

Brian J. Mankin, Esq. [CSB No. 216228]
brian@lmlfirm.com
Peter J. Carlson, Esq. [CSB No. 295611]
peter@lmlfirm.com
LAUBY, MANKIN & LAUBY LLP
5198 Arlington Avenue, PMB 513
Riverside, CA 92504
Tel: (951) 320-1444 | Fax: (951) 320-1445

Attorneys for Plaintiff, on a representative basis and on behalf of all others similarly situated

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

CLARENCE PHILLIPS, individually, on a
representative basis, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated;

Plaintiff,

vs.

HARDY WINDOW COMPANY, a
California Corporation; and DOES 1 through
20, inclusive;

Defendants.

Case No.: CIVSB2312048

*[Assigned to the Hon. Christian Towns, Dept.
S26, for all purposes]*

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT;
DECLARATIONS IN SUPPORT
THEREOF; AND [PROPOSED] FINAL
ORDER AND JUDGMENT**

Hearing:

Date: December 16, 2024

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept.: S26

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 16, 2024, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter
as this matter may be heard by the Honorable Christian Towns in Department S26 of the San
Bernardino County Superior Court, located at 247 West Third Street, San Bernardino, CA
92415, Plaintiff Clarence Phillips, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, will
move this Court for an Order granting final approval of the class action settlement between
Plaintiff and Defendant Hardy Window Company (“Defendant”), which was preliminarily
approved by the Court. This Motion seeks final approval and entry of judgment of a \$662,500

1 settlement on behalf of the Class Members and Aggrieved Employees, and is unopposed by
2 Defendant.

3 Specifically, Plaintiff will and hereby does move the Court to grant final approval of the
4 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”), and enter the
5 proposed order and final judgment filed concurrently herewith:

- 6 1. Finally certifying the Class, as defined in the Settlement Agreement and the
7 Court’s Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, for settlement purposes only;
- 8 2. Finally appointing Plaintiff as the Class Representative for purposes of settlement;
- 9 3. Finally appointing Brian Mankin and Peter Carlson as Class Counsel for purposes
10 of settlement;
- 11 4. Finding that the Class Notice was properly provided to the Class in accordance
12 with the Court’s Order granting Preliminary Approval;
- 13 5. Finally approving the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, based upon the
14 terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement;
- 15 6. Binding participating Class Members and the Aggrieved Employees to the terms
16 of the Settlement Agreement, including the Release specified therein; and
- 17 7. Retaining jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement.

18 This Motion will be based upon this notice; the attached memorandum of points and
19 authorities; the Declarations of the Settlement Administrator (Mayra Gonzalez of Phoenix
20 Settlement Administrators), Class Counsel (Brian Mankin and Peter Carlson) and Plaintiff
21 (Clarence Phillips) filed concurrently herewith; the records and files in this action; and any other
22 further evidence or argument that the Court may receive at or before the hearing.

23 Dated: November 20, 2024

LAUBY, MANKIN & LAUBY LLP


24
25 BY: 
26 Brian J. Mankin, Esq.
27 Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class
28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AND ESSENTIAL POINTS	1
II.	PERTINENT BACKGROUND AND SETTLEMENT TERMS	1
III.	THE NOTICE PROCESS	3
A.	Notice to the Class Members	3
B.	There are Zero Objections and One Opt-Out, Resulting In An Impressive 99.75% of the Class Participating in the Settlement	4
V.	EVALUATION OF THE SETTLEMENT	4
A.	The Settlement Was Reached Through Informed Arms-Length Negotiation	5
B.	Plaintiff's Investigation Was Sufficient	6
C.	Class Counsel Are Experienced in Similar Litigation and Endorse the Settlement	6
D.	Reasonable Estimate of the Nature and Amount of Recovery	6
VI.	THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE	7
A.	Plaintiff is Entitled to Recover Reasonable Attorney's Fees Under the Labor Code	8
B.	Class Counsel's Request for Fees Is Reasonable and Properly Calculated as a Percentage of the Common Fund	8
1.	<i>The Attorneys' Fees Requested Here Fall Within the Reasonable Range Awarded in Similar Cases Under the Well-established Common Fund Method</i>	<i>9</i>
2.	<i>The High Quality of Work and Excellent Result Obtained Support the Award</i>	<i>10</i>
3.	<i>Class Members Had Sufficient Notice of the Requested Fees</i>	<i>10</i>
4.	<i>The Contingent Nature of Class Counsel's Representation of Plaintiff and the Class Further Supports the Fee Award at 1/3 of the Common Fund</i>	<i>11</i>
5.	<i>A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the Fee Award</i>	<i>12</i>
VII.	THE REQUESTED COSTS AND SERVICE AWARDS ARE REASONABLE	14
A.	The Requested Costs Are Reasonable and Merit Approval	14
B.	The Requested Service Award is Reasonable and Merits Approval	14
VIII.	OTHERS MATTERS RE: FINAL APPROVAL	15
A.	Settlement Administration Costs	15
B.	Notice of Final Judgment to the Class	16
C.	Uncashed Checks	16
D.	Final Report	16
E.	Submission to the LWDA	16
IX.	CONCLUSION	16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.</i> (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135	6
<i>Bell v. Am. Title Ins. Co.</i> (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1589	4
<i>Bell v. Farmers Insurance Exchange</i> (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715.....	14
<i>Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert</i> (1980) 444 U.S. 472.....	9
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43	7
<i>Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein</i> (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1037.....	4
<i>Franklin v. Kaypro Corp.</i> (9th Cir. 1989) 884 F.2d 1222	4
<i>Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University</i> , 132 Cal.App.4th 359 (2005).....	11
<i>In re American Bank Note Holographics, Inc.</i> (SDNY 2001) 127 F.Supp.2d 418	4
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.....	6
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half International, Inc.</i> (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 480.....	7
<i>Litwin v. iRenew Bio Energy Solutions, LLC</i> , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 883	10
<i>Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc.</i> , (9th Cir. 1976) 541 F.2d 672.....	4
<i>PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler</i> (2000) 22 Cal.4 th 1084.....	12
<i>Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc.</i> (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311	12
<i>Rodriguez v. West Publishing</i> (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948	15
<i>Serrano III v. Priest</i> (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25	9
<i>Stambaugh v. Super. Ct.</i> (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231.....	4
<i>Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp</i> (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043.....	11
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.</i> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 246	6
<i>Williams v. MGM-Pathe Communs. Co.</i> (9th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 1026.....	10

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AND ESSENTIAL POINTS**

3 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiff Clarence Phillips
4 respectfully requests that this Court grant final approval of the Class Action and PAGA
5 Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”), and enter the proposed order and final
6 judgment in this matter. This Motion is unopposed by Defendant Hardy Window Company
7 (“Defendant”).

8 There are several essential reasons why this settlement should be approved, and judgment
9 entered accordingly, as follows:

- 10 • After extensive work, the Parties reached a \$662,500 settlement with the
11 assistance of an experienced mediator, which is tailored to a limited release of the claims alleged
12 on behalf of the Participating Class Members and the Aggrieved Employees;
- 13 • The Class Members were deemed to participate in the Settlement, and were not
14 required to submit a Claim Form to receive funds;
- 15 • There is no reversion to Defendant;
- 16 • There have been zero objections and one opt-out to the Settlement, meaning that
17 99.75% of the Class is participating in the Settlement.

18 In accordance with the analysis and laws set forth herein as well as in the preliminary
19 approval motion, the Settlement should be approved and judgment entered based on the
20 determination that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the
21 Class. (Declaration of Class Counsel, Brian J. Mankin; ¶ 13 (“Mankin Decl.”).)

22 **II. PERTINENT BACKGROUND AND SETTLEMENT TERMS**

23 Plaintiff and the Class Members include all current and former nonexempt employees
24 who were employed by Defendant in California at any time during the Class Period of December
25 10, 2019, through August 1, 2024. Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees include all current and
26 former nonexempt employees who were employed by Defendant Hardy Window Company in
27 California at any time during the PAGA Period of May 4, 2022, through August 1, 2024. The
28 primary claims, which Defendant disputes, include allegations that the Class Members did not

1 receive all minimum, regular and overtime wages owed, did not receive accurate itemized wage
2 statements, were not provided compliant meal and rest breaks, as well as claims for waiting time
3 penalties and PAGA penalties.

4 The Settlement includes 405 Participating Class Members. The following is a
5 breakdown reflecting how the funds are allocated under the Settlement Agreement (Declaration
6 of Administrator, Mayra Gonzalez (“Gonzalez Decl.”), ¶ 12):

<i>Settlement Amount</i>	\$ 662,500.00
Attorneys’ Fees (1/3)	\$ 220,833.33
Litigation Costs	\$ 20,350.16
Administrator Costs	\$ 9,500.00
PAGA Penalties	\$ 40,000.00
Class Representative Service Award	\$ 10,000.00
<i>Net Settlement Amount</i>	\$ 361,816.51

12 In terms of the payments, all Class Members were deemed to participate and did not need
13 to submit a Claim Form to receive payment. (Settlement Agreement or “S.A.” ¶ 3.1). Each
14 Participating Class Member will receive a pro rata share of the Net Settlement Amount according
15 to the percentage of Workweeks worked during the Class Period, such that the amount actually
16 distributed to Participating Class Members will equal 100% of the Net Settlement Amount.
17 (Settlement Agreement ¶ 3.2.4).

18 Assuming all of the amounts in the Settlement are approved by the Court, the *average*
19 Individual Class Payment is estimated to be \$893.37 and the *highest* individual settlement
20 payment is approximately \$3,905.25. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 13). The Participating Class Members
21 collectively worked 22,421 weeks during the Class Period, resulting in a net Workweek value of
22 approximately \$16.14. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 11).

23 In addition, 232 Aggrieved Employees will each receive an Individual PAGA Payment
24 based on their share of the \$10,000 in PAGA Penalties (25% of the total \$40,000 PAGA
25 allocation), calculated pro-rata based on the number of Weeks Worked during the PAGA Period.
26 (S.A. ¶ 3.2.6). The Aggrieved Employees collectively worked 12,156 Weeks, and their average
27 Individual PAGA Payment is \$43.10. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 14).

1 Fifteen percent (15%) of each Individual Settlement Amount shall constitute wages (for
2 which each Participating Class Member will be issued an IRS Form W-2 for such payment), and
3 the remaining eighty-five percent (85%) shall constitute interest and penalties (each for which
4 each participating Class Member will be issued an IRS Form 1099). (S.A. ¶ 3.2.4.1). The
5 Settlement Agreement provides that Defendant shall deposit the Settlement Amount within 30
6 days after the “Effective Date” (S.A. ¶ 4.3), which will be the date that the Final Order is entered
7 since there were no objections or motions to intervene filed. Additionally, Defendant will
8 separately fund its share of payroll taxes. Within 10 days of receipt, the Settlement
9 Administrator shall issue payments to cover all court-approved payments. (S.A. ¶ 4.4).

10 Class Members and Aggrieved Employees will have 180 days to cash the settlement
11 check. If a person fails to cash a check by the deadline, the Settlement Administrator shall issue
12 unclaimed funds to the California State Controller in the name of the person. (S.A. ¶ 4.4.1).

13 **III. THE NOTICE PROCESS**

14 **A. Notice to the Class Members**

15 Pursuant to the Court’s Order and the Settlement Agreement, the Parties directed the
16 Settlement Administrator to review and update the Class Members’ addresses, mail the Court-
17 approved Notice Packet, and process their responses. The Administrator also posted the relevant
18 documents on its website for the Class Members to access.

19 Prior to the mailing, the Settlement Administrator performed a National Change of
20 Address search on all Class Members to determine if any had moved. (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 4). On
21 September 3, 2024, the Class Notice was sent via first-class mail to 406 Class Members.
22 (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 5). Ultimately, 14 Class Notices were determined to be undeliverable,
23 resulting in a 96.6% success rate in mailing the Class Notice. (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 6-7).

24 In accordance with California Rules of Court, rules 3.766 (d) and 3.769 (f), the Notice
25 provided Class Members with (1) a brief explanation of the case; (2) an explanation of each
26 Class Member’s right to opt out of the settlement class; (3) an explanation of the process (and
27 relevant deadlines) through which a Class Member could opt out of the settlement class; (4)
28 notice about the binding nature of the Judgment for Class Members who do not opt out; (5) an

1 explanation of each Class Member’s right to appear through counsel; (6) an explanation of each
2 Class Member’s right to appear at the fairness hearing and express views on the settlement, i.e.,
3 object or otherwise respond; and (7) an explanation of each Class Member’s right to participate
4 in the Settlement and receive payment accordingly. (See **Exhibit A** to the Gonzalez Decl.)

5 **B. There are Zero Objections and One Opt-Out, Resulting In An Impressive**
6 **99.75% of the Class Participating in the Settlement**

7 California law makes clear that the percentage of objectors and opt-outs is an important
8 factor in the Court’s consideration of a proposed class action settlement. (See *Dunk v. Ford*
9 *Motor Co.* (1186) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794 at 1802.) Indeed, the Ninth Circuit and other federal
10 courts recognize that in the final fairness analysis, the number or percentage of class members
11 who object to the settlement is a significant factor. (See *Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods.,*
12 *Inc.*, (9th Cir. 1976) 541 F.2d 672, 677; *In re American Bank Note Holographics, Inc.* (SDNY
13 2001) 127 F.Supp.2d 418, 425 [“[i]t is well settled that the reaction of the class to the settlement
14 is perhaps the most significant factor to be weighed in considering its adequacy.”])

15 In this case, there are zero objections and one opt-out to the Settlement -- meaning that
16 99.75% of the Class Members elected to participate in the Settlement. (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 7-9).

17 **V. EVALUATION OF THE SETTLEMENT**

18 It is axiomatic that California law strongly favors and encourages settlements. (See
19 *Stambaugh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236.) This presumption in favor of
20 settlement applies with particular force in the context of class actions. (See *Ferguson v. Lieff,*
21 *Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1037 [“[p]ublic policy favoring settlement is
22 especially weighty for class actions”]; *Bell v. Am. Title Ins. Co.* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1589,
23 1607-1608 [affirming the trial court’s approval of a class settlement and implicitly endorsing its
24 citation of federal precedent for the notion that there is a “strong public policy in favor of
25 settlement of class actions”]; see also *Franklin v. Kaypro Corp.* (9th Cir. 11869) 884 F.2d 1222,
26 1229, quoting *Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp.* (9th Cir. 1976) 529 F.2d 943, 950 [“it hardly
27 seems necessary to point out that there is an overriding public interest in settling and quieting
28 litigation. This is particularly true in class action suits”].)

1 When entertaining a request for final approval of a class action settlement, a court's
2 fundamental consideration is whether the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. (See *Dunk*,
3 *supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801, fn. 7 [noting that state courts look to federal authority concerning
4 the approval of class settlements]; California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(g).)

5 Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length
6 bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act
7 intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; (4) the percentage of objectors and
8 opt outs is small, and (5) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible
9 recovery in light of all attendant risks of litigation.” (*Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802.) All
10 five of these factors are discussed in detail below.

11 **A. The Settlement Was Reached Through Informed Arms-Length Negotiation**

12 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement,
13 unless evidence to the contrary is offered. Thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations
14 were conducted in good faith. (See, 3 Alba Conte & Newberg, *supra*, at § 11.51.) The proposed
15 settlement here was the product of arm's-length negotiation before a highly experienced and
16 reputable class action mediator to reach a settlement, which was finally consummated in the
17 months after mediation.

18 Here, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have diligently investigated the claims raised in this
19 litigation and, after taking into account the disputed factual and legal issues involved in this
20 action, the risks attending further prosecution, and the benefits to be received pursuant to the
21 compromise and settlement of the action as set forth in the Settlement, concluded that the
22 settlement terms are fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the Class.

23 As the Settlement Agreement itself reveals, there is no preferential treatment for any
24 segment of the class, as the Settlement is designed to compensate all Class Members fairly and
25 adequately. And pursuant to California Rules of Court Rule 3.769(b), the parties have disclosed
26 the agreed upon and proposed attorney fee award, which is well within the range of
27 reasonableness for matters of this nature.

28 ///

1 **B. Plaintiff's Investigation Was Sufficient**

2 As set forth at the time of preliminary approval, Class Counsel's investigation into the
3 facts and merits of the wage and hour claims alleged included substantial written discovery,
4 analyzing substantial amounts of information, correspondence, documents, policies and
5 procedures, pay data and timekeeping records, and evidence relating to the class size and the
6 commonality of the claims. During this process, Plaintiff and Class Counsel conducted
7 investigations into the potential claims of the similarly situated employees, as well as researching
8 and investigating Defendant's defenses. Finally, Class Counsel synthesized and analyzed
9 information provided by Defendant as to the total Class Members, the number of current and
10 former employees, the number of employees who worked during various time periods, and
11 prepared comprehensive damages calculations regarding the claims at issue.

12 **C. Class Counsel Are Experienced in Similar Litigation and Endorse the**
13 **Settlement**

14 Class Counsel are experienced in this type of litigation, and they have represented (and
15 hereby do represent) that this Settlement is fair and reasonable. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 13; see 7-
16 *Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1152
17 [Final approval of settlement affirmed where counsel were all experienced litigators with class-
18 action experience and had recommended settlement based on the negotiated terms].)

19 **D. Reasonable Estimate of the Nature and Amount of Recovery**

20 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval contained a comprehensive *Kullar* analysis
21 (which sufficiently provided the Court with "basic information about the nature and magnitude
22 of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the
23 release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise." (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail,*
24 *Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133.) Of course, a settlement is not judged against what
25 might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to
26 provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba v. Apple Computers,*
27 *Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) ("Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement
28 process ... even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it

1 would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because
2 the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives
3 ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”)

4 In light of the uncertainties of protracted litigation, this negotiated settlement reflects the
5 best practicable recovery for the Class. While the total settlement amount is, of course, a
6 compromise figure, the potential risks and opportunities of both parties were effectively weighed
7 and considered by the parties, resulting in a fair and equitable settlement. Based upon detailed
8 data obtained through discovery and information exchanges, and factoring in claim certification
9 probabilities and liability probabilities, Class Counsel formulated detailed damages models to
10 evaluate the claims in preparation for mediation and in order to reach a realistic and reasonable
11 resolution.

12 Defendant denies that any damages should be assessed and denies all of the value
13 assessed by Plaintiff. Notwithstanding these arguments, in light of the uncertainties and
14 expense associated with protracted litigation, the Settlement commits Defendant to pay
15 \$662,500 to settle the litigation.

16 **VI. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE**

17 For their efforts in creating a common fund for the benefit of the Class, the Settlement
18 Agreement provided that Class Counsel may seek reasonable fees of \$220,833.33 (one-third of
19 the Settlement Amount). This amount will be paid from the settlement amount, as provided by
20 the Settlement Agreement. These fees are warranted under the law and within the range of fees
21 commonly awarded in similar cases.

22 As shown herein, the requested percentage of one-third of the settlement fund as payment
23 for attorneys’ fees should be granted for several reasons, including one-third is the standard
24 bench mark in California for class action settlements (see e.g., *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162
25 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 n. 11 (“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage
26 method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of
27 the recovery”), that the California Supreme Court held that the percentage of the fund method
28 survives in California class action cases (*Laffitte v. Robert Half International, Inc.* (2016) 1

1 Cal.5th 480, and through the prism of a lodestar cross-check. Accordingly, this request should
2 receive final approval.

3 **A. Plaintiff is Entitled to Recover Reasonable Attorney's Fees Under the**
4 **Labor Code**

5 Plaintiff and the Class in this action are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees,
6 expenses and costs under section 218.5 of the California Labor Code, which provides that, "[i]n
7 any action brought for the nonpayment of wages ... the Court shall award reasonable attorneys'
8 fees and costs to the prevailing party." In addition, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover
9 reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to section 1194.2 of the Labor Code, which provides that,
10 "... any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage ... applicable to the employee is
11 entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum
12 wage... including ... reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit." Plaintiff is also entitled to
13 fees and costs under section 226(e) of the Labor Code (employee who prevails on claim for
14 itemized wage statement violation "is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorneys'
15 fees"); under PAGA (Labor Code § 2699(g), which provides "Any employee who prevails in any
16 action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs, including any filing
17 fee paid"); and, potentially, section 1021.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.

18 **B. Class Counsel's Request for Fees Is Reasonable and Properly Calculated as**
19 **a Percentage of the Common Fund**

20 Under the "common fund" doctrine, the request for attorneys' fees in the amount of 1/3
21 of the common fund is reasonable and appropriate, because (1) it is within the approved range
22 for percentages awarded as attorneys' fees in similar cases; (2) it is supported by the high quality
23 of Class Counsel's work on this case and the results obtained for the Class; (3) the Class had
24 sufficient notice of the fee request; (4) it is supported by the fact that this case was handled on a
25 contingency basis and was undertaken despite various risks and expenses; and (5) the lodestar
26 cross-check supports the fee request.

27 ///

28 ///

1 **1. *The Attorneys’ Fees Requested Here Fall Within the Reasonable***
2 ***Range Awarded in Similar Cases Under the Well-established***
3 ***Common Fund Method***

4 The California Supreme Court has approved trial courts’ usage of the common fund
5 method of awarding attorneys’ fees in wage and hour class actions, like this one, upholding a fee
6 awarded of 1/3 of the total settlement amount obtained for the class. *See Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at
7 506; *see also*, 4 Newberg on Class Actions, § 14:6 at 552 (“fee awards in class actions average
8 around one-third of the recovery”). Specifically, in *Laffitte*, the Court wrote: “[w]e join the
9 overwhelming majority of federal and state courts in holding that when class action litigation
10 establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its
11 equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount
12 of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created”). *Id.* at 506. The
13 California Supreme Court also noted that trial courts have the discretion to award fees as a
14 percentage of the common fund, with or without the necessity to conduct a lodestar cross-check.
15 *Id.* (“...[Courts] ... retain the discretion to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to
16 evaluate the reasonableness of a requested percentage fee.”)

17 The California Supreme Court’s *Laffitte* decision was consistent with its prior rulings
18 recognizing that “when a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund, and an
19 action brought by ... plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that
20 fund, such ... plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys’ fees out of the fund.” *Serrano III v. Priest*
21 (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34; *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert* (1980) 444 U.S. 472, 478 (“[A] lawyer who
22 recovers a common fund . . . is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees from the fund as a whole”).
23 Notably, when fees are calculated as a percentage of the common fund, they should be calculated
24 based on the amount that was available to be claimed, rather than as a percentage of the actual
25 amount claimed. *See Id.* at 475-6, 480-1 (the SCOTUS held that attorneys for a successful class
26 may recover a fee based on the fund created for the class, even if some class members make no
27 claims against the fund, so that money remains in it that will be returned to the defendant,
28 explaining: “[t]heir [class members’] right to share the harvest of the lawsuit upon proof of their

1 identity, whether or not they exercise it, is a benefit in the fund created by the efforts of the class
2 representatives and their counsel.” *See also Williams v. MGM-Pathe Communs. Co.* (9th Cir.
3 1997) 129 F.3d 1026, 1027 (trial court “abused its discretion by basing the fee on the class
4 members’ claims against the fund rather than on a percentage of the entire fund or on the
5 lodestar”).

6 **2. *The High Quality of Work and Excellent Result Obtained Support***
7 ***the Award***

8 In addition to the fact that a Class benefit was created with a \$662,500 non-reversionary
9 common fund settlement, the fairness of the requested fee award of 1/3 of the Settlement
10 Amount is supported by the high quality of work performed by Class Counsel and the positive
11 result obtained for the Class. This result occurred because Class Counsel diligently, efficiently,
12 and creatively pursued this case and reached a successful settlement for the benefit of the entire
13 Class. In fact, some Class Members will receive \$3,905.25, which is a good result. Moreover,
14 the fact that the settlement was embraced and supported by the Class, as evidenced by a 99.75%
15 participation rate, demonstrates that Class Counsel obtained a favorable result for the Class.

16 **3. *Class Members Had Sufficient Notice of the Requested Fees***

17 Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court requires that the Class Members be given
18 notice of any agreement regarding an application for attorneys’ fees. Here, the Notice
19 preliminarily approved by the Court and distributed to the Class Members apprised them of the
20 requested attorneys fees, which was consistent with the Notice.

21 The Class Notice also advised the class members of the procedures for objecting to the
22 proposed settlement and appearing at the settlement hearing, where they could present their
23 objections to any aspect of the settlement, including the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded
24 to class counsel. (*Litwin v. iRenew Bio Energy Solutions, LLC* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 877, 883
25 [“[p]rocedural due process requires that affected parties be provided with ‘the right to be heard at
26 a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’”].) In accordance with the foregoing, it is
27 respectfully submitted that the instant notice complied with Rule 3.769 and, as a result, the Class
28 Members’ due process rights were fulfilled.

1 **4. *The Contingent Nature of Class Counsel’s Representation of***
2 ***Plaintiff and the Class Further Supports the Fee Award at 1/3 of the***
3 ***Common Fund***

4 An additional factor in favor of the granting of the requested fee award is the fact that this
5 case was both legally and financially risky for Class Counsel. (*See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp*
6 (*9th Cir. 2002*) 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-49.) Class Counsel have been representing the Class in this
7 matter on a strictly contingency basis, and as such, incurred the risk of non-recovery after a
8 substantial investment of time, money, and resources, and have done so since the inception of
9 this case without any payment or compensation. Specifically, there was the prospect of
10 enormous cost inherent in class action litigation; the risk that Defendant could prevail on its
11 argument that the class should not be certified; and the risk that Defendant could prevail on the
12 merits of some or all of the claims.

13 If Plaintiff had lost this case, Class Counsel would have recovered nothing, and would
14 have lost its out-of-pocket costs. This is not an easy burden for Plaintiff’s Counsel, which is a
15 small firm. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 20).

16 The court in *Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University*, 132
17 Cal.App.4th 359 (2005) analyzed this issue and held that, when determining the market-level
18 compensation to award to contingent fee attorneys, the analysis must take into account the large
19 risk inherent in such situations:

20 The market value of the services provided by plaintiffs’ counsel in
21 a case of this magnitude must take into consideration that any
22 compensation has been deferred for up to four years from the time
23 an hourly fee attorney would begin collecting fees from his or her
24 client; that the demands of the present case substantially precluded
25 other work during that extended period, which makes the ultimate
26 risk of not obtaining fees all the greater (since the attorneys must
27 use savings or incur debt to keep their offices afloat and their
28 families fed during the years-long litigation); and that a failure to
fully compensate for the enormous risk in bringing even a wholly
meritorious case would effectively immunize large or politically
powerful defendants from being held to answer for constitutional
deprivations, resulting in harm to the public.”

Id. at 399-400.

1 Indeed, as Class Counsel can attest, not all class/PAGA cases are successful. Many cases
2 end with no fees or a greatly reduced fee that is far less than lodestar, often due to no fault of
3 counsel (i.e., bankruptcy, change in the law, consolidation/coordination/preemption, being top
4 filed, etc.). According to Mayer Brown LLP's study entitled, An Empirical Analysis of Class
5 Actions, cited in *Laguna v. Coverall North America, Inc.*, No. 12-55479 (9th Circuit 2014), found
6 that only one-third of class actions are successful, compared to two-thirds that are defeated and
7 result in no payment to the class members.¹

8 Thus, the contingent nature of this case supports a fee of one-third of the common fund.

9 **5. A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the Fee**
10 **Award**

11 Despite recognized limitations of the so-called lodestar method, some California and
12 federal courts acknowledge the utility of a lodestar "cross-check."² (*Lealao, supra*, 82
13 Cal.App.4th at 46-47.) Under the "lodestar multiplier" method of cross-checking the
14 reasonableness of attorneys' fees in class actions, the court ascertains Class counsel's total
15 "lodestar" amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by each attorney or
16 legal staff member by their hourly rates, and then enhances or reduces this lodestar figure by a
17 "multiplier" to account for a range of factors, such as the novelty or difficulty of the case, its
18 contingent nature, and the degree of success achieved. *PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler* (2000) 22
19 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-96; *Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc.* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322; *Lealao, supra*, 82
20 Cal.App.4th at 43 [court has discretion to use a multiplier to ensure that the "fee awarded is
21 within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation"].)

22 Historically, California courts have approved multipliers of 1.5 to 4. But here, the actual
23 aggregated lodestar between the Plaintiffs' attorneys that worked on this case is approximately
24

25 ¹ www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2013/December/DoClassActionsBenefitClassMembers.pdf

26 ² In practice, the lodestar method is difficult to apply, time-consuming to administer, inconsistent in result, and
27 capable of manipulation. In addition, the lodestar creates inherent incentive to prolong the litigation until sufficient
28 hours have been expended. Herr, David F., *Manual for Complex Litigation*, § 14.121 (1988); See also *In re*
Activision (N.D. Cal 1989) 723 F.Supp 1373.

\$193,345. This results in a fair and reasonable 1.14 multiplier, as summarized in the following table, and in the submitted declarations of Plaintiff's counsel:

Attorney/Timekeeper	Role	Yrs Experience	Rate	Hours	Fee
Brian J. Mankin (Partner – LML)	Trial Counsel	23	\$775	71³	\$55,025
Peter Carlson (Senior Associate – LML)	Handling Attorney	10	\$650	212.8	\$138,320
Grand Total for All Attorneys					\$193,345

(See Mankin Decl., ¶ 25; Carlson Decl. ¶ 8-9).

The hourly rates above are comparable to those of other attorneys with equal or similar experience, if not somewhat lower (*i.e.*, the Laffey Matrix at www.laffeymatrix.com indicates that the benchmark rates are: \$777/hour for an 8–10-year attorney, \$878/hour for a 11–19-year attorney, and \$1,057/hour for a 20+ year attorney).

Moreover, the Wolters Kluwer 2023 Real Rate Report (“Real Rate Report”) provides directly applicable information in this regard. The Real Rate Report is based on an enormous and statistically significant compilation of data, comprising millions of billing entries from a hundred thousand individual timekeepers who worked at thousands of law firms. The Real Rate Report then compiles and analyzes this data to provide the hourly rates for partners and associates in major metropolitan areas. For the southern California area: (a) the rate for partners in Los Angeles is between \$840 and \$1,159 per hour for the middle and upper quartiles, and (b) the rates for associates with seven or more years of experience, the median rate is \$674 per hour, and the upper quartile rate is \$888 per hour. And, perhaps most importantly, the information provided in the Real Rate Report is not based on self-reported numbers, surveys, sampling, or reviews or other publications – instead, the Real Rate Report is based on the actual hours and fees billed by law firms, which makes it “a much better reflection of true market rates than self-reported rates in all practice areas.” *Brown v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182309, at *21; *PLCM Group*, 22 Cal.4th at 1085 (holding that rates

³ Includes an estimated 30 hours that will be expended in finalizing the motion, attending the hearing, working with the parties and administrator regarding the notice and payment process, and filing any post judgment paperwork.

1 should be premised upon precisely this form of independent, “objective” rate data that reflects
2 “fair market” rates actually billed to clients “in the community for similar work”). (Mankin
3 Decl., ¶ 24.)

4 Class Counsel are also highly experienced in Class/PAGA litigation, including having
5 been named by the LA Times as one “Southern California Leading Lawyers” in the May 2023
6 issue of Consumer Attorneys of Southern California (a recognition given to 17
7 employment/labor law attorneys in 2023), having been selected as “Super Lawyer” in
8 employment litigation over the last 5 consecutive years, having achieved large settlements,
9 having prevailed at trial in PAGA-only actions and Class Action jury trials. (Mankin Decl. ¶¶ 2-
10 6). Indeed, Class Counsel’s rates are typical of the rates charged by defense counsel with similar
11 experience doing similar employment law work in this region.

12 Thus, Plaintiff’s Counsel’s rates are reasonable and typical, and the attorneys’ fees
13 requested confirm that the fee request is fair and reasonable under the lodestar multiplier cross-
14 check.

15 **VII. THE REQUESTED COSTS AND SERVICE AWARDS ARE REASONABLE**

16 **A. The Requested Costs Are Reasonable and Merit Approval**

17 The Settlement Agreement authorized litigation expenses up to \$25,000. (Settlement
18 Agreement ¶ 3.2.2). However, Class Counsel’s actual costs through the final approval hearing
19 are estimated to be \$20,350.16. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 27.) Since Class Counsel’s actual costs were
20 less than the amount allocated, the saving will be placed in the Net Settlement Amount. These
21 costs include mediation fees, filing fees, CourtCall charges, and court filing fees, and process
22 server fees.

23 **B. The Requested Service Award is Reasonable and Merits Approval**

24 A named plaintiff is an essential ingredient of any class action and an incentive award
25 is appropriate to induce individuals to step forward and assume the burdens and obligations of
26 representing the Class. Courts regularly approve service payments to compensate named
27 Plaintiffs for their service to the class and the risks they incurred during the course of the
28 litigation. (*See, e.g. Bell v. Farmers Insurance Exchange* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726

1 (upholding “service payments” to named Plaintiff for their efforts in bringing class action);
2 *Rodriguez v. West Publishing* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 959 (stating that incentive awards
3 are “intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make
4 up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to
5 recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.”).

6 Under the Settlement, Defendant agreed to pay a Service Award in the amount of
7 \$10,000 to Plaintiff Clarence Phillips in recognition of his contribution as the Class
8 Representative. In addition, Plaintiff also undertook significant risks, including the risk of
9 being blackballed in the industry and the risk that he could have been liable for Defendant’s
10 costs if he lost. This factor is a significant one for a wage earner, and the potential risk is very
11 real. (*See Whiteway v. FedEx Kinkos Office & Print Svcs., Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2007) No.
12 C 05-2320 SBA, 2007 WL 4531783, at *3 (“the few courts to consider this ‘class
13 representatives’ dilemma’ have not found it inequitable to assess costs upon the lead or named
14 plaintiff in a class action.”).)

15 Plaintiff also committed a significant number of hours to assist with the
16 litigation/settlement processes of this case. The requested Service Payment is reasonable,
17 particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for the Class Members, the
18 risks he undertook, and in exchange for executing a general release against Defendant. (See
19 Phillips’ Declaration ¶¶ 3-9.)

20 The Notice sent to each Class Member detailed the proposed service award. No Class
21 Member has objected to the proposed payment to Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff’s request that the
22 Court approve the award because it is both reasonable and appropriate.

23 **VIII. OTHERS MATTERS RE: FINAL APPROVAL**

24 **A. Settlement Administration Costs**

25 The parties agreed that the Administrator, Phoenix Settlement Administrators, would be
26 compensated for services performed. The Administrator’s flat fee is \$9,500.00, which
27 included considerable work performed by the administrator in resolving the data issues and
28 paying for the newspaper ad. (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 16; Exhibit B thereto.)

B. Notice of Final Judgment to the Class

The Proposed Final Approval Order directs the Settlement Administrator to give notice of entry of judgment by including a postcard to the Class Members at the same time the checks are mailed.

C. Uncashed Checks

The Settlement Agreement provides that unclaimed funds will be submitted to the California State Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no “unpaid residue” subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). (S.A. ¶ 4.4.1.)

D. Final Report

Defendant's payment is due 30 days after the Effective Date, which will occur the date that the Final Order is entered since there were no objections or motions to intervene. The Administrator then has 10 days thereafter process the funds and issue checks to the Class Members, who will then have 180 days to cash their checks. Accordingly, the Parties project that the check cashing deadline will occur on approximately July 26, 2025. The Parties propose submitting a final report in the form of a declaration from the Administrator and then holding a disbursement hearing approximately one year after the final approval hearing.

E. Submission to the LWDA

As set forth in the Mankin Declaration at ¶ 29, the Settlement Agreement and this motion are concurrently being submitted to the LWDA in accordance with Labor Code § 2699(1)(2). The LWDA has not commented on the Settlement to date.

IX. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and merits final approval.

Dated: November 20, 2024

LAUBY, MANKIN & LAUBY LLP

BY:

Barry March

Brian J. Mankin, Esq.

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

PROOF OF SERVICE
(Pursuant to CCP §§ 1013(a)(1) and 2015.5)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE)

I am employed in the County of Riverside, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 5198 Arlington Avenue, PMB 513, Riverside, CA 92504.

On November 20, 2024, I caused to be served the foregoing document(s) described as follows:

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; DECLARATIONS IN SUPPORT THEREOF; AND [PROPOSED] FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

I declare that I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with the U.S. postal service on that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

☐ **By Mail** I deposited such envelope in the mail at Riverside, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.

☐ **By Facsimile** I sent this document via fax to all parties as listed on attached service list, on

☐ **By Overnight Service** I deposited such envelope in a facility regularly maintained by the United Parcel Service for receipt of items for overnight delivery, with overnight delivery expenses prepaid, addressed to the person to be served.


☒ **By Email or Electronic Transmission:** Pursuant to CCP § 1010.6 or an agreement of the parties to accept service by email or electronic transmission, I caused the document(s) to be sent from email address tracie@lmlfirm.com to the persons at the electronic notification address listed in the service list. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was not successful.

☐ **By Certified Mail-Return Receipt Requested** I caused such envelope with postage fully prepaid thereon, to be placed in the United States mail at Riverside, California

☐ **By Personal Service** I caused said document(s) to be personally served by hand on the parties listed on the attached service list.

☒ **State** I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on November 20, 2024, Riverside, California.

☐ **Federal** I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.


Tracie Chiarito, Declarant

SERVICE LIST

Roger Mansukhani, Esq.
Emma R. Horner, Esq.
GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKANI
101 W. Broadway, #2000
San Diego, CA 92101
619-544-7252-Emma direct
ehorner@grsm.com
rmansukhani@grsm.com
Attorneys for Defendants