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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

TYRIK FOULKS, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES OF
CALIFORNIA, INC., a California corporation;
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants

Case No.: 23STCV07285

REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

**DECLARATION OF KANE MOON IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPROVAL
OF PAGA SETTLEMENT**

[Filed with (1) Plaintiff's Notice of Motion and
Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, (2)
the Declaration of Plaintiff, (3) the Declaration
of Jodey Lawrence, (4) [Proposed] PAGA
Approval Order, and (5) [Proposed] Judgment]

PAGA APPROVAL HEARING:

Date: July 1, 2026

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept.: 17

Judge: Honorable Laura A. Seigle

Action filed: April 4, 2023

SAC filed: May 30, 2024

Trial date: Not set

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I, KANE MOON, declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice as such before all the Courts of the State of California and am one of the attorneys of record for Plaintiff Tyrik Foulks (“Plaintiff”). I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration and if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to them under oath.

2. This declaration is submitted in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement. Plaintiff seeks approval of the PAGA Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims (the "Settlement") entered into with Defendant Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. ("Defendant") (collectively, Plaintiff and Defendant are the "Parties"). A true and correct copy of the fully executed Settlement is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**. Exhibit A to the Settlement contains the Parties' proposed *Court-Approved Notice of PAGA Settlement* to be mailed to Aggrieved Employees with Individual PAGA Payments following settlement approval and Defendant's full settlement funding.

3. The proposed Settlement seeks to resolve all alleged claims for civil penalties pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”). Plaintiff brought this PAGA action on behalf of himself and all persons who are or were employed by Defendant in California as a non-exempt employee during the PAGA Period (“Aggrieved Employee”). (Settlement, ¶ A.2.) For purposes of settlement, the “PAGA Period” shall run from April 1, 2022 through February 9, 2026. (*Id.* at ¶ A.22.)

CASE BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

4. Defendant is a waste management company that operates landfills and recycling facilities. Plaintiff worked for Defendant from approximately April 2022 to June 2023 as an operating engineer. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff was classified as non-exempt and paid on an hourly basis. Plaintiff contends he and his former coworkers were subjected to the same or similar unlawful labor practices during their employment by Defendant, including failure to pay all wages.

5. Plaintiff's claims for unpaid wages stems from allegations of Defendant's failure to pay employees all minimum and overtime pay owed, including due to Defendant's failure to compensate employees for off-the-clock work. Plaintiff's meal and rest period claims are based on allegations that due to the nature of their work and Defendant's employment practices, employees regularly experienced missed,

1 untimely, or interrupted breaks, and that Defendant failed to provide any premiums for non-compliant rest
2 breaks or all premiums for non-compliant meals. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to reimburse
3 employees for all reasonable and necessary business expenses incurred, including work expenses incurred for
4 the use of employees' personal cellphone and for the purchase of masks, shoes, and flashlights. Plaintiff
5 further alleges he and other employees did not receive all wages owed at the time of termination nor accurate
6 itemized wage statements due to Defendant's failure to pay all wages and premiums. Accordingly, Plaintiff
7 alleges Defendant is liable for civil penalties under PAGA.

8 6. Because of the foregoing alleged violations of the Labor Code, Plaintiff filed a Class Action
9 Complaint on April 4, 2023, alleging Defendant systematically: (1) failed to pay minimum wages, (2) failed
10 to pay overtime compensation, (3) failed to provide meal periods, (4) failed to authorize and permit rest
11 breaks, (5) failure to indemnify necessary business expenses, (6) failed to timely pay final wages at
12 termination, (7) failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and (8) engaged in unfair business
13 practices.

14 7. Pursuant to PAGA, on April 1, 2023, Plaintiff submitted notice of the alleged Labor Code
15 violations to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (the "LWDA"), with certified mail
16 service on Defendant, and paid the required filing fee. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff's PAGA Notice is
17 attached hereto as **Exhibit 2**. The administrative exhaustion period under PAGA expired without the LWDA
18 indicating any intent to investigate the allegations. Accordingly, Plaintiff is duly authorized to act as a
19 private attorney general with respect to the PAGA claims involved in this action. On June 5, 2023,
20 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint to allege a ninth cause of action
21 for civil penalties under PAGA, to which Defendant filed an Answer and then a Motion for Judgment on the
22 Pleadings. The Court granted Defendant's Motion in part. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on
23 May 30, 2024 against Defendant. Defendant filed a demurrer, which was overruled. Defendant appealed the
24 ruling on its demurrer, which was denied.

25 8. In compliance with Labor Code section 2699(s)(1), Plaintiff submitted to the LWDA a file-
26 stamped copy of the First Amended Complaint containing the Court-assigned case number. To date, the
27 LWDA has not sought to intervene in this action.
28

9. Defendant ardently opposes the merits of this case and denies Plaintiff's factual allegations. Defendant argues all employees were properly paid for all hours worked and that it did not require or permit employees to work off-the-clock. Defendant maintains all employees were provided with the opportunity to take all their code-compliant meal and rest breaks and that missed breaks, if any, were solely the result of employees' voluntary choice. As for the unreimbursed business expenses, Defendant maintains it did not require employees to incur any business-related expenses. To the extent employees received wage statements that were allegedly inaccurate, Defendant argues penalties are not warranted because employees suffered no actual damage or harm as a result. (*See, e.g., Angeles v. U.S. Airways, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2013) No. C 12-05860 CRB, 2013 WL 622032, at *10 ["A plaintiff must adequately plead an injury arising from an employer's failure to provide full and accurate wage statements, and the omission of the required information alone is not sufficient."].) Additionally, Defendant alleges its good-faith belief that it paid all wages precludes the imposition of waiting time penalties because Plaintiff would be unable to show Defendant's alleged conduct was done willfully or knowingly. (*See, e.g., Pedroza v. PetSmart, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) No. ED CV 11-298 GHK (DTBx), 2012 WL 9506073, *5.) For these reasons, Defendant claims it did not engage in any unfair business practices and denies liability under PAGA. Defendant also maintains the claims are not susceptible to proof on a representative basis because of the individualized and varying nature of each employee's experience, making this matter unmanageable.

DISCOVERY AND INVESTIGATION

10. The Parties agreed to mediate the representative PAGA claims. The Parties engaged in informal discovery exchange prior to mediation. Defendant provided information and documents for the Aggrieved Employees, which enabled Plaintiff's Counsel to meaningfully investigate Plaintiff's allegations and assess the value of the PAGA claims. Specifically, Defendant produced Plaintiff's personnel file and his time and payroll records, documents regarding Defendant's written policies and practices in effect during the relevant period, and time and corresponding payroll records for approximately 84% of all Aggrieved Employees.

11. Prior to mediation, Plaintiff's Counsel reviewed and analyzed all the information that Defendant produced, including the time/pay records and Defendant's written policies, in conjunction with information provided by Plaintiff. Plaintiff's Counsel retained an expert to analyze the time/pay records and prepare a

1 damage analysis prior to mediation. The time/pay records contained 221,256 shifts worked (representing
2 89.7% of all shifts), which allowed the expert to prepare an analysis with a high degree of certainty. Further,
3 Plaintiff's Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in this action.
4 Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel were able to evaluate the probability of success on the merits and
5 Defendant's monetary exposure. In sum, Plaintiff and his Counsel's familiarity with the facts of the case and
6 the legal issues involved allowed them to act intelligently in negotiating the Settlement.

7 SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND NOTICE TO THE LWDA

8 12. On December 9, 2025, the Parties participated in a full day of private mediation facilitated
9 by Tripper Ortman, Esq., an experienced PAGA action mediator. The negotiations were at arm's length
10 and although conducted in a professional matter, were adversarial. Both sides went into the mediation
11 willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but they were also prepared to litigate their
12 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. Negotiations were protracted, with
13 extended discussions and instances in which it appeared the Parties would not reach a resolution.
14 Following a full discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses, the Parties
15 ultimately reached a resolution, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement at
16 issue.

17 13. In reaching a resolution, the Parties recognized that the issues presented in this action are
18 likely only to be resolved with extensive and costly pretrial and trial proceedings, and that further
19 litigation will lead to inconvenience, distraction, disruption, delay, and expense disproportionate to the
20 potential benefits of litigation. Plaintiff and his Counsel also considered the risk and uncertainty of the
21 outcome inherent in any litigation when determining whether this Settlement was the correct option. In
22 sum, Plaintiff and her Counsel believe the proposed Settlement is in the best interests of Aggrieved
23 Employees and the LWDA.

24 14. In compliance with Labor Code section 2699(s)(2), notice of settlement and a copy of the
25 proposed Settlement has been submitted to the LWDA along with a copy of Plaintiff's motion and the hearing
26 date. A true and correct copy of the LWDA's email confirming receipt thereof is attached hereto as Exhibit
27 3. To date, the LWDA has not indicated any objection to the Settlement.

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(*Id.* at ¶ A.35.) If the Court awards less than the amount requested, any amount not awarded will become part of the Net Settlement Amount for distribution to Aggrieved Employees. (*Id.* at ¶ C.2.d.)

18. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Settlement includes attorneys' fees in an amount not to exceed one third (1/3) of the GSA, or \$58,333.33, plus reimbursement for out-of-pocket litigation costs not to exceed \$28,000.00, payable to Plaintiff's Counsel from the GSA. (*Id.* at ¶ C.2.a.) In the event actual costs are less and/or the amount of fees and costs approved by the Court are less than the amounts requested, the difference will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount. (*Id.*) My firm has incurred \$26,109.74 in litigation costs. A true and correct copy of a report showing these costs is attached hereto as **Exhibit 4**.

19. Administration Costs. The Settlement provides Administration Costs to the Settlement Administrator, payable from the GSA, in an amount up to \$4,500.00, for its fees and expenses in administering this Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ C.2.b.) In the event the amount of actual administration costs is less and/or the amount approved by the Court is less than requested, the difference will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount. (*Id.*) The Parties jointly selected Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions ("Phoenix") as the neutral entity to administer this Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ A.31.) A true and correct copy of Phoenix's bid for \$4,500.00 is attached hereto as **Exhibit 5**.

20. Net Settlement Amount. After deducting the Service Payment, PAGA Counsel attorneys' fees and costs, and Settlement Administration Costs from the GSA, in the amounts specifically approved by the Court, any difference in the amounts requested and the amounts awarded will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount as PAGA Penalties. (*Id.* at ¶ C.1.b.) Accordingly, the Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be no less than **\$81,056.93**,² which will be distributed 75% (i.e., no less than 75% * \$81,056.93= **\$60,792.70**) to the LWDA and 25% (i.e., no less than 25% * \$81,056.93= **\$20,264.23**) to Aggrieved Employees pursuant to PAGA law governing Plaintiff's claims.

21. Individual PAGA Payments. Each Aggrieved Employee will be entitled to his or her pro rata amount from the 25% share of PAGA Penalties that is directly proportional to the number of pay periods

² The estimated Net Settlement Amount was calculated by deducting the following amounts from the GSA (\$175,000.00): \$5,000.00 for the PAGA Service Payment, \$26,109.74 for the PAGA Cost Award, \$58,333.33 for the PAGA Attorney Fees Award, and \$4,500.00 for the Administration Costs. (*See Settlement*, ¶ A.17.)

1 worked in the PAGA Period without having to submit any claim form. (*Id.* at ¶¶ C.2.c, C.2.c.i.) This results
2 in an average Individual PAGA Payment of roughly **\$88.11** for each of the estimated 230 Aggrieved
3 Employees (\$20,264.23 / 230), and a PAGA Pay Period value of **\$0.76** for each of the 26,660 estimated
4 PAGA Pay Periods (\$20,264.23 / 26,660). Individual PAGA Payments will be allocated to 100% penalties
5 for tax purposes. (*See id.* at ¶ C.2.c.ii.)

6 22. Releases of Claims. Upon entry of the Approval Order and on the date when Defendant fully
7 funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount, and except as to such rights or claims as may be created by the
8 Settlement, the Aggrieved Employees will forever completely release and discharge the Released Parties from
9 the Released Claims for the PAGA Period, including from all claims, transactions, occurrences, or penalties
10 under the California Private Attorneys' General Act (Labor Code section 2698, et seq.) that were or could
11 have been sought by the Labor Commissioner for the violations identified and facts contained in any of the
12 Complaints filed in the Action and/or in Plaintiff's PAGA Notice, that accrued at any time during the PAGA
13 Period. (*Id.* at ¶ E.1.) It is the intent of the Parties that the Approval Order and judgment entered by the Court
14 shall have full equitable and collateral estoppel and *res judicata* effect and be final and binding upon the
15 Aggrieved Employees. (*Id.*) "Released Claims" means the claims being released by Plaintiff and Aggrieved
16 Employees, including the PAGA claims that Plaintiff alleged or could have alleged against the Released
17 Parties, on behalf of the Aggrieved Employees and the State of California, based on the facts stated in the
18 Action, any of the Complaints filed in the Action, in the LWDA PAGA Notice letter, or that could have been
19 asserted based on those facts, as further detailed in the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ A.28.) The "Released Parties"
20 are "Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., and its respective past, present, or future affiliates, related
21 entities, parents, subsidiaries, owners, including specifically but not limited to including Republic Services,
22 Inc., as well as their members, partners, officers, directors, board members, managers, supervisors,
23 employees, co-employers, predecessors, successors, assigns, agents, shareholders, investors, insurers, and
24 legal representatives." (*Id.* at ¶ A.29.)

25 23. No Related Cases. To the best of my knowledge, there is no other pending litigation involving
26 similar claims against Defendant that may be impacted by approval of the Settlement at issue, other than *Luke*
27 *Miracle v. Republic Services Inc., a Delaware Corporation; Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc.,*
28 *a California Corporation, et. al*, case number 26CHCV01501, filed on April 13, 2026 in the Los Angeles

1 Superior Court (“*Miracle* Action”). The *Miracle* Action seeks civil penalties pursuant to PAGA based on
2 allegations that Defendant and defendant Republic Services, Inc. failed to pay overtime wages, failed to
3 prove meal periods, failed to provide rest periods, failed to pay minimum wages, failed to timely pay
4 wages upon termination, failed to timely pay wages during employment, failed to provide complete and
5 accurate wage statements, failed to keep complete and accurate payroll records, and failed to reimburse
6 necessary business-related expenses and costs. Accordingly, the claim for civil penalties in the *Miracle*
7 Action are premised on similar allegations as this Settlement and approval of this Settlement may
8 extinguish or affect the claims in the *Miracle* Action. However, this Action was filed on April 4, 2023,
9 approximately 3 years prior to the *Miracle* Action and thus takes priority. I have come to this conclusion
10 after a reasonable inquiry and review of the LWDA’s PAGA Case Search website, this Court’s case
11 search website, and other information reasonably available online.

12 THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE

13 24. Prior to settlement negotiations, the Parties engaged in substantial motion practice, including a
14 motion for judgment on the pleadings, a demurrer, and an appeal. There can be no doubt that this Settlement
15 is the result of vigorous, adversarial, non-collusive, and arm’s-length negotiations between the Parties. Based
16 on Plaintiff’s Counsel’s analysis of the arguments and information provided by Defendant, on an expert
17 analysis of the time and pay records, and on information from Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s Counsel evaluated
18 Defendant’s both maximum and risk-adjusted potential exposure in preparation for mediation. Although the
19 expert’s analysis revealed that the time and pay records supported several violations by Defendant, those
20 identifiable violations were primarily limited to the regular rate and meal period claims. However, the meal
21 period claim, overtime claim, and reimbursement claim were dismissed with prejudice through Defendant’s
22 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, with further limits Defendant’s exposure. The records themselves also
23 did not provide strong support for the off-the-clock work, rest period, and expense reimbursement claims,
24 and derivative penalties for those claims, as these claims are predominantly testimony based. In other words,
25 Plaintiff’s analysis revealed that certain claims were not as strong as originally believed.

26 25. Because Defendant did not require employees to record rest periods, there are no records to
27 establish the rest period claim on the merits. Additionally, there are no records to establish the off-the-clock
28 work and unreimbursed business expenses claims on the merits. Rather, proof of these claims would need to

1 be supported by declarations from Aggrieved Employees regarding missed rest periods, off-the-clock work,
2 and incurred business expenses, as the records themselves cannot demonstrate what breaks were missed,
3 when, and why and they cannot demonstrate business expenses incurred and the time, if any, Aggrieved
4 Employees spent working off the clock.

5 26. Indeed, the maximum exposure figures are based on assumed high violation rates that would not
6 likely be demonstrated at trial, as they assume either the participation of all Aggrieved Employees (which
7 would be difficult given the size of this group), or alternatively, the use of surveys or statistical data as a
8 surrogate (which would still require the participation of a majority of Aggrieved Employees to establish a
9 sound representation of all non-exempt employees). The reality is that many, if not all, employees would be
10 unwilling to participate due to fear of retaliation. However, even assuming those employees would be willing
11 to participate, obtaining such declarations would potentially reveal that each Aggrieved Employee had a
12 different experience. The individualized nature of their employment experience and the numerosity of
13 employees affected present significant risk with manageability and proof on the merits.

14 27. Even as to the regular rate and meal period claims, our analysis found that Defendant's exposure
15 is less than initially believed. As to meal periods, a review of the time/pay records shows a 45.7% violation
16 rate for Defendant. However, the records also show that after accounting for meal waivers and premium
17 payments, the violation rate is reduced to 21.8%. Defendant argues that the use of meal waivers and the
18 payment of meal premiums indicate that Defendant did not fail to provide meal breaks or provide meal
19 premium payments in lieu thereof. The use of waivers and premium payments also shows that to the extent
20 there was any violation, which Defendants dispute, such violations were not intentional. Defendant also
21 contends that many meal breaks were taken and, where a violation appears, it was a result of the Aggrieved
22 Employee voluntarily choosing to forego a meal period, to take it after the end of the fifth hour, or to stop his
23 or her break early to return to work. As to the regular rate issue, Plaintiff's expert identified 8,685 total
24 payments that were not factored into the regular rate of pay for purposes of paying sick pay, meal break
25 premiums, and overtime, resulting in a 66.9% violation rate for unpaid overtime, a 5.4% violation rate for
26 unpaid meal break premiums, and a 5.6% violation rate for unpaid sick pay. However, these violation rates
27 assume Plaintiff would be able to show the bonus payments were non-discretionary payments that should
28 have been factored into the regular rate. Indeed, Defendant argues that the bonuses were discretionary and

1 that it did not fail to incorporate any non-discretionary bonuses into the regular rate for purposes of paying
2 overtime, sick pay, and meal premium payments. Moreover, the overtime claim, meal period claim, and rest
3 period claims were dismissed through Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and as such
4 Defendant argues these claims cannot be a basis for Plaintiff's PAGA claim.

5 28. The likelihood that Defendant could assert viable legal defenses would likely further reduce its
6 overall exposure. For example, the individualized and testimony-intensive nature of the claims could bar
7 manageability of this representative action or otherwise significantly reduce Defendant's overall liability.

8 29. Further, a claim-by-claim penalty calculation is overly optimistic as it presumes Plaintiff
9 would be able to stack the penalties, although penalty stacking is not expressly permitted by PAGA. Rather,
10 without either (i) a prior finding by the LWDA or a court within the past five years that the employer violated
11 PAGA or (ii) evidence that the employer's conduct was malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive, PAGA only
12 provides for a maximum \$100.00 penalty for each pay period. (Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2)(A)–(B).) Plaintiff's
13 Counsel also believe it would be unrealistic to expect the Court to award the full (penalty-stacked) exposure
14 given the discretionary nature of awarding penalties and given Defendant's defenses, and additionally, to the
15 extent employees received wage statements that were allegedly inaccurate, employees suffered no actual
16 resulting damage or harm. Moreover, awarding the full penalties amount would likely raise Due Process
17 concerns.

18 30. For the foregoing reasons, the *realistic* exposure is thus far below the *optimistic* claim by claim
19 estimate.

20 31. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Counsel believe it is more reasonable to assess penalties on
21 a \$100.00 civil penalty per pay period basis pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(f)(2)(A) for each of the
22 estimated 26,660 pay periods at issue, as opposed to a claim-by-claim approach. Accordingly, Plaintiff's
23 Counsel estimate Defendant's maximum PAGA exposure to be **\$2,666,000.00** (\$100.00 x 26,660).
24 However, based on the discovery, Defendant's arguments at mediations and continued settlement
25 discussions, an understanding that the claims are heavily dependent on the unlikely participation by
26 Aggrieved Employees and their varying employment experience, and other important considerations
27 discussed above, it is reasonable to assume a violation occurred in at most 20% of all pay periods, which
28 results in a realistic (*risk-adjusted*) exposure of **\$533,200.00** (\$2,666,000.00 * 20%). As a result, the GSA

1 of \$175,000.00 represents roughly **33%** of the realistic exposure (\$175,000.00 / \$533,200.00).

2 32. The proposed Settlement therefore represents a substantial recovery when compared to the
3 reasonably forecasted recovery. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
4 continued litigation, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, and the probability of appeal, it is
5 clear the GSA of \$175,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and that settlement approval is
6 appropriate. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133; *see Munoz v. BCI*
7 *Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408–09 [holding that *Kullar* does not require
8 “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its
9 claims,” but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of
10 outcomes of the litigation”].)

11 33. The \$175,000.00 GSA amounts to “genuine and meaningful” relief. This is an excellent
12 result, particularly because, under the Settlement, Aggrieved Employees and the LWDA will receive
13 timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of not being able to recover anything at all.

14 34. The Settlement is a fair and reasonable resolution that satisfies PAGA’s dual statutory purposes
15 of deterrence and punishment, on the one hand, and providing Aggrieved Employees with genuine and
16 meaningful relief, on the other. As a result of this litigation, Defendant has had to hire legal counsel,
17 engage in employee-wide discovery, and participate in mediation. Assuming approval is granted,
18 Defendant will also have to pay civil penalties pursuant to PAGA. Not including its own attorneys’ fees
19 and costs, Defendant will pay at least \$175,000.00 to resolve this matter—of which at least \$81,056.93 is
20 allocated toward PAGA Penalties and will be distributed as 75% to the LWDA and 25% to Aggrieved
21 Employees, in compliance with PAGA law governing the claims in this Action. (*See* Settlement, ¶¶
22 C.2.c.i., C.2.c.ii.) This amount represents roughly **15%** of the realistic exposure for the claims
23 (\$81,056.93 / \$533,200.00), as discussed above. Additionally, the release obtained under the Settlement
24 does not preclude Aggrieved Employees from pursuing any individual (non-PAGA) claims they may
25 have against Defendant or the other Released Parties. (*See id.* at ¶ A.28.)

26 35. Plaintiff’s Counsel have conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of the allegations.
27 Based on discovery and on their own independent investigation and evaluation, Plaintiff’s Counsel are of
28 the opinion that the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Furthermore, considering all

1 known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, trial risk, appellate risk, the defenses that could
2 be asserted by Defendant on the merits, Plaintiff's Counsel respectfully submit that the Settlement is in the
3 best interests of the Aggrieved Employees and the State of California.

4 36. Although Plaintiff's Counsel believe there is merit to Plaintiff's allegations, they also
5 acknowledge a legitimate controversy exists as to each allegation. Plaintiff's Counsel also recognize that
6 proving the amounts of penalties owed to each Aggrieved Employee would be an expensive, time-consuming,
7 and uncertain proposition.

8 37. Moreover, Plaintiff's Counsel are also of the opinion that because the issues here are fairly
9 contested, there is a possibility of the Court not awarding PAGA penalties even if Plaintiff prevailed on the
10 merits due to the largely discretionary nature of awarding PAGA penalties. In other words, were this matter
11 to go to trial, any award granted would be at the discretion of the Court and subject to a substantial reduction.

12 38. While Plaintiff's Counsel believe there would be no persuasive grounds to reduce penalties,
13 they recognize that the Court could determine otherwise and significantly reduce any award of penalties.
14 This wide range of potential recovery and additional delays and risks of trial provide justification to settle
15 for a reasonable amount of recovery at this point in the litigation. In all, based on the investigation and
16 analysis of the claims in preparation for mediation, the maximum exposure did not comport with the
17 realistic exposure that Defendant faced, as discussed above.

18 39. Plaintiff's Counsel took into account the risk of not being able to proceed on a representative
19 basis at all due to the potential manageability issues, the risk of not prevailing at trial, and the risk that even
20 if Plaintiff prevailed at trial, the penalties would be limited due to the largely discretionary nature of
21 awarding PAGA penalties. The provisions of the Labor Code triggering PAGA penalties in this case
22 include Labor Code sections 203, 210, 226, 1197.1, and 2802. However, PAGA penalties are not
23 mandatory, but rather, permissive. (Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2).) Accordingly, it is entirely possible that even
24 if Plaintiff were successful at trial, assuming he is first able to win on the merits regarding his individual
25 claims at arbitration and then defeat the manageability issues presented at litigation by the large number
26 of Aggrieved Employees in this action, Plaintiff may still be awarded substantially less than what was
27 obtained through the Settlement.

28 40. The Settlement avoids the significant risks, burdens, and the accompanying expense of further

1 litigation. Though the Parties have engaged in a significant amount of investigation, informal discovery,
2 and employee data analysis, they have not completed formal discovery procedures. Moreover, Plaintiff
3 would have to proceed with arbitration of his individual claims and win on the merits before proceeding
4 with litigation of the representative PAGA claims. Preparation for trial and the prospect of appeals in the
5 wake of any summary judgment ruling would remain for the Parties. As a result, the Parties would incur
6 considerably more attorneys' fees and costs through trial, a lengthy and uncertain process that could result
7 in recovering less than was settled for.

8 ///

9 THE SERVICE PAYMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED

10 41. Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff, who was a former employee of Defendant, has cooperated
11 immensely with my office and has taken many actions to protect the interests of the State of California and
12 the Aggrieved Employees. Plaintiff provided valuable information regarding his hours worked, and what
13 duties were performed during those hours. Plaintiff participated in decisions concerning this action, assisted
14 in preparation for the mediation, and searched for potential witnesses. Before we filed this action, Plaintiff
15 worked with my office to determine the viability of his claims. Plaintiff also provided information and
16 documents relating to his employment with Defendant. The information and documentation provided by
17 Plaintiff was instrumental in establishing the violations alleged in this action, and the recovery provided
18 for under the Settlement would have been impossible to obtain without his participation.

19 42. At the same time, Plaintiff faced many risks in adding himself as the PAGA Representative in
20 this matter. Plaintiff faces actual risks with his future employment, as putting himself on public record in
21 an employment lawsuit could also very well affect his likelihood for future employment. For example, a
22 search of Plaintiff's name will reveal this action, and as a result, many employers may likely forego hiring
23 Plaintiff upon learning he sued a former employer.

24 43. In turn, Aggrieved Employees will now be reimbursed civil penalties for wage violations they
25 may have never known about or been willing to pursue on their own. If each Aggrieved Employee would
26 have tried to pursue legal remedies on their own, that would have resulted in each having to expend a
27 significant amount of their own monetary resources and time, not to mention limited judicial resources,
28 which were obviated by Plaintiff putting himself on the line on behalf of the Aggrieved Employees and the

1 LWDA. Further, prior to executing the Settlement, Plaintiff carefully reviewed the document and asked
2 questions to ensure his understanding, including as to the total recovery and releases of claims.

3 44. In the final analysis, this representative action would not have been possible without the aid of
4 Plaintiff, who put his own time and effort into this litigation and placed himself at risk for the sake of the
5 State of California and the Aggrieved Employees. The requested enhancement payment to Plaintiff for his
6 service as the PAGA Representative is a relatively small amount of money considering the time and effort
7 put into the litigation. For all the foregoing reasons, the requested enhancement to Plaintiff is reasonable.

8 MY EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

9 45. I received a B.A. in History in 1998 from UCLA, and my J.D. from Loyola Marymount Law
10 School in 2006. I became an Active Member of the State Bar of California in June 2007 and have been an
11 Active Member in good standing continuously since then. I have been selected to Super Lawyers each year
12 from 2019 to 2025.

13 46. I co-founded Moon & Yang, APC—now Moon Law Group, PC—in March 2010. My practice
14 is focused exclusively on advocating for the rights of employees in wage-and-hour litigation, almost entirely
15 in class and/or PAGA representative actions.

16 47. For the past decade, I have built my practice to have an emphasis on employment and related
17 civil litigation cases and have both prosecuted and defended employment-related litigation cases. I have been
18 heavily, successfully, and continuously involved in active litigation and trial work, and have conducted bench
19 and jury trials on behalf of both employees and employers in wage-and-hour cases.

20 48. My current billing rate is \$950.00 per hour, which is my usual hourly rate for wage and hour
21 litigations A \$950 per hour rate is reasonable considering my years of experience practicing in the highly
22 specialized area of employment and labor law and my Laffey Matrix rate (The Laffey Matrix,
23 <http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html>, [last visited May 5, 2026].) The Laffey Matrix is a “well-established
24 objective source for rates that vary by experience” used by the District of Columbia. (*In re HPL Tech., Inc.*
25 *Sec. Litig.* (N.D. Cal. 2005) 366 F. Supp 2d 912, 921.) A true and correct copy of the Laffey Matrix is
26 attached hereto as **Exhibit 6**. California Courts have adjusted the Laffey Matrix rate upwards based on
27 “locality pay differentials” and the location of counsel’s office in California to determine whether counsel’s
28 rates are reasonable. (*See, e.g., id.* [applying a 9% upward adjustment to the Laffey Matrix rate based on

1 an approximate difference of 9% between the locality pay differential of the District of Columbia and San
2 Francisco, California, where counsel's office was located].) To determine the locality pay differential, the
3 Court in *In re HPL Technologies, Inc.* utilized the locality pay differentials within the federal courts. (*Id.*
4 at pp. 921–22.) Using the same method here and based on firm's location in Los Angeles, California, the
5 current locality pay differential of the Los Angeles-Long Beach area is 36.47% and of the Washington-
6 Baltimore-Arlington area is 33.94%, which results in a difference of approximately 2.53%. (*Compare*
7 Judiciary Salary Plan of Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA, Effective January 12, 2026 with Judiciary Salary
8 Plan of Washington-Baltimore-Arlington, Effective January 12, 2026.) True and correct copies of the Los
9 Angeles-Long Beach and Washington-Baltimore-Arlington salary plans are attached hereto as **Exhibit 7** and
10 **Exhibit 8**, respectively. Based on my 19+ years of experience out of law school, my Laffey Matrix rate
11 with a 2.53% adjustment is \$1,044.78 per hour (\$1,019 Laffey Matrix rate + (2.53% x \$1,019)) (Ex. 6).
12 Accordingly, my current billing rate of \$950.00 per hour is reasonable.

13 49. I am experienced in prosecuting and defending employment matters, particularly class actions
14 and PAGA representative actions. My firm has focused a substantial percentage of its practice on wage, hour,
15 and working conditions violations. In addition to the present case, I am also class counsel for other wage and
16 hour class action lawsuits pending in various California counties, including in state and federal courts. The
17 following is a list of some of our recent class action settlements that have received preliminary and final
18 approval: *Aparicio v. Lineage Logistics, LLC* (LASC No. BC722764) (class size approx. 155; lead counsel);
19 *Black v. Mission Healthcare Servs., Inc.* (LASC No. 19STCV04602) (class size approx. 1,000; lead counsel);
20 *Campa v. Bloomingdeals, Inc.* (LASC No. BC700366) (class size approx. 1,500; lead counsel); *Garcia v.*
21 *Comfy U.S.A. Apparel, Inc.* (LASC No. BC709630) (class size approx. 210; lead counsel); *Gomez v. H Mart*
22 *Cos., Inc.* (LASC No. BC671525) (class size approx. 2,500; co-counsel); *Jones v. Citiguard, Inc.* (LASC No.
23 BC664890) (class size approx. 587; lead counsel); *Jones v. Fitness Alliance, LLC* (Riverside No.
24 PSC1404079) (class size approx. 1,000; lead counsel); *Lagos v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp.* (LASC No.
25 BC682972) (\$750,000 for 79 class members; lead counsel); *Mark Brulee et al. v. DAL Global Servs., LLC*
26 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2018, No. CV 17-6433 JVS(JCGx)) 2018 WL 6616659, at *10 (class size approx. 2,650;
27 lead counsel) (in approving my hourly rate in that case, the Court found: "Class Counsel's declarations show
28 that the attorneys are experienced and successful litigators. Other courts have approved the attorneys' current

1 rates for the Moon & Yang, APC attorneys”); *Martinez v. Bail Hotline Bail Bonds, Inc.* (LASC No.
2 BC700131) (class size approx. 173; lead counsel); *Montoya v. Golden 1 Credit Union* (Sacramento No. 34-
3 2018-00228252) (class size approx. 1,900; lead counsel); *Onofre v. Caitac Garment Processing, Inc.* (LASC
4 No. BC702283) (class size approx. 750; lead counsel); *Rodriguez v. Rossmoyne, Inc.* (LASC No. BC699137)
5 (class size approx. 220; lead counsel); *Sison v. Cha Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P.* (LASC No. BC6441 29) (class
6 size approx. 2,100; co-counsel); *Slaughter v. ACA Sec. Stems, LP* (LASC No. BC699137) (class size approx.
7 300; lead counsel); *Taylor v. Sherman’s Delicatessen & Bakery, LLC* (LASC No. BC722765) (class size
8 approx. 515; lead counsel); *Vargas v. AMS Paving, Inc.* (LASC No. BC722767) (case size approx. 260; lead
9 counsel); *Vertti v. Bagcraft Papercon III, LLC* (LASC No. 19STCV12729) (class size approx. 260; lead
10 counsel); and *Wallick v. Campbell Soup Supply Co., LLC* (San Joaquin No. STK-CV-UOE-2021-0000865)
11 (class size 435; lead counsel).

12 ALLEN FEGHALI’S EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

13 50. Allen Feghali is a senior partner at Moon Law Group, PC. He received his B.A. in Global and
14 International Studies in 2011 from UC Santa Barbara, and his J.D. from University of La Verne College
15 of Law in 2014. Mr. Feghali became an Active Member of the State Bar of California in December 2014
16 and has been an Active Member in good standing continuously since then. He was selected by Super
17 Lawyers as a “Southern California Rising Star” in 2020–2023.

18 51. Mr. Feghali began working at Moon Law Group, PC in May 2015, and his practice has focused
19 on advocating for the rights of employees at the trial-court and appellate level. Prior to approximately June
20 2018, with the exception of a handful of cases, his practice focused on individual FEHA and wrongful
21 termination claims, as well as individual wage and hour claims. In June 2018, Mr. Feghali became heavily
22 involved in the firm’s class and PAGA representative action practice.

23 52. Mr. Feghali’s current billing rate is \$900.00 per hour, which is his usual hourly rate in wage and
24 hour litigations. Based on Mr. Feghali’s 12 years of experience, his Laffey Matrix rate with a 2.53%
25 adjustment is \$1,044.78 per hour (\$1,019 Laffey Matrix rate + (2.53% x \$1,019)) (See Ex. 6.). Accordingly,
26 his current billing rate of \$900.00 per hour is reasonable.

53. During Mr. Feghali's tenure with Moon Law Group, PC, he has played a critical role in obtaining outstanding results for employees who have been wronged by their employers. Mr. Feghali's litigation experience includes, but is not limited to:

- (a) In March 2021, Mr. Feghali prepared the briefing in the matter of *Rivera, et al. v. Clearpath Federal Credit Union* (LASC No. 19STCV33504), which resulted in a certification order on all causes of action following contested briefing in a wage-and-hour class action.
- (b) Mr. Feghali prepared the briefing in a contested class certification motion in the matter of *Dawson, et al. v. GoHealth, LLC, et al.* (No. CGC-19-577790), which was argued and taken under submission by the Court on February 3, 2022.
- (c) Mr. Feghali prepared the briefing in a contested class certification motion in the matter of *Brown v. NTI-CA, Inc., et al.* (No. 21STCV04397).
- (d) Mr. Feghali was part of a team that prepared the briefing in a contested class certification motion in the matter of *Thong, et al. v. Outlook Resources, Inc., et al.* (No. 19STCV44400), which was granted in part and denied in part in October 2022.
- (e) Mr. Feghali prepared the briefing which resulted in a remand order in the matter of *Andrade v. Rehrig Pacific Corp.* (C.D. Cal. April 22, 2020, No. CV 20-1448 FMP (RAOx)) 2020 WL 1934954, where defendant removed a wage-and-hour class alleging that Plaintiffs' claims were pre-empted by the Labor Management Relations Act.
- (f) Mr. Feghali briefed, argued, and won the matter of *Lee, et al. v. The Christian Herald, U.S.A., Inc.* (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017, No. B266853) 2017 WL 6333905, at *1. There, the Court of Appeal reversed a dismissal of an individual defendant following the trial court's granting of a demurrer without leave to amend relating to alter ego allegations.
- (g) Mr. Feghali prepared the briefing which resulted in a remand order in the matter of *Sotelo v. Belfor USA Group, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. March 13, 2018, No. 2:17-cv-09056-RSWL-MRWx) 2018 WL 1352910. Defendants there sought to remove the case based on the inclusion of a "sham defendant," but the court agreed with Mr. Feghali's briefing which argued that the individual defendant, who was alleged to have harassed the Plaintiffs under FEHA, was a proper defendant.

(h) Mr. Feghali has been the lead counsel, or co-lead counsel, in individual cases that settled for \$850,000.00, \$375,000.00, and \$250,000.00. In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Feghali has resolved or assisted in the resolution of approximately 100 cases which has resulted in millions of dollars of unpaid wages being returned to low-wage employees.

(i) Mr. Feghali was part of a team that prepared the briefing in a contested class certification motion in the matter of *Hernandez v. CR Laurence, Inc., et al.* (No. 20STCV32372), which was granted, in part, and denied, in part, in February 2024.

54. Since June 2018, Mr. Feghali's practice has shifted to almost exclusively representing employees in wage and hour class and PAGA representative actions. His fee has been approved by Courts throughout the state. He has participated as lead, or co-lead counsel, in the litigation and resolution of over 100 wage and hour class actions, including obtaining preliminary and final approval of settlements. A selection of settled cases wherein Mr. Feghali served as lead or co-lead class counsel includes the following: *Barahona v. Methodist Hosp. of Cal.* (No. 20STCV09876) (\$5,000,000); *Stanley Black & Decker Wage and Hour Cases* (No. JCCP5218) (\$3,500,000); *Vazquez v. St. Mar 2.0 Inc.* (No. 37-2021-00042702-CU-OE-CTL) (\$2,250,000); *Duncan v. Infineon Technologies Americas Corp.* (No. 21STCV16872) (\$2,500,000); *Aquino v. Coast King Packing, LLC* (No. 21CV002448) (\$2,300,000); *Martinez, et al. v. Curative LLC* (No. 21STCV20778) (\$1,500,000); *Calderon v. Installed Building Products* (No. 37-2021-00035844-CU-OE-CTL) (\$1,500,000); *Majdoub v. Argent Hotel Mgmt.* (No. CGC-20-582921) (\$1,800,000); *Fuentes v. Covid Clinic, Inc.* (No. CIVSB2106806) (\$1,526,317.57); *Rahman, et al. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc.* (No. 3:20-cv-03047) (\$3,850,000); *Pagoulatos v. Coast Hills Credit Union* (No. 20CV02801) (\$1,100,000); *Hammers v. Redwood Oil Co., Inc.* (No. SCV-269625) (\$1,180,000); *Cuadras v. R.C. Wendt Painting, Inc.* (No. BC705964) (\$1,400,000); *Zaragoza v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno* (No. 22CV-00282) (\$1,500,000); *Garcia v. San Jose Water Co.* (22CV396328) (\$1,200,000); *Garcia v. Tri-Valley Plastering, Inc.* (No. 22CECG00591) (\$1,250,000); *Garcia v. Tapia Enter., Inc.* (\$2,137,651 for 507 class members); *Cha v. Center Point, Inc.* (No. CIV2102081) (\$1,000,000); *Sison v. Cha Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P.* (No. BC644129) (2,137 class members);

1 *Lagos v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp.* (No. BC682972) (\$750,000 for 79 class members); and
2 *Montoya v. Golden 1 Credit Union* (No. 34-2018-00228252) (\$1,250,000).

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4 JULIE SOHYUN OH'S EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

5 55. Julie S. Oh is an associate attorney at Moon Law Group, PC. Ms. Oh began working in October
6 2021, and initially, her practice focused on individual FEHA and wrongful termination claims, as well as
7 wage-and-hour class and representative actions. Since September 2022, Ms. Oh shifted her focus of practice
8 to almost exclusively class and representative actions, involving claims related to overtime and minimum
9 wages, meal and rest break violations, improper wage statements, the California Private Attorneys General
10 Act, and unfair business practices.

11 56. Ms. Oh received her Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of British
12 Columbia and her Juris Doctorate from California Western School of Law. Ms. Oh is a member in good
13 standing with the California State Bar and in the United States District Court for the Central, Eastern, and
14 Northern Districts.

15 57. Ms. Oh's current billing rate is \$700 per hour, which is her usual hourly rate in wage and hour
16 litigations. Ms. Oh's litigation experience includes, but is not limited to:

- 17 (a) In March 2025, Ms. Oh prepared the briefing in a wage and hour class action,
18 *Barley, Jr., et al. v. Mac Acquisition, LLC*, San Joaquin Superior Court, Case No.
19 STK-CV-UOE-2019-0006202, which resulted in the court granting summary
20 judgment as to all claims in favor of the plaintiffs.
- 21 (b) In January 2024, Ms. Oh prepared the Motion for Class Certification in the matter
22 of *Barley, Jr., et al. v. Mac Acquisition, LLC*, San Joaquin Superior Court, Case
23 No. STK-CV-UOE-2019-0006202, which resulted in a certification order on all
24 causes of action on June 2024.
- 25 (c) In October 2024, Ms. Oh briefed, argued, and prevailed on an opposition to
26 demurrer in the matter of *Foulks v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California,*
27 *Inc.*, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 23STCV07285, where the
28

defendant sought to dismiss the case based on federal preemption under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

(d) In March 2023, Ms. Oh prepared and argued an opposition to motion to compel arbitration in the matter of *Pullin v. Emerald Valley Marketing, LLC*, Stanislaus Superior Court, Case No. CV-22-0051471, which resulted in the Court denying the defendant's motion in part, finding that the plaintiff's PAGA claims-both individual and representative-are not subject to arbitration.

58. Based on Ms. Oh's 5 years of experience, her Laffey Matrix rate with a 2.53% adjustment is \$640.81 per hour (\$625 Laffey Matrix rate + (2.53% x \$625). (See Ex. 6.) As compared to the Laffey Matrix rate and when considering her experience, Ms. Oh's billing rate of \$700 per hour for this matter is reasonable.

59. A selection of settled class and/or representative actions that have received preliminary and/or final settlement approval, the resolution of which Ms. Oh assisted during her tenure with Moon Law Group, PC, includes following: *Quijano et al. v. GXO Logistics Supply Chain, Inc., et al.* (22STCV01988) (\$3,000,000.00); *Hamilton, et al. v. Magic Mountain, LLC* (20CV366750) (\$3,000,000.00); *Birk v. Simpson Strong-Tie Company, Inc.* (22CV018199) (\$2,940,000.00); *Billings v. Wind Youth Services, Inc., et al.* (34-2022-00327068-CU-OE-GDS) (\$1,535,000.00); *Calderon v. Installed Building Products* (No. 37-2021-00035844-CU-OE-CTL) (\$1,500,000); *Martinez et al. v. Curative, LLC, et al.* (21STCV20778) (\$1,450,000.00); *Cha v. Center Point* (CIV2102081) (\$1,000,000.00); *Maciel v. Western Health Advantage* (34-2022-00329710-CU-OE-GDS) (\$1,000,000.00); *Alvarez v. Los Angeles Philharmonic Association* (22STCV21979) (\$970,000.00); *Almonte et al. v. Yosemite Meat Company, Inc., et al.* (STK-CV-UOE-2021-0000860) (\$850,000.00); *Alvarez v. Tropicana Manufacturing Company, Inc.* (23STCV06663) (\$845,000.00); *Pitt v. The Brigantine, Inc.* (37-2021-00035830-CU-OE-CTL) (\$760,000.00); *Hernandez v. Creating A Legacy, Inc.* (CVRI2105846) (\$709,551.46); *Mendoza et al. v. Masonite Corporation* (5:21-cv-00025-SSS-KK) (\$635,000.00); *Maul v. The Illumination Foundation* (30-2022-01241473-CU-OE-CXC) (\$550,000.00); *Archila v. Labornow Inc., et al.* (21STCV21816) (\$512,803.50); *Butts v. Golden West Packaging Group, LLC, et al.* (34-2021-00311468-CU-OE-GDS) (\$450,000.00 for 183 aggrieved employees); and *Hernandez v. Superior Electrical Advertising, Inc.* (20STCV48834) (\$395,000.00 for 235 class members).

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64. In line with the Settlement, my firm requests an award of attorneys' fees in an amount of one-third of the GSA (i.e., \$58,333.33), plus reimbursement for actual litigation costs in the amount of \$26,109.74. (See Settlement, ¶ C.2.a.)

65. The requested PAGA Counsel Fees Payment can be justified under either the common fund or lodestar method. However, we base the requested award on the common fund method. Nonetheless, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check the reasonableness of the award calculated under the common fund method.

66. The total current lodestar for Moon Law Group, PC is *not less than* the following:

Attorney	Rate	Hours	Lodestar
Kane Moon	\$950.00	17.2	\$16,340.00
Allen Feghali	\$900.00	24.4	\$21,960.00
Julie Sohyun Oh	\$700.00	41.8	\$29,260.00
	Total:	83.4	\$67,560.00

67. There are additional hours devoted to this litigation by the attorneys and legal assistants in my office that are not reflected in the foregoing lodestar, including additional attorney time that will be spent to obtain and monitor approval of the Settlement and requested awards, oversee the settlement administration process and distribution of funds, respond to inquiries, and communicate with Plaintiff regarding the case. I estimate that my office will commit *no less than* 10 hours, although likely more time, to these additional tasks, which are hours not included in the foregoing lodestar total. My office also bears the risk of taking whatever actions are necessary if Defendant fails to pay. At my \$950.00 hourly rate, these additional 10 hours results in a lodestar of **\$9,500.00**.

68. "California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets." (*Wershba v. Apple Comp., Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.) The Court "should defer to the winning lawyer's professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case." (*Moreno v. City of Sacramento* (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1112.) We can provide complete, detailed billing records in the event the Court requests them but would request the opportunity to redact attorney-client privileged

1 information and any other privileged information. As discussed below, application of a positive multiplier is
2 warranted—*but not requested*—in this case.

3 69. The lodestar method requires the Court to determine a “touchstone” or lodestar figure based on
4 a compilation of time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney. (*Graham v.*
5 *DaimlerChrysler Corp.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579.) Generally, hours are reasonable if they were “reasonably
6 expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in the same manner that an attorney traditionally is
7 compensated by a fee-paying client.” (*Hensley v. Eckerhart* (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 431.)

8 (a) Number of Hours Expended by My Office is Reasonable: As set forth in this declaration,
9 my office expended a significant amount of time litigating the case to achieve an excellent result on
10 behalf of the Aggrieved Employees. To date, my office has spent no less than **83.4 hours** litigating
11 this case. In the event the Court grants settlement approval, my office will spend additional time
12 related to this litigation, including to monitor administration of the settlement after approval,
13 committing no less, although likely more, than **10** hours to those additional tasks. The number of
14 hours that my office has and will devote to this case is reasonable. (*See, e.g., Ketchum III v. Moses*
15 (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133 [fee award should be fully compensatory and, “absent circumstances
16 rendering the award unjust, an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for *all* the
17 hours *reasonably spent*”] [emphasis in original]; *Serrano v. Unruh* (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 621, 624
18 [counsel are entitled to compensation for all hours reasonably expended]; *Hensley, supra*, 461 U.S.
19 at pp. 435–36; *Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co.* (9th Cir. 2000) 224 F.3d 1014, 1028; *Cabrales v. Cty.*
20 *of L.A.* (9th Cir. 1991) 935 F.2d 1050, 1052–53.) As discussed above, my office was required to
21 expend considerable time and resources to investigate, litigate, and successfully settle these claims
22 for the benefit of the Aggrieved Employees.

23 (b) The Attorneys’ Hourly Rates are Reasonable: “[T]he established standard when determining
24 a reasonable hourly rate is the ‘rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by
25 attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’” (*Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc.* (9th
26 Cir. 2008) 523 F.3d 973, 979 [quoting *Barjon v. Dalton* (9th Cir. 1997) 132 F.3d 496, 502].) This
27 rule applies even when, as here, the attorneys representing a named plaintiff perform the work on a
28 contingent fee basis. (*See, e.g., Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal., Inc.* (2006) 144

Cal.App.4th 785, 818; *Blanchard v. Bergeron* (1989) 489 U.S. 87, 96.) These hourly rates are reasonable in light of the significant experience, expertise, and skill my firm brought to this action. Rates are reasonable if they are “within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (*Children’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) The trial court may “find hourly rates reasonable based on evidence of other courts approving similar rates.” (*Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor Am.* (C.D. Cal. 2010) 796 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1172.) The attorneys at Moon Law Group, PC are experienced litigators who specialize in employment law, with a substantial wage-and-hour class action practice. The hourly rates of each attorney are also reasonable as compared to their respective Laffey Matrix rates as explained *supra*. Moreover, these rates are not opposed or challenged, and have been approved by other courts, as explained *supra*.

(c) Application of a Multiplier is Warranted (But Not Requested): Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. As the California Supreme Court has held, contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum III, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132–33; *see also Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S.* (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3d 997, 1008.) “A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133.) Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather, it is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services, which typically includes a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.) **Multipliers normally range from two to four or higher.** (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051, n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0–4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011, No. CIV–02–285–RAW) 2011 WL 4478766, *11 [citing a study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class

1 action cases” and finding that a multiplier of 1.22 would be “per se reasonable”].) Factors considered
2 in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally include: (1) the risks presented
3 by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the
4 skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the nature of the opposition; (4) the
5 preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; and (5) the result
6 obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the public. (*Serrano v. Ivy Baker Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.
7 3d 25, 48–49 [hereinafter “*Serrano III*”].) All these factors favor approval of a multiplier along the
8 lines of those approved in the cases above. To date, my office has incurred no less than **\$67,560.00**
9 in attorneys’ lodestar fees, anticipates incurring at least another \$9,500.00 in lodestar fees, and has
10 advanced **\$26,109.74** in actual litigation costs. Thus, after reimbursement of our out-of-pocket
11 expenses, the fee request of \$58,333.33 represents a **negative** multiplier of the lodestar fees incurred
12 to-date in prosecuting this case.

13 1) *Risks presented by the contingent nature of the case:* The major
14 consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature of the
15 award. (*Ketchum III, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132–33; *see also Fischel, supra*, 307 F.3d at
16 p. 1008.) In determining what multiplier to award, the probability of success must be
17 assessed *ex ante*, that is, as viewed from the outset of the case. (*See, e.g., Harman v.*
18 *Lyphomed, Inc.* (7th Cir. 1991) 945 F.2d 969, 976.) Further, the possibility of no recovery is
19 only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
20 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
21 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*See, e.g.,*
22 *Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132–1133, 1138.) My office’s outlay of time and money in this
23 case has been significant. In all, my office has spent *no less than* **83.4** hours to date
24 investigating, analyzing, researching, litigating, and negotiating a favorable resolution of this
25 case, in addition to *a minimum of* **10** hours that will be spent following final settlement
26 approval, including to monitor settlement administration and distribution of funds, and has
27 incurred \$16,109.74 in necessary litigation costs. Unsettled legal issues also presented risks
28 to the claims in this case. My office bore the substantial risk of an uncertain outcome in

1 agreeing to prosecute this PAGA action on a contingency fee basis, as well as the difficulties
2 and delay inherent in such litigation. There was the prospect of the enormous cost inherent
3 in PAGA representative action litigation, as well as extensive negotiations with a corporate
4 Defendant who vigorously opposed Plaintiff's claims and right to pursue her individual or
5 class action claims in state court. My office risked significant time and expense to ensure a
6 successful settlement. As detailed *supra*, the risks presented in this case were significant, and
7 Defendant's defenses posed serious risks to the success of this PAGA matter on the merits,
8 assuming we were first successful at proving the merits of Plaintiff's individual claims at
9 arbitration. These risks illustrate the recognition by the California Supreme Court in
10 *Ketchum III* that, if multipliers are not awarded to PAGA counsel in the cases that are
11 successfully settled, counsel's fees are essentially being cut because the lodestar in and of
12 itself would not account for contingent risk.

13 2) *Difficulty of the questions involved and the skill required:* My office is
14 comprised of skilled attorneys who have had success in wage-and-hour class and PAGA
15 actions. This case required experienced and competent lawyers, as well as expertise in the
16 issues presented herein. To obtain such an attorney on the free market, a client must pay the
17 market rate. While most class/PAGA actions are complex and involve some risk, my office
18 had to overcome several major obstacles in prosecuting this case, as explained *supra*.
19 Defendant's contentions underscore the risk of prevailing at trial, and any of these obstacles
20 could have prevented recovery completely.

21 3) *Vigorous opposition by Defendant:* Counsel who skillfully overcome
22 difficult issues or uncompromising opposition in the litigation are entitled to a fee
23 enhancement. (*Serrano III, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at 49.) Here, before eventually agreeing to a
24 settlement, Defendant asserted a vigorous defense and challenged Plaintiff's ability to
25 litigate her individual and class action claims, including the filing of a motion for judgment
26 on the pleadings and a demurrer. The settlement effort was protracted, with extended
27 discussions and instances in which it appeared the Parties would not reach a settlement.
28 Further, proceeding to arbitration, and if successful, then trial would have added years to the

1 resolution of this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the
2 likelihood of appeals. Indeed, even if Plaintiff prevailed on the representative PAGA claims
3 at trial, assuming he was first successful at arbitration, Defendant would likely have mounted
4 an appeal.

5 4) *The extent to which litigation precluded other employment would justify an*
6 *enhancement:* There are only so many cases that my office can take at any one time.
7 Consequently, there were other meritorious cases presented to my office that would have
8 generated substantial fees, but were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to
9 devote the attention necessary to achieve favorable results.

10 5) *The result obtained would justify an enhancement:* The results obtained in
11 litigation can properly be used to enhance a lodestar calculation where an exceptional effort
12 produced excellent results. (*Graham, supra*, 34 Cal.4th at p. 582.) Here, the final maximum
13 settlement figure is **\$175,000.00**, which represents roughly **33%** of the total realistic
14 recovery. Considered against the size of the Aggrieved Employees, the risks posed by
15 continued litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery,
16 the relief provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Aggrieved
17 Employees and LWDA.

18 6) *The use of a multiplier is permitted in PAGA actions:* PAGA provides that
19 “[a]ny employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable
20 attorney’s fees and costs.” (Lab. Code § 2699(k)(1).) Although, PAGA does not provide a
21 specific standard for evaluating attorneys’ fees in connection with a settlement of PAGA
22 claims, California Courts have employed a lodestar analysis and use of multipliers for this
23 purpose. “Where a settlement produces a common fund for the benefit of the entire class,
24 courts have discretion to employ either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery
25 method. . . . To guard against an unreasonable result, the Ninth Circuit encourages district
26 courts to “cross-check[] their calculations against a second method. . . . Accordingly, the
27 Court calculates attorneys’ fees in the instant case using the percentage-of-recovery method
28 and then cross-checks its calculations against the lodestar method.” (*Hermosillo v. Davey*

1 *Tree Surgery Co.* (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2021) No. 18-CV-00393-LHK, 2021 WL 2826697, at
2 *1 [quoting *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.* (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 935, 942,
3 944–45].)

4 70. I am informed and believe that the fees and costs provision under the Settlement is reasonable.
5 My office invested significant time and resources into the case, with payment deferred to the end of the case,
6 and then, of course, contingent on the outcome.

7 71. The risk to my office has been very significant, particularly if we would not be successful in
8 pursuing this representative action. In that case, we would have been left with no compensation for all the
9 time taken in litigating this case. Indeed, I have taken on a number of class and/or PAGA action cases that
10 have resulted in thousands of attorney hours being expended and ultimately having the defendant company
11 going bankrupt. The contingent risk in these types of cases is very real and occurs regularly. Furthermore, we
12 were precluded from focusing on, or taking on, other cases which could have resulted in a larger, and less
13 risky, monetary gain.

14 72. Because most individuals cannot afford to pay for legal representation on an hourly basis, Moon
15 Law Group, PC represents virtually all its employment law clients on a contingency fee basis, including
16 Plaintiff in this action. Pursuant to this arrangement, we are not compensated for our time unless we prevail
17 at trial or our clients' cases are successfully settled. Because Moon Law Group, PC is taking the risk that we
18 will not be reimbursed for our time unless our client settles or wins his or her case, we cannot afford to
19 represent an individual employee on a contingency basis if, at the end of our representation, all we are to
20 receive is our regular hourly rate for services. It is essential that we recover more than our regular hourly rate
21 when we win if we are to remain in practice so as to be able to continue representing other individuals in civil
22 rights employment disputes.

23 73. My office invested significant time and resources into the case, with payment deferred to the end
24 of the case, and then, of course, contingent on the outcome. My office's efforts have included, and will include
25 following an approval order, without limitation, the following:

- 26 a. Numerous interviews with Plaintiff and review of documents provided by him;
27 b. Legal research and investigation regarding the Defendant's practices at numerous points in
28 the litigation;

- c. Preparation and submission of Plaintiff's PAGA Notice;
- d. Preparation of multiple drafts of the original class action complaint and subsequent amended complaint, as well as finalization and filing of said complaints;
- e. Extensive meet-and-confer discussions with Defendant's counsel regarding the arbitration agreement and the impact on Plaintiff's class action claims;
- f. Informal discovery activity;
- g. Extensive meet-and-confer discussions with Defendant's counsel regarding mediator selection and production of relevant documents and information in preparation for mediation through informal discovery;
- h. Analysis of Defendant's informal discovery production and preparation of a damages model with the aid of a statistics expert;
- i. Contacting witnesses;
- j. Research and preparation of Plaintiff's mediation brief;
- k. Attendance and active participation at a full day of mediation;
- l. Drafting, negotiating, and reviewing multiple drafts of the Settlement and its attachment;
- m. Preparation and submission of the instant motion for settlement approval and accompanying filings;
- n. Anticipated preparation for and attendance at the hearing on the motion for approval, monitoring approval of the Settlement and requested awards, and overseeing the administration process and distribution of funds; and
- o. Communications with Plaintiff throughout the case.

74. As of the drafting of this motion, my office has incurred **\$26,109.74** in expenses litigating this action without any reimbursement. (Ex. 4.) These expenses were reasonably necessary to the litigation and were actually incurred by my office. These to-date expenses are summarized as follows:

- (a) "LWDA Fee": a one-time cost for submitting Plaintiff's PAGA Notice to the LWDA;
- (b) "Journal- Complaint": the initial case filing fee for initiating Plaintiff's action;
- (c) "Berger Consulting Group": costs of expert review of discovery for mediation;
- (d) "Tripper Ortman Mediator": a one-time cost for mediation services;

1 (e) “ACE,” “Case Anywhere,” “One Legal,” “LASC,” and “Journal”: costs for purchasing court
2 documents, and for filing and serving various documents during this Action.

3 75. We anticipate incurring additional costs up to and after Settlement approval, including filing
4 costs for the approval motion and any notice of entry of approval order and judgment. However, at this time,
5 we are only requesting reimbursement of our to-date costs (\$26,109.74). Moreover, because our costs are
6 below the maximum allocation (\$28,000.00) under the Settlement, the difference (\$28,000.00 - \$26,109.74
7 = \$1,890.26) will revert to PAGA Penalties. (Settlement, ¶ C.2.a.) I respectfully submit that our
8 reimbursement request is fair and reasonable.

9 76. Through the efforts of my office and Plaintiff in this case, a fair and reasonable resolution has
10 been reached that includes a non-reversionary payment by Defendant of at least \$175,000.00 to compensate
11 Aggrieved Employees for Defendant’s alleged employment practices. I am informed and believe that, without
12 the efforts of my office or Plaintiff, the Labor Code and Wage Order violations alleged in this action would
13 have gone completely unremedied.

14 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true
15 and correct. Executed on May 7, 2026, at Los Angeles, California.

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17 _____
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