

Kane Moon (SBN 249834)
H. Scott Leviant (SBN 200834)
Sandy Pham (SBN 352753)
MOON LAW GROUP, PC
725 S. Figueroa St., 31st Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 232-3128
Facsimile: (213) 232-3125
E-mail: kmoon@moonlawgroup.com
E-mail: hsleviant@moonlawgroup.com
E-mail: spham@moonlawgroup.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

AGUSTIN UMANA VILLATORO,
individually, and BRYAN HERNANDEZ,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

AMERICAN ASPHALT REPAIR AND
RESURFACING COMPANY, INC.; and DOES
1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 22CV024706

*[Assigned for all purposes to the Hon. Somnath
Raj Chatterjee, Dept 21]*

CLASS ACTION

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL
OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Date: May 27, 2025
Time: 2:30 p.m.
Courtroom: Dept. 21
Judge: Hon. Somnath Raj Chatterjee

Action Filed: December 27, 2022
Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 27, 2025, at 2:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter
3 may be heard, in Department 21 of the above-captioned Court, located at 1221 Oak Street, Oakland, CA
4 94612, Plaintiffs AGUSTIN UMANA VILLATORO and BRYAN HERNANDEZ (“Plaintiffs”) will
5 and hereby do move this Court for an order:

6 1. Granting class certification of the Class, solely for settlement purposes pursuant to
7 Code of Civil Procedure § 382;

8 2. Preliminarily approving the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT
9 AGREEMENT AND CLASS NOTICE (“Settlement” or “Agreement”);

10 3. Appointing counsel for Plaintiffs, Moon Law Group, PC, as Class Counsel;

11 4. Appointing Plaintiffs AGUSTIN UMANA VILLATORO and BRYAN
12 HERNANDEZ as the Class Representatives;

13 5. Approving the use of the proposed notice procedure and related notice form;

14 6. Approving PHOENIX CLASS ACTION ADMINISTRATION as the third-party
15 administrator;

16 7. Directing that notice be mailed to the Class; and,

17 8. Scheduling a hearing date for motions for final approval of class action settlement
18 and awards of attorneys’ fees and costs.

19 Good cause exists to grant this Motion because: (1) the Class meets all of the requirements for
20 class certification for settlement purposes under Code of Civil Procedure § 382; (2) the Settlement
21 Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the disputed wage and hour claims asserted
22 by Plaintiffs; (3) Plaintiffs and Class Counsel are adequate to represent the Class; (4) the proposed notice
23 procedures and related forms comply with California Rules of Court 3.766(d) and (e), adequately apprise
24 Class Members of their rights, and fully comport with due process; and, (5) based on the foregoing,
25 notice should be directed to the Class Members and a final fairness hearing should be scheduled
26 (Plaintiffs suggest about 145 days after preliminary approval is granted).

27 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 and Rule 3.1113(e) of the California Rules of Court,
28 which require approval by the Court of a class action settlement and permit the Court to extend the page

1 limit for memoranda.

2 **TENTATIVE RULINGS:** The court adopts the tentative ruling procedure set out in California
3 Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1). The tentative ruling or notice to appear will generally be available by
4 4:00 p.m. two court days prior to the scheduled hearing and no later than 3:00 p.m. the court day before
5 the hearing. Unless the court directs otherwise, the court's tentative ruling will be available online or by
6 calling (866) 223-2244. The process for viewing a tentative ruling online are subject to change.

7 Instructions for access to tentative rulings online can be found at
8 <http://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/Pages.aspx/Tentative-Rulings>. Whenever a tentative ruling has not
9 been issued, the parties are to appear at the hearing unless otherwise ordered.

10 To find a tentative ruling online, you can search by department number or by case number. Go to
11 eCourt Public Portal and proceed through the following steps:

- 12 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal
- 13 2. Case Search
- 14 3. Enter the Case Number and select "Search"
- 15 4. Select the Case Name
- 16 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab
- 17 6. Select "View"

18 Oral argument is only permitted if a party notifies all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on
19 the court day before the hearing of the party's intention to appear. To do so, notify the Court and all the
20 other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the
21 issues you wish to argue through the following steps:

- 22 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal
- 23 2. Case Search
- 24 3. Enter the Case Number and select "Search"
- 25 4. Select the Case Name
- 26 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab
- 27 6. Select "Click to Contest this Ruling"
- 28 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting


1 8. Select "Proceed"

2 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points
3 and Authorities, the Declarations of H. Scott Leviant, Plaintiff, and the Settlement Administrator in
4 support thereof, all papers and pleadings on file with the Court in this action, all matters judicially
5 noticeable, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented in connection with the
6 hearing on the Motion.

7 Respectfully submitted,

8 Dated: April 30, 2025

MOON LAW GROUP, PC

9 By: 
10 Kane Moon
11 H. Scott Leviant
12 Sandy Pham

13 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	iii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE MAJOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT	1
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND	5
A. Plaintiffs' Claims	5
B. Pre-Mediation Data Production and Analysis.....	6
C. Settlement.....	7
IV. CLASS DEFINITION	7
V. DISCUSSION.....	8
A. The Court Should Conditionally Certify the Class for Settlement Purposes	8
1. The Members of the Class Are Both Ascertainable and Numerous.	8
2. There Are Common Questions That Predominate Over Any Questions That May Be Unique to Individual Class Members.....	9
3. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical of Those of the Class.	10
4. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class.	10
5. Proceeding as a Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions.....	11
6. The Proposed Class Notice Complies with Rule 3.766(d) and (e)	11
a) The Notice Procedure Satisfies Due Process	11
b) The Notice is Accurate and Informative	11
B. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage Claims.....	12
1. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Review and Approval.	12
2. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arms' Length Negotiations Between Experienced Counsel with the Assistance of a Highly Qualified Mediator After Sufficient Data Was Exchanged to Evaluate Settlement.	13

1	3.	The Settlement Represents a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of	
2		Class Members’ Claims Based on Defendant’s Estimated Liability Exposure	
3		Given the Risks Continued Litigation Would Entail.	14
4	a)	The Class Settlement is Fair, Adequate and Reasonable	14
5	b)	The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable.....	18
6	4.	The Proposed Method for Allocating Settlement Funds Is Fair.	19
7	5.	The Proposed Enhancement Awards to Plaintiffs Warrants Approval.....	20
8	6.	The Proposed Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Is Also Fair, Adequate,	
9		and Reasonable and Merits Preliminary Approval.	20
10	7.	The Proposed Payment to the Administrator Is Fair and Reasonable.....	21
11	VI.	THE COURT SHOULD SCHEDULE A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING	21
12	VII.	CONCLUSION	21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CALIFORNIA DECISIONAL AUTHORITY

<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.</i> , 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135 (2000).....	13
<i>Amaral v. Cintas Corp.</i> , 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157 (2008).....	19
<i>Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC</i> , 69 Cal. App. 5th 521 (2021).....	21
<i>Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.</i> , 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012).....	8, 10, 17
<i>Cartt v. Sup. Ct.</i> , 50 Cal. App. 3d 960 (1975).....	11
<i>Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC</i> , 175 Cal. App. 4th 785 (2009).....	20
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> , 191 Cal. App. 3d 605 (1987).....	8
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996).....	8, 13, 20
<i>Duran v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n</i> , 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014).....	14
<i>Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.</i> , 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524 (2008).....	10
<i>Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court</i> , 113 Cal. App. 4th 836 (2003).....	8
<i>Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.</i> 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286 (2010).....	8, 9
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> , 168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008).....	12
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.</i> , 1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016).....	20, 21
<i>Linderv. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> , 23 Cal. 4th 429 (2000).....	8, 11
<i>Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v. Superior Court</i> , 103 Cal. App. 3d 573 (1980).....	12
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> , 60 Cal. App. 3d 442 (1976).....	10
<i>Miller v. Woods</i> , 148 Cal. App. 3d 862 (1983).....	8
<i>Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.</i> , 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021).....	18, 19
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i> , 186 Cal. App. 4th 399 (2010).....	12
<i>Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.</i> , 7 Cal. 5th 955, 980 (2019).....	8
<i>Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court</i> , 34 Cal. 4th 319 (2004).....	8, 9
<i>Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.</i> , 149 Cal. App. 4th 1496 (2007).....	10
<i>Stambaugh v. Superior Court</i> , 62 Cal. App. 3d 231 (1976).....	12
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.</i> , 91 Cal. App. 4th 224 (2001).....	14

FEDERAL DECISIONAL AUTHORITY

<i>Miller v. CEVA Logistics U.S.A., Inc.</i> , 2015 WL 729638 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015)	18
<i>O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.</i> , 201 F.Supp.3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2016)	18
<i>Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.</i> , 563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2000)	18
<i>Willis v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC</i> , 2013 WL 6053831 (E.D. Cal. 2013)	19

STATUTES

Code of Civil Procedure § 382	8
-------------------------------------	---

RULES

Rules of Court, Rule 3.766	11
Rules of Court, Rule 3.769	8, 11, 12

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Class Certification in California: SECOND INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION - FEBRUARY 2010	17
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I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 3.769, Plaintiffs AGUSTIN UMANA VILLATORO and BRYAN HERNANDEZ (“Plaintiffs”) request that this Court preliminarily approve the class action settlement set forth in the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CLASS NOTICE (“Settlement” or “Agreement”) with Defendant AMERICAN ASPHALT REPAIR AND RESURFACING COMPANY, INC. (“Defendant”).

After the exchange of documents and data, and an arm’s-length mediation session with mediator Jeff Ross, Esq., Plaintiffs and Defendant (collectively referred to herein as the “Parties”) reached a proposed class action settlement with a gross settlement amount (“GSA”) of **\$790,000.00** in compromise of disputed claims asserted on behalf of the below-defined Class consisting of approximately **276** members. Plaintiffs believe this settlement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of disputed claims for alleged wage and hour violations and penalties asserted in this case.

Plaintiffs now submit this Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, along with the Settlement (attached to the Declaration of H. Scott Leviant [“Leviant Decl.”], Exhibit 1 thereto). For the Court’s convenience, below is a summary of the key provisions of the Settlement.

II. THE MAJOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

The provisions of the proposed Settlement include the following:

- Defendant agrees not to oppose certification for purposes of settlement. (Settlement, ¶ 12.1.)
- Class: All persons currently or formerly employed by Defendant as a non-exempt employee in California during the Class Period (the “Class Period” is the period from August 1, 2019, through the date the Court grants preliminary approval). “Participating Class Member” means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Class portion of the Settlement. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.5, 1.9, 1.12, 1.34.)
- Settlement Amount: Defendant will pay a maximum of **\$790,000.00**, referred to as the Gross Settlement Amount (or GSA herein), resulting in an estimated average **gross** benefit per Class Member of about **\$2,862.32**. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.21, 4.1; Leviant Decl., ¶ 17.)
- Escalator Clause: If the number of actual Workweeks at the close of the Class Period is more than ten percent (10%) higher than the estimated Workweeks per Paragraph 4.1 (i.e., exceeds

28,302 Workweeks), Defendant may, at its election, opt to (a) increase the Gross Settlement Amount on a pro-rata basis equal to the percentage increase in the number of workweeks worked by the Class Members above ten percent (10%) (e.g., if the number of Workweeks increases by 11% to 28,559 Workweeks, the Gross Settlement Amount will increase by 1%); or (b) end the Class Period on a date on which the total Workweeks does not exceed 28,302 . This election must be made at the time the Class Data is delivered to the Administrator. (Settlement, ¶ 8.)

- Funding of Gross Settlement Amount: Defendant shall fund the Gross Settlement Amount, and also fund the amounts necessary to fully pay Defendant's share of payroll taxes by transmitting the funds to the Administrator no later than 14 calendar days after the Effective Date. (Settlement, ¶ 4.3.)
- Class Size: An estimated **276** individuals worked about **25,729** workweeks through September 25, 2024. (Settlement, ¶ 4.1.)
- PAGA Group Size: An estimated **192** aggrieved employees who worked about **11,105** pay periods through September 25, 2024. (Settlement, ¶ 8.)
- PAGA Period: August 1, 2022, through the date of which the Court grants preliminary approval of this Settlement. (Settlement, ¶ 1.30.)
- Kullar/Munoz Analysis: Plaintiffs address the claims analysis herein, at Part V.B.3, and in the Declaration of Leviant, at Paragraph 18.
- No Reversion: The Settlement is a **non-reversionary** settlement. (Settlement, ¶ 3.1.)
- Certification: Plaintiffs address certification requisites herein, at Part V.A., and in the Declaration of Leviant, at Paragraphs 34-40;
- No Claim Form: No claim form is required. (Settlement., ¶ 3.1.)
- Class Release: All Participating Class Members release all claims that were alleged or reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts and legal theories contained in the Operative Complaint in the Action. (Settlement, ¶ 5.2.)
- PAGA Release: Plaintiff Villatoro, on behalf of the State of California, releases the Released Parties from all claims for civil penalties under PAGA, based on the facts and Labor Code

sections that were alleged or reasonably could have been alleged in Plaintiff's PAGA Notice of violations and the Operative Complaint. (Settlement, ¶ 5.3.)

- Net Settlement Amount: The Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved Employees, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service Payments, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments. (Settlement, ¶ 1.27.) The Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be at least **\$399,166.67**, resulting in an average **net** payment per Class Member of at least **\$1,446.26**, before any tax withholdings. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 17.)
- Tax Allocation: Twenty percent of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims and reported on an IRS W-2 Form. Eighty percent of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for interest and penalties and reported on IRS 1099 Forms. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.1.) The PAGA Settlement payments to Aggrieved Employees will be allocated as 100% penalties. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.5.2.)
- Employer's Portion of Payroll Taxes Paid Separately: Defendant's portion of payroll taxes (e.g., FICA, FUTA, etc.) owed on any settlement payments to Class Members that constitute wages will be paid separate and apart from the GSA. (Settlement, ¶ 3.1.)
- Settlement Administrator: The notice portion of the Settlement will be administered by a third-party Administrator, Phoenix Settlement Administrators ("Phoenix"), with the costs of administration not to exceed \$10,000.00, except for a showing of good cause as approved by the Court. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.3.) Phoenix's estimate for settlement administration services, in the amount of **\$8,250.00**, was selected as the most reasonable bid for all required services, with all due regard for the administrator's reputation and known quality of work from a competitive bidding process. (Declaration of Jodey Lawrence, ["Lawrence Decl."], ¶ 17.)
- Class Data for Administration: The Settlement Administrator will receive the Class Data not later than fourteen (14) calendar days after the Court grants Preliminary Approval, use the

1 National Change of Address (“NCOA”) database to update the Class Data, and then use skip
2 tracing on returned Notices. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.10; 4.2; 7.4.)

- 3 • Notice: The Notice will issue within fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of the Class Data.
4 (Settlement, ¶ 7.5.2.) The Notice describes how to dispute workweeks, submit an objection
5 in writing, in person, or through an attorney, or request exclusion. (Settlement, ¶¶ 7.5 – 7.8.)
- 6 • Notice Language: Notice will issue in English *and* Spanish. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.11.)
- 7 • Objections: Objections can be timely submitted to the Administrator by fax, email, or mail.
8 Alternatively, Participating Class Members may appear in Court (or hire an attorney to
9 appear in Court) to present objections at the Final Approval Hearing. (Settlement, ¶ 7.7.2.)
- 10 • Exclusion Requests: Signed, written requests for exclusion can be timely submitted to the
11 Administrator by fax, email, or mail. (Settlement, ¶ 7.5.1.)
- 12 • PAGA Allocation: From the GSA, **\$80,000.00** will be allocated to settle claims brought
13 pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 *et seq.*
14 (“PAGA”), allocated as seventy-five percent (75%), or at least **\$60,000.00**, to the California
15 Labor & Workforce Development Agency, and twenty-five percent (25%), or at least
16 **\$20,000.00** to Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.33; 3.2.5.)
- 17 • Notice to LWDA: Notice was provided prior to the filing of this Motion. Evidence is
18 attached to the Leviant Declaration as Exhibit 2.
- 19 • Enhancement/Service Award to Plaintiffs: Defendant will not oppose application for a Class
20 Representative Service Payments of up to **\$7,500.00** each, paid from the GSA. (Settlement, ¶
21 3.2.1.)
- 22 • Fees and Costs: Defendant will not oppose Class Counsel’s application for fees of not more
23 than one-third of the GSA, which is currently estimated to be **\$263,333.33** subject to the
24 escalator clause, and actual costs in an amount not to exceed **\$22,500.00**, to be paid out of the
25 GSA. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.2.)
- 26 • Check Void Period: Settlement checks will be valid for 180 days. (Settlement, ¶ 4.2.1.)
- 27 • Uncashed Checks: For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or
28 Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the

1 Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California
2 Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no
3 "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure § 384(b).
4 (Settlement, ¶ 4.4.3.)

- 5 • Judgment Notice: Judgment will be posted on the Settlement Administrator's website after
6 entry. (Settlement, ¶ 7.8.1.)
- 7 • Confidentiality Provisions: The Settlement permits Class Counsel to discuss the Settlement
8 with Class Members. (Settlement ¶ 12.2.)

9 (Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 11-12 and Exhibit 1 thereto.)

10 **III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

11 **A. Plaintiffs' Claims**

12 Defendant operates within the pavement maintenance industry, specializing in all
13 aspects of asphalt and concrete pavement solutions, sealcoating, slurry surfacing and striping. (Leviant
14 Decl., ¶ 4.) On December 27, 2022, this action was commenced with the filing of a Complaint alleging
15 causes of action against Defendant for failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime
16 compensation, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and provide rest breaks, failure to
17 timely pay final wages at termination, failure to indemnify for necessary business expenses, failure to
18 provide accurate itemized wage statements, and unfair business practices. (*Id.*)

19 Initial plaintiff Becerra sent a letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency
20 ("LWDA"), pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, providing notice of his intent to seek civil
21 penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.* (*Id.*, at ¶ 5.)
22 The LWDA did not indicate that it intended to investigate the alleged violations referenced in the letter,
23 and the 65-day time period permitted for the LWDA to provide such a notification expired. (*Id.*) On
24 August 1, 2023, plaintiff Becerra filed a First Amended Complaint (1) clarifying plaintiff Becerra's
25 claims; (2) adding Plaintiff Umana Villatoro and Plaintiff Hernandez as additional plaintiffs and class
26 representatives; and (3) alleging Plaintiff Umana Villatoro's causes of action against Defendant for civil
27 penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"). (*Id.*) On March 11, 2025, Plaintiff
28 Becerra, Plaintiff Umana Villatoro, and Plaintiff Hernandez filed a Second Amended Complaint (1)

1 dismissing plaintiff Becerra's claims and (2) alleging Defendant failed to include all non-discretionary
2 compensation within the regular rate of pay. (*Id.*) The Second Amended Complaint is the operative
3 complaint in the Action (the "Operative Complaint."). (*Id.*)

4 **B. Pre-Mediation Data Production and Analysis**

5 The Parties conducted informal discovery and investigation of the facts and law. (*Id.*, at ¶ 6.)
6 Such investigation included, *inter alia*, the exchange of extensive data and discoverable information in
7 preparation for the mediation session. (*Id.*) The Parties have analyzed time clock, pay and other data
8 pertaining to Plaintiffs and the Class during the settlement period, including but not limited to the
9 numbers of former and current members of the Class, average workweeks and pay periods, and the
10 average rate of hourly pay. (*Id.*) The time and pay data, drawn from over 86% of the Class, was used for
11 Plaintiff's pre-mediation analysis, a highly accurate sample. (*Id.*) The margin of error calculation for the
12 sample of the Class in this case is as follows:

13
$$1.96 \sqrt{\frac{0.5(1-0.5)}{276}} \sqrt{\frac{276-238}{276-1}} = \text{margin of error}^1 = 0.0236 = 2.36\%$$

14
15 (*Id.*) With a random sample of data for 238 employees, the margin of error, using the population
16 adjustment factor, was no more than 2.36 percent.² In addition, Defendant also provided other data
17 pertaining to Plaintiffs and the Class during the relevant Class Period, including but not limited
18 documents reflecting wage and hour policies and practices during the Class Period. (*Id.*)

19 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices and
20

21 ¹ The term "1.96" is derived from a standard deviation table for a 95% confidence interval, known as
22 a "z-table." It is not affected by sample or population size. The margin of error is an "overestimate" of
23 the margin of error because the variance is presumed to be at its highest value, using 0.5(1-0.5) to
represent p*q in the variance equation of (p*q)/n.

24 ² The margin of error formula does not require an adjustment factor for extremely large populations.
25 (*Id.*) A poll of all potential voters in the United States, for example, does not require an adjustment for the
26 population size, since the second radicand in the equation (the fraction in the second radical sign) is
27 effectively equal to 1. (*Id.*) This is because the square root of a fraction that is very close to 1 is even
28 closer to 1. Consider a population of 200 million and a sample of 1,000 individuals from that population.
The second radicand is the fraction of 200 million minus 1,000, all divided by 200 million minus 1. (*Id.*)
That is equal to 0.999995. (*Id.*) The square root is 0.99999975, which is indistinguishable from 1 when
talking about a margin of error percentage even to the nearest tenth of a percent. (*Id.*) But when the
population size is much smaller, the population size has a major impact on the margin of error for a given
sample size. (*Id.*)

1 other information obtained during the exchange of discovery, Class Counsel were able to evaluate the
2 probability of class certification, success on the merits, and the reasonably obtainable maximum
3 monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a
4 damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding
5 the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)

6 C. Settlement

7 On September 25, 2024, the Parties participated in a full day mediation presided over by Jeff
8 Ross, Esq., which led to this Agreement to settle the Action. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The Parties discussed at length
9 the burdens and risks of continuing with the litigation. (*Id.*) At the mediation, the Parties agreed to settle
10 the Action and thereafter prepared and signed a settlement agreement (the “Agreement”). (*Id.*)

11 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel are aware of the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability for
12 the claims asserted in the Action, both generally and in response to Defendant’s defenses thereto. (*Id.* at
13 ¶ 9). Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have also taken into account Defendant’s agreement to enter into a
14 Settlement that confers substantial relief upon the Class. (*Id.*)

15 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement set
16 forth in this Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable Settlement and is in the best interests of the
17 Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 10). Solely for the purpose of settling this case, the Parties agree that the requirements for
18 establishing class action certification with respect to this class have been met and are met. (*Id.*) If this
19 Settlement is not approved by the Court for any reason, Defendant reserves its right to contest class
20 certification. (*Id.*) This Settlement, if approved, will result in the termination of the litigation through the
21 entry of the Judgment and the release of all Released Claims for all Class Members who have not elected
22 to exclude themselves from the Class. (*Id.*)

23 IV. CLASS DEFINITION

24 The Class is defined as follows:

25 All persons currently or formerly employed by Defendant as a non-exempt employee in
26 California during the Class Period (the “Class Period” is the period from August 1,
27 2019, through the date the Court grants preliminary approval). “Participating Class
28 Member” means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for
Exclusion from the Class portion of the Settlement. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.5, 1.9, 1.12, 1.34)

(Leviant Decl., ¶ 11 and Exhibit 1.)

1 **V. DISCUSSION**

2 **A. The Court Should Conditionally Certify the Class for Settlement Purposes**

3 The Class should be provisionally certified for settlement because: (1) the Class is ascertainable
4 and numerous; (2) there exists a well-defined community of interest; and (3) a class action is the superior
5 method of adjudication for this settlement. Code of Civ. Proc. § 382; *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.*,
6 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021 (2012); *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435 (2000); *Sav-on Drug*
7 *Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 332 (2004). For purposes of this Settlement *only*,
8 Defendant stipulates to conditional certification. (Settlement, ¶ 12.1.)

9 “The certification question is ‘essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is
10 legally or factually meritorious.’” *Id.*, at 326, quoting *Linder*. Indeed, the certification question simply
11 asks whether the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class
12 treatment. *See, e.g., Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 1298 (2010). “[I]t is also well
13 established that trial courts should use different standards to determine the propriety of a settlement class,
14 as opposed to a litigation class certification. Specifically, a lesser standard of scrutiny is used for
15 settlement cases.” *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal. App. 4th 836, 859
16 (2003), citing *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1807 n. 19 (1996).

17 In view of these standards, the Class should be certified for purposes of settlement. Code Civ.
18 Proc. § 382; Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c).

19 **1. The Members of the Class Are Both Ascertainable and Numerous.**

20 Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size of
21 the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. *See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal. App. 3d
22 862, 873 (1983). A class is ascertainable when “it is defined ‘in terms of objective characteristics and
23 common transactional facts’ that make ‘the ultimate identification of class members possible when that
24 identification becomes necessary.’” *Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal. 5th 955, 980 (2019). The class
25 definition is sufficiently specific to enable the Parties, Class Members, and the Court to determine the
26 parameters of the class. *See Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.*, 191 Cal. App. 3d 605, 617 (1987). Here,
27 there were about 276 Class Members, all of whom may be identified by reference to Defendant’s
28 records. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 35.) The Class is not only ascertainable, but also numerous.

1 **2. There Are Common Questions That Predominate Over Any Questions That**
2 **May Be Unique to Individual Class Members.**

3 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of law
4 and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
5 representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1806; *Richmond*, 29
6 Cal. 3d at 473-75. A question of law or fact is common to the members of a class if it may be resolved
7 through common proof. *See, Jaimez*, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1305. As for predominance, it “is a
8 comparative concept, and ‘the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility and
9 damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.’” *Sav-on*, 34 Cal. 4th at 334.

10 In this case, common questions include, but are not limited to: (i) whether or not Defendant paid
11 proper wages to the Class; (ii) whether or not Defendant provided meal periods to the Class; (iii) whether
12 or not Defendant provided rest periods to the Class; (iv) whether or not Defendant paid compensation
13 timely upon separation of employment to former Class Members; (v) whether or not Defendant paid
14 compensation timely throughout Class Members’ employment; (vi) whether or not Defendant provided
15 accurate itemized wage statements to the Class; and, (vii) whether or not Defendant engaged in unlawful
16 or unfair business practices affecting the Class in violation of the California Business and Professions
17 Code §§ 17200-17208. (Levant Decl., ¶ 37.) In addition, common defenses, including an exemption
18 defense, apply to most of the Class.

19 In the Action, Plaintiffs’ claims present sufficient common issues of law and fact that
20 predominate over individual issues and warrant class certification. From their review of the
21 documentation provided, Class Counsel determined that for purposes of these claims, Defendant’s
22 policies and practices are either identical, or sufficiently similar, to raise the same questions of liability,
23 and applied to all Class Members. Because Class Members would have to prove the same issues of law
24 and fact to prevail, and because their potential legal remedies are identical, it would be preferable to
25 resolve all Class Members’ claims by means of the Settlement than to require each Class Member to
26 litigate his or her individual claims. Therefore, common questions predominate over questions that may
27 be unique to individual Class Members, and class-wide settlement is superior to any other resolution.
28

1 **3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of Those of the Class.**

2 Typicality “requires a showing that the class representative has claims or defenses typical of the
3 class.” *See, e.g., Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1534 (2008), approved
4 by *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012). California law does not require that
5 plaintiffs have claims identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class
6 representative is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on
7 conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured
8 by the same course of conduct. *Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal. App. 4th 1496, 1502 (2007).

9 In light of these standards, Plaintiffs are typical of class members. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 36.) Like
10 other Class Members, Defendant employed Plaintiffs as hourly employees during the Class Period. (*Id.*)
11 Plaintiffs allege that they and other Class Members share the same claims stemming from Defendant’s
12 alleged violations of the Labor Code and relevant wage order. (Declaration of Augustin Umana
13 Villatoro, [“Villatoro Decl.”], ¶¶ 9-11; Declaration of Bryan Hernandez, [“Hernandez Decl.”], ¶¶ 9-11).
14 In addition, Defendant’s main defense, that the wage and hour policies and practices fully comply with
15 California law, apply equally to the claims of all Class Members. Thus, Plaintiffs are typical of the
16 Class.

17 **4. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class.**

18 Adequacy is shown where the plaintiff is represented by counsel qualified to conduct the
19 litigation and the plaintiff’s interest in the litigation is not antagonistic to class members. *McGhee v.*
20 *Bank of America*, 60 Cal. App. 3d 442, 451 (1976). In other words, where the plaintiff has adequate
21 counsel, the plaintiff may represent the entire class absent any disabling conflicts of interest that might
22 hinder the plaintiff’s ability to represent the class. *Id.* In the Action, Plaintiffs have no conflicts of
23 interest with other Class Members and have agreed to place Class interests above his own. (Villatoro
24 Decl., ¶¶ 5-21; Hernandez Decl., ¶¶ 5-21; Leviant Decl., ¶ 39.) Moreover, Plaintiffs’ counsel is
25 experienced in wage and hour class litigation and has no conflicts of interest with absent Class Members.
26 (Leviant Decl., ¶ 39). Thus, this Court should appoint Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives and appoint
27 Plaintiffs’ Counsel as Class Counsel.
28

1 **5. Proceeding as a Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions**

2 Plaintiffs contend that proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute,
3 as the Class Members and the Court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would serve as
4 the only means to deter and redress the alleged Labor Code violations. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* 23
5 Cal. 4th at 434. Furthermore, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would unduly
6 burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results, which may be avoided by class certification.

7 **6. The Proposed Class Notice Complies with Rule 3.766(d) and (e)**

8 Notice requirements are set forth in Rules of Court, Rule 3.766. In determining the manner of
9 notice, the court must consider interests of the class, relief requested, stakes of individual class members,
10 costs of notifying class members, resources of the parties, possible prejudice to class members who do
11 not receive notice, and the *res judicata* effect on class members. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766(e).

12 *a) The Notice Procedure Satisfies Due Process*

13 The proposed procedure for distributing the Proposed Notice is robust and meets the requirement
14 that it have “a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members.” *Cartt v.*
15 *Sup. Ct.*, 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974 (1975). There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class
16 members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the Class Members will receive direct notice. Here, the
17 proposed procedure includes safeguards, including, but not limited to, mailing notice to Class Members’
18 last known addresses; skip tracing; searches for address changes; and the re-mailing of returned notices
19 to any forwarding addresses. (Lawrence Decl., ¶ 8). This manner of giving notice complies with Rule of
20 Court 3.766(c) because it provides a reasonable chance that Notice will reach most or all Class Members.

21 *b) The Notice is Accurate and Informative*

22 The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement should be approved for dissemination to the
23 Class Members because its content complies with Rule of Court 3.766(d) in that it contains a brief
24 explanation of the case, including the basic contentions or denials of the Parties, detailed information
25 about Class Members’ rights to be excluded from the Settlement and object to the Settlement; a
26 statement that the Settlement will bind all members who do not timely opt-out. Thus, the Notice also
27 satisfies Rule of Court 3.769(f) regarding the contents of settlement notices.

28 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. 3 NEWBERG § 8.39. It

1 summarizes the proceedings and the terms and conditions of the proposed Settlement, in an informative
2 and coherent manner, in compliance with the Manual for Complex Litigation (“MANUAL”), (2d Ed.
3 1993), which states that “the notice should be accurate, objective, and understandable to Class Members .
4 ..” MANUAL, § 30.211. It makes clear that the Settlement does not constitute an admission of liability
5 by Defendant and recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits. It also states that the final
6 settlement approval decision has yet to be made. Accordingly, the Notice complies with the standards of
7 fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

8 **B. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair,**
9 **Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage Claims**

10 California courts favor settlement. *See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Superior Court*, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231,
11 236 (1976). Unlike most settlements, class action settlements involve a court approval process that exists
12 to prevent fraud, collusion, and unfairness to class members. *Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v.*
13 *Superior Court*, 103 Cal.App.3d 573, 578-579 (1980). For the reasons discussed below, this Court
14 should preliminarily approve the Settlement, allow the Parties to give notice to the Class as proposed,
15 and schedule a Final Approval Hearing.

16 **1. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Review and Approval.**

17 Any settlement of class litigation must be reviewed and approved by the presiding court. Rules
18 of Court, Rule 3.769(a). Approval occurs in two steps: (1) an early (preliminary) review and (2) a
19 subsequent (final) review after notice has been distributed to the class members. The Preliminary
20 Approval Hearing and Final Approval Hearing coincide with these two steps. The present motion seeks
21 *preliminary approval* and the setting of a Final Approval Hearing.

22 To evaluate a settlement, the trial court must receive “*basic*” information about the nature and
23 magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the
24 release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.
25 App. 4th 116, 133 (2008). However, the record need *not* contain an explicit statement of the maximum
26 theoretical amount that the class could recover. *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*,
27 186 Cal. App. 4th 399, 409 (2010).

1 **2. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arms’ Length Negotiations**
2 **Between Experienced Counsel with the Assistance of a Highly Qualified**
3 **Mediator After Sufficient Data Was Exchanged to Evaluate Settlement.**

4 A settlement is presumptively fair where it is reached through arms’ length bargaining, based on
5 sufficient discovery and investigation to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, counsel is
6 experienced in similar litigation, and the percentage of objectors is small.³ *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at
7 1802; *In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006); *7-Eleven Owners for Fair*
8 *Franchising v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1146 (2000). In exercising the power to approve
9 a settlement, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and
10 reasonable,” *Dunk*, at 1801, considering “the complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk
11 of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery
12 completed and the state of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
13 governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. *Id.* These
14 factors require balancing, are non-exhaustive, and, as such, trial courts should tailor the factors
15 considered to each case and give due regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
16 between the parties.” *Id.*

17 Here, the Settlement resulted from thorough, arms’ length negotiations between experienced
18 counsel with the assistance of a skilled mediator, Jeff Ross. (Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) Plaintiffs obtained
19 data from Defendant and then carefully reviewed that data. (*Id.* at ¶ 6-7). Counsel for Plaintiffs also
20 examined policies, financial records, and interviewed witnesses in detail about their work experiences
21 and Defendant’s practices. (*Id.*)

22 Based on the review of data, Plaintiffs estimated potential exposure and then estimated risk
23 factors to adjust the reasonable expected outcome. The investigation that Plaintiffs’ counsel conducted
24 was sufficient to provide them with enough information to intelligently evaluate the estimated exposure
25 for purposes of negotiating the Settlement in view of the risks discussed below and was sufficient to
26

27 ³ Because the fourth prerequisite for the presumption to arise cannot be addressed until the final
28 approval hearing, only the first three prerequisites are relevant at this preliminary stage of the settlement
 approval process.

allow this Court to do the same. *See, e.g., Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001). A thorough data analysis was conducted.

3. The Settlement Represents a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Class Members' Claims Based on Defendant's Estimated Liability Exposure Given the Risks Continued Litigation Would Entail.

a) The Class Settlement is Fair, Adequate and Reasonable

A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial and does not have to provide 100% of damages sought to be fair and reasonable. "In the context of a settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances." *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 250. Accordingly, because settlements involve compromise, even one that provides for substantially narrower relief than would likely be obtained if the suit were successfully litigated can be reasonable given that "the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation." *Id.*

With respect to the claims asserted on behalf of the Class, there are serious risks that support this compromise amount. These risks include, but are not limited to: (i) the risk that Plaintiffs would be unable to establish liability for unpaid wages, *see Duran v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n*, 59 Cal. 4th 1, 39 & n. 33 (2014) ("*Duran*"); (ii) the risk that Defendant's meal and rest period policies might not support class certification or a class-wide liability finding; (iii) the risk that uncertainties about the legality of Defendant's policies and practices could preclude class-wide awards of statutory penalties; (iv) the risk that individual differences between Class Members could be construed as pertaining to liability and not just damages; (v) the risk that any penalty award under PAGA could be reduced by the Court in its discretion; (vi) the risk that lengthy trial or appellate litigation could ensue; and (vi) the risk that violation rates could prove lower than expected. (Levant Decl., ¶ 16.) These risks are non-exhaustive. (*Id.*)

In light of the uncertainties of protracted litigation, the settlement amount reflects a fair and reasonable recovery for the Class Members. (Levant Decl., ¶ 17.) The settlement amount is, of course, a compromise figure. (*Id.*) By necessity it took into account risks related to liability, damages, and the defenses asserted by Defendant. (*Id.*) Moreover, each Class Member will be given the opportunity to

1 opt-out of the Settlement, allowing those who feel they have claims that are greater than the benefits they
2 can receive under this Settlement to pursue their own claims. (*Id.*) For the approximately **276** members
3 of the Class, the average **gross** benefit is **\$2,862.32** per class member, and the estimated average **net**
4 recovery for each Class Member would be approximately **\$1,446.26**. (*Id.*) Given that Defendant could
5 potentially defeat certification, this is a significant sum to have achieved in settlement. (*Id.*) Moreover, a
6 Class Member who worked a greater number of weeks for Defendant will receive a larger share of the
7 Settlement than a Class Member who worked for a shorter amount of time during the class period. (*Id.*)

8 After analyzing the claims in this matter, Class Counsel has concluded that the value of this
9 Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (Levant Decl., ¶ 18.) The Gross Settlement Amount of
10 **\$790,000.00** is about 93% of the **\$849,289.29** estimate of *risk-adjusted* recovery (excluding interest) at
11 this stage in the litigation. (*Id.*) This assessment is based on a carefully constructed model of the current
12 fair value of the case, using estimated risks, average wage rates, numbers of employees, and the amount
13 of time covered by the class period, resulting in the following exposure projections:

- 14 • A reasonably estimated exposure for unpaid off-the-clock wages was calculated, with the
15 assistance of an expert, to be approximately **\$266,394.00**, based on an estimate of five (5)
16 minutes of off-the-clock work for half of all shifts for every Class Member. However,
17 with the high-risk factor discounts for certification and liability proof, the value of that
18 claim is estimated by Plaintiff's counsel to be approximately **\$43,623.04**, assuming
19 certification probability of 40% and merits success at 40%. The off-the-clock time
20 resulted from allegations of off-the-clock loading of equipment and occasional time clock
21 delays. Here, a \$43,623.04 exposure has a value of about 16% of its maximum, given a
22 likelihood of success on both certification and the merits, which is an approximation of
23 the chain probability of certification multiplied by merits chances: $0.4 \times 0.4 = 0.16$. This
24 theory of recovery has a high degree of risk because it depends on Class Member
25 estimates of the frequency and duration and is testimony dependent.
- 26 • A reasonably estimated exposure for unpaid off-the-clock wages due to regular rate
27 errors was calculated, with the assistance of an expert, to be approximately **\$201,932.00**.
28 However, with the risk factor discounts for certification and liability proof, the value of
that claim is estimated by Plaintiff's counsel to be approximately **\$60,579.60**, assuming
certification probability of 75% and merits success at 40%. The unpaid overtime
depends upon the classification of additional compensation as non-discretionary. This
theory of recovery has a moderate degree of risk because it depends on the classification
of the "ebon" payment as non-discretionary compensation, which is highly disputed.
- A reasonably calculated exposure for meal break violations over the class period was
calculated at **\$460,259.50**, with chances of certification and liability risks (50% and 40%,
respectively), resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$92,051.90**. This exposure is based
upon facial violations. Employee choice is a serious issue in the context of a meal period
claim. So long as an employee has the opportunity to take a lawful meal period, an
employee can choose to take it late, cut it short, or skip it.

- A reasonably estimated exposure for rest break violations over the class period was calculated at **\$931,527.40**, but with chances of certification and proof of liability (20% and 20%, respectively), resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$37,261.10**. This claim is based entirely on class member testimonials that rest breaks were sometimes missed due to work demands. Plaintiffs estimated the exposure assuming 100% of the Class missed one rest break per pay period, while understanding that this theory carries the potential for high risk given that employees were often allowed to determine when to take rest breaks and worked in small teams at job sites.
- A reasonably calculated exposure for unreimbursed expenses was estimated to be **\$160,912.50**, but with chances of certification and proof of liability (60% and 50%, respectively), resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$48,273.75**. The allegation is that employees used cell phones to document completed work (which would not have impacted all employees if true) and employees felt obligated to purchase steel-toed boots for safety reasons.
- The risk-adjusted penalty recovery for wage statement penalties were estimated to be approximately **\$86,400.00**, on a maximum exposure of **\$384,000.00** (with certification and merits success chances of 75% and 30%, respectively, based on all theories of unpaid wages, adjusted for the additional risk of needing to prove other elements in addition to the underlying wage claim). The value of this claim was just dealt a severe blow by the recent California Supreme Court decision of *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.* (May 6, 2024), which significantly strengthened the good faith defense to Section 226 penalties.
- The risk-adjusted penalty recovery for Labor Code § 203 penalties was estimated to be approximately **\$149,139.90**, on a maximum exposure of **\$662,844.00** (with certification and merits success chances of 75% and 30%, respectively, based on all theories of unpaid wages, adjusted for the additional risk of needing to prove other elements in addition to the underlying wage claim). The need to show a knowing and intentional violation constitutes an additional risk factor.
- Performing risk-adjusted valuations for all claims yields a total value in the range of **\$516,329.29**, excluding PAGA.⁴
- For the PAGA Period, the number of PAGA Pay Periods at issue is estimated to be **11,105** for the approximately **192** Aggrieved Employees. Using the most straightforward formulation of applying the “catch-all” \$100 penalty specified in Labor Code § 2699(f)(2) to each PAGA Pay Period, the total penalty exposure is approximately **\$1,110,500.00**. In addition, with assistance from Plaintiff’s data consultant, and after a thorough review of evidence casting serious doubt on the viability of many of the theories of penalty recover, counsel separately estimated the plausible potential PAGA exposure to be, on a penalty-by-penalty basis, to be approximately Plausible PAGA penalties exposure was calculated to be **\$3,329,600.00**. But, assuming issues with proof and cooperation of aggrieved employees, along with the Court’s power to reduce penalties, the realistic exposure was calculated to be **\$332,960.00**.

⁴ It is difficult to assign specific percentages to future events, but it does provide a method for attempting to reduce the concept of “very high risk” or “high risk” to a quantifiable amount. Certification of a claim is typically a binary event. One does not obtain a 20% certification; a claim is either certified or it is not. But the current expected value is best quantified by applying a risk reduction, based on the total experience of counsel. The numbers explain with math what can also be described conceptually in words.

1 (See, Leviant Decl., ¶ 18.)

2 This result here is fully supportable as reasonable. (*Id.* at ¶ 19). First, it is important to recognize
3 the wilfulness finding required for Labor Code §§ 203 and 226 is challenging to establish. (*Id.*) Second,
4 rest break and meal period claims have been challenging to certify for many years, even after *Brinker*.
5 (*Id.*) Arbitration agreements present a very high risk to all class claims. (*Id.*) The Judicial Council's
6 Class Certification in California: SECOND INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF
7 CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION - FEBRUARY 2010 ("Second Interim Report"), at
8 page 5, states that "less than a quarter of disposed cases in the study sample were certified, either through
9 a litigated motion for certification or as part of a classwide settlement agreement." See, Second Interim
10 Report, at 5 (emphasis added).⁵ (*Id.*) That "*or*" is significant. (*Id.*) The certification rates identified in
11 the study of less than 25% includes *both* contested certifications and settlement certifications, which are
12 the majority of certifications. (*Id.*) In other words, one must assume in any wage and hour class action
13 prior to certification that a contested certification motion will have a success rate of well under 25%, and
14 probably closer to 10% as a starting point for risk evaluation. (*Id.*) The facts of each case have
15 significant bearing on these percentages. (*Id.*) But it cannot be disputed that certification is an
16 exceptionally difficult procedural hurdle to successfully overcome. (*Id.*) Thus, it is not unreasonable to
17 start from the proposition that a pre-certification settlement that is 10% to 15% of the maximum
18 plausible exposure is a valid starting point for valuation. (*Id.*) If roughly 10% of class actions are
19 certified on a contested basis, then, on average, 90% of the time a class will not be certified and the result
20 for the class is *zero* dollars. (*Id.*)

21 Here, the estimated certification probabilities are *above* the average rate at which cases were
22 certified in California over the study years, based upon data available through the California Courts
23 websites. (*Id.*) Since well *under* 20% of all cases filed as proposed class actions are ultimately certified
24 by way of a *contested* motion, the recovery falls within the expected outcome under the likelihood of
25 success metric. (*Id.*) It would also be appropriate to evaluate the result by examining only the premium
26

27 ⁵ The report is available at <https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/classaction-certification.pdf> (last
28 viewed March 12, 2024).

wages at issue (approximately \$1,860,112.90, *with no risk reduction*), excluding penalties and interest.⁶ (*Id.*) This Settlement achieves the goals of the litigation.

b) The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable

The ultimate decision as to the amount of penalties is always up to the discretion of the Court. Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) states: “In any action by an aggrieved employee seeking recovery of a civil penalty available under subdivision (a) or (f), a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”

Prior to the issuance of *Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.*, 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021), the only sources of persuasive guidance as to how to assess the reasonableness of a PAGA allocation were found in federal court decisions. In their view, a PAGA allocation, even if a small portion of the total settlement, could be reasonable if the settlement of the wage and hour claims is robust and serves the deterrent purpose of PAGA. *O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“By providing fair compensation to the class members as employees and substantial monetary relief, a settlement not only vindicates the rights of class members as employees, but may have a deterrent effect upon the defendant employer and other employers, an objective of PAGA.”). *Moniz* provided explicit confirmation that this was an appropriate yardstick by which to measure reasonableness of a PAGA settlement. *Moniz*, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 77. *Moniz*, in agreeing with federal courts that have considered how to evaluate a PAGA settlement, concluded that the class action factors are appropriately considered, along with a consideration of whether the settlement furthers “PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws.”

As to the first set of elements (the class-type analysis), it is embodied in Plaintiffs’ discussion of

⁶ The exclusion of interest and penalties from the fairness evaluation is proper because, first, PAGA penalties are discretionary (*see* Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2) (the court in its discretion “may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part...”), and, second, courts evaluate the strength of a proposed settlement without taking potential penalties or interest into consideration. *See Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2000); *see also Miller v. CEVA Logistics U.S.A., Inc.*, 2015 WL 729638, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015) (court utilized calculation of a defendant’s exposure exclusive of interest and penalties to determine whether the settlement fell within the range of possible approval).

1 the adequacy of the settlement generally. Here, the expense, complexity and likely duration of future
2 litigation was to some extent an unknown. However, what is certain is that to adequately establish the
3 violations that would support a substantial penalty, tremendous time and expense would be invested.

4 The second element (the PAGA purposes element) is also satisfied here. As held by *Moniz*,
5 PAGA's purposes include (1) remediation of present labor law violations, (2) deterrence of future
6 violations, and (3) maximization of enforcement of state labor laws. Here, the allocation of a major
7 portion of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of labor law violation remediation.
8 The allocation of a major portion of settlement funds to class members also deters future violations. This
9 is a \$790,000.00 settlement, which is a good result. Deterrence is fulfilled. Finally, allocation of a major
10 portion of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of enforcement of state labor law.
11 This settlement is, by definition, a response to alleged violations of labor laws, balanced against risks.

12 In addition, there is no evidence that a court or a commissioner had informed Defendant that its
13 conduct violated the Labor Code. *Amaral v. Cintas Corp.*, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1209 (2008); *Willis*
14 *v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC*, 2013 WL 6053831, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. 2013). And in *Cotter*, the court found a
15 significant reduction of the PAGA claim would be appropriate because "[t]his does not appear to be a
16 case where a company has deliberately sought to evade the law." *Cotter*, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 941.

17 Finally, the PAGA allocation is fair. Out of the \$80,000.00, the LWDA is receiving \$60,000.00
18 allocated as PAGA penalties. The Class is receiving, net, an estimated \$399,167.67 for the releases of *all*
19 other claims. While the proportion is tipped in favor of employees, the allocation satisfies California's
20 wage and hour policies.

21 **4. The Proposed Method for Allocating Settlement Funds Is Fair.**

22 The proposed method of allocating the Settlement Fund to Class Members also is fair and
23 reasonable. The Settlement Fund is to be allocated between all Class Members, based on time worked
24 by the Class Member during the Class Period, in relation to the total amount of time worked by all
25 participating Class Members. This proposed method is fair and reasonable because each Class
26 Member's actual potential damages vary based on the number of workweeks he or she worked (e.g., Lab.
27 Code § 226.7 provides for an extra hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of pay for each violation,
28 resulting in a higher potential damage when a higher number of incidents occur). A Class Member who

1 worked a greater number of work weeks will receive a larger payment under the Settlement than a Class
2 Member who worked for a shorter amount of time. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 17.)

3 **5. The Proposed Enhancement Awards to Plaintiffs Warrants Approval.**

4 The proposed enhancement of \$7,500.00 to each Plaintiff is intended to recognize substantial
5 initiative and significant efforts on behalf of the Class. Courts routinely approve incentive awards to
6 compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class action
7 litigation, often in much higher amounts than that sought here. Factors considered when awarding an
8 incentive include the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the class, the degree to which the class has
9 benefitted, the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in the litigation, the risk to the class
10 representative in commencing suit (financial and otherwise), the notoriety and personal difficulties
11 encountered, the duration of the litigation, and the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the
12 plaintiff as a result of the litigation. *Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 804
13 (2009). Here, Plaintiffs contributed time to the prosecution of this matter, including providing
14 information to counsel; assisted with the settlement process (with included conferring with counsel
15 during the preparation of Plaintiffs' mediation brief); and, regularly conferred with counsel regarding the
16 case whenever questions arose. (Villatoro Decl., ¶¶ 5-20; Hernandez Decl., ¶¶ 5-20; Leviant Decl., ¶
17 32.) The enhancement also recognizes risks Plaintiffs took to be personally liable for costs regardless of
18 the success of the litigation, as well as the personal risk of facing intrusive discovery and potential
19 disclosure to future employers that Plaintiffs sued an employer, making future employment less certain.

20 **6. The Proposed Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Is Also Fair, Adequate,**
21 **and Reasonable and Merits Preliminary Approval.**

22 The California Supreme Court removed any lingering doubt about the use of the percentage of
23 the fund method to award attorney's fees in California Courts. *Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.*, 1 Cal.
24 5th 480, 503 (2016).⁷ Thus, this Court may and, pursuant to *Laffitte*, *should* award fees to Plaintiffs'

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26
27 ⁷ The Supreme Court also corrected the misconception that *Dunk* should be viewed as expressing
28 doubt about the use of the percentage method: "The *Dunk* court, while finding the percentage method
inapplicable to the settlement before it due to the lack of a readily valued common fund, did not purport
to bar its usage generally in common fund cases." *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 501.

counsel based upon the percentage of the fund methodology.

Setting *Laffitte* aside, whether the once-again-confirmed percentage of the fund method or the lodestar method is used, the outcome is roughly the same: “[F]ee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery’ regardless of ‘whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used.’” *Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC*, 69 Cal. App. 5th 521 (2021). This is also consistent with counsels’ experience in class cases. Here, Plaintiff’s attorneys intend to request attorneys’ fees of up to \$263,333.33 (one-third of the GSA), and costs capped at \$22,500.00 (which includes payment for mediations, filing fees, service of process fees, and other standard expenses). (Leviant Decl., ¶ 31.) Given the efforts and risks involved in this case, as well as the results achieved, these amounts are within the range of reasonableness and warrant *preliminary approval*.

7. The Proposed Payment to the Administrator Is Fair and Reasonable

Phoenix, which has been selected due to its most reasonable bid for all required services, with all due regard for its reputation and known quality of work, states that administration can be performed for a flat rate of **\$8,250.00**. (Lawrence Decl., ¶ 17; Leviant Decl., ¶ 33). In counsel’s experience, based on similar wage-and-hour actions, an estimated cost of **\$8,250.00** is a fair and reasonable amount for administration fees, is below the Parties’ estimate of \$10,000.00 in costs for administration, and should be preliminarily approved. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 33.) Phoenix also confirmed its capabilities and security protocols in the accompanying declaration. (Lawrence Decl., ¶¶ 7; 11-12).

VI. THE COURT SHOULD SCHEDULE A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Plaintiffs request that the fairness hearing in this case be scheduled for about 145 calendar days after issuance of the Court’s Order granting preliminary approval. Under the Settlement, Defendant will have 15 calendar days after preliminary approval to provide the data to Phoenix, which will then have 14 calendar days to mail out the class notice. Class Members have sixty (60) calendar days after mailing of the notice to submit exclusions or objections (with a 14-day extension available for re-mailed notices). Therefore, Plaintiffs propose a final approval hearing scheduled for the first available hearing date that is about 145 days after preliminary approval is granted.

VII. CONCLUSION


For all the foregoing reasons, because the Class meets the requirements for certification, because

1 the Settlement bears all requisite indicia of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, and because the
2 proposed notice procedure and forms comport with Rule 3.766 and due process, this Court should grant
3 this Motion for Preliminary Approval and schedule a Final Approval Hearing.

4 Respectfully submitted,

5 Dated: April 30, 2025

MOON LAW GROUP, PC

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7 By: 
Kane Moon
H. Scott Leviant
Sandy Pham

9 Attorneys for Plaintiff