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11 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
12 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

13 NIMA NASERZADEH, individually, and on
14 behalf of all others similarly situated,

15 *Plaintiff,*

16 v.

17 KAMBRIAN CORPORATION, a California
18 corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

19 *Defendants.*

Case No.: 23STCV04343

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Carolyn
B. Kuhl, Dept. 12]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

[Filed concurrently with: Declaration of
Arrash T. Fattahi; Declaration of Plaintiff
Nima Naserzadeh; and Declaration of Lisa
Mullins of ILYM Group, Inc.]

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: July 10, 2025

Time: 10:30 a.m.

Dept: 12

Complaint filed: February 28, 2023

FAC filed: November 13, 2023

Trial date: Not set

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 10, 2025 at 10:30 a.m., in Department 12 of the Los
3 Angeles County Superior Court, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California
4 90012, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule
5 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiff Nima Naserzadeh (“Plaintiff”) will move the Court for an Order granting
6 preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant
7 Kambrian Corporation. Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:


- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement;
9 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
10 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
11 4. Appointing Plaintiff Nima Naserzadeh as Class Representative for settlement purposes;
12 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Arrash T. Fattahi and Arman A. Salehi of Wilshire Law
13 Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
14 6. Appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
15 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

16 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
17 authorities, the Declarations of Arrash T. Fattahi, Plaintiff, and Lisa Mullins, filed concurrently
18 herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the
19 Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

20 Respectfully submitted,

21 Dated: May 1, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

22
23 By: 

24 Arrash T. Fattahi
Arman A. Salehi

25 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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27
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Nima Naserzadeh (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$350,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Kambrian Corporation (“Defendant” or “Kambrian,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). This motion for preliminary approval is unopposed. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 111 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, the Steve Cerveris, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and putative class members worked in California as misclassified independent contractors for Defendant during the class period. Defendant is an I.T. reseller providing software, hardware, and services to customers such as the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and Los Angeles County. (Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Fattahi Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misclassified employees as independent contractors and failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and

1 Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts
2 related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at
3 termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

4 On February 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint
5 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay
6 overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest
7 periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate
8 itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; (8) failure to
9 produce requested employment records; and (9) unfair business practices. On March 9, 2023,
10 Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency
11 (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA. On November 13,
12 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class & Representative Action Complaint adding a claim
13 for civil penalties under the PAGA. Prior to the hearing on the Motion for Preliminary
14 Approval, Plaintiff will file a Second Amended Class & Representative Action Complaint.
15 (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 4.)

16 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

17 Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
18 information before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sampling of timekeeping and
19 payroll records for the class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour
20 policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of
21 current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

22 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices
23 and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
24 the probability of class certification and success on the merits and assess Defendant’s maximum
25 monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable
26 law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed
27 these records and utilized an expert to prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

28 ///

1 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

2 On October 8, 2024, the Parties participated in a private mediation with experienced
3 class action mediator, the Steve Cerveris, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via
4 Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a
5 professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into mediation willing to explore the
6 potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position
7 through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations
8 and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's
9 defenses, the Parties were able to reach a resolution, the material terms of which are
10 encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 1 [Class Action and PAGA
11 Settlement Agreement].)

12 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
13 on the Parties' informal exchange of documents and information and Class Counsel's own
14 independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is
15 fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in
16 light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could
17 be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk.
18 (*Id.* at ¶ 14.)

19 Indeed, the \$350,000.00 Settlement represents approximately **88%** of the **realistic**
20 **maximum recovery** of \$396,098.25. (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Although Class Counsel estimated that
21 Defendant's maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$3.6 million, when
22 the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel
23 believes that Defendant's realistic exposure was \$396,098.25, meaning the Settlement achieves
24 a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-27.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at
25 class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Indeed,
26 because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and
27 will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

28 ///

1 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

2 The Settlement’s key terms include:

3 1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification
4 of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons employed
5 by Kambrian in California as a low-voltage tech worker classified as an independent contractor
6 during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

7 2. Class Period: “means the period from September 3, 2018 to December 31, 2024.”
8 (Settlement, § 1.12.)

9 3. Participating Class Member: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid
10 and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

11 4. Aggrieved Employee: “means a person employed by Kambrian in California and
12 classified as a low-voltage tech worker classified as an independent contractor who worked for
13 Kambrian during the PAGA Period.” (Settlement, § 1.4.)

14 5. PAGA Period: “means the period from March 9, 2022 to December 31, 2024.”
15 (Settlement, § 1.31.)

16 6. Gross Settlement Amount: “means \$350,000.00, which is the total amount
17 Kambrian agrees to pay under the Settlement except as provided in Paragraph 8 [].” (Settlement,
18 § 1.22.)

19 7. Uncashed Checks: Any settlement checks remaining uncashed after one hundred
20 and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to Legal Aid at Work, the *cy pres* recipient. (Settlement,
21 § 4.4.3.)

22 8. Release: “All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their
23 respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors,
24 and assigns, release Released Parties from all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have
25 been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint and ascertained in
26 the course of the Action including any and all claims for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight
27 time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to
28 authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure

1 to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures;
2 (8) failure to produce requested employment records; (9) failure to properly classify workers; and
3 (10) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. Except as set forth in Section 5.3 of this
4 Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for
5 vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act,
6 unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers’ compensation, or claims based on
7 facts occurring outside the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release will be deemed
8 effective on the date of final approval of the Settlement by the Court. (Settlement, § 5.)

9 9. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Kambrian.”
10 (Settlement, § 3.1.)

11 10. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$25,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s
12 claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$18,750.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25%
13 (\$6,250.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5. [the Agreement contains
14 a typographical error and mistakenly estimates the Aggrieved Employees’ 25% share of PAGA
15 Penalties as \$2,500.00, when the share is actually \$6,250.00].) Class Counsel submitted the
16 proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Fattahi
17 Decl., ¶ 9.)

18 11. Net Settlement Amount: “means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following:
19 Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, the Class Representative’s Service
20 Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the
21 Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as
22 Individual Class Payments.” (Settlement, § 1.23.)

23 12. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the
24 Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class
25 Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
26 Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate
27 each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25%
28 share of PAGA Penalties [\$6,250.00] by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by

all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee's PAGA Period Pay Periods." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1 [the Agreement contains a typographical error and mistakenly estimates the Aggrieved Employees' 25% share of PAGA Penalties as \$2,500.00, when the share is actually \$6,250.00].)

13. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 20% wages and 80% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

14. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$10,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiff's time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

15. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 1/3 (\$116,666.67) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$30,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

16. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 7.4.) ILYM Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Fattahi Decl., ¶ 10; Declaration of Lisa Mullins, Ex. C [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This

1 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
2 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached
3 through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
4 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
5 is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

6 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
7 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff’s case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely
8 duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
9 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
10 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
11 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
12 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
13 that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record
14 need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-*
15 *Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
16 require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
17 prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy
18 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

19 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
20 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
21 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

22 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
23 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

24 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
25 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

26 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
27 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
28 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)

1 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
2 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
3 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
4 to approve the settlement.”].)

5 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
6 mediation with experienced employment mediator, the Steve Cerveris, Esq. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 7.)
7 The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner,
8 were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a
9 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through
10 trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and
11 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses,
12 the Parties reached an agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

13 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
14 the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
15 records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
16 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
17 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
18 former employees, and the wage rates in effect. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive
19 factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and
20 defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently
21 and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

22 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
23 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 38-46.) Again, this supports the position that the
24 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
25 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
26 action.

27 ///

28 ///

1 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’**
2 **Respective Legal Positions**

3 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
4 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
5 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
6 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
7 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
8 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
9 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

10 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
11 (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 25.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate
12 controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving
13 the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
14 uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

15 The proposed settlement of \$350,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
16 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-27.) Because of the proposed
17 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
18 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
19 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
20 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$350,000.00 is well
21 within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*)
22 ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of***
23 ***approximately \$1,459.31.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 26.)

24 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

25 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
26 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
27 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 38-46.)
28 Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,

1 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

2 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

3 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
4 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
5 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
6 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
7 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
8 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

9 **C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

10 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, the Parties agreed to allocate
11 reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$116,666.67, and up to \$30,000.00 in costs. These amounts
12 are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

13 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund"**
14 **Method**

15 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created
16 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number
17 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
18 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
19 may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
20 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

21 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common
22 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all
23 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v.*
24 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995)
25 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in
26 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
27 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
28 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized

1 that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought
2 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

3 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
4 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
5 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
6 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
7 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
8 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
9 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
10 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
11 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
12 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

13 2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

14 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on
15 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
16 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
17 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
18 are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
19 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
20 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
21 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
22 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
23 million].)

24 Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to \$116,666.67 of the Settlement Amount,
25 which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic
26 literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162
27 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method
28 or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the

recovery.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 36-37.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 38-46.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award

1 is reasonable and fair.

2 **D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable**

3 Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and “there is no
4 indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other” class members,
5 such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr.
6 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for
7 PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement.
8 (*Id.* [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or \$1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D.
9 Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v.*
10 *Fed. Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts
11 approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here,
12 the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved
13 by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia*
14 *v. Shamrock Foods Co.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431,
15 at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson*, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 [approving a
16 PAGA settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012)
17 No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA settlement of
18 0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of \$25,000.00, 75% percent of which
19 (\$18,750.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$6,250.00) to be distributed to the Aggrieved
20 Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) The \$25,000.00 settlement amount equates to approximately
21 7.1% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which far exceeds amounts that are routinely approved. The
22 Parties negotiated to allocate 7.1% of the Settlement to PAGA penalties in good faith and this
23 amount is extremely reasonable considering that the maximum PAGA penalties were estimated at
24 \$77,800.00 (which assumed \$100 per pay period). (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 22.)

25 **E. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable**

26 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
27 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
28 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval

1 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
2 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
3 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
4 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

5 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
6 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
7 codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously
8 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to
9 work under substandard unlawful conditions” Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has
10 noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is
11 widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*
12 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for
13 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
14 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

15 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay a Service
16 Award in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s
17 general release of all claims against Defendant. Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement
18 award for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.*
19 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award
20 is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National Association* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No.
21 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class
22 representative.”].) Class Counsel represent that Plaintiff devoted a great deal of time and work
23 assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to
24 prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation.
25 (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 28-32; *see also* Plaintiff’s declaration.) This amount is reasonable particularly
26 in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members. (*Id.*)

27 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
28 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive

award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev. 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

A. Legal Standard

The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.

(*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for Settlement Purposes.

1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous

The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable and includes approximately 111 employees of Defendant.

Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

“The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate

The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to

warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.)

Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant properly classified its employees as independent contractors; whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were consequently non-compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class

The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly situated" vis-à-vis the class.]) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated employees.

4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement

The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second, a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

1 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel
2 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
3 previously settled. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 38-46.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified,
4 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
5 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,
6 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing his dedication. Plaintiff’s
7 willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates his serious commitment to bringing about the
8 best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

9 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

10 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
11 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
12 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
13 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
14 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
15 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
16 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
17 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th
18 Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns
19 are essentially non-existent.

20 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

21 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

22 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
23 Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
24 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
25 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
26 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
27 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
28 Members . . .” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by

1 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

2 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

3 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
4 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
5 terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
6 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
7 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

8 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
9 *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
10 terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It
11 makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
12 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
13 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
14 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
15 combined settlement-certification class notice.


16 **VI. CONCLUSION**

17 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
18 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing.

21 Dated: May 1, 2025

20 Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

22 By: 
23 _____

24 Arrash T. Fattahi
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25 Attorneys for Plaintiff

Naserzadeh v. Kambrian Corporation, et al.
23STCV04343

I, Ashley Narinyans, am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this action. My business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is ashley.narinyans@wilshirelawfirm.com.

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- (X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor & Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.
- (X) **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic service address listed above via third-party service **CASEANYWHERE**.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this **May 1, 2025**, at Los Angeles, California.


Ashley Narinyans