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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE**

LETICIA ISABEL SANDOVAL, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

GRAZIE MILLE FOODS, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendant.

Case No.: CVRI2301002
Assigned to: Hon. Harold Hopp, Dept. 1

Complaint filed: February 28, 2023
FAC filed: April 28, 2025
Trial date: Not set

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: March 30, 2026
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: 1

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 30, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 1 of Riverside County Superior Court, located at 4050 Main Street, Riverside, CA 92501, Plaintiff Leticia Isabel Sandoval (“Plaintiff” or “Class Representative”) will and hereby does move for an order as follows:

1. Certifying, for settlement purposes, a class consisting of all persons employed by Defendant Grazie Mille Foods, Inc. (“Defendant”) in California and classified as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant during the period March 1, 2020, to September 1, 2024 (the “Class Period”) (the “Class”);
2. Pursuant to the Settlement’s Escalator Clause, the Gross Settlement Amount increased to \$376,481.02, (the “Gross Settlement Amount”) as memorialized in the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice (the “Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) between the Plaintiff and Defendant as fair, just, reasonable and adequate. A true and correct copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Declaration of Lucy H. Nguyen in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Class Counsel Declaration”) submitted concurrently herewith.
3. Finding that Class Members were given adequate notice of the Settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the Settlement, object to the Settlement, or exclude themselves from the Settlement, in a reasonable manner;
4. Appointing Plaintiff Leticia Isabel Sandoval as Class Representative for settlement purposes, and approving a payment of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff Leticia Isabel Sandoval (the “Class Representative Service Award”);
5. Appointing Tyler J. Woods, Alan A. Wilcox, Lucy Nguyen and Conor Gomez of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC (“WLF”) as class counsel (“Class Counsel”) for settlement purposes;
6. Approving payment of \$125,493.67 in attorneys’ fees, which is 33 and 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount (the “Class Counsel Fees Payment”);
7. Approving payment to Class Counsel for litigation costs in the amount of \$13,725.48 for litigating this action (the “Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment”);

8. Approving payment of administrative expenses to ILYM Group, Inc. as the settlement administrator (the “Administrator”) in the amount of \$9,650.00 (the “Administration Expenses Payment”);
9. Directing the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
10. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, and pursuant to C.C.P. 664.6, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the Parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or enforcing the terms of the judgment.


This Motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Lucy H. Nguyen and Nick Castro, and such oral argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

Dated:

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: _____


Tyler J. Woods
Alan A. Wilcox
Lucy Nguyen
Conor Gomez

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff seeks final approval of the Settlement with Defendant. The Settlement will
4 provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 639 Class Members. And, as set forth
5 more fully below, the Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under
6 California law.

7 Upon the Court's approval of the settlement, participating Class Members will receive
8 an *average estimated individual gross settlement payment of approximately \$326.82*, with the
9 *highest individual estimated gross settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$1,668.83*.
10 (Castro Decl., ¶ 15.) regarding class notice dissemination and class response.) As of the date of
11 this Motion, zero objections and zero requests for exclusion have been received. (Castro Decl.,
12 ¶¶ 11–12.) The response deadline is April 6, 2026, and Plaintiff will file an amended declaration
13 once response deadline passes. For the reasons set forth in this Motion, the Settlement is fair,
14 just, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Class Members.

15 Final approval of the Settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval
16 under California law. As demonstrated in the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action,
17 the Settlement provides excellent benefits to the Class, particularly considering the complexities
18 and risks of the Action. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant final approval of
19 the Settlement.

20 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

21 **A. Plaintiff's Claims**

22 This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") (Lab. Code
23 §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative Class Members were employed
24 by Defendant in California and classified as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees during the
25 Class Period. Defendant is a fast-food chain restaurant with its headquarters located in Riverside,
26 California. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 2.)

27 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
28 resulted in California Labor Code. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges

1 that Defendant failed to pay all wages worked, including minimum and overtime wages. failed
2 to provide legally compliant meal and rest periods; failed to reimburse necessary business
3 expenses; failed to furnish accurate wage statements; and failed to timely pay all final wages at
4 termination. Plaintiff also asserts claims for unfair business practices and civil penalties under
5 PAGA. (*Id.*)

6 On February 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint
7 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay
8 overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods;
9 (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage
10 statements; and (7) unfair business practices. (Class Counsel Decl., at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff sent a notice
11 to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging
12 similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA on March 9, 2023. (*Id.*) On July 12,
13 2023, Plaintiff filed a separate PAGA action against Defendant alleging claims for civil
14 penalties under PAGA. On April 28, 2025. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
15 consolidating the Class and PAGA actions (the “Action” or “Operative Complaint”). (*Id.*)

16 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

17 Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
18 information before mediating this action, including more than 600 pages of documents relevant to
19 Plaintiff’s claims. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant produced a sample of more than 200
20 pages of time and pay records for class members. (*Id.*) Defendant also provided documents of its
21 wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total
22 number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.*)

23 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices
24 and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
25 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum monetary
26 exposure for all claims. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable
27 law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the Action. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these
28 records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*) This extensive investigation and

discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the Settlement.

C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement

On June 11, 2024, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced employment mediator Kevin T. Barnes, Esq. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the Action, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses and further negotiations regarding the settlement terms reached a settlement for \$290,000.00 (the “Original Gross Settlement Amount”) on April 18, 2025, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, **Ex. 1**).

At the time of mediation and settlement negotiations, the Parties estimated that there were approximately 605 Class Members based on the payroll data then available. Following updated payroll reconciliation and preparation of the final class list for notice purposes, 639 Settlement Class Members were identified and provided notice. The Settlement Agreement contemplated potential minor fluctuations in class size, and this increase did not alter the structure, fairness, or adequacy of the Settlement.

The increased number of Class Members (and thereby the increased number of total workweeks) triggered the Escalator Clause (as defined below). Pursuant to the Escalator Clause, the Original Gross Settlement Amount was increased from \$290,000.00 to \$376,481.02 (the “Gross Settlement Amount”).

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, just, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.)

1 **D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement**

2 Following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, the Court granted Plaintiff's
3 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on November 17, 2025. (Class
4 Counsel Decl., ¶ 10.) Pursuant to the Court's Preliminary Approval Order, the Court-approved
5 Class Notice was disseminated to all identified Settlement Class Members by the Settlement
6 Administrator. (*Id.*)

7 The Settlement Administrator reports that as of February 18, 2026, no Class Member has
8 requested exclusion, and no Class Member has submitted an objection. (See Declaration of Nick
9 Castro of ILYM Group, Inc. ["Castro Decl."] ¶¶ 11-12.) The response deadline is April 6, 2026
10 (the "Response Deadline"). (*Id.*) The Final Approval Hearing is set for March 30, 2026. The Court
11 retains jurisdiction to consider any timely objections received by the Response Deadline. As of
12 February 18, 2026, no Settlement Class Member has submitted an objection to the Settlement and
13 no Settlement Class Member has requested exclusion from the Settlement. (*Id.*) The absence of
14 objections or opt-outs strongly supports final approval and that the Settlement is fair, reasonable,
15 and adequate to the Settlement Class.

16 **E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

17 Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay the Gross Settlement Amount to
18 resolve this Action. The key terms include:

19 1. Settlement Class: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, the Parties
20 agree to the certification of the Class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382.

21 2. Participating Class Members: A participating Class Member is a Class Member
22 who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement
23 ("Participating Class Member(s)"). (Settlement, ¶ 1.35.)

24 3. Aggrieved Employee: An "Aggrieved Employee" is a person employed by
25 Defendant in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee who worked
26 for Defendant between March 9, 2022, to September 1, 2024 (the "PAGA Period"). (Settlement,
27 ¶ 1.4, 1.31.)

28 4. Gross Settlement Amount: The Gross Settlement Amount will be used to pay all

of the following (the Gross Settlement Amount less these payments shall be the “Net Settlement Amount”):

- a. “Individual Class Payments” are the Participating Class Members’ pro rata share of the “Net Settlement Amount” (as defined below) calculated according to the number of “Workweeks” (any week during which a Class Member worked for Defendant for at least one day during the Class Period) worked during the Class Period (the “Individual Class Payments”);
- b. “PAGA Penalties” are the \$10,000.00 PAGA civil penalties, 25% of which is allocated to be paid to the Allegedly Aggrieved Employees and 75% to be paid to the LWDA;
- c. “Individual PAGA Payments” are the Allegedly Aggrieved Employees’ pro rata share of 25% (\$2,500.00) of the PAGA Penalties
- d. “LWDA PAGA Payment” is the 75% (\$7,500.00) share of the PAGA Penalties to be paid to the LWDA;
- e. Class Counsel Fees Payment;
- f. Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment;
- g. Class Representatives Service Payment or \$7,500.00; and
- h. the Administration Expenses Payment. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.22, 1.23, 1.28, 1.34.)

5. Effective Date: “The date by when both of the following have occurred: (a) the Court Enters a Judgment on its Order Granting Final Approval of the Settlement; and (b) the Judgment is final. The Judgment is final as of the latest of the following occurrences: (a) if no Participating Class Member objects to the Settlement, the day the Court enters Judgment; (b) if one or more Participating Class Members objects to the Settlement, the day after the deadline for filing a notice of appeal from the Judgment; or if a timely appeal from the Judgment is filed, the day after the appellate court affirms the Judgment and issues a remittitur.” (Settlement, ¶ 1.18.)

1 6. Class Size Estimates and Escalator Clause: “Based on its records, Defendant
2 estimates that, as of the date of this Settlement Agreement, (1) there are 605 Class Members
3 and 21,122 Total Workweeks during the Class period and (2) there were 226 Aggrieved
4 Employees who worked 6,744 Pay Periods during the PAGA Period. In the event the number of
5 workweeks worked by the Class Members increases by more than 10% or 2,112, then the
6 [Original] Gross Settlement Amount shall be increased by a proportional amount over 10%.”
7 (Settlement, ¶ 8.) Defendant’s provided Class data has since confirmed there are 639 total Class
8 Members and 29,533 workweeks. (Castro Decl. ¶ 14.)

9 7. Uncashed Checks: For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check
10 or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the
11 Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California Controller's
12 Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue"
13 subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b).
14 (Settlement, ¶ 4.4.3.)

15 8. Released Parties: The released parties in the Settlement are: Defendant and each
16 of its former and present directors, officers, shareholders, owners, members, attorneys, insurers,
17 predecessors, successors, assigns, subsidiaries, and affiliates (the “Released Parties”).
18 (Settlement ¶ 1.41.)

19 9. Release by Participating Class Members: “All Participating Class Members, on
20 behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs,
21 administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from any and all claims asserted or that
22 could have been asserted based on the facts pled in the operative complaints, including but not limited
23 to, state wage and hour claims for any and all violations of California's Labor Code and Unfair
24 Competition Law based on Defendant's failure to pay for all hours worked (including minimum, straight
25 time, and overtime wages), failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods,
26 failure to timely pay final wages at termination, failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements, and
27 failure to indemnify employees for expenditures based on the alleged Labor Code violations, and all
28 damages, interest, penalties, attorneys' fees, costs, and other amounts recoverable under said causes of

1 action under California law, to the extent permissible, including, but not limited to, the California Labor
2 Code and the applicable Wage Orders. Except as set forth in Section 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating
3 Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful
4 termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability,
5 social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period."
6 (Settlement, ¶ 5.2.)

7 10. Release by Allegedly Aggrieved Employees: "All Aggrieved Employees are
8 deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present
9 representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released
10 Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been
11 alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint and the PAGA
12 Notice, including any and all claims involving any alleged failure to pay minimum wages or
13 overtime, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to provide accurate wage statements,
14 failure to pay all wages due at separation, and failure to reimburse business expenses, including
15 Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 210, 216, 223, 225.5, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 245-248.5, 256,
16 432, 432.5, 432.7, 510, 512, 558, 558.1, 1024.5, 1174, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1198.5, 1199,
17 2699, 2699.3, 2802, 2810.5 during the PAGA Period. Aggrieved Employees only release these
18 claims for the duration of the PAGA Period." (Settlement, ¶ 5.3.)

19 11. Distribution Formula: "An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing
20 the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class
21 Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
22 Member's Workweeks." (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: "The Administrator will calculate
23 each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Allegedly Aggrieved
24 Employees' 25% share of PAGA Penalties \$2,500.00 by the total number of PAGA Period Pay
25 Periods worked by all Allegedly Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b)
26 multiplying the result by each Allegedly Aggrieved Employee's PAGA Period Pay Periods."
27 (Settlement ¶ 3.2.5.1.)

28 12. Tax Allocation: 20% of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class

Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the "Wage Portion"). (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.1.)

13. Class Representative Service Award: "Class Representative Service Payment to the Class Representative of not more than \$7,500.00 (in addition to any Individual Class Payment and any Individual PAGA Payment the Class Representative is entitled to receive as a Participating Class Member). (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.1.)

14. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: Class Counsel, at the Court's discretion, shall receive the Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.2.)

15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The class notice set forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated (the "Class Notice"). (Castro Decl., Ex. A.) A true and correct copy of the Class Notice is attached as **Exhibit A** to the Castro Declaration. (*Id.*) Class Members were notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Castro Decl. ¶¶ 6-9) The Administrator undertook its best efforts to ensure that the notice was provided to the current addresses of Class Members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL

The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel ... and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) The factual record must be sufficiently developed to withstand evaluation of plaintiffs' likelihood of success, with the most important factor being "the strength of the case

1 for plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement. (*Clark v. American*
2 *Residential Services, LLC*, (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 799).

3 Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial
4 court's broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give
5 "[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties." (*Dunk*
6 *v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) "The inquiry 'must be limited to the extent
7 necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or
8 overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a
9 whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.'" (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

10 **A. Plaintiff's Case and Risks of Further Litigation**

11 Plaintiff has established that her claims are based on viable causes of action. Class Counsel
12 propounded and responded to written formal discovery. (Class Counsel Decl. ¶¶ 5-6). Through all
13 of this formal and informal discovery and investigation it became abundantly clear that both Parties
14 were able to establish credible claims and viable defenses. While Plaintiff is confident in the merits
15 of their claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff
16 also recognizes that proving the amount of wages due to each Class Member would be an
17 expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.* at ¶ 10.) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff
18 obtained certification of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive,
19 involving a trial and possible appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by
20 the Class. (*Id.*)

21 Under *Clark*, the most important factor is the strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits,
22 balanced against the amount offered in settlement (*Clark* at 799). Indeed, the Plaintiff has identified
23 and provided a sufficient basis for bringing legitimate claims against Defendants, which could very
24 well lead to a favorable judgment should litigation continue. However, the strengths of Plaintiff's
25 claims cannot be viewed in a vacuum. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties
26 involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, and
27 the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment compared to the relative strengths of Plaintiff's
28 claims, it is clear that the Gross Settlement Amount is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness, and

1 approval of the Settlement is appropriate.

2 Because of the proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief
3 and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. *Indeed, each Class Member is eligible to*
4 *receive an average benefit of approximately \$326.82, and the highest estimated gross payout is*
5 *expected to be approximately \$1,668.83.* (Castro Decl., ¶ 15.) Furthermore, given that continued
6 litigation of this Action could very reasonably result in a lower award than the amount of the
7 Settlement (or even no award), the Gross Settlement Amount and Individual Class Payments are
8 reasonable.

9 A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had he or she prevailed
10 at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and
11 reasonable. (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 250 [“Compromise is
12 inherent and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed
13 settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated,
14 this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary
15 settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”]).

16 **B. A Presumption of Fairness Over the Settlement Exists**

17 A presumption that a settlement is fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following
18 four factors are present: “(1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2)
19 investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3)
20 counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.”
21 (*Wershba*, at 245.) A presumption of fairness exists here as the Settlement was reached through
22 extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery, which
23 allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage and
24 hour litigation.

25 The Settlement was reached following a full-day mediation with experienced employment
26 mediator, Kevin T. Barnes, Esq. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at
27 arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties
28 went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the Action, but the

1 Parties were also prepared to litigate their positions through trial and appeal if a settlement had not
2 been reached. (*Id.*)

3 As discussed above, Class Counsel conducted formal and informal discovery concerning
4 the claims set forth in the Action, including depositions, sufficient to allow Plaintiff and Class
5 Counsel to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

6 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
7 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶¶ 28-49.) Class Counsel has
8 substantial experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law
9 and motion, trial, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class
10 actions on behalf of plaintiff and has been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case
11 handling responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action
12 settlements. (*Id.*)

13 Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class
14 Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of
15 Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and
16 the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the
17 best interests of Class Members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great
18 weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give
19 considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral
20 mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction
21 entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct"].)

22 At the time of mediation and settlement negotiations, the Parties relied on payroll data then
23 available, which reflected an estimated class size of approximately 605 non-exempt employees
24 during the Class Period. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 8.) That estimate was used for purposes of
25 negotiating the Gross Settlement Amount and evaluating potential exposure. (*Id.*) Recognizing that
26 final payroll reconciliation could result in minor fluctuations in the class list, the Parties anticipated
27 a reasonable variance. (*Id.*) Consistent with that expectation, the Settlement Administrator's bid
28

1 assumed up to 650 class members in order to provide sufficient administrative flexibility without
2 increasing costs. (*Id.*)

3 After Defendant produced finalized payroll data and the Class list was fully reconciled for
4 notice purposes, 639 Class Members were identified and provided notice. (Castro Decl., ¶ 14.) The
5 variance does not alter the fairness of the negotiated Settlement because the Parties had agreed to
6 the Escalator Clause (described above), which protects the interests of each Class Member in the
7 event the number of Class Members and workweeks increases between the Settlement and the Final
8 Approval Hearing. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 8.) This is so that each Class Member's Individual
9 Settlement Payment is not unfairly diluted as a result of any changes in the Class data. (*Id.*)
10 Pursuant to the Escalator Clause the Original Gross Settlement Amount increased to the adjusted
11 Gross Settlement Amount of \$376,481.02. (*Id.*; see also Castro Decl., ¶ 15.)

12 Lastly, as of the date of this Motion, no Class Member has objected to the Settlement, and no
13 Class Member has requested exclusion. (Castro Decl., ¶¶ 11–12.) The overwhelmingly positive
14 response of the Class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement.

15 Courts routinely recognize that a low number of objections and opt-outs is compelling
16 evidence of fairness. (See, e.g., *In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D.
17 Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections and requests for exclusion support
18 approval].) In fact, courts have approved class action settlements under far less favorable
19 circumstances. (See, e.g., *Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D. Wash. 2001) 2001 WL 34089697, *8
20 [approving settlement where thousands participated and multiple objections and opt-outs were
21 submitted], citing *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027.)

22 Here, the absence of any objections and the absence of any opt-outs from the Class
23 demonstrates that the Class supports the Settlement and that the proposed resolution is fair, just,
24 reasonable, and adequate. Additionally, no workweek disputes have been submitted, further
25 supporting the Class's support of with the Gross Settlement Amount (as adjusted pursuant to the
26 Escalator Clause) and the Settlement's allocation methodology.

1 **IV. CLASS COUNSEL FEES PAYMENT, CLASS COUNSEL LITIGATION**
2 **EXPENSES PAYMENT, AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE PAYMENT**
3 **ARE REASONABLE.**

4 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class
5 Counsel the Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment.
6 (Settlement ¶ 3.2.2.) Defendant has further agreed to pay Plaintiff the Class Representative Service
7 Award. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.2.1.)

8 **A. Class Counsel Fees Payment Is Reasonable**

9 According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on
10 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually **50%** of the fund is the upper limit on
11 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
12 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
13 are not unprecedented." (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
14 Attorneys' fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with **thirty to**
15 **forty percent** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
16 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
17 cases where 30-50% was awarded involved "smaller" settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

18 In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for
19 calculating attorneys' fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed
20 by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, the California
21 Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage and hour class action
22 settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480,
23 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court explained:

24 As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we
25 emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, **does not override**
26 **the trial court's primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common**
27 **fund** and thus **does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the**
28 **potential fee award.** If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-
check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the
percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a
justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an
adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time

counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable percentage to apply.

(*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

The settled-for Class Counsel Fees Payment is consistent with the average fee award in class actions. Indeed, as is the case here, the custom and practice in class actions is to award *approximately* one-third of a fund as a fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) 33 and 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount fits squarely within the customary one-third benchmark and is therefore reasonable.

Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the Action involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Detailed timesheets are **not** necessary for a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375) (*see also*

1 *United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407
2 “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the
3 community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the
4 plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.”) Here, Class Counsel
5 submits their declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates concurrently with this Motion.

6 Additionally, as the California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

7 With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts
8 conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely
9 scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on
attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award
appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.”

10 (5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v.*
11 *Integrated Resources, Inc., supra*, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a
12 mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively
scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales*
13 *Practice Action Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with
district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it
14 was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”];
Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451
15 [“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method,
it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s
hours.”].)

16 (*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

17 Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$94,140.00 based on over 103.7 hours of work
18 performed thus far. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶¶ 18-27.) Accordingly, the Class Counsel Fees Award
19 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 1.33. (*Id.*) To be sure, trial
20 courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See*
21 *Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano v.*
22 *Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2
23 to 4 or even higher.” (*See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*,
24 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 [“[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy
25 and complex class action litigation.”].)

26 Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other
27 “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seek a positive multiplier of
28 1.33 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request is underscored by the fact that similar

1 multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel in other class actions. (*See, e.g.,*
2 *Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL
3 3673845, *3 [finding WLF’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of
4 recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”]; *Chavez, supra*, 162 Cal.App.4th
5 at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir.
6 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v.*
7 *O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11, *citing* a study “reporting [an]
8 average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and finding that a multiplier of
9 2.43 would be “per se reasonable.”)

10 By way of further example, the intermediate court in *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is
11 a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check, affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert*
12 *Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82.) The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in
13 full by the California Supreme Court in its new decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

14 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
15 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
16 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
17 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
18 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
19 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) All these factors favor approval of a multiplier
20 along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

21 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent
22 nature of the award. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) Further, the
23 possibility of no recovery is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case.
24 Other uncertainties are the amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in
25 effort and expenses, and uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is
26 obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133, 1138.)

27 Furthermore, contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services
28 paid concurrently with the provision of the services. (*Id.*) “A lawyer who both bears the risk of

1 not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if
2 he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will
3 be reluctant to accept fee award cases.”) Application of that rule is particularly appropriate
4 where the case is brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk
5 enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous.
6 Rather it is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services which
7 typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney’s fees. (*Id.*
8 at p. 1138.)

9 Here, Class Counsel has been the only counsel to represent the Class Members in this
10 Action and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigating this Action purely on a contingency
11 basis. Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$93,140.00 based on 101.7 hours. The requested
12 attorneys’ fees of \$125,493.67 reflect a multiplier of approximately 1.35, which is well within the
13 range routinely approved in wage-and-hour class actions. Class Counsel’s outlay of time and
14 money in this case has been significant. (Class Counsel Decl. ¶ 118.)

15 The other factors are also present here. As discussed, this Action represents complex
16 questions of law and fact. Defendants’ contentions compared to Plaintiff’s assertions underscore
17 the risk of prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have
18 prevented recovery completely. (*Id.* at ¶ 12.) Given the complexities of this Action, this Action
19 required experienced and competent lawyers with expertise in the issues presented herein.
20 Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of this Action because of
21 the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals. (*Id.*) Despite these
22 risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Further, there are only
23 so many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) As a direct result of
24 litigating this Action, there were other meritorious cases that were presented to Class Counsel
25 and that would have generated substantial fees but were nonetheless declined during the
26 pendency of this Action in order to devote the attention necessary to achieve this favorable
27 result. (*Id.*) Considered against the risks of continued litigation, and the importance of the
28 employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief provided under the Settlement represents a

1 very strong result for the Class.

2 Thus, Plaintiff's request for the Class Counsel Fees Payment is in line with the prevailing
3 guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards
4 in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the Class Counsel Fees Payment requested
5 herein.

6 **B. Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment Is Reasonable.**

7 As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred \$13,725.48 in litigation
8 expenses in prosecuting this Action. Attached as **Exhibit 3** to the Nguyen Declaration is a true and
9 correct copy of Class Counsel's itemized cost ledger reflecting the date, nature, and amount of
10 each expense incurred. (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) These expenses include filing fees, mediation fees, service of
11 process, legal research, and other litigation costs reasonably necessary to achieve the Settlement.
12 (*Id.*)

13 Accordingly, the requested Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of \$13,725.48 is
14 reasonable and should be approved. (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) Counsel can recover "out-of-pocket expenses
15 that 'would normally be charged to a fee-paying client'" including costs for "service of summons
16 and complaint, service of trial subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage,
17 investigator, copying costs, hotel bills, meals, messenger service and employment record
18 reproduction." (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly
19 recoverable on motions for settlement approval. (*See Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair*
20 *Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012)
21 No. CV 06-00350 DOC, 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 ["Expenses such as reimbursement for travel,
22 meals, lodging, photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage,
23 courier service, mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically
24 recoverable."].)

25 Therefore, the requested Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment should be
26 approved.

27 **C. Class Representative Service Payment Is Reasonable.**

28 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits "are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to

1 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
2 members of the class.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186
3 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements
4 containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to
5 represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring
6 about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The
7 California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory
8 rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect
9 employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiffs should therefore be
10 rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman*
11 *Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

12 Under the Settlement Agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
13 a Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff Leticia Isabel
14 Sandoval. Plaintiff seeks this award for her efforts in prosecuting this Action and for the broader
15 general release of her individual claims.

16 Plaintiff assisted counsel by providing factual information regarding Defendant’s policies
17 and practices, reviewing documents, participating in mediation preparation, and remaining
18 available throughout the litigation and settlement process. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 20.)

19 Plaintiff also assumed the risks associated with serving as the named representative in a
20 wage-and-hour class action, including the possibility of reputational harm and future employment
21 consequences.

22 The requested award is modest in comparison to service awards routinely approved in
23 wage-and-hour class actions and is proportional to Plaintiff’s contributions and the overall
24 settlement recovery.

25 Accordingly, the requested service award is fair and reasonable. (*See, generally,*
26 *Declaration of Plaintiff submitted in support of Motion for Preliminary Approval.*)

27 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
28 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive

award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award for plaintiffs represented by class counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno, supra*, 2021 WL 3673845 at *3 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n*, No. 18-CV-01202-LB, 2024 WL 150721, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2024) [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

“Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark* at 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at p. 806.) “An incentive award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’” (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394, *quoting Clark*, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.) Plaintiff’s declaration describes how each of the five *Cellphone Termination* factors are present here.

D. The Administration Expenses Payment Is Reasonable.

The Administrator estimates that it will incur a total of \$9,650.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Castro Decl., ¶ 17.) These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the Class, claim and exclusion tracking, and Class Member payment processing.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

Dated:

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: _____

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