

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

Rene C. Davidson Courthouse

William Coleman et al
Plaintiff/Petitioner(s)
VS.
Edges Electrical Group LLC
Defendant/Respondent
(s)

No. RG21110791

Date: 04/14/2026

Time: 2:30 PM

Dept: 21

Judge: S. Raj Chatterjee

ORDER Hearing on Motion for Final
Approval of Settlement
filed by William Coleman
(Plaintiff) + CRS# A-
21110791-001 filed by
Shaun Rogers (Plaintiff)
on 03/27/2026

Prior to the hearing, the Court issued a tentative ruling which is contested by Plaintiff. The matter is argued, submitted, and modified as set forth below.

The Motion for Final Approval of Settlement filed by Shaun Rogers, Benjamin Gonzalez, William Coleman on 03/20/2026 is Granted.

The motion of plaintiffs for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement is GRANTED.

APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT

The complaint alleges various Labor Code claims.

The case preliminarily settled for a total of \$500,000. The settlement agreement states there will be attorneys' fees of up to \$175,000 (35%), costs of up to \$30,000, Service Payment of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Coleman; not more than \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff Gonzalez; and not more than \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff Rogers, a PAGA payment of \$50,000 (\$37,500 to the LWDA), and administrative expenses of up to \$9,500. After these expenses the amount available to be distributed to the Class would be \$220,000. There are an estimated 398 Class Members, so the average net recovery for each class member would be \$552.

The motion makes an adequate analysis as required by Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

Rene C. Davidson Courthouse

The proposed class notice form and procedure are adequate. No Settlement Class Members have objected to the Settlement, and no Settlement Class Members have requested exclusion from the Settlement.

The proposed class is appropriate for class certification.

The scope of the named plaintiff release is appropriate. The agreement for the named plaintiff may include a Civil Code 1542 waiver.

The scope of the LWDA's release for claims asserted under the PAGA is appropriate. The PAGA release does not release claims by the aggrieved employees. The scope of the LWDA's release is limited to the scope of the PAGA notice letter. (*LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC* (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1192-1196.)

The scope of the class release is appropriate. The scope of the class release is limited to the claims arising out of the claims in the complaint where the named plaintiffs are typical and can adequately represent the class. (*Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC* (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 537-538.) The release of claims by the class is limited by the "factual predicate rule." (*Hesse v. Sprint Corp.* (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3d 581, 590.) (See also *Hendricks v. Starkist Co* (N.D. Cal. 2016) 2016 WL 692739 at * 2-4 [Denying motion for final approval of class settlement because scope of release overbroad].) The scope of the class release does not include a release of the LWDA's claims.

The Court notes and approves of the plan to distribute the settlement funds with no claims process.

The unclaimed funds will be distributed to Legal Aid at Work. This is consistent with CCP 384. Counsel has provided a declaration in support of the motion that provides the information required by CCP 382.4.

APPROVAL OF FEES, COSTS, AND SERVICE AWARD

"Because absent class members are not directly involved in the proceedings, oversight to ensure settlements are fair and untainted by conflict is the responsibility of both the class representative and the court." (*Mark v. Spencer* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 219, 227.)

"[T]horough judicial review of fee applications is required in all class action settlements and the fairness of the fees must be assessed independently of determining the fairness of the substantive settlement terms. (*Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 555-556.)

The court starts with its benchmark, then cross-checks with the lodestar, and makes adjustments if the benchmark is significantly different from the lodestar. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 505 ["If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should be adjusted"].)

The Ninth Circuit's benchmark is 25%. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 495.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

Rene C. Davidson Courthouse

When using the percentage of recovery approach, this court's benchmark for fees is 30% of a total fund. Courts have benchmarks ranging from 25% to 33%. *Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 495; *Schulz v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc.* (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1167, 1175; *Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557 fn 13; *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 fn 11; *Schulz v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc.* (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1167, 1175.)

The court recently reviewed and reaffirmed its use of a benchmark of 30%. (*Hurtubise v. Sutter East Bay Hosp.* (2021) 2021 WL 11134912.)

The benchmark of 30% of \$500,000 suggests fees of \$150,000.

When cross-checking with the lodestar/multiplier, the court will evaluate the lodestar based on reasonable fees that would have been charged at hourly rates and then apply a multiplier. The multiplier includes contingent fee risk and other factors.

Counsel assert they spent approximately 190.8 hours on the case. This is reasonable.

The court finds that a blended rate of \$600 is appropriate for the case. (*Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan* (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 708-709 [blended rate of \$550]; *Espejo v. Copley Press, Inc.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 329, 337 [blended rate of \$500/hour]; *569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 438-440 fn 14, fn 16 [blended rate of \$275].) Regarding the amount of the blended rate, the court considers the evidence and its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market. (*Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan* (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 709.) The court takes judicial notice of the rates for counsel in the USAO Fitzpatrick Matrix on “Hourly Rates (\$) for Legal Fees for Complex Federal Litigation in the District of Columbia.” The court takes judicial notice of the Laffey matrix. (<http://www.laffeymatrix.com/>) The court gives little weight to the anecdotal fee awards of other trial judges. Counsel can selectively present fee awards that indicate the highest hourly billing rates.

The court recently reviewed and reaffirmed its use of a blended rate of \$550. (*Harris v. Southern New Hampshire University* (2023) 2023 WL 3605289.)

The court will use a blended rate of \$600 per hour.

This results in a lodestar of \$114,600.

The court applies a 1.2 multiplier for risk. When considering risk, the court considers there is less risk in a case with fee shifting statutes because counsel's potential fees are not limited by and coupled to the monetary recovery. With a fee shifting statute, counsel has the risk of proving liability but if counsel proves liability, then the fees shift to the defendant with little to no consideration of the amount of the client's monetary recovery. (*Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie* (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1174.) For example, a nominal damage recovery will result in counsel recovering “reasonable attorneys’ fees” that could far exceed the award of damages. (*Harman v. City and County of San Francisco* (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 419 [jury awarded

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

Rene C. Davidson Courthouse

plaintiff \$30,300, counsel recovered \$1,113,905.40 in fee-shifted fees]; Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1006-1007 [client recovered \$1, counsel recovered \$87,525 in fee-shifted fees].) There was a fee shifting provision. (E.g. Labor Code 2802) This results in a multiplier adjusted lodestar of \$137,520.

Considering the percentage analysis fees of \$150,000 and the multiplier adjusted lodestar fees of \$137,520, the court will award fees of \$150,000. This is the Court's benchmark. The Court does not find any facts that warrant a departure from its benchmark, either upwards or downwards. The award of fees is appropriate to compensate counsel in this case, to incentivize the prosecution of meritorious cases, and does not result in an unreasonable windfall to counsel at the expense of their clients.

The Court considered the argument of counsel on 4/14/26 that they should be paid more than 30% from the settlement fund. The Court did hear any facts that would warrant a departure from the court's benchmark.

The court approves costs of \$24,720.58.

The court approves actual settlement administration costs of \$9,500.

The court approves a service awards: \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff William Coleman, \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff Benjamin Gonzalez, and \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff Shaun Rogers. Plaintiffs proposed an unequal allocation. Plaintiffs submitted declarations with evidence regarding the nature of participation in the action, including a description of specific actions and the amount of time committed to the prosecution of the case. (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804-807.)

SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION

"The settlement-fund proceeds, having been generated by the value of the class members' claims, belong solely to the class members." (Klier v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc. (5th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3d 468, 474.) "Ultimately, "[t]he goal of any distribution method is to get as much of the available damages remedy to class members as possible and in as simple and expedient a manner as possible.'" (In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 327 F.R.D. 483, 496.) If there are unclaimed funds after an initial distribution to the class members, then the Court can order a second distribution to the class members who cashed their initial checks. (4 Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions (6th ed. 2022) §§ 12:28, 12:30.)

The Court ORDERS that the settlement checks are void 120 days after mailing.

The Court ORDERS that a compliance hearing on final distribution is set for 9/21/26.

The Court ORDERS that funds not be distributed to the cy pres beneficiary until after Court approval of a final accounting. If there are significant uncashed checks after the initial

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

Rene C. Davidson Courthouse

distribution, then class counsel may propose a second distribution to the persons who cashed the first checks. Based on information provided by the claims administrator, the court might order a second distribution.

The Court ORDERS that 10% of any fee award to be kept in the administrator's trust fund until the completion of the distribution process and Court approval of a final accounting.

The Court will set a compliance hearing after the completion of the distribution process and the expiration of the time to cash checks for counsel for plaintiff and the Administrator to comply with CCP 384(b) and to submit a summary accounting how the funds have been distributed to the class members and the status of any unresolved issues. If the distribution is completed, the Court will at that time release funds to the cy pres beneficiary and any hold-back of attorney fees.


The court ORDERS that at the time of the final accounting that counsel for plaintiff transmit a copy of this order and the final judgment and the final accounting to the Judicial Council. (CCP 384.5; Govt Code 68520.)

Plaintiff may submit a proposed order if necessary. The court will sign any proposed order, which is modified by this order.

Compliance Hearing re: Final Distribution is scheduled for 09/21/2026 at 02:30 PM in Department 21 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse.

The Court orders counsel to obtain a copy of this order from the eCourt portal.

Dated : 04/14/2026



S. Raj Chatterjee / Judge

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

Rene C. Davidson Courthouse