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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

DULCE MAGALLANES, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

BIOCAIR, INC., an unknown entity; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23STCV07027

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Elihu M.
Berle, Dept. 6]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: September 23, 2025
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Dept.: 6

Complaint filed: April 13, 2023
FAC filed: July 17, 2023
Trial date: Not set

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 23, 2025 at 10:00 a.m., in Department 6 of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Plaintiff Dulce Magallanes (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move for an order as follows:

1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
3. Appointing Plaintiff Dulce Magallanes as Class Representative for settlement purposes, and approving a Class Representative Service Award of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Dulce Magallanes;
4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Benjamin H. Haber and Daniel J. Kramer of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes, and approving payment of \$91,666.67 in attorneys’ fees, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount;
5. Approving costs in the amount of \$20,000.00 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to Phoenix Settlement Administration as the Settlement Administrator in the amount of \$6,500.00;
7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the Parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or enforcing the terms of the judgment.

This Motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Benjamin H. Haber, Kevin Lee, and Dulce Magallanes, and such oral argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

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
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1 Dated: July 18, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

3 By: 
4 Benjamin H. Haber
5 Daniel J. Kramer

6 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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3 Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)12

4 **OTHER SOURCES**

5 Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An
6 Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006)17

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Dulce Magallanes (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a proposed \$275,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Biocair, Inc. (“Defendant”, and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 52 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery, which allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage and hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$2,439.10*, with the *highest individual estimated net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$6,145.68*. (Declaration of Kevin Lee Regarding Notice and Settlement Administration [“Lee Decl.”], ¶ 14.) As of filing this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Motion”), there **no objections to the settlement and no requests for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 8-9.) The administrator will provide a supplemental declaration once the responsive deadline passes. Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

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II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff's Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") (Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant provides logistics services to the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and life sciences sectors and has multiple locations throughout California, including in Los Angeles. (Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement ["Haber Decl."], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under the PAGA. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 3.)

On March 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) unfair business practices. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 4.) On April 13, 2023, Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act "PAGA" (Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*) On July 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding claims for civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.*)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and

1 information before mediating this action. (Haber Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant produced a sample of
2 time and pay records for the class members. Defendant also provided employee handbooks
3 outlining its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period and information regarding
4 the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.*)

5 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices
6 and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
7 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum monetary
8 exposure for all claims. (Haber Decl., at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law
9 regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these
10 records and prepared a damage analysis assessing Defendant’s potential liability prior to
11 mediation. (*Id.*)

12 **C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement**

13 On December 4, 2023, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced
14 class action mediator, Steve Rottman, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted
15 via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a
16 professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore
17 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their
18 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
19 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and
20 Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are
21 encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, **Ex. 1** [Amended Class Action Settlement
22 Agreement and Class Notice].)

23 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
24 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
25 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
26 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
27 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
28 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

1 **D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement**

2 Following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, the Court granted Plaintiff's
3 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on April 28, 2025. (Haber Decl.,
4 ¶ 9.) The deadline for class members to opt out or object to the Settlement is August 18, 2025.
5 (*Id.*) The reaction of the Class to the settlement so far has been overwhelmingly positive.
6 Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, no Class Member has opted out of the settlement and no
7 Class Member has objected to the settlement. (*Id.*)

8 **E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

9 Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay \$275,000.00 to resolve this
10 litigation. The key terms include:

11 1. Settlement Class: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, the Parties
12 agree to the certification of the classes pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382
13 defined as: "all hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who, during the Class Period, have
14 previously or currently are employed in California by Defendant, as an hourly-paid, non-exempt
15 employee." (Settlement, ¶ 2.)

16 2. Class Period: "shall mean the period of time from March 30, 2019 through
17 February 2, 2024." (Settlement, ¶ 7.)

18 3. Participating Class Members: "shall mean all Class Member who have not
19 submitted a complete, valid, and timely request to be excluded from the Settlement pursuant to
20 the instructions provided in the Class Notice." (Settlement, ¶ 24.)

21 4. PAGA Group: "mean all hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who, during the
22 PAGA Period, have previously been or currently are employed in California by Defendant.
23 'PAGA Group Member' shall mean an individual who is a member of the PAGA Group (or if
24 any such person is incompetent, deceased, or unavailable due to the military service, the
25 person's legal representative or successor in interest evidenced by reasonable verification)."
26 (Settlement, ¶ 21.)

27 5. Maximum Settlement Amount: "shall mean the maximum settlement amount of
28 Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$275,000.00) payable by

Defendant as provided by this Agreement, unless that amount is increased pursuant to Paragraph 18 below, exclusive of the normal employer's share of any payroll taxes attributable to the Settlement Share payments allocated to wages. Defendant's payment of the normal employer's share of payroll taxes will be made separately, according to each Defendant's agreed upon proportionate share of the Maximum Settlement Amount and shall not come from the Maximum Settlement Amount." (Settlement, ¶ 17.)

6. Uncashed Checks: If a settlement check is returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator shall promptly attempt to obtain a valid mailing address by performing a skip trace search and, if another address is identified, shall mail the check to the newly identified address. Any settlement checks remaining uncashed after one hundred and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, ¶ 57.)

7. Participating Class Members Released Claims: "Upon Defendant fully funding the Settlement as described in this Agreement, each Participating Class Member, and without the need to manually sign a release document, shall release the Released Parties from all causes of action and claims that were alleged in the Action or reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts contained in the Action, including all of the following claims for relief: (i) failure to pay all regular wages, minimum wages and overtime wages due (Lab. Code §§ 204, 510, 558, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, & 1198); (ii) failure to provide compliant meal periods (Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512); (iii) failure to provide compliant rest breaks (Lab. Code § 226.7); (iv) failure to timely pay wages during employment (Lab. Code §§ 204 & 210); (v) failure to provide complete, accurate wage statements (Lab. Code § 226); (vi) failure to pay wages timely at time of termination or resignation (Lab. Code §§ 201-203); (vii) failure to indemnify all necessary business expenses (Lab. Code § 2802.); (viii) unfair business practices that reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts contained in the Action (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.); (ix) any claim for costs and attorneys' fees and expenses; and (x) any claim arising

1 from the claims described above under applicable federal, state, local or territorial law as well
2 as applicable regulations and Wage Orders (collectively, the “Released Claims”). Participating
3 Class Members who cash their checks are deemed to have waived all Released Claims inclusive
4 of claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Participating Class Members who do not cash
5 their checks shall be deemed to waive all Released Claims except for a claim under the Fair
6 Labor Standards Act. Released Claims for Class Members who worked for Defendant in
7 California during the Class Period shall have their claims released during the Class Period.”
8 (Settlement, ¶ 69.)

9 8. PAGA Group Released Claims: “Upon Defendant fully funding the Settlement as
10 described in this Agreement,, each PAGA Group Member, and without the need to manually
11 sign a release document, shall release the Released Parties for claims for civil penalties pursuant
12 to PAGA based upon all causes of action and claims that were alleged in the Action or
13 reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts contained in the Action, and/or the
14 LWDA Exhaustion Letter including all of the following claims for relief: (i) failure to pay all
15 regular wages, minimum wages and overtime wages due (Lab. Code §§ 204, 510, 558, 1194,
16 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, & 1198); (ii) failure to provide compliant meal periods (Lab. Code §§
17 226.7 & 512); (iii) failure to provide compliant rest breaks (Lab. Code § 226.7); (iv) failure to
18 timely pay wages during employment (Lab. Code §§ 204 & 210); (v) failure to provide
19 complete, accurate wage statements (Lab. Code § 226); (vi) failure to maintain accurate
20 employment and payroll records (Lab. Code §§ 1174 & 1174.5); (vii) failure to pay wages
21 timely at time of termination or resignation (Lab. Code §§ 201-203); (viii) failure to indemnify
22 all necessary business expenses (Lab. Code § 2802.); (ix) all claims under the California Labor
23 Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 that could have reasonably been alleged based on
24 the facts contained in the Action; and (x) any claim for costs and attorneys’ fees and expenses
25 (collectively, the “PAGA Released Claims”). PAGA Group Members who worked for
26 Defendant in California during the PAGA Period shall have their PAGA Released Claims
27 released during the PAGA Period.” (Settlement, ¶ 70.)

28 9. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$20,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s

claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$15,000.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$5,000.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement ¶ 65(c).) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing the Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Haber Decl., ¶ 11.)

10. Net Settlement Amount: “shall mean the Maximum Settlement Amount, less (i) the Class Representative Payment approved by the Superior Court; (ii) the Class Counsel Fees Payment approved by the Superior Court; (iii) the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment approved by the Superior Court; (iv) the LWDA Payment approved by the Superior Court; (v) the PAGA Payment approved by the Superior Court; (vi) the Settlement Administrator Payment approved by the Superior Court; and (vii) any other fees or expenses (other than Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment) incurred in implementing the terms and conditions of this Agreement as approved by the Superior Court.” (Settlement, ¶ 19.)

11. Distribution Formula: “The Settlement Administrator shall assign to each Participating Class Member a Settlement Share which shall be equal to the Workweek Value multiplied by each Participating Class Member’s Individual Workweeks.” (Settlement, ¶ 60(c).) As to PAGA: “The Settlement Administrator shall determine the value of a Pay Period (“Pay Period Value”) by taking the PAGA Payment amount and dividing it by the sum of all PAGA Group Members’ Pay Periods.” (Settlement ¶ 61(b).)

12. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 15% wages, 85% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, ¶ 62.)

13. Class Representative Service Award: “shall mean the special payment made to Plaintiff in her capacity as Class Representative to compensate her for prosecuting the Action, and performing work in support of the Action, in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00), subject to approval by the Superior Court.” (Settlement, ¶ 8.)

14. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: the Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 1/3% (\$91,666.67) of the Maximum Settlement Amount, plus out of pocket costs not to exceed \$20,000.00. (Settlement, ¶ 65(b).)

15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms,

1 a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of
2 attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement
3 allocations are calculated. (Lee Decl., ¶ 2, Settlement, Ex. A.) Class Members were notified
4 by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, ¶ 45(b).) Phoenix Settlement Administrators,
5 the Settlement Administrator, undertook its best efforts to ensure that the notice was provided
6 to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address
7 search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*)

8 **III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL**

9 The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex
10 cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors
11 to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the
12 risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
13 action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
14 government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar*
15 *v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is
16 fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: "(1) the settlement
17 is reached through arm's length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow
18 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4)
19 the percentage of objectors is small." (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
20 224, 245.)

21 Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial
22 court's broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give
23 "[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties." (*Dunk*
24 *v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) "The inquiry 'must be limited to the extent
25 necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or
26 overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a
27 whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned." (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

28 ///

1 **A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise**

2 A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had he or she prevailed
3 at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and
4 reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and
5 necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
6 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
7 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
8 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

9 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or
10 some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Haber Decl., ¶ 10.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of her
11 claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognizes
12 that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-
13 consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification
14 of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible
15 appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

16 Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief
17 and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the
18 uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish
19 liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of
20 \$275,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and settlement approval is appropriate.
21 ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit of approximately***
22 ***\$2,439.10, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$6,145.68.*** (Lee
23 Decl., ¶ 14.)

24 **B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following**
25 **Formal and Informal Discovery**

26 The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced
27 employment mediator, Steve Rottman, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were
28 at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The

1 Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but
2 each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement
3 had not been reached. (*Id.*)

4 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
5 the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
6 records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
7 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
8 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
9 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
10 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
11 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
12 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and her counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
13 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

14 **C. Plaintiff's Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience**

15 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
16 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 27-36.) Class Counsel has substantial
17 experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion,
18 trial, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on
19 behalf of plaintiffs and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling
20 responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

21 Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class
22 Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of
23 Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and
24 the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the
25 best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great
26 weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give
27 considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral
28 mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction

entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct”].)

D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement

To date, no class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class member has requested exclusion from the Settlement. (Lee Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) The overwhelmingly positive response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the “class members overwhelmingly support[ed] the settlement” where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in the settlement, “only nine objections were submitted”, and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, “these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23”], *citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the “fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$91,666.67, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, costs up to \$20,000.00 for litigating this action, and enhancement awards of \$10,000.00 to named Plaintiff Dulce Magallanes. Defendant has also agreed that it would not oppose an application for these payments addressed above, and no class member has objected to these amounts.

1 In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for
2 calculating attorneys' fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed
3 by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, the California
4 Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage and hour class action
5 settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court
6 explained:

7 As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we
8 emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override***
9 ***the trial court's primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common***
10 ***fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the***
11 ***potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-
12 check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the
percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a
justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an
adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time
counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable
percentage to apply.

13 (*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017
14 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

15 **A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard**

16 According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on
17 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
18 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
19 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
20 are not unprecedented." (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
21 Attorneys' fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to***
22 ***forty percent*** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
23 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
24 cases where 30-50% was awarded involved "smaller" settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

25 The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions.
26 Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a
27 fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ["Empirical studies
28

show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the attorneys’ fees requested herein.

B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.

Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Detailed timesheets are not necessary to a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) As the California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.”

(5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., supra*, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”]; *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.* (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451 [“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method, it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s hours.”].)

(*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$104,200 based on over 142 hours of work performed thus far. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 18-19.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$91,666.67 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 0.86. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 [“[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”].) Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm, PLC’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

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1 **2. Class Counsel’s Requested Fees are Derived Using a Negative**
2 **Multiplier.**

3 Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other
4 “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seek a negative multiplier of
5 0.88 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request is underscored by the fact that a
6 significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

7 Multiplying the total hours billed by Class Counsel to the litigation by their reasonable
8 hourly rates yields a lodestar of \$104,200, which is more than the \$91,666.67 in attorney’s fees
9 Class Counsel are requesting. This disparity is important to note because when plaintiffs seek an
10 amount in fees that is less than what they actually billed, the requested fee amount is generally
11 considered reasonable. (*Chun-Hoon v. McKee Foods Corp.* (N.D. Cal. 2010) 716 F. Supp. 2d 848,
12 854 [finding that, if the court is asked to apply a negative multiplier, it “suggests the negotiated
13 fee award is a reasonable and fair valuation of the services rendered to the class by Plaintiff’s
14 Counsel.”].) Indeed, there is no reason for the Court to reduce Class Counsel’s lodestar with a
15 negative multiplier. (*Roos v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.* (2015) 241 Cal. App. 4th 1472, 1495 [“a trial
16 court acts appropriately . . . when it accepts in a common-fund case a cap on fees . . . when the
17 application of the cap results in a lower award than would be authorized under the lodestar
18 method.”], disapproved on another ground in *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.* (2018) 4
19 Cal.5th 260.)

20 Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently
21 with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A
22 lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the
23 fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid
24 no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.)
25 Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important
26 rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a
27 windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-
28 level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment

1 or delay in payment of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

2 “Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at
3 p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512
4 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162
5 Cal.App.4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft*
6 *Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier
7 of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11, *citing* a
8 study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and
9 finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be “per se reasonable.”) The intermediate court in
10 *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check,
11 affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82.)
12 The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new
13 decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

14 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
15 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
16 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
17 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
18 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
19 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a
20 multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

21 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
22 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
23 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
24 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
25 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133,
26 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter
27 and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel’s
28 outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

1 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have
2 had success in wage and hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent
3 lawyers and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant's contentions underscore the
4 risk of prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented
5 recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of
6 this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals.
7 Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so
8 many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other
9 meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but
10 were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to
11 achieve favorable results. (Haber Decl., ¶ 25.) Considered against the risks of continued
12 litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief
13 provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

14 **C. Costs Are Reasonable.**

15 As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$22,916.02 in costs,
16 and Defendant has agreed that they will not oppose any cost award request up to \$20,000.00.
17 (Haber Decl., ¶ 26.) Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to
18 \$20,000.00 in costs. The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of
19 Benjamin H. Haber, and these costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

20 Counsel can recover "out-of-pocket expenses that 'would normally be charged to a fee
21 paying client'" including costs for "service of summons and complaint, service of trial
22 subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills,
23 meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction." (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir.
24 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval.
25 (*See Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018,
26 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06-00350 DOC, 2012 WL
27 3151077, at *12 ["Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying,
28 long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation,

exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

D. The Enhancement Payments to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiff should therefore be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay a Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Dulce Magallanes. This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general releases of all claims against Defendant. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration demonstrating her devotion to this case, including her efforts assisting counsel in the case, communicating with counsel frequently for litigation, preparing for mediation, and reviewing case-related documents. (*See, generally*, Declaration of Plaintiff submitted in support of Motion for Preliminary Approval.)

When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno, supra*, 2021 WL 3673845 at *3

1 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez, supra*, 2024 WL
2 150721 at p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

3 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may
4 be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC*
5 (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive
6 awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have
7 incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at p. 806.) “An incentive
8 award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’”
9 (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394, *quoting Clark*, 175
10 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an
11 incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both
12 financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class
13 representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the
14 duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class
15 representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.) Plaintiff’s declaration
16 describes how each of the five *Cellphone Termination* factors are present here.

17 **E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.**

18 Phoenix Settlement Administrators, the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will
19 incur a total of \$6,500.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Lee Decl.,
20 ¶ 17.) These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion
21 tracking, and Class Member payment processing.

22 **V. CONCLUSION**

23 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval
24 of the proposed settlement.

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26 ///


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1 Dated: July 18, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

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4 Benjamin H. Haber
5 Daniel J. Kramer

6 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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PROOF OF SERVICE

Magallanes v. Biocair Inc., et al.
23STCV07027

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Rebecca Padilla, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is rebecca.padilla@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On July 18, 2025, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Matthew C. Sgnilek, Esq. (SBN 235299)
msgnilek@ohaganmeyer.com
Andrea Rosenkranz, Esq. (SBN 301559)
arosenkranz@ohaganmeyer.com
Carla Vasques dos Santos-Moore, Esq. (SBN 241883)
cmoore@ohaganmeyer.com
Virginia Tomlinson
vtomlinson@ohaganmeyer.com
O'HAGAN MEYER
3200 Park Center Drive, Suite 700
Costa Mesa, California 92626
Telephone: (949) 942-8500
Facsimile: (949) 942-8510

Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic service addresses listed above via third-party cloud service **CASEANYWHERE.**

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 18, 2025, at Los Angeles, California.



Rebecca Padilla