

Brian J. Mankin, Esq. [CSB No. 216228]
brian@lmlfirm.com
Peter J. Carlson, Esq. [CSB No. 295611]
peter@lmlfirm.com
LAUBY, MANKIN & LAUBY LLP
5198 Arlington Avenue, PMB 513
Riverside, CA 92504
Tel: (951) 320-1444 | Fax: (951) 320-1445

Attorneys for Plaintiff, on a representative basis and on behalf of all others similarly situated

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

AUDRIANA SPARKS, individually, on a
representative basis, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated;

Plaintiff,

vs.

LOGAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
INC., a California Corporation; and DOES
1 through 20, inclusive;

Defendants.

Case No.: CVRI2302103
*[Assigned to Hon. Harold Hopp, Dept 1, for all
purposes]*

**PLAINTIFF'S UNOPPOSED MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION AND PAGA
SETTLEMENT**

*Filed Concurrently with Declarations in
Support Thereof and [Proposed] Order*

Hearing

Date: July 17, 2024

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept.: 1

1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 17, 2024, 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the
3 matter may be heard by the Honorable Harold Hopp in Department 1 of the Riverside County
4 Superior Court, located at 4050 Main Street, Riverside, CA 92501, Plaintiff Audriana Sparks,
5 individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, will and hereby does move the Court
6 for entry of an Order preliminarily approving the Parties' Class Action and Private Attorneys
7 General Act ("PAGA") settlement, including:


- 8 1. Certifying the class for purposes of settlement only;
- 9 2. Preliminarily appointing Plaintiff as class representative for settlement purposes;
- 10 3. Appointing Plaintiff's counsel as class counsel for purposes of settlement only;
- 11 4. Preliminarily approving the class action and PAGA settlement as fair, adequate,
12 and reasonable, based upon the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement;
- 13 5. Directing distribution of the Class Notice, including notice of the opportunity to
14 exclude oneself from, or object to, the settlement;
- 15 6. Setting a date for a final fairness hearing to determine, following dissemination of
16 the Class Notice, whether to grant final approval of the Settlement.

17 This motion is based upon this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
18 thereof; the Declaration of Plaintiff's counsel (Brian Mankin and Peter Carlson); the Declaration
19 of Plaintiff; the Declaration of Defendant's counsel, Joseph Parker, Esq.; the Declaration of
20 Defendant's Representative Martha Enriquez; the Declaration of Michael Moore on behalf of
21 Phoenix Settlement Administrators; the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and
22 Release of Claims (the "Settlement Agreement"); the proposed Order granting Preliminary
23 Approval of the Settlement; all other records, pleadings, and papers filed in this action; and upon
24 such other evidence or argument as may be presented to the Court at the hearing of this motion.

25 Dated: June 24, 2024

LAUBY, MANKIN & LAUBY LLP

26
27 BY:



28 Brian J. Mankin, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Audriana Sparks seeks preliminary approval of a \$255,000 class action
4 settlement on behalf of approximately 98 current and former nonexempt (hourly paid) employees
5 employed by Defendant Logan Property Management, Inc. (“LPM” or “Defendant”) in
6 California and who received bonus pay at any time from April 25, 2019, through April 25, 2024
7 (the “Class Period”).

8 Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement,¹ Defendant will not oppose Plaintiff
9 Counsel’s application for a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees not to exceed \$85,000 (1/3 of the
10 Settlement Amount), litigation expenses not to exceed \$20,000, Settlement Administrator Costs
11 of \$6,000, PAGA penalties of \$20,000 (75% to LWDA and 25% to Aggrieved Employees), and
12 a Service Payment of \$5,000 to Plaintiff Audriana Sparks (“Class Representative”). (S.A. ¶ 49).

13 After all Court-approved deductions from the Settlement Amount, it is estimated that
14 \$119,000 will be available to pay the Class Members, as follows:

15

<i>Settlement Amount</i>	\$ 255,000.00
Attorneys’ Fees (1/3)	\$ 85,000.00
Litigation Costs (not to exceed)	\$ 20,000.00
Administrator Costs	\$ 6,000.00
PAGA Penalties	\$ 20,000.00
Class Representative Service Award	\$ 5,000.00
<i>Net Settlement Amount</i>	\$ 119,000.00

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20 Assuming 98 total Class Members, the average payment will be approximately
21 \$1,214.29. But the actual payments will be calculated by providing each Class Member a
22 guaranteed minimum payment of \$250, with the remaining balance of the Net Settlement
23 Amount distributed on a pro-rata workweek basis. (S.A. ¶ 49(c); Mankin Decl. ¶¶ 56-58
24 [description of high/low payments]). In addition, approximately 70 Aggrieved Employees will
25 receive a share of the \$5,000 PAGA Penalties (25% of the \$20,000 allocation), calculated pro-
26 rata based on Weeks Worked during the PAGA Period. (S.A. ¶ 49(h)).

27
28 ¹ The Class and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims (the “Settlement Agreement” or “S.A.”) is attached as Exhibit A to the Decl. of Brian Mankin (“Mankin Decl.”).

1 Because the settlement is fair, reasonable, and negotiated at arm's length by experienced
2 counsel and an experienced mediator following a sufficient exchange of information and
3 documents prior to mediation, it should be preliminarily approved. Plaintiff respectfully requests
4 that the Court enter an order preliminarily approving the settlement, conditionally certifying the
5 Class under Code of Civil Procedure § 382 for settlement purposes, approving the proposed
6 Class Notice, appointing Plaintiff's counsel as class counsel, appointing Phoenix Settlement
7 Administrators as the Administrator, and scheduling a hearing for final approval.

8 **II. BACKGROUND**

9 **A. THE CLASS**

The Class is defined as follows:

10 All current and former nonexempt (hourly paid) employees
11 employed by Defendant in California and who received bonus pay
12 during the Class Period (April 25, 2019, through April 29, 2024).
(S.A. ¶¶ 4, 8).

13 **B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

14 Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA")
15 for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA"), and
16 simultaneously sent a letter to LPM requesting the production of personnel and timekeeping
17 records to further evaluate her wage and hour claims. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 13).

18 On April 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed this class action, alleging that LPM violated various
19 sections of the Labor Code. Then, on July 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
20 adding PAGA causes of action. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 14).

21 Defendant retained counsel and immediately began to defend the case. Then, after early
22 discussions among counsel, the Parties agreed to attend private mediation. In preparation for
23 mediation, the Parties informally exchanged documents and information that allowed both sides
24 to calculate the potential damages and evaluate potential risk, including policies and procedures
25 pertaining to the claims, statistics relating to the number of current and former employees,
26 number of shifts, pay periods worked and other things, and a sampling of payroll and
27 timekeeping records for Class Members. This information enabled both parties to take a deep
28 dive into the claims. Additionally, during this process, Plaintiff and her counsel analyzed,

1 researched, and investigated the potential issues, including matters related to the calculation of
2 damages, trial, and appellate issues and risks. However, the mediation was ultimately
3 unsuccessful. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 15).

4 Consequently, Plaintiff initiated class-wide discovery in preparation for class
5 certification, and requested the Class Members names and contact information. (Mankin Decl. ¶
6 16). This flurry of activity and the looming prospect of having to engage in full blown discovery
7 and a class certification hearing prompted the Parties to schedule a second round of mediation,
8 which was held on April 29, 2024 with Hon. Jonathan Cannon (Ret.), a well-respected
9 employment mediator. The matter resolved at this session of mediation and the Parties entered
10 into the Settlement Agreement submitted herewith. The Parties now seek the Court's preliminary
11 approval of the Settlement. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 17).

12 **C. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CLAIMS AND DEFENSES**

13 Plaintiff alleged numerous wage and hour violations on behalf of the Class Members.
14 However, Defendant vigorously contested and denied Plaintiff's material allegations on the
15 merits and as to the propriety of a class action or PAGA representative action. Still, Plaintiff
16 believed there were several strong claims. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 18).

17 Plaintiff's primary claim was based on Defendant's policy that paid the Class on an
18 hourly basis plus various forms of bonus pay yet failed to include the bonus payments in the
19 calculations for overtime, meal premiums under Labor Code § 226.7, sick pay under Labor Code
20 § 246, and vested vacation under Labor Code § 227.3. Plaintiff argued these violations resulted
21 in significant unpaid wages, waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203 and other derivative
22 penalties. However, Defendant opposed each claim on the merits and as to the propriety of class
23 certification. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 19).

24 Plaintiff also alleged that she and the Class Members were often denied compliant meal
25 and rest breaks due to the nature of the work. However, Defendant argued that it provided and
26 made all mandated meal and rest breaks available to the Class, and any employee who did not
27 take a break did so entirely of their own volition. Thus, Defendant argued that these claims were
28 without merit because, for each violation, a fact-finder would have to determine why a break was

1 noncompliant, because if it was by the employee's choice, no liability attaches to Defendant.
2 LPM also argued that it had a practice of paying meal premiums when the timekeeping records
3 evidenced a noncompliant meal period (although Plaintiff argued this amount was not paid at the
4 proper rate [the "regular rate of pay"])). (Mankin Decl. ¶ 20).

5 Finally, Plaintiff alleged a variety of other claims (all of which Defendant disputed), such
6 as the failure to timely pay wages each period, failure to timely pay all wages upon separation of
7 employment, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and failure to reimburse
8 business expenses. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 21).

9 Despite the disputed nature of the claims, the Parties concluded that further litigation of
10 the Action would be protracted and expensive, and that it is desirable that the Action be fully and
11 finally settled to limit further risk, expense, and protracted litigation. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 22).

12 **III. SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

13 The following is a summary of the principal terms of the Settlement Agreement.

14 **A. SETTLEMENT CONSIDERATION AND ALLOCATION**

15 The \$255,000 Settlement Amount² is non-reversionary and will be paid out to Class
16 Members without the need to submit a claim form or take any affirmative action. It includes (1)
17 Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs, as approved by the Court; (2) a service award of \$5,000 to
18 Plaintiff, subject to approval by the Court; (3) Administration Costs, not to exceed \$6,000; (4) a
19 \$20,000 PAGA award, with 75% paid to the LWDA and 25% to the Aggrieved Employees; and
20 (5) the aggregate of all Individual Settlement Amounts of the Participating Class Members. (S.A.
21 ¶ 49). Defendant will separately pay its share of employer payroll taxes and withholdings. (*Id.*).

22 **B. NOTICE PROCEDURES**

23 Here, the Parties will provide notice of this settlement in strict compliance with Court's
24 Class Action Case Management Order #1, issued on May 1, 2023 (the "CMO"). Thus, as
25 required by CMO ¶ G, the Parties will send each Class Member a Class Notice, a Request for
26

27 ² The Settlement Amount is subject to increase if the "Escalator Clause" is triggered. S.A. ¶¶ 15,
28 49(a). If this clause is triggered, other figures will also shift upward along with the Settlement
Amount, such as attorneys' fees (but this is still constrained to 1/3 of the Settlement Amount)
along with increased Administration Costs (*see* S.A. ¶ 49(g)).

1 Exclusion Form, an Objection Form, and a Dispute Form. (S.A. ¶ 65), which are attached to the
2 Mankin Decl. as Exhibits B, C, D, and E, respectively.

3 Notably, the proposed Notice complies with CMO ¶ G(5) because it informs each Class
4 Member of the estimated recovery, the number of Weeks Works that each Class Members is
5 credited with, and the applicable average payments, minimum, and high payments. And the
6 Notice Packet will be provided in both English and Spanish to ensure that each Class Member
7 can read and understand the contents.

8 Within 14 calendar days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, LPM shall
9 provide the Settlement Administrator with the “Class Data” consisting of Class Member names,
10 addresses, Social Security Numbers, and Weeks Worked during the applicable periods. (S.A. ¶¶
11 7, 63). Within 10 calendar days of receipt of the Class Data, the Settlement Administrator shall
12 calculate the numbers for each Class Member, populate the Notice, and send each Class Member
13 the Notice Packet via first-class, United States mail. (S.A. ¶ 65).

14 If a Notice is returned as undelivered by the U.S. Postal Service, the Settlement
15 Administrator shall perform a skip trace and seek an address correction for the Class Member(s),
16 and a second Notice will be sent to any new or different address obtained. (S.A. ¶ 66).

17 **C. EXCLUSION AND OBJECTION PROCEDURES**

18 Class Members who do not timely Opt-Out of the Settlement will be deemed to
19 participate in the Settlement and shall become a Participating Class Member without having to
20 submit a claim form or take any other action. To Opt-Out of the Settlement, the Class Member
21 must submit a written request to the Administrator no later than 45 days after being mailed by
22 the Settlement Administrator (“Response Deadline”). (S.A. ¶ 35). Any Opt-Out request that is
23 not postmarked by the Response Deadline will be invalid, unless a Notice was remailed in which
24 case the Class Member’s exclusion or objection must be returned by the later of the original
25 Notice Response Deadline or 15 calendar days after the remailing of the notice. (S.A. ¶¶ 66, 70).

26 The Class Notice shall inform Class Members of their right to object to the Settlement.
27 Any Participating Class Member who wishes to object to the Settlement must complete the
28 Objection Form in the Notice Packet. To be valid, any Objection Form must be mailed to the

1 Settlement Administrator and postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (S.A. ¶ 70(c)).

2 **D. SETTLEMENT ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR SETTLEMENT SHARES**

3 The amount of each Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be calculated by
4 providing each Participating Class Member with a guaranteed minimum payment of \$250, with
5 the remaining balance of the Net Settlement Amount distributed on a pro-rata Workweek basis,
6 calculated and apportioned by (a) dividing the remaining Net Settlement Amount (*i.e.*, the
7 amount remaining after deducting the guaranteed minimum payments) by the total number of
8 Weeks Worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period, and (b) multiplying
9 the result by each Participating Class Members' Weeks Worked. (S.A. ¶ 49(c)). Additionally,
10 each "Aggrieved Employee" will receive an Individual PAGA Payment, calculated by dividing
11 and distributing the \$5,000 on a pro-rata Weeks Worked basis. (S.A. ¶ 49(h)).

12 The Class Notice will inform Class Members of the number of Weeks Worked during the
13 relevant periods and the estimated Individual Class and PAGA Payments. Class Members may
14 dispute their Share Points or Weeks Worked by timely submitting evidence to the Settlement
15 Administrator. (S.A. ¶ 68).

16 **E. TIMING OF SETTLEMENT DISBURSEMENTS**

17 Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, LPM is required to fund the
18 Settlement Amount, plus its share of payroll taxes owed on the Individual Class Payments,
19 within 15 days of the Effective Date. (S.A. ¶ 71). Within 10 days after receiving the funds, the
20 Administrator shall issue payments to cover all court-approved payments. (S.A. ¶ 72).

21 Class Members will have 180 days to cash the settlement check. (S.A. ¶ 73). If a Class
22 Member fails to cash a check by the deadline, the Administrator shall issue unclaimed funds to
23 the California State Controller in the name of the Class Member/Aggrieved Employee. (*Id.*).
24 As required by CMO ¶ G(3)(c)(i), Plaintiff's Counsel explains the reasoning for this method of
25 distribution at Mankin Decl. ¶¶ 53-58.

26 **F. TAX TREATMENT**

27 The Parties agree that twenty percent (20%) of the Individual Class Payments will be
28 allocated as wages subject to withholding of all applicable local, state and federal taxes and the

1 remaining eighty percent (80%) will be allocated for interest and penalties (pursuant to, *e.g.*,
2 California Labor Code §§ 203, 210, 226, 2699 etc.) from which no taxes will be withheld. (S.A.
3 ¶ 49(d)). The Individual PAGA Payments will be classified entirely as civil penalties and shall
4 be reported as required on an IRS Form 1099. (S.A. ¶ 49(h)).

5 **G. PARTICIPATING CLASS MEMBERS' RELEASE OF CLAIMS**

6 In exchange for these payments, and in strict compliance with CMO ¶ G(3)(e), the
7 Settlement Agreement at ¶ 30 defines the “Released Class Claims” as follows:

8 the claims stated in the Complaint and those based solely upon the
9 facts in the Complaint, including: (1) failure to pay minimum wages,
10 (2) failure to pay overtime wages, (3) failure to provide meal periods,
11 (4) failure to provide rest breaks, (5) failure to pay vested vacation,
12 (6) failure to reimburse business expenses, (7) failure to timely pay
final wages, (8) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements,
and (9) unfair and unlawful competition

13 Additionally, as required by CMO ¶ G(3)(e)(iii), the “Release Period” (*i.e.*, the time
14 period governing the Released Class Claims) is the same as the Class Period. (S.A. ¶ 33). And,
15 pursuant to CMO ¶ G(3)(e)(i), the “Released Parties” are limited to Defendant, together with its
16 officers, directors, employees, and agents. (S.A. ¶ 32).

17 It is understood and agreed that the Settlement Agreement will not release any person, party
18 or entity from claims, if any, by Class Members for any other claims, including claims for vested
19 benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment
20 insurance, disability, social security, workers’ compensation, or claims based on facts occurring
21 outside the Class Period.

22 **H. AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEES' RELEASE OF CLAIMS**

23 The Settlement Agreement at ¶ 31 also complies with CMO ¶¶ G(3)(e)(iv) and G(9)(d) as
24 it defines the “Released PAGA Claims” as follows:

25 all PAGA claims that Plaintiff alleged against the Released Parties,
26 based on the facts stated in the relevant LWDA notice letters and
27 only to the extent that they are alleged in the Complaint, including
28 all PAGA claims seeking civil penalties premised upon: (1) failure
to pay minimum wages, (2) failure to pay overtime wages, (3) failure
to provide meal periods, (4) failure to provide rest breaks, (5) failure
to pay vested vacation, (6) failure to reimburse business expenses,

(7) failure to timely pay wages each period, (8) failure to timely pay wages upon separation of employment, (9) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and (10) all other claims for civil penalties recoverable under the Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq. based on the facts or claims alleged in the LWDA notice letters and Complaint.

The CMO, at ¶¶ G(3)(e)(iv) and G(9)(d)(i), also requires that the “release of claims for PAGA penalties shall bind only the named plaintiff and the State of California.” The Settlement Agreement strictly complies with this requirement. (See S.A. ¶ 53 [“Plaintiff – in her individual capacity and on behalf of the State of California and LWDA – shall completely release and discharge the Released Parties from the Released PAGA Claims for the PAGA Period”]).

Moreover, even if an Aggrieved Employee requests exclusion from the Class settlement, that individual will still be subject to the Released PAGA Claims and will receive a pro-rata share of PAGA Penalties. (S.A. ¶ 54; CMO ¶ G(9)(c)).

IV. PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS IS APPROPRIATE FOR PURPOSES OF SETTLEMENT

California Rule of Court 3.769(d) provides that the Court may make an order approving certification of a provisional settlement class at the preliminary approval stage. It is well-established that trial courts should use a “lesser standard of scrutiny” for determining the propriety of certifying a settlement class, as opposed to a litigation class. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1807 at n.19; *Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com.* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 633 (“[C]ertification issues raised by class action litigation that is resolved short of a decision on the merits must be viewed in a different light.”); *Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor* (1997) 521 U.S. 591, 620 (“Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no trial.”). As discussed below, for the purposes of this settlement only, Plaintiff requests that this Court provisionally certify the Class, as defined above, under Code of Civil Procedure § 382.

///

///

1 **A. ASCERTAINABILITY AND NUMEROSITY**

2 In determining whether a class is ascertainable, the court considers “(1) the class
3 definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying the class
4 members.” *Reyes v. San Diego County Board of Supervisors* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263,
5 1271; *Medrazo v. Honda of N. Hollywood* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 89, 101 (proposed settlement
6 class is ascertainable if the class members can be objectively identified and given notice of the
7 litigation without unreasonable time or expense). Here, according to Defendant’s records, there
8 are approximately 98 Class Members that are easily identifiable and fall within the defined
9 Class. Thus, Plaintiff’s proposed Class meets the ascertainability and numerosity requirements.

10 **B. WELL-DEFINED COMMUNITY OF INTEREST**

11 1. Commonality

12 To justify certification, the class proponent must show that questions of law or fact
13 common to the class predominate over the questions affecting the individual members. *Arenas v.*
14 *El Torito Rests., Inc.* (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 723, 732. Here, Plaintiff contends that the Class
15 was subjected to common policies and practices relating to payment of wages, meal/rest breaks,
16 and so on. While the Parties dispute whether a class would be appropriate if the litigation were to
17 continue, they agree to class certification for the purposes of this settlement only.

18 2. Typicality

19 Typicality “focuses on whether there exists a relationship between the Plaintiff’s claims
20 and the claims alleged on behalf of the class.” *See* Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, *Newberg*
21 *on Class Actions* (“*Newberg*”) § 3:13 (4th ed. 2002). Again, the Parties dispute whether
22 Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class for the purposes of any continued litigation of the
23 Action, but agree for the purposes of this settlement only, that Plaintiff asserts claims regarding
24 Defendant’s pay policies, meal and rest break practices, wage statements, and the provisions
25 governing the timely and complete payment of wages, which are at the core of the lawsuit.

26 3. Adequacy of Representation

27 The proposed class representative must establish that he or she will adequately represent
28 the proposed class. *Barboza v. West Coast Digital GSM, Inc.* (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 540, 546.

Specifically, Plaintiff is adequate to represent the class because she was employed by Defendant during the Class Period, experienced the same wage and hour practices as the rest of the Class, understood her duties as a Class Representative, has been willing to undergo the risks of litigation, and has no conflict of interest. (Sparks Decl. ¶¶ 2-5).

Adequacy may be established by the fact that counsel are experienced practitioners. See *Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2001) 244 F.3d 1152, 1162. Here, Plaintiff is represented by Class Counsel with extensive experience in wage and hour class actions like this matter. (Mankin Decl. ¶¶ 2-6; Carlson Decl. ¶¶ 3-9).

4. Superiority

Certification of the Class for settlement purposes is superior here because there will be a global resolution of all claims at once, which fosters judicial economy. Class certification for settlement purposes is also vastly superior to litigation of numerous individual claims because most of the claims are too small to litigate outside of the class context.

V. THE COURT SHOULD PRELIMINARILY APPROVE THE SETTLEMENT, WHICH IS FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE

A. CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL UNDER THE CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT

The law favors settlements. *Bush v. Superior Court* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374. This is particularly true in class actions where substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the time, cost, and rigors of formal litigation. However, a class action may not be dismissed, compromised, or settled without the Court's approval. Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(a). The California Rules of Court set forth the procedures for court approval of a class action settlement: (1) the Court preliminarily approves the settlement; (2) class members receive notice as directed by the Court; and (3) the Court conducts a final approval hearing to inquire into the fairness of the proposed settlement. *See* Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(c), (e-g).

The decision to approve or reject a proposed settlement lies within the Court's sound discretion. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234-35. And the Court's ultimate duty is to determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

1 *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (setting forth the “fair, adequate, and reasonable” standard).

2 Thus, at the preliminary approval stage, the Court need only determine that the settlement
3 falls within the “range of possible judicial approval,” so that notice to the class and the
4 scheduling of the fairness hearing are worthwhile. *See Newberg* § 11:25. Indeed, the Court
5 should grant preliminary approval if there are no “grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious
6 deficiencies . . . and [the settlement] appears to fall within the range of possible approval.”
7 *Manual For Complex Litigation* (Third) § 30.41 (1995); see *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802. A
8 “presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length
9 bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
10 intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
11 is small.” *Dunk, supra* (citing *Newberg* § 11:41). As shown below, the settlement falls well
12 within the range of approval because there are no grounds to doubt its fairness.

13 **B. THE SETTLEMENT IS THE RESULT OF SERIOUS, INFORMED, NON-COLLUSIVE**
14 **NEGOTIATIONS**

15 The settlement was the product of extensive arm’s length negotiations between counsel
16 and was facilitated by an experienced wage-and-hour class action mediator. Though cordial and
17 professional, the settlement negotiations were adversarial and non-collusive in nature. The
18 settlement reached is the product of substantial effort by the parties and their counsel. Although
19 Plaintiff and her counsel believed that there was a possibility of certifying the claims, they
20 recognized the potential risk, expense, and complexity posed by litigation, such as unfavorable
21 decisions on class certification, summary judgment, at trial and/or on the damages awarded,
22 and/or on an appeal that can take several more years to litigate. In addition, if Defendant
23 prevailed on any of the defenses, the employees may not have received any monetary recovery.

24 **C. THE EXTENT OF THE INVESTIGATION WAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT**
25 **PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT**

26 Plaintiff thoroughly investigated and evaluated the factual and legal strengths and
27 weaknesses of this case before reaching the settlement. As described above, the settlement was
28 reached after extensive investigation and research, thorough calculations and risk evaluation, and

1 a substantial exchange of information prior to mediation. *See Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling*
2 *Co.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 410 (approving settlement where “considerable information
3 [exists] from which to assess the strength of the class claims” and litigation risks).

4 **D. THE SETTLEMENT IS A REASONABLE COMPROMISE OF CLAIMS**

5 To evaluate a settlement, the parties must provide the trial court with “basic information
6 about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the
7 consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.”
8 *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133.

9 However, *Kullar* does not require review of the outer reaches of possible exposure
10 without considering actual risks of certification, decertification, dispositive motions, and trial,
11 rather only a record which allows “an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the
12 realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.” *Munoz*, 186 Cal.App.4th at 408-9. Thus, a
13 settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial,
14 nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
15 *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 250 (“Compromise is inherent and necessary in [settlement] ... even
16 if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the
17 suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public
18 interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the
19 interest of avoiding litigation.”)

20 Here, LPM raised significant legal and factual defenses that weigh in favor of the
21 reasonableness of the proposed Settlement. In addition to disputing the merits of Plaintiff’s
22 claims, Defendant strongly disputed that Plaintiff could obtain class certification, arguing a lack
23 of commonality of the legal claims and injuries. LPM further argued that it complied with the
24 applicable law and that any purported deviations therefrom were individualized in nature,
25 thereby limiting Plaintiff’s ability to certify the class. Thus, while Plaintiff asserts that this is a
26 suitable case for certification, she realizes that there is always a significant risk associated with
27 class certification proceedings, which could limit the claims she could pursue on a class basis.
28

1 Considering the uncertainties of protracted litigation, this negotiated settlement reflects
2 the best practicable recovery for the Class. While the total Settlement Amount is, of course, a
3 compromise figure, the potential risks and opportunities of both parties were effectively weighed
4 and considered by the parties, resulting in a fair and equitable settlement.

5 Based upon data obtained through formal and informal discovery, Plaintiff's counsel
6 estimated the following through mediation: (1) 98 Class Members, (2) 60 *former* Class Members
7 for Labor Code § 203, (3) 10,480 workweeks, (4) 47,160 shifts worked, and (4) approximately
8 1,938 semi-monthly wage statements during the PAGA Period. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 26).

9 From these numbers, and by applying violations rates derived from analysis of extensive
10 documents and data from Defendant, Plaintiff calculated the following maximum amounts
11 assuming all claims were entirely successful at trial: class damages and penalties of \$1,527,300
12 and PAGA penalties of \$996,380. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 55). Then, by applying risks at class
13 certification and on the merits, and when considering other factors (such as evidentiary burdens
14 of proof), Plaintiff calculated the risk-adjusted award at trial for the class claims to be \$532,876
15 and for PAGA as \$119,038. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 55). As required by CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(i and ii), the
16 full analysis of the maximum and risk-adjusted values is contained in the Mankin Decl. at ¶¶ 25-
17 55 (and, for the sake of brevity, that information is not duplicated in this Motion).

18 Thus, the reasonableness of the settlement is apparent from the fact that the proposed
19 settlement is 47.9% of the risk-adjusted class damages and penalties. And, for that reason and
20 the others discussed in this Motion, the Parties submit that this settlement is fair and reasonable.

21 **E. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL IS EXPERIENCED IN WAGE-AND-HOUR LITIGATION**

22 The view of attorneys conducting the litigation is entitled to significant weight deciding
23 whether to approve a settlement. *Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility* (N.D. Cal. 1980) 87 F.R.D.
24 15, 18; *Kullar*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 128 (court must consider "the experience and view of
25 counsel"). Here, Plaintiff's Counsel are highly experienced in Class/PAGA litigation, having
26 repeatedly been named "Super Lawyer" in employment litigation (a distinction awarded to only
27 5% of litigators), having achieved large settlements and verdicts, including one of the largest
28 PAGA awards in California's history, collecting over \$250 million for its clients, having tried

1 class and PAGA cases against Fortune 100 companies, among other things. (Mankin Decl. ¶¶ 2-
2 6; Carlson Decl. ¶¶ 3-9). Plaintiff's counsel, operating at arm's length, weighed the strengths and
3 risks of this case, and are of the view that this is a fair and reasonable settlement considering the
4 nature of the claims, realistic risk adjusted value, the complexities of the case, state of the law,
5 and uncertainties of class certification and litigation.

6 **F. THE CLASS NOTICE CONFORMS TO ALL APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES**

7 The proposed Notice should be approved, as it fully informs the Class Members of the
8 nature of the lawsuit and each Class Member's rights under terms of the Settlement Agreement
9 and applicable law. The way the Class Notice shall be disseminated ensures that all or nearly all
10 of the Class Members shall be properly notified of the proposed settlement.

11 The proposed Notice and proposed plan for the Administrator to mail the Notice to the
12 last known address of all class members complies with all the requirements of Cal. Rule of Court
13 3.769(f) and 3.766(b). The proposed Notice includes: (1) the material terms of the settlement; (2)
14 the proposed attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and the costs of administration; (3) details
15 about the final fairness hearing and how class members may elect to exclude themselves or make
16 an objection; (4) how class members can obtain additional information; and (5) each Class
17 Members' Individual Class and PAGA Payments. *See* Class Notice (Exhibit B to Mankin Decl.).

18 The Court has wide discretion in approving the means of providing notice, so long as the
19 class representative "provide(s) meaningful notice in a form that should have a reasonable
20 chance of reaching a substantial percentage of class members." *Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels*,
21 (1976) 15 Cal.3d 853, 861. Here, the Notice Packet will be disseminated directly to the Class
22 Members by first class mail by the Settlement Administrator, since Defendant have the last
23 known addresses of all class members and the Settlement Administrator will perform a skip trace
24 and update those addresses for any Notice Packets that are returned and re-send the same.

25 The Notice satisfies the requirements of Rule of Court 3.766 and affords Class Members
26 with all due process protections required by the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, the contents of the
27 Notice comply with Cal. R. Ct. 3.766(d), because the Notice includes, without limitation (1) a
28 detailed explanation of the case, including the basic contentions or denials of the parties; (2) a

1 statement that the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a
2 specified date; (3) a procedure for the member to follow in requesting exclusion from the class;
3 (4) a statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will bind all members who do not
4 request exclusion; and (5) a statement that any member who does not request exclusion may, if
5 the member so desires, enter an appearance through counsel. The 45-day deadline to opt-out or
6 object is also reasonable, as it provides Class Members sufficient time to do so and, if they so
7 choose, to seek independent legal advice in the interim. If a Class Member does not opt-out, he
8 or she will automatically be sent a settlement check.

9 **G. THE NON-REVERSIONARY “CHECKS CASHED” DISTRIBUTION ENSURES**
10 **MAXIMAL RECOVERY FOR CLASS MEMBERS**

11 The fact that each member who does not opt out of the Settlement shall be mailed a check
12 ensures that every Class Member will be paid unless they affirmatively act to exclude themselves.
13 Moreover, the Settlement Amount is non-reversionary, which means that no settlement funds
14 will revert to Defendant; instead, if any checks are uncashed by the deadline, the funds will be
15 transferred to the State Controller’s Office subject to approval of the Court. Such terms are
16 favored by Courts and demonstrate that there was no collusion between counsel for the parties
17 and that the Settlement is fair and favorable to the Class Members.

18 **H. THE ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS ALLOCATION IS FAIR**

19 Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Class Counsel is seeking reimbursement
20 of up to \$20,000 in litigation costs, along with attorneys’ fees equal to one-third of the
21 Settlement Amount. See, e.g., *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th. 480 (approving
22 1/3 fee in the amount of \$6.33 million at a 2.13 lodestar multiplier, and holding that when class
23 action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, the trial court
24 may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
25 fund created); *Stuart v. RadioShack Corp.* (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010) 2010 WL 3155645
26 (approving fee 1/3 from settlement amount of \$4.5 million since 1/3 was “well within the range
27 of percentages which courts have upheld as reasonable in other class action lawsuits”).
28

1 Once the Court grants preliminary approval and Notice is disseminated, Plaintiff's
2 counsel will submit a comprehensive request for attorneys' fees and costs with final approval.

3 **I. THE REQUESTED SERVICE AWARD REQUEST IS FAIR AND APPROPRIATE**

4 The Settlement Agreement provides an incentive award payment of \$5,000 to the Class
5 Representative, which is reasonable given the recovery Class Members will receive on average,
6 as well as the time and effort she devoted to this case. Her efforts included providing factual
7 background for the litigation; providing documents and information about Defendant's
8 compensation plan; participating in phone calls to discuss litigation and settlement strategy;
9 making herself available throughout the litigation to assist with analyzing the claims and
10 defenses; helping Class Counsel prepare for the mediation; and reviewing the settlement
11 documents. The Class Representative also assumed significant risk in bringing this litigation—
12 namely, had she lost, she could have been ordered to pay Defendant's costs.³

13 The requested service award falls within the range of incentive payments typically
14 awarded to Class Representatives in similar class actions. See, e.g., *Bond v. Ferguson*
15 *Enterprises, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. 2011) 2011 WL 2648879 (approving \$11,250 service awards in class
16 action); *Ross v. US Bank National Association* (N.D. Cal. 2010) 2010 WL 3833922, at *2
17 (approving \$20,000 enhancement award in California wage-and-hour class settlement); *Vasquez*
18 *v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. 2010) 266 F.R.D. 415, 493 (approving service awards of
19 \$15,000 from a \$300,000 settlement fund in a wage/hour class action); *West v. Circle K Stores,*
20 *Inc.* (E.D. Cal. 2006) 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76558, at *28 (finding service awards "of \$ 15,000
21 each to be reasonable."); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.* (N.D. Cal. 2007) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22 8476, at *52 (finding "requested payment of \$25,000 to each of the named Plaintiff is
23 appropriate" in wage and hour settlement).

24 **VI. THE COURT SHOULD APPOINT PHOENIX AS ADMINISTRATOR**

25 Subject to the Court's approval, the parties agreed to Phoenix Settlement Administrators
26 serving as the Settlement Administrator. Phoenix is experienced in administering class action
27

28

³ The Parties also resolved Plaintiff's separate FEHA and related claims against Defendant via a separate individual settlement agreement.

1 settlements and has provided a flat-fee proposal to administer this settlement for \$6,000.
2 (Mankin Decl. ¶ 86; Decl. of Michael Moore of Phoenix and exhibits).

3 **VII. TIMELINE AND SCHEDULING A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING**

4 The last step in the approval process is the formal hearing, whereby proponents of the
5 Settlement may explain and describe its terms and conditions and offer argument in support of
6 approval, and Class Members or their counsel may be heard in support of or in opposition to the
7 settlement. Subject to the Court's approval, the Parties propose that the Court schedule a hearing
8 for final approval approximately 120 days after the Preliminary Approval Date, as follows:

9 July 17, 2024	Preliminary Approval (PA) hearing
10 August 12, 2024 11 (24 days after PA)	Deadline for Administrator to complete first mailing of the Notice Packet to all Class Members.
12 September 26, 2024 13 (45 days after mailing)	Deadline for Class Members to submit Requests for Exclusion and Objections to the settlement.
14 16 court days before Final Approval hearing	Deadline for Plaintiff to file and serve Motion for Final Approval and application for award of fees, costs and service payments.
15 9 court days before Final 16 Approval hearing	Deadline for filing of any written opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval, or filing response to an objection.
17 5 court days before final 18 approval hearing	Deadline for filing of any written reply to opposition Motion for Final Approval
19 Approx. Nov. 14, 2024 (120 days after PA)	Final Approval Hearing

20 **VIII. CONCLUSION**

21 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant the
22 motion for preliminary approval of the settlement.

23 Dated: June 24, 2024

LAUBY, MANKIN & LAUBY LLP

24 BY:



25 Brian J. Mankin, Esq.

26 Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

PROOF OF SERVICE
(Pursuant to CCP §§ 1013(a)(1) and 2015.5)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE)

I am employed in the County of Riverside, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 5198 Arlington Avenue, PMB 513, Riverside, CA 92504.

On June 24, 2024, I caused to be served the foregoing document(s) described as follows:

PLAINTIFF'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT

I declare that I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with the U.S. postal service on that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

- ☐ **By Mail** I deposited such envelope in the mail at Riverside, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.
- ☐ **By Facsimile** I sent this document via fax to all parties as listed on attached service list, on
- ☐ **By Overnight Service** I deposited such envelope in a facility regularly maintained by the United Parcel Service for receipt of items for overnight delivery, with overnight delivery expenses prepaid, addressed to the person to be served.
- ☒ **By Email or Electronic Transmission:** Pursuant to CCP § 1010.6 or an agreement of the parties to accept service by email or electronic transmission, I caused the document(s) to be sent from email address tracie@lmlfirm.com to the persons at the electronic notification address listed in the service list. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was not successful.
- ☐ **By Certified Mail-Return Receipt Requested** I caused such envelope with postage fully prepaid thereon, to be placed in the United States mail at Riverside, California
- ☐ **By Personal Service** I caused said document(s) to be personally served by hand on the parties listed on the attached service list.
- ☒ **State** I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on June 24, 2024, Riverside, California.
- ☐ **Federal** I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.


Tracie Chiarito, Declarant

SERVICE LIST

Joseph M. Parker, Esq.
PARKER LEGAL GROUP, PC
600 W. Broadway, #700
San Diego, CA 92101
619-930-9821
jparker@parkerlegalgroup.com
Attorneys for Defendant, LOGAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.