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as an individual and on behalf of all
employees similarly situated

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

EFRAIN VIVEROS, as an individual and on
behalf of all employees similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

D AND T RESTAURANTS, INC., a California
Corporation; MCSURF, INC., a California
Corporation; BLADE ENTERPRISES III, Inc., a
California Corporation; BLADE ENTERPRISES
IV, Inc., a California Corporation; BLADE
ENTERPRISES V, Inc., a California Corporation;
BLADE ENTERPRISES VI, Inc., a California
Corporation; BLADE ENTERPRISES VII, Inc., a
California Corporation; BLADE ENTERPRISES
VIII, Inc., a California Corporation; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 23STCV10019

[Assigned to Hon. Laura Seigle, Dept.17]

**CLASS AND PAGA REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION**

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS AND PAGA
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Date: November 8, 2024
Time: 9 a.m.
Courtroom: Dept. 17
Judge: Hon. Laura Seigle

Action Filed: May 4, 2023
Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 8, 2024, at 9 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the
3 matter may be heard, in Department 17 of the above-captioned Court, located at 312 North Spring Street,
4 Los Angeles, California 90012, Plaintiff EFRAIN VIVEROS ("Plaintiff") will and hereby does move
5 this Court for an order:

6 1. Granting class certification of the Class, solely for settlement purposes pursuant to
7 Code of Civil Procedure § 382;

8 2. Finally approving the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT
9 AGREEMENT ("Settlement" or "Agreement");

10 3. Appointing counsel for Plaintiff, Tunyan Law, APC, as Class Counsel;

11 4. Appointing Plaintiff Efrain Viveros as the Class Representative;

12 5. Approving Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the third-party
13 administrator;

14 6. Ruling that Settlement Class Members who did not timely submit requests for
15 exclusion from the settlement as set forth in the Agreement have released their claims against
16 Defendants and the other releasees as set forth in the Agreement;

17 7. Ruling that Settlement Class Members who did not timely object to the settlement
18 pursuant to the terms set forth in the Agreement are barred from prosecuting or pursuing any
19 appeal of the Court's Order;

20 8. Awarding the sums requested in the Motion;

21 9. Entering a Final Judgment; and,

22 10. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing
23 jurisdiction over the parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering
24 the settlement as set forth in the Agreement or enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment.

25 Good cause exists to grant this Motion because:

26 1. The Class meets all of the requirements for class certification for settlement
27 purposes under Code of Civil Procedure § 382;

28 2. The Settlement Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the

disputed wage and hour claims asserted by Plaintiff;

3. Plaintiff and Class Counsel are adequate to represent the Class;

4. The notice procedures and related forms complied with California Rules of Court 3.766(d) and (e), and adequately apprised Class Members of their rights and fully comport with due process.

This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 and Rule 3.1113(e) of the California Rules of Court, which require approval by the Court of a class action settlement and permit the Court to extend the page limit for memoranda.

This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Lilit Tunyan, Plaintiff and the Settlement Administrator in support thereof, all papers and pleadings on file with the Court in this action, all matters judicially noticeable, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented in connection with the hearing on the Motion.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: October 15, 2024

TUNYAN LAW, APC

By: _____


Lilit Tunyan
Artur Tunyan

Attorneys for Plaintiff EFRAIN VIVEROS

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiff EFRAIN VIVEROS
3 (“Plaintiff”) respectfully requests that this Court finally approve the proposed class action settlement set
4 forth in the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (“Settlement” or
5 “Agreement”) with Defendants D AND T RESTAURANTS, INC., MCSURF, Inc., BLADE
6 ENTERPRISES III, Inc., BLADE ENTERPRISES IV, Inc., BLADE ENTERPRISES V, Inc., BLADE
7 ENTERPRISES VI, Inc., BLADE ENTERPRISES VII, Inc., BLADE ENTERPRISES VIII
8 (“Defendants”). The CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT used by the Parties
9 is based upon the model agreement template made available by the Los Angeles Superior Court.

10 After informal discovery, the exchange of documents, and an arm’s-length mediation session
11 with an experienced mediator Mark LeHocky, Esq., Plaintiff and Defendants (collectively referred to
12 herein as the “Parties”) reached a proposed class action settlement with a gross settlement amount
13 (“GSA”) of **\$900,000.00** in compromise of disputed claims asserted on behalf of the below-defined Class
14 consisting of **1,886** members. Plaintiff believes that this settlement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable
15 compromise of the disputed claims for alleged unpaid wage and hour violations and penalties asserted in
16 this case.

17 Plaintiff now submits this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement,
18 along with the Settlement (attached to the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan [“Tunyan Decl.”], **Exhibit 1**
19 thereto).

20 **II. THE NOTICE PROCESS WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED AFTER**
21 **PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

22 Plaintiff and Defendants have fulfilled the class notice procedures set forth in the Settlement. The
23 Settlement Administrator, Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions (“Phoenix”), sent individual
24 Notices to 1,886 Class Members on June 28, 2024. (Declaration of Mayra Gonzalez [“Gonzalez Decl.”],
25 ¶¶ 3-5.) Of the Notices that were mailed, 0 were returned after mailing. (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 6.) No Class
26 Members requested to be excluded from the Settlement, and no Class Members objected or disputed
27 Workweeks in writing. (Gonzalez Decl., ¶¶ 7-9.)

28 **PAYMENTS:** For 1,886 Settlement Class Members, the average gross payment per Class Member is

1 **\$477.2.** The Net Settlement Amount (including both Class and PAGA Settlement payments) is
2 estimated to be at least **\$493,536.46**, resulting in an average net payment per Class Member of at least
3 **\$261.68** (including PAGA Settlement payments), before any tax withholdings. (Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 15.)
4 The highest net payment (including PAGA Settlement payments) is estimated to be **\$1,593.05** (Gonzalez
5 Decl., ¶ 15.) For the Court’s convenience, below is a summary of the key provisions of the Settlement.

6 **III. THE MAJOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT**

7 The provisions of the proposed Settlement include the following:

- 8 • Defendants agree not to oppose certification of a Class for purposes of Settlement only
9 (Settlement, ¶ 12.1);
- 10 • Class: All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants who worked for Defendants in
11 California during the Class Period (the “Class Period” is May 4, 2019 through the date of
12 granting preliminary approval of this settlement). (Settlement, ¶ 1.5, 1.12.) “Participating
13 Class Members” are those Class Members who do not submit timely exclusion requests to
14 the Settlement Administrator. (Settlement, ¶ 1.9, 1.35);
- 15 • Settlement Amount: Defendants will pay a maximum of **\$900,000.00**, referred to as the
16 Gross Settlement Amount (or GSA herein), resulting in an estimated average **gross**
17 payment per Class Member of approximately **\$477.2** (Settlement, ¶ 1.22);
- 18 • Class Size: approximately **1,886** individuals who worked **133,949** workweeks during Class
19 Period. (Settlement, ¶ 8);
- 20 • PAGA Group Size: an estimated **1,153** individuals, who worked **33,281** pay periods during
21 PAGA period (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 18);
- 22 • PAGA Period: May 4, 2022 through the date of granting preliminary approval of
23 this settlement. (Settlement, ¶ 1.31);
- 24 • Escalator Clause: Based on its records, Defendants estimates that, as of the date of the pre-
25 mediation document and data production, there are 1,917 Class Members and 122,386 total
26 workweeks during the Class period. If the total number of workweeks during the Class
27 Period exceeds 122,386 by more than 10%, then Defendants can either have the Class
28 Period end on the date that the Workweeks exceed 134,625 or increase the Gross

Settlement Amount on a pro rata basis a pro-rata dollar value equal to the number of workweeks in excess of 134,625 workweeks. (the “Escalator Clause”). (Settlement, ¶ 8);

The escalator clause was not triggered.

- Kullar/Munoz Analysis: Plaintiff addresses the claims analysis herein, at Part V.B.3, and in more detail the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan, at Paragraph 18;
- No Reversion: The Settlement is a **non-reversionary** settlement (Settlement, ¶ 3.1);
- Certification: Plaintiff addresses certification requisites herein, at Part V.A., and in the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan, at Paragraphs 34-40;
- No Claim Form: No claim form is required (Settlement., ¶ 3.1);
- Class Release: The Settlement will release specified wage-and-hour claims for Class Members (those Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement) (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.39, 5.2);
- PAGA Release: The Class Members will release the PAGA Claims set forth in this Action, that were identified in the First Amended Complaint and Plaintiff’s LWDA Notice Letter, regardless of whether they opt out of the class portion of the Settlement (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.40, 5.3);
- Release Effective Date: The Release is not active until Defendants tender all payments required under the Settlement to the Settlement Administrator (Settlement, ¶ 5);
- Net Settlement Amount Available to the Class: After deducting Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs, service payment to Plaintiff, administration costs, and the payment to the LWDA, the remainder will be available for distribution to Class Members who do not opt out, with each Class Member receiving a share based on the number of workweeks each Class Member worked for Defendants within the Class Period. The Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be at least **\$493,536.46**, resulting in an average **gross** payment per Class Member of **\$477.2** and **net** payment per Class Member of at least **\$261.68** before any tax withholdings. (Settlement, ¶ 3);
- Tax Allocation: The amounts distributed to Class Members will be characterized as 20% alleged unpaid wages, 80% to penalties and interest, and PAGA Settlement Payments will

be allocated as 100% penalties. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.1, 3.2.5.2);

- Employer’s Portion of Payroll Taxes Paid Separately: Defendants’ portion of payroll taxes (e.g., FICA, FUTA, etc.) owed on any settlement payments to Class Members that constitute wages will be paid separate and apart from the GSM (Settlement, ¶ 3.1);
- Settlement Administrator: The notice portion of the Settlement will be administered by a third-party Administrator, Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions and the Parties estimated that the costs of administration should not reasonably exceed \$30,000.00. Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions’ low bid for settlement administration services in the amount of **\$17,000.00** was selected as the lowest bid from a competitive bidding process. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.3);
- Class Data for Administration: The Settlement Administrator will receive the Class List within 20 calendar days of Preliminary Approval, use the NCOA database to update the Class List, and then use skip tracing on returned Notices (Settlement, ¶ 4.2);
- Notice: The Notice will issue within 14 days of receipt of the Class List (Settlement, ¶ 7.4.2). The Notice describes how to dispute workweeks, submit an objection in writing, in person, or through an attorney, or request exclusion (Settlement, ¶¶ 7.4 – 7.7);
- Notice Language: Notice will issue in English and Spanish (Settlement, ¶ 1.11);
- Objections: Objections can be submitted in person, through an attorney, or in writing to the Settlement Administrator (Settlement, ¶ 7.7);
- Exclusion Requests: The procedure for exclusion requests, mailing a request to the Settlement Administrator, is the same as the procedure for submitting a written objection (Settlement, ¶¶ 7.5 and 7.7);
- PAGA Allocation: From the GSA, **\$80,000.00** will be allocated to settle claims brought pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 *et seq.* (“PAGA”), and seventy-five percent (75%), or **\$60,000.00**, will be paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.34, 3.2.5.);
- Notice to LWDA: Notice was provided prior to the filing of this Motion. Evidence is attached to the Declaration of Lilit Tunyan;

- Enhancement/Service Award to Plaintiff: Defendants will not oppose the application for Class Representative Service Payment of up to **\$10,000.00** for Plaintiff, to be paid from the GSA (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.1);
- Fees and Costs: Defendants will not oppose Class Counsel’s application for fees not to exceed 33 1/3% of the GSA (**\$300,000.00**), and actual costs, in an amount not to exceed **\$20,000.00**, to be paid out of the GSA (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.2);
- Check Void Period: Settlement checks will be valid for 180 days (Settlement, ¶ 4.4.3);
- Uncashed Checks: Any settlement checks that are mailed to the Class Members and remain uncashed after 180 days of the date of issuance will be cancelled, and the moneys will be directed to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund (Settlement, ¶ 4.4.3);
- Judgment Notice: Settlement Agreement, Class Notice and Judgment will be posted on the Settlement Administrator’s website after entry (Settlement, ¶ 7.8.1);
- Confidentiality Provisions: The Settlement permits Class Counsel to discuss the Settlement with Class Members (Settlement ¶ 12.2).

(Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 10-11 and Exhibit 1 thereto.)

IV. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

On May 4, 2023, Plaintiff commenced this Action by filing a Complaint alleging causes of action against Defendants for: (1) Violation of Labor Code §§ 204, 510, 1194, 1198 (Failure to Pay All Wages; (2) Violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512 (Failure to Provide Meal Periods); (3) Violation of Labor Code § 226.7 (Failure to Provide Rest Periods); (4) Violation of Labor Code § 226, (Failure to Keep Accurate Itemized Wage Statements); (5) Violation of Labor Code §§ 201-203 (Failure to Pay Wages Upon Termination of Employment); (6) Violation of Labor Code § 2802 (Failure to Reimburse For Necessary Expenditures); (7) Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (Unfair Business Practices). On July 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint adding a cause of action for Civil Penalties Under PAGA [Cal. Lab. Code § 2699, et seq.]. The First Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in the Action (the “Operative Complaint.”) (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 3.)

Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3(a), Plaintiff gave timely written notice to Defendants and the

1 LWDA by sending the PAGA Notice. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 4.)

2 **B. Pre-Settlement Data Production and Analysis**

3 The Parties have conducted informal discovery and investigation of the facts and law. Such
4 discovery and investigation have included, inter alia, the exchange of informal data and discoverable
5 information in preparation for the settlement negotiations. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 5.) The Parties have
6 analyzed payroll and other data pertaining to Plaintiff and the Class during the relevant Settlement
7 Period, including but not limited to the numbers of former and current members of the Class, average
8 workweeks, sample size time and pay records and average rate of hourly pay, wage and hour policies.
9 (*Id.*)

10 After reviewing documents regarding Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices and
11 other information obtained during the informal exchange of discovery, Class Counsel were able to
12 evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and the reasonably obtainable
13 maximum monetary exposure for all claims. Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a
14 damage analysis prior to engaging in settlement negotiations. Class Counsel also investigated the
15 applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 6.)

16 **C. Settlement**

17 On January 11, 2024, the Parties mediated before a mediator Mark LeHocky, Esq. who is a
18 highly experienced and well-regarded mediator for wage and hour class action litigation. (Tunyan Decl.,
19 ¶ 7.) At the mediation, the Parties discussed at length the burdens and risks of continuing with the
20 litigation considering Defendants’ limited ability to pay settlement funds in an amount exceeding the
21 Gross Settlement Amount due to McDonald’s Corporation reinvestment requirements as well as the
22 merits of the claims and defenses. (See Declaration of Jim Howard, ¶ 2.) (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 7.) The
23 Parties have been able to reach a settlement at the mediation. The Parties have reached an agreement
24 regarding the substantive terms of a class-wide settlement, pending the Parties’ agreement on a long-
25 form class settlement agreement. The Parties then signed a long form settlement agreement
26 (“Agreement”). (*Id.*)

27 Plaintiff and Class Counsel are aware of the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability for
28 the claims asserted in the Action, both generally and in response to Defendants’ defenses thereto.

Plaintiff and Class Counsel have also taken into account Defendant’s agreement to enter into a Settlement that confers substantial relief upon the Class. (Tunyan Decl., ¶8.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth in this Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable Settlement and is in the best interests of the Class. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 9.) Solely for the purpose of settling this case, the parties agree that the requirements for establishing class action certification with respect to this class have been met and are met. (*Id.*) If this Settlement is not approved by the Court for any reason, Defendants reserve their right to contest class certification. (*Id.*) This Settlement, if approved by the Court, will result in the termination with prejudice of the litigation through the entry of the Judgment and the release of all Released Claims for all Class Members, including all within the class definition who have not elected to exclude themselves from the Class. (*Id.*)

V. CLASS DEFINITION

The Class is defined as follows:

All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants who worked for Defendants in California during the Class Period (the “Class Period” is May 4, 2019 through the date of granting preliminary approval of this settlement.) “Participating Class Members” are those Class Members who do not submit timely exclusion requests to the Settlement Administrator. (Settlement, ¶ 1.35.)(Tunyan Decl., ¶ 34 and Exhibit 1.)

The Aggrieved Employees are defined as follows:

All non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendants who worked for Defendants in California during the PAGA Period (the “PAGA Period” is May 4, 2022 through the date of granting preliminary approval of this settlement.) Aggrieved Employees cannot opt out of the settlement of the PAGA claim. (Settlement, ¶ 7.5.4.)

VI. DISCUSSION

A. The Court Should Certify the Class Because It Meets All the Requirements for Certification for Settlement Purposes Under CCP § 382

Under Code of Civil Procedure § 382, class certification is warranted so long as there is a numerous and ascertainable class with a well-defined community of interest among its members and a “class action proceeding is superior to other means for a fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.” *See, e.g., Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 332 (2004). Any doubts as to

1 the appropriateness of class treatment must be resolved in favor of certification, subject to later
2 modification. *Richmond v. Dart Indus. Inc.*, 29 Cal. 3d 462, 473-475 (1981). For purposes of this
3 Settlement *only*, Defendants stipulated to conditional certification. (Settlement ¶ 12.1.)

4 “The certification question is ‘essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is
5 legally or factually meritorious.’” *Id.*, at 326, quoting *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 439-440
6 (2000). Indeed, the certification question simply asks whether the theory of recovery advanced by the
7 plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment. *See, e.g., Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal.
8 App. 4th 1286, 1298 (2010). In ruling on certification, a trial court’s task is to determine “whether ... the
9 issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so
10 numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial
11 process and to the litigants.” *Id.* Thus, “[t]he relevant comparison lies between the costs and benefits of
12 adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims in a class action and the costs and benefits of proceeding by numerous
13 separate actions” *See, e.g., id.*

14 “[I]t is also well established that trial courts should use different standards to determine the
15 propriety of a settlement class, as opposed to a litigation class certification. Specifically, a lesser standard
16 of scrutiny is used for settlement cases.” *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal.
17 App. 4th 836, 859 (2003), citing *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1807 n. 19 (1996). As
18 the court noted in *Dunk*, although certification requirements are intended “to protect the interests of the
19 non-representative class members,” that concern is “protected by the trial court’s fairness review of the
20 settlement.” *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1807 n.19.

21 Indeed, numerous courts have certified settlement classes. For example, the court in *In re Drexel*
22 *Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.*, 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 1088, 122 L. Ed.
23 497, 113 S. Ct 1070 (1993), addressed settlement before a class was certified. After a hearing, the
24 “district court issued an order certifying the class and approving the settlement agreement.” *Id.* at 289;
25 *see also Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc.*, 73 F.R.D. 269, 278 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“the use of the
26 tentative settlement class procedure was appropriate in this case”), *aff’d*, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert.
27 denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978). Certification of a settlement class is a regular feature of class action
28 litigation and an approved procedure which ought to be followed in this case. *See Newberg on Class*

1 Actions (3d ed. 1991) § 11.27, pp. 11-40 to 11-56; Manual for Complex Litigation, 2d (1993) § 30.45.

2 In view of these standards, **as discussed more thoroughly as part of the preliminary approval**
3 **motion already granted by the Court**, the Settlement Class should be certified for purposes of
4 settlement. Code Civ. Proc. § 382; Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c).

5 **B. The Court Should Finally Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair, Adequate,**
6 **and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage Claims in View of Defendants’**
7 **Potential Liability Exposure and the Risks of Continued Litigation**

8 California courts favor settlement. *See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Superior Court*, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231,
9 236 (1976). Unlike most settlements, class action settlements involve a court approval process that exists
10 to prevent fraud, collusion, and unfairness to class members. *Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v.*
11 *Superior Court*, 103 Cal.App.3d 573, 578-579 (1980). This approval process consists of preliminary
12 settlement approval, notice being given to class members, and a final fairness and approval hearing being
13 held at which class members may be heard with respect to the settlement. *Id.* For the reasons discussed
14 below, this Court should finally approve the Settlement and enter Judgment.

15 **1. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Review and Approval.**

16 Any settlement of class litigation must be reviewed and approved by the presiding court. Rules
17 of Court, Rule 3.769(a). Approval occurs in two steps: (1) an early (preliminary) review by the trial
18 court and (2) a subsequent (final) review after notice has been distributed to the class members. The
19 Preliminary Approval Hearing and Final Approval Hearing coincide with these two steps. The present
20 motion seeks final *approval* and the entry of a Judgment.

21 To evaluate a settlement, the trial court must receive “basic information about the nature and
22 magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the
23 release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.
24 App. 4th 116, 133 (2008). However, the record need *not* contain an explicit statement of the maximum
25 theoretical amount that the class could recover. *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*,
26 186 Cal. App. 4th 399, 409 (2010).

1 **2. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arms’ Length Negotiations**
2 **Between Experienced Counsel After Sufficient Data Was Exchanged to**
3 **Evaluate Settlement.**

4 A settlement is presumptively fair where it is reached through arms’ length bargaining, based on
5 sufficient discovery and investigation to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, counsel is
6 experienced in similar litigation, and the percentage of objectors is small.¹ *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802;
7 *In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006); *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v.*
8 *Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1146 (2000). In deciding whether to approve a settlement, a
9 trial court has broad powers to determine whether it is fair under the circumstances of the case. *See, e.g.,*
10 *Mallick v. Superior Court*, 89 Cal. App. 3d 434, 438 (1979). In exercising these powers, the overriding
11 concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk*, at 1801,
12 quoting *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).

13 Relevant factors in making this determination, include, but are not limited to:

14 [T]he complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
15 action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery
16 completed and the state of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the
17 presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
18 proposed settlement.

19 *Id.* These factors require balancing, are non-exhaustive, and, as such, trial courts should tailor the factors
20 considered to each case and give due regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
21 between the parties.” *Id.*

22 Here, the Settlement resulted from thorough, arms’ length negotiations between experienced
23 counsel with the assistance of highly regarded mediator. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) With respect to the
24 claims at issue in this case, Plaintiff obtained employees’ pay and time data from Defendants and then
25 carefully reviewed that information. Counsel for Plaintiff also examined relevant policies.

26 Based on the totality of that review, Plaintiff estimated the potential exposure and then estimated
27 risk factors to adjust the reasonable expected outcome. The investigation and discovery that Plaintiff’s
28

¹ Because the fourth prerequisite for the presumption to arise cannot be addressed until the final approval hearing, only the first three prerequisites are relevant at this preliminary stage of the settlement approval process.

counsel conducted were sufficient to provide them with enough information to intelligently evaluate the estimated exposure in this action for purposes of negotiating the Settlement in view of the risks discussed below and are also sufficient to allow this Court to do the same. *See, e.g., Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001).

Finally, there are no objectors as of the completion of the notice process.

3. The Settlement Represents a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Class Members' Claims Based on Defendants' Estimated Liability Exposure Given the Risks Continued Litigation Would Entail.

A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial and does not have to provide 100% of damages sought to be fair and reasonable. "In the context of a settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances." *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 250. Accordingly, because settlements involve compromise, even one that provides for substantially narrower relief than would likely be obtained if the suit were successfully litigated can be reasonable given that "the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation." *Id.*, quoting *Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc.*, 455 F.2d 101, 109 (7th Cir. 1972).

With respect to the claims asserted on behalf of the Class in this case, there are serious risks that support the reduced compromise amount. These risks include, but are not limited to: (i) the risk that Plaintiff would be unable to establish liability for unpaid straight time or overtime wages, *see Duran v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n*, 59 Cal. 4th 1, 39 & n. 33 (2014) ("*Duran*"), citing *Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC* 2014 WL 205039 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing certified off-the-clock claims based on proof at trial); (ii) the risk that Defendants' meal and rest period policies might not ultimately support class certification or a class-wide liability finding, *see Duran*, 59 Cal. 4th at 14, n. 28 (citing Court of Appeal decisions favorable on class certification issue without expressing opinion as to ultimate viability of proposition); (iii) the risk that uncertainties pertaining to the ultimate legality of Defendants' policies and practices could preclude class-wide awards of statutory penalties under Labor Code §§ 203 and 226(e); (iv) the risk that individual differences between Class Members could be construed as pertaining to liability and

not solely to damages, *see Duran*, 59 Cal. 4th at 19; (v) the risk that any civil penalties award under the PAGA could be reduced by the Court in its discretion, *see Labor Code § 2699(e)(1)*; (vi) the risk that class treatment could be deemed improper as to one or more claims, except for settlement purposes; and, (vii) the risk that appellate litigation could ensue; (viii) the risk that violation rate estimates would prove much lower than expected. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 15.) These risks are non-exhaustive.

In light of the uncertainties of protracted litigation, the settlement amount reflects a fair and reasonable recovery for the Class Members. (Tunyan Decl. ¶¶ 12-19.) The settlement amount is, of course, a compromise figure. (Tunyan Decl. ¶ 16.) By necessity it took into account risks related to liability, damages, and the defenses asserted by Defendants. (*Id.*) Moreover, each Class Member will be given the opportunity to opt-out of the Settlement, allowing those who feel they have claims that are greater than the benefits they can receive under this Settlement to pursue their own claims. (*Id.*) For the approximately **1,886** members of the Class, the average **gross** recovery is at least **\$477.2** per class member, and the estimated average **net** recovery for each Class Member is approximately **\$261.68** (*Id.*) Given that Defendants could challenge certification and liability and Defendants' limited ability to pay settlement amount exceeding the Gross Settlement Amount due to McDonald's Corporation reinvestment requirements, this is a significant sum to have achieved in settlement. Moreover, a Class Member who worked a greater number of weeks for Defendants will receive a larger share of the Settlement than a Class Member who worked for a shorter amount of time during the class period. (*Id.*)

After analyzing the claims in this matter, Plaintiff has concluded that the Gross Settlement Amount of **\$900,000.00** is about 75% of the **\$1,206,799.52** estimate of *risk-adjusted* recovery (excluding interest) at this stage in the litigation. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 17.) This assessment is based on a carefully constructed model of the current fair value of the case, using estimated risks, average wage rates, numbers of employees, and the amount of time covered by the class period. (*Id.*) The maximum calculated reasonable exposure is **\$6,331,610.50**, including PAGA penalties. (*Id.*)

- A reasonably estimated exposure for unpaid off-the-clock work was calculated, with the assistance of an expert, to be approximately **\$1,180,138.50**. However, with the risk factor discounts for certification and liability proof, the value of that claim is estimated by Plaintiff's counsel to be approximately **\$141,616.62**, assuming certification probability of

40% and merits success at 30%.

- A reasonably estimated exposure for rest break violations over the class period was calculated at **\$67,509.00**, but with chances of certification and proof of liability (50% and 40% respectively) for a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$13,501.80**.
- A reasonably estimated exposure for meal break violations over the class period was calculated at **\$394,483.00** with chances of certification and liability risks (50% and 40% respectively) resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$78,896.60**.
- Risk-adjusted penalty recoveries for wage statement and Labor Code § 203 penalties were estimated to be approximately **\$28,930.00** and **\$151,632.50**, respectively, on maximum exposures of **\$289,300.00** and **\$1,516.325.00**, respectively (50% and 20% respectively).
- A reasonably estimated exposure for unreimbursed expenses was calculated at **\$598,475.00**, with chances of certification and liability risks (80% and 70% respectively) resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$335,146.00**.
- Performing risk-adjusted valuations for all claims yields a total value in the range of **\$749,723.52**, excluding PAGA. (*Id.*)
- PAGA penalties were calculated as having a maximum realistic exposure of **\$2,285,380.00**, but a risk adjusted value of **\$457,076.00**, after factoring in risks of reduction in penalties pursuant to Court discretion and the high risk of the inability to prove violations for all aggrieved employees.

The concurrently filed Declaration of Lilit Tunyan sets forth claim valuation in additional detail. (*See*, Tunyan Decl., ¶ 17.)

This result here is fully supportable as reasonable. First, it is important to recognize the wilfulness finding required for Labor Code §§ 203 and 226 is challenging to establish. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 18.) Second, rest break and meal period claims have been challenging to certify for many years, even after *Brinker*. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 18.) Third, the certification rates in California are lower than conventional wisdom holds. *See*, H. Scott Leviant, *Second Interim Report on class actions in California sheds new light on certification* (February 19, 2010), www.thecomplexlitigator.com, available at <http://www.thecomplexlitigator.com/post-data/2010/2/19/second-interim-report-on-class-actions-in->

1 california-sheds-n.html; *see also*, *Findings of the Study of California Class Action Litigation*, 2000-2006,
2 available at <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf> (finding, at page
3 5, and in Table 9, at page 15, that only 21.4% of all class actions were certified either as part of a
4 settlement **or** as part of a contested certification motion).

5 Here, the estimated certification probabilities are **above** the average rate at which cases were
6 certified in California over the study years, based upon data available through the California Courts
7 websites. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 18.) In sum, well *under* 20% of all cases filed as proposed class actions are
8 ultimately certified by way of a *contested* motion. (*Id.*) The recovery is roughly 14% of the maximum
9 plausible recovery (estimated to be approximately \$6,331,610.00, including PAGA), which falls within
10 the expected outcome under the likelihood of success metric. (*Id.*) It would also be appropriate to
11 evaluate the result by examining only the premium wages at issue (approximately \$1,642,130.50, with
12 no risk reduction), excluding penalties and interest; the settlement is about 54.9% of the premium wages
13 (unpaid wages, meal period premiums, and rest break premiums) at maximum realistic exposure value.²
14 This Settlement achieves the goals of the litigation.

15 **4. The Proposed Method for Allocating Settlement Funds Is Fair, Adequate,**
16 **and Reasonable.**

17 The proposed method of allocating the Settlement Fund to Class Members also is fair and
18 reasonable. As noted, the parties agreed to allocate the Settlement Fund between all Class Members
19 based on time worked by the Class Member during the Class Period, in relation to the total amount of
20 time worked by all participating Class Members collectively during the class period. This proposed
21 method is fair and reasonable because each Class Member's actual potential damages vary based on the
22 number of workweeks he or she actually worked (e.g., Lab. Code § 226.7 provides for an extra hour of
23 pay at the employee's regular rate of pay for each violation, resulting in a higher potential damage when
24

25 ² The exclusion of interest and penalties from the fairness evaluation is proper because, first, PAGA
26 penalties are discretionary (*see* Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2) (the court in its discretion "may award a lesser
27 amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part...")), and, second, courts evaluate
28 the strength of a proposed settlement without taking potential penalties or interest into consideration. *See*
Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2000); *see also* *Miller v. CEVA*
Logistics U.S.A., Inc., 2015 WL 729638, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015) (court utilized calculation of a
Defendants's exposure exclusive of interest and penalties to determine whether the settlement fell within
the range of possible approval).

a higher number of incidents occur). A Class Member who worked a greater number of weeks for Defendants will receive a larger payment under the Settlement than a Class Member who worked for a shorter amount of time during the relevant period. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 11, 17.)

5. The Proposed Enhancement Award to Plaintiff Is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable and Warrants Final Approval.

The proposed enhancement payment to Plaintiff is intended to recognize the substantial initiative and significant efforts on behalf of the Class. Courts routinely approve incentive awards to compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class action litigation, often in much higher amounts than that sought here. *See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange*, 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 726 (2004) (upholding “service payments” to named plaintiffs for their efforts in bringing the case); *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.*, 901 F. Supp. 294 (N.D.Cal. 1995) (approving a \$50,000 enhancement award). Plaintiff contributed time to the prosecution of this matter, including assistance prior to the settlement negotiations and during settlement negotiations with information and substantial time conferring with counsel over the course of this litigation and before it was filed. (Viveros Decl., ¶¶ 4-22; Tunyan Decl., ¶ 32.) The enhancement also recognizes the considerable risks Plaintiff undertook on behalf of the Class to be personally liable for all costs incurred regardless of the success of the litigation or class certification, as well as the personal risk of facing intrusive discovery and potential disclosure to future employers that Plaintiff sued a former employer, making future employment prospects uncertain and general release of all claims beyond wage-and-hour claims released in this action. The accompanying Declaration of Plaintiff confirms his involvement and supports his appointment as the Settlement Class Representative.

6. The Proposed Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Is Also Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable and Merits Final Approval.

a) Plaintiff’s Counsel Should be Awarded Fees Based on a Percentage of the Fund Recovered, Consistent with the Common Fund Method

The request for attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the settlement fund is supported by the “common fund theory,” where “one who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits, may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the

litigation costs.” *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 35 (1977). The lodestar may be cross-checked against the percentage-of-recovery. See *In re Consumer Privacy Cases*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 545, 556-58 (2009).

The purpose of the common fund approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet*, 12 Cal. 4th 105, 110 (1995); see *Quinn v. State of California*, 15 Cal. 3d 162, 167 (1975) (“[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.”).

The California Supreme Court removed any lingering doubt about the use of the percentage of the fund method to award attorney’s fees in California Courts:

We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created. The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation (See pt. I, *ante*; *Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 48–49, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 797; *Rawlings v. Prudential–Bache Properties, Inc., supra*, 9 F.3d at p. 516)—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.

Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016).³ Thus, this Court may and, pursuant to *Laffitte*, should award fees to Plaintiff’s counsel based upon the percentage of the fund methodology.

Setting *Laffitte* aside, whether the once-again-confirmed percentage of the fund method or the lodestar method is used, the outcome is roughly the same: “[F]ee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery’ regardless of ‘whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used.’” *Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC*, 69 Cal. App. 5th 521 (2021). “Empirical studies show that,

³ The Supreme Court also corrected the misconception that *Dunk* should be viewed as expressing doubt about the use of the percentage method: “The *Dunk* court, while finding the percentage method inapplicable to the settlement before it due to the lack of a readily valued common fund, did not purport to bar its usage generally in common fund cases.” *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 501.

1 regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions
2 average around one-third of the recovery.” *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal. App. 4th 43, 47 n. 11 (2008).
3 This is also consistent with counsels’ experience in class cases. Here, Plaintiff’s attorneys request
4 attorneys’ fees of up to \$300,000.00 (one-third of the GSA), and costs of \$19,463.54 (below the cap or
5 \$20,000), which includes payment for filing fees, service of process fees, mediation fees, expert fees and
6 other standard expenses and future motion and final report filing, CaseAnywhere fees. (Tunyan Decl., ¶
7 31.) Given the efforts and risks involved in this case, as well as the results achieved, these amounts are
8 within the range of reasonableness and warrant *final approval*.

9 b) *Class Counsel Is Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees and Costs under the*
10 *California Labor Code and California’s Private Attorney General Statute*

11 Class Counsel is entitled to recover fees under Labor Code § 1194, which provides, in part:

12 [A]ny employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime
13 compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the
14 unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation,
15 including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

16 Lab. Code § 1194. As this litigation culminated in a Settlement that provides for a recovery of unpaid
17 wages, including unpaid minimum and overtimes wages, Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable
18 attorneys’ fees and costs under the Labor Code.

19 Class Counsel is also entitled to a fee under California’s private attorney general statute, Code of
20 Civil Procedure § 1021.5. “The award of attorney’s fees is proper under section 1021.5 if ‘(1) plaintiffs’
21 action ‘has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,’ (2) ‘a
22 significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a
23 large class of persons’ and (3) ‘the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to
24 make the award appropriate.’” *Press v. Lucky Stores*, 34 Cal. 3d 311, 317-318 (1983). The objective of
25 the statute is “to encourage suits enforcing public policies by providing substantial attorneys’ fees to
26 successful litigants in such cases.” *Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.*, 34 Cal. 4th 553, 565 (2004).

27 The Action resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, as
28 Plaintiff sought to enforce Class Members’ rights to recover statutory wages arising from Defendants’
29 failure to pay all wages and failure to provide meal and rest breaks. *See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole*

1 *Productions, Inc.*, 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1113 (2007) (noting that “health and safety concerns” are what
2 motivated the Industrial Wage Commission to adopt mandatory meal and rest periods).

3 The Action also conferred a significant benefit on a class of persons who worked for Defendants
4 during the Class Period and were, according to allegations, not properly compensated for all hours
5 worked and were not provided meal and rest periods or compensation therefor.

6 Finally, the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement render an award appropriate.
7 Without the incentive of an attorneys’ fee award, Plaintiff could not have afforded to hire counsel to
8 pursue this case, as the cost of litigating this matter far outweighed Plaintiff’s potential recovery. *See*
9 *Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation*, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1044 (2001) (“As to the necessity
10 and financial burden of private enforcement, an award is appropriate where the cost of the legal victory
11 transcends the claimants’ personal interest; in other words, where the burden of pursuing the litigation is
12 out of proportion to the plaintiff’s individual stake in the matter.”).

13 c) *A Lodestar Cross Check Confirms that Class Counsel’s Requested*
14 *Attorneys’ Fees Are Reasonable*

15 Plaintiff’s fee application is also reasonable based on Class Counsel’s lodestar. Under the
16 lodestar method, the court considers a compilation of the time spent and a reasonable hourly
17 compensation of each attorney to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee requested. *Ramos v.*
18 *Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.*, 82 Cal. App. 4th 615, 622 (2000). The moving party meets its burden in
19 this regard by submitting “declarations evidencing the reasonable hourly rate for their services and
20 establishing the number of hours spent working on the case” as “California case law permits fee awards
21 in the absence of detailed time sheets.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 254-55; *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at
22 1810; *Nightengale v. Hyundai Motors America*, 31 Cal. App. 4th 99, 103 (1994). The hours spent and
23 the reasonable hourly compensation are computed to arrive at a “lodestar” figure which may then be
24 augmented or diminished by the court taking into account various “multiplier” factors. *See Ramos*, 82
25 Cal. App. 4th at 622 (citing *Serrano*, 20 Cal. 3d at 48-49).

26 Here, Class Counsel’s billed lodestar exceeds **\$144,675.00** which is based on approximately
27 269.7 *billed* hours (not including final estimated hours) at the attorneys’ customary hourly rates.
28 (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 31-33.) The actual lodestar is estimated to be **\$150,175.00**. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 33.)

Application of a positive multiplier is appropriate, based on the contingent risk incurred by Class Counsel, the difficulty of the questions involved, the benefit conferred on the class as a result of the Settlement, and the skill displayed by Class Counsel. Thus, the request for \$300,000.00 in attorneys' fees, which is 1.9 times the final *estimated* lodestar, is reasonable under the lodestar method.

(1) Class Counsel's Hours Are Reasonable

In determining whether the number of hours expended on the litigation was reasonable, the court must determine that "the time spent was reasonably necessary and that [] counsel made 'a good faith effort to exclude from the fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'" *Jordan v. Multnomah County*, 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 n.8 (9th Cir. 1987). The court "should defer to the winning lawyer's professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case." *Moreno v. City of Sacramento*, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that "[l]awyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee cases in the hope of inflating their fees. The payoff is too uncertain, as to both the result and the amount of the fee.>").

Here, Class Counsel expended a prudent amount of time litigating the case to achieve the excellent result on behalf of the class. (Tunyan Decl. ¶ 31.)

(2) Class Counsel's Hourly Rates Are Reasonable

The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. *PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler*, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000). "[I]n assessing a reasonable hourly rate, the trial court is allowed to consider the attorneys' skill as reflected in the quality of work, as well as the attorneys' reputation and status." *MBNA American Bank, N.A. v. Gorman*, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1, 3 (2006). The trial court may also "find hourly rates reasonable based on evidence of other courts approving similar rates." *Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor America*, 796 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2010).

Class Counsel are experienced litigators who specialize in employment law, with a substantial wage and hour class action practice. (Tunyan Decl. ¶¶ 20-26.) A number of courts, including this Court, have approved Class Counsel's hourly rates which are consistent with their practice area, legal market. (Tunyan Decl. ¶ 26.) Given the skill and experience of Class Counsel, and the excellent result achieved, Class Counsel's hourly rates are reasonable.

///

(3) Application of a Positive Multiplier Would Be Appropriate

The lodestar may be adjusted by applying a multiplier. *See Serrano*, 20 Cal. 3d at 49. In California, “[m]ultipliers can range from **two to four or even higher**” and are routinely applied in the range requested by Class Counsel. *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 254; *see also Chavez*, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 66 (upholding **2.5 multiplier**); *Glendora Community Redevelopment Agency v. Demeter*, 155 Cal. App. 3d 465 (1984) (affirming a fee award that included a **12.0 multiplier**); Some factors a trial court considers when determining whether to apply a multiplier are: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” *See Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001) (citations omitted). The ultimate goal is “to entice competent counsel to undertake difficult public interest cases.” *San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc. v. County of San Bernardino*, 155 Cal. App. 3d 738, 755 (1985). Fee awards that are too small “chill the private enforcement essential to the vindication of many rights....” *Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.*, 82 Cal. App. 4th 19, 53 (2000).

In *Ketchum*, the California Supreme Court held that fee enhancement in contingency cases is necessary to (1) fully compensate counsel for the “loan” of legal services in light of the inherent high risk of “default” posed by losing the case, and (2) encourage competent counsel to take on fee award cases. *Ketchum*, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132-1133. As the court noted, “A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” *Id.* at 1133 (citations omitted). Application of a positive multiplier is appropriate, based on the contingent risk incurred by Class Counsel, the difficulty of the questions involved, the benefit conferred on the class as a result of settlement, and the skill displayed by Class Counsel. Here, a multiplier of **1.9** is required to align the final estimated lodestar with the requested fee. Class Counsel have been litigating this case before receiving any reimbursement, expending resources which could have been directed elsewhere. Class Counsel agreed to litigate on a contingent basis, and in the process assumed considerable risk. (Tunyan Decl. ¶ 27.)

Class Counsel’s efficiency and skill in bringing the case to an early resolution should not be used

1 to justify refusal to award the requested fees. As the court explained in *Lealao*:

2 [T]he promptness of settlement cannot be used to justify the refusal to apply a multiplier
3 to reflect the size of the class recovery without exacerbating the disincentive to settle
4 promptly inherent in the lodestar methodology. Considering that our Supreme Court
has placed an extraordinarily high value on settlement ... it would seem counsel should
be rewarded, not punished, for helping to achieve that goal....

5 *Lealao*, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 52 (citations omitted).

6 Given the contingent risk incurred by Class Counsel, the issues involved, the substantial benefit
7 conferred on the class and State as a result of the Settlement, and the skill displayed by Class Counsel,
8 application of a modest positive multiplier would be appropriate. Thus, Plaintiff respectfully requests
9 that the Court award Class Counsel the requested fees of **\$300,000.00** under the common fund theory
10 with a lodestar cross-check or, alternatively, based on Class Counsel's lodestar with application of a
11 modest multiplier based upon the agreed-upon cap on fees.

12 *d) Class Counsel's Costs Are Reasonable*

13 The Settlement Agreement provides for reimbursement of costs not to exceed \$20,000.00. To
14 date, Tunyan Law, APC has already incurred actual costs in the amount of \$19,463.54 which include
15 future motion, final report filing, CaseAnywhere fees. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 34.) These costs were
16 reasonably incurred in prosecuting the Action on behalf of the Class Members and should be approved
17 by the Court. Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests the Court approve costs in the amount of
18 **\$19,463.54**. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 34.)

19 **7. The Proposed Payment to the Administrator Is Fair and Reasonable**

20 In deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, a trial court must determine if the
21 proposed settlement is fair under the circumstances of the case. *Mallick*, 89 Cal.App.3d at 438. In
22 exercising this power, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is "fair, adequate,
23 and reasonable." *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted). Phoenix Class Action
24 Administration Solutions, which has been selected due to its competitive bid, estimates that
25 administration can be performed for **\$17,000.00**. In counsel's experience, based on similar wage-and-
26 hour actions, an estimated cost of **\$17,000.00** is a fair and reasonable amount for administration fees and
27 should be preliminarily approved. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 33.)
28

1 **8. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable**

2 The ultimate decision as to the amount of PAGA penalties is always up to the discretion of the
3 Court. Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) states: “In any action by an aggrieved employee seeking recovery of a
4 civil penalty available under subdivision (a) or (f), a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum
5 civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case,
6 to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”

7 Prior to the issuance of *Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.*, 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021), the only sources
8 of persuasive guidance as to how to assess the reasonableness of a PAGA allocation were found in
9 federal court decisions addressing that question. In their view, a PAGA allocation, even if a small
10 portion of the total settlement, could be reasonable if the settlement of the underlying wage and hour
11 claims is robust and serves the deterrent purpose of the PAGA statute. *O’Connor v. Uber Technologies,*
12 *Inc.*, 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“By providing fair compensation to the class members
13 as employees and substantial monetary relief, a settlement not only vindicates the rights of class
14 members as employees, but may have a deterrent effect upon the Defendants employer and other
15 employers, an objective of PAGA.”); *see also Visceral v. Mistras Group*, 2016 WL 5907869 *9 (N.D.
16 Cal. 2016) (“Applying O’Connor’s sliding scale approach, settlement of the PAGA claim may be
17 substantially reduced below its standalone settlement value without sacrificing its statutory purposes
18 because the non PAGA settlement is relatively substantial.”)

19 *Moniz* then provided explicit confirmation that this was an appropriate yardstick by which to
20 measure reasonableness of a PAGA settlement. *Moniz* said:

21 [W]hile PAGA does not require the trial court to act as a fiduciary for aggrieved
22 employees, adoption of a standard of review for settlements that prevents “ ‘ ‘ ‘fraud,
23 collusion or unfairness’ ” (Dunk, *supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1800–1801, 56
24 Cal.Rptr.2d 483), and protects the interests of the public and the LWDA in the
25 enforcement of state labor laws is warranted. Because many of the factors used to
26 evaluate class action settlements bear on a settlement’s fairness—including the strength
27 of the plaintiff’s case, the risk, the stage of the proceeding, the complexity and likely
28 duration of further litigation, and the settlement amount—these factors can be useful in
29 evaluating the fairness of a PAGA settlement.

30 Given PAGA’s purpose to protect the public interest, we also agree with the LWDA
31 and federal district courts that have found it appropriate to review a PAGA settlement to
32 ascertain whether a settlement is fair in view of PAGA’s purposes and policies.
33 (*O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1132–
34 1134; *Jordan v. NCI Group, Inc.* (Jan. 5, 2018, No. EDCV 16-1701-JVS) 2018 WL
35 1409590, at *1–*2, 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25297, at *3–*4; *Chamberlain v. Baker*

Hughes, a GE Co., LLC, supra, 2020 WL 4350207 at *3–*4, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 134582 at *10–*11; see *Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 46, 59, 61–62, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 [where the Legislature required court approval of private settlements of Proposition 65 actions brought to vindicate the public interest, court must evaluate the resulting consent decree to determine if it is “just” and “serves the public interest”].) We therefore hold that a trial court should evaluate a PAGA settlement to determine whether it is fair, reasonable, and adequate in view of PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws. (See *Williams, supra*, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 472, 398 P.3d 69 [PAGA “sought to remediate present violations and deter future ones”]; *Arias, supra*, 46 Cal.4th at p. 980, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 [the declared purpose of PAGA was to augment state enforcement efforts to achieve maximum compliance with labor laws].) The trial court below used this standard.

Moniz, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 77. *Moniz*, in agreeing with the federal courts that have considered how to evaluate a PAGA settlement, concluded that the class action factors are appropriately considered, along with a consideration of whether the settlement furthers “PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws.”

As to the first set of elements (the class-type analysis), it is embodied in Plaintiff’s discussion of the adequacy of the settlement generally. Using class settlements as a source of analogous settlement review standards, to assess the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of a settlement, the court should also consider the expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801. Here, the expense, complexity and likely duration of future litigation as it pertained to Plaintiff’s PAGA claims was to some extent an unknown. However, what is certain is that to adequately establish the foundational violations that would support a substantial penalty award, tremendous time and expense would be invested. To adequately establish that aggrieved employees experience the alleged violations, and at what frequency, most of the aggrieved employees would need to be interviewed in a systematic fashion and their testimony cataloged in way sufficiently meaningful to permit the submission of summary evidence at trial, such as via survey. *First*, the burdensome nature of such a process would be expensive and time-consuming. *Second*, substantial risk that the Court would either substantially reduce any penalty ultimately awarded *or* conclude that the conduct was insufficient to support a penalty award. *Third*, it would be essentially impossible to formulate an objectively reliable means of summarizing testimonial experiences, other than by an extraordinarily detailed survey. And formulating such a survey would have been important, since frequency of violations would need to be established before any

1 penalties could be recovered. At least as to claims such as meal period and rest break violations, the
2 decisions of aggrieved employees are a major factor in assessing liability. In sum, the evidence collected
3 to date leads Plaintiff to conclude that, direct testimony would have been required from as many of the
4 roughly 1,153 aggrieved employees as could be obtained, which would be, at best, very difficult. Proof
5 of this sort gives rise to a manageability argument that could substantially reduce the size of the
6 aggrieved employee group.

7 The second element (the PAGA purposes element) is also satisfied here. As held by *Moniz*,
8 PAGA's purposes include (1) remediation of present labor law violations, (2) deterrence of future
9 violations, and (3) maximization of enforcement of state labor laws. Here the allocation of a major
10 portion of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of labor law violation remediation.
11 Class members benefit from payments intended to offset the harm of alleged violations of wage and hour
12 requirements. The allocation of a major portion of settlement funds to class members also deters future
13 violations, since, from the perspective of an employer, where settlement funds go is less significant than
14 the fact that settlement funds are issuing at all. Finally, allocation of a major portion of settlement funds
15 to class members still advances the goal of enforcement of state labor law. This settlement is, by
16 definition, a response to alleged violations of state labor laws, balanced against the competing factors of
17 uncertainty of proof and other risks.

18 A final note on the analysis discussion in *Moniz* is appropriate. *Moniz* was concerned with the
19 standard applied to a standalone PAGA action, not a settlement in which money was allocated between
20 class and PAGA claims. Here, the adequacy of the settlement as a whole impacts the factors approved of
21 by *Moniz*. It would be misleading to examine only the PAGA portion of the settlement without asking
22 how this Settlement as a whole is consistent with the purposes of PAGA. Second, the discussion of
23 "fairness" to those impacted by the settlement in *Moniz* does not play a role in this matter. In *Moniz*, the
24 Court found the record lacked any support for the disparate allocation of PAGA penalties between
25 different types of employees: "[T]he settlement's allocation of shares of civil penalties to Colleagues that
26 are fifteen times greater than the shares allocated to Associates does not seem to have been justified
27 below and may be contrary to PAGA's purposes." *Moniz*, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 87. Here, PAGA
28 penalties are allocated by pay period, irrespective of job classification, an equitable method of allocation.

1 In addition, there is no evidence that a court or a commissioner had informed Defendants that any
2 conduct violated the Labor Code. *Amaral v. Cintas Corp.*, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1209 (2008); *Willis*
3 *v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC*, 2013 WL 6053831, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“Under California law, courts have
4 held that employers are not subject to heightened penalties for subsequent violations until and unless a
5 court or commissioner notified the employer that it is in violation of the Labor Code.”) And in *Cotter*,
6 the court found a significant reduction of the PAGA claim would be appropriate because “[t]his does not
7 appear to be a case where a company has deliberately sought to evade the law.” *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 176
8 5 F. Supp. 3d 930, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Here, Defendants can state a strong case that, as the Court
9 concluded in *Cotter*, the efforts to devise compliant operational policies do not indicate an organization
10 that has deliberately sought to evade the law. This is a very significant risk factor.

11 Finally, the PAGA allocation is fair. The LWDA is receiving **\$60,000.00**. The Class is
12 receiving, net, an estimated **\$493,536.46** for the releases for eight theories of recovery (including the
13 **\$20,000.00** as the aggrieved employees’ share of the PAGA Allocation). The allocation to the LWDA
14 equal to 12.2% of the Net Settlement Amount is not unfair and satisfies the policies underlying
15 California’s wage and hour laws.

16 **VII. CONCLUSION**

17 For all the foregoing reasons, because the Class meets the requirements for certification, because
18 the Settlement bears all requisite indicia of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, and because the
19 notice procedure complied with Rule 3.766 and due process, this Court should grant this Motion for
20 Final Approval.

21 Respectfully submitted,

22
23 Dated: October 15, 2024

TUNYAN LAW, APC

24
25 By: _____


Lilit Tunyan
Artur Tunyan

26 Attorneys for Plaintiff EFRAIN VIVEROS
27
28

1 **PROOF OF SERVICE**

2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
3) ss
4 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

5 I am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of
6 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 535 N Brand Blvd. Suite 285,
7 Glendale, California 91203.

8 On the date indicated below, I served the document described as: **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF**
9 **MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS AND PAGA**
10 **REPRESENTATIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND**
11 **AUTHORITIES** on the interested parties in this action by sending a true copy thereof to interested
12 parties as follows and as stated on the attached service list:

13 Lisa Reimbold
14 lreimbold@clarkhill.com
15 Saige Shaw
16 sshaw@clarkhill.com
17 Hiba Hammad
18 hhammad@clarkhill.com
19 **CLARK HILL LLP**

20 555 South Flower Street, 24th Floor
21 Los Angeles, CA 90071
22 Phone: 213-891-9100
23 Facsimile: 213-488-1178

24 *Attorneys for Defendants D AND T RESTAURANTS, INC., MCSURF, INC., BLADE*
25 *ENTERPRISES III, Inc., BLADE ENTERPRISES IV, Inc., BLADE ENTERPRISES V, Inc.,*
26 *BLADE ENTERPRISES VI, Inc., BLADE ENTERPRISES VII, Inc., BLADE*
27 *ENTERPRISES VIII, Inc.*

28 [✓] **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties
to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the
electronic service addresses listed above via third-party cloud service
CASEANYWHERE. I did not receive an error message.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
true and correct.

Executed on October 15, 2024 at Glendale, California.

Lilit Tunyan
Name



Signature