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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - HALL OF JUSTICE**

STEPHEN BARRIER, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

COASTAL TREE CARE, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 37-2023-00017971-CU-OE-CTL
Assigned to Judge Judy S. Bae, Dept. C-62

Complaint filed: April 28, 2023
FAC filed: September 6, 2023
Trial date: Not set

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: October 23, 2026
Time: 9:10 a.m.
Dept: C-62

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 23, 2026 at 9:10 a.m., in Department 22 of the
3 Sacramento County Superior Court, located at 720 9th St, Sacramento, CA 95814, pursuant to
4 Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiff Stephen
5 Barrier (“Plaintiff” or “Class Representative”) will move the Court for an Order granting
6 preliminary approval of the proposed \$110,000.00 (the “Gross Settlement Amount”) Stipulation
7 for Class Action Settlement (the “Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) between Plaintiff and
8 Defendant Coastal Tree Care, Inc. (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”) to
9 resolve the wage and hour class action and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab.
10 Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action between Plaintiff, on behalf of the Class (defined
11 below), and Defendant (the “Action”). Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:

- 12 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement;
- 13 2. Certifying the Class, defined as “all current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt
14 employees employed directly by Defendant who worked for Defendant in the State of
15 California at any time during the Class Period” for settlement purposes. The Class
16 Period is the period from November 1, 2018 through October 15, 2024 (the “Class
17 Period”);
- 18 3. Approving the proposed class notice (the “Class Notice”) and the plan for distribution
19 of the Class Notice. A true and correct copy of the Class Notice is attached to the
20 Settlement Agreement as **Exhibit A**;
- 21 4. Appointing Plaintiff Stephen Barrier as Class Representative for settlement purposes;
- 22 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Benjamin H. Haber, Daniel J. Kramer, Alan Wilcox,
23 Lucy Ngyuen, and Conor Gomez of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC (“WLF”) as “Class
24 Counsel” for settlement purposes;
- 25 6. Appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as the “Settlement Administrator”; and
- 26 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.


27 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
28

1 authorities, the Declarations of Conor J.D. Gomez (the “Class Counsel Declaration”) and Stephen
2 Barrier, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in the Action, and any other further
3 evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

4
5
6 Dated: March 19, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

7 By: 

8 Benjamin H. Haber

Daniel J. Kramer

9 Alan Wilcox

Lucy Nguyen

10 Conor Gomez

11 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION.....	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	v
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.....	1
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT.....	1
A. Plaintiff’s Claims	1
B. Discovery and Investigation.....	2
C. Settlement Negotiations	2
D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement.....	3
III. DISCUSSION	7
A. A Presumption of Fairness Exists Over The Settlement.....	7
1. The Settlement Is the Product of Arm’s-Length Negotiations.....	7
2. The Parties Conducted Sufficient Investigation.....	8
3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation.....	8
4. The Percentage of Objectors Is Small.....	8
B. The Settlement Is Fair, Just, Reasonable, and Adequate	9
1. Plaintiff’s Strengths and Risks of Continued Litigation	9
2. The Gross Settlement Amount Is Reasonable.....	10
C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable	11
1. Class Counsel Request an Award of the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Based on the “Common Fund” Method.....	11
2. The Requested Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are in Line with Typical Cases.....	12
3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code	12
4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.....	13
D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable.....	14

1	E. The Enhancement Payment Is Reasonable	14
2	IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED	16
3	A. Legal Standard	16
4	B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for	
5	Settlement Purposes.	17
6	1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous.....	17
7	2. There is a Well-Defined Community of Interest in the Questions of Law and	
8	Fact.....	18
9	3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.....	20
10	V. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND	21
11	A. The Proposed Class Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process.....	21
12	B. The Class Notice is Accurate and Informative	21
13	C. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved	21
14	VI. CONCLUSION	22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES

<i>ABM Industries Overtime Cases</i> , (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 277, 303.).....	17, 18
<i>Bowles v. Super. Ct.</i> (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574	18
<i>Cartt v. Super Ct</i> (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960.....	21
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43	12
<i>City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet</i> (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105	11
<i>Classen v. Weller</i> (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27	19
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605	19
<i>Collins v. Rocha</i> (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232	18
<i>D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners</i> (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1	11
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co</i> , (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794	7
<i>Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc.</i> (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220	17
<i>Gentry v. Super. Ct.</i> (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443	15
<i>In re Tobacco II Cases</i> , (2009) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 313	16
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116	9, 10
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.</i> (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480.....	11
<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429	17
<i>Mallick v. Super. Ct.</i> (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434	7
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442	20
<i>Miller v. Woods</i> (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 862	20
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399	10, 14
<i>Quinn v. State of California</i> (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162.....	11
<i>Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.</i> (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462.....	16, 17, 18
<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i> (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926	18
<i>Serrano v. Priest</i> (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25.....	11

1	<i>Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.</i> (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231	9
2	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.</i> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224.....	10
3	<u>FEDERAL CASES</u>	
4	<i>Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.</i> (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174	15
5	<i>Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.</i> (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575	14
6	<i>Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.</i> (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133	14
7		
8	<i>Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.</i> (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942	14
9	<i>Leyva v. Medline Ind.</i> (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510	20
10	<i>McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp.</i> (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124	14
11	<i>Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.</i> (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845	15
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16	<i>Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company</i> (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294.....	12
17	<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.</i> (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759	11
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19		
20		

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff seeks preliminary approval of a proposed Settlement Agreement entered into
4 between Plaintiff (on behalf of the Class) and Defendant. The Settlement Agreement will provide
5 substantial monetary payments to approximately 54 Class Members. And, as set forth more fully
6 below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.
7 The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The
8 negotiations were at arms-length and after extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the
9 strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached the
10 Settlement on December 26, 2025. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily
11 approve the proposed Settlement, certify the Class, approve the proposed Class Notice, and set a
12 final approval hearing.

13 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

14 **A. Plaintiff's Claims**

15 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
16 resulted in Labor Code violations. (Class Counsel Decl., at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
17 failed to pay for all hours worked. (*Id.*) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide
18 employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse
19 business expenses. (*Id.*)

20 Based on these allegations, on April 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour
21 class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time
22 wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor
23 Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512);
24 (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code § 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay
25 final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized
26 wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures
27 (Labor Code § 2802); and (8) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code §§
28 17200, *et seq.*). (Class Counsel Decl., at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the

1 California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour
2 violations pursuant to the PAGA on May 12, 2023. (*Id.*) On September 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed
3 a first amended complaint adding a cause of action for Civil Penalties Under the Private
4 Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code § 2699 et seq. in the Action, which alleged the PAGA
5 claim against Defendant. (*Id.*)

6 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

7 Following the filing of the Action, the Parties exchanged information, data, and
8 documents, and review before going to mediation. (Class Counsel Decl., at ¶ 5.) Defendant
9 produced a sample of time and pay records for Class Members. (*Id.*) Defendant also provided
10 documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the Class Period, information
11 regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses,
12 and financial records. (*Id.*) The Parties have engaged in sufficient informal discovery and
13 investigation to assess the relative merits of the claims and contentions of the Parties. (*Id.*)

14 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices
15 and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
16 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum monetary
17 exposure for all claims. (Class Counsel Decl., at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the
18 applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the Action. (*Id.*) Class Counsel
19 reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*) This extensive
20 investigation and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently and effectively in
21 negotiating the Settlement. (*Id.*)

22 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

23 From May 2024 to March 2025, the Parties engaged in extensive settlement discussions,
24 which also included the exchange of additional information and data. (Class Counsel Decl., at
25 ¶ 7.) The Parties’ settlement discussions were conducted at arms’ length and although the Parties
26 were professional, the settlement negotiations were adversarial with each of the Parties prepared
27 to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After
28 extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s

claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached the Settlement, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement.)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, just, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (Class Counsel Decl., at ¶ 14.)

Indeed, the Gross Settlement Amount represents approximately **52%** of the **realistic maximum recovery** of \$211,961.16. (Class Counsel Decl., at ¶ 23.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant's maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$1.16 million, when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant's realistic exposure was \$211,961.16, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-27.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. (*Id.* at ¶ 23.)

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Settlement's key terms include:

1. Class Period: "means the period from November 1, 2018 through October 15, 2024." (Settlement, § 9(f).)

2. Settlement Class or Settlement Class Member(s): "means all Class Members who do not submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion." (Settlement, § 9(nn).)

3. PAGA Employee(s): "means all current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees employed directly by Defendant who worked for Defendant in the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period." (Settlement, § 9(z).)

4. Gross Settlement Amount: "means the amount of One Hundred and Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$110,000.00) to be paid by Defendant in full satisfaction of the Action

Released Class Claims, and Released PAGA Claims, which includes all Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, PAGA Amount, Settlement Administration Costs, and Net Settlement Amount to be paid to the Settlement Class Members." (Settlement, § 9(q).)

5. Uncashed Checks: "Any funds associated with such canceled checks shall be distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the State of California's Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the Settlement Class Member and/or PAGA Employee. The Parties agree that this disposition results in no "unpaid residue" under California Civil Procedure Code § 384, as the entire Net Settlement Amount will be paid out to Settlement Class Members, whether or not they cash their settlement checks." (Settlement, § 37.)

6. Released Class Claims: "means all claims which were alleged or which could have been reasonably alleged based on the factual allegations in the Action and Operative Complaint, arising during the Class Period, which shall specifically include claims for Defendant's alleged failure to pay minimum, straight time, and overtime wages, including the alleged failure to pay overtime at the correct rates of pay, provide or authorize compliant meal and rest periods and associated premium payments, timely pay wages during employment and upon termination, provide compliant or itemized wage statements, and reimburse or indemnify for necessary business-related expenses in violation of California Labor Code Sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 226(a), 226.7, 510, 512(a), 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802, the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order(s), California Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq., and any claims for herein.. (Settlement, § 9(gg).)

7. Released PAGA Claims: "means all claims for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code Sections 2698 and 2699 et seq., which were alleged or which could have been reasonably alleged based on the factual allegations in the PAGA Letter and Operative Complaint, arising during the PAGA Period, which shall specifically include claims for Defendant's alleged failure to pay minimum, straight time, and overtime wages, including the alleged failure to pay overtime at the correct rates of pay, provide compliant or authorize meal and rest periods and associated premium payments, timely pay wages during employment and upon termination, provide compliant or itemized wage statements, keep requisite

1 payroll and timekeeping records, and reimburse or indemnify necessary business-related expenses
2 in violation of California Labor Code Sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 226(a), 226.7, 510, 512(a),
3 1174(d), 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802, and the applicable Industrial Welfare
4 Commission Wage Order(s), including attorney's fees and costs related thereto.” (Settlement, §
5 9(hh).)

6 8. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant.”
7 (Settlement, § 1(q).)

8 9. PAGA Amount: “means the allocation of Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
9 (\$10,000.00) from the Gross Settlement Amount for the PAGA Settlement. Seventy-five percent
10 (75%) of the PAGA Amount, or Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$7,500.00), will be paid
11 to the LWDA (i.e., the LWDA Payment) and the remaining twenty-five percent (25%), or
12 \$2,500.00, will be distributed to the PAGA Employees (i.e., the PAGA Employee Amount).
13 (Settlement, § 9(y).) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing
14 this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 9.)

15 10. Net Settlement Amount: “means the portion of the Gross Settlement Amount that is
16 available for distribution to Settlement Class Members, which is the Gross Settlement Amount less
17 the Court-approved Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, PAGA Amount and
18 Settlement Administration Costs.” (Settlement, § 9(w).)

19 11. Distribution Formula: “After Preliminary Approval, the Settlement Administrator
20 will divide the Net Settlement Amount by the Workweeks of all Class Members to yield the
21 “Estimated Workweek Value,” and multiply each Class Member’s estimated Individual Settlement
22 Share that each Class Member may be entitled to receive under the Class Settlement.” (Settlement,
23 § 17(a).) After Final Approval, the Settlement Administrator will divide the final Net Settlement
24 Amount by the Workweeks of all Settlement Class Members to yield the "Final Workweek Value,"
25 and multiply each Settlement Class Member's individual Workweeks by the Final Workweek
26 Value to each Settlement Class Member's final Individual Settlement Share. (Settlement, § 17(b).)
27 As to PAGA: “Individual PAGA Payments will be calculated and apportioned from the PAGA
28 Employee Amount based on the PAGA Employees’ number of PAGA Pay Periods, as follows:

1 The Settlement Administrator will divide the PAGA Employee Amount, i.e. 25% of the PAGA
2 Amount, by the PAGA Pay Periods of all PAGA Employees to yield the “PAGA Pay Period
3 Value,” and multiply each PAGA Employee’s individual PAGA Pay Periods by the PAGA Pay
4 Period Value to yield each PAGA Employee’s Individual PAGA Payment.” (Settlement, § 18.)

5 12. Tax Treatment of Individual Settlement Shares and Individual PAGA Payments:
6 “Each Individual Settlement Share will be allocated as follows: twenty percent (20%) wages and
7 eighty percent (80%) penalties, interest, and non-wage damages. The portion allocated to wages
8 will be reported on an IRS Form W-2 and the portions allocated to penalties, interest, and non-
9 wage damages will be reported on an IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Settlement
10 Administrator.” (Settlement, § 19.)

11 13. Enhancement Payment: “Defendant agrees not to oppose or impede any application
12 or motion by Plaintiff for an Enhancement Payment in the amount up to Seven Thousand Five
13 Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents (\$7,500.00). The Enhancement Payment, which will be paid from
14 the Gross Settlement Amount, subject to Court approval, will be in addition to his Individual
15 Settlement Payment as a Settlement Class Member and Individual PAGA Payment as a PAGA
16 Employee. Plaintiff shall be solely and legally responsible for correctly characterizing this
17 compensation for tax purposes and for paying any taxes on the amounts received. (Settlement, §
18 13.)

19 14. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: “Defendant agrees not to oppose or impede any
20 application or motion by Class Counsel for attorneys’ fees in the amount up to thirty-five (35%)
21 of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e. \$38,500 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$110,000) and
22 reimbursement of verified costs and expenses associated with Class Counsel’s litigation and
23 settlement of the Actions, in an amount not to exceed Fifteen Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
24 (\$15,000), both of which will be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount. (Settlement, § 12.)

25 15. Settlement Administrator: “means ILYM Group, Inc., or any other third-party class
26 action settlement administrator agreed to by the Parties and approved by the Court for purposes of
27 administering the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 9(11).)

1 16. Settlement Administration Costs: “The Settlement Administrator will be paid for
2 the reasonable costs of administration of the Settlement and distribution of payments under the
3 Settlement, which is currently not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00).”
4 (Settlement, § 15.)

5 17. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Class Notice sets forth in plain
6 terms, a statement of the Action, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount
7 of the Class Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Costs, and Class Representative Service Award being
8 sought, and an explanation of how the Settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A,
9 Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the Settlement. (Settlement, §
10 24(e).) The Settlement Administrator will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the Class Notice
11 is provided to the current addresses of Class Members, including conducting a national change of
12 address search and re-mailing the Class Notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Class Counsel Decl., ¶
13 10, Ex. 2 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

14 **III. DISCUSSION**

15 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
16 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
17 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed Settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
18 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.)

19 **A. A Presumption of Fairness Exists Over The Settlement**

20 Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining;
21 (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is
22 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk* at p. 1800.)

23 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

24 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
25 evidence to the contrary is offered. No evidence to the contrary has been offered here; thus, there
26 is a presumption that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg*
27 *on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)

28 From May 2024 to March 2025, the Parties engaged in extensive settlement discussions,

1 which also included the exchange of additional information and data. (Class Counsel Decl., at ¶
2 7.) The Parties' settlement discussions were conducted at arms' length and although the Parties
3 were professional, the settlement negotiations were adversarial with each of the Parties prepared
4 to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After
5 extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims
6 and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached the Settlement. (*Id.*)

7 **2. The Parties Conducted Sufficient Investigation**

8 Prior to reaching this Settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
9 the claims set forth in the Action, such as a sample of Class Member timekeeping and payroll
10 records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
11 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
12 as information regarding the number of putative Class Members and the mix of current versus
13 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
14 paid to Class Members. (Class Counsel Decl., at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual
15 investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses
16 asserted in the Action. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and Class Counsel were able to act intelligently and
17 effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

18 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

19 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
20 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
21 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 37-50.) Although
22 Plaintiff and Class Counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the Action, they believe
23 the proposed Settlement is in the best interests of the Class.

24 **4. The Percentage of Objectors Is Small**

25 This factor cannot yet be determined unless and until the Court preliminarily approves the
26 Motion and the Class Notice. This factor will be properly addressed in Class Counsel's Motion
27 for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, should this Court grant the instant Motion.

1 **B. The Settlement Is Fair, Just, Reasonable, and Adequate**

2 In considering whether a settlement is fair, just, reasonable, and adequate the trial court
3 should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff’s case, the risk,
4 expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action
5 status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the
6 stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, ... and the reaction of the class
7 members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th
8 116, 128.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh*
9 *v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236.)

10 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
11 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
12 proposed Settlement is fair, just, adequate, and reasonable.

13 **1. Plaintiff’s Strengths and Risks of Continued Litigation**

14 Based on Plaintiff’s discovery and investigation, Class Counsel reached the conclusion that
15 Defendant had a policy and practice of: requiring its employees to work “off-the-clock” prior to
16 clocking in for the workday, during meal periods, and after clocking out for the workday, time
17 which it did not pay for; not providing its employees with California compliant meal and rest
18 periods, which it did not pay appropriate premiums for; and failing to reimburse its employees for
19 business-related expenses. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 16.) Defendant denies these claims.

20 While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate controversy exists as
21 to each cause of action. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 24.) Plaintiff recognizes that proving the amount
22 of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain
23 proposition. (*Id.*) Although the Parties had engaged in significant amount of investigation, informal
24 discovery and Class-wide data analysis, the Parties had not yet completed formal written discovery.
25 (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff intended to depose corporate officers and managers of Defendant. (*Id.*)
26 Moreover, preparation for a class certification and a trial remained for the Parties as well as the
27 prospect of appeals in the wake of a disputed class certification ruling for Plaintiffs and/or adverse
28 summary judgment ruling. (*Id.*) Had the Court certified any claims, Defendant could move to

1 decertify the claims. (*Id.*) As a result, the Parties would incur considerably more attorneys’ fees
2 and costs through trial. (*Id.*) This Settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of
3 further litigation. (*Id.*)

4 Balancing the strengths of Plaintiff’s claims against the risks of continued litigation of the
5 Action, Plaintiff and Class Counsel determined that the proposed Settlement was in the best
6 interests of the Class.

7 **2. The Gross Settlement Amount Is Reasonable**

8 In order to approve a class action settlement, the Court must satisfy itself that the class
9 settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Kullar*, at 133.) The fact that a plaintiff
10 might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the
11 settlement. (*Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447.) The record need not contain an
12 explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of*
13 *Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require “an explicit
14 statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims”,
15 but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of
16 outcomes of the litigation.”].)

17 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
18 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
19 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
20 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
21 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
22 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
23 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

24 The proposed Gross Settlement Amount represents a substantial recovery when compared
25 to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (Class Counsel Decl. at ¶¶ 14-27.) Because of the
26 proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk
27 of an unfavorable judgment. (*Id.*) When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties
28 involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the

1 probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the Settlement is within the “ballpark”
2 of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Class***
3 ***Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately \$537.04.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 27.)

4 **C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

5 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class
6 Counsel the Attorney Fees and Costs. These amounts are disclosed to all Class Members in the
7 proposed Class Notice and are reasonable. (Class Counsel Decl., at Ex. 1, Ex..A.)

8 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Based**
9 **on the “Common Fund” Method**

10 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created
11 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that “when a number
12 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
13 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
14 may be awarded attorneys’ fees out of the fund.” (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
15 quoting *D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

16 Class Counsel seeks approval of the Class Counsel Fees based on the “percentage of
17 recovery/common fund” theory. The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation costs
18 proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire
19 burden alone.” (*Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v.*
20 *State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends
21 attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require
22 those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly,
23 in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court
24 recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an
25 action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p.
26 110.)

27 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
28 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class

1 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
2 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
3 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
4 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
5 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
6 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
7 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
8 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

9 **2. The Requested Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are in Line with Typical** 10 **Cases**

11 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on
12 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
13 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
14 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
15 are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
16 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
17 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
18 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
19 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
20 million].)

21 Here, Class Counsel equal to 35% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is in line with
22 the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is
23 consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66,
24 n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar
25 method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)
26 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated
27 by the Parties and requested herein.

28 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

1 Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
2 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
3 section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
4 larger than the total Class recovery at the conclusion of this Action should it proceed. The
5 Settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time,
6 energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their
7 decision to assume risk by taking on this Action. In fact, prosecution of this Action involved
8 significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶¶ 35-36.) Class Counsel
9 undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once Class
10 Counsel undertook this Action on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its
11 conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns. (*Id.*)

12 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the**
13 **Requested Attorneys’ Fees and Costs**

14 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
15 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Class
16 Counsel Decl., ¶¶ 37-50.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several
17 class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate
18 class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested
19 fee award is supported here.

20 Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
21 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the Settlement.
22 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
23 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
24 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
25 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested Class
26 Counsel Fees are reasonable and fair.

1 **D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable**

2 Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and “there is no
3 indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other” class members,
4 such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr.
5 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for
6 PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement.
7 (*Id.* [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or \$1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D.
8 Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v.*
9 *Fed. Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts
10 approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].)

11 Here, the PAGA Amount is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved by
12 the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia v.*
13 *Shamrock Foods Co.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431,
14 at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson, supra*, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1
15 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal.
16 Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA
17 settlement of 0.27%].) The Parties negotiated the PAGA Amount, 75% percent of which
18 (\$7,500.00) as the LWDA Payment and 25% (\$2,500.00) to be distributed to the individual PAGA
19 Members. (Settlement, § 14.) The PAGA Amount equates to approximately 9% of the Gross
20 Settlement Amount, which far exceeds amounts that are routinely approved. The Parties negotiated
21 to allocate 9% of the Settlement to PAGA Amount in good faith and this amount is reasonable.
22 (Class Counsel Decl., ¶ 22.)

23 **E. The Enhancement Payment Is Reasonable**

24 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
25 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
26 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
27 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
28 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the

1 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
2 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

3 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
4 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
5 codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously
6 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to
7 work under substandard unlawful conditions” Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has
8 noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is
9 widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*
10 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for
11 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
12 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

13 Under the Settlement Agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
14 the Enhancement Payment in the amount of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff. Courts routinely approve service
15 awards of \$10,000.00 for plaintiffs represented by counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium*
16 *Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [“The Court concludes a
17 \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National Association* (N.D.
18 Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at *4 [“The court approves awards
19 of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

20 A **2006** study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from
21 **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median
22 award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action*
23 *Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev. 1303, 1308.) That same study found that
24 named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850
25 and a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received
26 an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the
27 study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make
28

1 representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class,
2 including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

3 Class Counsel represents that Plaintiff devoted a great deal of time and work assisting Class
4 Counsel litigate the Action, and Plaintiff communicated with Class Counsel during the mediation
5 and the preparation leading up to mediation. (*See generally* Plaintiff’s declaration; Class Counsel
6 Decl., ¶¶ 28-32.) The Class Representative Service Award is reasonable particularly in light of the
7 substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all Class Members and as compared to similarly situated
8 plaintiffs in other employment class and representative actions. (*Id.*)

9 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

10 **A. Legal Standard**

11 The proposed Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a
12 core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons
13 set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for
14 certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when the question is one
15 of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
16 impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of
17 all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382). There are three requirements to section 382: Class certification
18 requires proof (1) of a sufficiently numerous, ascertainable class, (2) of a well-defined community
19 of interest, and (3) that certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e.,
20 that proceeding as a class is *superior* to other methods. (*In re Tobacco II Cases*, (2009) 46
21 Cal.App.4th 298, 313.)

22 The California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to further
23 explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant
24 questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and
25 (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.*
26 (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

27 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
28 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a

means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system.” (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for Settlement Purposes.

1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous

A class is ascertainable if a plaintiff supplies a reasonable means of identifying potential class members and the class is defined in terms of objective characteristics and common facts sufficient to allow a class member to identify himself or herself as having a right to recover based on that description. (*ABM Industries Overtime Cases*, (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 277, 303.) Courts also consider the size or numerosity of the class when determining whether or not it is ascertainable. (*Id.* at 302).

a) Class Definition

When defining a class, the terminology used must convey “sufficient meaning to enables persons hearing to determine whether they are members of the class” and if the proposed class definition offers an objective way to identify those who will be bound by the results of the litigation. (*Id.* at 302-303.) Courts have routinely certified classes defined using language to that here. (*Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc.* (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 227; *see also Brinker* at 1017-1018, 1019, defining several subclasses such as employees “who worked one or more work periods in excess of three and a half hours without receiving a paid 10 minute break” and those “who worked ‘off-the-clock’ or without pay.”)

Here, the Class definition (as stated above) is objective as it is limited in scope to a specific time frame (during the Class Period) and is limited to the potential class members’ employment classification (hourly or non-exempt employees). Further, there are common facts that exist here (such as those employees who worked without pay, were not given proper meal or rest periods, etc.) that are encapsulated by the causes of action alleged in the Action. This definition therefore provides sufficiently clear information to allow current and former employees to readily and reasonably determine whether or not they are a putative Class Member in this Action based upon

1 this definition. (*ABM* at 304, stating “As long as the potential class members may be identified
2 without unreasonable expense or time and given notice of the litigation, and the proposed class
3 definition offers an objective means of identifying the persons who will be bound by the results of
4 the litigation, the ascertainability requirement is met.”) Thus, the proposed Class that Plaintiff
5 seeks to represent is easily ascertainable and includes approximately former and current 54
6 employees of Defendant.

7 **b) Numerosity**

8 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
9 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
10 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
11 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
12 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
13 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries
14 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
15 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) If even as
16 little as 10 persons can constitute a class, then certainly the 54 Class Members here satisfy the
17 numerosity requirement.

18 **2. There is a Well-Defined Community of Interest in the Questions of**
19 **Law and Fact**

20 The community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant
21 questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and
22 (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond* at 470.)

23 **a) There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which**
24 **Predominate**

25 The Court should grant conditional Class certification for settlement purposes here on the
26 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all Class and subclass predominate over any
27 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
28

warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.)

Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether payment of wages during employed was timely; whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal and rest period premium wages; whether wage statements were consequently non-compliant; and whether Defendant failed to keep requisite payroll records. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all the identified Class Members, including Plaintiff. Further, all Class Members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

b) *Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class*

The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as such, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated employees. Thus, Plaintiff's claims arise out of the same practices of Defendant and rest on the same legal theories as those of the Class. Therefore, Plaintiff can easily meet the typicality requirement in favor of certification.

1 **c) *Plaintiff and Class Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement***

2 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
3 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
4 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
5 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

6 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained Class
7 Counsel, whom have extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar
8 class actions that previously settled. (Class Counsel Decl., ¶¶ 36-49.) Class Counsel
9 unquestionably is "qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation."
10 (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and
11 Plaintiff has, with Class Counsel, litigated this Action and diligently reviewed the Settlement
12 terms, showing their dedication. Plaintiff's willingness to serve as Class Representative and to
13 sacrifice the value of their own individual claims by executing a general release broader than that
14 of the other Class Members so that the Class may benefit from this Settlement demonstrates
15 Plaintiff's serious commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the Class, thereby
16 also demonstrating that Plaintiff's interests are aligned with those of the Class and no conflict
17 exists. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

18 **3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

19 Finally, in making its Class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
20 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
21 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court's use of the
22 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
23 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
24 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
25 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
26 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th
27 Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns
28 are essentially non-existent.

1 **V. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

2 **A. The Proposed Class Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

3 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
4 Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
5 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
6 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this Action,
7 the Class Notice will be disseminated through direct U.S. first class mail to the last known address
8 for each Class Member. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he notice given should have a
9 reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members” (*Id.* at p. 974.)
10 In this Action the Class Notice will be provided by direct mailing, which is the best possible form
11 of notice as it provides the most reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the
12 Class.

13 **B. The Class Notice is Accurate and Informative**

14 The proposed Class Notice is informative. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the
15 Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. If there are Class Members who
16 wish to object to this proposed Settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections
17 and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

18 The Class Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte &
19 Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date
20 and the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement, in an informative and coherent
21 manner. It makes clear that the Settlement Agreement does not constitute an admission of
22 liability by the Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled
23 on the merits of the Action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to
24 be made. The Class Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and
25 neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

26 **C. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

27 The proposed Class Notice, in the form attached as **Exhibit A** to the Settlement Agreement,
28 should be approved for dissemination to the Class. The Class Notice informs the Class of the terms

1 of the Settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
2 Members who wish to object to the Settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their
3 objections and be heard at the final approval hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Class Notice
4 meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court and should be
5 approved.

6 **VI. CONCLUSION**

7 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
8 approval of the proposed Settlement and set a final approval hearing on March 9, 2027.

9
10
11 Dated: March 19, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

12 By: _____

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