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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF KINGS

JOHNNY RIVAS, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated and on behalf of other aggrieved employees,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BUCKINGHAM PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23CU0355

Honorable Jennifer Giuliani
Department 1

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT, ATTORNEYS' FEES, ATTORNEYS' EXPENSES, SERVICE AWARD, AND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Date:	April 30, 2026
Time:	8:15 a.m.
Dept:	1

Complaint Filed:	September 15, 2023
FAC Filed:	October 30, 2023
SAC Filed:	June 11, 2025
Trial Date:	Not Set

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on **April 30, 2026 at 8:15 a.m.** in Department 1 of the above-captioned Court located at 1640 Kings County Drive, Hanford, California 93230, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 382, Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, and California Labor Code section 2699(l), Johnny Rivas ("Plaintiff") will and hereby does move the Court for an Order granting final approval of the proposed class action and Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq*. ("PAGA") settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Buckingham Property Management ("Defendant").

Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an Order:

1. Granting final approval of the class action and PAGA settlement;

2. Approving the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, based upon the terms as set forth in the Court-approved Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement and Release of Claims ("Settlement Agreement" or "Settlement"), including payment by Defendant of the escalated Gross Settlement Amount of Three Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Zero Cents ($336,993.00) equal to the amounts to pay (1) the Settlement Class Members and PAGA Members pursuant to the terms of the Settlement; (2) the Court-approved Attorneys' Fees and Attorneys' Expenses; (3) the Court-approved Service Award; (4) the Court-approved Administration Expenses; and (5) the Court-approved payment to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") pursuant to PAGA;

3. Approving Class Counsel's request for thirty-five percent (35%) of the escalated Gross Settlement Amount, i.e., One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars and Fifty-Five Cents ($117,947.55) in attorneys' fees, plus reimbursement of actual costs and expenses in the amount of Twenty-Two Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Five Dollars and Forty Cents ($22,165.40);

4. Approving the Service Award to Plaintiff in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($5,000.000) in recognition of his services to the Class Members;

5. Approving the Administration Expenses to ILYM Group, Inc. in the amount of Eight Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents ($8,450.00); and

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8. Approving Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents ($11,250.00) to be paid to the LWDA as seventy-five percent (75%) of the Fifteen Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($15,000.00) allocated to civil penalties under PAGA.

This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 and Rule 3.1113(e) of the California Rules of Court, which require approval by the Court of a class action settlement and permit the Court to extend the page limit for memoranda.

This Motion is based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Settlement Agreement, the Declarations of Class Counsel (Alexandra Rose), the Class Representative (Johnny Rivas), and the Settlement Administrator (Garvin Brown on behalf of ILYM Group, Inc.), the pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this matter, and such evidence or oral argument as may be presented at the hearing on this Motion.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: April 6, 2026

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

By: ______________________________
Alexandra Rose
Attorneys for Plaintiff Johnny Rivas
and the Class

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Statutes

Other Authorities

Rules

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnny Rivas ("Plaintiff" or "Class Representative") seeks final approval of the class action settlement reached with Defendant Buckingham Property Management ("Defendant"). Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff and Defendant (together, the "Parties") have settled the Released Class Claims and Released PAGA Claims as defined in the Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement and Release of Claims ("Settlement Agreement" or "Settlement") for a total escalated amount of Three Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Zero Cents ($336,993.00) ("Gross Settlement Amount"). (*See* Declaration of Alexandra Rose in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement, Attorneys' Fees, Attorneys' Expenses, Service Award, and Administration Expenses ["Rose Decl."], ¶ 19, Exh. 1).

The Court conditionally certified, for settlement purposes only, the Class defined as: "All current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California at any time during the Class Period" ("Class" or "Class Members"). (Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.F; Rose Decl., ¶ 17). The "Class Period" is defined as the period from July 31, 2020 through November 5, 2025. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.I; Rose Decl., ¶ 17). The "Settlement Class Members" consist of all Class Members who did not submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.QQ; Rose Decl., ¶ 17). The "PAGA Members" consist of "all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California any time during the PAGA Period." (Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.Y; Rose Decl., ¶ 17). The "PAGA Period" is defined as the period from August 25, 2022 through November 5, 2025. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.BB; Rose Decl., ¶ 17).

As discussed herein, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for final settlement approval under California law because it is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (Rose Decl., Exh. 1; *See also, Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129-30; *Dunk v. Ford Motor Company* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 180 l). The response of the Class to the Settlement confirms that final settlement approval is appropriate. *There have been no objections to and only six (6) requests for exclusion from* the Class Settlement. (Declaration of Garvin Brown of ILYM Group, Inc. Regarding Notice and Settlement Administration ["ILYM Decl."], ¶¶ 9 and 10).

Because the Settlement achieves outstanding results for the Settlement Class Members, the PAGA Members, and the State of California, Plaintiff respectfully requests, on behalf of the Class and without opposition from Defendant, that the Court approve the Settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, and enter judgment in accordance with the Settlement's terms.

Plaintiff seeks the Court's approval of an attorneys' fee award of thirty-five percent (35%) of the escalated Gross Settlement Amount, equaling One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars and Fifty-Five Cents ($117,947.55) ("Attorneys' Fees"), plus reimbursement of actual litigation costs and expenses in the amount of Twenty-Two Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Five Dollars and Forty Cents ($22,165.40) ("Attorneys' Expenses"). Class Counsel's request for an award of attorneys' fees and costs is reasonable and appropriate in light of the outstanding work performed by Class Counsel in the matter, the contingent nature of this action, and the results achieved under the Settlement. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19).

Plaintiff also requests the Court's approval of the amount to be paid to Plaintiff in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($5,000.00) ("Service Award") for his services on behalf of the Class. This amount proposed to be awarded to Plaintiff is fair and reasonable for the reasons Plaintiff provided in his declaration. (*See* Declaration of Plaintiff Johnny in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement, Attorneys' Fees, Attorneys' Expenses, Service Award, and Administration Expenses ["Rivas Decl."] filed concurrently herewith). Courts approve incentive awards to plaintiffs when justified and appropriate to compensate plaintiffs for their time, effort, and inconvenience. (*See e.g., Van Vranken v. Atlantic Riclifield Co.* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294, 299).

Finally, Plaintiff requests that the Court approve the payment of Eight Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents ($8,450.00) ("Administration Expenses") to ILYM Group, Inc. ("ILYM" or "Settlement Administrator") as compensation for its administration services it has and will provide in connection with the Settlement. (*See, generally*, ILYM Decl.).

In order to efficiently present the Court with adequate information to determine whether to grant final approval of the Settlement and award the Attorneys' Fees, Attorneys' Expenses, Service Award, and Administration Expenses, Plaintiff also moves for an order permitting the filing of this single consolidated memorandum, although it exceeds the page limit established by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(d), instead of filing several separate motions.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is a full-service residential property management company servicing more than 17,000 residents in 150 properties across 80 cities in California. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an hourly-paid, non-exempt Maintenance Technician from approximately July 2003 to approximately June 2023. (Rivas Decl., ¶ 2).

On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff provided written notice to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") by online submission and to Defendant by U.S. Certified Mail, pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2699.3, of the specified provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated by Defendant ("PAGA Notice"). (Rose Decl., ¶ 2).

On September 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint for Damages in the action entitled *Johnny Rivas v. Buckingham Property Management*, Kings County Superior Court Case No. 23CU0355 ("Action"), thereby commencing a putative class action against Defendant. (*Id*., ¶ 3).

On October 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages and Enforcement Action Under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code §§ 2698 Et Seq. in the Action, which added a cause of action under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code Section 2698, *et seq*. ("PAGA"). (*Id*., ¶ 4).

On November 17, 2023, Defendant propounded written formal discovery onto Plaintiff (specifically, Form Interrogatories – General (Set One), Form Interrogatories – Employment Law (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Request for Admission (Set One), and Request for Production of Documents (Set One)), and noticed the deposition of Plaintiff. (*Id*., ¶ 5).

On January 4, 2024, Plaintiff propounded written formal discovery onto Defendant (specifically, Form Interrogatories – General (Set One), Form Interrogatories – Employment Law (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Requests for Admission (Set One), and Requests for Production of Documents (Set One)), and served a notice of deposition of Defendant's Person Most Knowledgeable and a proposed Belaire-West notice. (*Id*., ¶ 6).

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On January 9, 2024, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's first set of written formal discovery. (Rose Decl., ¶ 7).

On August 15, 2024, the Parties participated in a formal mediation conducted by Eve Wagner, Esq. ("Mediator"), a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and hour matters, which did not result in a settlement. (*Id*., ¶ 8).

On August 16, 2024, Defendant propounded additional and repeated written formal discovery onto Plaintiff (specifically, Form Interrogatories – General (Set One), Form Interrogatories – Employment Law (Set One), Request for Admission (Set One), and Request for Production of Documents (Set One)), and noticed the deposition of Plaintiff. (*Id*., ¶ 9).

On September 24, 2024, Defendant served responses to Plaintiff's first set of written formal discovery. (*Id*., ¶ 10).

On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's second set of written formal discovery. (*Id*., ¶ 11).

On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff propounded additional written formal discovery onto Defendant (specifically, Form Interrogatories – General (Set Two), Special Interrogatories (Set Two), Requests for Admission (Set Two), and Requests for Production of Documents (Set Two)). (*Id*., ¶ 12). On October 2, 2024, Plaintiff served an objection to Defendant's deposition notice. (Ibid).

On January 13, 2025, with the assistance of the Mediator, the Parties were able to reach an agreement to resolve this dispute on a class and representative basis. (*Id*., ¶ 13). The Parties then worked diligently to negotiate and memorialize the terms in a long-form settlement agreement. (Ibid).

On June 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages and Enforcement Action Under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code §§ 2698 Et Seq. ("Operative Complaint") in the Action, which added causes of action for failure to provide records in violation of California Labor Code Section 226, 432, and 1198.5, failure to pay minimum wage in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S. Code Section 206), and failure to pay overtime in violation of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S. Code Section 207). (*Id*., ¶ 14). The Operative Complaint alleges thirteen (13) causes of action for violations of the California Labor Code for failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide compliant meal periods and premium payments in lieu thereof, failure to provide compliant rest periods and premiums payments in lieu thereof, failure to timely pay wages during employment, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to timely pay wages upon termination, failure to reimburse necessary business expenses, and failure to produce requested employment records, for violations of California Business & Professions Code Section 17200, *et seq*. based on the aforementioned California Labor Code violations, for civil penalties under PAGA based on the aforementioned California Labor Code violations, and for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime. (Ibid).

On October 14, 2025, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id*., ¶ 15 and Exh. 1).

On October 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Motion for Preliminary Approval") and supporting documents. (*Id*., ¶ 16). On January 22, 2026, the Court entered the Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Preliminary Approval Order"), thereby preliminary approving the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Notice of Class Action Settlement ("Notice Packet"), and the proposed administration procedures and associated deadlines. (*Id*., ¶ 16 and Exh. 2).

The Parties agree that the Class described herein may be certified for settlement purposes only. If for any reason the Settlement is not approved, the certification will have no force or effect and will immediately be revoked. The Parties further agree that certification for purposes of approving the Settlement Agreement is in no way an admission that class certification is proper under the more stringent standard applied for litigation and that evidence of this limited stipulation for settlement purposes only will not be admissible for any purpose in this or any other proceeding.

III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS AND PLAN OF DISTRIBUTION

The Parties have agreed to settle the Class and PAGA claims at issue in the Operative Complaint for a non-reversionary escalated Gross Settlement Amount of Three Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Zero Cents ($336,993.00), which is exclusive of employer-side payroll taxes. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.R; Rose Decl., ¶ 19). The escalated Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) Class Counsel's fees in the amount of thirty-five percent (35%) of the escalated Gross Settlement Amount, equaling One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred

Forty-Seven Dollars and Fifty-Five Cents ($117,947.55); (2) Class Counsel's actual litigation costs and expenses, in the amount of Twenty-Two Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Five Dollars and Forty Cents ($22,165.40); (3) Administration Expenses in the amount Eight Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents ($8,450.00); (4) Service Award in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($5,000.000); and (5) PAGA Payment in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($15,000.00). (Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ I.B, I.D, I.E, I.CC, I.NN, III.A.1, III.M.9, III.M.10, III.M.11, and III.M.12; Rose Decl., ¶ 19). After the above Court-approved amounts are deducted from the escalated Gross Settlement Amount, the Settlement Class Members will share in a Net Settlement Amount of approximately One Hundred Sixty-Eight Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Dollars and Five Cents ($168,430.05). (Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.U; Rose Decl., ¶ 19).

The Settlement does not require Settlement Class Members to submit claims as a prerequisite to receiving their *pro rata* share of the Net Settlement Amount ("Individual Settlement Payment") nor does it require PAGA Members to submit claims as a prerequisite to receiving their *pro rata* share of twenty-five percent (25%) of the PAGA Payment ("Individual PAGA Payment"). (Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ I.S and I.T; Rose Decl., ¶ 20). Individual Settlement Payments are calculated by the Settlement Administrator by dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of weeks each Settlement Class Member worked for Defendant in California during the Class Period ("Workweeks") and multiplying the result by each Settlement Class Member's Workweeks worked during the Class Period. (Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ I.RR and III.M.1; Rose Decl., ¶ 20). Individual PAGA Payments are calculated by the Settlement Administrator by dividing the amount of the PAGA Members' twenty-five percent (25%) share of the PAGA Payment ($3,750.00) by the total number of pay periods each PAGA Member worked for Defendant in California during the PAGA Period ("PAGA Pay Periods") and multiplying the result by each PAGA Members's PAGA Pay Periods worked during the PAGA Period. (Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ I.AA and III.M.2; Rose Decl., ¶ 20)

Each Individual Settlement Payment will be allocated as ten percent (10%) for alleged unpaid wages and ninety percent (90%) as alleged unpaid interest, penalties, and non-wage damages. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ III.M.3; Rose Decl., ¶ 22). The portion allocated to wages ("Wage Portion") of the Individual Settlement Payments shall be reported on an IRS Form W-2 and the portions allocated to interest, penalties, and non-wage damages ("Non-Wage Portion") will be reported on an IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Settlement Administrator. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ III.M.3; Rose Decl., ¶ 22). The Settlement Administrator will withhold the employee's share of taxes and withholdings with respect to the Wage Portion of the Individual Settlement Payments, and issue checks to Settlement Class Members for their net payment of their Individual Settlement Payment. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ III.M.3; Rose Decl., ¶ 22). The employer's share of taxes and contributions in connection with the Wage Portion of Individual Settlement Payments will be paid by Defendant separately and in addition to the escalated Gross Settlement Amount. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.A.4; Rose Decl., ¶ 22). Each Individual PAGA Payment will be allocated as one hundred percent (100%) penalties and will be reported on an IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Settlement Administrator. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ III.M.4; Rose Decl., ¶ 22).

Each Individual Settlement Payment and Individual PAGA Payment check will be valid and negotiable for one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and thereafter, shall be canceled. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ III.M.8; Rose Decl., ¶ 23). Any funds associated with such canceled checks will be distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the State of California's Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the Settlement Class Member and/or PAGA Member and their respective share. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ III.M.8; Rose Decl., ¶ 23).

As of the Effective Date, Plaintiff and the Settlement Class Members release the Released Parties from all class claims alleged in the Operative Complaint, or which could have been alleged in the Operative Complaint based on the facts alleged, which occurred during the Class Period, and expressly excluding all other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, and class claims outside the Class Period (collectively, "Released Class Claims"). (Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ I.II and III.A.4.B). The Released Claims specifically include, but are not limited to, California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 226, 226.7, 432, 510, 512, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198.5, 2800 and 2802, the related IWC Wage Order No. 1-2001, California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.* claims (based on alleged violations of these California Labor Code and Wage Order provisions), Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. Section 206, Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C Section 207, and all other claims, such as those under the California Labor Code, IWC Wage Orders, regulations, and/or other provisions of law, that could have been plead based on the facts asserted in the Operative Complaint, including: (1) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; (2) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (3) Failure to Provide Meal Periods; (4) Failure to Permit Rest Breaks; (5) Failure to Timely Pay Wages During Employment; (6) Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements; (7) Failure to Pay Wages Due Upon Separation; (8) Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses; (9) Failure to Provide Records; (9) Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200; and (10) all interest, fees, and costs in connection therewith. (*Id*., ¶ I.11). The Released Class Claims expressly exclude claims for PAGA penalties. (Ibid). Only those Settlement Class Members who cash or deposit their Individual Settlement Payment check shall be deemed to opt-in to the settlement and release of the Released Class Claims that arise under the FLSA. (*Id*., ¶ III.A.4.B).

As of the Effective Date, the Plaintiff acting on behalf of the LWDA and the State of California, releases the Released Parties from all PAGA claims alleged in the Operative Complaint and PAGA Notice, which occurred during the PAGA Period, and expressly excluding all other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, and PAGA claims outside of the PAGA Period (collectively, "Released PAGA Claims"). (*Id*., ¶¶ I.JJ and III.A.4.C). The Released PAGA Claims includes claims for PAGA penalties based on California Labor Code sections §§ 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 1174, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, and 2802 and the related IWC Wage Orders. (*Id*., ¶ I.JJ).

The "Released Parties" means Defendant and its current and former partners, subsidiaries, owners, shareholders, agents (including, without limitation, any investment bankers, accountants, insurers, reinsurers, attorneys, and any past or present officers, directors, and exempt employees) predecessors, successors, and assigns. (*Id*., ¶ I.KK).

IV. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION PROCESS

ILYM has taken all necessary steps to effectuate the notice and settlement administration process, as set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order.

On November 6, 2025, ILYM received the Court approved text for the Notice Packet from Class Counsel. (ILYM Decl., ¶ 4).

On December 4, 2025, ILYM received the class data file from Defendant's counsel, which contained the full name, social security number, last known mailing address, dates worked during the Class Period, number of Workweeks, and number of PAGA Pay Periods for each Class Member (collectively, "Class Data"). (*Id.*, ¶ 5). The Class Data was uploaded to ILYM's database and checked for duplicates and other possible discrepancies. (Ibid). The Class Data contained 651 Class Members who worked 54,368.4 Workweeks and 305 PAGA Members who worked 6,968 PAGA Pay Periods. (Ibid). Accordingly, the escalator clause of the Settlement was triggered by 12.331% (i.e., $36,993). (Ibid).

As part of the preparation for mailing, all 651 names and addresses contained in the Class Data were then processed against the National Change of Address ("NCOA") database, maintained by the United States Postal Service ("USPS"), for purposes of updating and confirming the mailing addresses of the Class Members before mailing of the Notice Packet. (*Id.*, ¶ 6). The NCOA contains requested change of addresses filed with the USPS. (Ibid). To the extent that an updated address was found in the NCOA database, the updated address was used for the mailing of the Notice Packet. (Ibid). To the extent that no updated address was found in the NCOA database, the original address provided by Defendant's counsel was used for the mailing of the Notice Packet. (Ibid).

On February 3, 2026, the Notice Packet was mailed, via U.S. First Class Mail, to all 651 individuals contained in the Class Data. (*Id.*, ¶ 7). 69 Notice Packets were returned to ILYM as undeliverable. (*Id.*, ¶ 8). ILYM performed a computerized skip trace on the 69 returned Notice Packets that did not have a forwarding address in an effort to obtain an updated address for the purpose of re-mailing the Notice Packet. (Ibid). As a result of this skip trace, 50 updated addresses were obtained and the Notice Packets were promptly re-mailed to those Class Members, via U.S First Class Mail. (Ibid). A total of 19 Notice Packets have been deemed undeliverable as no updated address was found notwithstanding the skip tracing. (Ibid).

Class Members had forty-five (45) calendar days after the Settlement Administrator mailed the Notice Packets to submit a Request for Exclusion, Notice of Objection, and/or Dispute ("Response Deadline"). (Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.MM). The Response Deadline was March 20, 2026. (ILYM Decl., ¶¶ 9, 10, and 11). The Settlement Administrator received 6 Requests for Exclusion and did not receive any Notice of Objections and/or Disputes. (Ibid).

The estimated average gross Individual Settlement Payment is $255.19, the estimated highest gross Individual Settlement Payment is $841.53, and the estimated lowest gross Individual Settlement Payment is $1.84; the estimated average Individual PAGA Payment is $12.30, the estimated highest Individual PAGA Payment is $44.88, and the estimated lowest Individual PAGA Payment is $0.54. (*Id*., ¶¶ 14 and 15).[1]

V. COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF PAGA

On October 14, 2025, Class Counsel submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement to the LWDA through its online submission portal in compliance with California Labor Code § 2699(s)(2). (Rose Decl., ¶ 24). The LWDA has not objected or otherwise responded to the submissions. (Ibid).

VI. EVALUATION OF SETTLEMENT FOR FINAL APPROVAL

A. The Legal Standard for Final Approval

Before granting final approval of a class action settlement, the Court must review the settlement for fairness. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(g); *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co*. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801). A court must take into account relevant factors, including, for example, the strength of the plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 244-45; *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 ["The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case"]; *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625). Considering such factors, a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245; *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802). "The settlement or fairness hearing is not to be turned into a trial or

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[1] The actual average, highest, and lowest Individual Settlement Payment will be larger than the amounts stated in the ILYM Decl. because the Net Settlement Amount is larger due to Class Counsel's request for reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses in an amount that is less than $26,000.00 (the difference between the amount sought and the amount authorized under the Settlement, i.e., $3,834.60 will be part of the Net Settlement Amount).

rehearsal for trial on the merits. [The trial court is not] to reach any ultimate conclusions on the contested issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the dispute, for it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements." (*Officers for Justice*, *supra*, 688 F.2d at 625).

B. The Settlement Should be Finally Approved

California courts recognize that "a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining." (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245; *see also Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 799 (2009)). Here, the Parties' settlement negotiations were at all times made at arm's-length and were adversarial. (Rose Decl., ¶ 25). The Parties engaged in extensive formal and informal discovery prior to reaching a settlement. (*Id*., ¶ 26).

C. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable

Courts typically assess the status of discovery in determining whether a class action settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801). Prior to mediation, Defendant produced a sampling of putative class members' time and pay records as well as Defendant's relevant wage and hour policies, and information regarding the total number of putative class members, the number of current versus former employees, the total workweeks worked by the putative class members, and the average rate of pay for the putative class members. (Rose Decl., ¶ 26). This allowed Class Counsel to conduct an informed assessment and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the potential class-wide damages. (Ibid). Plaintiff's investigation was sufficient to satisfy the criteria for court approval set forth in *Dunk v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 and *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129-130 ("Dunk/Kullar").

Based on the information exchanged, the Parties extensively briefed issues regarding class certification and liability and provided their analyses to the Mediator who helped the Parties debate the strengths and weakness of their respective positions. (Rose Decl., ¶ 27). At all times, Plaintiff was willing and prepared to litigate this matter through class certification and trial if the Parties had been unable to reach a favorable resolution. (Ibid). Additionally, settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel. (Ibid). Class Counsel are respected members of the California State Bar with strong records of vigorous and effective advocacy and are experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Ibid). Accordingly, Class Counsel had sufficient information and experience to act intelligently in negotiating the Settlement.

A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to obtain 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250). In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court must consider "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)).

Here, the reasonableness of the Settlement is underscored by the fact that Defendant has legal and factual grounds for defending the Action. Based upon Class Counsel's experience litigating similar complex matters, Plaintiff reasonably expected a vigorous and lengthy defense to both class certification and the merits of the Action absent a settlement.

Class Counsel is aware of Defendant's defenses and arguments and has also taken into account the uncertainty and risk of the outcome of further litigation, and the difficulties and delays inherent in such litigation, including those involved in class and/or representative adjudication. (Rose Decl., ¶ 29). Plaintiff further recognizes the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability for the claims asserted in the Action, Defendant's defenses, and the difficulties in establishing entitlement to monetary recovery. (Ibid). Plaintiff has also considered the Parties' settlement discussions, as well as the evaluations of the Mediator, who is experienced and well-regarded in complex labor and employment matters. (Ibid).

Defendant denied and continues to deny any liability and wrongdoing of any kind associated with the claims alleged in the Action, and further denies that class certification is appropriate for any purpose other than the Settlement. (*Id.*, ¶ 30). Defendant believes that it would ultimately prevail in the Action. (Ibid). Defendant proffered defenses to both certification and to the merits of Plaintiff's claims. (Ibid). Defendant contended that Plaintiff's claims are not suitable for class certification because individual issues would predominate should this case go to trial. (Ibid). As with all class actions, these complex cases raise difficult management and proof issues and, accordingly, there is a significant risk that the Court may deny class certification. (Ibid).

Class Counsel also recognized that, even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification, proving the amount of wages due to each Class Member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and extremely uncertain proposition. (*Id*., ¶ 31). In order to prove liability and damages, Class Counsel would need to request and analyze thousands of pages of documents, obtain the Class Members' contact information, contact them, and obtain declarations at great expense. (Ibid). Obtaining the cooperation of current employees would also be difficult, given the likely reluctance to aid prosecution of a lawsuit against a current employer. (Ibid). On the other hand, Defendant would likely be able to obtain the cooperation of its employees. (Ibid). Moreover, even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification and trial, possible appeals would substantially delay any recovery by the Class. (Ibid).

In light of the Parties' respective legal positions and the risks of continued litigation, the escalated Gross Settlement Amount for resolution of the Class and PAGA claims, is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (*Id*., ¶ 32).

VII. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED

Class Counsel seeks thirty-five percent (35%) of the escalated Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., $117,947.55) for fees for the time spent litigating this matter and reimbursement of actual costs and expenses totaling Twenty-Two Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Five Dollars and Forty Cents ($22,165.40) incurred in the prosecution of the Action. (Rose Decl., ¶ 33). The requested fees and costs are fair compensation for undertaking complex, risky, expensive, and time-consuming litigation on a contingent fee basis, especially in light of the substantial benefits achieved by Class Counsel for the Class Members. (Ibid).

A. Plaintiff's Fee Request of Thirty-Five Percent (35%) of the Escalated Gross Settlement Amount is Proper Under the Common Fund Doctrine

Courts have long recognized the "common fund" or "common benefit" doctrine, under which attorneys who create a common fund or benefit for a group of persons may be awarded their fees and costs to be paid out of the fund. (*See Serrano v. Priest ("Serrano III")* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1; *Glendale City Employees' Association v. City of Glendale* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 341 fn.19; *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, 16 7; *see also Boeing Co. v. Van Gernert* (1980) 444 U.S. 472,478; *Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.* (1970) 396 U.S. 375, 391-392).

The California Supreme Court has held that, "when a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano III, supra,* 20 Cal.3d at 34, quoting *D'Amico,* 11 Cal.3d 1; *see also Boeing, supra,* 444 U.S. at 478 ("[A] lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole."); *Mills, supra,* 396 U.S. at 391-392 (United States Supreme Court endorsing the common fund approach in class actions)). California Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group) at § 17:172.3 explains the common fund doctrine as follows:

> Where the lawsuit results in the recovery of a fund or property benefiting others as well as plaintiff (e.g., a class action), the court has inherent equitable power to order plaintiffs attorney fees paid out of the common fund or property [citations]. Such fee spreading assures that all of those benefited by the litigation pay their fair share of obtaining the recovery.

The percentage-of-the-fund approach appears to be the preferred method of awarding fees in traditional common fund cases, such as this case. Where the settlement amount is a "certain or easily calculable sum of money," use of the percentage-of-the-fund method is appropriate. (*Serrano III,* 20 Cal. 3d at 35).

In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, 167, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 110-111, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common benefit doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share."

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Numerous appellate courts have similarly found. (*See e.g., Knoff v. City and County of San Francisco* (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 184, 203-204 (court upheld a "contingent percentage" award of attorneys' fees in a representative action as the proper exercise of the court's broad equitable powers); *Rider v. County of San Diego* (1992) 1 I Cal.App.4th 1410, 1423 (attorneys' fees and expenses properly awarded from common benefit composed of illegally imposed sales and use tax); *Bank of America v. Cory* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 66, 89-92 (fees awarded from common benefit created by action compelling state to claim dormant bank accounts)).

The Supreme Court noted that several courts have expressed frustration with the alternative "lodestar" approach for deciding fee awards, which usually involves wading through voluminous and often indecipherable time records. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 503; *see Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 31 n.5 citing *In re Activision Sec. Litig.* (N.D. Cal 1989) 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1375). The percentage approach is preferable to the lodestar because: (1) it aligns the interests of class counsel and absent class members; (2) it encourages efficient resolution of the litigation by providing an incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement; and (3) it reduces the demands on judicial resources. (*In re Activision Sec. Litig*., 723 F. Supp. at 1378-79). The Ninth Circuit now routinely uses the percentage of the common fund approach to determine the award of attorney's fees. (*Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 30-31).

A fee of thirty-five percent (35%) of the escalated Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., $117,947.55) is easily within the range of reasonableness. Historically, courts have awarded percentage fees in the range of 20% to 50%, depending on the circumstances of the case. (*See In re Activision Sec. Litig*., 723 F. Supp. at 1378). According to Professor Newberg: "No general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund…Usually 50 per cent of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund, in order to assure that fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, though somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented." (Newberg on Class Actions (4th Ed.), § 14.6). Class Counsel's requested fee is reasonable and falls well within the historical range of attorney's fee awards under the common fund theory. Based on Class Counsel's showing of reasonableness, the Court should approve the requested fees pursuant to the common fund approach.

B. The Circumstances of this Case Support a Thirty-Five Percent (35%) Fee Award

Given the significant results achieved under the circumstances of this litigation, the requested fee award is reasonable. As discussed in *Sumitomo Copper Litigation, supra,* 74 F. Supp. 2d at 396:

> No one expects a lawyer whose compensation is contingent on the success of his services to charge, when successful, as little as he would charge a client who in advance of the litigation has agreed to pay for his services, regardless of success. Nor, particularly in complicated cases producing large recoveries, is it just to make a fee depend solely on the reasonable amount of time expended.

In that vein, this Court should consider the contingent nature of this case, the uncertainty of the outcome, the quality of the counsel, and the preclusion from other employment.

C. The Contingent Nature of This Matter

From the outset of the Action to the present, prosecution of this matter has involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. Class Counsel has placed its own resources at risk to prosecute this matter with no guarantee of success. The risks of this matter are apparent in that class certification would likely have been a hard-fought issue, especially given the uncertainty regarding certification of cases such as this. Moreover, even if class certification were granted over Defendant's opposition, there was no assurance that Plaintiff would succeed at trial. (Rose Decl., ¶¶ 29-31). Despite such challenges, Class Counsel was able to persuade Defendant that it faced significant liability exposure.

D. The Experience, Reputation, Ability of Counsel, and Skill in Litigation

Class Counsel has substantial experience in wage-and-hour and other class action litigation, including litigation involving the legal issues in this matter. (Rose Decl., ¶¶ 36 and 37). Class Counsel's skill in developing a factual record and convincing Defendant of its litigation exposure under California law was essential to achieving the Settlement. Through its skill and reputation, Class Counsel was able to obtain a settlement that provides an outstanding result for Class Members. (*See generally* Rose Decl.).

E. The Results Achieved

The excellent results achieved by the Settlement support Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees. Class Members' support for the results achieved by Class Counsel is demonstrated by the absence of any objections to either the Class Settlement or to Class Counsel's request for fees, both of which were described clearly in the Notice Packet. As of the date of this Motion, Settlement Class Members will be paid, on average, approximately $255.19 each, which is intended to compensate them for the alleged wage and hour violations they suffered during their employment. (Rose Decl., ¶ 21). This is a significant benefit for the Settlement Class Members here as it represents a recovery for highly disputed claims. Equally important is the fact that the State of California will receive $11,250.00 for enforcement of labor laws and education of employers. (*Id*., ¶ 43).

Furthermore, the efficiency with which this litigation was conducted and resolved should be rewarded. After preparing and investigating the case prior to filing the Action, Class Counsel strongly litigated and then resolved the case in an efficient manner. The Class Members will directly benefit from the prompt and fair resolution of their claims. They will be receiving a significant award in a relatively short period of time, as opposed to waiting years to recover some undetermined amount if they succeeded at trial, which is an uncertainty in itself.

F. Preclusion of Other Employment

As California law recognizes, Class Counsel's commitment to this litigation should not be assessed in a vacuum. (*See Serrano, supra,* 20 Cal.3d at 49). A relevant factor in determining attorneys' fees is whether the litigation required Class Counsel to forego other employment. (*See ibid*). Class Counsel had to consider its workload during this litigation when considering taking on additional work that was available, and which Class Counsel had to forego in order to devote the time necessary to pursue this litigation. (Rose Decl., ¶ 35).

G. The Requested Fees Are Also Justified Under the Lodestar Method

Fee calculations under the lodestar method would result in a similar award, demonstrating the fairness of Class Counsel's percentage fee request. Under the lodestar method, a base fee amount is calculated from a compilation of time reasonably spent on the case and the reasonable hourly compensation of the attorney. The base amount is then adjusted by use of a multiplier in light of various factors. (*Serrano 111, supra,* 20 Cal.3d at 48). Class Counsel's hourly rates are summarized in the Rose Decl. at ¶¶ 36-37.

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One difficulty in determining the hourly rate of attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community is the scarcity of hourly fee-paying clients in class action litigation. (Rose Decl., ¶ 37). As a practical matter, few if any employees or consumers pay attorneys' fees on an hourly basis for such extensive litigation, and thus retainer agreements in such cases are based on a stepped-up contingency fee (with the percentage increasing from one third to forty-five – and sometimes even fifty percent, which is on par with personal injury contingency fee agreements – if the case goes to trial). (Ibid). Therefore, there is no customary hourly billing rate for work that is routinely based on a contingent fee relationship, but the nature of class action work should be strongly considered by the Court. (Ibid). Wage and hour work presents a specialized and challenging area of law that is not within the knowledge of many lawyers. (Ibid). This kind of class action work requires specialized learning and the willingness to take large risks. (Ibid).

Class Counsel has spent approximately 346.30 total hours litigating these claims to date.[2] (Rose Decl., ¶ 37). Class Counsel expects to spend another 10 hours in connection with the final approval process (including preparing for and attending the Final Approval Hearing, and managing the Settlement through its conclusion, including anticipated communications with defense counsel, the Settlement Administrator, our client, and Class Members). (*Id*., ¶ 38). In addition to time spent during litigation, reasonable hours also include the time spent before the Action was filed, including time spent interviewing the client, investigating the facts and the law, preparing the initial pleadings, as well as litigating the case. (*Webb v. Board of Educ.* (1985) 471 U.S. 234). Further, the fee award should include fees incurred to establish and defend the attorneys' fee claim. (*Serrano v. Priest* (1982) 32 Cal .3d 621, 639 ("*Serrano IV*")). Based on the rates of Class Counsel, the total fees incurred to date are $309,349. (Rose Decl., ¶ 37). By the conclusion of this matter, the total fees are estimated to be approximately $316,849. (*Id*., ¶ 38).

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[2] In *Martino v. Denevi* (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559, the court addressed the issue of what evidence is required in California to support a fee application. The court held: "Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records." *Id.* There is no need to attach the voluminous invoices prepared in a case as a basis for an award of fees and costs. *Id.* Through Class Counsel's declaration in support of this application, however, Plaintiff presents a thorough breakdown of the hours spent and costs incurred in prosecuting this class action. Pursuant to *Martino, supra,* this presentation is sufficient to support the amount requested.

In cases where a common fund analysis is not used, once the court establishes the lodestar amount, it should adjust the fee award by a multiplier in order to make an appropriate fee award. (*Serrano III, supra,* 20 Cal.3d at 48). In applying the multiplier, *Newberg on Class Actions* states that "[m]ultiples ranging from one to four frequently are awarded in common fund cases when the lodestar method is applied. A large common fund award may warrant an even larger multiplier." (4 *Newberg on Class Actions* 4th (4th ed. 2002) § 14.6). If the class members paid the fees that the market would bear, they would pay a fee of anywhere from one-third to forty-five percent of any recovery. Since this is the market rate, the lodestar calculation should be enhanced to reflect what the class members would pay on the open market. (*Lealao, supra,* 82 Cal.App.4th at 47-48).

In *Lealao,* the court held that trial courts should award lodestar fees by examining the percentage-of-the-benefit and adjusting the lodestar calculation accordingly. (*Id.* at 49 and 53). The court indicated that this is an upward adjustment and should be akin to a contingency fee recovery; the court stated, "[a]n adjustment reflecting the amount of the class recovery is not significantly different from an adjustment reflecting a percentage of that amount; and California courts have evaluated a lodestar as a percentage of the benefit." (*Id.* at 46). The *Lealao* method appears particularly appropriate because class actions generally are contingency fee cases for plaintiffs - and the class action clients do not expect to pay an hourly fee.

The rationale of *Lealao* comports with the purpose of the multiplier. The multiplier is "primarily to compensate the attorney for the prevailing party at a rate reflecting the risk of nonpayment in contingency cases." (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138). The *Lealao* court reasoned:

> Given the unique reliance of our legal system on private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law through class and derivative actions, attorneys providing the essential enforcement services must be provided incentives roughly comparable to those negotiated in the private bargaining that takes place in the legal marketplace, as it will otherwise be economic for defendants to increase injurious behavior. It has therefore been urged (most persistently by Judge Richard Posner) that in defining a reasonable fee in such representative actions, the law should mimic the market.
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> In the class action context, that would mean attempting to award the fee that informed private bargaining, if it were truly possible, might have reached. The simplest way for the law to duplicate the bargain that informed parties would reach if agency costs were low is to look to fee award levels in actions

> brought by sophisticated private parties under the same or comparable statutes.

(*Lealao,* 82 Cal.App.4th at 47-48 (internal citations and quotations omitted)). The court added:

> [T]rial judges need the flexibility *Serrano III* provides, as it enables them to relate fee awards to the economic realities that determine the efficacy of the private enforcement contemplated by our civil justice system. Accordingly, we hold that, in cases in which the value of the class recovery can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty and it is not otherwise inappropriate, a trial court has discretion to adjust the basic lodestar through the application of a positive or negative multiplier where necessary to ensure that the fee awarded is within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.

(*Id.* at 49-50).

In looking at similar cases, including those set forth above, Class Counsel's requested fee comports to the market. Based on the reasonable hourly rates suggested by Class Counsel and the collective hours worked in this matter, the requested fee award would represent a negative multiplier of the current total fee lodestar. In this regard, Class Counsel's fee request is reasonable.

H. No Class Member Objected to the Requested Attorneys' Fee Award

Class Counsel's intention to request the Court's approval for payment of attorneys' fees was clearly disclosed to each Class Member in the Court-approved Notice Packet. (Rose Decl., ¶ 40; *See also,* ILYM Decl., Exh. A). As of the filing of this Motion, there has not been a single objection to the request for attorneys' fees. (ILYM Decl., ¶ 10). It is fair to conclude that the Class approves of/does not take issue with the requested award of attorneys' fees. Based thereon, Class Counsel's request for thirty-five percent (35%) of the escalated Gross Settlement Amount, equaling One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars and Fifty-Five Cents ($117,947.55), should be granted.

I. Plaintiff's Cost Request is Reasonable

Class Counsel seeks reimbursement of a total amount of Twenty-Two Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Five Dollars and Forty Cents ($22,165.40) in costs and expenses in this matter, which includes reasonable future costs for filing the Motion. (Rose Decl., ¶ 39 and Exh. 4). All costs and expenses were reasonably incurred in prosecution of this matter.

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VIII. THE REQUESTED SERVICE AWARD TO PLAINTIFF IS REASONABLE

The named Plaintiff should be awarded a Service Award in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($5,000.00) for his services as the Class Representative and the risks in connection with that role. (Rose Decl., ¶ 41). Enhancement awards in wage and hour cases typically range from $5,000.00 to $20,000.00, although some awards are higher. (Ibid). Often, multiple class representatives receive awards in the above range. (*See e.g.*, *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412 [approving an enhancement request of $10,000.00 per named plaintiff in a 188 member class]; *Cook v. Niedert*, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998); *Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight*, 497 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1974) ["We also think there is something to be said for rewarding those drivers who protect and help to bring rights to a group of employees who have been the victims of discrimination."]). Here, the requested Service Payment is modest, reasonable, and should be approved.

Plaintiff's actions establish that: (1) he sought to protect the interests of the Class above his own personal interests; (2) the Settlement Class Members will be benefitted from his actions by receiving a payment without having to do anything; and (3) Plaintiff has put forth a significant amount of time and effort pursuing the litigation and seeing it through to resolution. (*See*, generally, Rivas Decl.; *see also Clark v. American Residential Services LLC* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804 (discussing the criteria for determining class representative enhancement awards in concluding that a requested award of $25,000 for two class representatives was too high)).

The requested award for Plaintiff is also reasonable given the financial and personal risk he took in commencing the Action, and in light of the benefits that his actions have conferred upon the Class. (Rivas Decl., ¶ 7; *See also Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co.* (N.D.Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294, 299-300). Additionally, in considering a requested class representative enhancement award, courts take into consideration a plaintiff's reasonable fear of retaliation. (*Staton v. Boeing Co*. (9th Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 977). Here, it is easy to see that a potential future employer could expend little effort to discover Plaintiff brought the lawsuit – and based thereon, decline to offer Plaintiff employment.

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In sum, Plaintiff has performed considerable services on behalf of the Class during the litigation. (*See*, generally, Rivas Decl.). Class Counsel cannot understate the importance of the role of an employee who is willing to search out an attorney and step forward to assume the risk of litigation and retaliation in order to represent a class and put the interests of the class before their own interests. Plaintiff has understood that this is a class action where he is serving as the Class Representative and must protect the Class Members' interests. (*Id.*, ¶ 10). Plaintiff was the catalyst to the benefit reached for the Class Members, and has actively protected the Class Members' interests during the pendency of this matter and will continue to do so even if the case was required to go to trial. (Ibid). Plaintiff spent numerous hours participating in this matter by searching for an attorney, communicating with his attorneys on numerous occasions, searching for and producing relevant documents related to his employment, responding to his attorneys' inquiries, reviewing the settlement documents, and approving the Settlement on behalf of all Class Members. (*See*, generally, Rivas Decl.).

In contrast, without having to take on any of the risk incurred by Plaintiff or time spent by Plaintiff in litigating this matter, Settlement Class Members will automatically be issued a payment for their claims. It appears that the Settlement Class Members recognize this enhancement was justified because since the time the Class received notice of the requested Service Award, no one has objected to the request. Thus, the Service Award to Plaintiff is warranted to compensate him for his time and effort, the fear and stress associated with assuming the responsibility of serving as the Class Representative, and the concrete risks he assumed as the Class Representative.

IX. THE REQUESTED ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES ARE REASONABLE

In Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval, Plaintiff requested, and the Court approved, Administration Expenses not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($10,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 42). ILYM Group, Inc. is the approved Settlement Administrator. (Ibid). It is an experienced class administrator and has adequately performed the administration tasks required by the Preliminary Approval Order. ILYM's *actual* costs to administer the Settlement are only Eight Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents ($8,450.00). (ILYM Decl., ¶ 16 and Exh. B). Based thereon, the requested costs should be approved.

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X. THE PROPOSED LWDA ALLOCATION IS REASONABLE

Pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2699(s)(1), the Superior Court shall review and approve the settlement of penalties sought under that California Labor Code Section. (Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(s)(1)). For all of the reasons stated above, the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and should be approved. As part of the Settlement, Defendant has agreed to pay Fifteen Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents ($15,000.00) to settle the claims of the PAGA Members brought pursuant to PAGA, of which the payment of Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents ($11,250.00) (75% of the PAGA Payment) will be paid to the LDWA for education and enforcement purposes. (Rose Decl., ¶ 43).

It is extremely common in approved wage and hour class action cases that settle that only a small portion of the total settlement is paid to PAGA penalties "in order to maximize payments to class members." (*Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs*. (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2019, No. 17-CV-00062-LHK) 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91732, *90-91, citing as examples *Ceja-Corona v. CVS Pharm., Inc*. (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2015) 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5118, 2015 WL 222500, at *2-3 [preliminarily approving $10,000 in PAGA penalties out of a total settlement amount of $900,000]; *Thio v. Genji, LLC* (N.D. Cal. 2014) 14 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1330 [preliminarily approving $10,000 in PAGA penalties out of a total settlement amount of $1,250,000]; *Franco v. Ruiz Food Prods*. (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2012) 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169057, 2012 WL 5941801, at *14 [granting final approval of $10,000 in PAGA penalties out of a total settlement amount of $2,500,000]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160052, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [granting final approval of $10,000 in PAGA penalties out of a total settlement amount of $3,700,000]; *Chu v. Wells Fargo Invs., LLC* (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15821, 2011 WL 672645, at *1 [granting final approval of $10,000 in PAGA penalties out of a total settlement amount of $6,900,000]). Like here, in these approved settlements, the parties generally maximized statutory penalties and minimized PAGA penalties to focus on claims to the class members, the persons who actually suffered the California Labor Code violations. (Rose Decl., ¶ 44).

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XI. THE CLASS RECEIVED THE BEST PRACTICABLE NOTICE

California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate notice program. (*See* California Civil Code § 1781; *Cartt v. Superior Court* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74). To protect the rights of absent class members, the parties must provide class members with the best notice practicable of a potential class action settlement. (*Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts* (1985) 472 U.S. 797, 811-12; *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin* (1974) 417 U.S. 156, 174-76 [individual notice must be sent to all class members who can be identified through reasonable efforts]; *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Garretson Company* (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314 [best practicable notice is that which is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections"]). The content and method of the notice should be designed to apprise the class members of the terms of the proposed settlement and of the class members' rights regarding the settlement. (*See Mullane*, *supra*, 339 U.S. at 314; *Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.* (E.D. Pa. 1970) 323 F. Supp. 364, 378).

The Notice Packet approved by the Court met these requirements: it identified the Parties and described the Action, the Class, the escalated Gross Settlement Amount, the proposed method for distribution of the escalated Gross Settlement Amount, the amounts proposed to be paid as the Service Award to Plaintiff, the Administration Expenses to the Settlement Administrator, and the Attorneys' Fees and Attorneys' Expenses to Class Counsel. (Rose Decl., ¶ 45; *see also* ILYM Decl., Exh. A thereto). The Notice Packet described the proposed Settlement with enough specificity to allow each Class Member to make an informed choice whether to accept and participate in it. (Ibid). It also explained how and when Class Members may object to or opt out of the Class Settlement. (Ibid). Finally, the Notice Packet provided the date for the hearing on final approval of the Settlement and informed Class Members how to obtain additional information about the Settlement. (Ibid).

XII. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement, and approve: (1) the requested attorneys' fees to Class Counsel of $117,947.55; (2) the requested reimbursement of actual costs and expenses to Class Counsel of $22,165.40; (3) the requested Service Award to Plaintiff of $5,000.00; and (4) the requested Administration Expenses to the Settlement Administrator of $8,450.00; and permit the filing of a memorandum that exceeds the page limit.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: April 6, 2026

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

By: ______________________________

Alexandra Rose
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and the Class