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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

TIM CHUNG, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ASSURANCE IQ, LLC, a limited liability
company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 34-2023-00337274

CLASS ACTION

[Hon. Jill H. Talley, Dept. 23]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL
OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Date: May 1, 2026
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Courtroom: Dept. 23
Judge: Hon. Jill H. Talley

Reservation ID: **A-337274-002**

Action Filed: April 3, 2023
FAC Filed: June 9, 2023
SAC Filed: April 16, 2025
Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 1, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter
3 may be heard, in Department 23 of the above-captioned Court, located at 720 9th Street, Sacramento CA
4 95814, Plaintiff TIM CHUNG (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move this Court for an order:

5 1. Granting class certification of the Class, solely for settlement purposes pursuant to
6 Code of Civil Procedure § 382;

7 2. Preliminarily approving the STIPULATION OF CLASS AND PAGA
8 REPRESENTATIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT (“Agreement”);

9 3. Appointing counsel for Plaintiff, Moon Law Group, PC, as Class Counsel;

10 4. Appointing Plaintiff as the Class Representative;

11 5. Approving the use of the proposed notice procedure and related notice form;

12 6. Approving ILYM Group, Inc., as the third-party Settlement Administrator;

13 7. Directing that notice be mailed to the Class; and,

14 8. Scheduling a hearing date for motions for final approval of class action settlement
15 and awards of attorneys’ fees and costs.

16 Good cause exists to grant this Motion because: (1) the Class meets all of the requirements for
17 class certification for settlement purposes under Code of Civil Procedure § 382; (2) the Agreement is a
18 fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the disputed wage and hour claims asserted by Plaintiff; (3)
19 Plaintiff and Class Counsel are adequate to represent the Class; (4) the proposed notice procedures and
20 related forms comply with California Rules of Court 3.766(d) and (e), adequately apprise Class Members
21 of their rights, and fully comport with due process; and, (5) based on the foregoing, notice should be
22 directed to the Class Members and a final fairness hearing should be scheduled (Plaintiff suggests about
23 145 days after preliminary approval is granted).

24 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 and Rule 3.1113(e) of the California Rules of Court,
25 which require approval by the Court of a class action settlement and permit the Court to extend the page
26 limit for memoranda.


27 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points
28 and Authorities, the Declarations of H. Scott Leviant, Plaintiff, and the Settlement Administrator in

1 support thereof, all papers and pleadings on file with the Court in this action, all matters judicially
2 noticeable, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented in connection with the
3 hearing on the Motion.

4 Respectfully submitted,

5 Dated: February 3, 2026

MOON LAW GROUP, PC

6
7 By: _____
Kane Moon
H. Scott Leviant
Jaeyoung Lee

9 Attorneys for Plaintiff TIM CHUNG

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SECOND INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION

LITIGATION - FEBRUARY 2010 17

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 3.769, Plaintiff requests that this Court preliminarily
3 approve the class action settlement set forth in the STIPULATION OF CLASS AND PAGA
4 REPRESENTATIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT (“Agreement”; “Settlement” describes the proposed
5 disposition of the Action effectuated by the Agreement and the Judgment) with ASSURANCE IQ, LLC
6 (“Defendant”).

7 After the exchange of documents and data, and an arm’s-length mediation session with mediator
8 Mike Young, and continued settlement discussions thereafter, Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively
9 referred to herein as the “Parties”) reached a proposed class action settlement with a gross settlement
10 amount (“GSA”) of **\$345,000.00** in compromise of disputed claims asserted on behalf of the below-
11 defined Class consisting of approximately **903** members.¹ Plaintiff believes this settlement is a fair,
12 adequate, and reasonable compromise of disputed claims for alleged wage and hour violations and
13 penalties asserted in this case.

14 Plaintiff now submits this Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, along
15 with the Settlement (attached to the Declaration of H. Scott Leviant [“Leviant Decl.”], Exhibit 1 thereto).
16 For the Court’s convenience, below is a summary of the key provisions of the Settlement.

17 **II. THE MAJOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT**

18 The provisions of the proposed Settlement include the following:

- 19 • Defendant agrees not to oppose certification for purposes of the Settlement.
20 (Agreement, ¶ 3.1.)
- 21 • Class: means all persons who worked for Defendant in California as an insurance
22 agent classified as an independent contractor at any time during the Class Settlement
23 Period. Class Settlement Period means the period from October 30, 2020 through
24 April 30, 2024. (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.34, 1.4.)
- 25 • Settlement Amount: Defendant will pay a maximum of **\$345,000.00**, referred to as
26

27 ¹ The approximate average term of service for a Class Member is just 19 weeks, which is a low
28 average duration for this type of profession.

the Gross Settlement Amount (or “GSA” herein), resulting in an estimated average **gross** benefit per Class Member of about **\$382.06** (about **\$19.71** per workweek). (Agreement, ¶ 3.3.1; Leviant Decl., ¶ 17.)

- Funding of Gross Settlement Amount: Within 21 calendar days after the Effective Date or within seven days of the Settlement Administrator providing all information necessary for Defendant to transfer funds to the Qualified Settlement Fund, whichever is later, Defendant shall pay the Gross Settlement Amount. (Agreement, ¶ 4.9.1.)
- Class Size: About **903** individuals who worked about 17,500 workweeks. (Agreement, ¶ 3.3.2.)
- PAGA Group Size: An estimated **401** aggrieved employees who worked about 16,955 pay periods during the PAGA Period. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 11.)
- PAGA Period: means March 30, 2022 through April 30, 2024. (Agreement, ¶ 1.24.)
- Kullar/Munoz Analysis: Plaintiff addresses the claims analysis herein, at Part V.B.3, and Leviant Declaration, at Paragraph 18.
- No Reversion: The Settlement is a **non-reversionary** settlement. (Agreement, ¶ 4.10.)
- Certification: Plaintiff addresses certification requisites herein, at Part V.A., and Leviant Declaration, at Paragraphs 34-40.
- No Claim Form: No claim form is required. (Agreement, ¶ 1.25.)
- Class Release: As of the date Defendant fully funds the Gross Settlement Amount, as described in Section 4.9 of the Agreement, all Participating Class Members fully and finally release the Released Parties from the Released Claims that arose during the Class Settlement Period. (Agreement, ¶ 3.7.2.)
- PAGA Release: As of the date Defendant fully funds the Gross Settlement Amount, as described in Section 4.9 below, Plaintiff, as representative of the State of California, and on behalf of the LWDA and as representative of the PAGA Members, fully and finally releases the Released Parties from the PAGA Released Claims for the PAGA Settlement Period. (Agreement, ¶ 3.7.3.)

- 1 • Net Settlement Amount Available to the Class: After deducting Class Counsel’s
2 attorneys’ fees and costs, service payment to Plaintiff, administration costs, and the
3 PAGA penalty, the remainder will be available for distribution to Class Members
4 who do not opt out, with each Class Member receiving a share based on the number
5 of Workweeks each Class Member worked for Defendant within the Class Period.
6 The Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be at least **\$160,000.00**, resulting in an
7 average **net** payment per Class Member of approximately **\$177.19**, before any tax
8 withholdings. (Agreement, ¶ 1.20.)
- 9 • Tax Allocation: The amounts distributed to Class Members will be characterized as
10 33% alleged unpaid wages, 67% to interest and penalties, and PAGA Settlement
11 payments to Aggrieved Employees will be allocated as 100% penalties. (Agreement,
12 ¶¶ 3.5.1, 3.5.2.)
- 13 • Employer’s Portion of Payroll Taxes Paid Separately: Defendant’s portion of payroll
14 taxes (e.g., FICA, FUTA, etc.) owed on any settlement payments to Class Members
15 that constitute wages will be paid separate and apart from the GSA. (Agreement, ¶
16 3.3.1.)
- 17 • Settlement Administrator: The notice portion of the settlement will be administered
18 by a third-party Settlement Administrator, ILYM Group, Inc. (“ILYM”), with the
19 costs of administration at a flat rate of up to \$15,000.00. ILYM’s estimate for
20 settlement administration services in the amount of **\$9,950.00** was selected as the
21 lowest bid from a competitive bidding process, and is below the Parties’ estimated
22 cost of \$15,000.00. (Agreement, ¶ 1.33; Mullins Decl., ¶ 10.)
- 23 • Class Data for Administration: The Settlement Administrator will receive the Class
24 Data within 30 calendar days of Preliminary Approval, use the National Change of
25 Address (“NCOA”) database to update the Class Data, and then use skip tracing on
26 returned Notices. (Agreement, ¶ 4.2.1.)
- 27 • Notice: The Notice will issue within 14 days of receipt of the Class Data (Settlement,
28 ¶ 4.2.2.). The Notice describes how to dispute workweeks, submit an objection in

writing, in person, or through an attorney, or request exclusion. (Agreement, ¶¶ 4.3 - 4.5.)

- Notice Language: Notice will issue in English; all Class Members are fluent in English.
- Objections: Objections can be submitted in person, by attorney, or in writing to the Administrator, with no pre-requisite to being heard. (Agreement, ¶¶ 4.4.)
- Exclusion Requests: The procedure for exclusion requests, mailing a request to the settlement Administrator, is the same as the procedure for submitting a written objection. (Agreement, ¶ 4.3.)
- PAGA Allocation: From the GSA, **\$35,000.00** will be allocated to settle claims brought pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 *et seq.* (“PAGA”), and seventy-five percent (75%), or **\$26,250.00**, will be paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency. (Agreement, ¶ 1.33; 3.2.5.)
- Notice to LWDA: Notice was provided prior to the filing of this Motion. Evidence is attached to the Leviant Declaration.
- Enhancement/Service Award to Plaintiff: Defendant will not oppose the application for Class Representative Service Payment of up to **\$5,000.00** for Plaintiff, to be paid from the GSA. (Agreement, ¶ 3.4.1.)
- Fees and Costs: Defendant will not oppose Class Counsel’s application for fees not to exceed 33 1/3% of the GSA (**\$115,000.00**), and actual costs, in an amount not to exceed **\$15,000.00**, to be paid out of the GSA. (Agreement, ¶ 3.4.2.)
- Check Void Period: Settlement checks will be valid for 180 days. (Agreement, ¶ 4.10.)
- Uncashed Checks: Any settlement checks that are mailed to the Class Members and remain uncashed after 180 days of the date of issuance will be cancelled, and the moneys will be directed to the State Controller’s Office, Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the recipient. (Agreement, ¶ 4.10.)

- Judgment Notice: Judgment will be posted on the Settlement Administrator’s website after entry. (Agreement, Exh. 1.)
- Confidentiality Provisions: The Settlement permits Class Counsel to discuss the Settlement with Class Members. (Agreement, ¶ 5.9.)

(Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 11-12 and Exhibit 1 thereto.) Counsel for Plaintiff has reviewed the Court’s checklist for settlement approval.

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

On April 3, 2023, Plaintiff commenced this Action by filing a Complaint alleging causes of action against Defendant Assurance IQ, LLC. (“Defendant”) for: failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime compensation, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and provide rest breaks, failure to timely pay final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failure to indemnify for necessary business expenses, and Unfair Business Practices. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendant sold life insurance products offered by other insurance companies. Defendant was acquired by another insurance company in 2019 but remained a separate entity, and Defendant’s operations were shut down in 2024. (*Id.*) The core underlying theory of the case is the allegation that Plaintiff and settlement Class Members were misclassified as independent contractors. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff sent a letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, providing notice of his intent to seek civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA Letter”). (Leviant Decl., ¶ 5.) The LWDA did not indicate that it intended to investigate the alleged violations referenced in the letter, and the 65-day time period permitted for the LWDA to provide such a notification expired. On June 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint alleging an additional cause of action against Defendant for violation of the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). On December 19, 2024, Plaintiff submitted an amended PAGA notice to add allegations of willful misclassification. On April 16, 2025, as part of the settlement process, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint adding claims for civil penalties under PAGA for willful misclassification. The Second Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint is the operative complaint in the Action (the “Operative Complaint”). (*Id.*)

1 **B. Pre-Mediation Data Production and Analysis**

2 The Parties conducted informal discovery and investigation of the facts and law. Such
3 investigation included, *inter alia*, the exchange of extensive data and discoverable information in
4 preparation for the mediation session. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 6.) The Parties analyzed data pertaining to
5 Plaintiff and the Class during the Settlement Period, including but not limited to the numbers of former
6 and current members of the Class, average workweeks and pay periods, and data regarding average time
7 online each day for class members.² Time-stamped activity data and commission pay data sufficient for
8 statistical significance was used for Plaintiff’s pre-mediation analysis. In addition, Defendant also
9 provided other data pertaining to Plaintiff and the Class during the relevant Class Period. (*Id.*)

10 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s policies and practices and other information
11 obtained during the informal exchange of discovery, Class Counsel were able to evaluate the probability
12 of class certification, success on the merits, and the reasonably obtainable maximum monetary exposure
13 for all claims. Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation.
14 Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
15 litigation. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 7.)

16 **C. Settlement**

17 On October 30, 2024, the Parties participated in mediation with Mike Young, which ultimately
18 led to a proposed settlement. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 8.) The Parties discussed at length the burdens and risks
19 of continuing with the litigation as well as the merits of claims and defenses. (*Id.*) After the mediation
20 and eventual settlement, the Parties signed a long form settlement agreement (the “Agreement”). (*Id.*)

21 Plaintiff and Class Counsel are aware of the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability for
22 the claims asserted in the Action, both generally and in response to Defendant’s defenses thereto.
23 (Leviant Decl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff and Class Counsel have also taken into account Defendant’s agreement to
24 enter into a Settlement that confers substantial relief upon the Class. (*Id.*)

25
26
27 ² The average time online was just 2.89 hours, which means that, even *if* the Class was misclassified,
28 they suffered little in the way of damages for more than half of all shifts. (*Id.*) Shifts of less than 3.5
hours in length (above even the average shift length) would not be entitled to a rest break, a meal period,
or any overtime pay, and compensation exceeded the minimum wage. (*Id.*)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth in this Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable Settlement and is in the best interests of the Class. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 10.) Solely for the purpose of settling this case, the parties agree that the requirements for establishing class action certification with respect to this class have been met and are met. (*Id.*) If this Settlement is not approved by the Court for any reason, Defendant reserves the right to contest class certification. (*Id.*) This Settlement, if approved, will result in the termination of the litigation through the entry of the Judgment and the release of all Released Claims for all Class Members, including all within the class definition who have not elected to exclude themselves from the Class. (*Id.*)

D. Other Affected Litigation

A Class Member has brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California against Defendant, asserting substantially similar wage and hour claims, in addition to claims under the Federal WARN Act and California WARN Act, captioned *Mark Steele v. Assurance IQ, LLC, et al.*, case number 3:25-cv-01614. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 20.) This settlement would extinguish overlapping wage and hour in the *Steele* action as to any individual who does not request exclusion from this matter. However, this action asserts no claims under the Federal WARN Act or California WARN Act, and the release in this matter does not release any such claims.

IV. CLASS DEFINITION

The Class is defined as follows:

All persons who worked for Defendant in California as an insurance agent classified as an independent contractor at any time during the Class Settlement Period (the “Class Settlement Period” is the period from October 30, 2020 through April 30, 2024). “Participating Class Member” means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Class portion of the Settlement. (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.34, 1.4, 1.25.)

(Leviant Decl., ¶ 34 and Exhibit 1.)

V. DISCUSSION

A. The Court Should Conditionally Certify the Class for Settlement Purposes

The Class should be provisionally certified for settlement because: (1) the Class is ascertainable and numerous; (2) there exists a well-defined community of interest; and (3) a class action is the superior method of adjudication for this settlement. Code of Civ. Proc. § 382; *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.*,

53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021 (2012); *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435 (2000); *Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 326, 332 (2004). For purposes of this Settlement *only*, Defendants stipulates to conditional certification. (Settlement ¶ 12.1.)

“The certification question is ‘essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is legally or factually meritorious.’” *Id.*, at 326, quoting *Linder*. Indeed, the certification question simply asks whether the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment. *See, e.g., Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 1298 (2010). “[I]t is also well established that trial courts should use different standards to determine the propriety of a settlement class, as opposed to a litigation class certification. Specifically, a lesser standard of scrutiny is used for settlement cases.” *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal. App. 4th 836, 859 (2003), citing *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1807 n. 19 (1996).

In view of these standards, the Class should be certified for purposes of settlement. Code Civ. Proc. § 382; Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c).

1. The Members of the Class Are Both Ascertainable and Numerous.

Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. *See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal. App. 3d 862, 873 (1983). A class is ascertainable when “it is defined ‘in terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts’ that make ‘the ultimate identification of class members possible when that identification becomes necessary.’” *Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal. 5th 955, 980 (2019). The class definition is sufficiently specific to enable the Parties, Class Members, and the Court to determine the parameters of the class. *See Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.*, 191 Cal. App. 3d 605, 617 (1987). Here, there were about 903 Class Members, all of whom may be identified by reference to Defendants’ records. The Class is not only ascertainable, but also numerous. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 35.)

2. There Are Common Questions That Predominate Over Any Questions That May Be Unique to Individual Class Members.

The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of law and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1806; *Richmond v.*

1 *Dart Industries*, 29 Cal. 3d 462, 473-75 (1981). A question of law or fact is common to the class if it
2 may be resolved through common proof. *See, Jaimez*, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1305. As for predominance, it
3 “is a comparative concept, and ‘the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility and
4 damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.’” *Sav-on*, 34 Cal. 4th at 334.

5 In this case, common questions include, but are not limited to: i. Whether Defendant
6 misclassified the Class as independent contractors; ii. Whether or not Defendant paid proper wages to the
7 Class; iii. Whether or not Defendant provided meal periods to the Class; iv. Whether or not Defendant
8 provided rest periods to the Class; v. Whether or not Defendant paid compensation timely upon
9 separation of employment to former Class Members; vi. whether or not Defendant paid compensation
10 timely throughout Class Members’ employment; vii. Whether or not Defendant provided accurate
11 itemized wage statements to the Class; and, viii. Whether or not Defendant engaged in unlawful or unfair
12 business practices affecting the Class in violation of the UCL. (Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 37-38.)

13 In the Action, Plaintiff’s claims present sufficient common issues of law and fact that
14 predominate over individual issues and warrant class certification. From their review of the
15 documentation provided, Class Counsel determined that for purposes of these claims, Defendant’s
16 policies and practices are either identical, or sufficiently similar, to raise the same questions of liability,
17 and applied to all Class Members. Because Class Members would have to prove the same issues of law
18 and fact to prevail, and because their potential legal remedies are identical, it would be preferable to
19 resolve all Class Members’ claims by means of the Settlement than to require each Class Member to
20 litigate his or her individual claims. Therefore, common questions predominate over questions that may
21 be unique to individual Class Members, and class-wide settlement is superior to any other resolution.

22 **3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of Those of the Class.**

23 Typicality “requires a showing that the class representative has claims or defenses typical of the
24 class.” *See, e.g., Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1534 (2008), approved
25 by *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012). California law does not require that
26 plaintiffs have claims identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class
27 representative is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on
28 conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured

1 by the same course of conduct. *Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal. App. 4th 1496, 1502 (2007).

2 In light of these standards, Plaintiff is typical of class members. Like other Class Members,
3 Defendants employed Plaintiff as an insurance agent classified as an independent contractor during the
4 Class Period, and Plaintiff claims that he was subject to the same policies alleged to have impacted the
5 entire class. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that he and other Class Members share the same
6 claims stemming from Defendant's alleged misclassification of its California insurance agents as
7 independent contractors and therefore violations of the Labor Code and relevant wage order. In addition,
8 Defendant's main defenses are asserted against both Plaintiff and Class Members, including the defense
9 that the Class Members were properly classified under California law as independent contractors. *See*,
10 *Arnold v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co.*, 202 Cal. App. 4th 580, 586-88 (2011) (affirming the trial court's
11 holding that under the *Borello* test insurance agents are independent contractors); *Hennighan v. Insphere*
12 *Ins. Sols., Inc.*, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (granting summary judgment in favor of
13 insurance agency finding that plaintiff insurance agent was an independent contractor as a matter of law);
14 *Desimone v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 2000 WL 1811385, at *16-17 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2000) (applying *Borello*
15 test and holding that insurance agents were independent contractors). If Defendant is correct, then the
16 Labor Code does not apply. *See, e.g., Rubin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (N.D.
17 Cal. 2009) (holding that where claims for violations of the California Labor Code failed, a derivative
18 claim of unlawful competition also failed); *Noorzay v. Tatitlek Support Servs., Inc.*, 2015 WL 12747823,
19 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015) ("[A]n independent contractor . . . may not assert California state law
20 claims for, inter alia, unpaid overtime, failure to provide meal or rest breaks, and failure to reimburse
21 business expenses."). Thus, Plaintiff is typical of the Class.

22 4. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class.

23 Adequacy is shown where the plaintiff is represented by counsel qualified to conduct the
24 litigation and the plaintiff's interest in the litigation is not antagonistic to class members. *McGhee v. Bank*
25 *of America*, 60 Cal. App. 3d 442, 451 (1976). In other words, where the plaintiff has adequate counsel,
26 the plaintiff may represent the entire class absent any disabling conflicts of interest that might hinder the
27 plaintiff's ability to represent the class. *Id.* In the Action, Plaintiff has no conflicts of interest with other
28 Class Members and has agreed to place Class interests above Plaintiff's own. (Chung Decl., ¶¶ 5-19;

Leviant Decl., ¶ 39.) Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel is experienced in wage and hour class litigation and have no conflicts of interest with absent Class Members. (Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 21-26, 39.) Thus, this Court should appoint Plaintiff as Class Representative and appoint Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel.

5. Proceeding as a Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions

Plaintiff contends that proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute, as the Class Members and the Court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would serve as the only means to deter and redress the alleged Labor Code violations. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* 23 Cal. 4th at 434. Furthermore, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would unduly burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results, which may be avoided by class certification.

6. The Proposed Class Notice Complies with Rule 3.766(d) and (e)

Notice requirements are set forth in Rules of Court, Rule 3.766. In determining the manner of notice, the court must consider interests of the class, relief requested, stakes of individual class members, costs of notifying class members, resources of the parties, possible prejudice to class members who do not receive notice, and the *res judicata* effect on class members. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766(e).

a) The Notice Procedure Satisfies Due Process

The proposed procedure for distributing the Proposed Notice is robust and meets the requirement that it have "a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members." *Cartt v. Sup. Ct.*, 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974 (1975). There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the Class Members will receive direct notice. Here, the proposed procedure includes safeguards, including, but not limited to, mailing notice to Class Members' last known addresses; skip tracing; searches for address changes; and the re-mailing of returned notices to any forwarding addresses. This manner of giving notice complies with Rule of Court 3.766(c) because it provides a reasonable chance that Class Notice will reach most if not all Class Members.

b) The Notice is Accurate and Informative

The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement should be approved for dissemination to the Class Members because its content complies with Rule of Court 3.766(d) in that it contains a brief explanation of the case, including the basic contentions or denials of the Parties, detailed information about Class Members' rights to be excluded from the Settlement and object to the Settlement; a

1 statement that the Settlement will bind all members who do not timely opt-out. Thus, the Notice also
2 satisfies Rule of Court 3.769(f) regarding the contents of settlement notices.

3 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. 3 NEWBERG § 8.39. It
4 summarizes the proceedings and the terms and conditions of the proposed Settlement, in an informative
5 and coherent manner, in compliance with the Manual for Complex Litigation (“MANUAL”), (2d Ed.
6 1993), which states that “the notice should be accurate, objective, and understandable to Class Members .
7 ..” MANUAL, § 30.211. It makes clear that the Settlement does not constitute an admission of liability
8 by Defendants and recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits. It also states that the final
9 settlement approval decision has yet to be made. Accordingly, the Notice complies with the standards of
10 fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

11 **B. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair,**
12 **Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage Claims**

13 California courts favor settlement. *See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Superior Court*, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231,
14 236 (1976). Unlike most settlements, class action settlements involve a court approval process that exists
15 to prevent fraud, collusion, and unfairness to class members. *Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v.*
16 *Superior Court*, 103 Cal. App. 3d 573, 578-579 (1980). For the reasons discussed below, this Court
17 should preliminarily approve the Settlement, allow the Parties to give notice to the Class as proposed,
18 and schedule a final fairness and final approval hearing.

19 **1. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Review and Approval.**

20 Any settlement of class litigation must be reviewed and approved by the presiding court. Rules
21 of Court, Rule 3.769(a). Approval occurs in two steps: (1) an early (preliminary) review and (2) a
22 subsequent (final) review after notice has been distributed to the class members. The Preliminary
23 Approval Hearing and Final Approval Hearing coincide with these two steps. The present motion seeks
24 *preliminary approval* and the setting of a Final Approval Hearing.

25 To evaluate a settlement, the trial court must receive “*basic*” information about the nature and
26 magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the
27 release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.
28 App. 4th 116, 133 (2008). However, the record need *not* contain an explicit statement of the maximum

1 theoretical amount that the class could recover. *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*,
2 186 Cal. App. 4th 399, 409 (2010).

3 **2. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arms’ Length Negotiations**
4 **Between Experienced Counsel with the Assistance of a Highly Qualified**
5 **Mediator After Sufficient Data Was Exchanged to Evaluate Settlement.**

6 A settlement is presumptively fair where it is reached through arms’ length bargaining, based on
7 sufficient discovery and investigation to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, counsel is
8 experienced in similar litigation, and the percentage of objectors is small.³ *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802;
9 *In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006); *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v.*
10 *Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1146 (2000). In exercising the power to approve a settlement,
11 the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable,” *Dunk*,
12 at 1801, considering “the complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
13 action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the
14 state of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant,
15 and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. *Id.* These factors require balancing, are
16 non-exhaustive, and, as such, trial courts should tailor the factors considered to each case and give due
17 regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” *Id.*

18 Here, the settlement resulted from thorough, arms’ length negotiations between experienced
19 counsel with the assistance of a skilled mediator, Mike Young. (Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) Plaintiff
20 obtained data from Defendant and carefully reviewed it. Counsel for Plaintiff also examined relevant
21 policies and interviewed witnesses in detail about their work experiences and Defendant’s practices.

22 Based on the review of data, Plaintiff estimated potential exposure and then estimated risk factors
23 to adjust the reasonable expected outcome. The investigation that Plaintiff’s counsel conducted was
24 sufficient to provide them with enough information to intelligently evaluate the estimated exposure for
25 purposes of negotiating the Settlement in view of the risks discussed below and was sufficient to allow
26

27 ³ Because the fourth prerequisite for the presumption to arise cannot be addressed until the final
28 approval hearing, only the first three prerequisites are relevant at this preliminary stage of the settlement
approval process.

1 this Court to do the same. *See, e.g., Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001).

2 **3. The Settlement Represents a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise**
3 **of Class Members' Claims Based on Defendant's Estimated Liability**
4 **Exposure Given the Risks Continued Litigation Would Entail.**

5 *a) The Class Settlement is Fair, Adequate and Reasonable*

6 A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at
7 trial and does not have to provide 100% of damages sought to be fair and reasonable. "In the context of a
8 settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the
9 complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances." *Wershba*, 91
10 Cal. App. 4th at 250. Accordingly, because settlements involve compromise, even one that provides for
11 substantially narrower relief than would likely be obtained if the suit were successfully litigated can be
12 reasonable given that "the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each
13 side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation." *Id.*

14 With respect to the claims asserted on behalf of the Class, there are serious risks that support this
15 compromise amount. These risks include, but are not limited to: (i) the risk that Plaintiff could not
16 demonstrate that insurance agent Class Members were misclassified; (ii) the risk that uncertainties about
17 the legality of Defendant's policies and practices could preclude class-wide awards of statutory penalties;
18 (iii) the risk that individual differences between Class Members could be construed as pertaining to
19 liability and not just damages; (iv) the risk that any penalty award under PAGA could be reduced by the
20 Court in its discretion; (v) the risk that lengthy trial or appellate litigation could ensue; (vi) the risk that
21 violation rates could prove lower than expected; and (vii) ***the critical risk that arbitration agreements***
22 ***would preclude class treatment entirely.*** (Leviant Decl., ¶ 16.) These risks are non-exhaustive.

23 In light of the uncertainties of protracted litigation, the settlement amount reflects a fair and
24 reasonable recovery for the Class Members. (Leviant Decl. ¶¶ 13-20.) The settlement amount is, of
25 course, a compromise figure. (Leviant Decl. ¶ 17.) By necessity it took into account risks related to
26 liability, damages, and the defenses asserted by Defendant. (*Id.*) Moreover, each Class Member will be
27 given the opportunity to opt-out, allowing those who feel they have claims that are greater than the
28 benefits they can receive under this Settlement to pursue their own claims. (*Id.*) For the approximately

1 903 members of the Class, the average **gross** benefit is **\$382.14** per class member, and the estimated
2 average **net** recovery for each Class Member would be approximately **\$177.19**. (*Id.*) Given that
3 Defendants could challenge certification and liability, this is the best result that could have been achieved
4 in settlement. Moreover, a Class Member who worked a greater number of workweeks will receive a
5 larger Settlement share than a Class Member who worked for a shorter time during the class period. (*Id.*)

6 After analyzing the claims in this matter, Plaintiff has concluded that the Gross Settlement
7 Amount of **\$345,000.00** is about 42% of the **\$818,747.35** estimate of *risk-adjusted* recovery (excluding
8 interest) at this stage in the litigation. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 18.) This assessment is based on a carefully
9 constructed model of the current fair value of the case, using estimated risks, average wage rates,
10 numbers of employees, and the amount of time covered by the class period. (*Id.*)

- 11 • The crux of Plaintiff's claims is his contention that Plaintiff and the Class were misclassified
12 as independent contractors. Defendant is a life insurance seller and Plaintiff and Class were
13 salespeople. Plaintiff and the Class did not independently obtain customers; all leads were
14 provided exclusively by Defendant. Once connected, Plaintiff and the Class input customer
15 information on Defendant's platform and they would be given options by the platform to
16 explain to customers. All sales were executed through Defendant's platform. Defendant
17 tracked activity with timestamped data by Plaintiff and the Class, but Plaintiff and the Class
18 had complete discretion as to when and how much to work. Plaintiff and the Class worked
19 outside of Defendant's place of business and supplied their own equipment. Plaintiff and the
20 Class could sell other life insurance products in any state where they were licensed.
21 Moreover, the average time online was just 2.89 hours, which means that, even *if* the Class
22 was misclassified, they suffered little in the way of damages for more than half of all shifts.
23 Shifts of less than 3.5 hours in length (above even the average shift length) would not be
24 entitled to a rest break, a meal period, or any overtime pay, and compensation exceeded the
25 minimum wage.
- 26 • A reasonably estimated exposure for unpaid wages due to misclassification was calculated,
27 with the assistance of an expert, to be approximately **\$222,383.50**. However, with the high
28 risk factor discounts for certification and liability proof, the value of that claim is estimated
by Plaintiff's counsel to be approximately **\$26,686.02**, assuming certification probability of
30% and merits success at 40%. The claim is predicated on Defendant's misclassification of
workers and failure to adhere to Labor Code Section 204. Here, a \$26,686.02 exposure has a
value of about 12% of its maximum, given a likelihood of success on both certification and
the merits, which is an approximation of the chain probability of certification multiplied by
merits chances: $0.3 \times 0.4 = 0.12$. Arbitration agreements pose a very high risk for this claim.
This theory of recovery also has a high degree of risk because it depends on Class Member
estimates of the frequency and duration and is testimony dependent.
- A reasonably estimated exposure for rest break violations over the class period was
calculated at **\$923,445.00**, but with chances of certification and proof of liability (30% and
30% respectively) for a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$83,110.05**. This claim is based on
Defendant's failure to adopt a lawful rest break policy by virtue of its misclassification of
Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff asserted value for settlement purposes based on the
assumption that 80% of pay periods contained at least one shift of sufficient length to trigger
rest periods. Arbitration agreements pose a very high risk for this claim. The exposure

assumes 100% of all rest periods were non-compliant.

- An estimated exposure for meal break violations over the class period was calculated at **\$1,346,699.00**, with chances of certification and liability risks (40% and 50% respectively) resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$269,339.80**. This exposure is based upon Defendant's failure to adopt a lawful meal period policy by virtue of its misclassification of Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff asserted value for settlement purposes based on the assumption that 50% of pay periods contained at least one shift of sufficient length to trigger meal periods. Arbitration agreements pose a very high risk for this claim. In addition, the majority of shifts were not long enough to trigger a meal period right, so the estimated exposure is likely a significant overstatement.
- A reasonably calculated exposure for unreimbursed expenses over the class period was calculated at **\$115,737.50**, with chances of certification and liability risks (40% and 40% respectively) resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$18,518.00**. This exposure is based upon Defendant's failure to adopt a lawful reimbursement policy by virtue of its misclassification of workers leading to home office costs not being reimbursed. Arbitration agreements pose a very high risk for this claim.
- The risk-adjusted penalty recovery for Labor Code § 203 penalties was estimated to be approximately **\$149,918.48**, on a maximum exposure of **\$428,338.50** (with certification and merits success chances of 70% and 50% respectively, based on all theories of unpaid wages, adjusted for the additional risk of needing to prove other elements in addition to the underlying wage claim). The need to show a knowing and intentional violation constitutes an additional risk factor.
- The risk-adjusted penalty recovery for wage statement penalties were estimated to be approximately **\$141,400.00**, on a maximum exposure of **\$404,000.00** (with certification and merits success chances of 70% and 50% respectively, based on all theories of unpaid wages, adjusted for the additional risk of needing to prove other elements in addition to the underlying wage claim). The value of this claim was just dealt a severe blow by the recent California Supreme Court decision of *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.* (May 6, 2024), which significantly strengthened the good faith defense to Section 226 penalties.
- Performing risk-adjusted valuations for all claims yields a total value in the range of **\$688,972.35**, excluding PAGA.⁴
- PAGA penalties exposure was calculated to be **\$1,297,750.00**. But, assuming issues with proof and cooperation of aggrieved employees, along with the Court's power to reduce penalties, the realistic exposure was calculated to be ten percent of that amount, or **\$129,775.00**. Plaintiff's Counsel concludes that showing a "willful" misclassification is highly unlikely, given that there are classification test factors that favor Defendant or are neutral at best.

(See, Leviant Decl., ¶ 18.)

⁴ It is difficult to assign specific percentages to future events, but it does provide a specific method for attempting to reduce the concept of "very high risk" or "high risk" to a quantifiable amount. Certification of a claim is typically a binary event. One does not obtain a 20% certification; a claim is either certified or it is not. But the current expected value is best quantified by applying a risk reduction, based on the total experience of counsel. The numbers explain with math what can also be described conceptually in words.

1 This result here is fully supportable as reasonable. First, it is important to recognize the
2 wilfulness finding required for Labor Code §§ 203 and 226 is challenging to establish. (Leviant Decl., ¶
3 19.) Second, rest break and meal period claims have been challenging to certify for many years, even
4 after *Brinker*. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 19.) The Judicial Council’s Class Certification in California: SECOND
5 INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION -
6 FEBRUARY 2010 (“Second Interim Report”), at page 5, states that “less than a quarter of disposed
7 cases in the study sample were certified, either through a litigated motion for certification or as part of a
8 classwide settlement agreement.” *See*, Second Interim Report, at 5 (emphasis added).⁵ That “*or*” is
9 significant. The certification rates identified in the study of less than 25% includes *both* contested
10 certifications and settlement certifications, which are the majority of certifications. In other words, one
11 must assume in any wage and hour class action prior to certification that a contested certification motion
12 will have a success rate of well under 25%, and probably closer to 10% as a starting point for risk
13 evaluation. The facts of each case have significant bearing on these percentages. But it cannot be
14 disputed that certification is an exceptionally difficult procedural hurdle to successfully overcome. Thus,
15 it is not unreasonable to start from the proposition that a pre-certification settlement that is 10% to 15%
16 of the maximum plausible exposure is a valid starting point for valuation. If roughly 10% of class
17 actions are certified on a contested basis, then, on average, 90% of the time a class will not be certified
18 and the result for the class is *zero* dollars.

19 Here, the estimated certification probabilities are *above* the average rate at which cases were
20 certified in California over the study years, based upon data available through the California Courts
21 websites. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 19.) In sum, well *under* 20% of all cases filed as proposed class actions are
22 ultimately certified by way of a *contested* motion. (*Id.*) Thus, the recovery falls within the expected
23 outcome under the likelihood of success metric. (*Id.*) It would also be appropriate to evaluate the result
24 by examining only the premium wages at issue (approximately \$2,608,265.00, *with no risk reduction*),
25
26

27 ⁵ The report is available at <https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/classaction-certification.pdf> (last
28 viewed March 12, 2024).

1 excluding penalties and interest.⁶ This Settlement achieves the goals of the litigation.

2 *b) The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable*

3 The ultimate decision as to the amount of penalties is always up to the discretion of the Court.
4 Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) states: “In any action by an aggrieved employee seeking recovery of a civil
5 penalty available under subdivision (a) or (f), a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil
6 penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do
7 otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”

8 Prior to the issuance of *Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.*, 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021), the only sources
9 of persuasive guidance as to how to assess the reasonableness of a PAGA allocation were found in
10 federal court decisions. In their view, a PAGA allocation, even if a small portion of the total settlement,
11 could be reasonable if the settlement of the wage and hour claims is robust and serves the deterrent
12 purpose of PAGA. *O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
13 (“By providing fair compensation to the class members as employees and substantial monetary relief, a
14 settlement not only vindicates the rights of class members as employees, but may have a deterrent effect
15 upon the defendant employer and other employers, an objective of PAGA.”). *Moniz* provided explicit
16 confirmation that this was an appropriate yardstick by which to measure reasonableness of a PAGA
17 settlement. *Moniz*, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 77. *Moniz*, in agreeing with federal courts that have considered
18 how to evaluate a PAGA settlement, concluded that the class action factors are appropriately considered,
19 along with a consideration of whether the settlement furthers “PAGA’s purposes to remediate present
20 labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws.”

21 As to the first set of elements (the class-type analysis), it is embodied in Plaintiff’s discussion of
22 the adequacy of the settlement generally. Here, the expense, complexity and likely duration of future
23

24 ⁶ The exclusion of interest and penalties from the fairness evaluation is proper because, first, PAGA
25 penalties are discretionary (*see* Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2) (the court in its discretion “may award a lesser
26 amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part...”), and, second, courts evaluate
27 the strength of a proposed settlement without taking potential penalties or interest into consideration. *See*
28 *Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2000); *see also Miller v. CEVA*
Logistics U.S.A., Inc., 2015 WL 729638, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015) (court utilized calculation of a
defendant’s exposure exclusive of interest and penalties to determine whether the settlement fell within
the range of possible approval).

1 litigation was to some extent an unknown. However, what is certain is that to adequately establish the
2 violations that would support a substantial penalty, tremendous time and expense would be invested.

3 The second element (the PAGA purposes element) is also satisfied here. As held by *Moniz*,
4 PAGA's purposes include (1) remediation of present labor law violations, (2) deterrence of future
5 violations, and (3) maximization of enforcement of state labor laws. Here the allocation of a major
6 portion of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of labor law violation remediation.
7 The allocation of a major portion of settlement funds to class members also deters future violations. This
8 is a \$345,000.00 settlement, a good result. Deterrence is fulfilled. Finally, allocation of a major portion
9 of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of enforcement of state labor law. This
10 settlement is, by definition, a response to alleged violations of labor laws, balanced against risks.

11 In addition, there is no evidence that a court or a commissioner had informed Defendants that
12 their conduct violated the Labor Code. *Amaral v. Cintas Corp.*, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1209 (2008);
13 *Willis v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC*, 2013 WL 6053831, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. 2013). And in *Cotter*, the court
14 found a significant reduction of the PAGA claim would be appropriate because "[t]his does not appear to
15 be a case where a company has deliberately sought to evade the law." *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 176 F.Supp.3d
16 930, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2016).

17 Finally, the PAGA allocation is fair. The LWDA is receiving \$26,250.00. The Class is
18 receiving, net, an estimated \$160,000.00 for *all* other claims. While the proportion is tipped slightly in
19 favor of employees, the allocation is not unfair because it satisfies California's wage and hour policies.

20 **4. The Proposed Method for Allocating Settlement Funds Is Fair.**

21 The proposed method of allocating the Settlement Fund to Class Members also is fair and
22 reasonable. The Settlement Fund is to be allocated between all Class Members, based on workweeks
23 worked by the Class Member during the Class Period, in relation to the total amount of workweeks
24 worked by all participating Class Members. This proposed method is fair and reasonable because each
25 Class Member's actual potential damages vary based on the number of workweeks he or she worked
26 (e.g., Lab. Code § 226.7 provides for an extra hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of pay for each
27 violation, resulting in a higher potential damage when a higher number of incidents occur). A Class
28 Member who worked a greater number of workweeks will receive a larger payment under the Settlement

1 than a Class Member who worked for a shorter amount of time. (Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 13, 17.)

2 **5. The Proposed Enhancement Award to Plaintiff Warrants Approval.**

3 The proposed enhancement of \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff is intended to recognize substantial initiative
4 and significant efforts on behalf of the Class. Courts routinely approve incentive awards to compensate
5 named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class action litigation, often
6 in much higher amounts than that sought here. Factors considered when awarding an incentive include
7 the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted, the
8 amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in the litigation, the risk to the class representative in
9 commencing suit (financial and otherwise), the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered, the
10 duration of the litigation, and the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the plaintiff as a result of
11 the litigation. *Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 804 (2009). Here, Plaintiff
12 contributed time to the prosecution of this matter, including assistance prior to the mediation with
13 information and substantial time conferring with counsel over the course of this litigation and before it
14 was filed. (Chung Decl., ¶¶ 5-19; Leviant Decl., ¶ 32.) The enhancement also recognizes risks Plaintiff
15 took to be personally liable for costs regardless of the success of the litigation, as well as the personal risk
16 of facing intrusive discovery and potential disclosure to future employers that Plaintiff sued an employer,
17 making future employment less certain.

18 **6. The Proposed Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Is Also Fair, Adequate,**
19 **and Reasonable and Merits Preliminary Approval.**

20 The California Supreme Court removed any lingering doubt about the use of the percentage of
21 the fund method to award attorney's fees in California Courts. *Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.*, 1 Cal.
22 5th 480, 503 (2016).⁷ Thus, this Court may and, pursuant to *Laffitte*, *should* award fees to Plaintiff's
23 counsel based upon the percentage of the fund methodology.

24 Setting *Laffitte* aside, whether the once-again-confirmed percentage of the fund method or the
25

26 ⁷ The Supreme Court also corrected the misconception that *Dunk* should be viewed as expressing
27 doubt about the use of the percentage method: "The *Dunk* court, while finding the percentage method
28 inapplicable to the settlement before it due to the lack of a readily valued common fund, did not purport
to bar its usage generally in common fund cases." *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 501.

lodestar method is used, the outcome is roughly the same: “[F]ee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery’ regardless of ‘whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used.’” *Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC*, 69 Cal. App. 5th 521 (2021). This is also consistent with counsels’ experience in class cases. Here, Plaintiff’s attorneys intend to request attorneys’ fees of up to \$115,000.00 (33 and 1/3% of the GSA), and costs capped at \$15,000.00 (which includes payment for mediation, filing fees, service of process fees, and other standard expenses). (Leviant Decl., ¶ 31.) Given the efforts and risks involved in this case, as well as the results achieved, these amounts are within the range of reasonableness and warrant *preliminary approval*.

7. The Proposed Payment to the Administrator Is Fair and Reasonable

ILYM, which has been selected due to its competitive bid, states that administration can be performed for a flat rate of **\$9,950.00**. In counsel’s experience, based on similar wage-and-hour actions, an estimated cost of **\$9,950.00** is a fair and reasonable amount for administration fees and should be preliminarily approved, and it is below the Parties’ original estimated cost of \$15,000.00 to administer the Settlement. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 33.) ILYM has also confirmed its capabilities and security protocols in the accompanying declaration.

VI. THE COURT SHOULD SCHEDULE A FINAL FAIRNESS HEARING

The last step in the settlement approval process is the fairness hearing, where the Court makes a final determination about the propriety of settlement. Plaintiff requests that the fairness hearing in this case be scheduled for about 145 days after issuance of the Court’s Order granting preliminary approval of the Settlement. Under the Settlement, Defendant will have 30 days to provide the data to the Settlement Administrator, which will then have 14 calendar days to mail out class notice. Class Members have 60 days after mailing of the notice to submit exclusions or objections (with a 14-day extension available for re-mailed notices). Therefore, Plaintiff proposes a final approval hearing scheduled for the first available hearing date that is about 145 days after preliminary approval is granted.

VII. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, because the Class meets the requirements for certification, because the Settlement bears all requisite indicia of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, and because the proposed notice procedure and forms comport with Rule 3.766 and due process, this Court should grant

1 this Motion for Preliminary Approval, adopt the [Proposed] Order Granting Preliminary Approval of
2 Class Action Settlement submitted herewith, and schedule a Final Fairness Hearing.

3 Respectfully submitted,

4 Dated: February 3, 2026

MOON LAW GROUP, PC

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6 By:



H. Scott Leviant

7 Attorneys for Plaintiff Tim Chung
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