

DOUGLAS HAN (SBN 232858)
SHUNT TATAVOS-GHARAJEH (SBN 272164)
WILLIAM WILKINSON (SBN 346777)
HAIG HOGDANIAN (SBN 334699)
JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION
751 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 101
Pasadena, California 91103
Telephone: (818) 230-7502
Facsimile: (818) 230-7259

Attorneys for Plaintiff

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA**

FRANCISCO GONZALEZ, individually, and
on behalf of other members of the general
public similarly situated;

Plaintiff,

v.

SAKATA SEED AMERICA, INC., a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through
100, inclusive;

Defendants.

Case No.: 23CV419334

Assigned for All Purposes to:
Honorable Charles F. Adams
Department 7

CLASS ACTION

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT,
CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION,
APPROVAL OF CLASS NOTICE,
SETTING OF FINAL APPROVAL
HEARING DATE; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT THEREOF**

[Declaration of Proposed Class Counsel
(Douglas Han); Declaration of Julie Green;
and [Proposed] Order filed concurrently
herewith]

Hearing Date: March 13, 2025
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.
Hearing Place: Department 7

Complaint Filed: July 20, 2023
FAC Filed: October 2, 2023
Trial Date: None Set

1 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on March 13, 2025 at 1:30 p.m., or as soon as the matter
2 may be heard, before the Honorable Charles F. Adams in Department 7 of the Santa Clara
3 Superior Court located at 191 North First Street, San Jose, California 95113, Plaintiff Francisco
4 Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order:

- 5 • Granting Preliminary Approval of the proposed class action settlement described
6 herein and as set forth in the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
7 (“Settlement Agreement,” “Settlement,” or “Agreement”), attached as **Exhibit 2**
8 to the Declaration of Douglas Han, including, and not limited to, the means of
9 allocation and distribution of funds, the allocations for payments under the Private
10 Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class
11 Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, and
12 Settlement Administration Expenses;
- 13 • Conditionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes only;
- 14 • Appointing Plaintiff as the class representative;
- 15 • Appointing Justice Law Corporation as Class Counsel;
- 16 • Approving the proposed Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action and
17 Hearing Date (“Class Notice”) attached as **Exhibit A** to the Settlement Agreement
18 and [Proposed] Order Preliminarily Approving Class Action Settlement;
- 19 • Directing the mailing of the proposed Class Notice with a postage-paid return
20 envelope to the proposed Class;
- 21 • Approving the proposed deadlines for the notice and settlement administration
22 process;
- 23 • Approving CPT Group, Inc. as the Administrator;
- 24 • Approving the settlement of the PAGA claims; and
- 25 • Scheduling a hearing to consider whether to grant Final Approval of the Settlement
26 Agreement, at which time the Court will also consider whether to grant Final
27 Approval of the request for the Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel
28 Litigation Expenses Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, Settlement
 Administration Expenses, and allocation of the PAGA Payment.

1 This motion is based upon the following memorandum of points and authorities;
2 Declaration of Proposed Class Counsel (Douglas Han); Declaration of the Proposed
3 Administrator (Julie Green); [Proposed] Order filed concurrently with this motion; pleadings and
4 other records on file with the Court in this matter; and such documentary evidence and oral
5 argument as may be presented at the hearing on this motion.

6
7 Dated: November 18, 2024

JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION

8 By: 
9 Douglas Han
10 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*
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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 This motion seeks preliminary approval of a non-reversionary wage-and-hour class and
3 representative action settlement by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all current and former
4 hourly-paid or non-exempt employees of Defendant Sakata Seed America, Inc. (“Defendant”)
5 within the State of California at any time during the period from July 20, 2019, through August
6 19, 2024 (“Class,” “Class Members,” and “Class Period”). At the time of this filing, the number
7 of Class Members confirmed by Defendant is estimated to be one hundred ninety-four (194).
8 (Declaration of Douglas Han In Support of Motion For Preliminary Approval of Class Action
9 Settlement (“Han Decl.”), ¶¶ 8, 9.)

10 **II. BACKGROUND**

11 On July 20, 2023, Plaintiff provided written notice to the California Labor and Workforce
12 Development Agency (“LWDA”) and Defendant. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 10, Exhibit 3.)

13 On July 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit in the Superior Court
14 of California, County of Santa Clara, alleging eight (8) causes of action. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶
15 11.) On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint that added the following
16 cause of action: violation of Labor Code section 2698 (PAGA). (*Id.* at ¶ 12; Exhibit 4.)

17 After engaging in discovery, investigations, and negotiation, on June 26, 2024, the Parties
18 remotely attended mediation with the mediator Judge Howard Broadman, ultimately resulting in
19 the Parties reaching a settlement via a mediator’s proposal. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 13.)

20 **III. INVESTIGATION/ LITIGATION HISTORY**

21 **a. Discovery, Investigation, and the Parties’ Staunchly Conflicting Positions**

22 After initiating this lawsuit, the Parties engaged in discovery. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 15.)
23 The Parties met and conferred and agreed to engage in an informal exchange of information and
24 then eventually remotely attended mediation. (*Ibid.*)

25 Prior to mediation, the Parties conducted significant investigation and discovery of the
26 facts and law. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 16.) Defendant produced several documents relating to the
27 policies, practices, and procedures. (*Ibid.*) As part of Defendant’s production, Plaintiff also
28 reviewed time records, wage statements, and information relating to the size and scope of the

1 Class. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 16.) Putative class members were also located and interviewed to
2 attain a better understanding of the alleged day-to-day violations. (*Ibid.*)

3 Based upon the information provided by Defendant and interviews with putative class
4 members, Plaintiff contends – and Defendant denies – Defendant: (1) failed to provide employees
5 with legally mandated meal and rest breaks; (2) failed to pay employees for all hours worked;
6 (3) failed to factor non-discretionary bonuses into employees’ regular rate; (4) failed to reimburse
7 employees for necessary business expenses; (5) issued noncompliant wage statements; and (6) is
8 liable for waiting time penalties. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 18-25.)

9 **b. The Parties Were Able to Reach an Agreement on Settlement of the Action**

10 **i. The Parties Attended Mediation Which Ultimately Led to the**
11 **Settlement Agreement**

12 The Parties remotely attended mediation with an experienced mediator. (Han Decl., *supra*,
13 at ¶ 26.) During the mediation, the Parties discussed the risks of continued litigation, the
14 likelihood of certification, and the merits of the claims and defenses versus the benefits of
15 settlement. (*Ibid.*) With the assistance of the mediator, the Parties reached a global settlement, the
16 terms of which were memorialized in the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 26, Exhibits 2, 5.)

17 **ii. The Settlement Was Reached as a Result of Arm’s-length Negotiations**

18 The Settlement was reached because of arm’s-length negotiations. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶
19 29.) Though cordial and professional, the settlement negotiations have always been adversarial
20 and non-collusive in nature. (*Ibid.*) At the mediation, the Parties’ counsel conducted extensive
21 arm’s-length settlement negotiations until an agreement was reached after mediation. (*Ibid.*)

22 Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe in the merits of the case but recognize the expense and
23 length of additional proceedings necessary to continue the litigation. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 30.)
24 Plaintiff and Class Counsel considered the uncertainty and risk of further litigation, potential
25 outcome, and difficulties and delays inherent in such litigation. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiff and Class Counsel
26 believe that the settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable
27 and is in the best interests of the Class Members. (*Ibid.*)

28 ///

1 **iii. The Settlement Is the Result of Thorough Investigation**

2 The Parties thoroughly investigated and evaluated the factual strengths and weaknesses
3 of the claims and defenses and engaged in sufficient investigation, research, and discovery. (Han
4 Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 31.) The Settlement was only possible following significant investigation and
5 evaluation of the relevant policies and procedures. (*Ibid.*) This information permitted Class
6 Counsel to engage in a comprehensive analysis of liability and potential damages. This case has
7 reached the stage the Parties understand “the strength of the case; the reasonableness of the
8 settlement in light of the attendant risks of litigation, and in light of the best possible recovery”
9 sufficient to support the Settlement’s reasonableness, adequacy, and fairness. (Han Decl., *supra*,
10 at ¶ 31; *Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.* (N.D.Cal. 1979) 485 F.Supp. 610, 617.)

11 **c. Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

12 **i. Deductions from the Settlement**

13 The Parties agreed (subject to the Court’s approval) this matter be settled for the total sum
14 of \$400,000 which includes the: (1) Class Counsel Fees Payment of up to \$140,000 (35% of the
15 Gross Settlement Amount); (2) Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of up to \$25,000; (3)
16 Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$10,000; (4) Settlement Administration Expenses
17 of up to \$10,000; and (5) PAGA Payment of \$30,000. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 27.)

18 **ii. Calculation of the Individual Class Payments**

19 If the Court approves the proposed deductions from the Gross Settlement Amount, it is
20 estimated that \$185,000 will be distributed to Participating Class Members, resulting in a gross
21 *average* Individual Class Payment of \$953.61. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 28.)

22 The Administrator will calculate and pay Individual Class Payments for Participating
23 Class Members using the formula set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶
24 26; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § III(3)(a)(i).) The Administrator shall also calculate and pay Individual
25 PAGA Payments to Aggrieved Employees using the formula set forth in the Settlement
26 Agreement. (*Id.* at § III(3)(a)(ii).)

27 ///

28 ///

1 **iii. The Allocation of 20% to Wages and 80% to Interests and Penalties Is**
2 **Justified Under the Claims of this Action**

3 Individual Class Payments will be apportioned twenty percent (20%) in the settlement of
4 wage claims and eighty percent (80%) in the settlement of claims for interest and penalties. (Han
5 Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 26; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § III(3)(b).)

6 The allocation of wages and penalties was based on the approximate realistic exposure
7 that Plaintiff could expect to receive for meal and rest break premiums and unpaid and underpaid
8 wages. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 50.) First, Plaintiff added the realistic exposure for rest break
9 premiums and meal break premiums (\$30,477.79 + \$73,112.79 = \$103,590.58). (*Ibid.*) Plaintiff
10 then added the \$103,590.58 to the low end realistic exposure for unpaid wages due to off-the-
11 clock work and underpaid overtime wages, sick leave, and premium wages (\$103,590.58 +
12 \$33,794.22 + \$99,804.59 + \$41,733.23 = \$237,189.39). (*Ibid.*) The realistic exposure of
13 \$237,189.39 that Plaintiff can expect to receive if he was to prevail at trial for meal and rest break
14 premiums, low end unpaid wages due to off-the-clock work, and underpaid overtime wages, sick
15 leave, and premium wages represents about 21.09% of the low end total realistic exposure and
16 PAGA penalties (\$237,189.39 ÷ \$1,124,771 = 0.21088 x 100 = 21.09%). (*Ibid.*) Because this
17 represents nearly twenty percent (20%) of wages, it is appropriate to allocate twenty percent
18 (20%) as wages and eighty percent (80%) as interest and penalties. (*Ibid.*)

19 **iv. Notice to the Class**

20 No later than thirty (30) calendar days after the Court grants preliminary approval,
21 Defendant will deliver the Class Data to the Administrator. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 26; Exhibit 2,
22 *supra*, at § III(5)(b)(i).) No later than fourteen (14) calendar days after receiving the Class Data,
23 the Administrator will mail the Class Notices with a translation to all the Class Members via first-
24 class regular U.S. Mail. (*Id.* at § III(5)(b)(ii).)

25 **v. Distribution of Funds**

26 The Gross Settlement Amount will be funded and distributed pursuant to the timeline and
27 manner set forth in the Settlement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 26; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § III(5)(h).)

28 ///

Uncashed settlement checks will be paid to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 26; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § III(5)(i).)

vi. Release of Claims

Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, Participating Class Members will waive and release the Released Parties from the Released Class Claims. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 26; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at §§ I(29), III(6)(a).)

Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, Plaintiff, State of California, and all Aggrieved Employees will waive and release the Released Parties from the Released PAGA Claims. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 26; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at §§ I(30), III(6)(b).)

Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, Plaintiff and his former and present spouses, representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns generally release and forever discharge the Released Parties from the Plaintiff's Release. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 26; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § III(6)(c).) Plaintiff also expressly waives and relinquishes the provisions, rights, and benefits, if any, of section 1542 of the Civil Code. (*Id.* at § III(6)(c)(i).)

With regards to class action releases, “[A] court may release not only those claims alleged in the complaint and before the court, but also claims which ‘could have been alleged by reason of or in connection with any matter or fact set forth or referred to in’ the complaint.” (*Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC* (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 537.) The scope of the releases in this case are acceptable because they are limited to the scope of the allegations in the operative complaints. The released claims are “based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action.” (*Ibid.*) In other words, the released claims do not “go beyond the scope of the allegations in the operative complaint” (*Ibid.*)

///

1 **d. Counsel for Both Parties Are Experienced in Similar Litigation**

2 Counsel for the Parties are experienced in wage-and-hour employment law and class
3 actions. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 2-7; Exhibit 1.) Class Counsel have prosecuted numerous cases
4 on behalf of employees for Labor Code violations. (*Ibid.*) Thus, Class Counsel are experienced
5 and qualified to evaluate the class claims, advantages, and disadvantages of settlement versus
6 trial, and viability of the defenses. (*Ibid.*) Class Counsel’s experience guided their determination
7 to endorse the Settlement.¹ (*Ibid.*)

8 **IV. ARGUMENT**

9 **a. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Court Review**

10 California Rules of Court, rule 3.769 requires court approval for class action settlements.²
11 “Before final approval, the court must conduct an inquiry into the fairness of the proposed
12 settlement.” (Rules of Court, rule 3.769(g).) Rule 3.769 further requires a noticed motion for
13 preliminary approval of class settlements:

- 14 (a) A settlement or compromise of an entire class action, or a cause of action in
15 a class action, or as to a party, requires the approval of the court after
16 hearing.
17 ...
18 (c) Any party to a settlement agreement may serve and file a written notice of
19 motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. The settlement
20 agreement and proposed notice to class members must be filed with the
21 motion, and the proposed order must be lodged with the motion.

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25 ¹ The final factor mentioned in *Dunk* – the number of objectors – is not determinable until
26 the Class Notice has been provided to the Class Members, and they have had an opportunity to
27 respond. This information will be provided to the Court in conjunction with the Motion for Final
28 Approval of Class Action Settlement.

29 ² The California Supreme Court has also authorized California’s trial courts to use Federal
30 Rule 23 and cases applying it for guidance in considering class issues. (*Vasquez v. Superior Court*
31 (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 821; *Green v. Obledo* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 145-146.) Where appropriate,
32 the Parties cite Federal Rule 23 and federal case law in addition to California law.

Courts have discretion to approve settlements that are fair, not collusive, and consider “all the normal perils of litigation as well as the additional uncertainties inherent in complex class actions.” (*In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation* (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 167, 179, cert. den. *sub nom. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Ass’n* (1981) 452 U.S. 905.)

b. The Proposed Settlement Is a Reasonable Compromise of Claims

An understanding of the amount in controversy is an important factor in whether the settlement “of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129; see also *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 409.) The most important factor in this regard is “the strength of the case for Plaintiff on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement.” (*Kullar*, at p. 130; see also *Munoz*, at p. 409.)

Kullar instructs the court is not to “decide the merits of the case or to substitute its evaluation of the most appropriate settlement for that of the attorneys.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, *supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.) *Kullar* does not require an explicit statement of the maximum amount the class could recover if the plaintiff prevailed on all his claims, provided there is a record that allows “an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*, *supra*, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.) Put differently, “as the court does when it approves a settlement as in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6, the court must at least satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the ‘ballpark’ of reasonableness.” (*Kullar*, at p. 133.)

i. The Gross Settlement Amount of \$400,000 Is Fair and Reasonable

The Settlement was only possible following significant investigation and evaluation of the relevant policies and procedures in place and the data provided for the putative class, as referenced in Section III(b) above, permitting Class Counsel to engage in a comprehensive analysis of liability and potential damages. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 31.)

///

///

1 The claims are predicated on the alleged: (1) failure to properly calculate and pay overtime
2 wages; (2) failure to pay minimum wages; (3) failure to provide meal and rest breaks and
3 consistently and properly pay applicable premium wages; (4) failure to timely pay wages; (5)
4 failure to issue compliant wage statements; (6) failure to reimburse business expenses; (7)
5 violation of PAGA; and (8) violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200. (Han Decl.,
6 *supra*, at ¶ 32.) Defendant vehemently denies the theories of liability. (*Id.* at ¶ 33.)

7 While Plaintiff believes that the case is suitable for certification, uncertainties with respect
8 to certification are always present. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 34.) As the California Supreme Court
9 ruled in *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, class certification is
10 a matter of the trial court's sound discretion. (*Ibid.*) Decisions following *Sav-On Drug Stores,*
11 *Inc.* have reached different conclusions concerning certification of wage-and-hour claims.³ (*Ibid.*)
12 These factors led to the discounting of the calculations for the potential damages.

13 **ii. The PAGA Payment of \$30,000 Is Reasonable**

14 The provisions of the Labor Code potentially triggering PAGA penalties include Labor
15 Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 218.5, 221, 226(a), 226.3, 226.7, 246, 432.5, 510, 512(a),
16 551, 552, 558, 1174(d), 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 43.)
17 Defendant asserts that PAGA penalties are not mandatory but permissive and discretionary.
18 (*Ibid.*) Defendant maintains that it had a strong argument it would be unjust to award maximum
19 PAGA penalties given the law's unsettled state. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 43; *Thurman v. Bayshore*
20 *Transit Mgmt.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 [reducing penalties by 30% under this authority].)
21 Defendant argued that without stacking and limited to the initial violation, the PAGA penalties
22 would be limited to **\$14,900** (149 employees x \$100 initial violation) on the low end and **\$89,400**
23

24
25 ³ (See e.g. *Harris v. Superior Court* (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 164 [reversing decertification
26 of class claiming misclassification and ordering summary adjudication in favor of employees],
27 review granted Nov. 28, 2007, (2007) 171 P.3d 545 [not cited as precedent, but rather for
28 illustrative purposes only]; *Walsh v. IKON Office Solutions, Inc.* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1440
[affirming decertification of class claiming misclassification]; *Aguiar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 121 [reversing denial of certification]; *Dunbar v. Albertson's Inc.* (2006)
141 Cal.App.4th 1422 [affirming denial of certification].)

(149 employees x \$100 initial violation x 6 theories of recovery) on the high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 44-47.)

Plaintiff recognized the risk that any PAGA award could be reduced. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 48.) Many of the causes of action brought were duplicative of the statutory claims, such as Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 226.7, 510, 512, 1194, 1197, 1198, 2800, and 2802. (*Ibid.*) Thus, allocating \$30,000 as the PAGA Payment was reasonable given that Defendant is paying an additional \$370,000 in the class settlement. (*Ibid.*) When PAGA penalties are negotiated in good faith and “there is no indication that [the] amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other Class Members,” such amounts are considered reasonable.⁴ (*Ibid.*)

Considering the defenses, supporting evidence, and position that the case is not suitable for class treatment, the settlement is reasonable, adequate, and fair.

c. Discount Analysis Justifies the Settlement

Excluding the civil penalties, which could be completely discretionary, the total estimated potential exposure, assuming certification and prevailing at trial, would be about **\$2,918,587.05** on the low end and **\$3,056,574.65** on the high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 49.)

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⁴ (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) No. 08-00844, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *24; see e.g. *Nordstrom Com. Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 579, “[T]rial court did not abuse its discretion in approving a settlement which does not allocate any damages to the PAGA claims”.)

Category	Potential Exposure	Certification Risk	Merits Risk	Realistic Exposure
Rest Break Premiums	\$487,644.65	75%	75%	\$30,477.79
Meal Break Premiums	\$596,839.14	65%	65%	\$73,112.79
Overtime/Minimum Wage: Off-the-Clock Work	\$275,871.20 to \$413,858.80	65%	65%	\$33,794.22 to \$50,697.70
Regular Rate	\$403,250.86	45%	55%	\$99,804.59
Unreimbursed Business Expenses	\$207,040	25%	55%	\$69,876
Wage Statement Penalty	\$424,650	35%	35%	\$179,414.63
Waiting Time Penalty	\$523,291.20	35%	35%	\$221,090.53
MAXIMUM TOTAL EXPOSURE	\$2,918,587.05 to \$3,056,574.65⁵			\$707,570.55 to \$724,474.03⁶

Based on this analysis, the realistic recovery is **\$707,570.55** on the low end and **\$724,474.03** on the high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 58.) The Gross Settlement Amount is about thirteen percent (13.09%) of the maximum potential exposure and fifty-five percent (55.21%) of the maximum realistic exposure at trial, which is a reasonable settlement. (*Ibid.*)

The only question at preliminary approval is whether the settlement is within the range of possible approval. (*In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation* (7th Cir. 1979) 594 F.2d 1106, 1124; *Acosta v. TransUnion, LLC* (C.D. Cal. 2007) 240 F.R.D. 564, 575.) “The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved.” (*Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.* (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 455; see also *Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership* (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 1234, 1242, “[I]t is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements. The proposed settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.”) The Settlement is in line with the realistic exposure if Plaintiff prevailed at trial and provides significant recovery for the Class.

⁵ (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 35-42.)

⁶ (*Id.* at ¶¶ 51-57.)

1 **d. Conditional Certification of the Class Is Appropriate**

2 Code of Civil Procedure section 382 “authorizes class actions ‘when the question is one
3 of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
4 impracticable to bring them all before the court.’” (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*,
5 *supra*, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) California courts certify class actions if the plaintiff can identify
6 “both [1] an ascertainable class and [2] a well-defined community of interest among class
7 members.” (*Ibid.*)

8 The Class is ascertainable and numerous as to make it impracticable to join all the Class
9 Members, and there are common questions of law and fact amongst the Class. (Han Decl., *supra*,
10 at ¶ 59.) Plaintiff contends that, as a former hourly-paid, non-exempt employee of Defendant, his
11 claims are typical of the claims of the Class, and Class Counsel will fairly and adequately protect
12 the interests of the Class. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiff asserts that the prosecution of separate actions by
13 individual Class Members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. (*Ibid.*)

14 **i. The Proposed Class Is Ascertainable and Sufficiently Numerous**

15 “Ascertainability is required in order to give notice to putative class members as to whom
16 the judgment in the action will be res judicata.” (*Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp.* (2001)
17 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 914.) “A class is ascertainable if it identifies a group of unnamed Plaintiff
18 by describing a set of common characteristics sufficient to allow a member of that group to
19 identify himself or herself as having a right to recover based on the description.” (*Bartold v.*
20 *Glendale Federal Bank* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 816, 828.) The proposed class must also be
21 sufficiently numerous. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.)

22 This case involves about one hundred ninety-four (194) Class Members, meaning the
23 Class is sufficiently numerous. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 60; *Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*
24 (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1531, n.5 [finding a proposed class of “as many as 190 current and
25 former employees” is sufficiently numerous].)

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1 **ii. The Class Members Share a Well-defined Community of Interest**

2 The community of interest requirement “embodies three factors: (1) predominant common
3 questions of law or fact; (2) Class Representative with claims or defenses typical of the class; and
4 (3) Class Representative who can adequately represent the class.” (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v.*
5 *Superior Court, supra*, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) “[T]he community of interest requirement for
6 certification *does not mandate that class members have uniform or identical claims.*” (*Capitol*
7 *People First v. Department of Developmental Services* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 692
8 (emphasis in original).) Rather, courts focus on the defendant’s internal policies and “pattern and
9 practice . . . in order to assess whether that common behavior toward similarly situated Plaintiff
10 renders class certification appropriate.” (*Ibid.*)

11 **1. Common Issues Predominate**

12 The “common issues” requirement “involves analysis of whether the proponent’s ‘theory
13 of recovery’ is likely to prove compatible with class treatment.” (*Capitol People First v.*
14 *Department of Developmental Services, supra*, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 690.) Courts determine
15 whether the elements necessary to establish liability are susceptible to common proof, even if the
16 class members must individually prove their damages. (*Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior*
17 *Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1024). These types of claims are regularly granted class
18 certification when the plaintiff can present evidence of common policies. (See e.g. *Jones v. JGC*
19 *Dallas LLC* (N.D.Tex. Nov. 29, 2012, Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-2743-O) 2012 U.S.Dist.LEXIS
20 185042 [certified collective action involving 190 dancers]; *Espinoza v. Galardi South Enters.*
21 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 11, 2016, No. 14-21244-CIV-GOODMAN) 2016 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 2904 [court
22 certified class of dancers on state law claims].)

23 Plaintiff asserts that common issues of fact and law predominate as to each of the claims
24 alleged. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 61.) Plaintiff contends that all Class Members were subject to the
25 same or similar employment practices, policies, and procedures described in detail above. (*Ibid.*)

26 **2. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Class Claims**

27 Typical claims rely on legal theories and facts that are substantially like those of other
28 class members. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 46.)

1 Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant and alleges that he and the Class Members
2 were employed by the same company and injured by the common policies and practices related
3 to the claims described above. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 62.) Plaintiff seeks relief for these claims
4 and derivative claims on behalf of the Class. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiff's claims arise from the same
5 employment practices and are based on the same legal theories applicable to the Class. (*Ibid.*)

6 **3. Plaintiff Is Adequate to Represent the Class**

7 Plaintiff has proven to be an adequate representative. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 63.) Plaintiff
8 has conducted himself diligently and responsibly in representing the Class in this litigation,
9 understands the fiduciary obligations, and has actively participated in the prosecution of this case.
10 (*Ibid.*) Plaintiff also has no interest that is averse to that of the Class Members. (*Ibid.*)

11 **4. Class Action Is Superior for the Fair and Efficient** 12 **Adjudication of this Controversy**

13 A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication
14 of this controversy. Plaintiff contends that the joinder of all Class Members is impractical and
15 that class treatment will permit many similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims
16 for settlement purposes simultaneously in a single forum without the duplication of effort and
17 expense. Because several Class Members are current employees, Plaintiff believes that fear of
18 retaliation further supports the superiority of class-wide relief as this fear deters legal redress.

19 **e. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate**

20 In deciding whether to approve a proposed class action settlement under Code of Civil
21 Procedure section 382, the Court must find a proposed settlement is "fair, adequate and
22 reasonable." (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) A proposed class
23 action settlement is presumed fair under the following circumstances: (1) the parties reached
24 settlement after arm's-length negotiations; (2) investigation and discovery were sufficient to
25 allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation;
26 and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Id.* at p. 1802.) All these elements are present here.

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1 **f. Notice to Class Members Complies with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f)**

2 California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(f), provides:

3 If the court has certified the action as a class action, notice of the final approval
4 hearing must be given to class members in the manner specified by the court. The
5 notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for
6 class members to follow in filing written objections to it and in arranging to appear
7 at the settlement hearing and state any objections to the proposed settlement.


8 The Class Notice meets all these requirements. The proposed Class Notice advises the
9 Class Members of their right to participate in the Settlement; how and when to object to or request
10 exclusion from the Settlement; and date, time, and location of the Final Approval Hearing.

11 **V. CONCLUSION**

12 Plaintiff submits that the Settlement is in the best interests of the Class, as it is fair,
13 adequate, and reasonable. Under the applicable class action criteria and guidelines, the Settlement
14 should be preliminarily approved by the Court, Class should be conditionally certified for
15 purposes of settlement only, and Class Notice should be approved.

16 Dated: November 18, 2024

JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION

17 By: 
18 Douglas Han
19 Attorneys for Plaintiff

PROOF OF SERVICE
1013A(3) CCP

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 751 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 101, Pasadena, California 91103 and my electronic service address is dmather@justicelawcorp.com.

On November 18, 2024, I served the foregoing document described as

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT, CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION, APPROVAL OF CLASS NOTICE, SETTING OF FINAL APPROVAL HEARING DATE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF

for the following case: **Gonzalez v. Sakata Seed America, Inc.**
LWDA/Court Case No.: **LWDA Case No.: CM-969763-23**
Court Case No.: 23CV419334
Santa Clara County Superior Court

on interested parties in this action by electronically submitting as follows:

State of California
Labor & Workforce Development Agency
800 Capitol Mall, MIC-55
Sacramento, California 95814


[X] BY ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION

Pursuant to California Senate Bill No. 836, I caused the documents described above to be electronically submitted by and through the procedure stated on the website of the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency.

[X] STATE

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on November 18, 2024, at Pasadena, California.



Drew Mather