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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

JOSE MALDONADO, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

TPS SOLUTIONS INC. dba COAST
PERSONNEL, a California corporation;
MESH LOGISTICS, an entity of unknown
form; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23STCV07076

CLASS ACTION

*[Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon. Theresa
M. Traber; Dept. SS-1]*

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT**

*[filed concurrently with Plaintiffs' Notice of
Motion and Motion; Declaration of Enoch J.
Kim; Declaration of Stephen M. Sloane;
Declaration of Jose Maldonado; Declaration of
Cintia Sevilla; and [Proposed] Order]*

Date: July 1, 2026

Time: 10:30 a.m.

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Jose Maldonado (“Plaintiff Maldonado”) and Plaintiff Cintia Sevilla (“Plaintiff
4 Sevilla”) (collectively “Plaintiffs” or “Class Representatives”) filed a class and PAGA action
5 (“Action”) against Defendant TPS Solutions, Inc. (“Defendant TPS”), and MESHLogistics, Inc.
6 (“Defendant MESH”) (collectively “Defendants,” Defendants and Plaintiffs hereinafter
7 collectively referred to as the “Parties”). Plaintiffs alleged the following causes of action: (1)
8 Failure to Pay Minimum Wages (including Regular Rate) in Violation of Labor Code §§ 1194
9 and 1197; (2) Failure to Pay Wages and Overtime Under Labor Code §§ 510, 1194; (3) Meal-
10 Period Liability Under Labor Code § 226.7; (4) Rest-Break Liability Under Labor Code § 226.7;
11 (5) Failure to Comply with Labor Code § 245 *et seq.* and 246; (6) Failure to Provide Complete
12 and Accurate Wage Statements in Violation of Labor Code § 226; (7) Failure to Keep Required
13 Payroll Records Under Labor Code §§ 1174 and 1174.5; (8) Failure to Timely Pay All Earned
14 Wages and Final Paychecks Due at Time of Separation of Employment and for Penalties Pursuant
15 to Labor Code §§ 201, 202 and 203; (9) Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200 *et*
16 *seq.*; and (10) Penalties Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699, *et seq.* under Private Attorney General
17 Act (“PAGA”). (Declaration of Enoch J. Kim (“Kim Decl.”), ¶ 3.)

18 After engaging in substantial investigation and extensive negotiations with the assistance
19 of a respected mediator, the Parties agreed to settle all claims alleged in the Action on a class-
20 wide, non-reversionary basis for \$900,000.00, inclusive of all fees and costs. The Parties’ Class
21 Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice (“Settlement” or “Settlement
22 Agreement”) defines the class as all persons employed by Defendants in California and classified
23 as a non-exempt hourly employee who worked for Defendants during the Class Period, which is
24 October 12, 2019 to April 27, 2025 (“Class” or “Class Members”). All of the approximately
25 1,310 Class Members will receive a settlement payment unless they opt out of the Class
26 Settlement. (Kim Decl., ¶ 4, Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 1.4 and 1.20.)

27 The proposed settlement reflected in the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and
28 adequate, and in the best interests of the Class. Consequently, Plaintiffs hereby move this Court

1 for an order: (1) granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement, as
2 embodied in the Settlement Agreement filed concurrently herewith; (2) approving the Notice of
3 Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final Court Approval (“Class Notice”) to be sent to
4 Class Members; and (3) setting a hearing for final approval of the class action settlement. (Kim
5 Decl., ¶ 5.)

6 **II. STATUS OF THE LITIGATION**

7 **A. Procedural History**

8 On March 30, 2023, Plaintiff Maldonado commenced a Class Action by filing a
9 Complaint alleging causes of action against Defendants for (1) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages;
10 (2) Failure to Pay Wages and Overtime under Labor Code § 510; (3) Violation of Labor Code §
11 226(a); (4) Failure to Keep Required Payroll Records Under Labor Code § 1174 and 1174.5; (5)
12 Penalties Pursuant to Labor Code § 203; and (6) Violation of Business & Professions Code §
13 17200 *et seq.* On June 5, 2023, Plaintiff Maldonado filed a First Amended Complaint adding a
14 cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA pursuant to Labor Code section 2699, *et seq.* On
15 March 30, 2023, pursuant to Labor Code section 2699.3, subd. (a), Plaintiff Maldonado gave
16 timely written notice to Defendants and the Labor & Workforce Development Agency
17 (“LWDA”). (Kim Decl., ¶ 11.)

18 On October 12, 2023, Plaintiff Sevilla commenced a Class Action by filing a Complaint
19 alleging causes of action against Defendants for (1) Failure to Pay Wages for All Hours Worked
20 at Minimum Wage in Violation of Labor Code sections 1194 and 1197; (2) Failure to Pay
21 Overtime Wages for Daily Overtime Worked in Violation of Labor Code sections 510 and 1194;
22 (3) Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Wage Statements in Violation of Labor Code
23 section 226; (4) Failure to Timely Pay All Earned Wages and Final Paychecks Due at Time of
24 Separation of Employment in Violation of Labor Code Sections 201, 202, and 203; and (5) Unfair
25 Business Practices in Violation of Business and Professions Code sections 17200, *et seq.* (Kim
26 Decl., ¶¶ 12-13.) On October 12, 2023, pursuant to Labor Code section 2699.3, subd.(a), Plaintiff
27 Sevilla gave timely written notice to Defendant TPS, Defendant Mesh and the LWDA. (*Id.*) On
28 December 18, 2023, Plaintiff Sevilla commenced a PAGA Action (Case No. 23STCV30800)

1 alleging one cause of action against Defendant TPS and Defendant Mesh for civil penalties
2 pursuant to PAGA, Labor Code Sections 2698, et seq. (*Id.*)

3 On January 27, 2025, the Parties participated in an all-day mediation presided over by
4 Monique Ngo-Bonnici which led to this Agreement to settle Plaintiffs' claims.

5 On February 4, 2026, Plaintiff Sevilla sent an amended PAGA notice to Defendant TPS,
6 Defendant Mesh and the LWDA.

7 On February 4, 2026, Plaintiff Maldonado sent an amended PAGA notice to Defendant
8 TPS, Defendant Mesh and the LWDA.

9 On February 5, 2026, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint in the Action to
10 combine the Plaintiffs and their claims ("Operative Complaint").

11 The Parties, Class Counsel and Defense Counsel represent that they are not aware of any
12 other pending matter or action asserting claims that will be extinguished or affected by the
13 Settlement. (Kim Decl., ¶ 18.)

14 **B. Investigation**

15 Before filing the lawsuit, Class Counsel investigated and researched the facts and
16 circumstances underlying the pertinent issues and the law applicable thereto. (Kim Decl., ¶ 19.)
17 This required thorough discussions and interviews between Class Counsel and Plaintiffs, as well
18 as preliminary research into the various legal issues involved in the case. (*Id.*) After conducting
19 their initial investigation, Class Counsel determined that Plaintiffs' claims were well-suited for
20 class and representative action adjudication owing to what appeared to be a common course of
21 conduct affecting a similarly situated group of employees. (*Id.*)

22 After filing the lawsuit, Class Counsel conducted a thorough investigation of the facts and
23 claims giving rise to the action, including: (1) conducting informal discovery and meeting and
24 conferring with defense counsel about the same; (2) reviewing and analyzing a sampling of time
25 and payroll data for Class Members and the necessary policy documents, Plaintiffs' personnel
26 files, relevant policies and other documentation; (3) researching the applicable law and potential
27 defenses; (4) constructing damage models based on interpretations of California law; and (5)
28 reviewing information provided by Defendants at mediation. (Kim Decl., ¶ 20.)

1 Defendants, for their part, vigorously contested liability, the amount of claimed damages,
2 and the propriety of class certification. (Kim Decl., ¶ 21.) After Class Counsel analyzed the
3 relevant documents and other gathered data, Class Counsel believed that this case was appropriate
4 for resolution via mediation. (*Id.*) Given the high level of risk present for both sides, the Parties
5 elected to mediate Plaintiffs' claims and explore the possibility of settlement. (*Id.*)

6 C. Settlement Efforts

7 On January 27, 2025, the Parties participated in an all-day mediation presided over by
8 Monique Ngo-Bonnici, a respected and highly experienced mediator in wage and hour class
9 actions. (Kim Decl., ¶ 22.) During mediation, Plaintiffs and Defendants' counsel discussed all
10 aspects of the case, including the risks of continued litigation and the risks to both sides of
11 proceeding with a motion for class certification as well as the law relating to unpaid wages, meal
12 periods, rest periods, wage statements, and final pay. (*Id.*) As a result of the mediation, the Parties
13 agreed to settle the lawsuit according to the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (Kim
14 Decl., ¶¶ 22, Exhibit 1.)

15 From Class Counsel's review of the strengths and weaknesses of the case, the risks and
16 delays posed by further litigation, and Class Counsel's own prior litigation experience, Class
17 Counsel believes that the recovery for each Class Member is fair and reasonable taking into
18 consideration the amounts received in other wage and hour class actions, the risks inherent in
19 litigation of this genre, and the reasonable tailoring of each Class Member's claim to the
20 settlement award he or she will receive. (Kim Decl., ¶ 23.) Further, and based on the settlement
21 negotiations, which were extensive and conducted in good faith and at arm's length between
22 attorneys with substantial experience litigating class actions and wage and hour cases, the
23 Settlement Agreement was the product of a non-collusive settlement process in which the Parties
24 were forced to make significant compromises in the interest of reaching a full and complete
25 settlement of the lawsuit. (*Id.*)

26 III. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS

27 Under the terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement, Defendants have agreed to pay
28 \$900,000.00 ("Gross Settlement Amount") on a non-reversionary basis to settle and release all

1 claims asserted by Plaintiffs in the Operative Complaint and PAGA Notice. (Kim Decl., ¶ 24;
2 Exh. 1, §3.1.)

3 The Settlement Agreement defines the “Class” as “all persons employed by Defendants in
4 California and classified as non-exempt hourly employee who worked for Defendants during the
5 Class Period,” which is from October 12, 2019 through April 27, 2025. (Kim Decl., ¶ 25; Exh. 1,
6 §1.5 and §1.13.) The Settlement Agreement also defines “Aggrieved Employees” as “all
7 individuals who were or have been employed by Defendants in California as non-exempt hourly
8 employees at any time during the PAGA Period,” which is from April 12, 2022 through April 27,
9 2025. (Kim Decl., ¶ 26; Exh. 1, §§ 1.4 and 1.33.)

10 The “Net Settlement Amount” shall be the Gross Settlement Amount, less the PAGA
11 Penalties payment (allocated to the Aggrieved Employees and to the LWDA), Class
12 Representative Service Payments, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation
13 Expenses Payment, and Administration Costs Payment. (Kim Decl., ¶ 27; Exh. 1, §1.29.) The
14 remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments. (Kim Decl.,
15 ¶ 27, Exh. 1, § 1.29.) These amounts are detailed as follows:

- 16 • Class Counsel Fees Payment of not more than thirty five percent (35%), which is
17 currently estimated to be \$315,000.00 and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses
18 Payment of not more than \$50,000.00; (Kim Decl., ¶ 27; Exh. 1, §3.2.2.)
- 19 • Administration Expenses Payment of not more than \$14,000.00; (Kim Decl., ¶ 27;
20 Exh. 1, §3.2.3.)
- 21 • Class Representative Service Payments of not more than \$10,000.00 to each
22 Plaintiff (totaling \$20,000.00); (Kim Decl., ¶ 27; Exh. 1, §3.2.1.)
- 23 • PAGA Penalties in the amount of \$100,000.00 for civil penalties under PAGA,
24 with 75% (\$75,000.00) paid to the LWDA for the LWDA PAGA Payment and
25 25% (\$25,000.00) paid to Aggrieved Employees for their Individual PAGA
26 Payments. (Kim Decl., ¶ 27; Exh. 1, §3.2.5)

27 The “Individual Class Payment” is each Class Member’s share of the Net Settlement
28 Amount and will be calculated and apportioned from the Net Settlement Amount based on the

1 number of Workweeks a Class Member worked during the Class Period. (Kim Decl., ¶ 28; Exh.
2 1, §1.24.) Under the Settlement, each of the approximately 1,310 Class Members will receive,
3 using a straight average and assuming they worked throughout the Class Period, \$306.11 for their
4 Individual Class Payment. (Kim Decl., ¶ 66.) The “Individual PAGA Payment” is the Aggrieved
5 Employee’s pro rata share of 25% of the PAGA Penalties, calculated according to the number of
6 PAGA Pay Periods worked during the PAGA Period. (Kim Decl., ¶ 29; Exh. 1, §1.25)

7 Defendants will pay their employer-side payroll tax obligations on the Wage Portion of
8 the Individual Class Payments in addition to the Gross Settlement Amount. (Kim Decl., ¶ 31;
9 Exh. 1, §3.1.) Ten percent (10%) of each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class Payment
10 will be allocated to the settlement of wage claims (the “Wage Portion”) and will be subject to tax
11 withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. (Kim Decl., ¶ 32; Exh. 1, §3.2.4.1.) The
12 remaining 90% of each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class Payment will be allocated
13 to the settlement of claims for interest and penalties (the “Non-Wage Portion”). (*Id.*) The Non-
14 Wage Portions are not subject to wage withholding and will be reported on IRS 1099 Forms. (*Id.*)

15 The Parties agreed to use Apex Class Action Administration (“Apex”) in this matter,
16 which provided the lower bid. Apex has extensive experience in administering employment class
17 action settlements and Class Counsel has worked with Apex in the past. (Kim Decl., ¶ 33.) Apex
18 has procedures in place to protect the security of class data, sufficient insurance in the event of a
19 data breach or mishandling of the settlement funds, and is qualified to administer the Settlement.
20 The procedures for mailing notice and processing exclusions and objections as well as
21 distribution of the Net Settlement fund are detailed in the Settlement Agreement. (Kim Decl.,
22 Exh. 1, § 7.)

23 The Settlement Administrator will send the Class Notice with Spanish translation via first
24 class mail to all Class Members identified in the Class Data. (Kim Decl., ¶ 35; Exh. 1, §7.4.2.) No
25 later than five (5) calendar days after after the receipt of any Class Notice returned by the USPS
26 as undelivered, the Settlement Administrator shall re-mail the Class Notice using any forwarding
27 address provided by the USPS. (*Id.*; Exh. 1, § 7.4.3.) If the USPS does not provide a forwarding
28 address, the Settlement Administrator shall conduct a Class Member Address Search, and re-mail

1 the Class Notice to the most current address obtained. (*Id.*; Exh. 1, § 7.4.3.)

2 Each Class Member shall have 45 days after the Settlement Administrator mails the Class
3 Notice (plus an additional 14 days for Class Members whose Class Notice is re-mailed) to
4 challenge the number of Class Workweeks and PAGA Pay Periods allocated to the Class Member
5 in the Class Notice. (Kim Decl., ¶ 36; Exh. 1, § 7.4.4.)

6 Class Members wishing to opt out from the Settlement Agreement must send a signed
7 written request for exclusion to the Settlement Administrator within 45 days from the initial
8 mailing of the Class Notice (plus an additional 14 days for Class Members whose Class Notice
9 was re-mailed). (Kim Decl., ¶ 37; Exh. 1, §7.5.) Participating Class Members will also have the
10 opportunity to object to the Settlement Agreement by serving a copy of the objection to the
11 Settlement Administrator within 45 days after the mailing of the Class Notice (plus an additional
12 14 days for Class Members whose Class Notice was re-mailed). (*Id.*; Exh. 1, §7.7.2.) In the
13 alternative, Participating Class Members may appear in Court (or hire an attorney to appear in
14 Court) to present verbal objections at the Final Approval Hearing. (*Id.*; Exh. 1, § 7.7.2.)

15 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY IS APPROPRIATE**

16 Express judicial policy favors maintaining wage and hour actions as class actions. (*Prince*
17 *v. CLS Transp., Inc.* (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4th 1320, 1328; *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.*
18 (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462.) Any doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved
19 in favor of class certification, subject to later modification if necessary. (*Richmond*, 29 Cal. 3d at
20 473-75.) The decision to certify a class is a procedural one, and should be based on the allegations
21 in the operative complaint, and not in the perceived factual or legal merit of the class claims.
22 (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 439-41.)

23 To certify a settlement class, the Court must find the two primary requirements for
24 maintaining a class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class, and (2) there must be a well-
25 defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involving the parties to be
26 represented. (*See Vasquez v. Superior Court* (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 800, 805-09; *Daar v. Yellow Cab*
27 *Company* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704.) These criteria are met here for the reasons set forth below.

1 **A. There Is A Numerous and Ascertainable Class**

2 Whether a class is ascertainable is determined by examining the class definition, the size
3 of the class and the means available for identifying class members. (*See Vasquez, supra*, 4 Cal. 3d
4 at 821-22; *Reyes v. Board of Supervisors of San Diego County* (1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263,
5 1271.) Class members are “ascertainable” where they may be readily identified without
6 unreasonable expense or time. *See Rose v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal. App. 3d 926, 932 (1981)
7 (finding that “class members are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily identified without
8 unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records).

9 Plaintiffs contend, and Defendants do not dispute for settlement purposes only, this
10 requirement and the requirement of numerosity are met. Class Members are “all persons
11 employed by Defendants in California and classified as non-exempt hourly employee who
12 worked for Defendants during the Class Period,” which is October 12, 2019, through April 27,
13 2025. (Kim Decl., ¶ 87(a).) Documents and information exchanged between the Parties reflect a
14 class of approximately 1,310 Class Members. (Kim Decl., ¶ 87(a).) The Class Members have
15 already been identified by reference to Defendants’ payroll and personnel records. (Kim Decl.,
16 ¶ 19.)

17 Therefore, and notwithstanding the foregoing, there is a numerous and ascertainable class.

18 **B. There Is A Well-Defined Community of Interest**

19 A community of interest is established by the predominance of common issues of law and
20 fact. *See Vasquez*, 4 Cal. 3d at 811. The requirement of a community of interest:

21 [D]oes not depend upon an identical recovery, and the fact that each
22 member of the class must prove his separate claim to a portion of any
23 recovery by the class is only one factor to be considered ... The mere
24 fact that separate transactions are involved does not of itself preclude
25 a finding of the requisite community of interest so long as every
26 member of the alleged class would not be required to litigate
27 numerous and substantial questions to determine his individual right
28 to recover subsequent to the rendering of any class judgment which
determined in plaintiff’ favor whatever questions were common to
the class.

Id. at 809.

Plaintiffs contend, and Defendants do not dispute for settlement purposes only, that

1 common issues of fact and law predominate as to each of the claims alleged by Plaintiffs, and the
2 Class is united in its proof. (Kim Decl., ¶ 87(e).) Because Plaintiffs have alleged a single scheme,
3 “the relevant proof [does] not vary among class members” and “clearly presents a common
4 question fundamental to all class members.” (See *In Re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust*
5 *Litigation* (SDNY 1997) 172 F.R.D. 119, 123 (citing *In Re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust*
6 *Litigation*, (SDNY 1997) 169 F.R.D. 493, 518).) California courts show “no hesitancy” in
7 inferring class-wide causation, class-wide injury, and class-wide damages when a common course
8 of action has been shown. (*B.W.I. Custom Kitchen*, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1350.) This inference
9 ““eliminates the need for each class member to prove individually the consequences of the
10 defendants’ actions to him or her.”” (*Id.* at 1351 (quoting *Rosack v. Volvo of America Corp* (1982)
11 131 Cal. App. 3d 741, 753 [emphasis added]).)

12 This action involves, *inter alia*, a determination about Defendants’ alleged failure to
13 provide meal and rest periods, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages,
14 failure to provide paid sick time, failure to pay final wages when required, failure to keep
15 required payroll records, failure to provide accurate wage statements, and largely derivative
16 claims under the Business & Professions Code and PAGA. Plaintiffs contend that these practices
17 affected Class Members in the same way. The outcome of litigation on this matter depends upon
18 questions that are common to Class Members. (Kim Decl., ¶ 87(e).)

19 C. The Named Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical

20 A class representative’s claims are typical when they arise from the same event, practice,
21 or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other putative class members, and if their
22 claims rest on the same legal theories. The class representative’s claims must be “typical” but not
23 necessarily identical to the claims of other class members. It is sufficient that the representative is
24 similarly situated so that he or she will have the motive to litigate on behalf of all class members.
25 (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47; *B.W.I. Custom Kitchens v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.*
26 (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347 (“[I]t has never been the law in California that the class
27 representative must have identical interests with the class members.”) Thus it is not necessary that
28 the class representative should have personally incurred all of the damages suffered by each of the

1 other class members. (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 228.)

2 Plaintiffs contend, and Defendants do not dispute for settlement purposes only, that
3 Plaintiffs' claims are typical of Class Members' claims because they arose from the same factual
4 basis and are based on the same legal theories. (Kim Decl., ¶ 83(c).) Plaintiffs were employed by
5 Defendants during the Class Period, and was subject to the allegedly unlawful meal and rest
6 policies and pay practices at issue in this litigation. (*Id.*) Accordingly, Plaintiffs are members of
7 the Class. (*Id.*) The central issues of this litigation (whether Defendants failed to pay all wages,
8 whether Defendant failed to provide meal and rest periods, etc.) apply to the other Class Members
9 as well. The answer to these questions would determine Defendants' liability to the Class. (*Id.*)
10 Thus, the claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class. (*Id.*)

11 **D. Adequacy of Class Counsel and Class Representative**

12 Class Counsel are experienced in class actions, have represented Plaintiffs and the Class
13 zealously and have no conflicts of interest. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 3-9, 83(d). The Class Representatives'
14 interests are aligned with those of Class Members, they have suffered the same injuries as Class
15 Members, and have no conflicts of interest. (*Id.*) Therefore, Class Counsel and the Class
16 Representatives are adequate.

17 **E. Predominance and Superiority**

18 Individualized issues do not predominate over the issues of law and fact that are common
19 to the class as a whole. (Kim Decl., ¶ 83(f).) The class action mechanism is superior to
20 individualized actions because Class Members have little incentive to bring claims that are small.
21 (*Id.*)

22 **V. THE TWO-STEP APPROVAL PROCESS**

23 Any settlement of class action litigation must be reviewed and approved by the Court.
24 This is accomplished in two steps: (1) An early (preliminary) review by the trial court, and (2) a
25 detailed review after the notice has been distributed to the class members for their comments or
26 objections. In this regard, the Manual for Complex Litigation (Second) explains:

27 A two-step process is followed when considering class settlements...
28 If the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious,
informed, non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies,

1 does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class
2 representative or segments of the class, and falls within the range of
3 possible approval, then the court should direct that notice be given to
the class members of a formal fairness hearing, at which evidence
may be presented in support of and in opposition to the settlement.

4 (*Manual for Complex Litigation (Second)* (1985) at § 30.44.) The preliminary approval of the
5 class action settlement by the trial court is simply a conditional finding that the settlement appears
6 to be within the range of acceptable settlements. (*See, e.g., Newberg*, § 11.25; *North County*
7 *Contractor's Assn., Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Services* (1994) 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1094-95.)
8 Thus, the preliminary approval of the class action settlement by the trial court is simply a
9 conditional finding that the settlement appears to be within the range of acceptable settlements.

10 Settlements to resolve PAGA claims also require court approval. (Labor Code §
11 2699(1)(2).) There is no articulated standard for approving PAGA settlements. PAGA settlements
12 for as little as \$0 have been approved. (*See Nordstrom Com'n Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576,
13 589 (approving PAGA settlement and release that allocated \$0 to PAGA claim).) Courts have
14 also approved settlements for \$20,000 or less. (*See, e.g., Hicks v. Toys 'R' Us-Delaware, Inc.*,
15 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) 2014 WL 4703915, at *1 (approving \$5,000 PAGA payment in \$4
16 million settlement); *Chu v. Wells Fargo Invest. LLC* (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) 2011 WL 672645,
17 at *1 (approving PAGA payment of \$7,500 in \$6.9 million settlement); *Williams v. Brinderson*
18 *Constructors* (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017) 2017 WL 490901, at *5 (\$10,000 PAGA settlement in
19 \$300,000 settlement).)

20 A review of the preliminary approval criteria demonstrates a substantial basis for granting
21 the instant Motion and proceeding to a final settlement approval hearing.

22 **VI. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR AND ADEQUATE**

23 As a matter of public policy, courts both encourage the use of the class action device and
24 favor settlement over continued litigation. (*See, e.g., Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th
25 429, 434 (“Courts have long acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means to prevent
26 a failure of justice in our judicial system.”); *Class Plaintiff v. City of Seattle* (1992) 955 F.2d
27 1268, 1276 (“[S]trong judicial policy . . . favors settlements, particularly where complex class
28 action litigation is concerned.”).)

1 Moreover, courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a
2 settlement unless evidence to the contrary is offered. In short, there is a presumption that the
3 negotiations were conducted in good faith. (*Newberg*, §11.51; *Rodriguez v. West Publ. Corp.*
4 (C.D. Cal. August 10, 2007) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74767, 24-25 ; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir.
5 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447.) Courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the proponents,
6 particularly when settlement has been reached by experienced counsel familiar with the litigation.
7 (*Rodriguez*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74767 at 24; *Hammon v. Barry* (D.D.C. 1990) 752 F. Supp.
8 1087.)

9 In *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 128 (2008), the court laid out
10 several factors that should be analyzed in determining if a class action settlement should be
11 approved. These factors include: (1) the strength of plaintiffs' case; (2) the risk, expense,
12 complexity and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status
13 through trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and
14 stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a
15 governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the Class Members to the proposed settlement.

16 The Settlement here satisfies each of these factors. Class Counsel conducted extensive
17 informal discovery before entering into meaningful settlement negotiations in this matter,
18 including a detailed analysis of Defendants' policies and a reasonable sample of Defendants' time
19 and pay records. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 15-19.) This discovery permitted Class Counsel to fairly evaluate
20 the strengths of the case and the risks associated with ongoing litigation. Class Counsel is very
21 experienced in the handling of wage and hour class actions and supports this Settlement. (Kim
22 Decl., ¶¶ 3-9.)

23 **A. The Strength of Plaintiffs' Case.**

24 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay minimum wages and overtime, failed to
25 provide proper meal breaks or provide premium pay in lieu thereof, failed to provide proper rest
26 breaks or provide premium pay in lieu thereof, failed to provide vacation wages, failed to provide
27 paid sick time, failed to provide accurate wage statements, failed to timely pay all wages upon
28 termination, and failed to keep required payroll records. (Kim Decl., ¶ 39.)

1 As further explained below, Plaintiffs contended that Defendants' policies and practices
2 relating to pay and meal and rest breaks were unlawful and applied to all Class Members. (Kim
3 Decl., ¶¶ 46-52.) Defendants contended, however, that their policies complied with California law
4 and denied Plaintiffs' allegations.

5 **B. The Risks Associated with the Merits.**

6 As with all litigation, there are risks that a party will not prevail on the merits. In this case,
7 Plaintiffs contended that Defendants failed to provide compliant, duty-free meal periods to Class
8 Members since they were required to remain on duty during their meal periods. (Kim Decl., ¶ 42.)
9 Defendants contended that Class Members were given a reasonable opportunity to take their meal
10 periods, and in fact received their meal periods most of the time, and any deviations were at the
11 voluntary election of Class Members. (Kim Decl., ¶ 44.) Defendants argued they have a high
12 meal period compliance rate and that they paid premium pay for any non-compliant meal periods.
13 (*Id.*) If Defendants' contentions are proven true and prevail in trial, the likely outcome of this
14 claim would be no recovery for Class Members. (*Id.*) Given the difficulty in certifying this claim,
15 Class Counsel had to apply a significant discount to damages. (*Id.*)

16 Plaintiffs also contended that Defendants did not provide Class Members with paid 10-
17 minute rest breaks for every four hours or major fraction thereof. (Kim Decl., ¶ 50.) Plaintiffs
18 contended that Class Members consistently worked in excess of consecutive four-hour shifts and
19 were entitled to paid rest breaks of not less than ten minutes for each consecutive four-hour shift
20 but were required to work through their rest breaks during their shifts. (*Id.*) Defendants
21 maintained that they did provide a reasonable opportunity for Class Members to take duty-free
22 rest breaks during their shifts pursuant to their policy and disputed all allegations that rest breaks
23 were not provided. (*Id.*) Defendants further argued that Class Members had multiple opportunities
24 to report non-compliant rest breaks and that Defendants provided premium pay for any reported
25 non-compliant rest breaks. (*Id.*) Defendants also pointed out that, unlike meal periods, rest breaks
26 need not be recorded, so any rest break violations would likely be difficult to certify and prove at
27 trial. (*Id.*) As these considerations would likely depress the damages *vel non* ultimately awarded,
28 Class Counsel applied appropriate discounts to the rest break claim. (*Id.*)

1 Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and Class Members at least
2 minimum wages for all hours worked and proper overtime wages for hours worked in excess of
3 eight hours in a day and 40 hours in a week. (Kim Decl., ¶ 42.) Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that
4 Plaintiffs and Class Members would have to work “pre-shift” without compensation as they were
5 required to stand in line to clock in “pre-shift” and when returning from their meal breaks and
6 wash their hands before clocking in. (*Id.*) To the extent that each Class Members’ worked over 40
7 hours in a week, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to pay all overtime wages by paying a
8 lower overtime rate than required. (*Id.*)

9 Defendants contended that they paid for all reported hours worked, that Class Members
10 were trained and required to record all hours worked, that any “off the clock” work was
11 performed without Defendants’ knowledge and was de minimis, and that they paid wages at the
12 proper rates, including for overtime. (Kim Decl., ¶ 44.) Given the difficulty in certifying this
13 claim, Class Counsel had to apply a discount to damages. (*Id.*)

14 Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants failed to compute the amount due for paid sick and
15 vacation time in conformance with the pay calculation under California Labor Code § 246. (Kim
16 Decl., ¶ 53.) Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants paid nondiscretionary commissions and/or
17 nondiscretionary bonuses to Plaintiffs and Class Members but Defendants failed to include these
18 forms of remuneration in the regular rate of pay upon which sick pay was calculated and paid.
19 (Kim Decl., ¶ 54.) Defendants contended that any commissions and/or bonuses paid to Class
20 Members were discretionary in nature and not required to be included in the calculation of the
21 regular rate of pay for Class Members. (*Id.*)

22 C. The Risks Associated with Paystub Violations and Waiting Time Penalties.

23 In order to establish liability for these penalties, Plaintiffs would first have to establish
24 liability for the underlying claims. Plaintiffs would then have to establish that Defendants’
25 conduct was willful and knowing. (Labor Code §§ 203, 226(e).)

26 With waiting time penalties, there is always the risk that the trier of fact would not have
27 held that Defendant’s actions were done “willfully.” A good faith belief in a legal defense can
28 preclude a finding of willfulness. (*Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 36,

1 54; 8 C.C.R. § 13520.) As discussed above, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to pay for all
2 hours worked and premiums for non-compliant meal breaks due to the underreporting of hours
3 and off the clock work. Plaintiffs contended that Class Members are entitled to these wages and
4 premiums, which they allege were not paid at the time of their termination or resignation. If
5 Plaintiffs are successful on their claims, the penalties pursuant to Labor Code § 203 shall attach.
6 Defendants, however, contend they provided employees with the reasonable opportunity to take
7 meal breaks, asked Class Members to confirm the accuracy of their time records, and therefore
8 had good-faith defenses under *Brinker* and its progeny. Defendants likewise contended that they
9 properly paid all hours worked by its employees. Based upon Defendants’ potential success in
10 establishing both that a good faith dispute existed with regard to unpaid wages, and Defendants
11 endeavored in good faith to supply accurate wage statements, Defendants argued the claims for
12 paystub violations and waiting time penalties have little or no value. *See Maldonado v. Epsilon*
13 *Plastics, Inc.*, 22 Cal. App. 5th 1308, 1336-1337 (2018) (wage statements that accurately report
14 wages paid to employees do not violate Labor Code § 226, even if it is later determined that
15 employer did not properly pay all wages due). As such, there was risk associated with wage
16 statement and waiting time penalties that Class Counsel had to consider. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 53-59.)

17 **D. The Risks Associated with the PAGA Penalties.**

18 Labor Code § 2699.3 gives aggrieved employees the right to recover civil penalties for
19 specific Labor Code violations by way of a civil action. The PAGA provides a penalty amount of
20 one hundred dollars (\$100) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation
21 and two hundred dollars (\$200) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent
22 violation. Labor Code § 2699(e)(2). However, if a civil penalty is provided in a specified amount
23 by the Labor Code section relating to the underlying alleged Labor Code violation, that amount
24 shall apply. (*Id.*) The PAGA also gives the Court discretion to award any lesser amount than the
25 maximum civil penalty. (*Id.* [“...a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil
26 penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular
27 case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or
28 confiscatory.”]); *See, e.g., Lopez v. Friant & Assocs., LLC*, 15 Cal. App. 5th 773, 788 (2017), *rev.*

1 *denied* (2018), (recognizing court’s ability to reduce PAGA penalties). Courts have held that
2 situations similar to the current one (e.g. injuryless violations, technical errors, and substantial
3 compliance) should lead to reductions in penalties. *See Thurman v. Bayshore Transit*
4 *Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal. App. 4th 1112, 1134-1135 (2012) (holding that reduction was
5 justified when employer “attempted to comply with the law”); *Fleming v. Covdien, Inc.*, No. ED
6 CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154590 at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. August 12, 2011)
7 (reducing PAGA penalties more than 80% – from \$2.8 million to \$500,000 – when “employees
8 suffered no injury” employers were “not aware” of the violation and “took prompt steps to correct
9 all violations once notified”).

10 Plaintiffs discounted potential penalties under this claim given this authority, and for
11 reasons already discussed. The PAGA claims are premised on the same underlying unpaid wages,
12 meal and rest break, wage statement, and waiting time claims, and thus subject to the same
13 disputes and defenses. There is also a dispute as to whether violations in later pay periods trigger
14 the \$200 penalty under PAGA as a “subsequent violation.” (*Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 163
15 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1203 (2008).) As such, there is a fair amount of risk associated with PAGA
16 claims makes the settlement’s proposed PAGA payment of \$100,000.00 appropriate. (Kim Decl.,
17 ¶¶ 60-63.)

18 **E. The Risk, Expense, Complexity and Likely Duration of Any Litigation.**

19 Given the risks outlined above, the issues in this case were complex and the risk for
20 Plaintiffs and Class Members associated with this litigation was significant. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 67-
21 70.) A class trial would have required the retention of expensive expert witnesses, the accrual of
22 extensive litigation costs, and the parties would have had to spend a substantial amount of time
23 litigating this matter. (*Id.*)

24 Finally, given the complexity and unsettled nature of the issues, it is likely that any
25 outcome at trial would have resulted in a lengthy and costly appeal. An appeal would result in
26 further delay for Class Members who will have already waited considerable time for resolution in
27 this matter.

1 **F. The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Through Trial.**

2 In class actions, decertification is always a possibility. There is always a risk that a trial of
3 this magnitude can become unmanageable. (Kim Decl., ¶ 70.) Given cases like *Duran v. U.S.*
4 *Bank Nat. Assn.*, 59 Cal. 4th 1, 34 (2014) that deal with the complexity of using statistical
5 samples in class actions, decertification is a real risk that Class Counsel must take into account.

6 **G. The Amount Offered in Settlement.**

7 Based on an analysis of Plaintiffs' time and pay records and a sampling of time and pay
8 records for the Class, Plaintiffs estimated the potential realistic exposure for the main claims as
9 follows: unpaid wages claims at **\$171,353.40**, meal period claim at **\$535,804.00**, rest period claim
10 at **\$141,654.10**, wage statement claim at **\$196,480.00**, waiting time penalties at **\$342,753.00**,
11 unpaid sick and vacation time claim at **\$3,278.00**, and on PAGA at **\$100,730.00**. (Kim Decl., ¶¶
12 40, 70.) As such, the total estimated realistic exposure Defendants could face is **\$1,492,052.50**.
13 (*Id.*)

14 The Gross Settlement Amount of \$900,000.00 represents a recovery for the Class of
15 approximately 60% of the total realistic exposure Plaintiffs estimated that Defendant could face
16 on the primary claims in this case. (Kim Decl., ¶ 66.) Plaintiffs and Class Counsel submit that this
17 is an excellent result in the face of uncertainty and the prospects of protracted and contested
18 litigation through class certification, summary judgment, and trial, and particularly in light of all
19 of the factors described above. (*Id.*)

20 Class Counsel believes that the settlement is fair and reasonable and serves the best
21 interests of Class Members. Although the recommendations of counsel proposing the class
22 settlement are not conclusive, the Court can properly take the recommendations into account,
23 particularly if counsel has been involved in litigation for some period of time, appear to be
24 competent, and have experience with this type of litigation, and significant discovery has been
25 completed. *See Newberg*, §11.47.

26 **VII. THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE PAYMENT IS FAIR AND**
27 **REASONABLE**

28 It is appropriate to provide a relatively modest additional incentive payment to the class

1 representative. See *Newberg*, § 12.1; *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901
2 F.Supp. 294.

3 Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable service payment for their efforts and initiative in
4 bringing and helping to prosecute this class action. Plaintiffs spent significant time better
5 apprising themselves of their rights, deciding whether remedial action should be taken, how it
6 should be taken, searching for attorneys, and contacting Class Counsel, who spent many hours
7 with Plaintiffs discussing the case and the law. (Kim Decl., ¶ 82.) In the end, Plaintiffs decided to
8 vindicate not only their own rights but also those of their co-workers by filing a class action
9 lawsuit. (*Id.*)

10 The courage it took to do this should not be underestimated. (Kim Decl., ¶ 83.) By suing
11 Defendants and serving as the class representative in this case, Plaintiffs contend that they
12 increased their risk of retaliation by prospective employers and put their own future employment
13 prospects at risk. (*Id.*) But Plaintiffs did not allow their fear of the potential repercussions of
14 being class representatives deter them from acting for the benefit of Class Members. (Kim Decl.,
15 ¶ 80.) To the contrary, Plaintiffs have been intimately involved in this case since its inception.
16 (*Id.*) They have devoted a substantial amount of time to helping Class Counsel effectively
17 develop and prosecute this action at every stage of the litigation. (*Id.*) Both before and after the
18 filing of this lawsuit, Plaintiffs conferred with Class Counsel to discuss every aspect of this case;
19 Plaintiffs provided Class Counsel with information about Defendants and about the industry
20 generally, reviewed documents, identified witnesses, consulted Class Counsel throughout the
21 litigation, participated in the mediation process, monitored the progress of the litigation with
22 Class Counsel, and reviewed and signed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*)

23 In sum, Plaintiffs have diligently, adequately, and fairly represented Class Members, and
24 have not placed their interests above any member of the putative class. (Kim Decl., ¶ 81.) This
25 sort of payment to a class representative has been a common feature of settlements negotiated by
26 Class Counsel and has been routinely approved by trial courts. (Kim Decl., ¶ 81.)

27 The Settlement allocates an incentive award in the amount of \$10,000.00 to each Plaintiff.
28 (Kim Decl., ¶ 23.) This amount is a far cry from the \$50,000 of enhancement awards to the two

1 named plaintiffs approved by the trial court in *Clark*. See *Clark Clark v. American Residential*
2 *Services, LLC* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th at 807. Although Class Counsel appreciate that the Court
3 has a duty to ensure that class representatives are not overcompensated at the expense of the class,
4 modest incentive awards in employment class actions, such as the one here, are necessary not
5 only to compensate class representatives for the time they spend in the case, but also, and more
6 importantly, to encourage aggrieved employees to challenge questionable employment practices
7 notwithstanding the very real consequences they may face.

8 In light of the foregoing, Class Counsel believes that the Class Representative Service
9 Payment in the amount of \$10,000.00 to each Plaintiff is fair and reasonable. (Kim Decl., ¶ 82.)

10 **VIII. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE PROVIDES ADEQUATE NOTICE TO THE**
11 **CLASS MEMBERS.**

12 Constitutional due process requires that class members be provided with notice sufficient
13 to give them an opportunity to be heard in the proceedings. *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &*
14 *Trust Co.* (1950) 339 U.S. 306. Proper notice must provide the class members with sufficient
15 information to make an informed decision as to whether to accept or object to the settlement. (*Id.*
16 at 314.) The notice must apprise the class members of the pendency of the action; reasonably
17 convey information regarding the settlement and the class members' rights, entitlements, and
18 obligations; and afford class members the opportunity to present their objections. (*Id.*)

19 The Class Notice meets constitutional standards because it provides all the information a
20 reasonable person would need to make a fully informed decision about the settlement. It will
21 notify all class members of the terms of the settlement, of its effect on their rights, of their options
22 as class members (i.e., participate, object, opt out, do nothing), and of the consequences of
23 exercising those options. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 71-73.) Moreover, the Class Notice will specifically
24 direct any class members who have questions or concerns to contact the Settlement Administrator
25 or Class Counsel. (*Id.*)

26 The standard for determining the adequacy of notice is whether the notice has "a
27 reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members." (*Cartt v. Superior*
28 *Court* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974.) The Judicial Council of California's Deskbook on the

1 Management of Complex Civil Litigation (Matthew Bender 2003), § 3.74 notes that individual
2 notice by mail is preferred when possible and dissemination of combined certification/settlement
3 notice is a common and accepted practice. (*In re Vitamin Cases* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 820,
4 828.)

5 Here, the Class Notice will be sent via first-class mail to each Class Member. (Kim Decl.,
6 ¶¶ 31, 71.) If any Class Notices are returned undeliverable without a forwarding address, the
7 Settlement Administrator will use the national change of address database and perform a skip
8 trace to locate the Class Member and mail a new Class Notice to him or her at the correct address.
9 (*Id.*) Thus, most, if not all, Class Members will likely receive the Class Notice.

10 Pursuant to controlling authority, the proposed Class Notice and method of distribution
11 fully comport with due process requirements. Therefore, the Court should approve the Class
12 Notice and direct that it be distributed as proposed herein.

13 **IX. STANDING TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

14 Non-settling parties and third parties periodically may attempt to object to proposed class
15 action settlements, but the right of non-settling parties to object at the final settlement approval
16 hearing, let alone the preliminary approval hearing, is quite limited. As a general rule, only class
17 members have standing to object to a proposed settlement. “Beginning from the unassailable
18 premise that settlements are to be encouraged, it follows that to routinely allow non-class
19 members to inject their concerns via objection at the settlement stage would tend to frustrate this
20 goal.” (*Gould v. Alleco, Inc.* (4th Cir. 1998) 883 F.2d 281, 284.) Since an application is being
21 filed to obtain a good faith determination, no persons other than class members have standing to
22 object to the proposed settlement. (*In re School Asbestos Litigation* (3rd Cir. 1990) 921 F.2d
23 1330.)

24 **X. THE STIPULATED AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS IS** 25 **REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED.**

26 Under the Settlement Agreement, subject to approval by this Court, Class Counsel will
27 seek an award of fees of no more than \$315,000.00, 35% of the Gross Settlement Amount, and
28 actual reasonable litigation costs in an amount not to exceed \$50,000.00. (Kim Decl. ¶ 75.) The

1 requested fees are fair compensation for a law firm involved in undertaking complex, risky,
2 expensive, and time-consuming litigation solely on a contingent basis. (Kim Decl. ¶¶ 76-77.)
3 Defendants will not oppose Class Counsel's above fees and cost request. (Kim Decl. ¶ 75.)

4 Here, Class Counsel has borne the entire risk and costs of litigation and will not receive
5 any compensation until recovery is obtained. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 76-77.) The Court should also
6 consider the significant benefit obtained by Class Counsel on behalf of Class Members. Thus, the
7 requested award for Class Counsel is reasonable.

8 **XI. ACTION REQUESTED AS A PART OF THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY** 9 **APPROVAL**

10 The Parties respectfully request this Court, as part of the preliminary approval process, to
11 grant the following relief and make the following orders:

- 12 1. Approve the Settlement Agreement;
- 13 2. Approve the Class Notice, attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit A;
- 14 3. Consider and determine that the proposed class action settlement as set forth in the
15 Settlement Agreement preliminarily appears fair, reasonable, and adequate;
- 16 4. Enter an order conditionally certifying the action as a class action for settlement
17 purposes only and preliminarily approving the proposed class action settlement and the
18 Settlement Agreement;
- 19 5. Approve and appoint D.Law, Inc., David Yeremian & Associates, Inc., and Lavi &
20 Ebrahimian, LLP to serve as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
- 21 6. Approve and appoint Apex Class Action, LLC as the settlement administrator to handle
22 the notice and claims procedures as set forth in the Settlement Agreement;
- 23 7. Approve the proposed settlement's allocation of funds to claims made under PAGA;
- 24 8. Order Defendants to disclose to the Administrator the names, last-known addresses,
25 telephone numbers, Social Security numbers, start and end dates of active employment as a non-
26 exempt employee of Defendants in the State of California, and any other information required by
27 the Settlement Administrator to effectuate the terms of the Settlement;
- 28 9. Order that the Administrator mail the Class Notices to Class Members; and


1 10. Set a date for the Final Approval Hearing.
2

3 Dated: February 6, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

4 D.LAW, INC.

5
6 By



7 Enoch J. Kim
8 Antonia Bliznets
9 Attorneys for Plaintiff Maldonado
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