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as an individual and on behalf of all
employees similarly situated

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

JESUS M CAMPOSECO, as an individual and on
behalf of all employees similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

SMARTE CARTE, INC., a Minnesota
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 23STCV07897

[Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Carolyn B.
Kuhl, Dept. 12]

**CLASS AND PAGA REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION**

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS AND PAGA
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Date: April 29, 2025
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Courtroom: Dept. 12
Judge: Hon. Carolyn B. Kuhl

Action Filed: April 10, 2023
Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 29, 2025, at 10:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the
3 matter may be heard, in Department 12 of the above-captioned Court, located at 312 North Spring Street,
4 Los Angeles, California 90012, Plaintiff JESUS CAMPOSECO (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move
5 this Court for an order:

6 1. Granting class certification of the Class, solely for settlement purposes pursuant to
7 Code of Civil Procedure § 382;

8 2. Finally approving the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT
9 AGREEMENT (“Settlement” or “Agreement”);

10 3. Appointing counsel for Plaintiff, Tunyan Law, APC, as Class Counsel solely for
11 settlement purposes;

12 4. Appointing Plaintiff Jesus M Camposeco as the Class Representative solely for
13 settlement purposes;

14 5. Approving Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the third-party
15 administrator;

16 6. Ruling that Settlement Class Members who did not timely submit requests for
17 exclusion from the settlement as set forth in the Agreement have released their claims against
18 Defendants and the other releasees as set forth in the Agreement;

19 7. Ruling that Settlement Class Members who did not timely object to the settlement
20 pursuant to the terms set forth in the Agreement are barred from prosecuting or pursuing any
21 appeal of the Court’s Order;

22 8. Awarding the sums requested in the Motion;

23 9. Entering a Final Judgment; and,

24 10. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing
25 jurisdiction over the parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering
26 the settlement as set forth in the Agreement or enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment.

27 Good cause exists to grant this Motion because:

28 1. The Settlement Class meets all of the requirements for class certification for

1 settlement purposes under Code of Civil Procedure § 382;

2 2. The Settlement Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the
3 disputed wage and hour claims asserted by Plaintiff;

4 3. Plaintiff and Class Counsel are adequate to represent the Settlement Class;

5 4. The notice procedures and related forms complied with California Rules of Court
6 3.766(d) and (e), and adequately apprised Class Members of their rights and fully comport with
7 due process.

8 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 and Rule 3.1113(e) of the California Rules of Court,
9 which require approval by the Court of a class action settlement and permit the Court to extend the page
10 limit for memoranda.

11 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points
12 and Authorities, the Declarations of Lilit Tunyan, Plaintiff and the Settlement Administrator in support
13 thereof, all papers and pleadings on file with the Court in this action, all matters judicially noticeable, and
14 on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented in connection with the hearing on the
15 Motion.

16 Respectfully submitted,

17 Dated: March 27, 2025

TUNYAN LAW, APC

18
19 By: _____


Lilit Tunyan
Artur Tunyan

Attorneys for Plaintiff JESUS CAMPOSECO

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiff JESUS CAMPOSECO
3 (“Plaintiff”) respectfully requests that this Court finally approve the proposed class action settlement set
4 forth in the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (“Settlement”, “Settlement
5 Agreement” or “Agreement”) with Defendant SMARTE CARTE, INC. (“Defendant”). The CLASS
6 ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT used by the Parties is based upon the model
7 agreement template made available by the Los Angeles Superior Court.

8 After formal and informal discovery, the exchange of documents, and an arm’s-length mediation
9 session with an experienced mediator Tagore Subramaniam, Esq., Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively
10 referred to herein as the “Parties”) reached a proposed class action settlement with a gross settlement
11 amount (“GSA”) of **\$240,000.00** in compromise of disputed claims asserted on behalf of the below-
12 defined Class consisting of approximately **271** members. Plaintiff believes that this settlement is a fair,
13 adequate, and reasonable compromise of the disputed claims for alleged unpaid wage and hour violations
14 and penalties asserted in this case.

15 Plaintiff now submits this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement,
16 along with the Settlement (attached to the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan [“Tunyan Decl.”], **Exhibit 1**
17 thereto).

18 **II. THE NOTICE PROCESS WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED AFTER**
19 **PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

20 Plaintiff and Defendants have fulfilled the class notice procedures set forth in the Settlement. The
21 Settlement Administrator, Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions (“Phoenix”), sent individual
22 Notices to **271** Class Members on January 9, 2025. (Declaration of Lluvia Islas [“Islas Decl.”], ¶¶3-5.)
23 Of the Notices that were mailed, 12 were returned after mailing. (Islas Decl., ¶ 6.) Skip tracing found
24 new addresses for 8 Class Members. 8 Notices were remailed with updated addresses. (Islas Decl., ¶6.)
25 Ultimately, 4 Notice Packets are considered undeliverable. (Islas Decl., ¶ 7.) No Class Members
26 requested to be excluded from the Settlement, and no Class Members objected or disputed Workweeks in
27 writing. (Islas Decl., ¶¶8-10.)

28 **PAYMENTS:** For 271 Settlement Class Members, the average gross payment per Class Member is

1 **\$885.61.** The Net Settlement Amount (including both Class and PAGA Settlement payments) is
2 estimated to be at least **\$121,072.11**, resulting in an average net payment per Class Member of **\$446.76**
3 (including PAGA Settlement payments), before any tax withholdings. (Islas Decl., ¶¶14,15.) The highest
4 net payment (including PAGA Settlement payments) is estimated to be **\$1,274.90** (Islas Decl., ¶15.) For
5 the Court’s convenience, below is a summary of the key provisions of the Settlement.

6 **III. THE MAJOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT**

7 The provisions of the proposed Settlement include the following:

- 8 • Defendant agrees not to oppose certification of a Class for purposes of Settlement only
9 (Settlement, ¶ 12.1);
- 10 • Class: All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendant who worked for Defendant in
11 California during the Class Period (the “Class Period” is July 17, 2021 through the date the
12 Court grants preliminary approval of this settlement or on the modified date pursuant to the
13 Paragraph 8 of this Agreement). (Settlement, ¶ 1.5, 1.12.) “Participating Class Members”
14 are those Class Members who do not submit timely exclusion requests to the Settlement
15 Administrator. (Settlement, ¶ 1.9, 1.35);
- 16 • Settlement Amount: Defendant will pay a maximum of **\$240,000.00**, referred to as the
17 Gross Settlement Amount (or GSA herein), resulting in an estimated average **gross**
18 payment per Class Member of approximately **\$885.61** (Settlement, ¶ 1.22);
- 19 • Class Size: **271** individuals who worked **16,574** workweeks during the Class Period
20 (Settlement, ¶ 8);
- 21 • PAGA Group Size: **236** individuals who worked **7,162** pay periods during the PAGA
22 period (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 18);
- 23 • PAGA Period: April 10, 2022 through the date the Court grants preliminary
24 approval of this settlement or on the modified date pursuant to the Paragraph 8 of
25 this Agreement. (Settlement, ¶ 1.31);
- 26 • Escalator Clause: Based on its records, Defendant estimates that, as of the date of
27 mediation, (1) there were 267 Class Members and 15,191 Total Workweeks during the
28 Class Period. If, at the end of the Class Period, the actual total workweeks worked by the

Class Members during the Class Period exceeds this figure by 10% (i.e., if there are 16,711 or more total workweeks), Defendant, at its sole discretion, shall either: (i) increase the Gross Settlement Amount on a proportional basis for those workweeks worked in excess of 10% of the current 15,191 estimate (i.e., if there is a 12% increase in the total workweeks, Defendant shall increase the Gross Settlement Amount by 2%), or (ii) elect to cut off the Class Period as of the date the total workweeks worked by Class Members during the Class Period does not exceed 10% (i.e., so that the total workweeks is at or below 16,711). Class Period can end at the latest on the date of preliminary approval of this Settlement. (the “Escalator Clause”). (Settlement, ¶ 8); ***The escalator clause was not triggered, and the class and PAGA period ended on the date of preliminary approval order, i.e. November 21, 2024.***

- **Kullar/Munoz Analysis:** Plaintiff addresses the claims analysis herein, at Part V.B.3, and in more detail the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan, at Paragraph 18;
- **No Reversion:** The Settlement is a ***non-reversionary*** settlement (Settlement, ¶ 3.1);
- **Certification:** Plaintiff addresses certification requisites herein, at Part V.A., and in the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan, at Paragraphs 34-40;
- **No Claim Form:** No claim form is required (Settlement., ¶ 3.1);
- **Class Release:** The Settlement will release specified wage-and-hour claims for Class Members (those Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement) (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.39, 5.2);
- **PAGA Release:** The Class Members will release the PAGA Claims set forth in this Action, that were identified in the First Amended Complaint and Plaintiff’s LWDA Notice Letter, regardless of whether they opt out of the class portion of the Settlement (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.40, 5.3);
- **Release Effective Date:** The Release is not active until Defendant tender all payments required under the Settlement to the Settlement Administrator (Settlement, ¶ 5);
- **Net Settlement Amount Available to the Class:** After deducting Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs, service award to Plaintiff, administration costs, and the payment to the

LWDA, the remainder will be available for distribution to Class Members who do not opt out, with each Class Member receiving a share based on the number of workweeks each Class Member worked for Defendant within the Class Period. The Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be at least **\$121,072.11**, resulting in an average **gross** payment per Class Member of **\$885.61** and an average **net** payment per Class Member of **\$446.76** before any tax withholdings. (Settlement, ¶ 3);

- Tax Allocation: The amounts distributed to Class Members will be characterized as 20% alleged unpaid wages, 80% to penalties and interest, and PAGA Settlement Payments will be allocated as 100% penalties. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.1, 3.2.5.2);
- Employer's Portion of Payroll Taxes Paid Separately: Defendant's portion of payroll taxes (e.g., FICA, FUTA, etc.) owed on any settlement payments to Class Members that constitute wages will be paid separate and apart from the GSM (Settlement, ¶ 3.1);
- Settlement Administrator: The notice portion of the Settlement will be administered by a third-party Administrator, Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions and the Parties estimated that the costs of administration should not reasonably exceed \$15,000.00. Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions' low bid for settlement administration services in the amount of **\$7,000.00** was selected as the lowest bid from a competitive bidding process. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.3);
- Class Data for Administration: The Settlement Administrator will receive the Class List within 28 calendar days of Preliminary Approval, use the NCOA database to update the Class List, and then use skip tracing on returned Notices (Settlement, ¶ 4.2);
- Notice: The Notice will issue within 14 days of receipt of the Class List (Settlement, ¶ 7.4.2). The Notice describes how to dispute workweeks, submit an objection in writing, in person, or through an attorney, or request exclusion (Settlement, ¶¶ 7.4 – 7.7);
- Notice Language: Notice will issue in English and Spanish (Settlement, ¶ 1.11);
- Objections: Objections can be submitted in person, through an attorney, or in writing to the Settlement Administrator (Settlement, ¶ 7.7);
- Exclusion Requests: The procedure for exclusion requests, mailing a request to the

Settlement Administrator, is the same as the procedure for submitting a written objection (Settlement, ¶¶ 7.5 and 7.7);

- PAGA Allocation: From the GSA, **\$15,000.00** will be allocated to settle claims brought pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 *et seq.* (“PAGA”), and seventy-five percent (75%), or **\$11,250.00**, will be paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.34, 3.2.5.);
- Notice to LWDA: Notice was provided prior to the filing of this Motion. Evidence is attached to the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan;
- Enhancement/Service Award to Plaintiff: Defendant will not oppose the application for Class Representative Service Award of up to **\$6,000.00** for Plaintiff, to be paid from the GSA (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.1);
- Fees and Costs: Defendant will not oppose Class Counsel’s application for fees not to exceed 33 1/3% of the GSA (**\$80,000.00**), and actual costs, in an amount not to exceed **\$15,000.00**, to be paid out of the GSA (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.2);
- Check Void Period: Settlement checks will be valid for 180 days (Settlement, ¶ 4.4.3);
- Uncashed Checks: Any settlement checks that are mailed to the Class Members and remain uncashed after 180 days of the date of issuance will be cancelled, and the moneys will be directed to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund (Settlement, ¶¶ 4.4.1, 4.4.3);
- Judgment Notice: Settlement Agreement, Class Notice and Judgment will be posted on the Settlement Administrator’s website after entry (Settlement, ¶ 7.8.1);
- Confidentiality Provisions: The Settlement permits Class Counsel to discuss the Settlement with Class Members (Settlement ¶ 12.3).

(Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 10-11 and Exhibit 1 thereto.)

IV. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

On April 10, 2023, Plaintiff commenced this Action by filing a Complaint alleging causes of action against Defendant for: (1) Violation of Labor Code §§ 204, 246, 510, 1194, 1198 (Failure to Pay

1 All Wages and Provide Paid Sick Leave; (2) Violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512 (Failure to Provide
2 Meal Periods; (3) Violation of Labor Code § 226.7 (Failure to Provide Rest Periods); (4) Violation of
3 Labor Code § 226, (Failure to Keep Accurate Itemized Wage Statements); (5) Violation of Labor Code
4 §§ 201-203 (Failure to Pay Wages Upon Termination of Employment); (6) Violation of Labor Code §
5 2802 (Failure to Reimburse For Necessary Expenditures); and (7) Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §
6 17200 et seq. (Unfair Business Practices). On May 10, 2023, Defendant filed its Answer to Plaintiff's
7 initial complaint. On May 12, 2023, Defendant filed its Notice of Removal of this Action to the United
8 States District Court for the Central District of California. On June 13, 2023, pursuant to the Parties'
9 stipulation, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint modifying the class period definition and adding
10 the eighth cause of action adding a cause of action for civil penalties Under PAGA [Cal. Lab. Code §
11 2699, et seq.] ("PAGA"). On June 13, 2023, pursuant to the Parties' stipulation, this action was
12 remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court. On July 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint
13 in Los Angeles Superior Court (the "Operative Complaint.") (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 3.)

14 Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3(a), Plaintiff gave timely written notice to Defendant and the
15 LWDA by sending the PAGA Notice. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 4.)

16 **B. Pre-Settlement Data Production and Analysis**

17 The Parties have conducted formal and informal discovery and investigation of the facts and law.
18 Such discovery and investigation have included, inter alia, the exchange of formal and informal data and
19 discoverable information in preparation for the settlement negotiations. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 5.) The Parties
20 have analyzed payroll and other data pertaining to Plaintiff and the Class during the relevant Settlement
21 Period, including but not limited to the numbers of former and current members of the Class, average
22 workweeks, sample size time and pay records and average rate of hourly pay, wage and hour policies.
23 (*Id.*)

24 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices and
25 other information obtained during the exchange of discovery, Class Counsel were able to evaluate the
26 probability of class certification, success on the merits, and the reasonably obtainable maximum
27 monetary exposure for all claims. Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis
28 prior to engaging in settlement negotiations. Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding

the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 6.)

C. Settlement

On July 1, 2024, the Parties mediated before a mediator Tagore Subramaniam, Esq. who is a highly experienced and well-regarded mediator for wage and hour class action litigation. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 7.) At the mediation, the Parties discussed at length the burdens and risks of continuing with the litigation considering Defendant’s defenses. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 7.) The Parties were able to reach a settlement at the mediation. The Parties reached an agreement regarding the substantive terms of a class-wide settlement, pending the Parties’ agreement on a long-form class settlement agreement. The Parties then signed a long form settlement agreement (“Agreement”). (*Id.*)

Plaintiff and Class Counsel are aware of the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability for the claims asserted in the Action, both generally and in response to Defendant’s defenses thereto.

Plaintiff and Class Counsel have also taken into account Defendant’s agreement to enter into a Settlement that confers substantial relief upon the Class. (Tunyan Decl., ¶8.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth in this Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable Settlement and is in the best interests of the Class. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 9.) Solely for the purpose of settling this case, the parties agree that the requirements for establishing class action certification with respect to this class have been met and are met. (*Id.*) If this Settlement is not approved by the Court for any reason, Defendant reserves its right to contest class certification. (*Id.*) This Settlement, if approved by the Court, will result in the entry of the Judgment and the release of all Released Claims for all Class Members, including all within the class definition who have not elected to exclude themselves from the Class. (*Id.*)

V. CLASS DEFINITION

The Class is defined as follows:

All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendant who worked for Defendant in California during the Class Period (the “Class Period” is July 17, 2021 through the date the Court grants preliminary approval of this settlement or on the modified date pursuant to the Paragraph 8 of this Agreement.) “Participating Class Members” are those Class Members who do not submit timely exclusion requests to the Settlement Administrator. (Settlement, ¶ 1.35.)(Tunyan Decl., ¶ 34 and Exhibit 1.)

The Aggrieved Employees are defined as follows:

1 All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendant who worked for Defendant in
2 California during the PAGA Period (the “PAGA Period” is April 10, 2022 through the
3 date the Court grants preliminary approval of this settlement or on the modified date
4 pursuant to the Paragraph 8 of this Agreement.) Aggrieved Employees cannot opt out
5 of the settlement of the PAGA claim. (Settlement, ¶ 7.5.4.)

6 **VI. DISCUSSION**

7 **A. The Court Should Certify the Class Because It Meets All the Requirements for** 8 **Certification for Settlement Purposes Under CCP § 382**

9 Under Code of Civil Procedure § 382, class certification is warranted so long as there is a
10 numerous and ascertainable class with a well-defined community of interest among its members and a
11 “class action proceeding is superior to other means for a fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.”
12 *See, e.g., Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 332 (2004). Any doubts as to
13 the appropriateness of class treatment must be resolved in favor of certification, subject to later
14 modification. *Richmond v. Dart Indus. Inc.*, 29 Cal. 3d 462, 473-475 (1981). For purposes of this
15 Settlement *only*, Defendants stipulated to conditional certification. (Settlement ¶ 12.1.)

16 “The certification question is ‘essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is
17 legally or factually meritorious.’” *Id.*, at 326, quoting *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 439-440
18 (2000). Indeed, the certification question simply asks whether the theory of recovery advanced by the
19 plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment. *See, e.g., Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal.
20 App. 4th 1286, 1298 (2010). In ruling on certification, a trial court’s task is to determine “whether ... the
21 issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so
22 numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial
23 process and to the litigants.” *Id.* Thus, “[t]he relevant comparison lies between the costs and benefits of
24 adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims in a class action and the costs and benefits of proceeding by numerous
25 separate actions” *See, e.g., id.*

26 “[I]t is also well established that trial courts should use different standards to determine the
27 propriety of a settlement class, as opposed to a litigation class certification. Specifically, a lesser standard
28 of scrutiny is used for settlement cases.” *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal.
App. 4th 836, 859 (2003), citing *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1807 n. 19 (1996). As

the court noted in *Dunk*, although certification requirements are intended “to protect the interests of the non-representative class members,” that concern is “protected by the trial court’s fairness review of the settlement.” *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1807 n.19.

Indeed, numerous courts have certified settlement classes. For example, the court in *In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.*, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 1088, 122 L. Ed. 497, 113 S. Ct 1070 (1993), addressed settlement before a class was certified. After a hearing, the “district court issued an order certifying the class and approving the settlement agreement.” *Id.* at 289; see also *Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc.*, 73 F.R.D. 269, 278 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“the use of the tentative settlement class procedure was appropriate in this case”), *aff’d*, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978). Certification of a settlement class is a regular feature of class action litigation and an approved procedure which ought to be followed in this case. See Newberg on Class Actions (3d ed. 1991) § 11.27, pp. 11-40 to 11-56; Manual for Complex Litigation, 2d (1993) § 30.45.

In view of these standards, **as discussed more thoroughly as part of the preliminary approval motion already granted by the Court**, the Settlement Class should be certified for purposes of settlement. Code Civ. Proc. § 382; Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c).

B. The Court Should Finally Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage Claims in View of Defendant’s Potential Liability Exposure and the Risks of Continued Litigation

California courts favor settlement. See, e.g., *Stambaugh v. Superior Court*, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236 (1976). Unlike most settlements, class action settlements involve a court approval process that exists to prevent fraud, collusion, and unfairness to class members. *Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v. Superior Court*, 103 Cal.App.3d 573, 578-579 (1980). This approval process consists of preliminary settlement approval, notice being given to class members, and a final fairness and approval hearing being held at which class members may be heard with respect to the settlement. *Id.* For the reasons discussed below, this Court should finally approve the Settlement and enter Judgment.

1. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Review and Approval.

Any settlement of class litigation must be reviewed and approved by the presiding court. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(a). Approval occurs in two steps: (1) an early (preliminary) review by the trial

1 court and (2) a subsequent (final) review after notice has been distributed to the class members. The
2 Preliminary Approval Hearing and Final Approval Hearing coincide with these two steps. The present
3 motion seeks final approval and the entry of a Judgment.

4 To evaluate a settlement, the trial court must receive “basic information about the nature and
5 magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the
6 release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.
7 App. 4th 116, 133 (2008). However, the record need *not* contain an explicit statement of the maximum
8 theoretical amount that the class could recover. *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*,
9 186 Cal. App. 4th 399, 409 (2010).

10 **2. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arms’ Length Negotiations**
11 **Between Experienced Counsel After Sufficient Data Was Exchanged to**
12 **Evaluate Settlement.**

13 A settlement is presumptively fair where it is reached through arms’ length bargaining, based on
14 sufficient discovery and investigation to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, counsel is
15 experienced in similar litigation, and the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802;
16 *In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006); *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v.*
17 *Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1146 (2000). In deciding whether to approve a settlement, a
18 trial court has broad powers to determine whether it is fair under the circumstances of the case. *See, e.g.,*
19 *Mallick v. Superior Court*, 89 Cal. App. 3d 434, 438 (1979). In exercising these powers, the overriding
20 concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk*, at 1801,
21 quoting *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).

22 Relevant factors in making this determination, include, but are not limited to:

23 [T]he complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
24 action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery
25 completed and the state of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the
presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
proposed settlement.

26 *Id.* These factors require balancing, are non-exhaustive, and, as such, trial courts should tailor the factors
27 considered to each case and give due regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
28 between the parties.” *Id.*

1 Here, the Settlement resulted from thorough, arms' length negotiations between experienced
2 counsel with the assistance of highly regarded mediator. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 7-9.) With respect to the
3 claims at issue in this case, Plaintiff obtained a sampling of employees' pay and time data from
4 Defendant and then carefully reviewed that information. Counsel for Plaintiff also examined relevant
5 policies.

6 Based on the totality of that review, Plaintiff estimated the potential exposure and then estimated
7 risk factors to adjust the reasonable expected outcome. The investigation and discovery that Plaintiff's
8 counsel conducted were sufficient to provide them with enough information to intelligently evaluate the
9 estimated exposure in this action for purposes of negotiating the Settlement in view of the risks discussed
10 below and are also sufficient to allow this Court to do the same. *See, e.g., Wershba v. Apple Computer,*
11 *Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001).

12 **3. The Settlement Represents a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise**
13 **of Class Members' Claims Based on Defendant's Estimated Liability**
14 **Exposure Given the Risks Continued Litigation Would Entail.**

15 A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at
16 trial and does not have to provide 100% of damages sought to be fair and reasonable. "In the context of a
17 settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the
18 complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances." *Wershba*, 91
19 Cal. App. 4th at 250. Accordingly, because settlements involve compromise, even one that provides for
20 substantially narrower relief than would likely be obtained if the suit were successfully litigated can be
21 reasonable given that "the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each
22 side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation." *Id.*, quoting *Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses*
23 *Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc.*, 455 F.2d 101, 109 (7th Cir. 1972).

24 With respect to the claims asserted on behalf of the Class in this case, there are serious risks that
25 support the reduced compromise amount. These risks include, but are not limited to: (i) the risk that
26 Plaintiff would be unable to establish liability for unpaid straight time or overtime wages, *see Duran v.*
27 *US Bank Nat'l Ass'n*, 59 Cal. 4th 1, 39 & n. 33 (2014) ("*Duran*"), citing *Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC*
28 2014 WL 205039 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing certified off-the-clock claims based on proof at trial); (ii)

1 the risk that Defendant's meal and rest period policies might not ultimately support class certification or
2 a class-wide liability finding, *see Duran*, 59 Cal. 4th at 14, n. 28 (citing Court of Appeal decisions
3 favorable on class certification issue without expressing opinion as to ultimate viability of proposition);
4 (iii) the risk that uncertainties pertaining to the ultimate legality of Defendant's policies and practices
5 could preclude class-wide awards of statutory penalties under Labor Code §§ 203 and 226(e); (iv) the
6 risk that individual differences between Class Members could be construed as pertaining to liability and
7 not solely to damages, *see Duran*, 59 Cal. 4th at 19; (v) the risk that any civil penalties award under the
8 PAGA could be reduced by the Court in its discretion, *see* Labor Code § 2699(e)(1); (vi) the risk that
9 class treatment could be deemed improper as to one or more claims, except for settlement purposes; and,
10 (vii) the risk that appellate litigation could ensue; (viii) the risk that violation rate estimates would prove
11 much lower than expected. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 15.) These risks are non-exhaustive.

12 In light of the uncertainties of protracted litigation, the settlement amount reflects a fair and
13 reasonable recovery for the Class Members. (Tunyan Decl. ¶¶ 12-19.) The settlement amount is, of
14 course, a compromise figure. (Tunyan Decl. ¶ 16.) By necessity it took into account risks related to
15 liability, damages, and the defenses asserted by Defendant. (*Id.*) Moreover, each Class Member will be
16 given the opportunity to opt-out of the Settlement, allowing those who feel they have claims that are
17 greater than the benefits they can receive under this Settlement to pursue their own claims. (*Id.*) For the
18 **271** members of the Class, the average **gross** recovery is at least **\$885.61** per class member, and the
19 estimated average **net** recovery for each Class Member is approximately **\$446.76** (*Id.*) Given that
20 Defendant would have strongly challenged certification and liability, this is a significant sum to have
21 achieved in settlement. Moreover, a Class Member who worked a greater number of weeks for
22 Defendant will receive a larger share of the Settlement than a Class Member who worked for a shorter
23 amount of time during the class period. (*Id.*)

24 After analyzing the claims in this matter, Plaintiff has concluded that the Gross Settlement
25 Amount of **\$240,000.00** is about 73% of the **\$328,401.64** estimate of *risk-adjusted* recovery (excluding
26 interest) at this stage in the litigation. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 17.) This assessment is based on a carefully
27 constructed model of the current fair value of the case, using estimated risks, average wage rates,
28 numbers of employees, and the amount of time covered by the class period. (*Id.*) The maximum

1 calculated reasonable exposure is **\$2,283,296.40**, including PAGA penalties. (*Id.*)

- 2 • A reasonably estimated exposure for unpaid off-the-clock work and split shift premiums was
3 calculated, with the assistance of an expert, to be approximately **\$300,781.80**. However, with
4 the risk factor discounts for certification and liability proof, the value of that claim is
5 estimated by Plaintiff's counsel to be approximately **\$60,156.36**, assuming certification
6 probability of 40% and merits success at 30%.
- 7 • A reasonably estimated exposure for rest break violations over the class period was
8 calculated at **\$300,781.80**, but with chances of certification and proof of liability (50% and
9 40% respectively) for a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$60,156.36**.
- 10 • A reasonably estimated exposure for meal break violations over the class period was
11 calculated at **\$300,781.80** with chances of certification and liability risks (50% and 40%
12 respectively) resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$60,156.36**.
- 13 • Risk-adjusted penalty recoveries for wage statement and Labor Code § 203 penalties were
14 estimated to be approximately **\$34,689.60** and **\$61,910.00**, respectively, on maximum
15 exposures of **\$346,896.00** and **\$619,100.00**, respectively (50% and 20% respectively).
- 16 • A reasonably estimated exposure for unreimbursed expenses was calculated at **\$75,955.00**,
17 with chances of certification and liability risks (20% and 50% respectively) resulting in a
18 risk-adjusted exposure of **\$7,595.50**.
- 19 • Performing risk-adjusted valuations for all claims yields a total value in the range of
20 **\$260,601.64**, excluding PAGA. (*Id.*)
- 21 • PAGA penalties were calculated as having a maximum realistic exposure of **\$339,000.00**, but
22 a risk adjusted value of **\$67,800.00**, after factoring in risks of reduction in penalties pursuant
23 to Court discretion and the high risk of the inability to prove violations for all aggrieved
24 employees.

25 The concurrently filed Declaration of Lilit Tunyan sets forth claim valuation in additional detail. (*See*,
26 Tunyan Decl., ¶ 17.)

27 This result here is fully supportable as reasonable. First, it is important to recognize the
28 wilfulness finding required for Labor Code §§ 203 and 226 is challenging to establish. (Tunyan Decl., ¶

18.) Second, rest break and meal period claims have been challenging to certify for many years, even after *Brinker*. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 18.) Third, the certification rates in California are lower than conventional wisdom holds. See, H. Scott Leviant, *Second Interim Report on class actions in California sheds new light on certification* (February 19, 2010), www.thecomplexlitigator.com, available at <http://www.thecomplexlitigator.com/post-data/2010/2/19/second-interim-report-on-class-actions-in-california-sheds-n.html>; see also, *Findings of the Study of California Class Action Litigation, 2000-2006*, available at <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf> (finding, at page 5, and in Table 9, at page 15, that only 21.4% of all class actions were certified either as part of a settlement **or** as part of a contested certification motion). Additionally, Defendant has consistently denied all of Plaintiff's asserted claims and Plaintiff's ability to pursue his claims on a class or representative basis, and maintains that it has complied with all applicable laws throughout the class period.

Here, the estimated certification probabilities are **above** the average rate at which cases were certified in California over the study years, based upon data available through the California Courts websites. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 18.) In sum, well *under* 20% of all cases filed as proposed class actions are ultimately certified by way of a *contested* motion. (*Id.*) The recovery is roughly **11%** of the maximum plausible recovery (estimated to be approximately **\$2,283,296.40**, including PAGA), which falls within the expected outcome under the likelihood of success metric. (*Id.*) This Settlement achieves the goals of the litigation.

4. The Proposed Method for Allocating Settlement Funds Is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable.

The proposed method of allocating the Settlement Fund to Class Members also is fair and reasonable. As noted, the parties agreed to allocate the Settlement Fund between all Class Members based on time worked by the Class Member during the Class Period, in relation to the total amount of time worked by all participating Class Members collectively during the class period. This proposed method is fair and reasonable because each Class Member's actual potential damages vary based on the number of workweeks he or she actually worked (e.g., Lab. Code § 226.7 provides for an extra hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of pay for each violation, resulting in a higher potential damage when

1 a higher number of incidents occur). A Class Member who worked a greater number of weeks for
2 Defendant will receive a larger payment under the Settlement than a Class Member who worked for a
3 shorter amount of time during the relevant period. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 11, 17.)

4 **5. The Proposed Enhancement Award to Plaintiff Is Fair, Adequate, and**
5 **Reasonable and Warrants Final Approval.**

6 The proposed enhancement payment to Plaintiff is intended to recognize the substantial initiative
7 and significant efforts on behalf of the Class. Courts routinely approve incentive awards to compensate
8 named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class action litigation, often
9 in much higher amounts than that sought here. *See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange*, 115 Cal. App.
10 4th 715, 726 (2004) (upholding “service payments” to named plaintiffs for their efforts in bringing the
11 case); *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 901 F. Supp. 294 (N.D.Cal. 1995) (approving a \$50,000
12 enhancement award). Plaintiff contributed time to the prosecution of this matter, including assistance
13 prior to the settlement negotiations and during settlement negotiations with information and substantial
14 time conferring with counsel over the course of this litigation and before it was filed. (Camposeco Decl.,
15 ¶¶ 4-22; Tunyan Decl., ¶ 35.) The enhancement also recognizes the considerable risks Plaintiff
16 undertook on behalf of the Class to be personally liable for all costs incurred regardless of the success of
17 the litigation or class certification, as well as the personal risk of facing intrusive discovery and potential
18 disclosure to future employers that Plaintiff sued a former employer, making future employment
19 prospects uncertain and general release of all claims beyond wage-and-hour claims released in this
20 action. The accompanying Declaration of Plaintiff confirms his involvement and supports his
21 appointment as the Class Representative.

22 **6. The Proposed Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Is Also Fair, Adequate,**
23 **and Reasonable and Merits Final Approval.**

24 *a) Plaintiff’s Counsel Should be Awarded Fees Based on a Percentage of*
25 *the Fund Recovered, Consistent with the Common Fund Method*

26 The request for attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the settlement fund is supported by the
27 “common fund theory,” where “one who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund
28 from which others derive benefits, may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the

litigation costs.” *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 35 (1977). The lodestar may be cross-checked against the percentage-of-recovery. See *In re Consumer Privacy Cases*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 545, 556-58 (2009).

The purpose of the common fund approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet*, 12 Cal. 4th 105, 110 (1995); see *Quinn v. State of California*, 15 Cal. 3d 162, 167 (1975) (“[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.”).

The California Supreme Court removed any lingering doubt about the use of the percentage of the fund method to award attorney’s fees in California Courts:

We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created. The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation (See pt. I, *ante*; *Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 48–49, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 797; *Rawlings v. Prudential–Bache Properties, Inc., supra*, 9 F.3d at p. 516)—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.

Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016).¹ Thus, this Court may and, pursuant to *Laffitte*, should award fees to Plaintiff’s counsel based upon the percentage of the fund methodology.

Setting *Laffitte* aside, whether the once-again-confirmed percentage of the fund method or the lodestar method is used, the outcome is roughly the same: “[F]ee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery’ regardless of ‘whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used.’” *Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC*, 69 Cal. App. 5th 521 (2021). “Empirical studies show that,

¹ The Supreme Court also corrected the misconception that *Dunk* should be viewed as expressing doubt about the use of the percentage method: “The *Dunk* court, while finding the percentage method inapplicable to the settlement before it due to the lack of a readily valued common fund, did not purport to bar its usage generally in common fund cases.” *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 501.

1 regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions
2 average around one-third of the recovery.” *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal. App. 4th 43, 47 n. 11 (2008).
3 This is also consistent with counsels’ experience in class cases. Here, Plaintiff’s attorneys request
4 attorneys’ fees of up to \$80,000.00 (one-third of the GSA), and costs of \$14,677.89 (below the cap or
5 \$15,000), which includes payment for filing fees, service of process fees, mediation fees, expert fees and
6 other standard expenses and future motion, final report filing and CaseAnywhere fees. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶
7 33-34.) Given the efforts and risks involved in this case, as well as the results achieved, these amounts
8 are within the range of reasonableness and warrant *final approval*.

9 b) *Class Counsel Is Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees and Costs under the*
10 *California Labor Code and California’s Private Attorney General Statute*

11 Class Counsel is entitled to recover fees under Labor Code § 1194, which provides, in part:

12 [A]ny employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime
13 compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the
14 unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation,
15 including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

16 Lab. Code § 1194. As this litigation culminated in a Settlement that provides for a recovery of unpaid
17 wages, including unpaid minimum and overtimes wages, Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable
18 attorneys’ fees and costs under the Labor Code.

19 Class Counsel is also entitled to a fee under California’s private attorney general statute, Code of
20 Civil Procedure § 1021.5. “The award of attorney’s fees is proper under section 1021.5 if ‘(1) plaintiffs’
21 action ‘has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,’ (2) ‘a
22 significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a
23 large class of persons’ and (3) ‘the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to
24 make the award appropriate.’” *Press v. Lucky Stores*, 34 Cal. 3d 311, 317-318 (1983). The objective of
25 the statute is “to encourage suits enforcing public policies by providing substantial attorneys’ fees to
26 successful litigants in such cases.” *Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.*, 34 Cal. 4th 553, 565 (2004).

27 The Action resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, as
28 Plaintiff sought to enforce Class Members’ rights to recover statutory wages arising from Defendants’
29 failure to pay all wages and failure to provide meal and rest breaks. *See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole*

1 *Productions, Inc.*, 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1113 (2007) (noting that “health and safety concerns” are what
2 motivated the Industrial Wage Commission to adopt mandatory meal and rest periods).

3 The Action also conferred a significant benefit on a class of persons who worked for Defendants
4 during the Class Period and were, according to allegations, not properly compensated for all hours
5 worked and were not provided meal and rest periods or compensation therefor.

6 Finally, the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement render an award appropriate.
7 Without the incentive of an attorneys’ fee award, Plaintiff could not have afforded to hire counsel to
8 pursue this case, as the cost of litigating this matter far outweighed Plaintiff’s potential recovery. *See*
9 *Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation*, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1044 (2001) (“As to the necessity
10 and financial burden of private enforcement, an award is appropriate where the cost of the legal victory
11 transcends the claimants’ personal interest; in other words, where the burden of pursuing the litigation is
12 out of proportion to the plaintiff’s individual stake in the matter.”).

13 c) *A Lodestar Cross Check Confirms that Class Counsel’s Requested*
14 *Attorneys’ Fees Are Reasonable*

15 Plaintiff’s fee application is also reasonable based on Class Counsel’s lodestar. Under the
16 lodestar method, the court considers a compilation of the time spent and a reasonable hourly
17 compensation of each attorney to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee requested. *Ramos v.*
18 *Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.*, 82 Cal. App. 4th 615, 622 (2000). The moving party meets its burden in
19 this regard by submitting “declarations evidencing the reasonable hourly rate for their services and
20 establishing the number of hours spent working on the case” as “California case law permits fee awards
21 in the absence of detailed time sheets.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 254-55; *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at
22 1810; *Nightengale v. Hyundai Motors America*, 31 Cal. App. 4th 99, 103 (1994). The hours spent and
23 the reasonable hourly compensation are computed to arrive at a “lodestar” figure which may then be
24 augmented or diminished by the court taking into account various “multiplier” factors. *See Ramos*, 82
25 Cal. App. 4th at 622 (citing *Serrano*, 20 Cal. 3d at 48-49).

26 Here, Class Counsel’s billed lodestar exceeds **\$127,880.00** which is based on approximately
27 213.9 *billed* hours (not including final estimated hours) at the attorneys’ customary hourly rates.
28 (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 31-33.) The actual lodestar is estimated to be **\$130,880.00**. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 33.)

Thus, the request for \$80,000.00 in attorneys' fees represents a **negative** lodestar multiplier of 1.6, when compared to the recorded and estimated future lodestar of counsel, totaling **\$130,880.00** (\$127,880.00 + \$3,000.00).

(1) Class Counsel's Hours Are Reasonable

In determining whether the number of hours expended on the litigation was reasonable, the court must determine that "the time spent was reasonably necessary and that [] counsel made 'a good faith effort to exclude from the fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'" *Jordan v. Multnomah County*, 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 n.8 (9th Cir. 1987). The court "should defer to the winning lawyer's professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case." *Moreno v. City of Sacramento*, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that "[l]awyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee cases in the hope of inflating their fees. The payoff is too uncertain, as to both the result and the amount of the fee.").

Here, Class Counsel expended a prudent amount of time litigating the case to achieve the excellent result on behalf of the class. (Tunyan Decl. ¶ 31.)

(2) Class Counsel's Hourly Rates Are Reasonable

The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. *PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler*, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000). "[I]n assessing a reasonable hourly rate, the trial court is allowed to consider the attorneys' skill as reflected in the quality of work, as well as the attorneys' reputation and status." *MBNA American Bank, N.A. v. Gorman*, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1, 3 (2006). The trial court may also "find hourly rates reasonable based on evidence of other courts approving similar rates." *Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor America*, 796 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2010).

Class Counsel are experienced litigators who specialize in employment law, with a substantial wage and hour class action practice. (Tunyan Decl. ¶¶ 20-26.) A number of courts, have approved Class Counsel's hourly rates which are consistent with their practice area, legal market. (Tunyan Decl. ¶ 26.) Given the skill and experience of Class Counsel, and the excellent result achieved, Class Counsel's hourly rates are reasonable.

d) Class Counsel's Costs Are Reasonable

The Settlement Agreement provides for reimbursement of costs not to exceed \$15,000.00. To

1 date, Tunyan Law, APC has already incurred actual costs in the amount of \$14,677.89 which includes
2 future motion, final report filing and CaseAnywhere fees. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 34.) These costs were
3 reasonably incurred in prosecuting the Action on behalf of the Class Members and should be approved
4 by the Court. Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests the Court approve costs in the amount of
5 **\$14,677.89.** (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 34.)

6 **7. The Proposed Payment to the Administrator Is Fair and Reasonable**

7 In deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, a trial court must determine if the
8 proposed settlement is fair under the circumstances of the case. *Mallick*, 89 Cal.App.3d at 438. In
9 exercising this power, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate,
10 and reasonable.” *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted). Phoenix Class Action
11 Administration Solutions, which has been selected due to its competitive bid, estimates that
12 administration can be performed for **\$7,000.00**. In counsel’s experience, based on similar wage-and-
13 hour actions, an estimated cost of **\$7,000.00** is a fair and reasonable amount for administration fees and
14 should be preliminarily approved. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 36.)

15 **8. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable**

16 The ultimate decision as to the amount of PAGA penalties is always up to the discretion of the
17 Court. Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) states: “In any action by an aggrieved employee seeking recovery of a
18 civil penalty available under subdivision (a) or (f), a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum
19 civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case,
20 to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”

21 Prior to the issuance of *Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.*, 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021), the only sources
22 of persuasive guidance as to how to assess the reasonableness of a PAGA allocation were found in
23 federal court decisions addressing that question. In their view, a PAGA allocation, even if a small
24 portion of the total settlement, could be reasonable if the settlement of the underlying wage and hour
25 claims is robust and serves the deterrent purpose of the PAGA statute. *O’Connor v. Uber Technologies,*
26 *Inc.*, 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“By providing fair compensation to the class members
27 as employees and substantial monetary relief, a settlement not only vindicates the rights of class
28 members as employees, but may have a deterrent effect upon the Defendant employer and other

employers, an objective of PAGA.”); *see also* *Viceral v. Mistras Group*, 2016 WL 5907869 *9 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Applying O’Connor’s sliding scale approach, settlement of the PAGA claim may be substantially reduced below its standalone settlement value without sacrificing its statutory purposes because the non PAGA settlement is relatively substantial.”)

Moniz then provided explicit confirmation that this was an appropriate yardstick by which to measure reasonableness of a PAGA settlement. *Moniz* said:

[W]hile PAGA does not require the trial court to act as a fiduciary for aggrieved employees, adoption of a standard of review for settlements that prevents “ ‘ ‘ ‘fraud, collusion or unfairness’ ” (Dunk, *supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1800–1801, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 483), and protects the interests of the public and the LWDA in the enforcement of state labor laws is warranted. Because many of the factors used to evaluate class action settlements bear on a settlement’s fairness—including the strength of the plaintiff’s case, the risk, the stage of the proceeding, the complexity and likely duration of further litigation, and the settlement amount—these factors can be useful in evaluating the fairness of a PAGA settlement.

Given PAGA’s purpose to protect the public interest, we also agree with the LWDA and federal district courts that have found it appropriate to review a PAGA settlement to ascertain whether a settlement is fair in view of PAGA’s purposes and policies. (*O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1132–1134; *Jordan v. NCI Group, Inc.* (Jan. 5, 2018, No. EDCV 16-1701-JVS) 2018 WL 1409590, at *1–*2, 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25297, at *3–*4; *Chamberlain v. Baker Hughes, a GE Co., LLC*, *supra*, 2020 WL 4350207 at *3–*4, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 134582 at *10–*11; *see Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 46, 59, 61–62, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 [where the Legislature required court approval of private settlements of Proposition 65 actions brought to vindicate the public interest, court must evaluate the resulting consent decree to determine if it is “just” and “serves the public interest”].) We therefore hold that a trial court should evaluate a PAGA settlement to determine whether it is fair, reasonable, and adequate in view of PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws. (*See Williams, supra*, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 472, 398 P.3d 69 [PAGA “sought to remediate present violations and deter future ones”]; *Arias, supra*, 46 Cal.4th at p. 980, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 [the declared purpose of PAGA was to augment state enforcement efforts to achieve maximum compliance with labor laws].) The trial court below used this standard.

Moniz, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 77. *Moniz*, in agreeing with the federal courts that have considered how to evaluate a PAGA settlement, concluded that the class action factors are appropriately considered, along with a consideration of whether the settlement furthers “PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws.”

As to the first set of elements (the class-type analysis), it is embodied in Plaintiff’s discussion of the adequacy of the settlement generally. Using class settlements as a source of analogous settlement

1 review standards, to assess the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of a settlement, the court should
2 also consider the expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at
3 1801. Here, the expense, complexity and likely duration of future litigation as it pertained to Plaintiff's
4 PAGA claims was to some extent an unknown. However, what is certain is that to adequately establish
5 the foundational violations that would support a substantial penalty award, tremendous time and expense
6 would be invested. To adequately establish that aggrieved employees experience the alleged violations,
7 and at what frequency, most of the aggrieved employees would need to be interviewed in a systematic
8 fashion and their testimony cataloged in way sufficiently meaningful to permit the submission of
9 summary evidence at trial, such as via survey. *First*, the burdensome nature of such a process would be
10 expensive and time-consuming. *Second*, substantial risk that the Court would either substantially reduce
11 any penalty ultimately awarded *or* conclude that the conduct was insufficient to support a penalty award.
12 *Third*, it would be essentially impossible to formulate an objectively reliable means of summarizing
13 testimonial experiences, other than by an extraordinarily detailed survey. And formulating such a survey
14 would have been important, since frequency of violations would need to be established before any
15 penalties could be recovered. At least as to claims such as meal period and rest break violations, the
16 decisions of aggrieved employees are a major factor in assessing liability. In sum, the evidence collected
17 to date leads Plaintiff to conclude that, direct testimony would have been required from as many of the
18 roughly 226 aggrieved employees as could be obtained, which would be, at best, very difficult. Proof of
19 this sort gives rise to a manageability argument that could substantially reduce the size of the aggrieved
20 employee group.

21 The second element (the PAGA purposes element) is also satisfied here. As held by *Moniz*,
22 PAGA's purposes include (1) remediation of present labor law violations, (2) deterrence of future
23 violations, and (3) maximization of enforcement of state labor laws. Here the allocation of a major
24 portion of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of labor law violation remediation.
25 Class members benefit from payments intended to offset the harm of alleged violations of wage and hour
26 requirements. The allocation of a major portion of settlement funds to class members also deters future
27 violations, since, from the perspective of an employer, where settlement funds go is less significant than
28 the fact that settlement funds are issuing at all. Finally, allocation of a major portion of settlement funds

1 to class members still advances the goal of enforcement of state labor law. This settlement is, by
2 definition, a response to alleged violations of state labor laws, balanced against the competing factors of
3 uncertainty of proof and other risks.

4 A final note on the analysis discussion in *Moniz* is appropriate. *Moniz* was concerned with the
5 standard applied to a standalone PAGA action, not a settlement in which money was allocated between
6 class and PAGA claims. Here, the adequacy of the settlement as a whole impacts the factors approved of
7 by *Moniz*. It would be misleading to examine only the PAGA portion of the settlement without asking
8 how this Settlement as a whole is consistent with the purposes of PAGA. Second, the discussion of
9 “fairness” to those impacted by the settlement in *Moniz* does not play a role in this matter. In *Moniz*, the
10 Court found the record lacked any support for the disparate allocation of PAGA penalties between
11 different types of employees: “[T]he settlement’s allocation of shares of civil penalties to Colleagues that
12 are fifteen times greater than the shares allocated to Associates does not seem to have been justified
13 below and may be contrary to PAGA’s purposes.” *Moniz*, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 87. Here, PAGA
14 penalties are allocated by pay period, irrespective of job classification, an equitable method of allocation.

15 In addition, there is no evidence that a court or a commissioner had informed Defendant that any
16 conduct violated the Labor Code. *Amaral v. Cintas Corp.*, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1209 (2008); *Willis*
17 *v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC*, 2013 WL 6053831, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“Under California law, courts have
18 held that employers are not subject to heightened penalties for subsequent violations until and unless a
19 court or commissioner notified the employer that it is in violation of the Labor Code.”) And in *Cotter*,
20 the court found a significant reduction of the PAGA claim would be appropriate because “[t]his does not
21 appear to be a case where a company has deliberately sought to evade the law.” *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 176
22 5 F. Supp. 3d 930, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Here, Defendant can state a strong case that, as the Court
23 concluded in *Cotter*, the efforts to devise compliant operational policies do not indicate an organization
24 that has deliberately sought to evade the law. This is a very significant risk factor.

25 Finally, the PAGA allocation is fair. The LWDA is receiving \$11,250.00. The Class is
26 receiving, net, an estimated **\$121,072.11** for the releases for eight theories of recovery (including the
27 \$3,750.00 as the aggrieved employees’ share of the PAGA Allocation). An allocation to the LWDA
28 equal to roughly 10.7% of the Net Settlement Amount is not unfair and satisfies the policies underlying

1 California's wage and hour laws.

2 **VII. CONCLUSION**

3 For all the foregoing reasons, because the Class meets the requirements for certification, because
4 the Settlement bears all requisite indicia of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, and because the
5 notice procedure complied with Rule 3.766 and due process, this Court should grant this Motion for
6 Final Approval.

7
8 Respectfully submitted,

9 Dated: March 27, 2025

TUNYAN LAW, APC

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11 By: _____


Lilit Tunyan
Artur Tunyan

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13 Attorneys for Plaintiff JESUS CAMPOSECO
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27 **PROOF OF SERVICE**
28

1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
2) ss
3 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

4 I am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18
5 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 535 N. Brand Blvd., Suite 285
6 Glendale, California 91203.

7 On the date indicated below, I served the document described as: **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF**
8 **MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS AND PAGA**
9 **REPRESENTATIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND**
10 **AUTHORITIES** on the interested parties in this action by sending a true copy thereof to interested
11 parties as follows and as stated on the attached service list:

12 Eric J Gitig
13 Eric.Gitig@Jacksonlewis.com
14 Orlando J. Arellano,
15 Orlando.Arellano@jacksonlewis.com
16 Pamela Trujillo
17 Pamela.Trujillo@Jacksonlewis.com
18 **JACKSON LEWIS P.C.**
19 725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2500
20 Los Angeles, CA 90017
21 Telephone: (213) 689 0404

22 Attorneys for Defendant **SMARTE CARTE, INC.**

23 [✓] **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties
24 to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the
25 electronic service addresses listed above via third-party cloud service
26 **CASEANYWHERE**. I did not receive an error message.

27 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
28 true and correct. Executed on March 27, 2025 at Glendale, California.

29 _____
30 Lilit Tunyan

31 Name



32 Signature