour class action, brought on behalf of approximately 245 California
12 non-exempt employees.

13 On February 8, 2023, Plaintiff Anthony Anglin filed this putative class action alleging the
14 following claims: (1) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; (2) Failure to Pay Wages and Overtime
15 Under Labor Code § 510; (3) Meal Period Liability Under Labor Code § 226.7; (4) Rest Break
16 Liability Under Labor Code § 226.7; (5) Violation of Labor Code § 226(a); (6) Violation of Labor
17 Code § 203; (7) Violation of Labor Code § 204; (8) Failure to Keep Required Payroll Records
18 Under Labor Code §§ 1174 and 1174.5; (9) Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenses §
19 2802; (10) Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.* On the same date, Mr.
20 Anglin’s Counsel sent a letter to the LWDA to exhaust his remedies under PAGA. On October 18,
21 2024, Mr. Anglin filed a First Amended Complaint adding a cause of action for penalties under
22 the PAGA. (Declaration of Enoch J. Kim [“Kim Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

23 The parties agreed to participate in mediation and informally exchanged information and
24 documents, including data points such as number of Class Members, pay periods, workweeks
25 included in the class period, and Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices and time and
26 pay records for a sample of Class Members employed from December 8, 2021, through December
27 23, 2023. In preparation for mediation, Plaintiff hired an expert to prepare damage calculations
28 and an exposure analysis for the mediation. (Kim Decl., ¶ 3.) On January 16, 2024, the parties

mediated this case before well-respected mediator Brandon McKelvey, Esq. (Kim Decl., ¶ 4.)

After extensive negotiations during the mediation, the parties ultimately settled the case in the total amount of \$120,000 (Gross Settlement Amount) on a class-wide and PAGA basis for the period of February 8, 2019, to January 16, 2024. (Kim Decl., ¶ 5.)

III. THE SETTLEMENT

A. Benefit to the Class

The Settlement Class consists of the named Plaintiff and all persons employed as a non-exempt employee by Defendant in California from February 8, 2019, to January 16, 2024. (“Class Members”). There is no claim form requirement, and no residual will revert to Defendant. It is an opt-out class. (Kim Decl., ¶ 6.)

The average settlement payment is \$148.98, and the highest settlement payment is \$826.13. (Kim Decl., Ex. 3 - Declaration of Mayra Gonzalez of Phoenix Class Action Solutions [“Gonzalez Decl.”].)

Additional proposed disbursements are as follows:

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| 1) Class Counsel Fees: | \$40,000; |
| 2) Costs: | \$13,915.88; |
| 3) Settlement Administrator Fees: | \$8,500; |
| 4) Class Representative Service Award: | \$5,000; |
| 5) PAGA Penalties: | \$10,000 (LWDA Portion: \$7,500). |

B. Preliminary Approval of Settlement

On March 18, 2025, the Court granted Preliminary Approval of this settlement, approved the Notice of Class Action and related forms, appointed the Class Representative, designated Class Counsel, approved Phoenix Class Action Solutions as the Settlement Administrator, and set timelines for the settlement administration process. (Kim Decl., ¶ 7.)

On or about April 1, 2025, Phoenix Settlement Administrators (“Phoenix”) received the Court-approved Notice of Class Action Settlement from the parties. The Notice advised Class Members of their right to submit opt out of the settlement, object to the settlement, dispute the quantity of Workweeks, or do nothing, and the implications of each such action. The Notice also

1 advised Class Members of applicable deadlines and other events, including the date of the Final
2 Approval Hearing, and how Class Members could obtain additional information. (Kim Decl., Ex.
3 3.)

4 On or about April 17, 2025, Defendant's counsel provided Phoenix with a data list
5 containing the names, social security numbers, last known addresses, and pertinent employment
6 information during the Class Period for each Class Member (the "Class Data"). The Class Data
7 contained records for 245 individuals identified as Class Members. (Kim Decl., Ex. 3 - Gonzalez
8 Decl., ¶ 3.)

9 The mailing addresses contained in the Class Data were processed and updated utilizing
10 the National Change of Address Database ("NCOA") maintained by the U.S. Postal Service
11 ("USPS"). The NCOA contains changes of addresses filed with the USPS. In the event that any
12 individual had filed a USPS change of address request, the address listed with the NCOA was
13 utilized in connection with the mailing of the Notices. (Kim Decl., Ex. 3 - Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 4.)

14 On April 25, 2025, Phoenix caused the Notice of Class Action Settlement ("Notice") to be
15 mailed via first class U.S. Mail to 245 Class Members. (Kim Decl., Ex. 3 - Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 5.)

16 Nine (9) Notices were returned by the post office. For the Notices returned without a
17 forwarding address, Phoenix performed an advanced address search TransUnion TLOxp (i.e., skip
18 trace) on these addresses. Of the nice traces performed, eight (8) updated addresses were obtained,
19 and Notices were promptly re-mailed to those Class Members via First Class mail. Of the eight
20 Notices mailed to a more current address identified from trace, zero Notices were returned to
21 Phoenix as undeliverable a second time. As of this date, one (1) Notice remains undeliverable as
22 an updated address could not be obtained via skip trace. (Kim Decl., Ex. 3 - Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 7.)

23 The deadline for Class Members to submit a Request for Exclusion, object to the
24 settlement, or dispute pay periods and/or workweeks was February 10, 2025. Re-mailed Notices
25 were provided an extended deadline of June 16, 2025. (Kim Decl., Ex. 3.)

26 As of this date, Phoenix has received no Request for Exclusions from Class Members.
27 Therefore, 100% of the Class Members are participating in the class settlement, as of this date.
28 (Kim Decl., Ex. 3 - Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 8.)

1 **IV. FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL IS APPROPRIATE**

2 A class action cannot be dismissed or compromised without court approval, and notice of
3 any proposed dismissal or compromise must be given to all class members as directed by the
4 court. (*La Sala v. Am. Sav. & Loan Assn.* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, 872; see Code Civ. Proc. § 1781(f).)
5 In deciding whether to grant final approval to a proposed class action settlement under Code of
6 Civil Procedure section 382, a court's overriding concern is whether the proposed settlement is
7 "fair, adequate, and reasonable." (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Company* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794,
8 1801.)

9 **A. The Settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness.**

10 A presumption of fairness exists where: (1) a settlement is reached through arm's length
11 bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
12 intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is
13 small. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Company, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1802.)

14 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement or dismissal of a class
15 action requires court approval. (*Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v. Superior Court* (1980) 103
16 Cal.App.3d 573, 578-579.) The purpose of the requirement is the protection of those class
17 members, including the named plaintiff, whose rights may not have been given due regard by the
18 negotiating parties. (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Com'n of City and County of San Francisco*
19 (1982) 688 F.2d 615, 624.) The trial court has broad powers to determine whether a proposed class
20 action settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Superior Court* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434.)

21 At the Final Approval hearing, the Court should consider the relevant factors, such as the
22 strength of the plaintiff's case, the risk, expenses, complexity, and likely duration of further
23 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement,
24 the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of
25 counsel, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Officers for Justice,*
26 *supra*, 688 F.2d at p. 624.) "This list is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. Due
27 regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties."
28 (*Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1801.)

1 **B. The settlement was reached through arm’s length negotiations**

2 This settlement was reached through arms-length negotiations with an experienced, highly
3 regarded neutral mediator, Brandon McKelvey, Esq. He is familiar with this type of class action in
4 its substance and procedure. The parties ultimately agreed on the settlement through the mediator.
5 (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.)

6 **C. Sufficient discovery and investigation have been completed to warrant**
7 **settlement.**

8 The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed when the settlement
9 was reached are important factors in determining the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a
10 settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.)

11 Here, the settlement was reached through arm’s-length negotiation with an experienced
12 mediator. Before mediation, the parties engaged in informal discovery, and Defendant provided
13 information and records including data points such as number of Class Members, pay periods,
14 workweeks included in the class period, Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices, and
15 time and pay records and time and pay records for a sample of Class Members employed from
16 December 8, 2021, through December 23, 2023. Plaintiff hired an expert to prepare damage
17 calculations and an exposure analysis for the mediation. (Kim Decl., ¶ 3.)

18 The attorneys representing the Class have a great deal of experience in wage and hour class
19 action litigation and have been approved as class counsel in numerous other wage and hour class
20 actions. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 25-29.) Based on that experience, the information produced by Defendant,
21 and the expert’s calculations, Class Counsel was able to negotiate a sizable recovery for the Class
22 Members.

23 **D. Class Counsel is experienced and endorses the settlement.**

24 Experienced counsel, operating at arm’s length, have weighed all of the foregoing factors
25 and endorse the proposed settlement. The view of the attorneys actively conducting the litigation
26 is “entitled to significant weight.” (*Fisher Bros. V. Cambridge-Lee Industries, Inc.* (E.D. Pa. 1985)
27 630 F.Supp.482, 488.) “The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption
28 of reasonableness.” (*In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2008) 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043;

1 see *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1801.)

2 Class Counsel has extensive experience in class actions and employment litigation, and
3 specifically in wage and hour class actions. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 25-29.) Class Counsel is experienced
4 and qualified to evaluate the class claims and viability of the defenses. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 25-29.)

5 The recovery for each Class Member is substantial, given the risks inherent in litigation
6 and the defenses asserted. This Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and in the best interests
7 of the Class.

8 **E. 100% of the Class Members are participating in the settlement.**

9 There are 245 Class Members, all of whom are participating in this Settlement. (Kim Decl.,
10 ¶¶ 8.)

11 **V. ATTORNEYS' FEES**

12 **A. Attorneys' fees are properly calculated as a percentage of the total value**
13 **created for the benefit of the Settlement Class.**

14 Class Counsel seek a fee award for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action,
15 calculated as a percentage of the total value of benefits to Class Members by the settlement, which
16 is an appropriate method for determining an award of attorneys' fees. (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20
17 Cal.3d 25, 34; *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) The purpose
18 of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment of counsel and to "spread litigation costs
19 proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire
20 burden alone." (*Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.)

21 The Common Fund Doctrine is predicated on the principle of preventing unjust
22 enrichment. When a litigant's efforts create or preserve a fund from which others derive benefits,
23 the Court may spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries to compensate
24 those who created the fund. "Where the lawsuit results in the recovery of a fund or property
25 benefitting others as well as the plaintiff (e.g., a class action), the court has inherent equitable
26 power to order Plaintiff's attorney's fees paid out of the common fund or property." (*Serrano,*
27 *supra*, 20 Cal.3d at p. 35.)

28 Such fee spreading assures that all those benefited by the litigation pay their fair share of

1 obtaining the recovery. (*Lealao v. Beneficial Calif., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26.)
2 “Percentage fees have traditionally been allowed in such common fund cases.” (*Id.* at p. 27.) The
3 California Supreme Court has long approved of awarding fees as a percentage of the settlement.
4 (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at p. 35.) California courts have been expressly authorized to award
5 attorneys’ fees so as “to ensure that **the fee awarded is within the range of fees freely**
6 **negotiated in the legal marketplace incomparable litigation.**” (*Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th
7 at p. 50, emphasis added.) As *Lealao* explained, in a representative action, courts must consider
8 the amount of attorney fees typically negotiated in comparable litigation: “Given the unique
9 reliance of our legal system on private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law through
10 class and derivative actions, attorneys providing the essential enforcement services must be
11 provided incentives roughly comparable to those negotiated in the private bargaining that takes
12 place in the legal marketplace, as it will otherwise be economic for defendants to increase
13 injurious behavior. It has therefore been urged (most persistently by Judge Richard Posner) that in
14 defining a ‘reasonable fee’ in such representative actions the law should ‘mimic the market.’” (*Id.*
15 at p. 47.)

16 In this case, the fees are being paid from the common fund; accordingly, the fee should be
17 awarded to mimic fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace for comparable common fund
18 cases under *Lealao*. As *Lealao* acknowledged, in cases like this, the percentage-of-the-benefit
19 approach should be considered, because “it better approximates the workings of the marketplace
20 than the lodestar approach.” (*Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 49; see also *Apple Computer,*
21 *Inc. v. Superior Court* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1270 [observing that “attorney fees awarded
22 under the common fund doctrine are based on a ‘percentage-of-the-benefit’ analysis”].)

23 In *Laffitte v. Robert Half International Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 503, the California
24 Supreme Court affirmed that trial courts may grant attorneys’ fees in a common fund case based
25 on a percentage of the recovery. The *Laffitte* court held: “We join the overwhelming majority of
26 federal and state courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for
27 the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a
28 fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an

1 appropriate percentage of the fund created. The recognized advantages of the percentage
2 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
3 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it
4 provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation...—
5 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
6 (*Ibid.*)

7 Thus, California courts have affirmed the continued validity of percentage fee awards in
8 class action cases. Under these principles, a percentage of the common fund fee award is properly
9 based on the total settlement. Class Counsel’s application for an award of attorneys’ fees in an
10 amount of one-third of the settlement amount created on behalf of the Class is reasonable and fair.

11 Class Counsel seek a fee award calculated as a percentage of the total Settlement Amount
12 for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. For Class Counsel, the fees here were
13 wholly contingent in nature, and the case presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee
14 case. There was the prospect of the enormous cost inherent in class action litigation, as well as a
15 long battle with a corporate defendant. Class Counsel risked their time, money, and resources to
16 ensure the successful litigation of this action on behalf of the Class Members. Accordingly, the
17 requested percentage of the common fund is appropriate, and Class Counsel respectfully requests
18 that the Court enter an Order to that effect. (Kim Decl. ¶ 16.)

19 Defendant has not objected to the fees and costs being requested in this case. (Kim Decl., ¶
20 17.) Moreover, the Notice mailed to Class Members stated the amount of fees being requested by
21 Class Counsel. Not a single Class Member objected to an award of fees in the amount requested.
22 (Kim Decl., ¶ 14.)

23 **B. A lodestar analysis also supports the attorneys’ fees award.**

24 California courts have been expressly authorized to award attorneys’ fees so as “to ensure
25 that the fee awarded is within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in
26 comparable litigation.” (*Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 50.) Specifically, *Lealao* holds that if
27 the court sets fees under a lodestar, the multiplier should consider what counsel would have earned
28 on the free market. The free market is determined by the percentage of the common fund, not the

1 lodestar amount. (*Ibid.*) Accordingly, whatever method the court uses to set fees, the Court is
2 encouraged to look to what the free market would bear under any circumstances. Even if the Court
3 awards fees under the lodestar method, under *Lealao*, the lodestar fees can be adjusted by a
4 multiplier to reflect the percentage of the fund. (*Id.* at pp. 19, 50.)

5 Once the Court establishes the lodestar amount, it may enhance the fee award by a
6 multiplier in order to make an appropriate fee award. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal. 3d at p. 48.) The
7 pertinent factors include the difficulty of the questions involved and the skill in presenting them,
8 the contingent nature of the fee award, the extent to which the litigation precluded other
9 employment, and the percentage-of-the-fund the attorney would have received on the fair market.
10 (*Ibid.*; *Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 49.) However, this list is not exhaustive, and the Court
11 can consider other factors it deems important in setting the multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 40.)

12 In this case, by the time of the Final Approval hearing, Class Counsel will have worked at
13 least 129.9 hours on this case, with a lodestar of approximately \$99,353.50. (Kim Decl., ¶ 18, **Ex.**
14 **1**, Time Records.) Class Counsel requests a fee of \$40,000, which is significantly less than the
15 amount warranted by the lodestar. (Kim Decl., ¶ 18.) The efficiency with which settlement was
16 reached, the results and quality of the settlement, and the contingent risk support the
17 reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee request.

18 **1. Class counsel's hourly rate**

19 Class Counsel requests an hourly rate of \$925 for Natalie Haritounian, \$1,045 for Enoch
20 Kim, \$475.00 for attorney Matthew Carraher, \$475 for Antonia McKee, \$475 for Mason Doidge,
21 and \$725 for Walter Haines. The blended rate for the lodestar is \$686.67. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 30-32.)

22 A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and
23 experience in the relevant community. (*PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084,
24 1095.) The Court may consider other factors when determining a reasonable hourly rate, such as
25 the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise, and the attorney's customary
26 billing rates. (*Flannery v. California Highway Patrol* (1998) 61 Cal App.4th 629, 632.) One
27 difficulty in determining the hourly rate of attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant
28 community is the scarcity of hourly fee-paying clients in class action litigation. As a practical

1 matter, few if any consumers pay attorneys' fees on an hourly basis for such extensive litigation,
2 thus retainer agreements in such cases are based on a contingency fee relationship. Although there
3 is no customary billing rate, the nature of class action work should be strongly considered by the
4 Court.

5 The rates requested are in line with those approved in other cases. (*Simers v. Los Angeles*
6 *Times Communications LLC* (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 940, 949 [affirming attorney rates from
7 \$400-900]; *Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc.* (2023) 96 Cal.App. 5th 908, 914 (2023) [hourly
8 rates of \$750, \$600, and \$535 were reasonable in FEHA case]. (Kim Decl., ¶ 20)

9 The rates are also consistent with surveys relied on by other courts. (*Martinez v. Helzberg's*
10 *Diamond Shops* (C.D. Cal., Sept. 24, 2021, No. EDCV201085PSGSHKX) 2021 WL 9181893, at
11 at *10 ([The Real Rate Report provides that, in Los Angeles, partners litigating employment and
12 labor matters have hourly rates ranging from \$470 to \$784, and associates have hourly rates
13 ranging from \$335 to \$570"]; *Gutierrez v. Chopard USA Ltd.* (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 383, 387
14 [Unruh Act case affirming award based on Laffey Matrix, available at
15 <http://www.laffeymatrix.com/sec.html>].) (Kim Decl., ¶ 21)

16 In sum, Class Counsel are attorneys who command a high rate based on their skill and
17 experience. They have had success in class actions, are held in high regard by the legal
18 community, and practice in a niche area. This case required attorneys with great skills and
19 financial backing. To obtain such an attorney on the free market, a client must pay appropriate
20 compensation. Therefore, Class Counsel's requested rate is fair and reasonable.

21 **2. Class Counsel's hours spent on the case**

22 "Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is
23 sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time
24 records." (*Martino v. Denevi* (1986) 182 Cal. App. 3d 553, 559.)

25 Reasonable hours include, in addition to time spent during litigation, the time spent before
26 the action is filed, including time spent interviewing the clients, investigating the facts and the law,
27 and preparing the initial pleadings. (*New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey* (1980) 447 U.S. 54,
28 62.) Further, the fee award should include fees incurred to establish and defend the attorneys' fee

1 claim. (*Serrano v. Unruh* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.)

2 Here, Class Counsel maintained a record of recorded hours spent on this case and assert
3 that D.Law's hours are fair and reasonable. Class Counsel will have spent approximately over
4 129.9 hours litigating this case and bringing the settlement to fruition. (Kim Decl., ¶ 18, **Ex. 1**,
5 Time Records.) Class Counsel requests that the Court find that these hours were reasonably
6 expended in this litigation.

7 **VI. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUEST FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF**
8 **COSTS.**

9 The request for reimbursement of costs is fair and reasonable. The Settlement Agreement
10 provides for reimbursement of costs incurred by Class Counsel of up to \$20,000. (Kim Decl. ¶
11 13.) Class Counsel has incurred total costs in the amount of \$13,915.88. (Kim Decl., ¶ 13, **Ex. 2**,
12 Itemization of Costs.) Class Counsel's request for litigation costs in the amount of \$13,833.06
13 should therefore be granted.

14 The parties' Settlement Agreement provides for settlement administration fees capped at
15 \$8,500. (Kim Decl. ¶ 13, **Ex. 3**, Gonzalez Decl.) The Settlement Administrator's request for fees
16 in the amount of \$8,500 should therefore be granted.

17 These costs are all litigation related. The authority for the Court to award these amounts is
18 both the parties' Settlement Agreement and the applicable Labor Code provisions. Therefore, these
19 requests should be approved.

20 **VII. THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE AWARD IS REASONABLE AND**
21 **STANDARD IN CLASS ACTIONS.**

22 A class representative is generally entitled to a fee for service to the Class. (*Clark v.*
23 *American Residential Services LLC* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.) "Since without a named
24 plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be necessary to induce him to
25 participate in the suit could be thought the equivalent of the lawyers' nonlegal but essential
26 case-specific expenses, such as long-distance phone calls, which are reimbursable." (*Ibid.*; see,
27 e.g., *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393 [approving \$10,000
28 enhancement for each of four named plaintiffs]; *Godfrey v. Oakland Port Services Corp.* (2014)

230 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1272 [affirming \$10,000 enhancement for each of two named plaintiffs];
Glass v. UBS Financial Services, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Jan. 26, 2007, No. C-06-4068 MMC) 2007 WL
221862, at *17 [awarding \$25,000 enhancement to each of four named plaintiffs].)

“[C]riteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an incentive award
include: 1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; 2)
the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; 3) the amount of
time and effort spent by the class representative; 4) the duration of the litigation and; 5) the
personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation.
[Citation.]” (*Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D.Cal.1995) 901 F.Supp. 294, 299; see
Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958 [class representative
enhancements “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the
class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and,
sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general”].)

The request for the Service Award of \$5,000 for Class Representative Anthony Anglin is
fair and reasonable. (Kim Decl., ¶ 10.) This Service Award is based on his contribution to the
Class, risks incurred, stress, execution of a general release, benefit of the Settlement to the Class
Members, and all other factors presented to the Court and set forth in his declaration. This
settlement had a great result: 100% of the money will be paid out because there is no reversion to
Defendant, and 100% of Class Members are participating in the settlement. (Kim Decl., ¶ 8.)
There are no opt-outs to the class portion of the Settlement. (Kim Decl., Ex. 3 – Gonzalez Decl.)

Class Representative Anglin has worked hard at every step of this litigation, remaining in
contact with Class Counsel’s office throughout the litigation and the settlement process. He
provided all documents in his possession and answered questions. He identified relevant witnesses
and spoke with other employees regarding their experiences working for Defendant. He also
reviewed numerous pages of documents, participated in the mediation, and reviewed settlement
documents. Mr. Anglin has helped with all aspects of this litigation and has been diligent and acted
in accordance with what is expected of a class representative throughout all stages of the litigation,
up to and including Preliminary and Final Approval. (See Declaration of Class Representative

1 Anthony Anglin filed in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
2 Settlement, which is attached hereto for the convenience of the Court as **Ex. 5** to the Kim Decl.,
3 Declaration of Anthony Anglin [Anglin Decl.], ¶¶ 3, 9.) As detailed in the Declaration of Class
4 Representative Anthony Anglin, he has spent approximately 24 hours on this case. (Anglin Decl.,
5 ¶ 9.)

6 In addition, the Class Representative faces the threat of stigma and decreased
7 employability. He knew his name would be easily linked to this action through background checks
8 or even an internet search. In fact, a simple Google search of Mr. Anglin's name and Defendant's
9 name together puts this case at the very top of Google's search results. (**Exhibit A** to Anglin Decl.)
10 Despite knowing this could damage his future employment options, Mr. Anglin courageously
11 moved forward in order to achieve justice for the Class Members. (Anglin Decl., ¶ 12.)

12 Further, Mr. Anglin has signed a general release for any and all claims related to his
13 employment with Defendant, so he cannot pursue any other potential claims. (Anglin Decl., ¶ 11.)

14 There are few individuals who are willing to act as a class representative and provide the
15 work, sacrifice, and willingness to assume a substantial risk should the defendant prevail in the
16 case. Here, Class Representative Anglin's resolve to assume the financial risk is significant.
17 California law states that the losing party must pay the prevailing party's cost. As such, if Plaintiff
18 had not prevailed in this case, Mr. Anglin may have been subjected to a cost award in the amount
19 of thousands of dollars. (Anglin Decl., ¶ 10.)

20 **VIII. CONCLUSION**

21 Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval of the Class Action and
22 PAGA Settlement.

23 Dated: August 13, 2025

D.LAW, INC.

24
25 By: _____
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