

Arrash T. Fattahi (SBN 333676)
arrash.fattahi@wilshirelawfirm.com
Arman A. Salehi (SBN 351112)
arman.salehi@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
660 S. Figueroa Street, Sky Lobby
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: (213) 381-9988
Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiff

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

MARCO CARBAJAL, individually, on behalf of
all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the
State of California and other aggrieved
employees,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTCO FORGE, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 23STCV12264

*Assigned for all purposes to:
Hon. Samantha P. Jessner
Dept. 7*

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT**

Date: July 28, 2025
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Dept.: 7

TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 28, 2025 at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 7 of the above-entitled Court, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Plaintiff Marco Carbajal (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move this Court for an Order:

1. Granting final approval of the proposed Class Action and PAGA Settlement and Class Notice;
2. Awarding Class Counsel attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$316,666.67 and reimbursement of litigation costs in the amount of \$18,798.68;
3. Awarding Plaintiff a Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$10,000.00;
4. Awarding \$6,146.00 to Apex Class Action, LLC (“APEX”) for its settlement administration expenses; and
5. Approving allocation of \$25,000.00 as civil penalties under the Private Attorneys’ General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), 75% of which (\$18,750.00) will be paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency, and 25% of which (\$6,250.00) will be distributed to Aggrieved Employees based on the number of pay periods worked during the PAGA Period.

This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the accompanying declarations, and on all records and documents on file, together with such oral and documentary evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

Dated: July 3, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: 
Arrash T. Fattahi
Arman A. Salehi

Attorneys for Plaintiff Marco Carbajal

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.....	5
II. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL.....	6
A. A Presumption of Fairness Exists.....	6
B. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Claims, and the Risks, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation as a Class Action Through Trial.....	7
C. The Amount Offered in Settlement.....	7
D. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the Proceedings.....	8
E. The Experience and Views of Counsel.....	8
F. The Presence of a Government Participant.....	9
G. The Reaction of Class Members to the Proposed Settlement.....	9
III. THE REQUESTED FEE AWARD IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED...	10
A. The Requested Fee Award is Fair and Reasonable Based on the Percentage-of- Recovery Method.....	10
B. A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the Requested Fee.....	11
IV. THE REQUESTED COST AWARD IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED.	12
V. THE REQUESTED CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE PAYMENT IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED.....	13
VI. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED.....	13
VII. CONCLUSION.....	14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.</i> , 85 Cal.App.4th 1135 (2000)	7
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> , 162 Cal. App. 4th, 60 (2008)	11
<i>Clark v. American Residential Services, LLC</i> , 175 Cal.App.4th 785 (2009)	13
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> , 48 Cal.App.4th 1794 (1996)	6
<i>Golba v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc.</i> , 238 Cal.App.4th 1251 (2015)	13
<i>Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.</i> , 4 Cal.5th 260 (2018).....	7, 10
<i>Ketchum v. Moses</i> , 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33 (2001)	11
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l</i> , 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82 (2004)	11
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.</i> , 1 Cal.5th 480 (2016)	10
<i>Lealo v. Beneficial California, Inc.</i> , 82 Cal.App.4th 19 (2000)	9
<i>Melnyk v. Robledo</i> , 64 Cal.App.3d 618 (1976)	11
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i> , 186 Cal.App.4th 399 (2010).....	7
<i>PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler</i> , 22 Cal.4th 1084 (2000).....	11
<i>Roos v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.</i> , 241 Cal.App.4th 1472 (2015)	10
<i>Serrano v. Priest</i> , 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48-49 (1977)	11
<i>Singer v. Becton Dickinson and Co.</i> , No. 08–CV–821–IEG, 2010 WL 2196104 (S.D. Cal. 2010)	10
<i>Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases</i> , 171 Cal.App.4 th 495, 512 (2009)	11
<i>Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.</i> , 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002)	11
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.</i> 91 Cal.App.4th 224 (2001)	7, 11
<i>Wren v. RGIS Inventory Specialists</i> , No. C–06–05778 JCS, 2011 WL 1230826 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011)	10

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Marco Carbajal (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of \$950,000.00. The Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement”) provides that the deductions will be made from the Gross Settlement Amount:

1. Attorneys’ fees in the amount of up to \$316,666.67;
2. Litigation costs in the amount of up to \$25,000.00;
3. A Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$10,000.00;
4. Settlement administration expenses of up to \$6,146.00; and
5. Civil penalties in the amount of \$25,000.00 for claims under the Private

Attorneys’ General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), 75% of which (18,750.00) will be paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA), and 25% of which (\$6,250.00) will be distributed to Aggrieved Employees based on the number of pay periods worked during the PAGA Period. (*See* Settlement §§ 3.2.5, 3.2.5.1; *see also* Declaration of Ryan McNamee (“McNamee Decl.”), ¶¶ 15, 17.)

After all deductions are made, the Net Settlement Amount will be distributed to 193 Class Members as of the filing of this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (the “Motion”) (“Participating Class Members” or “Settlement Class Members”) based on the number of weeks worked during the Class Period. (McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 14-16.)

The proposed Settlement is a product of diligent efforts, litigation, arm’s length negotiations, and informal discovery that resulted in the best possible outcome for the Class. By resolving this matter now, Class Members will receive a guaranteed recovery without risk of nonpayment, delay, or an adverse judgment at trial.

There are no objections to the Settlement and no requests for exclusion. (McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 11-13.) The Participating Class Members will receive an average settlement payment of \$2,938.79, with the highest payout reaching \$7,153.56. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 16.) Aggrieved Employees will receive an average settlement PAGA payment of \$41.12, with the highest payout reaching \$70.40. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 18.) In light of the Class’s favorable response, and the facts and law set forth below as well as in the motion for preliminary approval, Plaintiff

respectfully requests that the Court now enter an Order: (1) granting final approval of the Settlement; (2) entering final judgment; (3) requiring distribution of individual settlement shares to Participating Class Members; and (4) approving payments for attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, the Class Representative Service Payment, Settlement Administration Expenses, and civil penalties under PAGA.

II. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL

In deciding whether to grant final approval of a class action settlement, California courts consider whether the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) In evaluating whether a settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, courts evaluate the following factors: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity and duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status through trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of class members to the proposed settlement. (*Id.*)

A. A Presumption of Fairness Exists

While the burden is on the proponent to demonstrate that a proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, “a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” (*Id.* at p. 1802.)

At preliminary approval, Plaintiff presented evidence that this Settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness because: (1) it was reached through arm’s length bargaining with the assistance of an experienced mediator; (2) Plaintiff conducted a thorough investigation through informal discovery and an analysis of Class Members’ time and payroll records; and (3) Plaintiff’s Counsel is experienced in similar litigation. (*See* Declaration of Justin F. Marquez in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Marquez MPA Decl.”], ¶¶ 5-8, 16-30, 41-53.) None of the Class Members have opted out and none have

objected. (*See* McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 11-13.) Therefore, the Court can confidently conclude that a presumption of fairness exists.

B. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Claims, and the Risks, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation as a Class Action Through Trial

Courts are not required to ensure that a settlement maximizes the value of released claims with mathematical precision. “[T]he test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 250, disapproved of on other grounds by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 269-270; *see also 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1150 [“the merits of the underlying class claims are not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action; the operative word is ‘settlement.’”].) The relevant circumstances include the strengths and weaknesses of plaintiffs’ claims and the risks they faced in litigation. (*7-Eleven*, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146.)

Here, Plaintiff presented sufficient information at preliminary approval regarding the number of class members and an estimate of the maximum value of each of the claims alleged. (*See* Marquez MPA Decl., ¶¶ 16-30.) Plaintiff has also described in detail the risks the Class faced in litigation and the strengths and weaknesses of each of the claims. (*See id.*) Plaintiff noted potential difficulties in obtaining class certification and succeeding on the merits at trial. (*See id.*) The factual record here is sufficiently developed to allow the Court to independently satisfy itself “that the consideration being received for the release of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 410.)

C. The Amount Offered in Settlement

The Settlement provides a \$950,000.00 Gross Settlement Amount (“GSA”) to be distributed among the 193 Class Members who did not opt out as of the date of this filing. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 14.) The GSA will be used to pay Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs,

Plaintiff’s Class Representative Service Payment, and Apex Class Action, LLC (“APEX”) for its administration of the Class Notice and settlement funds. (*Id.* at ¶ 15.) The Settlement also allocates \$25,000.00 from the GSA to civil penalties under PAGA. (*See* Settlement, ¶ 3.2.5; *see also* McNamee Decl. ¶ 15.) After all deductions are made, the Net Settlement Amount will be \$567,187.33, which will be distributed to Participating Class Members according to the number of weeks they worked for Defendant during the Class Period. (*See* Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4; *see also* McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 14-16.)

The Settlement Administrator has calculated a total of 20,139 workweeks in the Class Period. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 15.) As a result, the average recovery for Participating Class Members is \$2,938.79, and the highest payout is \$7,153.56. (*Id.* at ¶ 16.) Weighing the potential value of the class claims against the risk and expense of trial, the Settlement provides sufficient relief in light of the potential risks associated with seeking a class judgment.

D. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the Proceedings

Class Counsel sufficiently investigated the alleged claims, applicable law, and potential defenses. (*See* Marquez MPA Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) Specifically, Class Counsel assessed the value of the claims using data and documents provided by Defendant in informal discovery, which included policy documents and timekeeping and payroll records. (*See id.*) Following a complete analysis of this information, the Parties attended mediation on February 20, 2024 with an experienced mediator. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The Parties were able to reach an agreement and spent the next several months negotiating the terms of the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

E. The Experience and Views of Counsel

Plaintiff is represented by Wilshire Law Firm, PLC. (Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Fattahi MFA Decl.”], ¶ 2.) Class Counsel prosecute wage and hour cases, including class and representative actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 3-4.) Class Counsel has litigated many wage and hour cases and have successfully resolved cases involving similar issues presented in this matter. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 4-14.) Class Counsel has negotiated a settlement here that they believe is fair, reasonable, and adequate based on their prior experience litigating these types of cases. (*Id.* at ¶ 19.)

F. The Presence of a Government Participant

The LWDA has received the required notice of this Settlement. (Fattahi MFA Decl., ¶ 20.) On June 21, 2023, Plaintiff provided notice to the LWDA of his intention to file a PAGA claim. (Marquez MPA Decl., ¶ 4.) The Settlement provides for the payment of \$25,000.00 in civil penalties, 75% of which (\$18,750.00) will be paid to the LWDA, and 25% of which (\$6,250.00) will be paid to Aggrieved Employees based on the number of pay periods worked during the PAGA Period. (See McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 15, 17-18; see also Settlement, ¶¶ 3.2.5, 3.2.5.1.) Plaintiff submitted a copy of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice to the LWDA. (Marquez MPA Decl., ¶ 10.) The LWDA has not responded to or objected to the Settlement. (Fattahi MFA Decl., ¶ 20.)

G. The Reaction of Class Members to the Proposed Settlement

Class Members' reaction to the Settlement has been favorable. A court may properly infer that a class action settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate when few class members object to or opt out of it. (*Lealo v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 51.)

When the Court granted preliminary approval, it also approved the method of providing notice to Class Members. Following a search of the National Change of Address database, APEX mailed the Class Notice to all Class Members on January 22, 2025. (McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.) The Class Notice informed Class Members of the terms of the Settlement, the amount of their individual settlements and how those amounts were calculated, their right to either participate in the Settlement, opt out of it, object to it, or dispute the amount of their individual settlement payment, the procedures and deadlines to submit an opt out, objection, or dispute, and the date, time, and place of the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval and instructions to be heard at the hearing. (*Id.* at ¶ 7, Exhibit A.) Here, in response to the Class Notice, zero (0) Class Members opted out, and none objected as of the date of the filing of this Motion. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11-13.) Class Members' favorable response to the Settlement further supports final approval.

///

///

III. THE REQUESTED FEE AWARD IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED

There are two primary methods of determining a reasonable attorney fee in the context of class action litigation. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489.) The percentage-of-recovery method calculates the fee as a percentage of a common fund recovered on behalf of the class. (*Id.*) The lodestar method calculates the fee by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate, which amount then may be adjusted based on other factors. (*Id.*) In *Laffitte*, the California Supreme Court held that trial courts have the discretion to choose between the two calculation methods. (*Id.* at p. 504.) Trial courts also have the discretion to blend the two fee calculation methods, using one method to “cross-check” the reasonableness of the other’s result, but a cross-check is not required. (*Id.* p. 506.)

A. The Requested Fee Award is Fair and Reasonable Based on the Percentage-of-Recovery Method

The ultimate purpose of the percentage-of-recovery method is to “spread the attorney fee among all the beneficiaries of the fund.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The California Supreme Court recognized that the percentage-of-recovery method has many advantages, “including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement is provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation [citation] . . .” (*Id.*)

The requested fee award (one-third of the GSA) is consistent with the average fee award in class actions. (*See, e.g., Roos v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc.* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1472 [fee award of 37.5% was not an abuse of discretion], disapproved of on other grounds by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 287; *Wren v. RGIS Inventory Specialists*, No. C-06-05778 JCS, 2011 WL 1230826, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011) [approving fee award of 42%]; *Singer v. Becton Dickinson and Co.*, No. 08-CV-821-IEG, 2010 WL 2196104, at *8 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2010) [approving fee award of one-third and noting that the typical fees

1 awarded in wage and hour class action cases ranges from 33.33% to 40%].) Therefore, the
2 percentage-of-recovery method should be utilized to approve the requested fee.

3 **B. A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the Requested Fee**

4 Although *Laffitte* makes clear that a lodestar cross-check is not required, Class Counsel’s
5 lodestar supports the reasonableness of the requested fee. The lodestar is determined by
6 multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate. (*PLCM*
7 *Group, Inc. v. Drexler* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted,
8 based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market
9 value for the legal services provided.” (*Id.*) The factors that can be considered include “the
10 nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the
11 skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.”
12 (*Melnyk v. Robledo* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-24 [citations omitted].) Additionally,
13 Courts utilize “multipliers” to account for the risk of taking on cases where there is no guarantee
14 of recovery, uncertainties as to the amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost of
15 litigating the case (both in effort and expenses), and uncertainty about how much time will pass
16 before the recovery is obtained. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33; *see also*
17 *Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48-49 [approving the adjustment of the lodestar figure
18 based on factors specific to the case to ensure fair market value for legal services provided on
19 a contingency basis].) Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is
20 brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. (*Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133.)

21 Generally, “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91
22 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
23 495, 512 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez v.*
24 *Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th, 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check];
25 *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund
26 cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0]; *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2004) 231 Cal.App.4th 860,
27 881-82 [affirming a 2.13 multiplier after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for
28 multipliers on a cross-check].) Here, the application of a modest 2.1 multiplier supports Class

Counsels' fee request of \$316,666.67. (Fattahi MFA Decl., ¶ 17.)

The risk factors present in this case favor the application of a 2.1 multiplier. (*Id.*) To begin, Class Counsel has singularly assumed the risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. (*Id.*) And, while Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action, posing an actual risk that Plaintiff may not succeed at class certification and/or trial. (*Id.*; see Marquez MPA Decl., ¶¶ 17-30.) Any of these obstacles could have prevented recovery completely, meaning Class Counsel would have been left with no compensation for all the time and money invested in litigating this case. (Fattahi MFA Decl., ¶ 17.) Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis so that Class Members (a particularly vulnerable group of hourly paid workers) could be compensated for their unpaid wages. (*Id.*) Consequently, Class Counsel was precluded from focusing on, or taking on, other cases which could have resulted in a larger, and less risky, monetary gain. (*Id.*) Moreover, Class Counsel's hourly rates are comparable to those charged by other class action counsel. Class Counsel spent 192.4 hours prosecuting this action, which was divided among the attorneys working on this case according to skill level. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-17.) Multiplying the total hours expended by Class Counsel by their reasonable hourly rates yields a lodestar of \$150,200. (*Id.* at ¶ 16.) The hours expended by each attorney were reasonable and not duplicative and reflect the extensive investigation and analysis that was required to achieve this Settlement. (*Id.*)

Considered against the risks of continued litigation, and the importance of advocating for employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class. Class Counsel's fee request is fair and reasonable and should be approved.

IV. THE REQUESTED COST AWARD IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED

The Settlement permits Class Counsel to seek reimbursement of litigation costs in an amount up to \$25,000.00. The actual costs incurred are \$18,498.68, which does not exceed the maximum amount allocated for litigation costs in the Settlement, and Class Counsel anticipates

1 incurring at least \$300.00 in additional costs up to the time the Court enters a judgment in this
2 action and schedules a hearing on distribution. (*Id.* at ¶ 18, **Exhibit 4.**) These costs were
3 reasonable and necessary to prosecute this case and obtain the results achieved. (*Id.*)

4 **V. THE REQUESTED CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE PAYMENT IS**
5 **REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED**

6 Plaintiff also requests that he be awarded a service payment of \$10,000.00 for his role
7 in obtaining the Settlement. In evaluating a service payment, the Court may consider: “(1) the
8 risk, both financial and otherwise, the class representative faced in bringing the suit; (2) the
9 notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of
10 time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation; and (5) the
11 personal benefit received by the class representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Golba v.*
12 *Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc.* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1272; *Clark v. American Residential*
13 *Services, LLC* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.)

14 Here, Plaintiff provided a declaration in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
15 Approval of Class Action Settlement detailing the risk he faced in bringing the suit, the notoriety
16 and personal difficulties he encountered, the amount of time and effort he spent on this
17 litigation, the duration of this litigation, and the personal benefit he will receive as a result of
18 the litigation. (*See generally*, Declaration of Plaintiff Marco Carbajal in Support of Plaintiff’s
19 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, filed on July 10, 2024.) Plaintiff
20 should be adequately compensated for his role in obtaining in this Settlement.

21 Additionally, no Class Members objected to the amount of additional compensation
22 sought by Plaintiff. As such, the award is reasonable in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff
23 conferred upon the settlement class.

24 **VI. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE REASONABLE AND**
25 **SHOULD BE APPROVED**

26 The Parties agreed to hire APEX as the Settlement Administrator in this case and the
27 Court approved this choice at preliminary approval. The Settlement Administrator was
28 responsible for updating Class Members’ mailing addresses, mailing the Class Notice to each

1 Class Member, responding to Class Member questions, providing weekly status reports, and
2 providing a declaration as to the results of the mailing. (*See* McNamee Decl., ¶ 3.) Following
3 final approval, APEX's duties will continue in order to calculate and to mail the settlement
4 payments to Class Members, disburse other payments as ordered by the Court, and perform such
5 other duties described in the Settlement. (*Id.*) The requested amount of \$6,146.00 for services
6 rendered and to be rendered is therefore fair and reasonable.

7 **VII. CONCLUSION**

8 Based on the foregoing, Class Counsel respectfully requests that the Court grant final
9 approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement, approve Class Counsel attorneys' fees in
10 the amount of \$316,666.67 and reimbursement of litigation costs in the amount of \$18,798.68,
11 the Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$10,000.00, civil penalties under
12 PAGA in the amount of \$25,000.00, and \$6,146.00 to APEX for its settlement administration
13 expenses.

14 Dated: July 3, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

15
16 By: 

Arrash T. Fattahi
Arman A. Salehi

Attorneys for Plaintiff Marco Carbajal

PROOF OF SERVICE

Carbajal v. Mattco Forge, Inc., et al.
23STCV12264

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Ashley Narinyans, am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this action. My business address is 660 S. Figueroa Street, Sky Lobby. Los Angeles, California 90017. My electronic service address is ashley.narinyans@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On July 3, 2025, I served the foregoing **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Brittany A. Sachs (SBN 287651)
bsachs@perkinscoie.com
Michelle Jackson
michellejackson@perkinscoie.com
PERKINS COIE LLP
1888 Century Park East Suite 1700
Los Angeles, CA 90067-1721
Telephone: (310) 788-9900
Facsimile: (310) 788-3399

Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor & Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

(X) **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic service addresses listed above via third-party cloud service **CASEANYWHERE**.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this **July 3, 2025**, at Los Angeles, California.



Ashley Narinyans