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similarly situated and similarly aggrieved employees

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE – CIVIL COMPLEX CENTER

ENE C. HERNANDEZ, individually and
on behalf of other persons similarly
situated and similarly aggrieved
employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NORTHWEST HOTEL
CORPORATION, an active California
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 30-2023-01310267-CU-OE-CXC

CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION

*[Assigned to Hon. Lon F. Hurwitz in Dept.
CX-103]*

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT**

[FILED CONCURRENTLY WITH
THE DECLARATION OF HAIK
HACOPIAN WITH EXHIBITS;
DECLARATION OF ZORIK
MOORADIAN; DECLARATION OF
ENE C. HERNANDEZ; AND
[PROPOSED] ORDER]

Date: February 1, 2024
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Dept.: CX-103

1 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that, pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769, on
2 February 1, 2024 at 2:00 p.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department
3 CX-103 of the above-entitled Court, located at 751 West Santa Ana Boulevard, Santa Ana,
4 California 92701, Plaintiff Ene C. Hernandez ("Plaintiff"), individually and on behalf of a
5 similarly-situated class of individuals, will and hereby does move this Court for an order:

6 1. Preliminarily approving the proposed class settlement of this lawsuit;

7 2. Provisionally certifying the Class, defined as follows:

8 All current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees of Defendant
9 Northwest Hotel Corporation in California, including those at Howard Johnson Hotel and
10 Water Playground, Courtyard Anaheim Theme Park Entrance, Courtyard by Marriot
11 Fisherman's Wharf, and its corporate staff, employed during the Class Period (the period from
12 March 3, 2019, through preliminary approval or February 5, 2024, whichever is sooner.);

13 3. Preliminarily appointing Plaintiff Ene C. Hernandez as Class Representative;

14 4. Preliminarily appointing Zorik Mooradian and Haik Hacopian of Mooradian
15 Law, APC as Class Counsel;

16 5. Preliminarily approving the proposed settlement of Plaintiff's Private
17 Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") claims;

18 6. Appointing CPT Group, Inc. as the third-party settlement administrator;

19 7. Scheduling a hearing to consider whether the class settlement should be finally
20 approved, and whether to award an amount for the Service Award to the Class Representative,
21 attorneys' fees and costs to Class Counsel, and settlement administration costs; and

22 8. Approving the proposed Class Notice, and ordering that it shall be
23 disseminated to the proposed Settlement Class as provided in the Class Action and PAGA
24 Settlement Agreement.

25 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of
26 Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Haik Hacopian with Exhibits, the Declaration of
27 Zorik Mooradian, the Declaration of Ene C. Hernandez, the pleadings and other papers filed
28 in this action, and on any further oral or documentary evidence or argument presented at the

1 time of hearing.

2 The Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement is attached as **Exhibit “1”** to the
3 Declaration of Haik Hacopian. The proposed Class Notice is attached as **Exhibit “A”** to the
4 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement. See HH Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1.

5
6 Dated: Dec. 29, 2023

MOORADIAN LAW, APC

7
8 By: /s/Haik Hacopian

Zorik Mooradian, Esq.,

Haik Hacopian, Esq.,

9 Attorneys for Plaintiff Ene C. Hernandez,
10 individually and on behalf of other persons
11 similarly situated and similarly aggrieved
12 employees
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff, Ene C. Hernandez (“Class Representative” or “Plaintiff”) and Defendant
4 Northwest Hotel Corporation (“NWH” or “Defendant”) have reached a proposed class
5 settlement with a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of \$400,000 for a Class
6 consisting of approximately 450 non-exempt employees who worked for NWH at three hotel
7 locations in California from March 3, 2019 through February 5, 2024 (“Class Period”). The
8 Settlement anticipates coverage for approximately 32,438 workweeks which results in a fair,
9 reasonable and adequate recovery for largely defensible claims consisting of a workweek
10 value of \$6.09, and an average settlement payment in excess of \$430.00.

11 This Settlement resolves this class action lawsuit and settles the wage and hour claims
12 for all Settlement Class Members who do not request exclusion. Payments will be made on an
13 opt-out non-reversionary basis.

14 The proposed settlement is memorialized in the “Class Action and PAGA Settlement
15 Agreement” hereinafter referred to as “Settlement Agreement” or “S.A.” A true and correct
16 copy of which is attached to the accompanying Declaration of Haik Hacopian (hereinafter
17 “HH Decl.”) as **Exhibit “1”**.

18 The Parties have conducted an investigation concerning the facts and law during the
19 pendency of this action and which included informal discovery, production of class records
20 and data and expert analysis of same, conferences, and a mediation session before a respected
21 mediator, Hon. Amy D. Hogue (ret.).

22 This proposed settlement is well within the range of what constitutes a fair, reasonable,
23 and adequate settlement to all concerned especially in light of the legal and factual obstacles
24 that Plaintiff faced, the sharply contested issues involved, the risks and costs of further
25 litigation, and the tangible monetary benefits to be received by Plaintiff and the Class. The
26 proposed notice procedure comports with Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769, and due process
requirements. The notice program should be approved and a final fairness hearing set.

1 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

2 **A. Defendant, Class Members, and Plaintiff**

3 Defendant NWH owned and operated three franchised hotel locations during the Class
4 Period where Plaintiff and the putative class were employed. In Anaheim, NWH operated the
5 Howard Johnson Hotel and Water Playground and Courtyard Anaheim Theme Park Entrance.
6 In San Francisco, NWH maintained its corporate office and operated the Courtyard by Marriot
7 Fisherman’s Wharf. Declaration of Haik Hacopian (hereinafter “HH Decl.”) ¶7.

8 Plaintiff was employed at NWH’s Anaheim locations as a housekeeping employee
9 from 1996 through March of 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the closure of
10 these locations. Plaintiff went on leave around then and was later terminated. A main point
11 made by NWH during the litigation was that Plaintiff was employed during the earlier part of
12 the Class Period and her experience is not representative of NWH’s operations during the vast
13 majority of the Class Period. Namely, that upon reopening of the hotels later in 2020, NWH
14 implemented changes that all but limited the potential issues alleged by Plaintiff including the
15 placement of additional time clocks, a new time tracking system (that eliminated rounding),
16 and staggered scheduling of meal breaks such that there was no large of group of employees
17 taking breaks at the same time. Moreover, that Plaintiff’s experience was limited to the
18 housekeeping group and would not be relevant to the experiences of kitchen, front staff
employees, and office personnel. HH Decl., ¶8.

19 Four-Hundred Forty (440) Class Members worked 29,507 workweeks through
20 October 5, 2023. For the PAGA period from March 7, 2022, through October 5, 2023, 296
21 aggrieved employees worked 6,562 semi-monthly pay periods. The average rate of pay is
22 \$19.60. The average shift is 7.6 hours in length. HH Decl., ¶9.

23 **B. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit**

24 On March 3, 2023, Plaintiff Ene Hernandez filed her original Complaint, asserting
25 causes of action against NWH for (1) Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods in Violation
26 of Cal. Lab. Code sections 226.7 & 512 and the Applicable IWC Wage Order; (2) Failure to
Provide Required Rest Periods in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code sections 226.7 & 512 and the

1 Applicable IWC Wage Order; (3) Failure to Pay Wages in Violation of Cal. Labor Code
2 sections 204, 210, 510, 1194 and 1194.2; (4) Failure to Provide Wages at
3 Termination/Separation in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code sections 201, 202, and 203; (5) Failure
4 to Timely Pay Vacation Wages at Termination in Violation of Cal. Labor Code section 227.3;
5 (6) Failure to Provide Itemized Wage Statements in Violation of Cal. Labor Code section 226;
6 (7) Failure to Reimburse All Business Expenses in Violation of Cal. Labor Code sections 2800
7 and 2802; and (8) Violation of Unfair Business Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200,
8 et seq.) S.A. ¶2.1.

9 On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (“FAC”) adding a single cause
10 of action under the Private Attorney’s General Act. The FAC is the operative complaint in the
11 Action (the “Operative Complaint”). NWH denies the allegations in the Operative Complaint,
12 denies any failure to comply with the laws identified in in the Operative Complaint, and denies
13 any and all liability for the causes of action alleged. *Id.*

14 **C. Discovery and Mediation**

15 The Parties have conducted investigation of the operative facts and applicable law
16 during the pendency of the case through informal discovery. Specifically, Plaintiff received
17 complete pay data (13,536 lines of data) and time data (280,999 lines of data) in electronic
18 format for the class from the start of the Class Period through mediation. No class data was
19 sampled. Also, prior to mediation, Plaintiff had the benefit of both variations of Defendant’s
20 Employee Handbook in effect during the Class Period as well as Plaintiff’s personnel file.
21 Plaintiff assessed and analyzed the data with expert assistance prior to mediation to inform
22 potential exposure on asserted claims. HH Decl. ¶10.

23 On October 5, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendant participated in a full-day mediation
24 before Hon. Amy D. Hogue (ret.). The Parties were able to reach a resolution at the mediation
25 and executed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”). The Parties ultimately entered into
26 their Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement, a true and correct copy of which is
attached as **Exhibit “1”** to the Declaration of Haik Hacopian, which incorporated the terms
of the MOU. HH Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1.

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1 through preliminary approval or February 5, 2024, whichever is sooner.).
2 S.A. ¶¶1.5 & 1.12.

3 Aggrieved Employees are defined as follows:

4 All current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees of NWH
5 in California, including those at Howard Johnson Hotel and Water
6 Playground, Courtyard Anaheim Theme Park Entrance, Courtyard by
7 Marriot Fisherman's Wharf, and its corporate staff, employed during the
8 PAGA period ("the period from March 3, 2022, through preliminary
9 approval, or February 5, 2024, whichever is sooner). S.A. ¶¶1.4 & 1.31.

10 **C. Settlement Payments to Class Members and Aggrieved Employees**

11 Each Participating Class Member's pro rata share of the Net Settlement Amount
12 ("Individual Class Payment") will be calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount
13 by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the
14 Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member's Workweeks.
15 S.A. ¶¶1.23 & 3.2.4.

16 Each Aggrieved Employee's pro rata share of PAGA Penalties ("Individual PAGA
17 Payment") shall be calculated by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees' 25%
18 share of PAGA Penalties at \$7,500.00 by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods
19 worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result
20 by each Aggrieved Employee's PAGA Period Pay Periods. ¶¶1.24 & 3.2.5.1.

21 **D. Settlement Allocation to Class Members**

22 Thirty-three percent (33%) of Individual Class Payments will be allocated to wages
23 for which W-2s shall be issued, and sixty-seven percent (67%) will be allocated to interest
24 and penalties, and liquidated damages to be reported on an IRS Form 1099. The PAGA
25 Payments to PAGA Members will be reported on IRS Form 1009s. S.A. ¶¶3.4.2.1 & 3.2.5.2.

26 **E. Opt-Outs, Disputes, and Objections**

Class Members who wish to exclude themselves (opt-out of) the Class Settlement must
send the Administrator, by fax, email, or mail, a signed written Request for Exclusion not later
than 60 days after the Administrator mails the Class Notice (plus an additional 14 days for
Class Members whose Class Notice is re-mailed). A Request for Exclusion is a letter from a
Class Member or his/her representative that reasonably communicates the Class Member's

1 election to be excluded from the Settlement and includes the Class Member's name, address
2 and email address or telephone number. To be valid, a Request for Exclusion must be timely
3 faxed, emailed, or postmarked by the Response Deadline. S.A. ¶7.5.1.

4 Each Class Member shall have 60 days after the Administrator mails the Class Notice
5 (plus an additional 14 days for Class Members whose Class Notice is re-mailed) to challenge
6 the number of Class Workweeks and PAGA Pay Periods (if any) allocated to the Class
7 Member in the Class Notice. The Class Member may challenge the allocation by
8 communicating with the Administrator via fax, email or mail. The Administrator must
9 encourage the challenging Class Member to submit supporting documentation. In the absence
10 of any contrary documentation, the Administrator is entitled to presume that the Workweeks
11 contained in the Class Notice are correct so long as they are consistent with the Class Data.
12 The Administrator will also consult with Class Counsel and Defense Counsel in an attempt to
13 address any such challenges. The Administrator shall promptly provide copies of all
14 challenges to calculation of Workweeks and/or Pay Periods to Defense Counsel and Class
15 Counsel and the Administrator's recommendation as to the challenges. The Parties shall
16 present any disputes, along with the Administrator's recommendation, to the Court for
17 resolution at final approval. S.A. ¶7.6.

18 Only Participating Class Members may object to the class action components of the
19 Settlement and/or this Agreement, including contesting the fairness of the Settlement, and/or
20 amounts requested for the Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses
21 Payment and/or Class Representative Service Payment. S.A. ¶7.7.1.

22 Participating Class Members may send written objections to the Administrator, by fax,
23 email, or mail. In the alternative, Participating Class Members may appear in Court (or hire
24 an attorney to appear in Court) to present verbal objections at the Final Approval Hearing. A
25 Participating Class Member who elects to send a written objection to the Administrator must
26 do so not later than 60 days after the Administrator's mailing of the Class Notice (plus an
additional 14 days for Class Members whose Class Notice was re-mailed). S.A. ¶7.7.2.

1 **F. Release**

2 Release by Participating Class Members: All Participating Class Members (including
3 Plaintiff), on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives,
4 agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from:

5 The Claims set forth in the Action, including, but not limited to: (1) Failure to pay
6 minimum and regular rate wages; (2) Failure to pay overtime compensation; (3) Failure to
7 provide meal periods or provide premiums in lieu thereof; (4) Failure to provide rest periods
8 or provide premiums in lieu thereof; (5) Failure to pay timely wages at termination; (6) Failure
9 to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) Violation of Business and Professions Code
10 § 17200, et seq.; (8) Failure to reimburse for necessary business expenses; (9) Failure to Pay
11 Vacation Wages Due at Termination, and those claims predicated on the same or similar facts
12 and/or claims alleged in the Action; as well as any claims that could have been pled which
13 arise from the same or similar facts concerning the Plaintiff or the putative class, and claims
14 for interest, penalties (including but not limited to waiting time penalties); as well as any
15 claims under the California Labor Code and California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage
16 Orders (specifically for violations of California Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210,
17 225.5, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 227.3, 510, 512, 1194, 1194.2, 2800, and 2802, and applicable IWC
18 Wage Orders, and California Code of Regulations, Title 8, section 11000 et seq.; or which
19 could have been alleged under the same or similar facts, allegations and/or claims pleaded in
20 the Action. S.A., ¶5.2.1.

21 Any claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, restitution, alleged or which could
22 have been alleged under the facts, allegations and/or claims pleaded in the complaints filed as
23 part of the Action. S.A., ¶5.2.2.

24 Any and all other claims under California common law, the federal law, and the
25 California Business and Professions Code alleged in or that could have been alleged under the
26 same or similar facts, allegations and/or claims pleaded in the Action and based on the alleged
Labor Code violations. S.A., ¶5.2.3.

PAGA Release by Aggrieved Employees and Labor Workforce Development Agency:

1 The Labor Workforce Development Agency, State of California, in addition to all Aggrieved
2 Employees, and Plaintiff Hernandez as a proxy for the LWDA are deemed to release, on behalf
3 of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs,
4 administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from the claims for civil penalties
5 under the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq.) that
6 are set forth in the Action or which could have been asserted predicated on the same or similar
7 facts alleged in the Action and/or any PAGA letter sent to the LWDA by Plaintiff in or prior
8 to the Action for violations of California Labor Code sections 201, 203, 204, 226, 226.3,
9 226.7, 227.3, 510, 512, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, and 2802, and applicable IWC Wage Orders.
S.A., ¶5.3.

10 “Released Parties” means: Northwest Hotel Corporation, and any of its past, present
11 and future direct or indirect parents, subsidiaries, predecessors, successors and affiliates, as
12 well as each of their past, present and future officers, directors, employees, partners, members,
13 shareholders and agents, attorneys, insurers, reinsurers, and any individual or entity which
14 could be jointly liable with Defendant, including but not limited to Raymond J. Powers
15 Executor F/T Estate of James P. Edmondson dba Courtyard by Marriot at Fisherman’s Wharf.
16 S.A., ¶1.41.

17 Only Named Plaintiff will be providing a general release and waiver of Civil Code
18 §1542. S.A. ¶5.1.

19 **G. Service Award to Named Class Representative**

20 As part of the settlement, at the time of seeking final approval of the proposed class
21 action settlement, Plaintiff will separately apply for a Service Award in the amount of Seven
22 Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$7,500) for her services to the Class and for a general release
23 of all claims. S.A. ¶3.2.1. “[I]ncentive awards are fairly typical in class action cases ... and
24 are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class [and] to
25 make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action.” *In re Cellphone*
26 *Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393-94. Plaintiff’s requested incentive
payment is intended to recognize Plaintiff’s contributions on behalf of the Class and is fair in

1 relation to the total settlement, her efforts, and standing alone. HH Decl. ¶15. Plaintiff has put
2 a significant amount and time and effort participating in this case and understands her role
3 and obligations as class representative. Declaration of Ene C. Hernandez, ¶¶3-8.

4 **H. Attorneys' Fees & Costs**

5 Defendant agrees not to oppose Plaintiff's counsel's application for an attorneys' fees
6 award of \$140,000.00, which is thirty five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount of
7 \$400,000, and payment of documented litigation costs and expenses up to \$15,000. S.A.
8 ¶3.2.2. Plaintiff will submit detailed support for her request for a fee award along with her
9 motion for final approval of the settlement. For now, counsel submits that the requested fee is
10 fair compensation for undertaking a complex, risky, expensive, and potentially time-
11 consuming litigation involving this case on a purely contingent fee basis. Here, counsel has
12 incurred substantial attorneys' fees independently conducting pre-filing investigations,
13 analyzing the claims, litigating the case, conducting legal research and analysis, reviewing
14 significant documentary and electronic records produced by Defendant, performing data
15 analysis of employee timekeeping data and payroll records, preparing for and attending a full-
16 day mediation, negotiating the settlement, reviewing and amending the long-form Class
17 Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement, Class Notice, and preparing this Motion for
18 Preliminary Approval, and otherwise aggressively pursuing the interests of the putative class.
HH Decl. ¶16.

19 Both California and federal courts have recognized that an appropriate method for
20 awarding attorneys' fees in class actions is to award a percentage of the "common fund"
21 created as a result of the settlement. *See Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91
22 Cal.App.4th 224, 254 (recognizing both the "percentage of recovery" and "lodestar/
23 multiplier" methods). Plaintiff counsel's request for fees of thirty five percent (35%) of the
24 Gross Settlement Amount is within the range of reasonableness. Historically, courts have
25 awarded percentage fees in the one-third range. *See, e.g., Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.*
26 (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 878 ("[S]tudies show that . . . fee awards in class actions average
around one-third of the recovery."); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 n.11

1 (2008) (accord); Eisenberg & Miller, *Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical*
2 *Study*, J. of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 27-78, March 2004, at 35 (independent
3 studies of class action litigation nationwide conclude that a one-third fee is consistent with
4 market rates).

5 In conclusion, counsel submits that its request for attorneys' fees is reasonable when
6 viewed as an overall percentage of the settlement as well as with reference to counsel's
7 loadstar. In light of the risks and significant work undertaken by counsel, the results obtained
8 for the class, and the efficiency with which the Parties collaborated to conduct the litigation,
9 the fee and cost request is fair and reasonable. HH Decl. ¶17.

10 **IV. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL IS WARRANTED**

11 Rules of Court, rule 3.769 conditions the settlement of a class action on court approval,
12 which is generally evaluated under the federal standards applicable under Rule 23 of the Fed.
13 R. Civ. P. 23. *See Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322, 337
14 (2012) (stating that Rule 3.769 requires the trial court to determine "that the settlement is fair,
15 reasonable and adequate to all concerned"); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir. 1998) 150
16 F.3d 1011, 1026 (stating that Rule 23(e) requires the trial court to determine "whether a
17 proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable"). To be approved, a
18 settlement must be "fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned." *Reed*, 208 Cal.App.4th at
19 337. Settlement is the preferred means of dispute resolution, particularly in complex class
20 action litigation. *See In re Syncor ERISA Litig.* (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 1095, 1101. The
21 Court's role in evaluating a proposed settlement is limited to ensuring that the agreement taken
22 as a whole is fair, and is not the product of fraud or collusion between the negotiating parties.
23 *See, e.g., Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1027. There is an initial presumption of fairness when the
24 settlement agreement was negotiated at arms' length by experienced counsel. *See, e.g., Kullar*
25 *v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130. A trial court's decision to approve
26 a class action settlement is within the sound discretion for the trial judge and may be reversed

1 only if the trial court acted outside of its broad discretion. *See Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola*
2 *Bottling Co. of L.A.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 407.

3 **A. Standard for Preliminary Approval**

4 To make a fairness determination, the Court should consider several factors, including:
5 "The strength of Plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further
6 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
7 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, [and] the
8 experience and views of counsel." *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.
9 "The list of factors is not exclusive and the Court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing
10 of the factors depending on the circumstances of each case." *Wershba v. Apple Computer,*
11 *Inc., supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245. It should be noted that the reasonableness of a settlement
12 is not dependent upon its actual value approaching the potential recovery plaintiff might have
13 received if he had succeeded at trial, *Sutter Health Unins. Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal. App.
14 4th 495, 511 (emphasizing that the court must be mindful that "[t]he ... class case could have
15 gone to an incredibly lengthy and expensive jury trial, and the class could have lost the case"
16 and must account for that likelihood in discounting the value of the claims for settlement
17 purposes [emphasis in original]). As discussed below, the proposed settlement is fair, adequate
18 and reasonable in light of the overall balance of factors in this case.

18 **B. The Strength of Plaintiff's Case**

19 1. Unpaid Wage Claims

20 Plaintiff's unpaid wage claim is predicated on the allegation that there was a shortage
21 of time clocks and employees had to line up to use them. That, to clock in on time and avoid
22 reprimand, employees had to arrive to work prior to their scheduled shifts to account for the
23 5 to 7 minutes it took to wait and clock in. Also, due to the high incidence of meal periods
24 that were exactly 30 minutes in duration (47.1%) coupled with the shortage of time clocks,
25 employees would have to cut their meal breaks short to be able to clock back in at the 30th
26 minute such that meal breaks were not net 30-minutes in duration and off-the-clock wages
would be owed. Per Plaintiff's analysis, at 7 minutes of unpaid time per shift (55% of which

1 would be overtime), unpaid wages would tally to \$364,915. Also, Plaintiff identified rounding
2 loss occurring in the early part of the Class Period totaling \$4,908 and overtime
3 miscalculations during the class period that reflect \$6,173 in unpaid wages. HH Decl. ¶18.

4 Defendant contended that it maintained sufficient and conveniently located time
5 clocks for employee use. Notably, that Plaintiff had not worked since March of 2020, when
6 COVID started, and biometric time clocks were added after the hotels reopened. Also, that
7 shifts were also staggered such that there would be no large group of employees using any
8 specific time clock at the same time. That to the extent there was any backup in using a time
9 clock, they would be one off situations likely caused by time clock malfunctions and that
10 employees would be able to log their time manually if a time clock was not functional. HH
Decl. ¶19.

11 As Defendant maintained compliant written time tracking and wage payment policies,
12 a potential claim for unpaid wages will not emanate from there and as such, will be extremely
13 individualized and difficult to prove. The extent to which an employee worked off the clock
14 and was not compensated will depend circumstances that will not translate to certification.
15 Any assessment will rely on a morass of individual inquiries that will require a determination
16 as to whether Defendant is liable for specific instance of work off-the-clock. Based on the
17 foregoing, Plaintiff does not value an unpaid wage claim at more than 20% of the assessed
18 exposure of \$364,915, or \$72,983, plus 100% of the undisputed \$11,081 owed for rounding
19 loss and overtime miscalculations, or \$84,064 total. HH Decl. ¶20.

20 2. Meal Breaks

21 In Plaintiff's experience, meal breaks were extremely rare. Plaintiff recalls that the
22 typical practice was for management to have employees clock out and continue working and
23 clock back in around scheduled meal breaks to show compliance in the records. Plaintiff
24 understands that such was the practice at least as to housekeeping employees who were under
25 constant pressure to churn rooms and compliant meal breaks would otherwise occur during
guest check out/check in periods. HH Decl. ¶21.

26 Plaintiff's analysis identifies 117,111 of the 122,736 total shifts that exceed five hours

1 necessitating meal breaks. A notable issue with meal breaks is that 47.1% of the 104,074
2 recorded meal breaks are exactly 30 minutes in length. This suggests time clock manipulation
3 with strict managerial oversight, including potential rounding of meal punches in line with the
4 practice as to housekeeping employees as identified above. HH Decl. ¶22.

5 If a meal break violation is assumed for all recorded meal breaks that are 30 minutes
6 or less in duration, there would be 51,698 unique meal break violations (offset by the 7,593
7 in premiums paid) which at a \$19.60 average pay rate, calculates to \$864,458 exposure. HH
8 Decl. ¶23.

9 Defendant contended that the high incidence of meal break precision was not the result
10 of any manipulation and reflects a one-to-one representation of the meal punches by
11 employees. Defendant also represented that employees had company devices that enabled
12 them to track breaks with precision and set alarms for when a break ended. Moreover, that
13 most employees chose to take their lunch in the employee break room and accessed the time
14 clock located there as they entered and existed the space. Significantly, Defendant maintained
15 compliant written meal break policies and posted the pertinent wage orders that articulated
16 the relevant standards. That to the extent Plaintiff encountered any issues, she was employed
17 during the early part of the class period through March 2020 and Plaintiff would not be privy
18 to the higher compliance period after the hotels reopened for business later in 2020 when meal
19 breaks were more carefully scheduled to avoid having too many employees in one place. HH
20 Decl. ¶24.

21 The foregoing readily suggests that the claim will be extremely individualized and
22 difficult to certify, let alone prove. Individual inquiry will be necessary to establish whether a
23 non-compliant meal break in the time record was due to employee choice (for which
24 Defendant would not be liable) or Defendant's fault. There will be notable variations between
25 employee groups, e.g. housekeeping, restaurant, and front desk. Notably, Defendant
26 maintained the practice of paying meal premiums and the record reflects 7,593 instances of
paid premiums. Based on the foregoing, meal break exposure should not include meal breaks
that are exactly thirty minutes in length, which account for 43,962 of the 51,698 unique meal

1 period violations noted above, and a realistic exposure for a meal break claim may be assessed
2 at \$151,625.60. The value of the claim is not expected to exceed \$80,000 for settlement
3 purposes. HH Decl. ¶25.

4 3. Rest Breaks

5 Defendant maintained a compliant written rest break policy. Despite this, Plaintiff
6 contended that employees were denied rest breaks due to the volume and nature of work. That
7 although there were no express directives for employees to forego rest breaks, rest breaks
8 would affect workflow such that daily quotas would not be met and employees would face
9 reprimand and termination. HH Decl. ¶26.

10 Defendant countered that employees regularly took rest breaks and were encouraged
11 and regularly reminded to do so by management. Also, that there was no strict quota,
12 management was careful to not overburden employees, that housekeeping employees were
13 paid extra for cleaning additional rooms, and received a room cleaned credit to the extent a
14 room had a “do no disturb” sign placed. That such practices do not create an environment
15 where employees are coerced into skipping rest breaks and to the extent any employee did so,
16 it would be entirely of their own volition. HH Decl. ¶27.

17 Plaintiff identifies 120,652 shifts exceeding 3.5 hours that would require a rest break.
18 It is difficult to place a value on a rest break claim in light of a compliant written rest break
19 policy and lack of evidence in the time record as there is no requirement that rest breaks, unlike
20 meal breaks, be recorded. Moreover, the high degree of factual variations and necessity of
21 individualized inquiries to both identify missed rest breaks and reasons therefor make it
22 extremely remote that a rest break claim can be certified. Based on the foregoing, assessing
23 the claim at 10% of rest break eligible shifts would result in exposure of \$243,214 and a
24 realistic value of the claim may not be assessed at more than \$50,000. HH Decl. ¶28.

25 4. Waiting Time Penalties

26 Plaintiff’s analysis identified 212 terminated employees beginning on March 3, 2020.
A comparison of the time data (last day worked) and payroll data (last paycheck date) reveals
that the average waiting period was 10 days. Plaintiff argued that such would be period for

1 which penalties may be assessed for a substantive waiting time claim. Defendant countered
2 that this gap can be explained by their practice of placing employees on paid suspension before
3 termination such that an employee's last day worked is rarely their termination date. Also,
4 that employees were promptly tendered their final paycheck and benefits upon termination.
5 HH Decl. ¶29.

6 The claim for waiting time penalties could also be derivative of the claims for unpaid
7 wages and meal and rest premiums but the weaknesses described there would directly impact
8 the viability of this claim. See *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Svcs.* (2022) 13 Cal.5th 93. The
9 most likely avenue for recovery of waiting time penalties would be on a derivative basis to 33
10 former employees identified as being owed some unpaid wages due to regular rate
11 miscalculations, which amounts to \$150,123 in potential exposure for this claim at the
12 maximum of 30 days penalties to these 33 employees. Even here, Defendant may attempt to
13 avail itself of the "good faith dispute" defense under Cal. Code. Regs. §13520. Ultimately, the
14 value of waiting time claim is not expected to exceed for \$100,000 for settlement purposes.
HH Decl. ¶30.

15 5. Wage Statement Penalties

16 The regular wage statements issued to employees were facially compliant with the
17 requirements of Labor Code Section 226. As with waiting time penalties, this claim is
18 derivative of unpaid wage, meal, and rest break violations. See *Naranjo, supra*. Although
19 maximum exposure calculates to \$643,050 for the 263 employees during the wage statement
20 penalty period for 6,562 wage statements from March 3, 2022 to October 5, 2023, value may
21 be assessed at not more than \$60,000, due to this claim's reliance on the underlying claims
22 and subject to weaknesses described therein. HH Decl. ¶31.

23 6. PAGA Claims

24 The intention of PAGA penalties is not to serve a punitive or compensatory purpose
25 but to sufficiently act as a deterrent to future Labor Code violations. Any penalty evaluations
26 are subject to significant discretionary reductions per Labor Code Sec. 2699(e)(2). The most
likely avenue for recovery of PAGA penalties would be for \$6,173 underpayment of overtime

1 due to regular rate miscalculations, which would implicate 3,131 of the 6,562 total PAGA pay
2 periods. Maximum PAGA penalties for this issue would calculate to \$607,100. Applying an
3 80% reduction, consistent with reported cases, results in a potential exposure of \$121,420.
4 HH Decl. ¶30. See e.g., *Fleming v. Covidien* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) 2011 WL 7563047 at
5 *4 (reduction of PAGA civil penalties for wage statement violations from \$2,800,000 to
6 \$500,000, because employees suffered no injury, defendants were not aware that their wage
7 statements violated the law, and that they took prompt steps to correct violations.) Moreover,
8 a Court may readily conclude that a lower penalty assessment will more than suffice to deter
9 violations by this particular employer and in consideration of the minimal amount of total
10 wage loss. There is also the risk that all or part of the PAGA claim may be rejected on trial
11 manageability grounds. Based on the foregoing, the Parties' \$30,000 allocation for release of
12 the PAGA claims reflects a very fair compromise and is extremely reasonable. HH Decl. ¶32.

13 **C. Risks and Uncertainty**

14 Although Plaintiff steadfastly maintains that her claims are meritorious, she
15 acknowledges that her position includes real risks and uncertainty. In deciding whether to
16 approve the settlement, the Court must balance the risk factors against an "understanding of
17 the amount in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation." *Kullar*, 168
18 Cal.App.4th at 130, 133; *Munoz*, 186 Cal.App.4th at 408-09. In this case, the settlement is fair
19 and adequate when compared to the total potential exposure and the risks inherent in
20 Plaintiff's claims. HH Decl. ¶33.

21 As courts have observed, "simply because a settlement may amount to only a fraction
22 of the potential recovery does not in itself render it unfair or inadequate. Compromise is the
23 very nature of settlement." *Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.* (C.D. Cal. 1979) 485 F. Supp. 610, 618. In
24 this case, Plaintiff considers the settlement to be significantly more than a "fraction,"
25 particularly considering the various potential complications, dangers and pitfalls that
26 proceeding would entail. HH Decl. ¶33.

27 In addition to considering the value of immediate payment for Settlement Class
28 Members, Plaintiff's counsel discounted the value of the class claims based on a variety of

1 factors, including the California Supreme Court's decision in *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v.*
2 *Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004. Defendant could have argued that it sufficiently
3 provided breaks without "policing" them. Moreover, Plaintiff's theory of liability for rest
4 break violations was weaker since employers have no obligation to record rest breaks (as rest
5 breaks are paid breaks). The relative lack of written proof, except for potential testimony from
6 Class Members, diminished the prospect of certifying the claim. Thus, a significant discount
7 on those claims was warranted. HH Decl. ¶¶20-28.

8 The potential penalties were deemed to be substantial claims. Success on the penalty
9 claims would require proving that the Defendants' conduct was "willful." As to PAGA claims,
10 there existed a high likelihood of a marginal award due to the potential for discretionary
11 reduction of maximum penalties by the Court assuming liability was established. HH Decl.
12 ¶¶29-32.

13 In short, Plaintiff's ability to prevail on certification and merits was far from certain.
14 There is the risk that prolonged litigation would likely have produced a worse result for
15 Settlement Class Members. Thus, this factor supports preliminary approval.

16 **D. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Duration of Further Litigation**

17 This factor also weighs in favor of settlement approval. The parties had engaged in
18 informal discovery with significant review and assessment of the asserted claims which
19 included expert assistance. Defendant could have moved for summary adjudication on all or
20 some of the claims. Moreover, preparation for class certification and trial remained for the
21 Parties as well as the prospect of appeals in the wake of a disputed class certification ruling
22 for Plaintiff and/or summary judgment ruling. As a result, the parties would incur considerably
23 more attorneys' fees and costs through trial. This settlement avoids those risks and the
24 accompanying expense. HH Decl. ¶34. Hence, an additional support for a preliminary
25 approval.

26 **E. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status**

To the extent any claims were certified, Defendant would certainly seek to decertify
them. Absent settlement, there was a risk that there would never be a certified class. HH Decl.

¶35. Thus, this factor, too, supports preliminary approval of the settlement.

F. Amount Offered in Settlement Given Realistic Value of Claims

This proposed settlement provides a fair and reasonable monetary recovery for the Class in the face of disputed claims and significant hurdles. HH Decl. ¶33. Courts recognize that the reasonableness of a settlement is not dependent upon it approaching the potential recovery plaintiffs might receive if successful at trial. *See In re Omnivision Tech., Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2008) 2008 WL 123936; *see also Nat'l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. Directv, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (“well settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery”); *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F. 2d 615, 628 (it is “the complete package, taken as a whole rather than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness”). The \$197,500 Net Settlement Amount captures 52.8% of the \$374,064 assessed case value on viable class claims, as summarized herein, which is extremely favorable given the significant risk factors described above. HH Decl. ¶33.

G. Discovery Completed and the Status of Proceedings

The lawsuit involved informal discovery which included the production of complete payroll and timekeeping records for the putative class. It was only after the completion of this process and expert analysis that the parties participated in mediation and thereafter reached the proposed settlement. HH Decl. ¶¶10 & 11. Here is an additional factor germane to the preliminary approval.

H. The Experience and Views of Counsel

"Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party's expected outcome in litigation." *In re Pacific Enterprises Securities Litigation* (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 378. Here, Plaintiff is represented by competent and experienced counsel who pressed Plaintiff's claims forward against a reputable employment defense firm. Class Counsel possesses extensive experience litigating wage and hour class actions from the plaintiff side and has been appointed as class counsel in numerous cases alleging similar claims. HH Decl. ¶¶2-3, Declaration of Zorik

1 Mooradian (hereinafter “ZM Decl.”) ¶¶2-5. Class Counsel conducted review and analysis of
2 Defendant’s policies and timekeeping and payroll records and drew on its extensive
3 experience in similar cases to effectively assess the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s
4 claims. The settlement was also reached with the input and assistance of an experienced and
5 respected neutral mediator. HH Decl. ¶¶10 & 11. This factor strongly supports preliminary
6 approval. *See, Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130 (“The court undoubtedly should give
7 considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a
8 neutral mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arm's length
9 transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct.”).

10 **V. THE PRELIMINARY APPROVAL STANDARD HAS BEEN MET**

11 The Court should grant preliminary approval of the settlement and direct that notice
12 be given if the proposed settlement when it: (1) falls within the range of possible approval;
13 (2) appears to be the product of serious, informed and non-collusive negotiations; and (3) has
14 no obvious deficiencies. *See Manual for Complex Litigation* § 30.41 (3rd Ed. 1995); 4
Newberg on Class Actions § 11:24-25 (4th Ed. 2013).

15 The proposed settlement reflects a substantial portion of the estimated recovery that
16 the Settlement Class could reasonably expect in light of the potential litigation risks. As well,
17 the proposed settlement is for a sizable sum in light of the strong defenses and provides for
18 significant individual recovery. In accordance, the proposed settlement is within the range of
19 possible approval for communication of a notice in conformity and consideration thereof by
20 the Settlement Class. The Court will have the opportunity to again assess the reasonableness
21 of the settlement after the Class has had the opportunity to opt-out or object. HH Decl. ¶36.

22 **A. The Settlement Resulted From Serious, Informed, and Non-Collusive** 23 **Negotiations**

24 This proposed class-wide settlement is the result of arm's-length negotiations by
25 counsel, punctuated by a full-day mediation session before an experienced mediator and is,
26 therefore, entitled to an initial presumption of fairness. *See Kullar*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130.
Plaintiff reviewed complete and unsampled data for the class and conducted analysis of the

1 data and records, with the participation of an expert, to arrive at her estimated damage figures.
2 HH Decl. ¶¶10-11, 18-32.

3 The parties reached an agreement to mediate before Hon. Amy D. Hogue (ret.), a
4 respected neutral mediator. Both sides agreed to a settlement and executed an MOU. They
5 then finalized the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement. HH Decl. ¶11. Therefore,
6 this factor also supports preliminary approval.

7 **B. Provisional Class Certification is Appropriate Here**

8 “Litigation by class action has long been recognized as a superior method of resolving
9 wage and hour claims in California.” *Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings* (2014) 231
10 Cal.App.4th 362, 367. Class certification is appropriate when there exists “an ascertainable
11 and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits
12 from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to alternatives.” *Brinker*, 53
13 Cal.4th 1004 at 1021. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[c]laims alleging a uniform policy
14 consistently applied to a group of employees in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the
15 sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment.” *Id.* at 1033. This is exactly
16 such a case.

17 **1. The Proposed Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous**

18 A class is "ascertainable" where the members "may be readily identified without
19 unreasonable expense or time by reference to official [or business] records." *See Sevidal v.*
20 *Target Corp.* (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 919 (alterations in original). Here, the proposed
21 Class is defined by reference to two objective characteristics: (1) individuals who worked as
22 non-exempt employees for Defendant NWH in California, and (2) were employed by
23 Defendant NWH at some time during the Class Period. Therefore, Class Members can be
24 identified from Defendant’s personnel and other employment records. As to numerosity, the
25 Class consists of at least 440 individuals, making it highly impracticable to bring all class
26 members before the Court. HH Decl. ¶12.

**2. The Community of Interest Requirements for Class Treatment are
Met**

1 “[T]he community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant
2 common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of
3 the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” *Brinker*, 53
4 Cal.4th at 1021.

5 **a. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate**

6 The focus in a certification dispute is not on the merits of the case, but rather on what
7 types of questions, "common or individual," are likely to arise in the action. *See Sav-On Drug*
8 *Store, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 327. "Common questions of law and fact
9 are required in order to assure the interests of the litigants and the Court are furthered by
10 permitting the suit to proceed as a class action rather than in a multiplicity of separate suits."
11 *Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc.* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 966, 975. Where the defendant
12 systematically engages in policies and practices that allegedly violate the Labor Code and
13 subject all of its employees to the same unlawful conduct, common questions of law and fact
14 will predominate over individualized issues. *See, e.g., Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*
15 (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1538 (holding that a class of limousine drivers challenging their
16 compensation plan was proper for class treatment). Here, the predominance factor is met
17 because each claim challenges an alleged common policy or practice that Plaintiff contends is
18 illegal. Plaintiff's claims under the Labor Code are predicated on: a failure to pay for all hours
19 worked; meal, rest period policies and practices. These sorts of claims are commonly held to
20 be proper for class certification. *See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th
1353, 1371 (certifying class based on uncompensated work time).

21 **b. The Claims of Named Plaintiff are Typical**

22 The typicality requirement is satisfied where class representatives have claims that are
23 typical of those of the rest of the class. *B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* (1987)
24 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347 (finding typicality satisfied where named Plaintiff purchased the
25 same goods as the putative class in a consumer class action). Here, the claims of Plaintiff are
26 typical of those held by the members of the proposed Class. First, Plaintiff was employed by
NWH during the proposed Class Period and was subject to its wage and hour practices.

1 Second, Plaintiff claims she was injured by the same challenged practices she claims injured
2 the Class as a whole. Therefore, Plaintiff has suffered the same alleged injuries as the other
3 members of the Class and satisfies the typicality requirement.

4 **c. Plaintiff & Class Counsel Will Fairly & Adequately**
5 **Represent the Class**

6 The adequacy of representation requirement examines conflicts of interest between
7 named parties and the class they seek to represent. *See Capital People First v. State Dept. of*
8 *Developmental Services* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 697. A party's claim of representative
9 status will only be defeated by a conflict that "goes to the very subject matter of the litigation."
10 *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470. Here, Plaintiff and her counsel
11 will adequately represent the class as there are no conflicts between the named Plaintiff and
12 the Class she seeks to represent, and Plaintiff has claims that are in line with those of the class.
13 Declaration of Ene C. Hernandez, ¶¶3&4, HH Decl. ¶5, ZM Decl. ¶6. Plaintiff's counsel also
14 has extensive experience in wage and hour class action litigation. HH Decl. ¶¶2-6, ZM Decl.
15 ¶¶2-5. For these reasons, the Court should provisionally certify the proposed Class.

16 **3. Class-Wide Settlement is Superior to Other Available Methods of**
17 **Resolution**

18 Here, the alternative method of resolution would be multiple individual lawsuits,
19 challenging the same alleged wage and hour policies and practices of NWH, and each seeking
20 a small amount of damages. Such duplicative litigation would be extremely inefficient and
21 costly for the courts and wasteful for judicial forums that would otherwise devote resources
22 to other matters. HH Decl. ¶37. In light of these concerns, a class action is the superior method
23 of resolving these wage and hour claims. *Martinez*, 231 Cal.App.4th at 367 ("Litigation by
24 class action has long been recognized as a superior method of resolving wage and hour claims
25 in California.")
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1 **VI. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPOSED**
2 **NOTICE**

3 This Court should order distribution to the Class Members of the proposed Class
4 Notice in both English and Spanish by first-class mail. S.A. ¶7.4.2, Exh. “A”. This manner of
5 giving notice is the "best notice practicable" under the circumstances because it provides
6 "individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." *See Eisen*
7 *v. Carlisle & Jacquelin* (1974) 417 U.S. 156, 173. As a general rule, class notice must strike
8 a balance between thoroughness and the need to avoid unduly complicating the content of the
9 notice and confusing class members. *Wershba*, 911 Cal.4th at 252. The proposed Notice of
10 Settlement is attached as Exhibit A to the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement.
11 S.A. ¶7.4.2, Ex. A.

12 Here, the Parties propose that the settlement be administered by CPT Group, Inc.
13 (“CPT” or “Settlement Administrator”), an experienced class action settlement administrator.
14 S.A. §7. The Settlement Administrator’s duties are detailed in the Class Action and PAGA
15 Settlement Agreement. *Id.* Class Members' addresses are ascertainable through Defendant’s
16 personnel and payroll records. To the extent that the addresses of former employees have
17 changed, CPT will run all the addresses provided through the United States Postal Service
18 Notice of Change Of Address database (which provides updated addresses for any individual
19 who has moved in the previous four years and has notified the U.S. Postal Service of a
20 forwarding address) and perform skip traces to obtain current address information. *Id.* The
21 Settlement Agreement allocates a maximum of \$10,000 for administration expenses, which is
22 appropriate in light of the number of class members and the size of the settlement and the
23 extent of work to be performed in administering the settlement of the class. S.A. ¶3.2.3.
24 Plaintiff has secured a bid from CPT to administer the settlement for \$10,000. HH Decl., ¶38,
25 Ex. 3.

26 The content of the proposed Class Notice satisfies Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(d)
because it advises class members of the nature of the claims, basic contentions and denials of
the parties and the key terms of the settlement, the deadline to opt-out, or object to the

1 settlement and the procedure by which to do so, explains the recovery formula and expected
2 recovery amount for each class member, and advises them that they will be bound by the terms
3 of the settlement if they do not request exclusion. The proposed Class Notice will also notify
4 Settlement Class Members of the final approval hearing date and provides the contact
5 information for Class Counsel, and advises Settlement Class Members that they may enter an
6 appearance through counsel if they wish to. This manner of giving notice satisfies Cal. Rules
7 of Court, rule 3.769(e) as the most reliable and cost-effective method of reaching Settlement
8 Class Members.

9 **VII. THE PAGA ALLOCATION AND PAYMENTS SHOULD BE APPROVED**

10 The Settlement allocates \$30,000 for resolution of Plaintiff's PAGA claim with
11 \$22,500 (75%) payable to the LWDA and \$7,500 (25%) payable to Aggrieved Employees
12 Members. S.A. ¶3.2.5. To the extent an Aggrieved Employee is also a Class Member, they
13 will receive their Individual PAGA Settlement Payment even if they submit an exclusion
14 request. As required, this Motion and all supporting papers will be concurrently submitted to
15 the LWDA.

16 **VIII. THE COURT SHOULD SET A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING**

17 The Parties request that this Court set a hearing for final approval of the settlement on
18 a date appropriately scheduled to follow the deadline by which Settlement Class Members
19 must file objections to the settlement or opt-out. See Cal. Rule of Court, rule 3.769. The parties
20 propose that the final papers in support of the settlement be filed and served no later than 14
21 days prior to the hearing on final approval, and that the hearing on final approval of the
22 settlement be set 120 days after the date of the preliminary approval hearing, to allow a
23 reasonable period for notice and administration, and an opportunity to object to the settlement,
24 without excessive delay to the Class as to the receipt of their settlement shares.

1 **IX. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily
3 approve the proposed settlement, provisionally certify the Settlement Class, and enter the
4 Proposed Order submitted concurrently herewith.

5 Dated: December 29, 2023

MOORADIAN LAW, APC

6 By: /s/ Haik Hacopian

7 Zorik Mooradian, Esq.,

8 Haik Hacopian, Esq.,

9 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Ene C. Hernandez,
10 individually and on behalf of other persons
11 similarly situated and similarly aggrieved
12 employees
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