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individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

JOSE ROBERTO COCA MOLINA, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMM MARKET, INC., dba MISSION RANCH
MARKET, a California Corporation,

Defendant.

Case No. 30-2023-01337256-CU-OE-CXC
Related to Case No.:
30-202301351378CUOE-CXC
Judge: Hon. David A. Hoffer
Department: CX103

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF PAGA
AND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF
CLASS COUNSEL; DECLARATION
OF PLAINTIFF MOLINA**

Date: August 22, 2025
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Dept.: CX103


1 **TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND COUNSEL OF RECORD:**
2 **NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN** that on August 22, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the
3 matter may be heard in Department CX103 before the Honorable David A. Hoffer of the Orange
4 County Superior Court, Plaintiff JOSE ROBERTO COCA MOLINA (“Plaintiff”), by and through
5 Plaintiff’s counsels of record, will and hereby moves the Court for Final Approval of the
6 Settlement Agreement and Stipulation to Resolve Class Action and PAGA Claims, awarding
7 attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, Enhancement Award, Settlement Administration Costs, and
8 entering final approval and judgment.

9 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court and Labor
10 Code section 2699(1). This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached
11 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the accompanying Declarations of James R. Hawkins
12 (“Hawkins”), the declaration of Stacey Shim of APEX Class Action Administration, the
13 declaration of Plaintiff JOSE ROBERTO COCA MOLINA, the Settlement Agreement and
14 Stipulation to Resolve Class Action and PAGA Claims (the “Settlement Agreement”), attached to
15 the Hawkins Declaration, argument of counsel, all papers and pleadings filed in the action, and
16 upon any further information or evidence requested by the Court at the time of hearing on this
17 Motion.
18

19
20 Dated: July 31, 2025

JAMES HAWKINS APLC

21
22 BY:



James Hawkins
Gregory Mauro
Michael Calvo
Lauren Falk
Ava Issary

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24
25
26 Attorneys for Plaintiff JOSE ROBERTO
27 COCA MOLINA and the Proposed Class
28

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3	<i>Stambaugh v. Superior Court</i>	
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 This Court preliminary approved the settlement on or about April 18, 2025. (James
4 Hawkins Decl. “Hawkins”, **Exhibit A** - Preliminary Approval Order). Plaintiff Molina
5 (“Plaintiff”), now respectfully requests that this Court grant final approval of the settlement
6 agreement attached to the Hawkins Declaration as **Exhibit B**, along with the Amendment No. 1
7 to Settlement Agreement and Stipulation to Resolve Class Action and PAGA Claims attached to
8 the Settlement Agreement as **Exhibit 1**, which seeks to resolve claims against AMM MARKET,
9 INC., dba MISSION RANCH MARKET. (“Defendant”) in exchange for a Gross Settlement
10 Amount of (“GSA”) of Eight Hundred and Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$800,000.00).
11

12 The Class Members overwhelmingly supported the Settlement, as there is a 100%
13 participation rate, with zero objections and zero opt outs resulting in a full participation from all
14 Class Members (357). To determine a Participating Class Member’s individual settlement award
15 payment, the Net Settlement Fund will be divided by the total number of workweeks worked by
16 all Settlement Class Members during the Class Period, multiplied by the number of workweeks
17 worked by that Participating Class Member. The *highest* Individual Settlement Payment to a
18 Participating Class Member is currently estimated to be approximately \$4,770.51, the *average*
19 Individual Settlement Payment is currently estimated to be approximately \$1,283.13, and the
20 *lowest* Individual Settlement Payment is currently estimated to be approximately \$17.80. These
21 amounts are subject to employee-side tax and withholdings. The *highest* Individual PAGA
22 Payment to an Aggrieved Employee is approximately \$88.02, the *average* Individual PAGA
23 Payment is approximately \$71.94, and the *lowest* Individual PAGA Payment is approximately
24 \$1.57. (Administrator Decl. of Stacey Shim-hereinafter “Shim”, ¶¶ 16-18).

25 Plaintiff also moves for final approval of attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$266,666.66
26 which is one third of GSA. As will be demonstrated herein, Class Counsel’s attorney fee request
27 is supported using the percentage fee method and the lodestar method. Second, Plaintiff moves
28 for final approval of payment of the litigation costs in the amount of \$16,757.46, all of which
was incurred in litigating this matter. Third, Plaintiff moves for final approval of the

Enhancement Award to Plaintiff in the sum of \$10,000.00, to compensate the Class Representative for their service as the Class Representative and providing a general release of his claims against Defendant – a release significantly greater than the Class Members provided – and for the risks absorbed and time spent litigating the case. Plaintiff played a vital role in representing Class Members in this case and spearheading the lawsuit to seek monetary relief on behalf of all Class Members. Fourth, Plaintiff moves for final approval of the payment of \$8,500.00 in administrative costs to Apex Class Action Administrators. Fifth, Plaintiff moves for final approval of the \$40,000.00 PAGA Payment and the payment to the Labor and Work Development Agency (“LWDA”) for its share of the PAGA Payment (\$30,000.00, which is 75% of \$40,000.00; with the remaining \$10,000.00 payable to Aggrieved Employees).

This case required many hours of attorney and Plaintiff time who sought relief on behalf of 357 potential class members within the State of California defined all current and former non-exempt employees who were employed by Defendant AMM MARKET, INC., dba MISSION RANCH MARKET for the Class Period is July 20, 2019 through September 2, 2024.

This litigation involved the review and analysis of documents, policies, and practices, as well as a full day of mediation. Most importantly, the Settlement and all its terms received overwhelming support from Class Members, as there were no objections and only one request for exclusion. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully request the Court grant final approval of the Settlement, attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, Enhancement Award, Settlement Administration Costs, and payment to the LWDA in the amounts preliminarily approved by the Court and as fully disclosed to Class Members.

II. BACKGROUND, INVESTIGATION, DISCOVERY

On July 20, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the California Labor Workforce Development Agency (the “LWDA”) for civil penalties under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (the “PAGA”). (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 3).

On July 20, 2023, Named Plaintiff filed the Class Action against Defendant in a case entitled *Jose Roberto Coca Molina, et al. v. A MM Market, Inc dba Mission Ranch Market*, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2023-01337256-CU-OE-CXC. On September 27,

2023, Named Plaintiff filed the PAGA Action against Defendant in a case entitled *Jose Roberto Coca Molina, et al. v. AM M Markef1nc dba Mission Ranch Market*, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2023-01351378-CU-OE-CXC. The Class Action and PAGA Action allege that Defendant violated various wage and-hour laws, including: (1) failure to pay wages including overtime as required by Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194; (2) failure to provide meal periods as required by Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512 and IWC Wage Orders; (3) failure to provide rest periods as required by Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512; (4) failure to pay timely wages required by Labor Code § 203; (5) failure to timely pay wages during employment required by Labor Code § 204; (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements required by Labor Code §§ 226, 226.3, 558.1; (7) failure to maintain accurate records relating to hours worked daily; (8) violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq.; and (9) penalties pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 4-6).

In preparation for the mediation Defendant provided Class Counsel with first and last Defendant retained counsel and, time punch dates for all employees, time and payroll records and relevant policies for Class Members during the Class Period. (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 5).

On January 19, 2024, the Parties participated in mediation with Lisa Klerman, Esq. (the "Mediator"), a respected mediator of complex wage-and-hour actions, and with the assistance of the Mediator's evaluations, the Parties reached settlement. (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 6).

The settlement discussions were conducted at arm's-length, and the settlement is the result of an informed and detailed analysis of Defendant's potential liability in relation to the costs and risks associated with continued litigation. Based on the documents produced, as well as Class Counsel's own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel believes that the Settlement with Defendant for the consideration and on the terms set forth in this Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interest of the Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, including the risk of significant delay and uncertainty associated with litigation and various defenses asserted by Defendant. (Hawkins Decl. ¶ 4-12, Ex. B.)

In reaching the proposed settlement, Plaintiff counsel's negotiation efforts took into consideration relevant factors such as the size of the class, the information, data, and documents

1 obtained in the litigation and/or otherwise exchanged pursuant to the mediation privilege; the
2 experience of the named Plaintiff; the strengths and weaknesses of the case; the uncertain
3 outcome and risk of litigating complex actions; the time and expense in litigating a case through
4 trial; Defendant's defenses; and the non-reversionary nature of the settlement.

5 **A. THE SETTLEMENT PROVIDES REASONABLE COMPENSATION TO**
6 **CLASS MEMBERS**

7 As a result of the mediation, the parties agreed to settle this matter for a Gross Settlement
8 Amount ("GSA") of \$800,000.00 (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 9, Shim Decl., ¶ 14). Based on their own
9 respective independent investigations and evaluations, and after taking into account the sharply
10 disputed factual and legal issues involved in this matter, the risks attending further prosecution of
11 the case, and the monetary benefits received under the Settlement despite the questionable nature
12 of the claims, Plaintiff's counsel is of the opinion that Settlement for the consideration and on the
13 terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement remains fair, reasonable and adequate and is in the
14 best interests of the Class Members. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 5-13).

15 Even without the presumption of fairness and reasonableness, the settlement is clearly
16 within the range of reasonableness as thoroughly discussed in detail in the motion for
17 preliminary approval, and as considered by the Court in granting preliminary approval, (Hawkins
18 Decl., ¶¶ 9-18; Ex. A- Order Granting Preliminary Approval).

19 Accounting for the risks of continued litigation and impediments to discovery, Plaintiff
20 determined that a settlement amounting to \$800,000.00 was fair and reasonable and the court
21 preliminarily agreed. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 11-23). *See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.*, 212
22 F.R.D. 231, 256-58 (D. Del. 2002) (recognizing that a reasonable settlement amount can be 1.6% to 14%
23 of the total estimated damages); *In Re Armored Car Antitrust Litig.*, 472 F. Supp. 1357, 1373 (N.D. Ga.
24 1979) (settlements with a value of 1% to 8% of the estimated total damages were approved); *In Re Four*
25 *Seasons Secs. Laws Litig.*, 58 F.R.D. 19, 37 (W.D. Okla.1972) (approving 8% of damages); *Balderas v.*
26 *Massage Envy Franchising, LLP*, 2014 WL 3610945, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014) (finding that
27 settlement which amounted to 8% of maximum recovery "[fell] within the range of possible initial
28 approval based on the strength of plaintiff's case and the risk and expense of continued litigation."); *In re*

1 *Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (approving settlement of 6% to 8%
2 of estimated damages).¹ (*Id.*)

3 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AND THE CLASS MEMBERS' RESPONSE**

4 **A. TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT**

5 The GSA is (\$800,000.00). This amount includes, the Settlement Administration Costs of
6 \$8,500.00; the Enhancement Award of up to \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff; Court-approved attorneys'
7 fees up to \$266,666.66, litigation costs to Class Counsel in the amount of \$16,757.46; and PAGA
8 penalties of \$40,000.00 with 75% of that amount paid to the LWDA and the remaining 25% paid
9 to the Aggrieved Employees. The Net Settlement fund available to the settlement class is
10 approximately \$458,075.88 . (Shim Decl., ¶ 15).

11 The Settlement is a common fund settlement with no reversion to Defendant. Thus, each
12 of the participating Settlement Class Members will be paid his or her pro-rata share of the NSA.

13 **B. RELEASED CLAIMS**

14 Subject to approval by this Court, and in exchange for the consideration recited in the
15 Settlement Agreement, the Released Claims are all claims that have been or could have been
16 reasonably alleged or asserted in the PAGA Notices and as defined in the Settlement. (Hawkins
17 Decl., Ex. B- Settlement Agreement ¶31).

18 **C. THE CLASS MEMBERS SUPPORT THE SETTLEMENT – ZERO (0)**
19 **OBJECTIONS AND ZERO (0) OPT-OUTS**
20
21

22 ¹ See also *In re Uber FCRA Litig.*, No. 14-cv-05200-EMC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101552, at *23- 24 (N.D. Cal.
23 June 29, 2017) (granting preliminary approval to class action settlement where gross settlement fund, prior to
deducting attorneys' fees and services awards, was valued at 7.5% or less of total possible verdict); *Viceral v.*
24 *Mistras Grp., Inc.*, No. 15-cv-02198-EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140759, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016)
(granting preliminary approval to class action settlement representing "8.1% of the full verdict value" with net
25 settlement amount representing approximately 5.3% of full verdict value); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*,
No. 13-cv-02540-HSG, 2015 WL 3776765, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (granting final approval to settlement
26 with net recovery to Plaintiff valued at 7.3% of potential maximum recovery); *Cruz v. Sky Chefs, Inc.*, No. 12-cv-
02705-DMR, 2014 WL 7247065, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014) (granting final approval where gross settlement
27 amount represented 8.6% of the maximum potential recovery from the class claims and estimated amount
distributable to class after accounting for attorneys' fees and other deductions represented approximately 6.1% of
28 maximum potential recovery); *In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig.*, No. 07-cv-05182-WHA, 2010 WL 3001384, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. July 29, 2010) (granting final approving where "[t]he proposed settlement amount is [. . .] only about five
percent of the estimated damages before fee and costs—even before any reduction thereof for attorney's fees and
costs.").

On April 18, 2025, the Court granted Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, conditionally certified the class for settlement purposes, appointed Apex Class Action Administrators to act as the administrator, approved the Notice to be sent to the Class, and directed that the Notice be mailed to the Class via U.S. First Class Mail. (Hawkins Decl., Ex. A- Order Granting Preliminary Approval). On or about May 16, 2025, APEX mailed the Notices to 357 Class Members. (Shim Decl., ¶7). Out of the 357 Notices, only 31 were deemed undeliverable after attempts to ascertain the addresses. (Shim Decl., ¶¶ 7-11). As a result of the mailing, there is a 100% participation rate and 357 Class Members will be mailed a settlement check. (*Id.* ¶ 14).

If a Participating Class Member's or Aggrieved Employee's check is returned to the Settlement Administrator, the Settlement Administrator will make reasonable efforts to re-mail it to the Participating Class Member or Aggrieved Employee at the correct address. It is expressly understood and agreed that the checks for the Individual Settlement Payments, including the Individual PAGA Payments, will become void and no longer available if not cashed within 180 calendar days after mailing. The Settlement Fund is non-reversionary, so any funds from uncashed and voided checks will be transferred to the State of California's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Participating Class Member/Aggrieved Employee. (Settlement Agreement, Exhibit 1- ¶ 59.e).

IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE

A. THE SETTLEMENT SATISFIES THE STANDARD FOR FINAL APPROVAL

California Rule of Court, Rule 3.769, requires court approval for class action settlements. Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(g). California courts favor settlement. *Stambaugh v. Superior Court* (1976) 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236, *Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. of Cal.* (1951) 37 Cal. 2d 592, 602 (“[T]he law wisely favors settlements”). Accordingly, the Court must give “[due] regard to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245.

In deciding whether to approve a class settlement, a court evaluates whether the proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th

1 1794, 1801 (citing *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cnty. Of S.F.* (9th Cir. 1982)
2 688 F.2d 615, 625). A court enjoys broad discretion to make its fairness determination. *Dunk*, 48
3 Cal. App. 4th at 1801. However, “a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is
4 reached through arms-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow
5 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4)
6 the percentage of objectors is small.” *Id.* at 1802; *accord Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 245. In
7 addition, a court should consider additional relevant factors, including the strength of the Plaintiff’s
8 case compared to the settlement amount; the risk, expenses, complexity, and likely duration of
9 further litigation; and the fair treatment of class members in relation to each other. *Dunk*, 48 Cal.
10 App. 4th at 1802.

11 At the time of preliminary approval, the Court was provided with sufficient information to
12 satisfy three of the four *Dunk* factors, leaving the fourth factor, the number of objectors, unknown
13 until after the Class had an opportunity to respond to the Settlement as explained in the Notice.
14 Subject only to the Class’s reaction to the Settlement, the Court preliminarily presumed the
15 Settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. Following dissemination of the Notice, and
16 adequate time provided to the Class to object to the Settlement, no class member submitted
17 objections and no Class Member excluded themselves from the settlement, **resulting in a 100%**
18 **participation rate from the Class.** (Shim Decl., ¶ 14). Thus, the proposed Settlement is entitled to
19 the presumption that it is fair and in all other respects proper and should be finally approved.

20 **V. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUESTED FEES AND COSTS**

21 **A. THE REQUESTED FEE AWARD IS FAIR AND REASONABLE,** 22 **CALCULATED AS A PERCENTAGE** 23 **OF A COMMON FUND**

24 Class Counsel applies for an award of attorneys’ fees in the sum of \$266,666.66 of the
25 GSA, and litigation costs of \$16,757.46 (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 24-31, Ex. C). When a settlement
26 results in a common fund for the benefit of a class, class counsel may be awarded fees as a
27 percentage of the common fund. *See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 254 (recognizing the
28 “percentage of recovery” method). The California Supreme Court confirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert*

1 *Half Int'l, Inc.* that “[t]he percentage of fund method survives in California class action cases.” 1
2 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016), in stating:

3 The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of
4 calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better
5 approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
6 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging
7 the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not
8 be denied our trial courts.

9 *Id.* at 503 (internal citation omitted); *see also e.g., Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34
10 (1977) (“when a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action
11 brought by a plaintiff or Plaintiff for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that
12 fund, such plaintiff or Plaintiff may be awarded attorney’s fees out of the fund.”); *Serrano v.*
13 *Unruh*, 32 Cal.3d 621, 627 (1982) (in awarding a fee from the common fund obtained for the
14 benefit of all parties, the trial court acts within its equitable power to prevent the other parties’
15 unjust enrichment.); *Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc.*, 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir.
16 1993) (the percentage of the fund method for calculating attorney’s fees more accurately reflects
17 the results achieved for the putative class than the lodestar method and “establishes reasonable
18 expectations on the part of Plaintiff’s attorneys as to their expected recovery; and it encourages
19 early settlement, which avoids protracted litigation.”); *In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities Litigation*,
20 396 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The percentage-of-recovery method is generally favored in
21 common fund cases because it allows courts to award fees from the fund ‘in a manner that rewards
22 counsel for success and penalizes it for failure.’”).²

23 The purpose of the common fund/percentage approach is to “spread litigation costs
24 proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire
25 burden alone.” *Vincent, supra*, 557 F.2d at 769. In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d
26 162, 167, the Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in winning a suit which creates a
27 fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share

28 ² *Laffitte* also held trial courts have discretion to assess reasonableness of fee awards with tools
such as the lodestar cross-check, although they need not do so. *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506 (“We hold
further that trial courts have discretion to conduct a lodestar cross-check on a percentage fee . . .
they also retain the discretion to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the
reasonableness of a requested percentage fee”).

of the litigation costs.” Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 110, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” The reasons for applying the common fund doctrine include: “...fairness to the successful litigant, who might otherwise receive no benefit because his recovery might be consumed by the expenses; correlative prevention of an unfair advantage to the others who are entitled to share in the fund and who should bear their share of the burden of its recovery; encouragement of the attorney for the successful litigant, who will be more willing to undertake and diligently prosecute proper litigation for the protection or recovery of the fund if he is assured that he will be properly and directly compensated should his efforts be successful.” *Id.* Because there is a defined and clearly traceable benefit to the Class, the Court can base an award of attorneys’ fees using a ‘common fund’ approach to compensate Class Counsel.

1. The Requested Attorneys’ Fee is Within the Range of Fees Approved in Comparable Common Fund Cases

Assessing an appropriate fee based on a percentage of the fund involves considering “all of the circumstances of the case.” Appellate cases addressing fees arise almost exclusively where awards were challenged by Defendant or objectors – the only parties with standing to appeal. *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 236.

The requested fee falls in the mid-range of percentage class fee awards, which generally range from 20% to 50% of a common fund, and it constitutes fair compensation for undertaking complex, risky, expensive, and time-consuming litigation on a contingent basis and compensates Class Counsel for their efforts, as well as the result achieved for the benefit of the Class. Numerous courts in California routinely approve fee requests equal to or greater than 25% of the common fund. *See Martin v. Ameripride Servs.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61796, *22-23 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (collecting cases); *Birch v. Office Depot, Inc.*, USDC Southern District, Case No. 06cv1690 DMS (WMC) (awarding 40% fee on a \$16 million wage and hour class action settlement); *Rippee v. Boston Mkt. Corp.*, USDC Southern District, Case No. 05cv1359 BTM (JMA) (awarding a 40% fee on a \$3.75 million wage and hour class action settlement). In fact, the Sacramento County

1 Superior Court has awarded fees of 25% of the common fund in wage and hour class actions.
2 (*McMahon v. Airco Mechanical, Inc.*, Case No. 34-2019-00259269; *Uribe v. EcoGuard Pest*
3 *Management, Inc.*, Case No. 34-2021-00300650; *Arroyo v. Epic Home Solar*, Case No. 34-2021-
4 00310634; *Blair v. Clark Wagaman Designs*, Case No. 34-2021-00313156).

5 In short, Class Counsels' fee request of \$266,666.66 (33.33% of the common fund) is in
6 line with awards in similar cases in California and demonstrates that Class Counsels' fee request
7 is consistent with market rates and is reasonable.

8 **2. A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the Requested Fee**

9 Class Counsels' fee request is also reasonable when calculated using the lodestar method.
10 Under the lodestar method, a base fee amount is calculated from a compilation of time reasonably
11 spent on the case and the reasonable hourly compensation of the attorney. *Serrano*, 20 Cal. 3d at
12 48. The court then may enhance this lodestar figure by a "multiplier" to account for a range of
13 factors, such as the novelty and difficulty of the case, its contingent nature, and the degree of
14 success achieved. *Id.* at 49; *see also Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-36 (2001); *Thayer*
15 *v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 834 (2001), ["[t]here is no...rule limiting the factors
16 that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to [adjust the] lodestar"].

17 As of the date of filing, Class Counsel worked approximately 276.60 documented hours on
18 this case. for a lodestar value of approximately \$224,248.00. (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 29) In light of the
19 facts and circumstances of this matter, as well as the results that Class Counsel have achieved,
20 Class Counsel have spent a reasonable number of hours performing work on this matter. In
21 addition, Class Counsel will continue to perform work on this matter through the date of final
22 approval and in connection with the implementation of the Settlement and thus respectfully request
23 the Court apply a modest multiplier of 1.19. Attorney Gregory Mauro spent 125.90 hours on this
24 litigating this case at a rate of \$850 per hour, Attorney James Hawkins spent 101.30 hours litigating
25 this matter at a rate of \$1,050 per hour, and Paralegal Melissa Whitson spent 49.40 hours on this
26 case at a rate of \$220 per hour. Where "exceptional effort produced an exceptional benefit," a fee
27 award may be enhanced. *Thayer v. Wells Fargo* 92 Cal. App. 4th at 838; *In re Vitamin Cases*, 110
28 Cal. App. 4th 1041, 1058-1059 (2003) (high-quality work from counsel supports multiplier).

1 **3. Class Counsel’s Hourly Rates are Reasonable**

2 Class Counsels’ hourly rates are between \$200 and \$1,050 and are in line with rates
3 typically approved in wage and hour class action litigation and which rates have been approved by
4 Courts in California in the Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Francisco, Alameda, Orange and San
5 Diego County Superior Courts. (Hawkins Decl., ¶27); *Children’s Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Bonta*,
6 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 746 (2002) (noting rates were reasonable where they were “within the range
7 of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable
8 work”).

9 A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and
10 experience in the relevant community. *PLCM Group, Inc v. Drexler* (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.
11 When determining a reasonable hourly rate, courts may consider factors such as skill and
12 experience, the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise and the attorney’s
13 customary billing rates. *Flannery v. California Highway Patrol* (1998) 61 Cal. App. 4th 629, 632.
14 Class Counsels’ skill and experience support their hourly rates. Our practices are limited
15 exclusively to litigation, focusing on the representation of employees in wage and hour and
16 consumer class action matters. (Hawkins Decl., ¶ 24). As prominent attorneys in the field of wage
17 and hour class action litigation, Class Counsel continually monitors the prevailing market rates
18 charged by both defense and plaintiff law firms and set the billing rates of their attorneys and
19 paralegals to be consistent with the prevailing market rates in the private sector for attorneys and
20 staff of comparable skill, qualifications and experience. Other wage and hour attorneys working
21 as class counsel before California courts charge comparable if not higher rates. Therefore, as they
22 are in line with those of the relevant community, Class Counsels’ hourly rates are reasonable.

23 **4. Class Counsel’s Total Hours are Reasonable**

24 In determining a lodestar fee, reasonable hours include, in addition to time spent during
25 litigation, the time spent before the action was filed, including time spent interviewing clients,
26 investigating the facts and the law, and preparing the initial pleadings. *See New York Gaslight*
27 *Club, Inc. v. Carey* (1980) 447 U.S. 54, 62. The fee award should include fees incurred to establish
28 and defend the attorneys’ fee claim. *Serrano v. Priest* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.

1 Class Counsel expended a combined total of approximately 276.60 hours on this case.
2 The work performed to achieve a settlement that will provide valuable consideration to the Class
3 is summarized by Class Counsel in the declaration submitted herewith. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 28-31);
4 *Syers Props. III, Inc. v. Rankin*, 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 699 (2014) (“Because time records are not
5 required under California law ..., there is no required level of detail that counsel must achieve.”)
6 (internal quotations omitted). All tasks and work performed were reasonable and necessary for the
7 prosecution of this case. The work performed was justified considering the result achieved. All of
8 the work and tasks performed by Class Counsel were reasonable and necessary for the prosecution
9 of this case. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶28-31).

10 **5. Costs of Litigation are Reasonable**

11 Class Counsel seeks reimbursement of the litigation costs and expenses of \$16,757.46.
12 These costs were reasonable and necessary to prosecute this case, and the results achieved are fair,
13 and reasonable. (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 28-31, Ex. C).

14 **B. THE ENHANCEMENT AWARD IS REASONABLE**

15 Class Counsel seeks approval of a \$10,000.00 Enhancement Award to the named
16 Plaintiff/Class Representative. The requested enhancement award is reasonable in light of the
17 general release of all claims Plaintiff agreed to, greater than the release given by Class Members,
18 the benefits Plaintiff conferred upon the entire Class resulting in payments to all Class Members,
19 the time spent assisting counsel with the investigation and prosecution of these claims and
20 consenting to the proposed Settlement. Furthermore, in pursuing this action on behalf of the Class,
21 Plaintiff risked a judgment for attorneys’ fees and costs in the event this matter had been lost.
22 (Hawkins Decl., ¶¶ 31-33; *See also* declaration of Plaintiff Molina filed concurrently herewith)

23 Courts routinely approve service payments, or incentive awards, to compensate named
24 Plaintiff for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class litigation. *See In re*
25 *Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1393; *see also Bell v. Farmers*
26 *Ins. Exch.* (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 725-26 (upholding service payments to class
27 representatives); Manual § 21.62 n.971 (noting that service payments are warranted). Based on the
28

1 foregoing, the \$10,000.00 Enhancement Award is fair, appropriate, and justified as part of the
2 overall settlement.

3 **C. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE REASONABLE**

4 The Parties agreed to hire Apex Class Action Administrators as the administrator, and the
5 Court approved this choice. Apex Class Action Administrators' total fees and costs for services in
6 connection with the administration of this Settlement, which includes fees and costs incurred to-
7 date, as well as anticipated fees and costs for completion of the settlement administration, are
8 \$8,500.00. Apex Class Action Administrators' work in connection with this matter will continue
9 with the calculation of the settlement award payments, issuance and mailing of the settlement
10 award checks, the necessary tax filing and reporting on such payments, and any other tasks that
11 the Parties mutually agree to and/or the Court orders Apex Class Action Administrators to perform.
12 (Shim Decl., ¶19). Following the grant of final approval, the Administrator's duties will continue
13 in order to calculate and mail the Individual Settlement Payment checks to Class Members,
14 Aggrieved Employees, perform tax reporting obligations, disburse other payments as ordered by
15 the Court, and perform such other duties as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. The fee of
16 \$8,500.00 for services rendered and to be rendered is fair and reasonable and should be granted.

17 **D. THE SETTLEMENT PENALTIES UNDER PAGA ARE REASONABLE**

18 The PAGA payment of \$40,000.00 with 75% of to the LWDA and 25% to the aggrieved
19 employees is reasonable under the circumstances. The Parties negotiated a good faith amount for
20 PAGA penalties. The PAGA penalties allocation is not the result of self-interest at the expense of
21 other Class Members. The LWDA was also provided notice of the Settlement with the concurrent
22 filing of the preliminary approval motion and the instant motion. Plaintiff did not receive a
23 response or objection to the Settlement from the LWDA. Thus, Plaintiff requests the Court finally
24 approve the PAGA allocation in the amount of \$40,000.00 with 75% being paid to the LWDA and
25 25% being distributed to the aggrieved employees.


26 **VI. CONCLUSION**

27 Based on the foregoing, Class Counsel respectfully requests the Court grant final approval
28 of the Class Action Settlement, award (1) Class Counsels' fees in the sum of \$266,666.66 and

1 litigation costs of \$16,757.46; (2) award the named Plaintiff an Enhancement Award in the sum of
2 \$10,000.00; (3) award \$8,500.00 to Apex Class Action Administrators, for settlement
3 administration services, and (4) approve the PAGA Payment of \$40,000.00 with a \$30,000.00 of
4 that sum paid to the LWDA and the remaining \$10,000.00 paid to the Aggrieved Employees.

5
6 Dated: July 31, 2025

JAMES HAWKINS APLC

7
8 BY: 

James Hawkins

Gregory Mauro

Michael Calvo

Lauren Falk

Ava Issary

12 Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed
13 Class