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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

ELIZABETH CANDELARIO, individually, on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

REDTAILS LOGISTICS COMPANY LLC, a
limited liability company; REDTAILS
LOGISTICS CORPORATION, INC., a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 23STCV15238

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Elaine Lu,
Dept. 9]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: December 4, 2025

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept: 9

Complaint filed: June 29, 2023

FAC filed: October 27, 2023

Trial date: not set

TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 4, 2025 at 8:30 a.m., in Department 9 of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiff Elizabeth Candelario (“Plaintiff”) will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Redtails Logistics Company LLC and Redtail Logistics Corporation (“Defendant”). Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:


1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement;
2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
4. Appointing Plaintiff Elizabeth Candelario as Class Representatives for settlement purposes;
5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Benjamin H. Haber and Daniel J. Kramer of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
6. Appointing Apex Class Action as the Settlement Administrator; and
7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the Declarations of Benjamin H. Haber and Elizabeth Candelario, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: August 14, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

By: 

Benjamin H. Haber
Daniel J. Kramer

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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3	Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.)	9, 12, 20
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Elizabeth Candelario (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$200,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Redtails Logistics Company LLC and Redtails Logistics Corporation, Inc. (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Class Action and PGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 535 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Paul Grossman, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement on August 13, 2024. Accordingly, Plaintiff request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant is an eCommerce logistics and warehousing company with warehouses located throughout the United States. (Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Haber Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to: provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods; and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based

1 on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to pay wages during employment,
2 failure to pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure
3 to keep requisite payroll records, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA.
4 (Haber Decl., ¶ 3.)

5 On June 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against
6 Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194,
7 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure
8 to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest
9 periods (Labor Code § 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code
10 §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7)
11 failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802); and (8) unfair business
12 practices (Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*). (Haber Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff sent
13 a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”)
14 alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA on July 21, 2023. (*Id.*) On
15 October 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding a claim
16 for civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.*)

17 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

18 Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
19 information before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records
20 for class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and
21 practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and
22 former employees in its informal discovery responses. (Haber Decl., ¶ 5.)

23 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices
24 and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
25 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum monetary
26 exposure for all claims. (Haber Decl., ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law
27 regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these
28 records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*) This extensive investigation

1 and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the
2 Settlement.

3 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

4 On August 12, 2024, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced
5 employment mediator Paul Grossman, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted
6 via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a
7 professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore
8 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their
9 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
10 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and
11 Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a fully-executed settlement on August 14, 2025, the
12 material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 1, Settlement
13 Agreement.)

14 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
15 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
16 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
17 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
18 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
19 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 14.)

20 Indeed, the \$200,000.00 Settlement represents approximately **35%** of the **realistic**
21 **maximum recovery** of \$617,456.64. (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Although Class Counsel estimated that
22 Defendant's maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$5.6 million, when
23 the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel
24 believes that Defendant's realistic exposure was \$617,456.64, meaning the Settlement achieves
25 a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-27.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at
26 class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Indeed,
27 because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and
28 will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Settlement's key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees of Defendant within the State of California at any time during the Class Period." (Settlement, § A(5).)

2. Class Period: "means the period from August 1, 2020, through (i) the date of Preliminary Approval, or (ii) November 11, 2024, whichever date occurs earlier." (Settlement, § A(12).)

3. Participating Class Members: "means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement." (Settlement, § A(36).)

4. Aggrieved Employees: "means all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees of Defendant within the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period." (Settlement, § A(4).)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: "means \$215,000.00 which is the total amount Defendant agrees to pay under the Settlement. The Gross Settlement Amount will be used to pay Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, and Administration Expenses Payment." (Settlement, § A(21).)

6. Uncashed Checks: "For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member, thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 384, subd. (b)." (Settlement, § D(3)(c).)

7. Release by Participating Class Members: "All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release the Released Parties from all claims, causes of actions, demands, debts, obligations, penalties, damages or liability of any nature whatsoever,

known or unknown, based on or arising out of the facts, circumstances, or primary rights that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint (and any amendments thereto) that occurred during the Class Period and were ascertained during the Action. This release includes: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages for all hours worked; (2) failure to pay overtime wages (including failure to properly calculate the regular rate of pay to those who worked overtime and earned incentive pay); (3) failure to provide meal periods (including failure to pay meal period premiums at the regular rate of pay and include non-discretionary incentive compensation); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (including failure to pay rest period premiums at the regular rate of pay and include non-discretionary incentive compensation); (5) failure to pay all wages owed in a timely manner, including final wages and during employment; (6) failure to provide complete, accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures and reimburse employees for business expenses and costs; and (8) unfair business practices and unfair competition violations. This Release shall apply to Plaintiff and the Participating Class Members during the Class Period. Except as set forth in Section E(3) of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period." (Settlement, § E(2).) This Release will be deemed effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments. (Settlement, § E.)

8. Release by Aggrieved Employees: "All Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts, circumstances, or primary rights stated in the Operative Complaint (and any amendments thereto) and PAGA Notice that occurred during the PAGA Period and were ascertained during the Action. This release includes any and all claims for PAGA penalties involving: (1) failure to pay minimum

1 and straight time wages for all hours worked; (2) failure to pay overtime wages (including failure
2 to properly calculate the regular rate of pay to those who worked overtime and earned incentive
3 pay); (3) failure to provide meal periods (including failure to pay meal period premiums at the
4 regular rate of pay and include non-discretionary incentive compensation); (4) failure to authorize
5 and permit rest periods (including failure to pay rest period premiums at the regular rate of pay and
6 include non-discretionary incentive compensation); (5) failure to pay all wages owed in a timely
7 manner, including final wages and during employment; (6) failure to provide complete, accurate
8 itemized wage statements; and (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures and reimburse
9 employees for business expenses and costs. This Release shall apply to Plaintiff, the Aggrieved
10 Employees, the Labor & Workforce Development Agency, and the State of California during the
11 PAGA Period.” (Settlement, § E(3).)

12 9. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant.”
13 (Settlement, § C(1).)

14 10. PAGA Allocation: “PAGA Penalties in the sum of \$20,000 to be paid from the
15 Gross Settlement Amount, seventy-five percent (75%) of which (\$15,000) will be allocated to the
16 LWDA as the LWDA PAGA Payment and twenty-five percent (25%) of which (\$5,000.00) will
17 be allocated to the Aggrieved Employees as their Individual PAGA Payments.” (Settlement,
18 § C(2)(e).) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this
19 Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Haber Decl., ¶ 9.)

20 11. Net Settlement Amount: “means the Gross Settlement Amount less the following
21 payments in the amounts approved by the Court: (a) Individual PAGA Payments; (b) LWDA
22 PAGA Payment; (c) Class Representative Service Payment; (d) Class Counsel Fees Payment; (e)
23 Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment; and (f) Administration Expenses Payment. The Net
24 Settlement Amount is the total amount that will be paid to Participating Class Members in the form
25 of Individual Class Payments.” (Settlement, § A(27).)

26 12. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by: (a) dividing the
27 Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class
28 Members during the Class Period; and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class

Member's Workweeks." (Settlement, § C(2)(d).) As to PAGA: "The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by: (a) dividing the amount of Aggrieved Employees' twenty-five percent (25%) share of PAGA Penalties (\$5,000) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period; and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employees' PAGA Period Pay Periods during the PAGA Period." (Settlement, § C(2)(e).)

13. Tax Allocation: "Twenty percent (20%) of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims ("Wage Portion"). The Wage Portions are subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. Eighty percent (80%) of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for interests and penalties ("Non-Wage Portion"). The Non-Wage Portions are not subject to wage withholdings and will be reported on IRS 1099 Forms." (Settlement, § C(2)(d)(i).)

14. Class Representative Service Awards: "A Class Representative Service Payment of no more than \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff (in addition to any Individual Class Payment and Individual PAGA Payment the Class Representative is entitled to receive as a Participating Class Member)." (Settlement, § C(2)(a).)

15. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: "A Class Counsel Fees Payment of no more \$71,666.66 (one third of the Gross Settlement Amount) and a Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$30,000.00. Defendant will not oppose requests for these payments provided that do not exceed these amounts." (Settlement, § C(2)(b).)

16. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § D(3)(a).) Apex Class Action, the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-

mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Haber Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 2 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

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///

1 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
2 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

3 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
4 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

5 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
6 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
7 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
8 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
9 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
10 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
11 to approve the settlement.”].)

12 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
13 mediation with experienced employment mediator, Paul Grossman, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The
14 settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner,
15 were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a
16 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through
17 trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and
18 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses,
19 the Parties reached an agreement. (Haber Decl., ¶ 8.)

20 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
21 the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
22 records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
23 meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well
24 as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus
25 former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages
26 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
27 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
28 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and her counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in

1 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

2 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
3 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 38-47.) Again, this supports the position that the
4 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
5 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
6 action.

7 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’**
8 **Respective Legal Positions**

9 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
10 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
11 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
12 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
13 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
14 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
15 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

16 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Haber
17 Decl., ¶ 25.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of her claims, a legitimate controversy exists
18 as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages
19 due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

20 The proposed settlement of \$215,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
21 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-27.) Because of the proposed
22 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
23 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
24 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
25 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$215,000.00 is within
26 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
27 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***
28 ***\$127.73.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 26.)

1 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

2 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
3 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
4 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 38-47.)
5 Although Plaintiff and her counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
6 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

7 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

8 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
9 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
10 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
11 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
12 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
13 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

14 **C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

15 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class
16 Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$71,666.66, which is 1/3 of the Gross Settlement
17 Amount, and up to \$30,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the
18 proposed Notice and are reasonable.

19 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund"**
20 **Method**

21 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created
22 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number
23 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
24 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
25 may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
26 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

27 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common
28 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all

1 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent v.*
2 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995)
3 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in
4 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
5 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
6 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
7 that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought
8 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

9 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
10 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
11 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
12 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
13 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
14 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
15 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
16 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
17 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
18 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

19 2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

20 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on
21 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
22 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
23 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
24 are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
25 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
26 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
27 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
28 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10

million].)

Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys' fees equal to 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ["Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery."].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys' fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A "Fee-Shifting" Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of "minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit." Under this section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys' fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 36-37.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 38-47.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee award is supported here.

1 Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
2 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement.
3 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
4 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
5 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
6 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
7 is reasonable and fair.

8 **D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable**

9 Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and "there is no
10 indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other" class members,
11 such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr.
12 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for
13 PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement.
14 (*Id.* [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or \$1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D.
15 Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v.*
16 *Fed. Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts
17 approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here,
18 the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved
19 by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia*
20 *v. Shamrock Foods Co.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431,
21 at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson, supra*, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1
22 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal.
23 Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA
24 settlement of 0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of \$20,000.00, 75%
25 percent of which (\$15,000.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$5,000.00) to be distributed to
26 the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § C(2)(e).) The \$20,000.00 settlement amount equates to
27 approximately 9.3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which far exceeds amounts that are routinely
28 approved. The Parties negotiated to allocate 9.3% of the Settlement to PAGA penalties in good

1 faith and this amount is reasonable considering that the maximum PAGA penalties were estimated
2 at \$1,264,500.00 (which assumed \$100 per pay period). (Haber Decl., ¶ 22.)

3 **E. The Service Awards to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable**

4 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
5 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
6 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
7 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
8 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
9 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
10 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

11 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
12 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
13 codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously
14 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to
15 work under substandard unlawful conditions” Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has
16 noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is
17 widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*
18 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for
19 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
20 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

21 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
22 Service Awards in the amount of \$10,000.00 to named Plaintiff Elizabeth Candelario. This amount
23 is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendant. Courts routinely
24 approve enhancement awards in excess of \$10,000.00 for plaintiffs represented by Class
25 Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL
26 3673845, *3 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of*
27 *America, National Association* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721,
28 at *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].) Class Counsel

1 represent that Plaintiff devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case,
2 communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was
3 frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (*See generally* Plaintiff’s
4 declaration; Haber Decl., ¶¶ 28-32.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the
5 substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members. (*Id.*)

6 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
7 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
8 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
9 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg
10 & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev.
11 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class
12 actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named
13 plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median
14 award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in
15 employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
16 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
17 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

18 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

19 **A. Legal Standard**

20 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
21 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
22 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
23 prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when
24 the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
25 numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
26 for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1)
27 [t]here must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest
28 in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow*

1 *Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the
2 California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the
3 community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of
4 law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
5 representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29
6 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

7 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
8 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
9 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
10 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to
11 the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond*,
12 *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

13 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
14 **Settlement Purposes.**

15 **1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous**

16 The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable and includes
17 approximately 535 employees of Defendant.

18 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
19 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
20 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
21 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
22 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

23 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
24 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
25 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
26 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
27 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a
28 class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries

1 of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
2 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
3 Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

4 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

5 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
6 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
7 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
8 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
9 Cal.App.3d 605.)

10 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
11 policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant had
12 legally compliant policies and practices for pay sick time properly; whether Defendant had legally
13 compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had
14 legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest
15 periods; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether payment of
16 wages during employed was timely; whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded
17 unpaid wages, including meal and rest period premium wages; whether wage statements were
18 consequently non-compliant; and whether Defendant failed to keep requisite payroll records.
19 Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified class
20 members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for, the
21 same alleged injuries.

22 **3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

23 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
24 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
25 typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the defendant’s conduct and
26 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 [“[t]he only requirements are that
27 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
28 situated” vis-à-vis the class.]) A representative plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class if they

1 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
2 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as
3 such, she alleges that she was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
4 employees.

5 **4. Plaintiff and Her Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

6 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
7 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
8 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
9 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

10 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel
11 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
12 previously settled. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 38-47.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified,
13 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
14 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,
15 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication.
16 Plaintiff's willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates her serious commitment to
17 bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

18 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

19 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
20 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
21 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court's use of the
22 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
23 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
24 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
25 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
26 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th
27 Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns
28 are essentially non-existent.

1 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

2 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

3 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
4 Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
5 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
6 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
7 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
8 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
9 Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided
10 by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

11 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

12 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
13 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
14 terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
15 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
16 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

17 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
18 *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the
19 terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It
20 makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
21 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
22 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
23 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
24 combined settlement-certification class notice.

25 **VI. CONCLUSION**

26 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
27 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing.


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2 Dated: August 14, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

3
4 By:



Benjamin H. Haber

Daniel J. Kramer

5 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

On **August 14, 2025**, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic service addresses listed above via third-party cloud service **CASEANYWHERE**.

Executed on **August 14, 2025**, at Los Angeles, California.

Rebecca Padilla