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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

JOEL TABANCY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

FRESH DINING CONCEPTS, LLC; and
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23CV000661

Assigned for all purposes to:
Hon. Jill Talley
Dept. 23

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

Date: January 23, 2026
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: 23

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.769 (d) and (e), Plaintiffs Joel Tabancay and Andrew
3 Mangabat (“Plaintiffs”) request that the Court grant preliminary approval of a class action settlement of
4 wage and hour claims, including a claim under the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004,
5 codified at Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”), against Defendant Fresh Dining Concepts, LLC
6 (“Defendant”) (collectively, Plaintiffs and Defendant referred to as the “Parties”). The settlement
7 releases claims on behalf of all persons currently or formerly employed by Defendant as a non-exempt
8 employee in the State of California (individually, “Class Member,” collectively, the “Class”) from
9 January 1, 2022 through May 31, 2025 (the “Class Period”). The basic terms of the Class Action and
10 PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice (“Settlement Agreement” or “Settlement”)¹ provide for
11 the following:

- 12 (1) A non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of \$1,150,000.00 allocated to
13 approximately 594 Class Members on a pro rata basis according to the number of
14 weeks each Class Member worked during the Class Period;
- 15 (2) An award of up to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently
16 \$383,333.00) and up to \$30,000.00 in reimbursement of costs to Plaintiff’s Counsel
17 for services rendered as counsel on this matter;
- 18 (3) Service Payment of up to \$15,000.00 to each to each of the Plaintiffs;
- 19 (4) Settlement Administration fees and costs of up to \$7,950.00; and
- 20 (5) Allocation of \$100,000 for resolution of civil penalties under PAGA. Seventy-five
21 percent (75%) of this payment will be paid to the California Labor and Workforce
22 Development Agency (“LWDA Payment”), and twenty-five percent (25%) will be
23 paid to Class Members who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period (the
24 “Aggrieved Employees”).

25 _____

26 ¹ A true and correct copy of the fully-executed “Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and
27 Class Notice” is attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Declaration of Julia M. Toscano in Support of Plaintiff’s
28 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Toscano Decl.”), filed concurrently
herewith. Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms in this Motion will be used as such terms
are defined and used in the Settlement.

1 With each Class Member allocated an average recovery of approximately \$1,008.00 from the Net
2 Settlement Amount, the Settlement satisfies the criteria for preliminary approval and falls well within
3 the range of reasonableness given the risks and costs of continued litigation. The Settlement was reached
4 through informed, arms-length bargaining at and after mediation between experienced attorneys. As
5 such, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify
6 the Class for settlement purposes only, appoint Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives, appoint
7 Plaintiffs' Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator,
8 authorize the Settlement Administrator to send notice of the Settlement, and set a final approval hearing
9 date.

10 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

11 On April 27, 2023, Plaintiff Tabancay filed a putative class action on behalf of Defendant's non-
12 exempt employees alleging the following causes of action: (1) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; (2) Failure
13 to Pay Overtime Wages; (3) Failure to Provide Meal Periods; (4) Failure to Permit Rest Breaks; (5) Failure
14 to Reimburse Business Expenses; (6) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; (7) Failure
15 to Pay Wages Timely During Employment; (8) Failure to Pay All Wages Due Upon Separation of
16 Employment; and (9) Violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.* Toscano Decl., ¶ 3.
17 On April 27, 2023, Plaintiff's counsel provided written notice to the LWDA and Defendant regarding
18 Defendant's alleged Labor Code violations, as required by Labor Code section 2699.3(a). *Id.*, Ex. 2. The
19 LWDA did not respond to this notice, indicating it did not intend to investigate, thus allowing Plaintiff to
20 bring a PAGA claim against Defendant. *Id.* On June 28, 2023, Plaintiff provided amended written notice
21 to the LWDA and Defendant adding a second claimant, Andrew Mangabat. *Id.* On September 8, 2023,
22 Plaintiff filed a First Amended the Complaint adding a PAGA claim. *Id.* On February 14, 2024, Plaintiff
23 filed a Second Amended Complaint, curing items sustained in Defendant's Demurrer. *Id.*

24 Plaintiffs proceeded with formal discovery, propounding their first set of written discovery,
25 seeking, *inter alia*, their personnel files, policy documents, class members' contact information, and class
26 members' timekeeping and pay records. *Id.* at ¶ 4. After partially completing formal discovery, engaging
27 in numerous meet and confer discussions, and involving the Court in multiple Informal Discovery
28 Conferences, the Parties agreed to attend a private mediation session. *Id.* Ultimately, through formal and

1 informal discovery conducted in advance of mediation, Defendant produced a significant number of
2 documents and information, including Plaintiffs’ personnel files, policy documents, and a sample of class
3 members’ timekeeping and pay records. *Id.*

4 On May 1, 2025, the Parties attended a mediation session with Jill R. Sperber, a respected mediator.
5 *Id.* at ¶ 5. The Parties did not reach a settlement the day of mediation; however, they continued negotiating
6 in the following weeks, with the assistance of the mediator, until mutually accepting a mediator’s proposal.
7 *Id.* The Parties spent the next several months negotiating the terms of the Settlement. *Id.* The Parties
8 finalized the Settlement in September of 2025. *Id.* The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm’s
9 length and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients. *Id.*

10 On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff submitted the Settlement to the LWDA pursuant to Labor Code
11 section 2699(1)(2). *Id.* at ¶ 6, Ex. 3.

12 **III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT**

13 **A. Terms of Settlement**

14 Plaintiffs and Defendant agreed to settle the class claims in exchange for a Gross Settlement
15 Amount of \$1,150,000.00. Settlement Agreement, § 3.1. The Gross Settlement Amount will be used to
16 make payments for the following: (1) Individual Settlement Payments to Participating Class Members;
17 (2) attorneys’ fees to Class Counsel of up to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount; (3)
18 reimbursement of Class Counsel’s litigation costs of up to \$30,000.00; (4) Service Payments to Plaintiffs
19 of up to \$15,000 each; (5) Settlement Administration fees and costs of \$7,950.00; and (6) a payment to
20 the LWDA of \$75,000 pursuant to PAGA. *Id.* at § 3.2.1 – 3.2.5.

21 Class Members do not need to submit a claim form to participate in the Settlement. Settlement
22 Agreement, § 3.1. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will fully fund the Gross
23 Settlement Amount within 30 days of the “Effective Date,” the date by when both of the following have
24 occurred: (a) the Court enters a Judgment on its Order Granting Final Approval of the Settlement; and
25 (b) the Judgment is final. *Id.* at §§ 4.3, 1.18. Class Members’ Individual Settlement Payments will be
26 distributed within 14 days after Defendant fully funds the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.* at § 4.4.
27 Individual Settlement Payments will be calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the
28 total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b)

1 multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member's Workweeks. *Id.* at § 3.2.4. The Settlement
2 Administrator will calculate the actual estimated recovery to include in the Class Notice and provide
3 the estimated low and high range of possible recovery at final approval. *Id.* at § 7.4.2; Settlement
4 Agreement, Ex. A (Notice of Class Action Settlement). The Notice of Class Action Settlement will be
5 provided in English. *See* Settlement Agreement, § 1.11.

6 The Individual Settlement Payments to Class Members will be allocated for tax purposes as
7 follows: 20% to wages; 80% to penalties and interest. Settlement Agreement, § 3.2.4.1. The employer-
8 side payroll taxes on the portion allocated to wages will be paid by Defendant separately from, and in
9 addition to the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.* at § 4.2. No portion of the Gross Settlement Amount will
10 revert to Defendant. *Id.* at § 3.1. Funds from uncashed or undeliverable checks will be tendered by the
11 Settlement Administrator to the California State Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the
12 Class Member for whom the funds are designated. *Id.* at § 4.4.3.

13 **B. Proposed Opt-Out and Objection Process**

14 Once the Court grants preliminary approval, Defendant will have fifteen court days to deliver the
15 Class Data to the Settlement Administrator. Settlement Agreement, § 4.2. The Settlement Administrator
16 will then have fourteen days to send Class Members the Notice of Class Action Settlement ("Class
17 Notice") by first-class mail after checking for updated addresses through the National Change of Address
18 database. *Id.* at §§ 4.3.1, 7.4.2. The Class Notice provides information regarding the nature of the
19 lawsuit, a summary of the substance of the settlement terms, the formula for calculating Individual
20 Settlement Payments, the individual's estimated payout, a statement that Class Members who take no
21 action will release their claims and receive settlement checks, instructions regarding how to dispute the
22 calculations, instructions regarding how to request exclusion or object to the Settlement, the date for the
23 final approval hearing, the amounts sought for attorneys' fees and costs, the Settlement Administration
24 Costs, the Class Representative's Service Payment, and the PAGA allocation. *See* Settlement
25 Agreement, Ex. A (Class Notice).

26 The Class Notice provides instructions for Class Members who choose to exclude themselves
27 from the Settlement. *See* Settlement Agreement § 7.5.1. To opt out, Class Members are instructed to
28 submit a Request for Exclusion to the Settlement Administrator by a specified date (60 days after the date

1 of mailing of the Class Notice). *See* Settlement Agreement, Ex. A (Class Notice), pp. 1, 6. Class Members
2 do not need to submit a claim form to participate in the Settlement. *Id.* at p. 2. Class Members are
3 informed of how they can object to the Settlement, and the Class Notice informs Class Members of the
4 date, time, and location of the final fairness and approval hearing so that they can appear in person. *Id.* at
5 pp. 2, 8. The Class Notice also informs Class Members to check the Administrator's website or contact
6 Class Counsel to verify the date and time of the Final Approval Hearing. *Id.* at p. 8. Accordingly, the
7 content of the Class Notice complies with the requirements of California Rules of Court Rule 3.766(d).

8 If Class Notice packets are returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will perform a
9 skip-trace or other search, and re-mail the Class Notice with an extended deadline, to opt out or object, of
10 14 days from the date of the original deadline. Settlement Agreement, § 7.4.4. The initial 60-day notice
11 period and extension process ensures the notice program provides due process by giving Class Members
12 enough time to determine whether they want to participate in the Settlement. This means of notice is
13 reasonably calculated to apprise Class Members of the pendency of the action. *See* California Rules of
14 Court Rule 3.766 (d)-(f).

15 **C. Proposed Release**

16 The release to be given by Class Members is limited to Defendant and each of its former and
17 present directors, officers, shareholders, owners, members, attorneys, insurers, predecessors, successors,
18 assigns, subsidiaries, and affiliates (the “Released Parties”). Settlement Agreement, § 1.41. Under the
19 proposed release, Class Members who do not exclude themselves from the Settlement will be deemed
20 to have released the following:

21 all claims arising during the Class Period that were alleged, or reasonably could
22 have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint including
23 claims for unpaid minimum and overtime wages (including, *inter alia*, in
24 connection with off-the-clock work and improper rounding of time), claims related
25 to non-compliant meal and rest breaks or periods and nonpayment of premium pay
26 for such, failure to comply with itemized employee wage statement provisions,
27 failure to pay wages due at separation and associated waiting time penalties, failure
28 to timely pay wages during employment, failure to maintain compliant time and
payroll records, the failure to reimburse for business expenses, and unfair or
unlawful business practices pursuant to California Business and Professions Code
§ 17200, et seq. based on the aforementioned. The Released Class Claims
specifically include all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been
alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint, arising under
California Labor Code sections 201,202,203,204, 210,226,226.7, 510,512,558,

1174, 1174.5, 1182.12, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, 2802, 2698, *et seq.* California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 5-2001 §§3-4, 11-12, California Business and Profession Code sections 17200, *et seq.*, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, California common law of contract and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") in relation to interest and claims for attorney's fees relating in any way to those claims alleged and mentioned in the Operative Complaint in the Action.

Id at § 5.2.

Aggrieved Employees will release the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties arising during the PAGA Period that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint, and the PAGA Notice., regardless of whether the Aggrieved Employee opts out of the Class portion of the Settlement. *Id.* at § 5.3.

Only Plaintiff will agree to a general release of any and all claims, whether known or unknown, which exist or may exist on Plaintiff's behalf as of the date of the Settlement, and a waiver of Civil Code section 1542. Settlement Agreement, § 5.1. – 5.1.1.

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

A. Provisional Certification of the Class is Appropriate

Class certification is appropriate when there exists (1) an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, (2) a well-defined community of interest among class members, and (3) when certification would be a fair and efficient means of adjudicating the action, rendering class litigation superior to alternative means. *See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021 (2012).

1. The Proposed Class is Numerous and Ascertainable

Whether a class is "ascertainable" is "determined by examining (1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying class members." *Reyes v. Bd. of Supervisors*, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1271 (1987). Here, the Class consists of all current and former non-exempt employees who are or were employed by Defendant in California at any time from January 1, 2022 through May 31, 2025. Settlement Agreement, §§ 1.5, 1.12. Defendant's records show the Class consists of approximately 594 individuals, making joinder of all Class Members impracticable. Toscano Decl., ¶ 7. Further, the Class is readily ascertainable from Defendant's business records because all Class Members are current or former employees of Defendant. *Id.*

///

2. A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists Among Class Members

“[T]he ‘community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.’” *Fireside Bank v. Superior Court*, 40 Cal. 4th 1069, 1089 (2007) (quoting *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.*, 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470 (1981)).

a. Common Questions Predominate

To assess whether common questions predominate, courts focus on whether the theories of recovery advanced are likely to prove amenable to class treatment. *See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 327 (2004). In other words, courts determine whether the elements necessary to establish liability are susceptible of common proof, even if the class members must individually prove their damages. *Brinker, supra*, 53 Cal. 4th at 1021-1022, 1024.

Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant maintained uniform employment policies and/or practices that illegally deprived Class Members of lawful wages, meal periods, rest breaks, accurate wage statements, and waiting time pay. Toscano Decl., ¶ 8. Plaintiffs’ allegations present common legal and factual questions of, *inter alia*, whether Defendant applied the same scheduling, timekeeping, minimum and overtime pay, meal period, and rest break policies to all Class Members; whether these policies and practices resulted in Labor Code violations; whether Defendant’s conduct was intentional; and whether Class Members are entitled to penalties. *Id.* These common questions could be resolved using Class Members’ schedules, time punches, and payroll records, Defendant’s corporate representative’s testimony, written communications between Defendant and Class Members, and Class Member declarations. *Id.* Thus, the Court can and should exercise its discretion to grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes.

b. Plaintiff’s Claims are Typical of the Class Claims

The typicality requirement is satisfied when the legal theories and facts supporting Plaintiff’s claims are substantially similar to other class members. *See Classen v. Weller*, 145 Cal. App. 3d 27, 46 (1983). Here, Plaintiffs allege that they and other Class Members were employed by Defendant and injured by Defendant’s common wage and hour policies and practices, including Defendant’s scheduling, timekeeping, minimum wage pay, overtime pay, meal period, and rest break practices and

1 policies. Toscano Decl., ¶ 9. Through documents and information exchanged in discovery, including
2 production of thousands of pages of documents by Defendant, Plaintiffs confirmed that these common
3 policies and practices similarly affected Plaintiffs and the Class. *Id.* Thus, Plaintiffs' claims arise from
4 the same employment practices and are based on the same legal theories as those applicable to other
5 Class Members, as further explained in Plaintiff's exposure analysis below.

6 c. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Interests of
7 the Proposed Class

8 Certification requires adequacy of both the proposed class representative(s) and proposed class
9 counsel. With respect to the class representative, a plaintiff must adequately represent and protect the
10 interests of other members of the class and demonstrate that his or her claim is not inconsistent with the
11 claims of other members of the class. *See Capitol People First v. State Dep't of Developmental Servs.*,
12 155 Cal. App. 4th 676, 696-697 (2007). Here, Plaintiffs' interests are coextensive with the interests of
13 the Class. Plaintiffs demonstrated an ability to advocate for the interests of the Class by litigating this
14 action, gathering documents and information, responding to written discovery, being available on the
15 day of mediation to answer questions, meeting with his attorneys on several occasions to understand the
16 claims and theories of liability at issue, assisting attorneys in preparing for mediation, reviewing the
17 proposed settlement agreement to understand its legal effect, and obtaining a fair settlement on behalf
18 of Class Members who stand to recover a substantial amount under the Settlement. Toscano Decl., ¶ 20.

19 Likewise, Aegis Law Firm, PC has expended considerable time and effort on this case and will
20 continue to do so through final approval. *See generally*, Toscano Decl. Accordingly, Plaintiff should be
21 appointed Class Representative, and Plaintiff's Counsel should be appointed Class Counsel.

22 **3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multitude of Individual Lawsuits**

23 Class treatment is superior to other methods of adjudication when the probability is small that
24 each class member will come forward to prove his or her claim and when the class approach would deter
25 and redress the alleged wrongdoing. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435, 446 (2000);
26 *Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1537-1538 (2008). Here, none of the other
27 approximately 594 Class Members had shown any interest in bearing the expense and burden of
28 litigating their own claims. Toscano Decl. ¶ 20. Thus, a class action is the superior method for seeking

1 relief.

2 **B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval**

3 Preliminary approval is warranted if the settlement falls within a “reasonable range.” *See North*
4 *County Contractor’s Ass’n., Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Servs.*, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1089-90 (1994);
5 Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions*, § 11.26 (4th ed. 2002). In reviewing the fairness of a
6 class action settlement, due regard should be given to what is “otherwise a private consensual
7 agreement between the parties.” *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1389
8 (2010). The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the
9 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,
10 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.*

11 Reasonableness and fairness are presumed where (1) the settlement is reached through “arms-
12 length bargaining”; (2) investigation and discovery are “sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
13 intelligently”; (3) counsel is “experienced in similar litigation”; and (4) the percentage of objectors “is
14 small.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1802 (1996). The Settlement satisfies the first
15 three factors. Plaintiff will analyze the fourth factor at the final approval stage.

16 **1. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness**

17 *a. The Settlement is the Result of Arm’s-Length Negotiations*

18 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
19 evidence to the contrary is offered. Thus, there is a presumption that settlement negotiations are
20 conducted in good faith. Here, the Settlement was the product of product of a full-day mediation session
21 with a respected mediator following extensive investigation and discovery. Toscano Decl. ¶¶ 4 - 5. The
22 negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm’s length and tempered by the efforts of both sides to
23 serve the interests of their clients. *Id.* The amount of Plaintiffs’ requested Service Awards was not
24 negotiated until after the Parties agreed to the Gross Settlement Amount and many other terms. *Id.* at ¶
25 20.

26 *b. Plaintiff’s Counsel Conducted Sufficient Investigation and Discovery*

27 Plaintiffs’ Counsel thoroughly investigated the class claims, applicable law, and potential
28 defenses. *See generally*, Toscano Decl. Plaintiffs’ Counsel assessed the value of the class claims using

1 Defendant's data and documents produced through discovery. Toscano Decl., ¶ 9. Plaintiff's counsel
2 extensively reviewed policy documents and Class Members' time and pay records to perform a thorough
3 analysis. *Id.* Further, Plaintiffs' Counsel engaged an expert to quantify the potential exposure using the
4 time and payroll records, and then assessed the risks associated with each of the claims meriting
5 reductions in the likely recovery at trial. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel fully understood the
6 strengths and weaknesses of the claims before the Parties reached a settlement. *Id.*

7 *c. Plaintiffs' Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation*

8 Plaintiffs are represented by Aegis Law Firm, PC ("Class Counsel"). Class Counsel prosecute
9 wage and hour class actions on behalf of employees and others who have had their rights violated.
10 Toscano Decl. ¶¶ 23 - 35. The attorneys working on this case have been appointed class counsel in many
11 cases, through both contested motions and settlement approval motions. *Id.* Thus, Plaintiff's Counsel
12 has extensive experience in similar litigation and should be appointed as Class Counsel.

13 **2. The Settlement is Reasonable Given the Strengths of Plaintiff's Claims and**
14 **the Risks and Expense of Litigation**

15 Courts have discretion to approve class settlements by assessing several factors, including the
16 "strength of plaintiffs' case, risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation and risk
17 of maintaining the class action through trial." *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.*, 186 Cal.
18 App. 4th 399, 407 (2010); *see Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 129 (2008).

19 While Plaintiffs and their counsel believed and continue to believe this is a strong case for
20 certification, the significant risks and expenses associated with class certification and liability
21 proceedings were considered. Toscano Decl., ¶ 11. To determine if the amount offered at mediation was
22 reasonable, Plaintiffs' Counsel weighed that figure against many risk factors. If Plaintiffs continued to
23 prosecute the claims rather than accept a settlement, Plaintiffs would need to prepare and file a motion
24 for class certification, engage in further formal written discovery, take depositions, expend time and
25 resources to resolve disputes, prepare and file potentially dispositive motions and/or discovery motions,
26 and engage in extensive trial preparation. An adverse ruling at any one of these stages could have
27 prevented the Class from obtaining any recovery. *Id.* at ¶ 12.

28 ///

1 a. Exposure Analysis

2 A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered a fair and
3 reasonable settlement. *See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Rather,
4 compromise is expected:

5 Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if “the relief
6 afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits
7 were to be successfully litigated,” this is no bar to a class settlement because “the public
interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground
in the interest of avoiding litigation.”

8 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 250 (2001) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs
9 contend that their claims are based on Defendant’s common, class-wide policies and procedures, and
10 that liability could be determined on a class-wide basis without dependence on individual assessments
11 of liability. Toscano Decl., ¶ 10. Although the amount of Defendant’s potential exposure – if proven –
12 is substantial, the legitimate and serious risks of succeeding at class certification and trial compelled a
13 serious consideration of the benefit of a settlement. *Id.* at ¶ 12.

14 Minimum Wage and Overtime Claims: Plaintiffs’ minimum wage and overtime claims were
15 premised on the theories that (1) Defendant failed to compensate class members for all time worked by
16 requiring them to finish pre- and post-shift duties before they were allowed to clock in or out and (2)
17 Defendant failed to pay class members for rest breaks, instead deducting recorded rest break time from
18 their wages. Assuming unpaid wages of ten minutes per shift, and 1.5 hours per week, plus unpaid rest
19 break hours, Plaintiffs’ expert calculated a maximum exposure of \$1,618,522.00, including interest, for
20 unpaid wages. However, Defendant argued that it maintained policies of paying for all recorded work
21 and that there was no evidence that it required class members to work before or after clocking in.
22 Defendant also argued that the pre- and post-shift duties Plaintiffs allegedly performed were unique to
23 their positions and not performed by other class members. As such, this claim could become highly
24 individualized and difficult to certify. As such, Plaintiffs assumed there was a 30% chance of success
25 at class certification and 20% chance of success on the merits at trial, rendering the claim worth
26 approximately \$323,704.40. Toscano Decl., ¶ 13.

27 Unpaid Overtime, Meal Break Premium, and Sick Pay Wages: Plaintiffs’ unpaid wages claim
28 was also based on the theory that Defendant failed to properly calculate the overtime, meal premium,

1 and sick pay rates to include nondiscretionary bonuses and the cost of regularly provided meals.
2 Plaintiffs calculated that this claim was worth approximately \$75,858.00. However, Defendant provided
3 evidence that the non-discretionary bonuses affected only some class members, and a small percentage
4 of workweeks; while the meals provided each shift fell under an FLSA exception allowing Defendant
5 to exclude them from the regular rate. Without showing Defendant's common failure to adjust the
6 regular rate of pay for all class members, and the potential exclusion of the free meals from the regular
7 rate, this claim could be difficult to certify. As such, Plaintiffs assumed there was a 50% chance of
8 success at class certification and 40% chance of success on the merits at trial, rendering the claim worth
9 approximately \$30,343.20. Toscano Decl., ¶ 14.

10 Meal Period Claims: Plaintiffs' meal period claim was potentially worth about \$326,630.00
11 considering the violations shown in the records. However, Defendant argued that it maintained
12 compliant written policies and that employees could waive their meal periods. Thus, Plaintiffs
13 discounted this claim for the risk that the damages could at least be reduced, and that the claim would
14 be hard to certify with a compliant policy. As such, Plaintiffs' counsel believed there was a 60% chance
15 succeeding at class certification and a 40% chance at trial, resulting in a value of \$129,452.00. Toscano
16 Decl., ¶ 15.

17 Rest Break Claim: Defendant maintained a policy of requiring class members to record rest break
18 time; therefore, Plaintiffs' rest break claim was potentially worth about \$1,951,509.00 considering the
19 violations shown in the records. Additionally, Defendant maintained a policy that required class
20 members to prioritize customers over the timing of their rest breaks. Defendant, on the other hand,
21 argued that most violations occurred in shifts greater than 10 hours, which affected a smaller percentage
22 of workweeks, and class members had adequate coverage to take timely rest breaks. As such, Plaintiffs'
23 counsel believed there was a 30% chance succeeding at class certification and a 20% chance at trial,
24 resulting in a value of \$390,301.80. Toscano Decl., ¶ 16.

25 Waiting Time and Wage Statement Penalties: Plaintiffs' Counsel also considered the arguable
26 presence of various derivative penalties, and weighed the potential recoveries against probable defenses.
27 Specifically, Defendant could argue that Plaintiffs could not prove the "willful" prong needed to obtain
28 waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203. Additionally, Defendant could argue that Plaintiffs

could not show that Class Members suffered an “injury” as a result of wage statement violations, as required by Labor Code § 226, or that the wage statements correctly reflected the wages paid and owed. Moreover, Plaintiffs would not recover any of these derivative penalties if she failed to prove the underlying claims. Although the Class arguably could have seen a payout of approximately \$1,782,626.00 for waiting time penalties and \$1,200,300.00 for wage statement penalties, Plaintiffs would not recover any of these derivative penalties if he failed to prove the underlying claims. Thus, Plaintiffs discounted these claims assuming a 30% chance of class certification and 20% chance at the merits for both claims, resulting in a realistic value of \$356,531.00 for the waiting time claim and \$240,060.00 for the wage statement claim. Toscano Decl. ¶ 17.

PAGA Claim: The PAGA claim presented even higher hurdles. Although Plaintiffs’ Counsel found Defendant’s exposure could potentially reach approximately \$6,982,300.00, including interest, under Lab. Code § 2699(f), assuming the initial penalty rate of \$100 for each pay period, Plaintiffs would have to prove a violation in every pay period. Most importantly, the Court would have discretion to reduce the PAGA award based on whether the amount of the award would be “unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2). In theory, the Court could reduce the award by 99% if it so wished. Plaintiffs were doubtful he could recover any PAGA penalties, especially if a large class judgment was entered for the same violations. Accordingly, Plaintiffs could not place a high value on the PAGA penalties, and therefore allocated \$100,000 of the Gross Settlement Amount to settle these claims. Toscano Decl. ¶ 18.

C. The Requested Service Award for Plaintiff

Plaintiffs seek a Service Award of up to \$15,000 each for accepting the responsibilities of representing the interests of the Class and assuming risks and potential costs that were not borne by any other Class Members. A named plaintiff is eligible for payment that reasonably compensates him or her for undertaking and fulfilling a fiduciary duty to represent absent class members. *See Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, supra*, 186 Cal. App. 4th at 1393; *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 726 (2004).

Here, Plaintiffs had the option to pursue their claims individually, but instead chose to pursue this class action, delaying individual recovery until approval of a class action settlement. Toscano Decl., ¶

1 19. Throughout the case, Plaintiffs assisted counsel in gathering the evidence necessary to prosecute the
2 class claims, helped respond to written discovery, maintained regular contact with counsel, were
3 available on the day of mediation and communicated with his attorneys during the day of mediation to
4 answer critical questions, and reviewed the Settlement to make sure it was fair to the Class. *Id.* No action
5 would likely have been taken by Class Members individually, and no compensation would have been
6 recovered for them, but for Plaintiff's services on behalf of the Class. *Id.*

7 By actively pursuing this action, Plaintiffs furthered the California public policy goal of enforcing
8 the State's wage and hour laws. *See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc., supra*, 34 Cal. 4th at 340. The requested
9 Service Awards for Plaintiffs' service as the class representatives and for a general release of all
10 employment claims is reasonable and should be preliminarily approved. Plaintiffs support their requests
11 for their Service Awards with declarations that address the factors for the awards and can address them
12 further with additional declarations at the final approval stage if necessary. *Toscano Decl.*, ¶ 21; *see*
13 *Declaration of Plaintiff Joel Tabancay*; *see Declaration of Plaintiff Andrew Mangabat.*

14 **D. The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs**

15 The purpose of an attorneys' fee award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who invested
16 in a case despite the risk of non-payment and achieved a substantial positive result for the class.
17 Attorneys' fees are awarded as a matter of equity. California courts routinely award attorneys' fees
18 equaling one-third or more of the potential value of the common fund. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162
19 Cal. App. 4th 43, 66, n.11 (2008) ("Empirical studies show that, regardless of whether the percentage
20 method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the
21 recovery").

22 Plaintiffs seek appointment of Aegis Law Firm, PC as Class Counsel. The attorneys performed
23 significant work and expended litigation costs in prosecuting the matter with no guarantee of any
24 payment. *Toscano Decl.*, ¶ 35. Plaintiffs' Counsel seeks preliminary approval for \$383,333.00 in
25 attorneys' fees, which is up to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount, and up to \$30,000.00 in
26 reimbursement of litigation costs. Given the work performed in this matter, the extensive information
27 exchange, and substantial recovery obtained on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiffs' Counsel
28 achieved a settlement through efficient and diligent work. *See generally*, *Toscano Decl.* At final

1 approval, Plaintiffs' Counsel will fully brief the merits of its request for the award of attorneys' fees
2 and litigation costs. *Id.* at ¶ 36.

3 **V. CONCLUSION**

4 The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable Settlement of the class claims in light of the
5 risks present in this case. Plaintiffs have appropriately presented the materials and information necessary
6 for preliminary approval, and therefore, respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the
7 Settlement and schedule a date to conduct the final approval hearing.

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9 Dated: December 19, 2025

AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC

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11 By: /s/ Julia M. Toscano
12 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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