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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

MISAN AKUYA, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

E I G MANAGEMENT DBA ECOSTAR
REMODELING & CONSTRUCTION, a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23STCV15280

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Stuart M.
Rice, Dept. 1]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: January 22, 2026
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Dept.: 1

Complaint filed: June 30, 2023
FAC filed: September 25, 2023
Trial date: Not set

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 22, 2026 at 10:30 a.m., in Department 1 of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Plaintiff Misan Akuya (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move for an order as follows:

1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
3. Appointing Plaintiff Misan Akuya as Class Representative for settlement purposes, and approving a Class Representative Service Award of up to \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff Misan Akuya;
4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Benjamin H. Haber, Daniel J. Kramer, Alan Wilcox and Lucy Nguyen of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes, and approving payment of \$98,333.33 in attorneys’ fees, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount;
5. Approving costs in the amount of \$15,044.96 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator in the amount of \$8,500.00;
7. Approving payment of \$10,000.00 for settlement of the Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) claims with 75% (\$7,500) going to the Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and 25% (\$2,500) going to the aggrieved employees;
8. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
9. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the Parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or enforcing the terms of the judgment.

This Motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Benjamin H. Haber and Chantal Soto-Najera, and such oral argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

Dated: December 29, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: 

Benjamin H. Haber

Daniel J. Kramer

Alan Wilcox

Lucy Nguyen

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Misan Akuya (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a proposed \$295,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant E I G Management dba EcoStar Remodeling & Construction. (“Defendant”, and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 320 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery, which allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage and hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$538.48*, with the *highest individual estimated net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$8,563.42*. (Declaration of Chantal Soto-Najera Regarding Notice and Settlement Administration [“Soto-Najera Decl.”], ¶ 16.) As of filing this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Motion”), there **no objections to the settlement and one request for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11-12.) The administrator will provide a supplemental declaration once the responsive deadline passes. Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

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II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff's Claims

This is a wage and hour class action and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) representative action. Plaintiff and putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant E I G Management dba EcoStar Remodeling & Construction (“Defendant”) during the class period. Defendant is a home remodeling contractor that provides services throughout the greater Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay areas. (Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Haber Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, failure to produce requested employment records, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (Haber Decl., ¶ 3.)

On June 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7) failure to produce requested employment records (Labor Code §§ 226 and 1198.5); (8) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802); and (9) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code §§

2699, et seq.) on July 21, 2023. On September 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding claims for civil penalties under PAGA (Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq.). (*Id.*) \

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the Complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. (Haber Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records for class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.*)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices, analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class Members, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (Haber Decl., ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement

On September 17, 2024, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced class action mediator Phillip K. Cha, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, **Exs. 1-2** [Settlement Agreement: Plaintiff's Individual Claims, Class Action and PAGA and Class Notice].)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class

Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* ¶ 8.)

D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement

Following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on June 24, 2025. (Haber Decl., ¶ 9.) The deadline for class members to opt out or object to the Settlement was September 22, 2025. (*Id.*) The reaction of the Class to the settlement so far has been overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, one Class Member has opted out of the settlement and no Class Member has objected to the settlement. (*Id.*)

E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay \$295,000.00 to resolve this litigation. The key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, the Parties agree to the certification of the classes pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "means all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant during the Class Period." (Settlement, ¶ 1.5.)

2. Class Period: "shall mean the period of time from January 3, 2019 through October 30, 2024." (Addendum Settlement, ¶ 1.12.)

3. Participating Class Members: "means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement." (Settlement, ¶ 1.35.)

4. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by Defendant in California and classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period. (Settlement, § 1.4.)

5. PAGA Period: "means the period from July 21, 2022 to October 30, 2024." (Settlement, § 1.31.)

6. Gross Settlement Amount: “This amount is \$295,000.00, for all claims, including Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, Class Representative Service Payment and the Administrator’s Expenses Payment.” (Settlement, ¶ 1.22.)

7. Uncashed Checks: For any Class Member or Aggrieved Employee whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to a Court-approved nonprofit organization or foundation consistent with Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b) such as Legal Aid at Work, 180 Montgomery Street, Suite 600, San Francisco, California 94104 (“Cy Pres Recipient”). The Parties, Class Counsel and Defense Counsel represent that they have no interest or relationship, financial or otherwise, with the intended Cy Pres Recipient. (Settlement, ¶ 4.4.3.)

8. Participating Class Members Released Claims: “All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from any and all claims asserted or that could have been asserted based on the facts pled in the Operative Complaint, including but not limited to, state wage and hour claims for any and all violations of California’s Labor Code and Unfair Competition Law based on Defendant’s alleged (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages, (2) failure to pay overtime wages, (3) failure to provide meal periods, (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods, (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination, (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, (7) failure to produce employment records, and (8) failure to indemnify necessary business expenditures, and all damages, interest, penalties, attorneys’ fees, costs, and other amounts recoverable under said causes of action under California law to the extent permissible, including, but not limited to, the California Labor Code and the applicable Wage Orders. Except as set forth in Section 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers’

1 compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period.” (Settlement, ¶ 5.2.)

2 9. PAGA Group Released Claims: “All Aggrieved Employees are deemed to
3 release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents,
4 attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims
5 for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the
6 PAGA Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint and the PAGA Notice, including any and
7 all claims involving any alleged (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages, (2) failure
8 to pay overtime wages, (3) failure to provide meal periods, (4) failure to authorize and permit
9 rest periods, (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination, (6) failure to provide accurate
10 itemized wage statements, (7) failure to produce employment records, and (8) failure to
11 indemnify necessary business expenditures, and including Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203,
12 204, 210, 216, 223, 225.5, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 245-248.5, 256, 432, 432.5, 432.7, 510, 512, 558,
13 558.1, 1024.5, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1198.5, 1199, 2699, 2699.3, 2802,
14 2810.5 and applicable Wage Orders during the PAGA Period. Aggrieved Employees only
15 release these claims for the duration of the PAGA Period.” (Settlement, ¶ 5.3.)

16 10. PAGA Allocation: PAGA Penalties in the amount of \$10,000.00 to be paid from
17 the Gross Settlement Amount, with 75% (\$7,500.00) allocated to the LWDA PAGA Payment
18 and 25% (\$2,500.00) allocated to the Individual PAGA Payments. (Settlement, ¶ 1.34.)

19 11. Net Settlement Amount: “means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following
20 payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA
21 Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, Class
22 Representative Service Payment and the Administrator’s Expenses Payment. The remainder
23 Net Settlement Amount is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class
24 Payments.” (Settlement, ¶ 1.28.)

25 12. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing
26 the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class
27 Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
28 Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate

each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25% share of PAGA Penalties \$2,500.00 by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods. Aggrieved Employees assume full responsibility and liability for any taxes owed on their respective Individual PAGA Payments.” (Settlement ¶ 3.2.5.1.)

13. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 20% wages, 80% to penalties and interest . (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.1.)

14. Class Representative Service Award: “Class Representative Service Payment to the Class Representative of not more than \$10,000.00 (in addition to any Individual Class Payment and any Individual PAGA Payment the Class Representative is entitled to receive as a Participating Class Member). Defendant will not oppose Plaintiff’s request for Class Representative Service Payment that does not exceed this amount.” (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.1.)

15. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: A Class Counsel Fees Payment of not more than 33 and 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is currently estimated to be \$98,333.33 and a Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$20,000.00. Defendant will not oppose requests for these payments provided that do not exceed these amounts. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.2.)

16. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Soto-Najera Decl., ¶ 5, Settlement, Ex. A.) Class Members were notified by first-class United States Postal Service (“USPS”) mail of the settlement. (Settlement, ¶ 7.4.) CPT Group, Inc., the Settlement Administrator, undertook its best efforts to ensure that the notice was provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*)

III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL

The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex

1 cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors to
2 be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the
3 risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
4 action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
5 government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar*
6 *v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is
7 fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: “(1) the settlement
8 is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow
9 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4)
10 the percentage of objectors is small.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
11 224, 245.)

12 Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial
13 court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give
14 “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk*
15 *v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent
16 necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or
17 overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a
18 whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

19 **A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise**

20 A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had he or she prevailed
21 at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and
22 reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and
23 necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
24 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
25 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
26 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

27 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or
28 some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Haber Decl., ¶ 10.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his

claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$295,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and settlement approval is appropriate. *Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit of approximately \$538.48, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$8,563.42.* (Soto-Najera Decl., ¶ 16.)

B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following Formal and Informal Discovery

The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced employment mediator, Phillip K. Cha, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,

1 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
2 litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to
3 mediation. (*Id.*)

4 **C. Plaintiff's Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience**

5 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
6 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 27-35.) Class Counsel has substantial
7 experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion,
8 trial, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on
9 behalf of plaintiffs and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling
10 responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

11 Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class
12 Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of
13 Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and
14 the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the
15 best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great
16 weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give
17 considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral
18 mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction
19 entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct"].)

20 **D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement**

21 To date, no class member has objected to the Settlement, and only one class member has
22 requested exclusion from the Settlement. (Soto-Najera Decl., ¶¶ 11-12.) The overwhelmingly
23 positive response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re*
24 *Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6
25 [relatively few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

26 Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the reaction of the
27 class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The
28 reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in

1 lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist.
2 LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the “class members overwhelmingly
3 support[ed] the settlement” where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members
4 participated in the settlement, “only nine objections were submitted”, and there were 86 timely
5 opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, “these indicia of the approval of
6 the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23”], *citing Hanlon*
7 *v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by
8 objectors, the “fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and
9 stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the
10 court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

11 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF**
12 **FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.**

13 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class
14 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$98,333.33, which is 33 1/3% of the Gross
15 Settlement Amount, costs up to \$20,000.00 for litigating this action, and enhancement awards of
16 \$7,500.00 to named Plaintiff Misan Akuya. Defendant has also agreed that it would not oppose an
17 application for these payments addressed above, and no class member has objected to these
18 amounts.

19 In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for
20 calculating attorneys’ fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed
21 by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, the California
22 Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage and hour class action
23 settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court
24 explained:

25 As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we
26 emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override***
27 ***the trial court’s primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common***
28 ***fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the***
potential fee award. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-
check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the
percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a

justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable percentage to apply.

(*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard

According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to forty percent*** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions. Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the attorneys’ fees requested herein.

B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.

Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in

comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Detailed timesheets are not necessary to a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) As the California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.”

(5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., supra*, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”]; *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.* (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451 [“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method, it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s hours.”].)

(*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$122,820 based on over 135 hours of work performed thus far. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 18-19.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$98,333.33 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 0.80. To be sure, trial courts have substantial

discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 “[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”).) Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm, PLC’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

2. Class Counsel’s Requested Fees are Derived Using a Negative Multiplier.

Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seek a negative multiplier of 0.80 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request is underscored by the fact that a significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

Multiplying the total hours billed by Class Counsel to the litigation by their reasonable hourly rates yields a lodestar of \$122,820, which is more than the \$98,333.33 in attorney’s fees Class Counsel are requesting. This disparity is important to note because when plaintiffs seek an amount in fees that is less than what they actually billed, the requested fee amount is generally considered reasonable. (*Chun-Hoon v. McKee Foods Corp.* (N.D. Cal. 2010) 716 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 [finding that, if the court is asked to apply a negative multiplier, it “suggests the negotiated

1 fee award is a reasonable and fair valuation of the services rendered to the class by Plaintiff's
2 Counsel."].) Indeed, there is no reason for the Court to reduce Class Counsel's lodestar with a
3 negative multiplier. (*Roos v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc.* (2015) 241 Cal. App. 4th 1472, 1495 ["a trial
4 court acts appropriately . . . when it accepts in a common-fund case a cap on fees . . . when the
5 application of the cap results in a lower award than would be authorized under the lodestar
6 method."], disapproved on another ground in *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.* (2018) 4
7 Cal.5th 260.)

8 Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently
9 with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) "A
10 lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the
11 fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid
12 no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases." (*Id.* at p. 1133.)
13 Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important
14 rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is "earned compensation; unlike a
15 windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-
16 level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment
17 or delay in payment of attorney's fees." (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

18 "Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher." (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at
19 p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512
20 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162
21 Cal.App.4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft*
22 *Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 ["most" common fund cases apply a multiplier
23 of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11, *citing* a
24 study "reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases" and
25 finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be "per se reasonable.") The intermediate court in
26 *Laffitte*, after finding that "2 to 4" is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check,
27 affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l* (2014)
28 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82.) The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the

1 California Supreme Court in its new decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

2 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
3 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
4 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
5 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
6 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
7 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a
8 multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

9 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
10 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
11 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
12 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
13 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133,
14 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter
15 and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel's
16 outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

17 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have
18 had success in wage and hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent
19 lawyers and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant's contentions underscore the
20 risk of prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented
21 recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of
22 this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals.
23 Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so
24 many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other
25 meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but
26 were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to
27 achieve favorable results. (Haber Decl., ¶ 25.) Considered against the risks of continued
28 litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief

provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

C. Costs Are Reasonable.

As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$15,044.96 in costs, and Defendant has agreed that they will not oppose any cost award request up to \$20,000.00. (Haber Decl., ¶ 26, Ex. 4.) Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$20,000.00 in costs. The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber, and these costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee paying client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills, meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval. (See *Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

D. The Enhancement Payments to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (See *Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiff should therefore be

1 rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman*
2 *Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

3 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
4 a Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff Misan Akuya. This
5 amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general releases of all claims against Defendant. Plaintiff
6 has submitted a declaration demonstrating his devotion to this case, including his efforts assisting
7 counsel in the case, communicating with counsel frequently for litigation, preparing for mediation,
8 and reviewing case-related documents. (*See, generally*, Declaration of Plaintiff submitted in
9 support of Motion for Preliminary Approval.)

10 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
11 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
12 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
13 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
14 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
15 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award for
16 plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno, supra*, 2021 WL 3673845 at *3 [“The
17 Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez, supra*, 2024 WL 150721 at
18 p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

19 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may
20 be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC*
21 (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive
22 awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have
23 incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at p. 806.) “An incentive
24 award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’”
25 (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394, *quoting Clark*, 175
26 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an
27 incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both
28 financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class

1 representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the
2 duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class
3 representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.) Plaintiff’s declaration
4 describes how each of the five *Cellphone Termination* factors are present here.

5 **E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.**

6 CPT Group, Inc., the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will incur a total of
7 \$8,500.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Soto-Najera Decl., ¶ 19.)
8 These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and
9 Class Member payment processing.


10 **V. CONCLUSION**

11 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval
12 of the proposed settlement.

13
14 Dated: December 29, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

15 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

16 

17 Benjamin H. Haber
18 Daniel J. Kramer
19 Alan Wilcox
Lucy Nguyen

20 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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