

1 Carolyn H. Cottrell (SBN 166977)
2 Esther L. Bylsma (SBN 264208)
3 Sandra Acosta Tello (SBN 315616)
4 **SCHNEIDER WALLACE**
5 **COTTRELL KIM LLP**
6 2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
7 Emeryville, California 94608
8 Telephone: (415) 421-7100
9 Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
10 ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com
11 ebylsma@schneiderwallace.com
12 sacostatello@schneiderwallace.com

Edwin Aiwazian (SBN 232943)
8 **LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC**
9 410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
10 Glendale, California 91203
11 Telephone: (818) 265-1020
12 Facsimile: (818) 265-1021
13 edwin@calljustice.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class

14 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
15 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, HALL OF JUSTICE
16

17 MARTIN OLSON, individually, and on behalf
18 of other members of the general public
19 similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

20 v.

21 GKN AEROSPACE CHEM-TRONICS, INC.,
22 a California corporation, and DOES 1 through
23 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

24 AND RELATED CONSOLIDATED CASES
25
26
27
28

Case No. 37-2022-00029653-CU-OE-CTL

*[Consolidated with Case No. 37-2022-
00029655-CU-OE-CTL]*

*Assigned for All Purposes to
Hon. Euketa Oliver, Dept. C-75*

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS OF
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
AND PAGA ACTION SETTLEMENT**

Date: April 24, 2026
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: C-75

Complaint Filed: July 27, 2022
Trial Date: March 5, 2027

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	BACKGROUND	2
A.	Factual Background	2
B.	Procedural History	3
III.	TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT	4
A.	Monetary Terms	4
B.	Settlement Administration	5
C.	Releases	6
IV.	THE COURT SHOULD PRELIMINARILY APPROVE THE SETTLEMENT	6
A.	Applicable Legal Standard	6
B.	The Settlement Is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness	7
C.	The Settlement Is Within the Range of Reasonableness	8
D.	The Settlement Provides Significant Benefits to the Class Compared to the Risks of Continued Litigation	9
E.	The Proposed Enhancement Payment Is Reasonable	11
F.	The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Award Is Reasonable	11
V.	THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASS FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES	13
A.	The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous	13
B.	Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate	13
C.	The Typicality Requirement is Satisfied	14
D.	The Adequacy Requirement is Satisfied	14
VI.	THE PROPOSED NOTICE PROVIDES ADEQUATE NOTICE TO THE CLASS	15
VII.	CONCLUSION	15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.</i> (2000) 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135	9
<i>Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC</i> 69 Cal.App.5th 521 (2021)	6
<i>Balderas v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLP</i> (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) No. 12-CV-06327 NC, 2014 WL 3610945	8
<i>Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co.,</i> (N.D. Cal. 2015) 306 F.R.D. 245	9
<i>Boone v. Amazon.Com Servs., LLC</i> No. 1:21-cv-00241-KES-BAM, 2024 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 92122 (E.D.Cal. May 22, 2024)	9
<i>Cellphone Termination Fee Cases</i> 186 Cal.App.4th 1380 (2010)	11
<i>Churchill Village LLC v. General Electric</i> 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004)	15
<i>Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc.</i> No. EDCV 07-1182, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86920 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010)	12
<i>Classen v. Weller</i> 145 Cal.App.3d 27 (1983)	14
<i>Cruz v. Sky Chefs, Inc.</i> (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014) No. 12-cv-02705-DMR, 2014 WL 7247065	9
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794	7
<i>Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.</i> 2012 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 160052 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 29, 2012)	9
<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i> 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998)	15
<i>Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.</i> 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286 (2010)	14
<i>Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc.</i> 166 Cal.App.4th 1497 (2008)	14
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.</i> 1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016)	12
<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> 23 Cal.4th 429 (2000)	14

1	<i>Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.</i>	
2	(C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) No. SACV 12-02161-DOC, 2014 WL 360196	8
3	<i>Martin v. Ameripride Servs., Inc.</i>	
4	No. 08cv440-MMA (JMA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61796 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2011).....	12
5	<i>McGhee v. Bank of Am.</i>	
6	60 Cal. App. 3d 442 (1976).....	14
7	<i>North County Contractor’s Assn., Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Svcs.</i>	
8	(1994) 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085.....	7
9	<i>Omnivision Techs. Inc.</i>	
10	(N.D. Cal. 2008) 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036.....	9
11	<i>Reyes v. Bd. of Supervisors</i>	
12	196 Cal.App.3d 1263 (1987).....	13
13	<i>Rider v. County of San Diego</i>	
14	11 Cal.App.4th 1410 (1992).....	13
15	<i>Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court</i>	
16	34 Cal.4th 319 (2004).....	13
17	<i>Serrano v. Priest</i>	
18	20 Cal.3d 25 (1977).....	13
19	<i>Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.</i>	
20	2015 WL 3776765 (N.D. Cal. 2015).....	8
21	<i>Uber FCRA Litig.</i>	
22	(N.D. Cal. June 29, 2017) No. 14-cv-05200-EMC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101552	9
23	<i>Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.</i>	
24	(N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016) No. 15-cv-02198-EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140759	8
25	STATUTES	
26	California Code of Civil Procedure § 382	14
27	California Labor Code 226(a)	3
28	OTHER AUTHORITIES	
	<i>Manual for Complex Litig.</i> at §§ 21:311	16
	<i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> , § 11:25.....	8, 13, 16

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiffs Martin Olson, Donald Tvrdik, Richard Turrietta and Arturo Valdivia (“Plaintiffs”)
3 request that the Court take the first step in the settlement-approval process and grant preliminary
4 approval of this class and PAGA action Settlement with Defendant GKN Aerospace Chem-Tronics
5 Inc. (“Defendant” or “GKN”).¹ The purpose of the Court’s preliminary evaluation of the proposed
6 Settlement is to determine whether it is within the “range of reasonableness” and thus, whether notice
7 to the Class of the terms and conditions of the Settlement and the scheduling of a formal fairness
8 hearing are worthwhile. Here, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for preliminary approval
9 under California law and falls well within the range of reasonableness.

10 The basic monetary terms of the Settlement are as follows: (1) the Gross Settlement Amount
11 is \$2,250,000.00; (2) Plaintiffs request actual expenses to be paid to the Settlement Administrator to
12 administer the Settlement, currently estimated to be \$14,950.00; (3) Plaintiffs request, and Defendant
13 does not oppose, a service award of \$10,000.00 for each Plaintiff (a total of \$40,000.00) for their
14 efforts on behalf of the Class; (4) Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees in the amount of 35% of the Gross
15 Settlement Amount, or \$787,500.00, and actual costs not to exceed \$90,000.00; (5) the payment to the
16 LWDA is \$33,750.00; and (5) a Net Settlement Amount of \$1,283,800.00 will be available for
17 distribution to Settlement Class Members and PAGA Settlement Members.

18 The Net Settlement Amount provides an estimated average recovery of \$825.06 per Class
19 Member, assuming 100% participation in the Settlement. This is a significant recovery, well within
20 the range of reasonableness found by other courts in California. The Settlement was the result of
21 Plaintiffs’ litigation efforts over the course of nearly four years and was agreed to after Class Counsel
22 was well-informed of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims in the Lawsuits. Plaintiffs and Class
23 Counsel believe that the Settlement provides excellent benefits to the Class and requests that the Court
24 preliminarily approve the Settlement and permit notice of its terms to be disseminated to the Class
25 Members.

26
27
28 ¹ “Settlement” refers to the Settlement Agreement of Class Action and Private Attorneys General Act Claims, attached as **Exhibit A** to the Declaration of Esther L. Bylsma (“Bylsma Decl.”) filed concurrently herewith. Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms have the meaning ascribed to them in the Settlement.

1 **II. BACKGROUND**

2 **A. Factual Background**

3 The Lawsuits assert wage and hour class and PAGA claims against Defendant. *See* Declaration
4 of Esther L. Bylsma in Support of Plaintiffs’ motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement, filed
5 concurrently herewith (“Bylsma Decl.”), ¶¶10-11.

6 Defendant GKN manufactures and repairs aerospace parts. *Id.*, ¶8. Plaintiffs are former
7 employees. *Id.*, ¶9. *See also* Declaration of Martin Olson (“Olson Decl.”), filed concurrently herewith,
8 ¶3; Declaration of Donald Tvrdik (“Tvrdik Decl.”), filed concurrently herewith, ¶3; Declaration of
9 Richard Turrietta (“Turrietta Decl.”), filed concurrently herewith, ¶3; Declaration of Arturo Valdivia
10 (“Valdivia Decl.”), filed concurrently herewith, ¶3.

11 Plaintiffs’ main wage and hour claims are premised on the following factual allegations.
12 Plaintiffs allege that: (i) Defendant maintained a business environment that discouraged and prevented
13 employees from taking timely and full meal and rest periods free from Defendant’s control; (ii)
14 Defendant required employees to undergo Covid checks before clocking in and did not compensate
15 employees for this time; (iii) Defendant failed to reimburse employees for cell phone and tools
16 expenses; and (iv) Defendant failed to provide wage statements to employees that accurately stated
17 the information required under Labor Code 226(a). *Id.*, ¶10.

18 Based on the above core allegations, Plaintiffs’ complaints² collectively asserts the following
19 causes of action: (i) failure to pay overtime wages; (ii) failure to authorize and permit and/or make
20 available meal periods or pay premium wages in lieu thereof; (iii) failure to authorize and permit
21 and/or make available rest periods or pay premium wages in lieu thereof; (iv) failure to pay minimum
22 wages; (v) failure to pay wages at separation; (vi) failure to timely pay earned wages during
23 employment; (vii) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (viii) failure to keep requisite
24 payroll records; (ix) failure to reimburse business expenses; (x) violation of the California Business
25 and Professions Code (“UCL”); and (xi) violations under the PAGA. *Id.*, ¶11.

26
27 ² The operative complaint in the Olson/Turrietta Lawsuit is ROA No. 172, and the operative complaint in the Olson PAGA
28 Lawsuit is ROA No. 1 on its docket of the leading case, San Diego Superior Case No. 37-2022-00029653. The operative
complaint in the Tvrdik Lawsuit (San Diego Superior Case No. 37-2023-00031782) is ROA No. 9 on its docket. In
conjunction with the Settlement and pursuant to the Agreement, the Parties are also filing a Stipulation and [Proposed]

1 The Class includes all persons who have been employed by Defendant as non-exempt
2 employees in the state of California from July 27, 2018 through April 24, 2026. Settlement, ¶I.E.
3 Defendant has estimated that approximately 1,556 Settlement Class Members worked approximately
4 280,000 workweeks during this period. Bylsma Decl., ¶¶66; Settlement, ¶¶6b.

5 **B. Procedural History**

6 The procedural history of the Actions are described in detail in the Bylsma Decl., and
7 summarized below.

8 From approximately July 27, 2022 to October 18, 2023, Plaintiffs Olson and Tvrdik initiated
9 their class and PAGA complaints. Bylsma Decl., ¶¶14-15, 20-21.

10 On March 10, 2023, the Court consolidated the Olson/Turrietta Lawsuit and the Turrietta
11 PAGA Lawsuit. *Id.*, ¶18.

12 Over the course of approximately three years, Plaintiffs actively engaged in the discovery
13 process. *Id.*, ¶¶22-33. Among other things, Plaintiffs served and responded to numerous sets of written
14 discovery, conducted class member investigations, produced documents, and sought documents from
15 Defendant. *Id.*, ¶¶22-26, 32. Defendant produced tens of thousands of pages of documents, which
16 Plaintiffs reviewed with their expert. *Id.*, ¶26. Plaintiffs appeared for their depositions – twice for
17 Plaintiff Olson. *Id.*, ¶27-28, 30-31. Plaintiffs took the deposition of Defendant’s PMK. *Id.*, ¶29. The
18 Parties attended numerous meet and confers regarding their discovery disputes and engaged in motions
19 practice. *Id.*, ¶33.

20 On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff Olson filed a motion for class certification. *Id.*, ¶35. After full
21 briefing (including supplemental briefing) and oral argument by the Parties, the Court granted in part
22 and denied in part the motion. *Id.*, ¶¶35-42. Specifically, the Court conditionally certified a wage
23 statement class based on Plaintiff’s wage statement claim, but denied certification as to the other
24 claims. *Id.*, ¶42.

25 On March 11, 2025, the Parties attended a private mediation with Monique Ngo-Bonnici, Esq.,
26 a well-respected and experienced mediator in wage-and-hour class actions. *Id.*, ¶¶44-47. However, the
27

28
order to Consolidate Actions, in order to file an Amended Consolidated Complaint that includes all the claims so that the
Parties may seek approval of the global settlement in a streamlined manner.

1 Parties were unable to reach resolution at that time. *Id.*, ¶47.

2 After the first mediation, the Parties continued to actively litigate the Lawsuits, including via
3 continuing discovery and motion practice, and continued to prepare the Olson/Turrietta Lawsuit for
4 trial and the Tvrdik Lawsuit for class certification. *Id.*, ¶¶48-60. In the Olson/Turrietta Lawsuit,
5 Defendant filed a motion for summary adjudication, arguing that the wage statement claim did not
6 have a viable remedy. *Id.*, ¶59.

7 On January 8, 2026, the Parties attended a second private mediation with Monique Ngo-
8 Bonnici, Esq. *Id.*, ¶61. The Lawsuits did not settle at this second mediation, however, Ms. Ngo-Bonnici
9 then provided a double-blind mediator's proposal. *Id.*, ¶62. The Parties accepted the proposal on or
10 around January 13, 2026. *Id.*, ¶63. The Parties then negotiated the full terms and executed the
11 Settlement on March 31, 2026. *Id.*, ¶64.

12 **III. TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT**

13 **A. Monetary Terms**

14 The Settlement provides for a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Fund of \$2,250,000.00,
15 which excludes Defendant's share of federal, state, and local payroll taxes on the wage portion of the
16 Individual Settlement Payments. Settlement, ¶I.P. With the motion for final approval, Class Counsel
17 will seek fees not to exceed 35% of the Gross Settlement Fund, or \$785,500.00, and actual costs, not
18 to exceed \$90,000.00. Settlement, ¶III.C.2. The Settlement also provides for the actual costs of
19 settlement administration, which are estimated to be \$14,950.00, and a \$10,000.00 service awards to
20 each Plaintiff for their services to the Class. Settlement, ¶¶III.C.4, III.C.1. Finally, the Settlement
21 provides for a PAGA Payment of \$45,000.00, of which \$11,250.00 will be distributed to the PAGA
22 Members on a *pro rata* pay period basis, and \$33,750.00 will be paid to the LWDA. Settlement,
23 ¶III.C.3.a-b.

24 The estimated Net Settlement Amount³ available to the approximately 1,556 Class Members
25 is \$1,283,800.00. Bylsma Decl., ¶66. This provides an estimated average recovery of \$825.06 per
26 Class Member, assuming 100% participation in the Settlement. *Id.*

27
28 ³ The Net Settlement Amount consists of the Gross Settlement Amount of \$2,250,00.00 minus Plaintiffs' service award (\$40,000.00), Class Counsel's attorneys' fees (\$787,500.00), Class Counsel's costs (\$90,000.00), the PAGA Payment to the LWDA (\$33,750.00), and Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions' costs (\$14,950.00).

1 The Net Settlement Amount is to be divided among all Settlement Class Members on a *pro*
2 *rata* workweek basis. Settlement, ¶III.C.5. Specifically, Settlement Class Members' Class Member
3 Payments will be based on the number of Workweeks the Settlement Class Member worked during
4 the Class Period in proportion to the aggregate number of Workweeks worked by all Settlement Class
5 Members. *Id.*⁴ Twenty percent of all Class Member Payments be allocated as wages, and 80 percent
6 as interest and penalties. Settlement, ¶III.D.1.

7 Checks paid to Settlement Class Members and PAGA Settlement Members will be valid for
8 180 days after issuance. Settlement, ¶III.C.6.b. If, at the conclusion of the 180-day check cashing
9 period, any funds remain from checks returned as undeliverable or that are not negotiated, those
10 monies shall be transmitted to the State of California Office of the Controller Unclaimed Property
11 Fund in the names of the respective Settlement Class and/or PAGA Members who did not cash their
12 checks. *Id.*

13 **B. Settlement Administration**

14 The Parties have agreed to retain Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions ("Phoenix")
15 as the Settlement Administrator and have determined that its bid for administration is fair. Settlement,
16 ¶I.DD. Class Counsel has used Phoenix to administer dozens of settlements, and Phoenix is a qualified
17 and experienced settlement administrator with procedures in place to provide security for class data
18 and adequate insurance in the event of a data breach or misuse of funds. Within 30 calendar days
19 following preliminary approval, Defendant will provide Settlement Administrator the Class
20 Information containing each Class Member's contact information and Workweeks. Settlement, ¶
21 III.I.3.a. Within 15 calendar days of preliminary approval, Phoenix will mail the Court-approved Class
22 Notice to the Class Members by first-class U.S. mail. Settlement, ¶III.I.3.b.

23 Class Members will have 45 days after the date Phoenix first mails the Class Notice to submit
24 requests for exclusion from the Settlement, file and serve objections to the Settlement. *Id.* If the
25 Settlement is finally approved, the Phoenix will administer payments to the Settlement Class Members
26 within fourteen calendar days after Phoenix receives the Gross Settlement Amount from Defendant.
27 Settlement, ¶III.C.6.a.

28 ⁴ PAGA Settlement Members will also be paid on a *pro rata* basis from the PAGA Payment. Settlement, ¶III.C.3.b.

1 **C. Releases**

2 As of the Effective Date,⁵ all Settlement Class Members will release the Released Parties⁶ from
3 all claims that have been asserted by Plaintiffs or the Class Members asserted in the Lawsuits,
4 including as amended, and/or arising from or related to the facts and claims alleged in the Lawsuits.
5 Settlement, ¶III.G.1.

6 As of the Effective Date, all PAGA Settlement Members will release the Released Parties from
7 all known and unknown claims for civil penalties under PAGA that were alleged, or could have been
8 alleged, in the Lawsuits, or in the Olson and Tvrdik PAGA Notices. Settlement, ¶III.G.2.

9 Plaintiffs have also agreed to a general release. Settlement, ¶III.G.3.

10 The above released claims are proper under applicable California law. “In a class action
11 settlement, a clause providing for the release of claims may refer to all claims, both potential and
12 actual, that may have been raised in the pending action with respect to the matter in controversy.
13 Parties may agree to release not only those claims alleged in a complaint and before the court, but also
14 claims which could have been alleged by reason of or in connection with any matter or fact set forth
15 or referred to in the complaint.” *Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC*, 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 537
16 (2021).

17 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD PRELIMINARILY APPROVE THE SETTLEMENT**

18 **A. Applicable Legal Standard**

19 The decision to approve or reject a proposed settlement is committed to a court’s broad
20 discretion. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 234-35 (2001). To grant
21 preliminary approval of a class action settlement, courts need find only that the settlement falls within

22
23 ⁵ “Effective Date” means when all of the following events have occurred: Court grants the Motion for Final Approval of
24 the Settlement and upon service of the Notice of Entry of Order and/or Judgment, and upon the latter of: (i) if no appeal,
25 or other challenge is filed, the sixty-first (61st) day following Notice of Entry of the Court’s Order and/or Judgment; (ii)
26 the date of affirmance of an appeal of the Order Granting Final Approval and/or Judgment becomes final under the
California Rules of Court; or (iii) the date of final dismissal of any appeal from the Order Granting Final Approval and/or
Judgment or the final dismissal of any proceeding on review of any court of appeal decision relating to the Order Granting
Final Approval and/or Judgment. Settlement, ¶I.L.

27 ⁶ “Released Parties” means Defendant and each of its past, present and future agents, employees, servants, officers,
28 directors, managing agents, members, owners (whether direct or indirect, including but not limited to Melrose Industries),
partners, trustees, representatives, shareholders, stockholders, attorneys, parents, subsidiaries, corporate affiliates, and
potential and alleged joint employers, divisions, assigns, predecessors, successors, insurers, and all of their respective
past, present and future employees, directors, officers, members, owners, agents, representatives, payroll agencies and
providers, attorneys, stockholders, fiduciaries, parents, subsidiaries, and assigns. Settlement, ¶I.BB.

1 the range of possible final approval, also described as “the range of reasonableness.” *See, e.g., North*
2 *County Contractor’s Assn., Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Svcs.*, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1089-90 (1994); *see*
3 *also Newberg on Class Actions*, § 11:25.

4 To make this determination, courts must consider several relevant factors, including “the
5 strength of [the] plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation,
6 the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of
7 discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, [and] the experience and views of counsel.”
8 *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801 (1996). “The list of factors is not exclusive, and
9 the court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of the factors depending on the circumstances
10 of each case.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 245. Under the relevant factors, the Settlement warrants
11 preliminary approval.

12 **B. The Settlement Is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness**

13 A proposed settlement is presumed to be fair where: (1) the settlement is reached through
14 arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court
15 to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
16 is small. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802.

17 Here, the Settlement was clearly the result of arms-length bargaining. The material terms of
18 the Settlement were only agreed to by the Parties after two mediation sessions with Monique Ngo-
19 Bonnici, Esq., a well-respected and experienced mediator in wage-and-hour class actions. Bylsma
20 Decl., ¶¶44-47, 61-64. The Parties did not reach resolution at the end of the first mediation session,
21 and Plaintiffs demanded and obtained additional discovery. *Id.*, ¶¶48-55. The Parties also did not reach
22 resolution at the end of the second mediation, but subsequently accepted the mediator’s proposal. *Id.*,
23 ¶¶61-64.

24 Second, the material terms of the Settlement were only agreed to by the parties after significant
25 investigation and discovery. Among other things, Defendants produced key data points, tens of
26 thousand of pages of documents relating to the policies, practices, and procedures at issue in this
27 litigation, time and pay records, and contact information for Class members which Plaintiff utilized to
28 conduct factual interviews. *Id.*, ¶¶21-26, 32. The Parties took and/or defended the depositions of

1 Plaintiffs and Defendant’s PMK. *Id.*, ¶¶27-31. These efforts, among others, allowed Class Counsel to
2 formulate and assess potential damages against the risk of continuing litigation. *Id.*, ¶¶67-84.

3 Third, Class Counsel are experienced and respected class action litigators. *Id.*, ¶¶5-7. *See also*
4 Declaration of Farah Khaled in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
5 Settlement, and Declaration of Tara Zabehe in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
6 Action Settlement, filed concurrently herewith (“Khaled Decl.” and “Zabehe Decl.”), ¶¶6-19.

7 Fourth, after preliminary approval and notice to the Class, Plaintiffs expect that the fourth
8 factor (*i.e.*, low number of objectors) will also be satisfied.

9 Accordingly, the Settlement satisfies all factors and is entitled to a presumption of fairness.

10 **C. The Settlement Is Within the Range of Reasonableness**

11 The Settlement provides for a Net Settlement Amount of approximately \$1,283,800.00 to
12 approximately 1,556 Class Members. Bylsma Decl., ¶66. As noted above, this provides an estimated
13 average net recovery of \$825.06 per Class Member, assuming 100% participation in the Settlement.
14 *Id.*

15 Class Counsel’s damages and risks analysis, detailed in the Bylsma Decl., further supports the
16 Settlement. *Id.*, ¶¶67-77. Class Counsel carefully considered the substantive claims, Defendant’s
17 arguments, and the risks attendant in continuing to pursue these claims as compared to firm monetary
18 recovery possible through the Settlement. *Id.* The Net Settlement Amount of \$1,283,800 is
19 approximately 71% of the total estimated discounted exposure – a figure that places the Settlement
20 easily within the range of reasonableness determined in other comparable cases. *Id.*, ¶77. This is a
21 recovery that easily falls within the range of reasonableness. *See e.g., Vicerel v. Mistras Grp., Inc.*,
22 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140759, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016) (approving wage and hour settlement
23 of approximately 8% of total verdict value); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 WL
24 3776765, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“10% gross and 7.3% net figures are ‘within the range of
25 reasonableness.”); *Balderas v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLP*, 2014 WL 3610945, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
26 July 21, 2014) (gross settlement amount of 8% of maximum recovery and net settlement amount of
27 5%); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 360196, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (9.1% of “the
28 total value of the action” is within the range of reasonableness); *In re Omnivision Techs. Inc.*, 559 F.

1 Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (approving settlement of 6% to 8% of estimated damages);
2 *Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co.*, 306 F.R.D. 245, 256 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (approving settlement that
3 provided 9% recovery based on estimated liability exposure); *In re Uber FCRA Litig.*, 2017 U.S. Dist.
4 LEXIS 101552, at *23- 24 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2017) (approving settlement where the gross settlement
5 fund was valued at 7.5% of total possible verdict); *Cruz v. Sky Chefs, Inc.*, 2014 WL 7247065, at *5
6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014) (granting final approval where gross settlement amount represented 8.6%
7 of the maximum potential recovery from the class claims).

8 The PAGA Payment of \$45,000.00 is approximately 2% of the Gross Settlement Fund, which
9 is within the range of settlements previously approved by courts in California. *See, e.g., Boone v.*
10 *Amazon.Com Servs., LLC*, No. 1:21-cv-00241-KES-BAM, 2024 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 92122, at *40-*41
11 (E.D.Cal. May 22, 2024) (“The PAGA payment of approximately 1.8% of the Gross Settlement Fund
12 falls within the range of penalties approved by courts.”); *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.*, 2012
13 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 160052, at *21 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 29, 2012) (approving PAGA penalties representing
14 0.27% of the gross settlement fund).

15 **D. The Settlement Provides Significant Benefits to the Class Compared to the Risks**
16 **of Continued Litigation**

17 It is well-settled that a proposed settlement is not to be measured against a hypothetical ideal
18 result that might have been achieved. *See, e.g., 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland*
19 *Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1150 (2000). “[I]t is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and
20 avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements. The proposed
21 settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been
22 achieved by the negotiators.” *Id.*

23 Here, the certain benefits of the Settlement must be weighed against the risks of continuing
24 litigation, which Class Counsel carefully assessed. Bylsma Decl., ¶¶67-84. Defendant has denied the
25 allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaints and has denied all liability. Settlement, ¶ II.C.; Bylsma Decl., ¶79.
26 Defendant has also taken the position that this case is not suitable for class treatment and has asserted
27 that it fully complied with its obligations under California’s labor laws. *Id.* Defendant has asserted
28 legal and factual grounds which it may use to defend the Lawsuits, which present difficult hurdles for
Plaintiffs. *Id.*, ¶¶69, 72, 74, 76. These defenses relate to the merits and to class certification. *Id.*

1 For example, Plaintiff Olson attempted to certify several classes and subclasses for his meal
2 period claim, his rest period claim, and his wage statement claim. *Id.*, ¶¶35, 42, 68. The Court **denied**
3 class certification of these classes and subclasses, and only certified the wage statement class. *Id.*
4 While Plaintiff Tvrdik would seek to present arguments that his motion for class certification should
5 be decided without regard to the denial in the Turrietta/Olson Lawsuit, it was highly likely that the
6 Court would apply the same reasoning to deny Plaintiff Tvrdik’s motion. *Id.*, ¶74.

7 In addition, with respect to the wage statement claim, Defendant argued that the alleged wage
8 statement omissions and inaccuracies were not substantive, as the premium wages paid to the Class
9 members were correct and employees already knew their applicable rates. *Id.*, ¶69. Defendant also
10 asserted that any violation was not knowing or intentional. *Id.* Defendant filed a motion for summary
11 adjudication, and there was real and imminent risk that the motion may be granted. *Id.* If the Court
12 agreed with Defendant, there would be no monetary recovery for the Class for the wage statement
13 claim. *Id.*, ¶¶69-70.

14 In addition, with respect to the other claims, Defendant asserted and presented evidence that
15 employees’ experiences were varied depending on factors such as job duties, work location, and type
16 of shift. *Id.*, ¶¶72, 74, 76. Plaintiffs are aware that there is a significant risk that Defendants would
17 successfully argue that these variations in work experiences demonstrated that any wage and hour
18 violations were not the result of any policy or practice attributable to Defendant. *Id.* In addition,
19 Plaintiffs recognize that these arguments also potential manageability challenges for trial.

20 Absent this Settlement, further litigation would require substantial additional preparation and
21 discovery and ultimately would involve the depositions of Class Members and experts, the
22 presentation of percipient and expert witnesses at trial, as well as the consideration, preparation, and
23 presentation of voluminous documentary evidence and the preparation and analysis of expert reports.
24 Bylsma Decl., ¶¶80-83. While Plaintiffs continue to believe that they would prevail on liability and
25 certification, they also recognizes that a fact finder could find for Defendant on one or more of relevant
26 issues and/or find damages to be significantly less than Plaintiffs’ estimates. *Id.* Given the broad scope
27 and magnitude of the risks, Class Counsel concluded that the Settlement, which provides a material
28 percentage of Plaintiffs’ estimated damages, is a beneficial and just result for the Class. *Id.*, ¶84.

1 **E. The Proposed Enhancement Payment Is Reasonable**

2 Enhancement awards “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on
3 behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and,
4 sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” *Cellphone Termination*
5 *Fee Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393–94 (2010).

6 Here, Plaintiffs have substantially contributed their time and efforts over a period of over four
7 years in pursuing the Class and PAGA claims, and Plaintiffs’ role was crucial in the cases. Bylsma
8 Decl., ¶¶85-88. Plaintiffs took the significant risk of coming forward to represent the interests of their
9 fellow employees. *Id.* As set forth in the Plaintiffs’ Declarations, Plaintiffs had discussions with Class
10 Counsel, worked with Class Counsel to review facts and answer questions, assisted Class Counsel in
11 their two mediation efforts, and remained apprised of the case since choosing to become Named
12 Plaintiffs. Olson Decl., ¶¶6-9; Turrietta Decl., ¶¶6-9; Tvrdik Decl., ¶¶6-9; Valdivia Decl., ¶¶6-8.
13 Plaintiffs Olson, Turrietta and Tvrdik also had their depositions taken in the course of litigation. Olson
14 Decl., ¶8; Turrietta Decl., ¶8; Tvrdik Decl., ¶8. They brought this matter out of a sincere desire to
15 vindicate their own and their co-workers’ rights. Olson Decl., ¶5, 9; Turrietta Decl., ¶¶5, 9; Tvrdik
16 Decl., ¶¶5, 9; Valdivia Decl., ¶¶5, 8. In addition, Plaintiffs, unlike the Class Members, also agreed to
17 a general release of claims. Olson Decl., ¶10; Turrietta Decl., ¶10; Tvrdik Decl., ¶10; Valdivia Decl.,
18 ¶9. Plaintiffs’ service award in the amount of \$10,000.00 each is reasonable considering the efforts
19 they made and the risks they took in prosecuting this action to obtain the Settlement.

20 **F. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Award Is Reasonable**

21 Plaintiffs seek reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs from the Gross Settlement Amount.
22 Settlement, ¶ I.D; Bylsma Decl., ¶¶89-94. Under the terms of the Settlement, Class Counsel may seek
23 up to 35% of the Gross Settlement Fund, or \$787,500.00, and actual costs not to exceed \$90,000.00.
24 *Id.*

25 Class Counsel shall present their lodestar and costs reports in the final approval papers when
26 seeking Court approval of their Class Counsel Fees Award and costs. *Id.*, ¶90. For the purposes of
27 preliminary approval, Class Counsel notes that the 35% request is in accordance with the percentages
28 approved by California courts (including this Court in similar cases). Class Counsel’s fee request of
35% of the Gross Settlement Fund is within the range customarily approved by California and federal

1 courts in comparable class actions. *See, e.g., Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 506
2 (2016) (“33 1/3 percent of the common fund is consistent with, and in the range of, awards in other
3 class action lawsuits.”); *Martin v. Ameripride Servs., Inc.*, No. 08cv440-MMA (JMA), 2011 U.S. Dist.
4 LEXIS 61796, at *23 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2011) (“More particularly, courts may award attorneys’ fees
5 in the 30–40% range in wage and hour class actions that result in recovery of a common fund under
6 \$10 million.”).⁷

7 In addition, the 35% percentage mark is warranted considering the nature of this case. *Id.*, ¶90.
8 In this case, there was no guarantee of compensation or reimbursement. *Id.*, ¶91. Instead, Class
9 Counsel has undertaken all the risks of this litigation on a completely contingent-fee basis. *Id.* The
10 inherent risk of proving liability and damages on a class-wide basis and Defendant’s representation by
11 skillful counsel confronted Class Counsel with the prospect of recovering nothing or close to nothing
12 for their investment in the case. *Id.* Nevertheless, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have committed
13 themselves to developing and pressing Plaintiffs’ claims to enforce their fellow employees’ rights and
14 maximize the Class recovery. *Id.* This commitment and the risks involved are the reasons for
15 multipliers in contingency-fee cases. *Id.* As Class Members will receive a significant payment if the
16 Settlement is approved, Class Counsel seeks a reasonable fee award for their efforts and the risk they
17 have assumed. *Id.* Moreover, due to Class Counsel’s efforts and success on Plaintiff Olson’s certified
18 claim, Defendant modified their existing policies as to their wage statements as a result. *Id.* Attorneys
19 who litigate on a wholly or partially contingent basis expect to receive significantly higher effective
20 hourly rates in cases where compensation is contingent on success, particularly in hard-fought cases
21 where, like in the case at bar, the result is uncertain. *Id.*, ¶92.

22 Moreover, due to Class Counsel’s efforts and success on Plaintiff Olson’s certified claim,
23 Defendant modified their existing policies as to their wage statements as a result. This change in policy
24 entitles Class Counsel to statutory penalties. *Id.*, ¶93.

25
26
27 ⁷ *Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc.*, No. EDCV 07-1182, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86920, at *17 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010) (“[A]
28 review of California cases in other districts reveals that courts usually award attorneys’ fees in the 30–40% range in wage
and hour class actions that result in recover of a common fund under \$10 million.”); Rubenstein, Conte and Newberg,
Newberg on Class Actions at § 14:6 (collecting case law surveys suggesting that 50% is the upper limit, with 30–50%
commonly being awarded in cases in which the common fund is relatively small).

Furthermore, reasonable litigation expenses are ordinarily included with an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to California wage-and-hour law. Bylsma Decl., ¶94.; see *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 35 (1977); *Rider v. County of San Diego*, 11 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1424 (1992). Here, Class Counsel's expenses were reasonable, necessary to the prosecution, and of the type customarily billed to fee-paying clients. (*Ibid.*) Thus, the requested attorneys' fees and costs are reasonable compensation for the excellent recovery achieved and should be preliminarily approved.

V. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASS FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES

The Court should certify the proposed Class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 for purposes of the Settlement.⁸ California has a strong public policy in favor of broad enforcement of wage-and-hour laws for the benefit of workers and in favor of using the class-action device. *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 340 (2004). The party seeking certification has the burden of establishing the existence of both an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among class members. *Id.* at 326. The "community of interest" requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class." *Id.* Plaintiffs meet that burden here for settlement purposes.

A. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous

In determining whether a class is "ascertainable," courts "examine the class definition, the size of the class, and the means of identifying the class members." *Reyes v. Bd. of Supervisors*, 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1274–75 (1987). The Class is defined according to objective criteria. Bylsma Decl., ¶95. Class Members are easily identifiable and can be easily located from Defendant's records. *Id.* With respect to numerosity, the Class consists of approximately 1,556 individuals. *Id.* This size clearly renders the class so large as to make joinder impracticable. *Id.*

B. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate

"[T]he focus in a certification dispute is on what type of questions—common or individual—are likely to arise in the action[.]" *Sav-On*, 34 Cal. 4th at 427. Predominance does not require that all questions of law and fact be uniform for all members of the class. *Id.* at 338. Where, as in this case,

⁸ For purposes of the Settlement only, the parties have stipulated that all requirements of class certification have been met. Settlement, ¶ III.E.

1 uniform policies and procedures apply on a class-wide basis, “the legal question to be resolved is not
2 an individual one. To the contrary, the common legal question remains the overall impact of
3 [Defendant’s] policies on its [alleged employees]” *Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal. App. 4th
4 1286, 1299 (2010).

5 Here, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s class-wide policies and procedures raise common
6 issues of law and fact that are applicable to all of Defendant’s non-exempt employees, including
7 Plaintiffs and the Class Members. Bylsma Decl., ¶¶96-97. The policies at issue include Defendant’s
8 policies and practices with respect off the clock compensable COVID-19 screening, meal and rest
9 break policies and practices, wage statement policies, and business reimbursement practices. *Id.*

10 **C. The Typicality Requirement is Satisfied**

11 A representative plaintiff’s claims are “typical” if they arise from the same event, practice, or
12 course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class members and if their claims are based
13 on the same legal theory. *Classen v. Weller*, 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 46–47 (1983); *Linder v. Thrifty Oil*
14 *Co.*, 23 Cal.4th 429, 435 (2000). The typicality requirement is not onerous and does not require the
15 claims to be identical. *Id.* Here, Plaintiffs contend that their claims are typical of those of all other
16 Class Members because Plaintiffs were subject to the same alleged policies and practices that form
17 the basis of the claims asserted in this case. Bylsma Decl., ¶98. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are each
18 members of the Class they seek to represent, and their claims are “typical” of those asserted by other
19 Class Members.

20 **D. The Adequacy Requirement is Satisfied**

21 A plaintiff is an adequate class representative if his claims are not inconsistent with or
22 antagonistic to the claims of the class members. *See Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc.*, 166
23 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1509 (2008). Here, Plaintiffs contends that their interests are exactly in line with
24 those of the Class. Bylsma Decl., ¶99. Plaintiffs have agreed to prosecute this case with the interests
25 of the Class in mind and understands his responsibilities, and there are no conflicts between Plaintiffs
26 and the Class Members. *Id.* Furthermore, Plaintiffs are represented by counsel with extensive
27 experience in class-action and employment litigation, including wage-and-hour class actions, and
28 Class Counsel does not have any conflict with the Class. *Id.* For these reasons, Plaintiffs satisfies the
adequacy requirement. *McGhee v. Bank of Am.*, 60 Cal. App. 3d 442, 450 (1976).

1 **VI. THE PROPOSED NOTICE PROVIDES ADEQUATE NOTICE TO THE CLASS**

2 “Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement” *Hanlon v. Chrysler*
3 *Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1025 (9th Cir. 1998). A class-action settlement notice “is satisfactory if it
4 generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse
5 viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.” *Churchill Village LLC v. General*
6 *Electric*, 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004).

7 Here, Defendant will provide to the Settlement Administrator each Class Member’s contact
8 information and Workweeks. Settlement, ¶ III.I.3.a. Prior to mailing the Class Notice to the Class
9 Members by first-class U.S. mail, the Settlement Administrator will perform a search based on the
10 National Change of Address Database to update and correct any known or identifiable address
11 changes. Settlement, ¶III.I.3.b. Any Class Notice returned to the Settlement Administrator as
12 undeliverable will be re-mailed to the forwarding address if one is provided. *Id.* If no forwarding
13 address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will promptly attempt to determine a correct address
14 through skip-tracing or other means and will re-mail all undelivered mail within five calendar days of
15 receiving notice that a Class Notice was undeliverable. *Id.*

16 The proposed Class Notice is clear and straightforward, and provides information on the case,
17 the meaning and nature of the proposed Settlement, its terms and provisions, and the rights of the Class
18 Members to participate, opt out, and object. Bylsma Decl., ¶101. It describes the monetary awards that
19 the Settlement will provide to the Class Members, how the awards were calculated, and the Class
20 release. *Id.* It also provides the date, time, and location of the Final Approval Hearing, and the identity
21 and contact information for Class Counsel. *Id.* The Class Notice fulfills the requirement of neutrality
22 in class notices. *Id.*; see *Newberg on Class Actions* at §§ 8:21 and 8:39; *Manual for Complex Litig.* at
23 §§ 21:311 and 21:312. Based on the foregoing, the Class Notice complies with the standards of
24 fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a settlement class notice disseminated under
25 authority of the Court.

26 **VII. CONCLUSION**

27 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant this Motion for
28 Preliminary Approval and enter an order consistent with the proposed order submitted herewith.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

DATED: April 2, 2026

SCHNEIDER WALLACE
COTTRELL KIM LLP



Esther L. Bylsma
Sandra Acosta Tello

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class