Brian J. Mankin, Esq. [CSB No. 216228]
brian@lmlfirm.com
Misty M. Lauby, Esq. [CSB No. 243009]
misty@lmlfirm.com
LAUBY, MANKIN & LAUBY LLP
5198 Arlington Avenue, PMB 513
Riverside, CA 92504
Tel: (951) 320-1444 | Fax: (951) 320-1445

Attorneys for Plaintiff, on a representative basis and on behalf of all others similarly situated

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

RICARDO GALLARDO, individually, on a representative basis, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Plaintiff, vs. CLASSIC COLLISION CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., a Georgia Corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive; Defendants.	Case No.: CVRI2303068 *[Assigned to Hon. Harold Hopp, Dept 1, for all purposes]* **PLAINTIFF'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT; DECLARATIONS IN SUPPORT OF; [PROPOSED] ORDER** <u>Hearing</u> Date: February 19, 2025 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept.: 1 Complaint filed: June 14, 2023

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 19, 2025, 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard by the Honorable Harold Hopp in Department 1 of the Riverside County Superior Court, located at 4050 Main Street, Riverside, CA 92501, Plaintiff Ricardo Gallardo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, will and hereby does move the Court for entry of an Order preliminarily approving the Parties' Class Action and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Classic Collision, LLC, including:

1. Certifying the class for purposes of settlement only;
2. Preliminarily appointing Plaintiff as class representative for settlement purposes;
3. Appointing Plaintiff's counsel as class counsel for purposes of settlement only;
4. Preliminarily approving the class action and PAGA settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, based upon the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement;
5. Directing distribution of the Class Notice, including notice of the opportunity to exclude oneself from, or object to, the settlement;
6. Setting a date for a final fairness hearing to determine, following dissemination of the Class Notice, whether to grant final approval of the Settlement.

This motion is based upon this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support thereof; the Declaration of Plaintiff's counsel (Brian Mankin and Misty Lauby); the Declaration of Plaintiff; the Declaration of Defendant's counsel (Hazel U. Poei); the Declaration of Defendant's Representative (Chul Kwak); the Declaration of Michael Moore on behalf of Phoenix Settlement Administrators; the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims (the "Settlement Agreement"); the proposed Order granting Preliminary Approval of the Settlement; all other records, pleadings, and papers filed in this action; and upon such other evidence or argument as may be presented to the Court at the hearing of this motion.

Dated: January 24, 2025 LAUBY, MANKIN & LAUBY LLP

BY: ______________________
Brian J. Mankin, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ricardo Gallardo seeks preliminary approval of a $1,400,000 class action settlement on behalf of approximately 720 current and former nonexempt (hourly paid) employees employed by Defendant in California at any time during the Class Period of June 14, 2019, through the Preliminary Approval Date or, alternatively, the New Class Period End Date.

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement,[1] Defendant will not oppose Plaintiff Counsel's application for a reasonable award of attorneys' fees not to exceed $466,666.66 (1/3 of the Settlement Amount), litigation expenses not to exceed $25,000, Settlement Administrator Costs of $10,000, PAGA penalties of $100,000 (75% to LWDA and 25% to Aggrieved Employees), and a Service Payment of $10,000 to Plaintiff Ricardo Gallardo ("Class Representative") and $5,000 to the Class Representative in exchange for releasing all claims and foregoing an individual action. (S.A. ¶ 57).

After all Court-approved deductions from the Settlement Amount, it is estimated that $783,333.34 will be available to pay the Class Members, as follows:

Settlement Amount	**$ 1,400,000.00**
Attorneys' Fees (1/3)	$ 466,666.66
Litigation Costs (not to exceed)	$ 25,000.00
Administrator Costs	$ 10,000.00
PAGA Penalties	$ 100,000.00
Class Representative Service Award	$ 10,000.00
Class Representative Release Payment	$ 5,000.00
Net Settlement Amount	**$ 783,333.34**

Assuming 720 total Class Members, the average payment will be approximately $1,087.96 ($783,333.34 / 720). However, the actual payments will be calculated on a pro-rata basis according to the number of Weeks Worked by each Class Member during the Class Period. (S.A. ¶ 57©; Mankin Decl. ¶¶ 51-53 [description of high/low payments]). In addition,

[1] The Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims (the "Settlement Agreement" or "S.A.") is attached as Exhibit A to the Decl. of Brian Mankin ("Mankin Decl.").

approximately 490 Aggrieved Employees will receive a share of the $25,000 PAGA Penalties (25% of the $100,000 allocation), calculated pro-rata based on Pay Periods Worked during the PAGA Period. (S.A. ¶ 57(h)).

Because the settlement is fair, reasonable, and negotiated at arm's length by experienced counsel and an experienced mediator following a sufficient exchange of information and documents prior to mediation, it should be preliminarily approved. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter an order preliminarily approving the settlement, conditionally certifying the Class under Code of Civil Procedure § 382 for settlement purposes, approving the proposed Class Notice, appointing Plaintiff's counsel as class counsel, appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Administrator, and scheduling a hearing for "inal approval.

II. BACKGROUND

A. THE CLASS

The Class is defined as follows:

> All current and former nonexempt (hourly paid) employees employed by Defendant in California at any time during the Class Period of June 14, 2019, through the Preliminary Approval Date or, alternatively, the New Class Period End Date. (S.A. ¶¶ 3, 7).

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff submitted a June 14, 2023, letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA"), and simultaneously sent a letter to Defendant requesting the production of personnel and timekeeping records to further evaluate his wage and hour claims. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 13).

That same day, Plaintiff filed this class action, alleging that Defendant violated various sections of the Labor Code. Then, on September 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint adding causes of action under PAGA. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 14).

Defendant retained counsel and immediately began to defend the case. But after early discussions among counsel, the Parties agreed to attend private mediation in an effort to avoid a contested class certification process. In preparation for mediation, the Parties informally exchanged documents and information that allowed both sides to calculate the potential damages and evaluate potential risk, including policies and procedures pertaining to the claims, statistics relating to the number of current and former employees, number of shifts, workweeks and pay periods worked and other things, and a sampling of payroll and timekeeping records for Class Members. This information enabled both parties to take a deep dive into the claims. Additionally, during this process, Plaintiff and his counsel analyzed, researched, and investigated the potential issues, including matters related to the calculation of damages, trial, and appellate issues and risks. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 15).

On October 18, 2024, Plaintiff and Defendant participated in mediation before Kelly Knight, a well-respected mediator. At the conclusion of mediation, and after extensive arms-length negotiations, the mediator issued a mediator's proposal which was ultimately accepted by the Parties. The Parties now seek the Court's preliminary approval of the Settlement. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 16).

C. Brief Overview of Claims and Defenses

Plaintiff alleged numerous wage and hour violations on behalf of the Class Members. However, Defendant vigorously contested and denied Plaintiff's material allegations on the merits and as to the propriety of a class action or PAGA representative action. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 17).

For instance, Plaintiff alleged Defendants failed to pay proper wages due to two distinct wage violations. First, Plaintiff alleged unpaid wage claims on behalf of the Class based upon Defendants' nationwide overtime policies that applied a 40 hours per workweek standard under federal law, rather than California's daily requirement to pay overtime for hours worked in excess of 8 hours per day. Second, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to include nondiscretionary bonuses, commissions and other compensation in the regular rate of pay for purposes of calculating overtime, sick pay, and meal premiums. However, Defendant raised significant legal and factual defenses that weigh in favor of the reasonableness of the proposed Settlement. First, in addition to disputing the merits of Plaintiff's claims claiming that Class Members were subject to California compliant policies and that there was a location working under a valid alternative workweek schedule which accounts for the Class Members who were only paid overtime on a weekly basis, Defendant also strongly disputed that Plaintiff could obtain class certification, arguing a lack of commonality of the legal claims and injuries. Defendant further argued that it complied with the applicable law and that any purported deviations therefrom were individualized in nature, thereby limiting Plaintiff's ability to certify the class. While Plaintiff asserts that this is a suitable case for certification, he realizes that there is always a significant risk associated with class certification proceedings, which could limit the claims that he could pursue on a class basis. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 18).

Plaintiff also alleged that he and the Class Members were often denied compliant meal and rest breaks due to the nature of the work. However, Defendant argued that it provided and made all mandated meal and rest breaks available to the Class, and any employee who did not take a break did so entirely of their own volition. Thus, Defendant argued that these claims were without merit because, for each violation, a fact-finder would have to determine why a break was noncompliant, because if it was by the employee's choice, no liability attaches to Defendant. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 19).

20. Plaintiff also brought class-wide claims for failure to reimburse business expenses. Here, Plaintiff and class members were expected to supply and maintain their own personal cell phones for timekeeping and keeping notes on cars that they worked on. None of these necessary expenses were reimbursed by Defendant. As a result, Defendant illegally shifted these costs to Plaintiff and the Class Members in violation of Labor Code § 2802. However, Defendant argued that Class Members only utilized their own tools if they wanted to and always had the option to obtain necessary tools and supplies from Defendants. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 20).

21. Finally, Plaintiffs alleged claims for waiting time penalties and wage statement violations, including failure to accurately state all applicable hourly rates and total hours worked. Some of these claims were derivative of the claims above, meaning that they only had merit if the claims for unpaid wages or meal/rest breaks were successful. But Defendant raised a variety of defenses to these derivative claims that impacted the valuation. Namely, as to the wage statement violations, Defendant argued that its wage statements did not violate Labor Code §§ 226, and even if there was a "technical" violation, that Plaintiffs would be unable to prove the

required “knowing and intentional” and “injury” elements. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 21).

Despite the disputed nature of the claims, the Parties concluded that further litigation of the Action would be protracted and expensive, and that it is desirable that the Action be fully and finally settled to limit further risk, expense, and protracted litigation. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 22).

III. SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

The following is a summary of the principal terms of the Settlement Agreement.

A. SETTLEMENT CONSIDERATION AND ALLOCATION

The $1,400,000 Settlement Amount[2] is non-reversionary and will be paid out to Class Members without the need to submit a claim form or take any affirmative action. It includes (1) Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs, as approved by the Court; (2) a service award of $10,000 to Plaintiff plus a $5,000 release payment, subject to approval by the Court; (3) Administration Costs, not to exceed $10,000; (4) a $100,000 PAGA award, with 75% paid to the LWDA and 25% to the Aggrieved Employees; and (5) the aggregate of all Individual Class Payments to the Participating Class Members. (S.A. ¶ 57). Additionally, the Parties agreed to an optional Escalator Clause in the event that the Workweek information is more than 10% higher than Defendant estimated at the time of mediation. (S.A. ¶ 13). Defendant will also separately pay its share of employer payroll taxes and withholdings. (S.A. ¶ 57).

B. NOTICE PROCEDURES

Here, the Parties will provide notice of this settlement in strict compliance with Court’s Class Action Case Management Order #1, issued on June 27, 2023 (the “CMO”). Thus, as required by CMO ¶ G, the Parties will send each Class Member a Class Notice, a Request for Exclusion Form, an Objection Form, and a Dispute Form. (S.A. ¶ 73), which are attached to the Mankin Decl. as Exhibits B, C, D, and E, respectively.

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[2] If the “Escalator Clause” is triggered, Defendant may elect to increase the Settlement Amount or shorten the Class Period. S.A. ¶¶ 14, 50(a). If Defendant elects to increase the Settlement Amount, other figures will also shift upward along with the Settlement Amount, such as attorneys’ fees (but this is still constrained to 1/3 of the Settlement Amount) along with increased Administration Costs (*see* S.A. ¶ 50(g)).

Notably, the proposed Notice complies with CMO ¶ G(5) because it informs each Class Member of the estimated recovery, the number of Weeks Worked that each Class Members is credited with, and the applicable average payments, minimum, and high payments. And the Notice Packet will be provided in both English and Spanish to ensure that each Class Member can read and understand the contents.

Within 30 calendar days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, Defendant shall provide the Settlement Administrator with the "Class Data" consisting of Class Member names, addresses, Social Security Numbers, and Weeks Worked during the Class Period and Pay Periods worked during the PAGA Period. (S.A. ¶¶ 6, 70). Within 20 calendar days of receipt of the Class Data, the Settlement Administrator shall calculate the numbers for each Class Member, populate the Notice, and send each Class Member the Notice Packet via first-class, United States mail. (S.A. ¶ 73).

If a Notice is returned as undelivered by the U.S. Postal Service, the Settlement Administrator shall perform a skip trace and seek an address correction for the Class Member(s), and a second Notice will be sent to any new or different address obtained. (S.A. ¶ 74).

C. <u>EXCLUSION AND OBJECTION PROCEDURES</u>

Class Members who do not timely Opt-Out of the Settlement will be deemed to participate in the Settlement and shall become a Participating Class Member without having to submit a claim form or take any other action. To Opt-Out of the Settlement, the Class Member must submit a written request to the Administrator no later than 45 days after being mailed by the Settlement Administrator ("Response Deadline"). (S.A. ¶ 42, 79). Any Opt-Out request that is not postmarked by the Response Deadline will be invalid, unless a Notice was remailed in which case the Class Member's exclusion or objection must be returned by the later of the original Response Deadline or 15 calendar days after the remailing of the notice. (S.A. ¶¶ 74, 79).

The Class Notice shall inform Class Members of their right to object to the Settlement. Any Participating Class Member who wishes to object to the Settlement must complete the Objection Form in the Notice Packet. To be valid, any Objection Form must be mailed to the

Settlement Administrator and postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (S.A. ¶ 79(c)).

D. <u>SETTLEMENT ALLOCATION FORMULA FOR SETTLEMENT SHARES</u>

The amount of each Class Member's Individual Class Payment is tied to the number of Weeks Worked by each Class Member for Defendant in California during the Class Period. Therefore, Individual Class Payments will be calculated by: (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Weeks Worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period, and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Members' Weeks Worked. (S.A. ¶ 59(c)). Additionally, each "Aggrieved Employee" will receive an Individual PAGA Payment, calculated by dividing and distributing the $25,000 on a pro-rata Pay Periods Worked basis. (S.A. ¶ 59(h)).

The Class Notice will inform Class Members of the number of Weeks Worked during the Class Period, Pay Periods worked during the PAGA Period, and the estimated Individual Class and PAGA Payments. Class Members may dispute their Weeks Worked by timely submitting evidence to the Settlement Administrator. (S.A. ¶ 79).

E. <u>TIMING OF SETTLEMENT DISBURSEMENTS</u>

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Defendant is required to fund the Settlement Amount, plus their share of payroll taxes owed on the Individual Class Payments, within thirty (30) calendar days after the Effective Date. (S.A. ¶ 80). Within 10 days after receiving the funds, the Administrator shall issue payments to cover all court-approved payments. (S.A. ¶ 81).

Participating Class Members and Aggrieved Employees shall have 180 calendar days after mailing by the Settlement Administrator to cash each settlement check. If a check is not cashed within the 180-day period, the check will be voided, and a stop-payment will be issued. The Settlement Administrator shall issue all unclaimed funds to the California State Controller's Office in the name of the Participating Class Member or Aggrieved Employee. (S.A. ¶ 82).

As required by CMO ¶ G(3)(c)(i), Plaintiff's Counsel explains the reasoning for this method of distribution at Mankin Decl. ¶¶ 60-62.

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F. TAX TREATMENT

The Parties agree that 15% of the Individual Class Payments will be allocated as wages subject to withholding of all applicable local, state and federal taxes and the remaining 85% will be allocated for interest and penalties (pursuant to, *e.g.*, California Labor Code §§ 203, 210, 226, 2699 etc.) from which no taxes will be withheld. (S.A. ¶ 57(d)). The Individual PAGA Payments will be classified entirely as civil penalties and shall be reported as required on an IRS Form 1099. (S.A. ¶ 57(h)).

G. PARTICIPATING CLASS MEMBERS' RELEASE OF CLAIMS

In exchange for these payments, and in strict compliance with CMO ¶ G(3)€, the Settlement Agreement at ¶ 38 defines the "Released Class Claims" as follows:

> All claims stated in the Complaint and those based solely upon the facts in the Complaint, including, but not limited to: (1) failure to pay minimum and overtime wages (including, but not limited to, sick pay, meal/rest period premium pay, and accrued vacation pay), (2) failure to provide meal periods or to pay premium wages for missed meal periods, (3) failure to provide rest breaks or to pay premium wages for missed rest periods, (4) failure to reimburse business expenses, (5) failure to timely pay final wages, (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and (7) violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.; as well as claims under state, federal or local law, whether statutory, common law or administrative law, arising under California Labor Code §§ 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 210, 218.6, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 227.3, 256, 510, 512, 558, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2699, and 2802, California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders, the California Code of Regulations, and including, but not limited to, claims for injunctive relief, penalties of any nature, damages, restitution, losses, disgorgement, liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees, fees, fines, debts, obligations, costs, and expenses.

Additionally, as required by CMO ¶ G(3)(e)(iii), the "time period governing the Released Class Claims shall be any time during the Class Period." (S.A. ¶ 38). And, pursuant to CMO ¶ G(3)(e)(i), Defendant is providing an explanation for the definition of the "Released Parties.". (S.A. ¶ 41).

It is understood and agreed that the Settlement Agreement will not release any person, party or entity from claims, if any, by Class Members for any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period.

H. <u>AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEES' RELEASE OF CLAIMS</u>

The Settlement Agreement at ¶ 40 also complies with CMO ¶¶ G(3)(e)(iv) and G(9)(d) as it defines the "Released PAGA Claims" as follows:

> all PAGA Claims against the Released Parties based on the facts and violations identified in Plaintiff's LWDA Notice Letter and only to the extent that they are alleged in the LWDA Notice Letter and Complaint, including any and all PAGA Claims for civil penalties that could have been sought by the California Labor Commissioner against Released Parties for the violations identified in Plaintiff's LWDA Notice Letter, and any and all PAGA Claims seeking civil penalties premised upon: (1) failure to pay minimum and overtime wages (including sick pay, meal/rest period premium pay, and accrued vacation pay), (2) failure to provide meal periods or to pay premium wages for missed meal periods, (3) failure to provide rest breaks or to pay premium wages for missed rest periods, (4) failure to reimburse business expenses, (5) failure to timely pay final wages, (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, which were premised upon alleged violations of California Labor Code §§ 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 210, 218.6, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 227.3, 256, 510, 512, 558, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2699, and 2802, including California Industrial Commission Wage Orders, the California Code of Regulations and other related claims based on the facts and allegations pled in the operative Complaint during the PAGA Period. The time period governing the Released PAGA Claims shall be any time during the PAGA Period.

The CMO, at ¶¶ G(3)(e)(iv) and G(9)(d)(i), also requires that the "release of claims for PAGA penalties shall bind only the named plaintiff and the State of California." The Settlement Agreement complies with this requirement. (*See* S.A. ¶ 61 ["Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and his respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the State of California, and the LWDA – and, to the fullest extent permitted by law and this Court's Case Management Order, PAGA Employees, on behalf of themselves their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns – shall completely release and discharge the Released Parties from the Released PAGA Claims for the PAGA Period"]).

Moreover, even if an Aggrieved Employee requests exclusion from the Class settlement, that individual will still be subject to the Released PAGA Claims and will receive a pro-rata share of PAGA Penalties. (S.A. ¶ 62; CMO ¶ G(9)(c)).

IV. PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS IS APPROPRIATE FOR PURPOSES OF SETTLEMENT

California Rule of Court 3.769(d) provides that the Court may make an order approving certification of a provisional settlement class at the preliminary approval stage. It is well-established that trial courts should use a "lesser standard of scrutiny" for determining the propriety of certifying a settlement class, as opposed to a litigation class. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1807 at n.19; *Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com.* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 633 ("[C]ertification issues raised by class action litigation that is resolved short of a decision on the merits must be viewed in a different light."); *Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor* (1997) 521 U.S. 591, 620 ("Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no trial."). As discussed below, for the purposes of this settlement only, Plaintiff requests that this Court provisionally certify the Class, as defined above, under Code of Civil Procedure § 382.

A. ASCERTAINABILITY AND NUMEROSITY

In determining whether a class is ascertainable, the court considers "(1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying the class members." *Reyes v. San Diego County Board of Supervisors* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1271; *Medrazo v. Honda of N. Hollywood* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 89, 101 (proposed settlement class is ascertainable if the class members can be objectively identified and given notice of the litigation without unreasonable time or expense). Here, according to Defendant's records, there are approximately 720 Class Members that are easily identifiable and fall within the defined Class. Thus, Plaintiff's proposed Class meets the ascertainability and numerosity requirements.

B. <u>**WELL-DEFINED COMMUNITY OF INTEREST**</u>

1. Commonality

To justify certification, the class proponent must show that questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over the questions affecting the individual members. *Arenas v. El Torito Rests., Inc*. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 723, 732. Here, Plaintiff contends that the Class was subjected to common policies and practices relating to payment of wages, meal/rest breaks, and so on. While the Parties dispute whether a class would be appropriate if the litigation were to continue, they agree to class certification for the purposes of this settlement only.

2. Typicality

Typicality "focuses on whether there exists a relationship between the Plaintiff's claims and the claims alleged on behalf of the class." *See* Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, *Newberg on Class Actions* ("*Newberg*") § 3:13 (4th ed. 2002). Again, the Parties dispute whether Plaintiff's claims are typical of the Class for the purposes of any continued litigation of the Action, but agree for the purposes of this settlement only, that Plaintiff asserts claims regarding Defendant's pay policies, meal and rest break practices, wage statements, and the provisions governing the timely and complete payment of wages, which are at the core of the lawsuit.

3. Adequacy of Representation

The proposed class representative must establish that he or she will adequately represent the proposed class. *Barboza v. West Coast Digital GSM, Inc.* (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 540, 546. Specifically, Plaintiff is adequate to represent the class because he was employed by Defendant during the Class Period, experienced the same wage and hour practices as the rest of the Class, understood his duties as a Class Representative, has been willing to undergo the risks of litigation, and has no conflict of interest. (Gallardo Decl. ¶¶ 2-5).

Adequacy may be established by the fact that counsel are experienced practitioners. See *Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2001) 244 F.3d 1152, 1162. Here, Plaintiff is represented by Class Counsel with extensive experience in wage and hour class actions like this matter. (Mankin Decl. ¶¶ 2-6).

4. Superiority

Certification of the Class for settlement purposes is superior here because there will be a global resolution of all claims at once, which fosters judicial economy. Class certification for settlement purposes is also vastly superior to litigation of numerous individual claims because most of the claims are too small to litigate outside of the class context.

V. THE COURT SHOULD PRELIMINARILY APPROVE THE SETTLEMENT, WHICH IS FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE

A. CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL UNDER THE CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT

The law favors settlements. *Bush v. Superior Court* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374. This is particularly true in class actions where substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the time, cost, and rigors of formal litigation. However, a class action may not be dismissed, compromised, or settled without the Court's approval. Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(a). The California Rules of Court set forth the procedures for court approval of a class action settlement: (1) the Court preliminarily approves the settlement; (2) class members receive notice as directed by the Court; and (3) the Court conducts a final approval hearing to inquire into the fairness of the proposed settlement. *See* Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(c), (e-g).

The decision to approve or reject a proposed settlement lies within the Court's sound discretion. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234-35. And the Court's ultimate duty is to determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk,* 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (setting forth the "fair, adequate, and reasonable" standard).

Thus, at the preliminary approval stage, the Court need only determine that the settlement falls within the "range of possible judicial approval," so that notice to the class and the scheduling of the fairness hearing are worthwhile. *See Newberg* § 11:25. Indeed, the Court should grant preliminary approval if there are no "grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious deficiencies . . . and [the settlement] appears to fall within the range of possible approval." *Manual For Complex Litigation* (Third) § 30.41 (1995); see *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802. A "presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small." *Dunk*, *supra* (citing *Newberg* § 11:41). As shown below, the settlement falls well within the range of approval because there are no grounds to doubt its fairness.

B. THE SETTLEMENT IS THE RESULT OF SERIOUS, INFORMED, NON-COLLUSIVE NEGOTIATIONS

The settlement was the product of extensive arm's length negotiations between counsel and was facilitated by an experienced wage-and-hour class action mediator. Though cordial and professional, the settlement negotiations were adversarial and non-collusive in nature. The settlement reached is the product of substantial effort by the parties and their counsel. Although Plaintiff and his counsel believed that there was a possibility of certifying the claims, they recognized the potential risk, expense, and complexity posed by litigation, such as unfavorable decisions on class certification, summary judgment, at trial and/or on the damages awarded, and/or on an appeal that can take several more years to litigate. In addition, if Defendant prevailed on any of the defenses, the employees may not have received any monetary recovery.

C. THE EXTENT OF THE INVESTIGATION WAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT

Plaintiff thoroughly investigated and evaluated the factual and legal strengths and weaknesses of this case before reaching the settlement. As described above, the settlement was reached after extensive investigation and research, thorough calculations and risk evaluation, and a substantial exchange of information prior to mediation. *See Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 410 (approving settlement where "considerable information [exists] from which to assess the strength of the class claims" and litigation risks).

D. THE SETTLEMENT IS A REASONABLE COMPROMISE OF CLAIMS

To evaluate a settlement, the parties must provide the trial court with "basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise."

Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133.

However, *Kullar* does not require review of the outer reaches of possible exposure without considering actual risks of certification, decertification, dispositive motions, and trial, rather only a record which allows "an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation." *Munoz*, 186 Cal.App.4th at 408-9. Thus, a settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. *Wershba,* 91 Cal.App.4th at 250 ("Compromise is inherent and necessary in [settlement] … even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.")

Here, Defendant raised significant legal and factual defenses that weigh in favor of the reasonableness of the proposed Settlement. In addition to disputing the merits of Plaintiff's claims, Defendant strongly disputed that Plaintiff could obtain class certification, arguing a lack of commonality of the legal claims and injuries. Defendant further argued that they complied with the applicable law and that any purported deviations therefrom were individualized in nature, thereby limiting Plaintiff's ability to certify the class. Thus, while Plaintiff asserts that this is a suitable case for certification, he realizes that there is always a significant risk associated with class certification proceedings, which could limit the claims he could pursue on a class basis.

Considering the uncertainties of protracted litigation, this negotiated settlement reflects the best practicable recovery for the Class. While the total Settlement Amount is, of course, a compromise figure, the potential risks and opportunities of both parties were effectively weighed and considered by the parties, resulting in a fair and equitable settlement.

Based upon data obtained through formal and informal discovery, Plaintiff's counsel estimated the following through mediation: (1) 714 Class Members, (2) 423 *former* Class Members for Labor Code § 203, (3) 69,308 workweeks, (4) 325,113 shifts worked, and (4) approximately 24,710 wage statements during the PAGA Period. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 26).

From these numbers, and by applying violations rates derived from analysis of extensive documents and data from Defendant, Plaintiff calculated the following maximum amounts assuming all claims were entirely successful at trial:

Unpaid Wage Claims

Plaintiff alleged two unpaid wage claims on behalf of the Class: (1) Defendant failed to pay overtime after 8 hours each day due to improper policies; and (2) Defendant paid the Class on an hourly basis plus additional earned compensation but failed to include this compensation in the regular rate calculations and overtime pay. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 27).

As to the first unpaid overtime claim, Class Members were paid overtime after 40 hours in a week rather than after 8 hours in a day. Moreover, Class Members were paid on an hourly basis along with nondiscretionary bonuses and other earned compensation. However, the pre-mediation sampling showed that, on the occasions that a Class Member earned additional compensation and worked overtime during the time period when such compensation was earned, Defendant did not include the compensation in the regular rate (*i.e.*, Defendant only paid overtime at 1.5 times the base rate). (Mankin Decl. ¶ 28).

CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(ii): we calculated the maximum potential damages for the unpaid overtime wages (based on the improper policies) as $44,850 based on analysis of the sampling showing that there were 3,995 hours of unpaid overtime at a rate of $34.02. And we also calculated the maximum potential damages for the unpaid minimum and overtime wages (based on the regular rate claim – including overtime, sick pay and meal break premiums) as $28,652, and this figure was calculated based on an analysis of the sampling. Together the total maximum potential damages for these claims was $73,502. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 29).

CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(iii): we calculated the risk-adjusted value of these unpaid wage claims as $41,345. As to the improper overtime policies claims, Defendant vehemently argued that the only employees subject to these policies were working at a location with a valid alternative workweek schedule. With respect to the regular rate claims, Defendant argued that the bonus payments were discretionary and did not trigger liability. However, due to the objective nature of the regular rate violations, Plaintiff was confident that he would succeed on that specific claim, and placed little risk at class certification or on the merits. As a result, we calculated a 25% risk at class certification and a 25% risk on the merits. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 30).

CMO ¶ G(9)(b): as for the PAGA penalty claims on these issues, Plaintiff calculated the maximum potential PAGA penalty at trial as $617,750 based on an estimated 25% violation rate for 24,710 wage statements issued during the period. We then applied a merits risk, similar to the above, and further recognized that there were certain factors that reduce the possible value at trial. Specifically, when considering the amount of discretionary reduction to apply against the maximum penalties, we believe the Court would consider that: (a) if this claim succeeded, the Class would already be receiving compensation for the same violations [and would thus apply a smaller penalty because otherwise it is a double penalty], and (b) there were several "good faith" defenses. As a result, we calculated a PAGA risk-adjusted value of $115,828 for these unpaid wage claims. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 31).

Meal and Rest Break Claims

Plaintiff also alleged meal and rest break claims against Defendant, and this section provides CMO-compliant information as to the value and basis for such claims. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 32).

CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(ii): we calculated the maximum potential damages as follows. For the meal period claims, we calculated 67,737 violations (based on 19.9% violation rate) and multiplied that by an average hourly rate of $22.68 (the applicable premium rate under Labor Code § 226.7) to arrive at maximum potential damages of $1,536,275. For the rest break claims, we calculated 320,584 violations (25% violation rate) and multiplied that by $22.68 to arrive at maximum potential damages of $1,817,711. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 33).

CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(iii): we calculated the risk-adjusted value of the meal period claims as $576,103 and for the rest break claim as $454,428. These risk-adjusted figures are based on the numerous defenses and risks attached to such claims. For instance, Defendant raised numerous arguments in response to this claim, including that it maintained fully compliant written policies and specifically authorized the Class Members to take meal and rest breaks, meaning that no one had a reason or cause to miss a break or take a short/late break. Therefore, Defendant asserted that a fact-finder would have to determine for each Class Member whether a break was missed and why, and why a break was noncompliant or nonexistent, because if it was by the employee's choice, no liability attaches to Defendant. These defenses are factored into Plaintiff's analysis in two ways. First, these issues raise questions regarding whether the meal and rest break claims could be certified, and Plaintiff placed a 25% risk at the class certification stage for meal periods and a 50% risk for rest breaks. Second, these defenses also go toward the merits given the evidentiary question of proving the number of meal and rest violations. As such, Plaintiff placed a 50% risk on the merits for meal breaks, and an additional 50% risk on the merits for rest breaks. This returns risk-adjusted values for meal periods of $576,103 [$1,536,275 x 25% class cert risk x 50% merits risk] and for rest breaks of $ 454,428 [$1,817,711 x 50% cert risk x 50% merits risk]. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 34).

CMO ¶ G(9)(b): as for the PAGA penalty claims on these issues, Plaintiff calculated the maximum potential PAGA penalty at trial as $931,567 for meal periods (37.7% pay period violation rate) and $617,750 for rest breaks (25% pay period violation rate), based on $100 for each violation. But these claims faced the same merits and evidentiary risks discussed above, so we applied a 25% risk on the merits for each claim. Then we also assumed that the Court, when considering what discretionary reduction to apply, would give credit to Defendant's attempt to enact and apply a compliant written meal and rest period policy. And, as a result, we estimated that the Court would apply a discretionary reduction of 75%, leading to risk-adjusted PAGA values of $174,669 for meal periods and $115,828 for rest breaks. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 35).

Business Expense Claims

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants failed to reimburse business expenses for Class Members including cell phones and cell phone plans necessary to utilize the timekeeping application and to keep notes on the cars. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 36).

CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(ii):. Plaintiff valued this claim at an estimated $346,540 (based on 34,654 violative workweeks and $10 unreimbursed expenses per week). (Mankin Decl. ¶ 37).

CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(iii): However, Defendants argued that at no time were Class Members required to provide their own phone and only did so if they wanted to. Thus, based on this policy, which they claimed applied to Plaintiff, Plaintiff assigned a 50% risk of defeat at class certification and another 50% risk of defeat on the merits, leading to a risk-adjusted value of $86,635 on the Labor Code § 2802. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 38).

CMO ¶ G(9)(b): as for the PAGA penalty claims on these issues, Plaintiff calculated the maximum potential PAGA penalty at trial as $617,750 for wage statement claims based on a 25% violation rate for the pay periods multiplied by $100. However, due to the argument that Class Members were not required to furnish their own cell phones, we applied a 25% merits risk and we assumed that the Court would apply a discretionary reduction of 75%. Thus, the total risk-adjusted PAGA penalties for wage statement violations are $115,828. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 39).

Wage Statement Claims

Plaintiff alleged that, because of the unpaid wage and meal/rest violations above, Defendant's wage statements failed to accurately reflect the gross and net wages payable. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 40).

CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(ii): based on the formula under Labor Code § 226(e) ($50 for initial violation and $100 for subsequent violations), we calculated the maximum class wage statement penalties as $629,750 (480 "initial" violations at $50 and 24,230 "subsequent" violations at $100 ([480 x $50 = $24,000] + [24,230 x $100 = $2,423,000] = $2,447,000 x .25 (estimated 25% violation rate due to derivative nature based on wage claims and meal and rest break claims) = $611,750. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 41).

CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(iii): we calculated the risk-adjusted value of the class wage statement claims as $183,375. This analysis incorporated Defendant's arguments and defenses from above, and also accounted for the fact that these were "derivative" as opposed to "direct" wage statement violations (*i.e.*, because these claims were entirely derivative of the claims above, they only had merit if the claims for unpaid wages or meal/rest breaks were successful). Moreover, Defendant argued that "derivative" violations cannot trigger liability under § 226 and, even if there was a "technical" violation, Plaintiff would be unable to prove the required "knowing and intentional" and "injury" elements. Based on these facts and defenses, we placed a 40% risk at class certification (in line with the claims on which the derivative wage statement claim was based) and estimated another 50% risk on the merits, leading to a risk-adjusted value for the derivative claims of $183,375 [$611,250 x 40% cert risk x 50% merits risk]. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 42).

<u>CMO ¶ G(9)(b):</u> as for the PAGA penalty claims on these issues, Plaintiff calculated the maximum potential PAGA penalty at trial as $617,750 for wage statement claims based on a 25% violation rate for the 24,710 wage statements issued during the period multiplied by $100. However, like above, the risk-adjusted value must consider the difference between the direct and derivative claims. Thus, we applied the same 25% merits risk and, even though there is no requirement for "knowing and intentional" under PAGA, we assumed that the Court would apply a discretionary reduction of 75% based on Defendant's likely argument (if liability was found) that they were already liable for damages to the Class and for PAGA penalties for the overarching violations that triggered the derivative wage statement violations. Thus, the total risk-adjusted PAGA penalties for wage statement violations are $115,828. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 43).

Waiting Time Penalty Claims

Plaintiff's claim for failure to timely pay final wages (and for waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203) was entirely derivative of the claims above (*e.g.*, because Defendant failed to pay all wages and premiums owed, Defendant did not timely pay all final wages owed because there are still amounts due and payable). (Mankin Decl. ¶ 44).

<u>CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(ii)</u>: we calculated the maximum potential value of this claim as $1,223,189 based on estimate 50% of *former* employees affected by the claims under which waiting time penalties are derived for a total of 212 former employees who were paid $192.78 per day (212 employees x $192.78 daily pay x 30-day penalty = $1,223,189). (Mankin Decl. ¶ 45).

<u>CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(iii):</u> we calculated the risk-adjusted value of the waiting time penalty claim as $366,957. The valuation had to account for the fact that this claim was derivative of the unpaid wage and meal/rest break claims and, if those claims failed at certification or on the

merits, there would be no waiting time penalties owed, so the same risks for those claims applied to this claim. Furthermore, even if the unpaid wage and/or meal/rest claims succeeded at certification and on the merits, Plaintiff would have to prove that the violations (if any existed) were "willful" under the meaning of Labor Code § 203. And, here, Defendant argued there was no "willful" violation since they had compliant written policies and any deviations therefrom were inadvertent and unintentional. Additionally, argued that they had a "good faith" defense that prevents imposition of the waiting time penalties. As a result of this analysis, Plaintiff's counsel applied a 40% risk at class certification and a 50% risk on the merits, setting a risk-adjusted value of $366,957. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 46).

CMO ¶ G(9)(b): as for the PAGA penalty claims, Plaintiff calculated the maximum potential PAGA penalty at trial as $21,200 based on 212 violations multiplied by $100. But we had to incorporate the same risks as above (25% on the merits) and also assumed that, given Defendant's good faith attempts at compliance with California law, that the Court would also apply a 75% discretionary reduction in PAGA penalties, setting the risk-adjusted PAGA penalty value at $3,975. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 47).

Failure to Timely Pay Wages Each Period

This claim is pursued on a PAGA basis (the remedy for a violation is enforceable either through PAGA or the Labor Commissioner); thus, the analysis here focuses on PAGA. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 48).

¶ G(9)(b): Plaintiff calculated the maximum potential PAGA penalty at trial as $617,750 for Labor Code § 204 claims based on a 25% violation rate for the 24,710 wage statements issued during the period multiplied by $100. This claim is based on the allegation that Defendant did not pay all wages and wage premiums (for meal/rest violations) timely each period, which violated Labor Code § 204. However, because these claims were entirely derivative of the claims above, they only had merit if the claims for unpaid wages or meal/rest breaks were successful. And, as such, we had applied a 25% risk on the merits to align with the merits risk of the claims above. Additionally, we assumed that the Court would apply a discretionary reduction of 75% based on Defendant's likely argument (if liability was found) that PAGA penalties for § 204 violations should be greatly reduced because these are "derivative" and were already liable for damages to the Class and for PAGA penalties for the overarching violations. Thus, the risk-adjusted PAGA penalties under § 204 are $115,828. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 49).

Collective Maximum and Risk-Adjusted Class Damages/Penalties and PAGA Penalties

CMO ¶¶ G(3)(a)(ii)(C), CMO G(3)(a)(iii)(C), and CMO ¶ G(9)(b)(iii and iv)

The table below provides the total sums (for all claims) of the maximum and risk-adjusted class damages and penalties and the total maximum and risk-adjusted PAGA penalties. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 50).

Claim	***Class Values***		***PAGA Values***	
	Maximum	Risk-Adjusted	Maximum	Risk-Adjusted
Unpaid Wages	$73,502	$41,345	$617,750	$115,828
Meal Periods	$1,536,275	$576,103	$931,567	$576,103
Rest Breaks	$1,817,711	$454,428	$617,750	$115,828
Business Expenses	$346,540	$86,635	$346,540	$86,635
Wage Statement	$611,250	$183,375	$617,750	$115,828
Waiting Time Penalties	$1,223,189	$366,957	$21,200	$3,975
Labor Code § 204	n/a	n/a	$617,750	$115,828
Totals	**$5,608,467**	**$2,466,627**	**$4,041,517**	**$757,784**

CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(iv)

Based on an assumed Net Settlement Amount of $783,333.34, and an estimated 720 Class Members, the average payment will be $1,087.96. However, the actual amounts payable to the Class will be based on a guaranteed minimum payment plus an allocation based on each individual's weeks worked compared to the total Class weeks worked. While we cannot generate an exact "range of recoveries" right now since the Class Data will not be provided to the Settlement Administrator until after Preliminary Approval, I can provide reasonable estimates of the high and low payments as follows. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 51).

Based on our analysis, we estimate that there 720 Class Members participating in the Settlement, who will reach receive a share of the settlement based on weeks worked. Based on an estimate 24,000 workweeks during this period, we can assume an average per-workweek value of $16.58 ($783,333.34 / 24,000). Thus, on the low end, a Class Member that worked only

2 weeks during the Class Period will receive $33.16 ($16.58 x 2). And, at the high end, a Class Member that worked for the entire Class Period (234 calendar weeks) will receive an estimated high payment of $3,879.72($16.58 x 234). (Mankin Decl. ¶ 52).

Given that these are only preliminary estimates, the Settlement Administrator will fill in the average, high, and low payments in the Class Notice (if necessary) after Preliminary Approval and after calculating those figures from the Class Data. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 53).

<u>CMO ¶ G(3)(a)(v)</u>

From the data and analysis conducted prior to mediation, derived through both formal and informal discovery, I estimate the following recoveries by the Aggrieved Employees. First, given that we estimate 490 Aggrieved Employees, those individuals will receive an estimated average share of $52.08 ($25,000 /480). Then, based on an estimated Weeks Worked during the PAGA Period, we estimate the value of each PAGA Workweek as $.51 ($25,000 / 49,420); if an Aggrieved Employee worked only 2 weeks in the PAGA Period, the low payment would be $1.01 and, if an Aggrieved Employee worked the maximum weeks during the PAGA Period (122), then the maximum PAGA payment will be $123.22. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 54).

E. <u>PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL IS EXPERIENCED IN WAGE-AND-HOUR LITIGATION</u>

The view of attorneys conducting the litigation is entitled to significant weight deciding whether to approve a settlement. *Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility* (N.D. Cal. 1980) 87 F.R.D. 15, 18; *Kullar,* 168 Cal.App.4th at 128 (court must consider "the experience and view of counsel"). Here, Plaintiff's Counsel are highly experienced in Class/PAGA litigation, having repeatedly been named "Super Lawyer" in employment litigation (a distinction awarded to only 5% of litigators), having achieved large settlements and verdicts, including one of the largest PAGA awards in California's history, collecting over $250 million for its clients, having tried class and PAGA cases against Fortune 100 companies, among other things. (Mankin Decl. ¶¶ 2-6). Plaintiff's counsel, operating at arm's length, weighed the strengths and risks of this case, and are of the view that this is a fair and reasonable settlement considering the nature of the claims, realistic risk adjusted value, the complexities of the case, state of the law, and uncertainties of class certification and litigation.

F. <u>THE CLASS NOTICE CONFORMS TO ALL APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES</u>

The proposed Notice should be approved, as it fully informs the Class Members of the nature of the lawsuit and each Class Member's rights under terms of the Settlement Agreement and applicable law. The way the Class Notice shall be disseminated ensures that all or nearly all of the Class Members shall be properly notified of the proposed settlement.

The proposed Notice and proposed plan for the Administrator to mail the Notice to the last known address of all class members complies with all the requirements of Cal. Rule of Court 3.769(f) and 3.766(b). The proposed Notice includes: (1) the material terms of the settlement; (2) the proposed attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and the costs of administration; (3) details about the final fairness hearing and how class members may elect to exclude themselves or make an objection; (4) how class members can obtain additional information; and (5) each Class Members' Individual Class and PAGA Payments. *See* Class Notice (Exhibit B to Mankin Decl.).

The Court has wide discretion in approving the means of providing notice, so long as the class representative "provide(s) meaningful notice in a form that should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of class members." *Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels*, (1976) 15 Cal.3d 853, 861. Here, the Notice Packet will be disseminated directly to the Class Members by first class mail by the Settlement Administrator, since Defendants have the last known addresses of all class members and the Settlement Administrator will perform a skip trace and update those addresses for any Notice Packets that are returned and re-send the same.

The Notice satisfies the requirements of Rule of Court 3.766 and affords Class Members with all due process protections required by the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, the contents of the Notice comply with Cal. R. Ct. 3.766(d), because the Notice includes, without limitation (1) a detailed explanation of the case, including the basic contentions or denials of the parties; (2) a statement that the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; (3) a procedure for the member to follow in requesting exclusion from the class; (4) a statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will bind all members who do not request exclusion; and (5) a statement that any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member so desires, enter an appearance through counsel. The 45-day deadline to opt-out or object is also reasonable, as it provides Class Members sufficient time to do so and, if they so choose, to seek independent legal advice in the interim. If a Class Member does not opt-out, he or she will automatically be sent a settlement check.

G. THE NON-REVERSIONARY "CHECKS CASHED" DISTRIBUTION ENSURES MAXIMAL RECOVERY FOR CLASS MEMBERS

The fact that each member who does not opt out of the Settlement shall be mailed a check ensures that every Class Member will be paid unless they affirmatively act to exclude themself. Moreover, the Settlement Amount is non-reversionary, which means that no settlement funds will revert to Defendant; instead, if any checks are uncashed by the deadline, the funds will be transferred to the State Controller's Office subject to approval of the Court. Such terms are favored by Courts and demonstrate that there was no collusion between counsel for the parties and that the Settlement is fair and favorable to the Class Members.

H. THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ALLOCATION IS FAIR

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Class Counsel is seeking reimbursement of up to $25,000 in litigation costs, along with attorneys' fees equal to one-third of the Settlement Amount. See, *e.g.*, *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th. 480 (approving 1/3 fee in the amount of $6.33 million at a 2.13 lodestar multiplier, and holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, the trial court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created); *Stuart v. RadioShack Corp*. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010) 2010 WL 3155645 (approving fee 1/3 from settlement amount of $4.5 million since 1/3 was "well within the range of percentages which courts have upheld as reasonable in other class action lawsuits").

Once the Court grants preliminary approval and Notice is disseminated, Plaintiff's counsel will submit a comprehensive request for attorneys' fees and costs with final approval.

I. THE REQUESTED SERVICE AWARD REQUEST IS FAIR AND APPROPRIATE

The Settlement Agreement provides an incentive award payment of $10,000 to the Class Representative in exchange for his service to the Class and for Plaintiff agreeing to foregoing any potential individual claims.

This request is reasonable given the recovery Class Members will receive on average, as well as the time and effort he devoted to this case. His efforts included providing factual background for the litigation; providing documents and information about Defendant's compensation plan; participating in phone calls to discuss litigation and settlement strategy; making himself available throughout the litigation to assist with analyzing the claims and defenses; helping Class Counsel prepare for the mediation; and reviewing the settlement documents. The Class Representative also assumed significant risk in bringing this litigation—namely, had he lost, he could have been ordered to pay Defendant's costs.

The requested service award falls within the range of incentive payments typically awarded to Class Representatives in similar class actions. See, *e.g.*, *Bond v. Ferguson Enterprises, Inc*. (E.D. Cal. 2011) 2011 WL 2648879 (approving $11,250 service awards in class action); *Ross v. US Bank National Association* (N.D. Cal. 2010) 2010 WL 3833922, at *2 (approving $20,000 enhancement award in California wage-and-hour class settlement); *Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc*. (E.D. Cal. 2010) 266 F.R.D. 415, 493 (approving service awards of $15,000 from a $300,000 settlement fund in a wage/hour class action); *West v. Circle K Stores, Inc*. (E.D. Cal. 2006) 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76558, at *28 (finding service awards "of $ 15,000 each to be reasonable."); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs*. (N.D. Cal. 2007) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476, at *52 (finding "requested payment of $25,000 to each of the named Plaintiff is appropriate" in wage and hour settlement).

VI. THE COURT SHOULD APPOINT PHOENIX SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATORS AS ADMINISTRATOR

Subject to the Court's approval, the parties agreed to Phoenix Settlement Administrators serving as the Settlement Administrator. Phoenix Settlement Administrators is experienced in administering class action settlements and has provided a flat-fee proposal to administer this settlement for $10,000. (Mankin Decl. ¶ 83; Decl. of Michael Moore of Phoenix Settlement Administrators and exhibits).

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VII. TIMELINE AND SCHEDULING A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

The last step in the approval process is the formal hearing, whereby proponents of the Settlement may explain and describe its terms and conditions and offer argument in support of approval, and Class Members or their counsel may be heard in support of or in opposition to the settlement. Subject to the Court's approval, the Parties propose that the Court schedule a hearing for final approval approximately 160 days after the Preliminary Approval Date, as follows:

February 19, 2025	Preliminary Approval (PA) Order is Entered
March 21, 2025	Deadline for Defendant to provide the Class Data to the Settlement Administrator
April 10, 2025	Deadline for Settlement Administrator to complete first mailing of the Notice Packet to all Class Members.
May 26, 2025 *(45 days after mailing)*	Deadline for Class Members to submit Requests for Exclusion and Objections to the settlement.
16 court days before Final Approval hearing	Deadline for Plaintiff to file and serve Motion for Final Approval and application for award of fees, costs and service payments.
9 court days before Final Approval hearing	Deadline for filing of any written opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval, or filing response to an objection.
5 court days before final approval hearing	Deadline for filing of any written reply to opposition Motion for Final Approval
TBD (*Approximately July 29, 2025*)	Final Approval Hearing

VIII. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant the motion for preliminary approval of the settlement.

Dated: January 24, 2025

LAUBY, MANKIN & LAUBY LLP

BY: [signature]

Brian J. Mankin, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

PROOF OF SERVICE
(Pursuant to CCP §§ 1013(a)(1) and 2015.5)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE)

I am employed in the County of Riverside, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 5198 Arlington Avenue, PMB 513, Riverside, CA 92504.

On January 24, 2025, I caused to be served the foregoing document(s) described as follows:

PLAINTIFF'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT; DECLARATIONS IN SUPPORT OF; [PROPOSED] ORDER

I declare that I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with the U.S. postal service on that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

[ ] **By Mail** I deposited such envelope in the mail at Riverside, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.

[ ] **By Facsimile** I sent this document via fax to all parties as listed on attached service list, on

[ ] **By Overnight Service** I deposited such envelope in a facility regularly maintained by the United Parcel Service for receipt of items for overnight delivery, with overnight delivery expenses prepaid, addressed to the person to be served.

[X] **By Email or Electronic Transmission:** Pursuant to CCP § 1010.6 or an agreement of the parties to accept service by email or electronic transmission, I caused the document(s) to be sent from email address tracie@lmlfirm.com to the persons at the electronic notification address listed in the service list. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was not successful.

[ ] **By Certified Mail-Return Receipt Requested** I caused such envelope with postage fully prepaid thereon, to be placed in the United States mail at Riverside, California

[ ] **By Personal Service** I caused said document(s) to be personally served by hand on the parties listed on the attached service list.

[X] **State** I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on January 24, 2025, Riverside, California.

[ ] **Federal** I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.

Tracie Chiarito, Declarant

SERVICE LIST

Hazel U. Poei, Esq.
Kelli M. Dreger, Esq.
Martin P. Vigodnier
JACKSON LEWIS, P.C.
200 Spectrum Center Drive, #500
Irvine, CA 92618
949-885-13600
949-885-5267-Hazel direct
hazel.poei@jacksonlewis.com
kelli.dreger@jacksonlewis.com
martin.vigodnier@jacksonlewis.com
Attorneys for Defendant CLASSIC COLLISION CORPORATE SERVICES