

John G. Yslas (SBN 187324)
jyslas@wilshirelawfirm.com
Jeffrey C. Bills (SBN 301629)
jbills@wilshirelawfirm.com
Aram Boyadjian (SBN 334009)
aboyadjian@wilshirelawfirm.com
Andrew Sandoval (SBN 346996)
andrew.sandoval@wilshirelawfirm.com
John Brown (SBN 233605)
jbrown@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90010
Telephone: (213) 381-9988
Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiff

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SOLANO**

ZOEY SMITH, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

RECYCLING ZONE, INC., a California
corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: FCS059572

CLASS ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to:
Hon. Christine A. Carringer, Dept. 12]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

*[Filed with the Declaration of John G. Yslas;
Declaration of Plaintiff Zoey Smith; and
Proposed Order]*

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: November 13, 2024

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept.: 12

Complaint filed: January 31, 2023

Trial date: None set

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 13, 2024 at 8:30 a.m., in Department 12 of
3 the Solano County Superior Court, Old Solano Courthouse, located at 580 Texas St., Fairfield, CA
4 94533, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769 *et seq.*,
5 Plaintiff Zoey Smith (“Plaintiff”) will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval
6 of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Recycling Zone, Inc.
7 (“Defendant”). Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:

- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and
9 Release of Claims and Class Notice;
- 10 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
- 11 3. Approving the Class Notice and the plan for distribution of the Class Notice;
- 12 4. Appointing Plaintiff Zoey Smith as Class Representatives for settlement purposes;
- 13 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, John G. Yslas, Jeffrey C. Bils, Aram Boyadjian,
14 Andrew Sandoval and John Brown of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for
15 settlement purposes;
- 16 6. Appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
- 17 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

18 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
19 authorities, the Declarations of John G. Yslas and Plaintiff Zoey Smith, filed concurrently
20 herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the
21 Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: July 5, 2024

24 WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

25 By: _____

26 John G. Yslas

27 Attorneys for Plaintiff

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	7
II.	SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT.....	7
A.	Plaintiff’s Claims	7
B.	Discovery and Investigation.....	8
C.	Settlement Negotiations	9
1.	Settlement Consideration	9
D.	Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement.....	10
III.	DISCUSSION	17
A.	The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation	18
1.	The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations.....	18
2.	The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions.....	19
3.	Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation.....	20
B.	The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved	20
C.	The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable	21
1.	Class Counsel Requests an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund” Method	21
2.	The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases	22
3.	This Matter Involves a “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code	22
4.	The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award	23
D.	The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable.....	23
IV.	CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED	25
A.	Legal Standard	25

1	B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for	
2	Settlement Purposes.....	26
3	1. The Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous.....	26
4	2. Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate	26
5	3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class.....	27
6	4. Plaintiff and Her Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement.....	27
7	5. A Class Action Is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.....	28
8	V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND.....	28
9	A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process	28
10	B. The Notice Is Accurate and Informative.....	29
11	VI. CONCLUSION	29

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

<i>Bowles v. Super. Ct.</i> (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574	26
<i>Cartt v. Super Ct.</i> (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960.....	28
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43.....	22
<i>City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet</i> (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105.....	21
<i>Classen v. Weller</i> (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27	27
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.....	26
<i>Collins v. Rocha</i> (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232	26
<i>D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners</i> (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1	21
<i>Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.</i> (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695.....	25
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794	8, 17
<i>Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.</i> (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174	24
<i>Gentry v. Super. Ct.</i> (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443.....	24
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.....	8, 18
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.</i> (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480.....	22
<i>Leyva v. Medline Ind.</i> (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510	28
<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429.....	25
<i>Mallick v. Super. Ct.</i> (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434.....	17
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442	27
<i>Miller v. Woods</i> (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 862	28
<i>Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.</i> (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56	20
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399	18, 24
<i>Priddy v. Edelman</i> (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438	18
<i>Quinn v. State of California</i> (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162.....	21
<i>Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.</i> (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462.....	25, 26
<i>Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.</i> (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948	24
<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i> (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926	26

1	<i>Serrano v. Priest</i> (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25.....	21
2	<i>Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.</i> (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231	18
3	<i>Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company</i> (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294.....	22
4	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.</i> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224.....	19
5	<i>Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.</i> (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952	26

STATUTES

8	Business & Professions Code § 17200.....	8
9	California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766.....	28
10	California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f).....	21
11	Code of Civil Procedure § 382.....	25, 26
12	Labor Code § 1194	8, 22
13	Labor Code § 1194.2.....	8
14	Labor Code § 1197	8
15	Labor Code § 1198	8
16	Labor Code § 204	8
17	Labor Code § 226	8
18	Labor Code § 226.7	8
19	Labor Code § 2698 - Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 “PAGA”	8
20	Labor Code § 2699	8
21	Labor Code § 2802	8
22	Labor Code § 512	8
23	Labor Code § 90.5	24

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES

26	Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 11.51	18
27	Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 14.03	22
28	Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 8.39	29

Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An	
Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006)	24, 25

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Zoey Smith (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$520,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement (“Settlement”) with Defendant Recycling Zone, Inc. (“Defendant”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 250 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Gig Kyriacou, over the course of a private mediation on February 23, 2024. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties were able to reach a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. This is a wage and hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiff and putative Class Members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the Class Period. Defendant is a recycling company conducting business in numerous counties throughout the State of California, including Solano County. [Declaration of John G. Yslas in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Yslas Decl.”), ¶ 2.]

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil

1 penalties under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”).
2 Defendant denies Plaintiff’s allegations and denies liability for Plaintiff’s claims.

3 Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development
4 Agency (“LWDA”) alleging wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA (Labor Code §§
5 2699, *et seq.*) on March 2, 2023. [Yslas Decl., ¶ 4.] On January 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a
6 putative wage-and-hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay
7 minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to
8 pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194, and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor
9 Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7);
10 (5) failure to pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide
11 accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for
12 expenditures (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802); and (8) unfair business practices (Business and
13 Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.*). On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a separate Complaint
14 against Defendant for civil penalties under Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004
15 “PAGA” (Labor Code § 2698 *et seq.*).

16 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

17 2. Following the filing of the Complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
18 information before mediating this action. Prior to mediation, Plaintiff obtained, through informal
19 discovery, personnel records pertaining to Plaintiff; class data including the estimated number of
20 current and former hourly paid and non-exempt employees during the statutory period; total
21 number of workweeks and pay periods; average and median hourly rates of pay; timekeeping and
22 payroll records for Class Members; and other wage and hour policy documents. Plaintiff’s
23 investigation was sufficient to satisfy the criteria for court approval set forth in *Dunk v. Ford Motor*
24 *Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 and *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168
25 Cal.App.4th 116, 129-130 (“Dunk/Kullar”). [Yslas Decl., ¶ 5.]

26 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices,
27 and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
28 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum monetary

1 exposure for all claims. [*Id.* at ¶ 6.] Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law
2 regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. [*Id.*] Class Counsel reviewed these
3 records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. [*Id.*]

4 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

5 On February 23, 2024, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced
6 class action mediator Gig Kyriacou. [*Id.* at ¶ 7.] The settlement negotiations were at arm's
7 length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The parties went
8 into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side
9 was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been
10 reached. [*Id.*] After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and
11 weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached an agreement,
12 the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. [*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 1
13 (Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and Release of Claims).]

14 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
15 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
16 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
17 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
18 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
19 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. [*Id.* at ¶ 16.]

20 **1. Settlement Consideration**

21 Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed to settle the Lawsuit in exchange for the Gross
22 Settlement Amount of \$520,000.00. The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) attorneys' fees
23 in the amount of \$173,333.33 and reimbursement of reasonable litigation costs and expenses in
24 the amount of up to \$22,000.00 to Class Counsel; (2) Class Representative Service Payment to
25 Plaintiff in the amount of up to \$15,000.00; (3) fees and expenses of administration of the
26 Settlement to the Settlement Administrator in an amount not to exceed \$10,000.00; (4)
27 \$24,000.00 to PAGA with twenty-five percent (25%) share of the PAGA Penalties to be a part
28 of the Net Settlement Sum that will be distributed to Class Members in the PAGA Group in the

amount of \$6,000; and (5) the seventy-five percent (75%) share of PAGA penalties (“LWDA Payment”) in the amount of \$18,000.00 to the LWDA. (See Settlement Agreement generally).

Indeed, the 520,000.00 Settlement represents 78.7% of the realistic maximum recovery of \$660,764.72. [*Id.* at ¶ 25.] Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant’s maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$3,649,211.54, when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant’s realistic exposure was \$660,764.72, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. [*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.] Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. [*Id.* at ¶ 25.] Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Parties’ Stipulation of Class Action Settlement and Release of Claims is attached to the Declaration of John G. Yslas as **Exhibit 2**. The Settlement’s key terms include:

1. Class: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons who worked for Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at any time during the Class Period (“Class Members”).” (Settlement, ¶ 3.)

2. Class Period: This is defined as “the period from August 6, 2018 through and including May 23, 2024.” (Settlement, ¶ 8.)

3. Class Members: shall refer to an employee of Defendant who falls within the definition of the Class.” (Settlement, ¶ 7.)

4. PAGA Covered Employees: means “those Class Members who were employed by Defendant in California as hourly nonexempt employees during the PAGA Period, regardless of whether the Class Member submitted a valid Request for Exclusion or otherwise opted out of the Settlement.” (Settlement, ¶ 22.)

5. PAGA Period: means “the period of time from August 6, 2021 through May 23, 2024.” (Settlement, ¶ 26.)

1 6. Maximum Settlement Fund: means “the Maximum Settlement Amount of Five
2 Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars and No Cents (\$520,000.00), which includes the Individual
3 Settlement Payments, the Class Representative Enhancement, the Class Counsel Award, PAGA
4 Payment, and the Settlement Administration Costs, and which excludes Defendant’s share of
5 payroll taxes.” (Settlement, ¶ 18.)

6 7. Expiration: Any checks issued to Settlement Class Members shall remain valid and
7 negotiable for one hundred and eighty (180) days from the date of their issuance. If a Settlement
8 Class Member does not cash his or her settlement check within 180 days, fifteen (15) calendar days
9 after the check-cashing deadline the Claims Administrator shall escheat the funds to the California
10 Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund. The Parties agree that this obligation shall satisfy and fully
11 discharge Defendant’s obligations under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384 and the
12 doctrines of Cy Pres and escheat.(Settlement, ¶ 58 a. iv.)

13 8. Release:

14 (a) “General Release By Plaintiff.” In addition to the Settlement Class
15 Members’ Released Claims, described above, in exchange for the
16 consideration recited in this Agreement, including but not limited to the
17 Class Representative Enhancement, Plaintiff, for herself and for any
18 decedent, heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns, does hereby
19 irrevocably and unconditionally release, acquit and forever discharge the
20 Released Parties, from any and all claims, demands, damages, liquidated
21 damages, monies, penalties, restitution, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees,
22 costs, liabilities and/or causes of action of whatever kind or character,
23 whether known or unknown, which Plaintiff ever had, now has, has asserted
24 or may hereafter assert or claim to have against the Released Parties arising
25 out of or relating in any way to any acts, circumstances, facts, transactions,
26 or omissions based on facts occurring up to and including the date she signs
27 this Agreement. This release includes but is not limited to any and all claims
28 for unlawful discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and reasonable

1 accommodation; related to the terms and conditions of employment; for
2 penalties, compensation or benefits; and/or for wrongful termination of
3 employment under arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
4 as amended, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
5 Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as amended,
6 the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended and the Portal to Portal Act, the
7 Equal Pay Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, as amended,
8 the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, the Rehabilitation
9 Act of 1973, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the California Fair
10 Employment and Housing Act, the California Constitution, the California
11 Labor Code, the California Government Code, the California Civil Code;
12 and any and all other federal, state and local statutes, ordinances, regulations,
13 rules and other laws, and any and all claims based on equity, constitutional,
14 statutory, common law or regulatory grounds as well as any other claims
15 based on theories of wrongful or constructive discharge, breach of contract
16 or implied contract, fraud, misrepresentation, promissory estoppel or
17 intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, or damages
18 under any other federal, state or local statutes, ordinances, regulations, rules
19 or laws, except for such claims that cannot be released by law. With respect
20 to the claims referenced in this paragraph, Plaintiff shall be deemed to have
21 expressly waived and relinquished, to the fullest extent permitted by law, the
22 provisions, rights and benefits she may otherwise have had pursuant to
23 section 1542 of the California Civil Code, which states that:

24 A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS THAT THE
25 CREDITOR OR RELEASING PARTY DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT
26 TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING
27 THE RELEASE AND THAT, IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER, WOULD
28

HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR OR RELEASED PARTY. (Settlement, ¶ 49.)

(b) Release by All Settlement Class Members. Upon the Effective Date, each Class Member (including Plaintiff) who does not timely submit a valid Request for Exclusion, shall, for the Class Period, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, fully release and forever discharge the Released Parties from the Class Released Claims. (Settlement, ¶ 48.)

(c) “Class Released Claims” means any and all claims for wages, statutory and civil penalties (but not PAGA Penalties), monies, damages, liquidated damages, premiums, restitution, injunctive and declaratory relief, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, fees and costs, that were alleged in the Actions, and/or claims which reasonably relate to or which reasonably arise out of the same set of operative facts pled therein, whether such claims or forms of relief are known or unknown during the Settlement Period, including, but not limited to: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197 and the applicable IWC Wage Order); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194, 1198, 204 and the applicable IWC Wage Order); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512 and the applicable IWC Wage Order); (4) failure to provide rest periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512 and the applicable IWC Wage Order); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination ((Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226(a), (e), (h) and the applicable IWC Wage Order); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802); and (8) unfair business practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.), based on the Labor Code sections

1 alleged, and with respect to the statutory penalties claimed in the Actions,
2 any source of obligation as a basis for claiming such penalties during the
3 Class Period (the “Released Claims”) against the Released Parties in their
4 representative and individual capacities whether under Lab. Code §§ 558,
5 558.1 or otherwise. The release of the Class Released Claims shall be given
6 full res judicata and collateral estoppel effect upon entry of the judgment in
7 this Action so as to bar any other individual or entity from filling or pursuing
8 the Class Released Claims against the Released Parties in any forum.
9 (Settlement, ¶ 9.)

10 (d) “PAGA Release by PAGA Covered Employees and Labor Workforce
11 Development Agency.” Upon the Effective Date, the Labor Workforce
12 Development Agency, State of California, in addition to all PAGA Covered
13 Employees, and Plaintiff as a proxy for the LWDA, are deemed to release,
14 on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present
15 representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and
16 assigns, the Released Parties from the PAGA Released Claims. (Settlement,
17 ¶ 52.)

18 (e) “PAGA Released Claims” means the release of the Released Parties by the
19 Labor Workforce Development Agency, State of California, all PAGA
20 Covered Employees, and by Plaintiff SMITH as a proxy for the LWDA,
21 from all claims for civil penalties under the Labor Code pursuant to the
22 Private Attorneys General Act (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698 et seq.) that were
23 alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in
24 the operative complaint, the Actions, the PAGA Letter, and ascertained in
25 the course of the Actions and/or claims which reasonably relate to or which
26 reasonably arise out of the same set of operative facts pled therein, whether
27 such claims or forms of relief are known or unknown during the PAGA
28 Period, including, but not limited to: (a) failure to pay for all hours worked,

1 including minimum, straight time, and overtime wages in violation of
2 California Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, 1197.1, 1198 and the applicable Wage
3 Order; (b) failure to provide off-duty meal breaks and pay premium pay for
4 missed meal breaks in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512 and
5 the applicable Wage Order; (c) failure to authorize and permit off-duty paid
6 rest breaks and pay premium pay for missed rest breaks in violation of
7 California Labor Code § 226.7 and the applicable Wage Order; (d) failure to
8 pay all earned wages twice per month in violation of California Labor Code
9 § 204; (e) failure to maintain accurate records of hours worked and meal
10 periods in violation of California Labor Code §§ 1174(d), 1174.5, and the
11 applicable Wage Order; (f) failure to timely pay all wages at termination in
12 violation of California Labor Code §§ 201-203; (g) failure to issue accurate
13 itemized wage statements in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226 and
14 226(e), 226.3; (h) failure to reimburse necessary business expenses in
15 violation of Labor Code § 2802; (i) failure to produce requested employment
16 records in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226, 432, 1198.5. The
17 release of PAGA Released Claims shall be given full res judicata and
18 collateral estoppel effect upon entry of the judgment in this Actions so as to
19 bar the LWDA and any other individual or entity from filing or pursuing the
20 PAGA Released Claims against the Released Parties in any forum.
21 (Settlement, ¶ 27.)

22 9. No Reversion: “This settlement is non-reversionary and none of the Maximum
23 Settlement Fund shall revert to Defendant.” (Settlement, ¶ 46.)

24 10. PAGA Payment: The settlement includes \$24,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s claims
25 under PAGA, with 75% (\$16,000.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$6,000.00) being paid to
26 the PAGA Covered Employees. (Settlement, ¶ 58 a.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed
27 settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. [Yslas Decl., ¶ 10.]
28

1 11. Net Settlement Amount: means the Maximum Settlement Fund, less Class Counsel
2 Award, Class Representative Enhancement, PAGA Payment, and Settlement Administration
3 Costs. (Settlement, ¶ 19.)

4 12. Distribution Formula: Individual Settlement Payments shall be paid from the Net
5 Settlement Amount. The payments shall be calculated in accordance with the following steps:
6 Using the Class Data, the Settlement Administrator will calculate the total Compensable
7 Workweeks for all Settlement Class Members by adding the number of Compensable Workweeks
8 worked by each Settlement Class Member during the Class Period. The respective Compensable
9 Workweeks for each Settlement Class Member will be divided by the total Compensable
10 Workweeks for all Settlement Class Members in the Hourly Non-exempt Class, resulting in the
11 Payment Ratio for each Settlement Class Member. Each Settlement Class Member's Payment
12 Ratio will then be multiplied by the remaining Net Settlement Amount to calculate each Settlement
13 Class Member's estimated Individual Settlement Payments. (Settlement, ¶ 58 a. ii.) As to PAGA:
14 "The PAGA Individual Payment paid to each PAGA Covered Employee shall be calculated by
15 dividing 25% of the approved PAGA Payment by the number of Compensable Workweeks for all
16 PAGA Covered Employees during the PAGA Period and then multiplying the result by the number
17 of Compensable Workweeks for each PAGA Covered Employee during the PAGA Period."
18 (Settlement, ¶ 58 a.)

19 13. Tax Allocation: For tax purposes, the Individual Settlement Payments shall be
20 allocated Twenty Percent (20%) to the payment of wages and other taxable damages, which will
21 be subject to income and payroll tax withholding and all other authorized and required deductions
22 and Eight Percent (80%) to interest, penalties, liquidated damages, and other damages which are
23 not subject to income or payroll tax withholding but which are subject to all other required
24 authorized deductions.. (Settlement, ¶ 58 a. ii.)

25 14. Class Representative Service Payment: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be
26 paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$15,000.00. (Settlement, ¶ 58 b.) This amount is is the
27 sole and exclusive consideration for the Released Claims, a General Release, and for Plaintiff's
28 time, effort and risk in bringing and prosecuting the Action. (Settlement, ¶ 58. b) Any portion of

the requested Class Representative Enhancement that is not awarded to the Class Representative shall be part of the Net Settlement Amount and shall be distributed to Settlement Class Members as provided in this Agreement. (Settlement, ¶ 58 b.)

15. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$173,333.33), plus Litigation Expenses Payment not to exceed \$22,000.00. (Settlement, ¶ 58 c.)

Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Yslas Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. 2, Notice of Class Settlement.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the Settlement. (Settlement, ¶ 57 c.) ILYM Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the Notice is provided to the current addresses of Class Members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Yslas Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 3 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of

1 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
2 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
3 that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record
4 need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-*
5 *Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
6 require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
7 prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy
8 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

9 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
10 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
11 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

12 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
13 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

14 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
15 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

16 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
17 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
18 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
19 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
20 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
21 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
22 to approve the settlement.”].)

23 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following a of mediation with
24 experienced employment mediator, Gig Kyriacou. [Yslas Decl. ¶ 7.] The settlement negotiations
25 were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. [*Id.*]
26 The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute,
27 but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a
28 settlement had not been reached. [*Id.*] After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the

1 strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached an
2 agreement. [Yslas Decl. ¶ 8.]

3 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
4 the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
5 records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
6 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
7 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
8 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
9 paid to class members. [*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.] In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
10 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
11 litigation. [*Id.*] Thus, Plaintiff and her counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
12 negotiating the proposed Settlement. [*Id.*]

13 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
14 litigating wage and hour class actions. [*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-51.] Again, this supports the position that the
15 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
16 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
17 action.

18 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties'** 19 **Respective Legal Positions**

20 A settlement is not judged against what plaintiff might recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
21 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
22 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 ["Compromise is inherent
23 and necessary in the settlement process ... even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
24 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
25 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
26 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation."].)

27 The PAGA portion of this Settlement also is "fair, reasonable, and adequate in view of
28 PAGA's purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize

1 enforcement of state labor laws” (*Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.* (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 77), in
2 light of the discretionary nature of penalties, and the risks and uncertainty of prevailing at trial.
3 [Yslas Decl., ¶ 24.] Plaintiff submits that this Settlement, in its entirety, serves to remediate labor
4 law violations and deter future ones through its significant recovery for the proposed Class. [*Id.*,
5 ¶ 16.]

6 Further, this Settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation.
7 [*Id.*, ¶ 27.] While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of her claims, a legitimate controversy exists
8 as to each cause of action. [*Id.* at ¶ 26.] Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages
9 due to each Class Member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition.
10 [*Id.*]

11 The proposed Settlement of \$520,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
12 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. [*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-29.] Because of the proposed
13 Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
14 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
15 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
16 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the Settlement amount of [Settlement Amount]
17 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. [*Id.*]
18 *Indeed, each Participating Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of*
19 *approximately \$1,107.27 without factoring in payroll taxes.* [*Id.* at ¶ 28.]

20 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

21 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly skilled and experienced counsel.
22 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and have
23 extensive experience in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. [Yslas Decl., ¶¶
24 40-50.] Although Plaintiff and her counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the
25 matter, counsel supports this proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

26 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

27 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
28 for dissemination to the Class. The Notice informs the Class of the Settlement terms and of their

rights to be excluded from the Settlement. Additionally, if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action Settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of [Attorney Fees], which is 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, and up to \$22,000.00 in Litigation Expenses Payment. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

1. Class Counsel Requests an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund" Method

California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

Class Counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent, supra*, 557 F.2d at p. 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

1 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
2 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
3 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
4 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
5 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
6 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
7 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
8 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
9 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
10 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

11 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

12 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “No general rule can be articulated on what
13 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
14 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
15 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
16 are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
17 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
18 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also
19 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294 [stating that most
20 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
21 million].)

22 Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Settlement Amount, which
23 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature,
24 and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
25 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the
26 lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].;

27 **3. This Matter Involves a “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

28 Labor Code § 1194(a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime

1 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
2 section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
3 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This Settlement is beneficial in
4 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing
5 Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by
6 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class
7 Counsel. [Yslas Decl., ¶¶ 38-39.] Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent
8 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. [*Id.*] Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the
9 Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class
10 ahead of all other concerns.

11 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the** 12 **Requested Fee Award**

13 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
14 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. [Yslas
15 Decl., ¶¶ 40-51.] Class Counsel and the firm have been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in
16 several class actions that resulted in millions of dollars in recovery. [*Id.*] Because it is reasonable
17 to compensate Class Counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class
18 Counsel’s requested fee award is supported here.

19 Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
20 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the Settlement.
21 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
22 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
23 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel’s firm has frequently received
24 fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee
25 award is reasonable and fair.

26 **D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable**

27 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
28 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other

1 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
2 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
3 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
4 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
5 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

6 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
7 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
8 codified in California Labor Code section 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to
9 vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or
10 permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions....”). Nonetheless, the California
11 Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under
12 the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees.
13 (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should
14 be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v.*
15 *Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

16 Under the Settlement Agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
17 a Service Award in the amount of \$15,000 to the Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
18 Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendant. Plaintiff devoted a great deal of time
19 and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation
20 and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the
21 mediation. [Yslas Decl., ¶¶ 30-34.] This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the
22 substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members. [*Id.*]

23 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
24 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive
25 award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class
26 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.”
27 (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An
28 Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) That same study found that named

1 plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and
2 a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received
3 an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of
4 the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make
5 representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the
6 class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

7 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

8 **A. Legal Standard**

9 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
10 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
11 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
12 prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when
13 the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
14 numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
15 for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1)
16 There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest
17 in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow*
18 *Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the
19 California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the
20 community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of
21 law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
22 representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29
23 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

24 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
25 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
26 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
27 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
28

1 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond*,
2 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

3 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
4 **Settlement Purposes.**

5 **1. The Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous**

6 The proposed Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable, and includes
7 approximately [# of Employees] employees of Defendant.

8 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable Class, defined by objective and
9 precise criteria. Because Class Members are identified using specific criteria in the regular
10 business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the Class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life*
11 *Ins. Co.* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product
12 that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

13 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
14 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
15 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
16 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
17 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
18 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
19 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
20 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
21 Plaintiff contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

22 **2. Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate**

23 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
24 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all Class Members predominate over any
25 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
26 warrant adjudication by representation. (See, e.g., *Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
27 Cal.App.3d 605.)

1 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
2 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally
3 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods;
4 whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices to pay for all hours worked,
5 including overtime wages; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses;
6 whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal period
7 premium wages, and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were
8 consequently non-compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for
9 all of the identified Class Members, including Plaintiff. Further, all Class Members suffered from,
10 and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

11 **3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

12 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
13 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
14 typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and
15 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that
16 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
17 situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they
18 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
19 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as
20 such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
21 employees.

22 **4. Plaintiff and Her Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

23 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
24 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
25 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
26 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

27 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel
28 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that

1 previously settled. [Yslas Decl., ¶¶ 40-50.] Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified,
2 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
3 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,
4 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing her dedication. Plaintiff’s
5 willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates her serious commitment to bringing about
6 the best results possible for the Class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

7 **5. A Class Action Is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

8 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
9 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
10 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
11 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
12 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly
13 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
14 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
15 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457-62; *Leyva v.*
16 *Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the
17 superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

18 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

19 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

20 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. Cal. Rules of Court,
21 Rule 3.766 (e) and (f). California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
22 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
23 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
24 the Class Members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
25 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
26 Members....” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed Settlement will be provided by
27 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

1 **B. The Notice Is Accurate and Informative**

2 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
3 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
4 terms of the Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
5 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action Settlement, they will have the
6 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

7 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
8 Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
9 terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It
10 makes clear that the Settlement Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
11 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
12 of the Action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
13 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
14 combined settlement-certification class notice.

15 **VI. CONCLUSION**

16 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
17 approval of the proposed Settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing.

18
19
20 Dated: July 5, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

21 By: 
22 John G. Ysias
23 Jeffrey C. Bils
24 Aram Boyadjian
25 Andrew Sandoval
26 John Brown

Attorneys for Plaintiff