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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ

YVONNE LARKIN, as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and as a private attorney general,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PARK & KISS, INC.; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 26CV00361

[Hon. Syda K. Cogliati, Department 5]

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT

[*Filed concurrently with Declaration of Declaration of Simon L. Yang; Declaration of B. James Fitzpatrick; Declaration of Yvonne Larkin; Declaration of Taylor Mitzner; [Proposed] Order and Final Judgment*]

Date:	December 14, 2026
Time:	8:30 a.m.
Department:	5
Complaint Filed:	February 3, 2026

TO THE COURT, DEFENDANT, AND ITS COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 14, 2026, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 5, of the above-entitled court located at 701 Ocean Street, Santa Cruz, California 95060, Plaintiff, Yvonne Larkin, will and hereby does move for an Order:

1. granting final approval to the Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (the "Agreement") in this action;
2. approving distribution of the settlement funds to Settlement Class Members and PAGA Employees pursuant to the terms of the Agreement;
3. approving Plaintiff's request for a general release payment of $10,000.00 to the Class Representative pursuant to the terms of the Agreement;
4. approving Class Counsel's request for an award of attorneys' fees of 33⅓% of the $120,000.00 Gross Settlement Amount, or $40,000.00, and reimbursement of litigation costs of $11,936.05 pursuant to the terms of the Agreement;
5. approving Plaintiff's request for payment of the settlement administration costs to Phoenix Settlement Administrators in the amount of $6,500.00 pursuant to the terms of the Agreement;
6. approving Plaintiff's request for payment to the Labor & Workforce Development Agency of $7,800.00 pursuant to the terms of the Agreement; and
7. entering final judgment as to all members of the Settlement Class and the State of California (including the Labor and Workforce Development Agency) in this action.

This motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, which provides for Court approval of the settlement of a purported class action and allows the Court to grant final certification of a class for settlement purposes. The overwhelmingly positive Class response—as shown by the lack of any objections to the settlement and the lack of any opt outs from the settlement—supports that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and should be granted final approval.

This motion will be based on the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the supporting Declarations of Simon L. Yang, B. James Fitzpatrick, Plaintiff Yvonne Larkin, and Taylor

Mitzner of Phoenix Settlement Administrators, upon the oral arguments of counsel (should there be any), and on the complete records and file herein.

DATED: November 16, 2026

DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.

By: _____
Simon L. Yang
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY OF MOTION 1

DISCUSSION 2

I. Class Members Were Provided Notice of the Settlement. 2

II. The Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Settlement Should Be Given Final Approval. 3

A. The Strength of the Case and Likelihood of Class Certification Support Approval. 3

1. The Class Is Ascertainable. 3

2. There Is a Community of Interest. 4

a. There Are Predominant Common Questions of Law and Fact. 4

b. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Class Claims. 4

c. Plaintiff Adequately Represented the Class. 5

B. Defendant's Allegations and Position on Class Certification Support Approval. 5

C. Risks, Expenses, and Complexity of Further Litigation Support Approval. 5

D. The Settlement Terms and Negotiation—as Well as the Class Member Response—All Support the Conclusion that the Settlement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable. 6

III. Well-Established Legal Principles Support Final Approval of the Settlement 6

A. The Settlement is Presumed to Be Fair 7

B. Two-Way Costs and Other Risks Inherent in Litigation Favor Final Approval. 8

C. The Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of Continued Litigation Against Defendant Favor Final Approval. 9

D. The Opinions of Experienced Counsel Favor Final Approval 9

IV. The Proposed Payments and Procedures Should Be Approved 10

A. The Proposed Procedure for Uncashed Settlement Checks Should Be Approved. 10

B. The Requested General Release Payment Should Be Approved. 10

C. The Requested Attorneys' Fees Should Be Approved. 11

1. The Percentage of the Fund Method Supports the Requested Fees. 11

2. The Lodestar Cross-Check Supports the Requested Fees 13

D. The Court Should Approve the Request for Reimbursement of Costs. 15
E. The Administrator's Fees and Costs Should Be Approved. 15
V. Notice to the LWDA Has Been Provided. 16
CONCLUSION 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

State Cases

7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp., 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1146 (2000) 7

Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 4th 43, 66 n.11 (2008) 12, 14

City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 203 Cal. App. 3d 78 (1988) 14

Classen v. Weller, 145 Cal. App. 3d 27, 45 (1983) 4

Flannery v. California Highway Patrol, 61 Cal. App. 4th 629, 632-33 (1998) 15

Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (Aug. 11, 2016) 12

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 1096, 1104-05 (2003) 4

Martino v. Denevi, 182 Cal. App. 3d 553, 559 (1986) 14

Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 5th 56, 77 (2021) 7

PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000) 15

Reese v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1234 (1999) 4

Reyes v. San Diego County Board of Supervisors, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1271 (1987) 3, 4

Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470 (1981) 4

Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 34 (1977) [*Serrano III*] 11

Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 639 (1982) [*Serrano IV*] 15

Simons v. Horowitz, 151 Cal.App.3d 834, 846 (1984) 5

Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases, 171 Cal App.4th 495, 512 (2009) 14

Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 255 (2001) 11, 14

Federal Cases

Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) 11

Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 616-17 (N.D. Cal. 1979) 8, 10

Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 907, 913-14 (S.D. Ohio 2001) 11

Byrd v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983) 6

Church v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 1993 WL 149840 (N.D. Cal. 1993) 7

City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F. 2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974) 13

Class Plaintiff v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992) 6, 7

Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998) 11

Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125-26 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 14
Dyer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 303 F.R.D. 326, 334 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 14
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174-75 (1974) 3
Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility, 87 F.R.D. 15, 18 (N.D. Cal. 1980) 7, 10
Enter. Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D. 240, 251-52 (S.D. Ohio 1991) 11
Fernandez v. Victoria Secret Stores LLC, 2008 WL 8150856, *16 n. 59 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2008) 12
Gaskill v. Gordon, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998) 12
Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 1 53, 157 (3d Cir. 1975) 8, 9
Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., No. C-06-4068, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476, at *51-52 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2007) 11
Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) 4
Hopkins v. Stryker Sales Corp., No. 11-CV-02786-LHK, 2013 WL 496358, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) 14
In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig., 130 F.R.D. 366, 374 (S.D. Ohio 1990) 11
In re General Motors Corp., 55 F.3d 768, 806 (3d Cir. 1995) 8
In re Rite Aid Corp. Secs. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 306-307 (3d Cir. 2005) 13
In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 720 F.Supp. 1379 (D. Ariz. 1989), *aff'd sub nom.* 7
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) 3
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 62 (1980) 14
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) 2
Swedish Hospital v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 13
Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976) 6, 9
Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299-300 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 11
Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F. 2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1997) 11, 12
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) 14
Willner v. Manpower Inc., No. 11-CV-02846-JST, 2015 WL 3863625, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2015) 14
Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1971) 9

Statutes

Civil Code § 1542 10
Code Civ. Proc. § 382 3
Labor Code § 226(e) 5

Other Authorities

4 Newberg on Class Actions, 4th § 11.41 (2008) 6, 9
Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees (Fall 2003) 81 Wash U. L. Q. 653, 659 n. 11) 12
Fitzpatrick, *An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award*, 7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811, 833 (2010) 12
Manual for Complex Litigation Fourth (Fed. Judicial Center 2004) ("MCL"), § 21.6 at 309 ..... 6, 7

Rules

California Rule of Court 3.769 6

SUMMARY OF MOTION

On February 3, 2026, Plaintiff, Yvonne Larkin, filed this class and Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA") action against Defendant, Park & Kiss, Inc. The lawsuit alleges that Defendant failed to pay reporting time pay, to pay all tips, to pay wages for all hours worked, to pay all overtime wages due, to provide lawful meal periods and rest periods, to timely pay wages during employment and upon the separation of employment, to provide lawful wage statements, and to reimburse business expenses. Defendant denies that it violated the law.

Plaintiff now seeks the Court's final approval of the Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (the "Agreement"). The Agreement provides for a $120,000.00 fund to be created for the benefit of the Class, from which attorneys' fees, litigation costs, a general release payment to the Class Representative, payment to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA"), and costs of settlement administration are to be paid. The net settlement fund remaining after these deductions will be paid to Settlement Class Members and PAGA Employees.

The history of this litigation was previously detailed in Plaintiff's Preliminary Approval Motion. On August 24, 2026, the Court preliminarily approved this settlement. It directed distribution of the Notice of Class Action Settlement ("Class Notice") and scheduled the hearing for final approval of settlement (the "Preliminary Approval Order").

As directed by the Court, the Administrator, Phoenix Settlement Administrators, distributed the Class Notice to 142 Class Members. Declaration of Taylor Mitzner on behalf of Phoenix Settlement Administrators ("Admin Decl.") ¶ 5. Not a single objection was submitted. *Id.* ¶ 9. Nor was any request for exclusion received. *Id.* ¶ 8. As such, there is a 100% participation rate. Based on the Class Members' response, an inference can be made that the Class supports the Court's Preliminary Approval Order finding that the Agreement is fair and reasonable.

In addition to the results of the notice process, the points discussed in Plaintiff's Preliminary Approval Motion also support final approval of the settlement:

- The settlement provides a total settlement sum of $120,000.00;
- The settlement is fair given that Class Members will receive (*after* deductions for fees, costs, etc.) a substantial amount of money (on average, each Settlement Class Member will receive

approximately $278.62, *see* Admin Decl. ¶ 14, and an additional $63.64 as an Aggrieved Employee, *see* Admin Decl. ¶ 15);

- Class Members did not need to submit claim forms to participate in the settlement, but are being paid automatically;
- The allocation reflects that payment of claims will be paid to all Class Members in proportion to the number of relevant workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period;
- Plaintiff conducted significant investigation in this case, including extensive informal discovery and exchanges of information by Plaintiff and Defendant of class data for the entire class necessary for Plaintiff to fully evaluate this case; and
- California's LWDA will also be the beneficiary of this settlement as it will receive $7,800.00, should this settlement be granted final approval.

For these and other reasons discussed below, the Court should grant Final Approval.

DISCUSSION

I. Class Members Were Provided Notice of the Settlement.

The notice procedures required by the Preliminary Approval Order have been followed and satisfy all due process rights of Class Members. The Preliminary Approval Order contemplated that Phoenix Settlement Administrators would serve as the Administrator. It also contemplated that the Class Notice would be sent to all Class Members by first class mail, as specified in the Agreement.

As stated in the Admin Declaration, notice was provided to Class Members, as required by the Preliminary Approval Order. On September 4, 2026, the Administrator received a Class Member mailing list from Defendant's counsel that included 142 Class Members. Admin Decl. ¶ 3. On September 10, 2026, each of the persons identified on the mailing list were sent the Class Notice via first class mail. *Id*. ¶ 5. The Class Notice provided Class Members with Class Counsel's contact information, where they could further seek information regarding the settlement, leave questions for the Administrator, and update their addresses. *Id.* Ex. A. From the date of mailing, 14 mailed Class Notices were returned to the Administrator; nine of the 14 returned Class Notices were re-mailed to updated addresses obtained via a skip trace. *Id*. ¶ 6. In other words, only five Class Notices were undeliverable. *Id.* ¶ 7.

Plaintiff provided the "best notice practicable" in this case as necessary to protect the due process rights of class members. *See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts*, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985)

(providing "best notice practicable" with description of the litigation and explanation of opt-out rights satisfies due process); *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 174-75 (1974) (explaining individual notice must be sent to class members who can be identified through reasonable means); *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co*., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (stating best practicable notice is that which is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections").

Here, Class Members were mailed a notice that explained the settlement and allowed Class Members to seek information, ask questions, and object, if so desired. As such, proper notice has been given to the Class Members. Thus, the Court may determine the fairness and adequacy of the settlement and enter its Order granting final approval, secure in the knowledge that all absent Class Members have been given the opportunity to participate fully in the claims, exclusion, and the approval process.

II. The Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Settlement Should Be Given Final Approval.

A. The Strength of the Case and Likelihood of Class Certification Support Approval.

The Court already addressed the requirements for certifying a class for settlement purposes in its Order granting preliminary approval. Plaintiff briefly addresses the requirements again here.

1. The Class Is Ascertainable.

"Whether a class is ascertainable is determined by examining (1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying the class members." *Reyes v. San Diego County Board of Supervisors,* 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1271 (1987); *see also* Code Civ. Proc. § 382.

Here, the Class includes all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in the State of California at any time during the Class Period. Agreement § 1.5. The Class Period is from February 3, 2022, through May 22, 2026. *Id.* § 1.7.

There are 142 individuals that comprise the Class. Agreement § 1.5; *see also* Admin Decl. ¶ 3.[1] This is more than the minimum required to certify a class. Within the context of manageability, the issue is whether there exists sufficient means for identifying class members at the remedial stage. *Reyes*, 196

[1] There are also 66 PAGA Employees. Agreement § 1.17; *see also* Admin Decl. ¶ 15. The PAGA Employees include all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period. Agreement § 1.17. The PAGA Period is from September 22, 2024, through May 22, 2026. *Id.* § 1.18.

Cal. App. 3d at 1274-75. Here, Class Members have already been identified and have already been sent notice.

2. There Is a Community of Interest.

The "community of interest" requirement embodies three separate factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives whose claims are typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.*, 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470 (1981); *Reese v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc*., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1234 (1999).

a. There Are Predominant Common Questions of Law and Fact.

"The ultimate question in every case of this type [class actions] is whether … the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous and substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants." *Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court*, 29 Cal. 4th 1096, 1104-05 (2003).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, as a matter of common corporate policy, practice, or procedure, failed to pay reporting time pay, to pay all tips, to pay wages for all hours worked, to pay all overtime wages due, to provide lawful meal periods and rest periods, to timely pay wages during employment and upon the separation of employment, to provide lawful wage statements, and to reimburse business expenses. Plaintiff alleges these violations resulted from Defendant's common payroll practices. While Defendant denies that liability could be established on a class-wide basis and contends instead that liability would need to be conducted on a case-by-case basis, common questions predominate Plaintiff's theory of liability.

b. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Class Claims.

A class representative's claim must be "typical" but not necessarily identical to the claims of other class members; it is sufficient that the representative is similarly situated so that he or she will have the motive to litigate on behalf of the class. *Classen v. Weller*, 145 Cal. App. 3d 27, 45 (1983). Courts look to "whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named Plaintiff" and whether other class members were injured by the same conduct. *Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp*., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). The purpose of the typicality requirement "is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the interests of the class." *Id.* at 508.

Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff was subjected to the same payroll policies as all other Class Members. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that she—like other members of the Class—was compensated based on Defendant's common reporting time, tip, meal and rest period policies and practices. Declaration of Yvonne Larkin ("Larkin Decl.") ¶ 2. In sum, Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to the same policies as other Class Members. Plaintiff's claims thus are typical to those of Class Members.

c. Plaintiff Adequately Represented the Class.

The class representative, through qualified counsel, must be capable of "vigorously and tenaciously" protecting the interests of the class members. *Simons v. Horowitz*, 151 Cal. App. 3d 834, 846 (1984). Here, Plaintiff does not have any interests adverse to the Class, nor have any such issues been raised or presented. Plaintiff has taken all necessary steps to represent the interests of the Class, including providing information and documents to her counsel and reviewing pleadings in this case. Larkin Decl. ¶¶ 3-6. For such reasons, Plaintiff has adequately represented Class Members.

B. Defendant's Allegations and Position on Class Certification Support Approval.

Defendant asserts that even assuming that a class could have been certified, Plaintiff would be unable to establish classwide liability. For example, with respect to liability for underpaid meal and rest period premiums, Defendant contends that it would not be subject to Section 203 penalties, based on a "good faith dispute" defense.[2] Likewise, with respect to wage statement liability, Defendant contended that liability under Section 226(e) would be subject to additional defenses requiring proof of injuries resulting from knowing and intentional violations. Similarly, with respect to PAGA penalties, Defendant claims that the alleged circumstances are such that PAGA penalties would be subject to discretionary reductions. Based thereon, Defendant continues to maintain that it is not liable for the allegations made by Plaintiff or for the amounts alleged by Plaintiff.

C. Risks, Expenses, and Complexity of Further Litigation Support Approval.

Plaintiff believes that a class can be certified. However, Plaintiff also believes in the fairness of the settlement when factoring in the uncertainty and risks involved in not prevailing on the theory of liability alleged in the Complaint, the possibility of non-certification, and the potential for appeals.

There is always a risk that the court will not grant certification of the class. As Defendant alleges

[2] Except as otherwise noted, all "Section" references are to the Labor Code.

that a class could not have been certified, there was at least a considerable risk that Plaintiff would not have obtained the total amount of damages alleged, and a significant number of complex issues that would have necessitated substantial expenditure of time and expenses. Therefore, the risks, expenses, and complexity of further litigation warrant granting of this motion.

D. The Settlement Terms and Negotiation—as Well as the Class Member Response—All Support the Conclusion that the Settlement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable.

Without reiterating the details in the Preliminary Approval Motion showing that the Agreement (and the negotiation process that led up to it) is fair and adequate, Plaintiff highlights the following facts. The Agreement was the product of negotiation between highly able and experienced attorneys on both sides who possessed the relevant data and extensive legal research which they had carefully analyzed. Declaration of Simon L. Yang ("Yang Decl.") ¶¶ 4-5.

Following notice to the Class, not a single objection to the settlement was received. Admin Decl. ¶ 9. The Court may appropriately infer that the class action settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, given that not a single Class Member has submitted an objection. *See Class Plaintiff v. City of Seattle*, 955 F.2d 1268, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992). Indeed, the Class Member response suggests the preliminarily approved settlement should now be granted final approval.

III. Well-Established Legal Principles Support Final Approval of the Settlement.

On a motion for final approval of a class action settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, a court's inquiry is whether the settlement is "fair, adequate and reasonable." *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). A settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and therefore merits final approval, when "the interests of the class are better served by the settlement than by further litigation." *See Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth* § 21.6 at 309 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., 4th ed. 2004) ("MCL"). The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other complex cases, where substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the time, cost, and rigors of formal litigation. *See* 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* § 11.41 (4th ed. 2002); *Class Plaintiff v. City of Seattle*, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992); *Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp*., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976).

Although the Court possesses "broad discretion" in determining that a proposed class action settlement is fair, the Court's role must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable, and adequate to all concerned. *See Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625. Accordingly, the Court should give due regard to what is otherwise a "private consensual agreement" between the parties. *Id*.; *see also Church v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc*., 1993 WL 149840 (N.D. Cal. 1993); *In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig*., 720 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Ariz. 1989), *aff'd sub nom.; City of Seattle*, 955 F.2d 1268; MCL § 21.6 at 309 ("The judicial role in reviewing a proposed settlement is critical, but limited to approving the proposed settlement, disapproving it, or imposing conditions on it. The judge cannot rewrite the agreement").

As the Court of Appeal has cautioned:

> It cannot be overemphasized that neither the trial court in approving the settlement nor this Court in reviewing that approval have the right or duty to reach any ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the dispute. It is well settled that in the judicial consideration of proposed settlements, 'the [trial] judge does not try out or attempt to decide the merits of the controversy,' [citation] and the appellate court 'need not and should not reach any dispositive conclusions on the admittedly unsettled legal issue.

7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp., 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1146 (2000).

A court's review and approval of a PAGA settlement is subject to a similar standard as that for class action settlement approval. A court should evaluate a PAGA settlement to determine whether it is fair, reasonable, and adequate in view of PAGA's purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws. *Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.*, 72 Cal. App. 5th 56, 77 (2021).

A. The Settlement is Presumed to Be Fair

The Court should begin with the presumption that the settlement is fair and should be approved:

> [A] presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.

Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1802 (1996); *accord Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility*, 87 F.R.D. 15, 18 (N.D. Cal. 1980); *In re Wash. Pub Power Supply*, 720 F. Supp. at 1387.

The settlement in the case at bar warrants approval and carries a presumption of fairness. As previously noted in the application for Preliminary Approval, this current settlement was negotiated at arm's length. Yang Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Class Counsel engaged in extensive factual investigation before settling, including the exchange of extensive informal discovery and class data enabling Class Counsel to evaluate the full extent of Defendant's potential liability. *Id.* ¶ 4. Further, Class Counsel is highly experienced in this type of litigation. As shown in the supporting declarations, Class Counsel has significant experience in class actions and employment wage and hour matters. Yang Decl. ¶¶ 6-9; Declaration of B. James Fitzpatrick ("Fitzpatrick Decl.") ¶¶ 3-4.

B. Two-Way Costs and Other Risks Inherent in Litigation Favor Final Approval.

To assess the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of a class action settlement, the Court also should weigh the immediacy and certainty of substantial settlement proceeds against the risks inherent in continued litigation. *See also In re General Motors Corp*., 55 F.3d 768, 806 (3d Cir. 1995) ("present value of the damages Plaintiff would likely recover if successful, appropriately discounted for the risk of not prevailing, should be compared with the amount of the proposed settlement"); *Girsh v. Jepson*, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975); *Boyd v. Bechtel Corp*., 485 F. Supp. 610, 616-17 (N.D. Cal. 1979).

If Plaintiff pursued this case without settlement and failed to prevail, Plaintiff would have been potentially responsible for Defendant's costs. Likewise, any other current or former employees that bring individual claims also would face the uncertainty of prevailing and the possibility of paying costs to Defendant. For that reason, many of these current and former employees likely would not pursue claims. This lawsuit thus achieves a true benefit for the Class that they otherwise might not get or even seek as individuals. Here, given that a fair and reasonable settlement has been reached, neither Plaintiff nor any of the Class Members will be required to pay for Defendant's litigation costs.

The risks of this case were weighed by Class Counsel and should be considered a significant factor by the Court in its determination of final approval. Class Counsel obtained a significant settlement for the Class that resulted in a fair recovery which at the same time provides for finality and no risk of costs by the Class Members or Class Representative.

C. The Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of Continued Litigation Against Defendant Favor Final Approval.

Another factor considered by courts in approving a settlement is the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation. *See Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625; *Girsh*, 521 F.2d at 157. In applying this factor, courts weigh the benefits of settlement against the expense and delay involved in achieving a favorable result at trial. *Young v. Katz*, 447 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1971).

The Agreement affords the Class prompt, fair relief while avoiding significant legal and factual battles that otherwise may have prevented the Class from obtaining any recovery at all. While Class Counsel believe the Class Members' claims are meritorious and can be successfully litigated, they are experienced and fully understand the inherent risks and uncertainty involved with such matters as the resolution of class certification, the outcome of a potential trial, and the outcome of any appeals that would inevitably follow should the Class prevail at trial. Class Counsel has also assessed the same risks in connection with the current settlement. Because the settlement provides immediate and substantial relief, without the attendant risks and delay of continued litigation—not to mention the threat of litigation fees and costs—Class Counsel believe that the settlement warrants the Court's final approval.

While continued litigation could have led to appeals on several issues, the settlement that was reached provides to all Class Members—regardless of their means—fair relief in a prompt and efficient manner. Were the Court to deny final approval, the Class Members would be left without a remedy as a practical matter and courts across the State would have to address the issues presented here in a piecemeal, costly, and time-consuming manner. The settlement in this case is therefore consistent with the "overriding public interest in settling and quieting litigation" that is "particularly true in class action suits." *See Van Bronkhorst*, 529 F.2d at 950; *see also 4 Newberg* § 11.41. Here, litigation of this case through trial and appeals would require extended litigation.

D. The Opinions of Experienced Counsel Favor Final Approval.

Class Counsel supports the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate, as in the best interest of the Class Members as a whole (and in light of PAGA's purposes). Yang Decl. ¶ 5; Fitzpatrick Decl. ¶ 2. Similarly, counsel for Defendant is in favor of this settlement. The endorsement of qualified and well-informed counsel of a settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate is entitled to significant weight by the

Court. *See Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625; *Ellis*, 87 F.R.D. at 18; *Boyd*, 485 F. Supp. at 617; *Linney v. Cellular Alaska P'ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998).

IV. The Proposed Payments and Procedures Should Be Approved.

A. The Proposed Procedure for Uncashed Settlement Checks Should Be Approved.

As referenced in the Motion for Preliminary Approval, to the extent any uncashed settlement funds remain after 180 days, the Parties have agreed that the funds (upon the expiration date) be distributed to the State Controller's Office, Unclaimed Property Division. Agreement § 5.6. None of the settlement funds will revert to Defendant.

B. The Requested General Release Payment Should Be Approved.

Class Representative Yvonne Larkin requests a general release payment (or service award) of $10,000.00. The request is reasonable in light of the general release that the Agreement requires of Plaintiff but not of any other Class Member. Independently, the request is also appropriate in recognition of Plaintiff's efforts on behalf of the Class and the State.

With respect to the general release, Plaintiff did not proceed with litigation of all potential wage-hour claims and instead strategically limited the claims in this lawsuit to maximize her ability to recover for the Class. Larkin Decl. ¶ 9. Had Plaintiff instead pursued all of Plaintiff's individual claims, Plaintiff could have recovered additional sums. Nonetheless, for the benefit of the Class, Plaintiff provided a general release and waiver of the protections of Civil Code section 1542 (a more extensive release than that provided by the Class at large)—even though Plaintiff in other contexts would have sought at least a $10,000.00 payment in exchange for a general release. Yang Decl. ¶ 15.

Independently, Plaintiff actively contributed to the litigation of this case. Larkin Decl. ¶ 3. Indeed, Plaintiff provided invaluable information, evidence, and documents that resulted in this settlement. *Id.* In addition to the services that Plaintiff provided (and the more than 50.0 hours Plaintiff devoted to the litigation on behalf of the Class), Plaintiff took significant risks, both professionally and monetarily, in acting as the Class Representative to seek benefits for the Class. *Id.* Moreover, Plaintiff understood that individual cases would have resolved much faster than a class action (and involved much less financial risk than a class action involved). In addition, as discussed above, because the claims Plaintiff alleges involve the payment of costs to the prevailing party, Plaintiff could have possibly

faced paying the costs of Defendant had Plaintiff not prevailed in this action. Despite this, Plaintiff agreed to pursue this case on behalf of the Class.

Also, given that future employers are much less likely to hire individuals who have filed employment-related lawsuits (particularly representative cases of this nature), Plaintiff also faces significant risk in not being able to find suitable employment—due to the filing of this case. Plaintiff took these risks upon herself to the benefit of the Class. Larkin Decl. ¶ 8. Class Members did not have to file individual lawsuits and bear the risks of payment of costs if they did not prevail, nor did they have to face the potential for retaliation and not getting future employment had they filed a lawsuit which is a public record. These are significant benefits that weigh in favor of granting the requested award. Moreover, this litigation has resulted in a significantly valuable benefit to the Class. Plaintiff took on substantial risks in helping to get this financial benefit to the Class. As such, in addition to the value of Plaintiff's general release, the requested service award should also be granted to Plaintiff for her commitment, dedication, and risks taken for this litigation.[3]

C. The Requested Attorneys' Fees Should Be Approved.

1. The Percentage of the Fund Method Supports the Requested Fees.

Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at 33⅓% of the total value of the settlement for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a percentage of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1997). The purpose of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to "spread litigation costs

[3] Courts have routinely granted approval of settlements containing such incentive awards. *See Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co*., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299-300 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (incentive award of $50,000); *In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig*., 130 F.R.D. 366, 374 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (two incentive awards of $55,000, and three incentive awards of $35,000); *Brotherton v. Cleveland*, 141 F. Supp. 2d 907, 913-14 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (granting a $50,000 incentive award); *Enter. Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp*., 137 F.R.D. 240, 251-52 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ($50,000 awarded to each class representative); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs*., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476, at *51-52 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2007) (awarding $25,000 incentive award in FLSA overtime wages class action); *Cook v. Niedert*, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming $25,000 incentive award to class representative).

proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys' fees in wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys' fees in common fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. *See Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) ("We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created"). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court's objective remains to "mimic the market" in fixing a reasonable fee. *See Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.) ("When a fee is set by a court rather than by contract, the object is to set it at a level that will approximate what the market will set … . The judge, in other words, is trying to mimic the market in legal services.").

First, a fee award of 33⅓% of the fund is consistent with "empirical studies [that] show that … fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery." *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc*., 162 Cal. App. 4th 43, 66 n.11 (2008). Here, a fee award representing 33⅓% of the fund is consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and fee awards. Indeed, attorneys' fees awards of 35% of the fund are within the expected range in the "market in legal services." *See* Fitzpatrick, *An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award*, 7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811, 833 (2010) (analyzing 444 cases between 2006-2007 and concluding that "[m]ost fee awards were between 25 percent and 35 percent").[4]

Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the fund. Here, Plaintiff and her counsel secured a $120,000.00 settlement. As detailed in the Preliminary Approval Motion, the $120,000.00 settlement obtained approximately 10.82% of the potential total recovery of 1,109,458.29. *See* Preliminary Approval Motion at 7:3-11. Each Settlement Class Member

[4] Such a fee award mimics the market and "is supported by the fact that typical contingency fee agreements provide that class counsel will recover 33% if the case is resolved before trial and 40% if the case is tried." *Fernandez v. Victoria Secret Stores LLC*, 2008 WL 8150856, at *16 n.59 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2008) (citing Brickman, *Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees* (Fall 2003) 81 Wash U. L. Q. 653, 659 n. 11).

will release claims related the pled violations only, but on average, each Settlement Class Member will receive more than $300.00—$278.62 as a Settlement Class Member (and an additional $63.64 as a PAGA Employee), *see* Admin Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff contends that this is an excellent result.

Third, "the response of the class members to attorneys' fee notice, though not decisive, is relevant to the … reasonable determination" regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court's "approximation of the market" for fees is well supported. *Id*. at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class that Class Counsel would be seeking $40,000.00 in attorneys' fees. Again, there were no objections.

Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney's fees reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. As observed in *City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp*.:

> No one expects a lawyer whose compensation is contingent upon his success to charge, when successful, as little as he would charge a client who had agreed to pay for his services, regardless of success. Nor, particularly in complicated cases producing large recoveries, is it just to make a fee depend solely on the reasonable amount of time expended.

495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974). Here, it is clear that a settlement fund of $120,000.00 has been created. For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly contingent in nature and the case presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case. Among the risks was the cost inherent in class action litigation, as well as a long battle with a corporate Defendant who had retained a premier and highly experienced defense firm. For such reasons, Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees in the amount of $40,000.00 is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

2. The Lodestar Cross-Check Supports the Requested Fees.

The amount requested is reasonable for an additional reason. While the primary method employed to determine fees is the percentage method, courts have discretion to use the lodestar method to "cross-check" the amount of fees calculated by way of percentage. The *Laffitte* court emphasized, however, that "the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, does not override the trial court's primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common fund and thus does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the potential fee award." *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 505 (emphasis added); *In re Rite Aid Corp. Secs. Litig*., 396 F.3d 294, 306-307 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[The lodestar cross-check does not trump the primary reliance on the percentage of common fund method").

Courts find reasonable multipliers in a lodestar cross-check can "range from 2 to 4 or even higher." *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc*., 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 255 (2001).[5] Indeed, the intermediate court in *Laffitte*—after finding that "2 to 4" is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check—affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. *Laffitte*, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 881-82.[6] Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has cited with approval a comprehensive study of fees awarded by the percentage method showing that the majority of multipliers awarded are "in the 1.5-3.0" range. *See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp*., 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming a multiplier of 3.65 in an employment class action case and analyzing the multiplier awarded in over 30 cases).[7]

With respect to Class Counsel's lodestar, at least 90.0 hours have been expended by just one of the Class Counsel litigating this case. Yang Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 2. Moreover, Class Counsel expects to incur approximately 3.0 hours of anticipated time spent to attend the final approval hearing, secure final approval, submit post-final approval compliance papers, as well as respond to post-final approval phone calls and correspondence from the Administrator, defense counsel, and Class Members. Yang Decl. ¶ 12. Courts are quite liberal in the evidence required to prove an attorney's hours. Detailed time records are not required; an attorney's testimony alone may suffice: "Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records." *Martino v. Denevi*, 182 Cal. App. 3d 553, 559 (1986).

Reasonable hours include, in addition to time spent during litigation, the time spent before the action is filed, including time spent interviewing the clients, investigating the facts and the law, and preparing the initial pleadings. *New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey*, 447 U.S. 54, 62 (1980). The fee

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[5] *Accord Chavez*, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 60 (applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check); *Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*, 171 Cal. App. 4th 495, 512 (2009) (applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check); *City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders*, 203 Cal. App. 3d 78 (1988) (affirming a 2.34 multiplier without remand).

[6] The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full upon review by the California Supreme Court.

[7] Federal district courts applying California law have likewise routinely approved cross-check multipliers between 2.0 and 3.0 in employment cases. *See*, *e.g*., *Willner v. Manpower Inc*., 2015 WL 3863625, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2015) (affirming a 2.10 multiplier on settlement of California Labor Code violations); *Dyer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A*., 303 F.R.D. 326, 334 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (approving attorneys' fees that resulted in lodestar multiplier of 2.83); *Hopkins v. Stryker Sales Corp*., 2013 WL 496358, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) (approving a multiplier of 2.76 in settlement of Labor Code violations). Other courts have found even higher multipliers to be reasonable by comparison to other cases. *See Craft v. County of San Bernardino*, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125-26 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (approving a 5.2 multiplier after surveying a large body of cases affirming a higher multiplier).

award should also include fees incurred to establish and defend the attorneys' fee claim. *Serrano v. Unruh*, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 639 (1982). The hours for which Plaintiff's Counsel seeks compensation involve only these types of tasks. Thus, the number of hours for which fees are sought is reasonable.

A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. *PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler*, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000). The court may consider other factors when determining a reasonable hourly rate, *e.g.*, the attorney's skill and experience, the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise and the attorney's customary billing rates. *Flannery v. California Highway Patrol*, 61 Cal. App. 4th 629, 632-33 (1998).

Here, Mr. Yang's hourly rate is $800. Yang Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff's Counsel's skill and experience justify the requested rates. As shown in the supporting declaration, Plaintiff's Counsel has significant experience in the area of employment and wage and hour class and representative actions. Plaintiff's Counsel's practices focus on representing employees in employment matters, particularly wage and hour cases on a contingency basis. Yang Decl. ¶¶ 6-9.

Based on the rates and 93.0 total hours for just one of Plaintiff's Counsel, the lodestar for Class Counsel through the finalization of this settlement will be at least $74,400.00. Yang Decl. ¶ 12. The requested attorneys' fees result in a negative multiplier of approximately 0.52. Again, the requested fees are reasonable and fair, based on the factors described above. The cross-check also supports the requested fees.

D. The Court Should Approve the Request for Reimbursement of Costs.

The request for reimbursement of costs, in the amount of $11,936.05 is fair and reasonable. As set forth in Plaintiff's counsel's declaration, the costs were all directly incurred in the prosecution of this action. Yang Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 1; Fitzpatrick Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. A. As such, this request should be approved.

E. The Administrator's Fees and Costs Should Be Approved.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the fees and costs of the Administrator, Phoenix Administrators, are to be paid out of the class settlement funds. As shown in the Declaration of Taylor Mitzner, the settlement administration fees expended in this matter amount to a total of $6,500.00. Admin Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. B. For such reasons, it is requested that the Administrator's fees be approved.

V. Notice to the LWDA Has Been Provided.

Plaintiff previously uploaded the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement to the LWDA's website. Yang Decl. ¶ 13. Concurrent with the filing of this motion, Plaintiff also has uploaded the final approval motion to the LWDA. *Id*.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the standards for final approval have been met and the terms of the Agreement are fair, adequate, and reasonable. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order in the form proposed and submitted.

DATED: November 16, 2026

DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.

By: _____
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