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13 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

14 **FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

15 DAVID NGUYEN, an aggrieved employee,  
16 CZARMAN LUCEA, an aggrieved employee,  
17 and on behalf of other aggrieved employees;

18 Plaintiff,

19 vs.

20 BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION,  
21 a Delaware corporation; KELLY SERVICES  
22 GLOBAL, LLC, a Michigan limited liability  
company; and DOES 1 through 50,

23 Defendants.

Case No.: 30-2023-01358073-CU-OE-CXC

[Assigned for All Purposes to:  
Hon. Melissa R. McCormick, Dept. CX105]

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION  
AND MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF  
PAGA SETTLEMENT; SERVICE  
AWARDS; AND ATTORNEY'S FEES  
AND COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF  
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

(Filed Concurrently with Supporting  
Declarations and [Proposed] Judgment and  
Order)

DATE: August 20, 2026

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

DEPT: CX105

RESERVATION ID: 74850803

Action Filed: October 30, 2023

Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE COURT, AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 20, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. in Department CX105 of  
3 the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Orange at 751 W. Santa Ana Blvd.,  
4 Santa Ana, CA 92701, Plaintiffs David Nguyen and Czarman Lucea (“Plaintiffs”) will move the  
5 Court, pursuant to California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), Labor Code §§ 2698, *et*  
6 *seq.*, for an Order:

7 1. Approving the settlement of this PAGA representative action in the form agreed to  
8 by Plaintiffs, and Defendants Baxter Healthcare Corporation (“Baxter”) and Kelly Global Services,  
9 LLC (“Kelly”; collectively, “Defendants”) in the PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement”  
10 or “Agreement”);

11 2. Appointing Plaintiffs’ counsel as PAGA counsel, for settlement purposes only, and  
12 approving an award to Plaintiffs’ counsel for reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of  
13 \$140,000.00, broken down as \$70,000.00 to Justice for Workers, P.C. and \$70,000.00 to  
14 Otkupman Law Firm; and reasonable costs in the amount of \$22,415.50, broken down as  
15 \$11,467.35 to Justice for Workers, P.C. and \$10,948.15 to Otkupman Law Firm;

16 3. Appointing CPT Group as the Administrator, and approving payment of  
17 Administrator’s costs in the amount of \$8,500.00;

18 4. Approving service awards for Plaintiffs in the amount of \$5,000.00 each, totaling  
19 \$10,000.00;

20 5. Approving the release of PAGA claims by Plaintiffs on behalf of Aggrieved  
21 Employees and the LWDA;

22 6. Directing consummation of the Settlement pursuant to its terms and provisions;

23 7. Entering final Judgment;

24 8. Setting a Non-Appearence Case Review Hearing Regarding Distribution; and

25 9. Without affecting the finality of the Judgment and Order, reserving exclusive and  
26 continuing jurisdiction over the Actions, the Parties, and the Aggrieved Employees for purposes of  
27 interpreting and enforcing the terms, conditions, and obligations of the Settlement pursuant to  
28 California Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

1 This Motion will be based upon this notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and  
2 Authorities, Declarations of William C. Sung, Roman Otkupman, Nidah Farishta, David Nguyen,  
3 Czarman Lucea, Julie Green of CPT Group, Yesenia Gallegos of McDermott Will & Schulte LLP  
4 on behalf of Baxter, Jennifer A. Riley of Duane Morris, LLP on behalf of Kelly, and exhibits  
5 thereto that were filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other  
6 further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

7  
8 DATED: May 13, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

9 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

10  
11 By: 

12 William C. Sung  
13 Tiffany L. Luu  
14 Attorneys for Plaintiff DAVID NGUYEN

15 DATED: May 13, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

16 **OTKUPMAN LAW FIRM**

17  
18 By: 

19 Roman Otkupman  
20 Nidah Farishta  
21 Attorneys for Plaintiff CZARMAN LUCEA  
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 This Motion seeks Court approval of the settlement of this California Private Attorneys  
4 General Act, Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”) representative action brought by David  
5 Nguyen and Czarman Lucea (“Plaintiffs”) against Defendants Baxter Healthcare Corporation  
6 (“Baxter”) and Kelly Services Global, LLC (“Kelly”; collectively, “Defendants”). After a full day  
7 of global mediation with experienced neutral mediator Steven Pearl, Esq. and months-long, post-  
8 mediation negotiations, the Parties reached a settlement and thereafter executed a PAGA Settlement  
9 Agreement (the “Settlement” or “Agreement”)<sup>1</sup>.

10 The Settlement calls for a Gross Settlement Amount of \$420,000.00. After deducting  
11 Plaintiffs’ counsel’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs awards, service awards for Plaintiffs, and  
12 payment for the Administrator’s cost, approximately \$179,313.38 in civil penalties will be paid to  
13 the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (the “LWDA”) and \$59,771.13 in civil  
14 penalties will be paid to approximately 536 Aggrieved Employees. The average approximate share  
15 of the settlement paid to Aggrieved Employees is \$111.51. Pursuant to Labor Code section  
16 2699(s)(2), Plaintiff Nguyen now files this unopposed motion, seeking an order approving the  
17 proposed Settlement.

18 The settlement of a PAGA claim requires court approval pursuant to the operative PAGA  
19 statute, which states that the “court shall review and approve any penalties sought as part of a  
20 proposed settlement agreement pursuant to this part.” Lab. Code § 2699(s)(2). In deciding whether  
21 to grant approval of a proposed settlement, the primary issues to be decided is whether the  
22 settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Villalobos v. Calandri Sonrise Farm LP* (C.D. Cal.,  
23 July 22, 2015, No. CV 12-2615 PSG (JEMx)) 2015 WL 12732709, at \*5; *see also O’Connor v.*  
24 *Uber Technologies, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135.

25 ///

26  
27  
28 <sup>1</sup> A true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Declaration of William C. Sung in Support of Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement (“Sung Decl.”). All defined terms in this Motion have the same definition as that in the Agreement. The Explanatory Letter is attached as **Exhibit A** to the Agreement.

As set forth herein, the proposed Settlement embodies all the features of a settlement that is fair, adequate, and reasonable, as it is the product of (1) an arms-length negotiation, (2) negotiated by attorneys experienced in wage and hour issues, (3) subsequent to undertaking sufficient investigation necessary to evaluate the relative strength and value of the PAGA claim, and (4) reflects a reasoned compromise based directly on the relative strength and value of the PAGA claims, as well as the risks, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation.

## **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

### **A. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

Defendant Baxter operates medical device manufacturing facilities in California and Defendant Kelly is a staffing agency. Sung Decl., ¶ 8. Defendant Kelly placed Plaintiff Nguyen to work for Defendant Baxter as an hourly paid, non-exempt employee from approximately February 2023 to August 2023 as an assembler at its Irvine facility. Declaration of David Nguyen ("Nguyen Decl."), ¶ 2. Defendant Baxter directly employed Plaintiff Lucea from approximately November 2020 to January 2024 as a delivery driver at its Dixon facility. Declaration of Czarman Lucea ("Lucea Decl."), ¶ 2. Plaintiffs contend they and their coworkers were subjected to the same alleged unlawful labor practices during their employment. Nguyen Decl., ¶ 2; Lucea Decl., ¶¶ 3-8.

On August 25, 2023 and October 3, 2023, Plaintiff Nguyen submitted the LWDA Letter and Amended LWDA Letter of alleged Labor Code violations to Defendants and the LWDA. Sung Decl., ¶ 9, **Exh. 2** – LWDA Letter, **Exh. 3** – Amended LWDA Letter. Plaintiff Nguyen's administrative exhaustion period expired without the LWDA indicating its intent to investigate the allegations. *Ibid.* On October 30, 2023, Plaintiff Nguyen filed the Representative Action Complaint alleging a single cause of action for Violation of the California Private Attorneys General Act. *Ibid.*

On May 31, 2024, the Court granted Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and ordered Plaintiff Nguyen to arbitrate his individual claims, dismiss class claims, and stay PAGA claim pending individual arbitration. Sung Decl., ¶ 10. Thereafter, Plaintiff Nguyen filed a Demand for Arbitration against Defendants with AAA, Case No. 01-24-0008-1468-2-RJ. Sung Decl., ¶ 11.

On March 22, 2024, Plaintiff Lucea submitted a letter of alleged Labor Code violations to Defendants and the LWDA. Declaration of Roman Otkupman ("Otkupman Decl."), ¶ 12, **Exh. 1** –

1 *Lucea* PAGA Letter. Plaintiff Lucea’s administrative exhaustion period expired without the LWDA  
2 indicating its intent to investigate the allegations. *Ibid.*

3 On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff Lucea filed a class and PAGA complaint in Solano County  
4 Superior Court, Case No. CU24-04170 (the “*Lucea* Action”; collectively, with this Action, the  
5 “Actions”), against Defendant Baxter alleging the following causes of action: (1) failure to provide  
6 meal periods; (2) failure to provide rest periods; (3) failure to pay all wages; (4) knowing and  
7 intentional failure to comply with itemized employee wage statement provisions; (5) failure to  
8 timely pay wages due at termination; (6) failure to timely pay employees; (7) failure to reimburse  
9 for business expenses; (8) failure to pay for all hours worked, including overtime hours worked; (9)  
10 violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; and (10) civil penalties pursuant to  
11 PAGA. Otkupman Decl., ¶ 13.

12 After the Parties agreed to a global settlement and executed the Agreement, the Parties  
13 stipulated to, and the Court granted on March 18, 2026, consolidation of the Actions. Sung Decl., ¶  
14 12. On Mach 19, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint which consolidated  
15 the Action (“Complaint). *Id.*, **Exh. 4** – Complaint.

#### 16 **B. DISCOVERY, INVESTIGATION, AND MEDIATION**

17 Prior to mediation, the Parties engaged in informal discovery, which allowed the Parties to  
18 meaningfully mediate this matter. Sung Decl., ¶ 13; Otkupman Decl., ¶ 14. Specifically, Defendants  
19 produced: (1) PAGA demographics including the number of direct-hire and staffing agency  
20 Aggrieved Employees and breakdown of PAGA Pay Periods; (2) time and payroll records for a  
21 20% random sampling of Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period; (3) Defendants’  
22 employee handbooks and standalone policies and procedures; and (4) Plaintiffs’ personnel records  
23 and wage statements. *Ibid.*

24 Plaintiffs’ counsel retained and worked with an expert data scientist with prior class action  
25 litigation experience, AttorneyTalk, to analyze and review the documents regarding Defendants’  
26 wage and hour policies and practices, Aggrieved Employees’ time and pay records, and other  
27 information provided by Defendants and Plaintiffs. Sung Decl., ¶ 14. Plaintiffs’ counsel were able  
28 to evaluate the probability of success on the merits and Defendants’ maximum and risk-adjusted

1 monetary exposure and prepare a damage analysis prior to mediation. *Ibid.* The time and pay  
2 records of a sampling of Aggrieved Employees allowed Plaintiffs' counsel and their expert to  
3 prepare an analysis with a high degree of certainty. *Ibid.* In conjunction with their extensive factual  
4 investigation, Plaintiffs' counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and  
5 defenses asserted in the litigation. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel's familiarity with the  
6 facts of the case and the legal issues raised by the pleadings allowed them to act intelligently in  
7 negotiating the Settlement. *Ibid.*

8         On May 1, 2025, the Parties participated in private mediation before Steven Pearl, Esq., an  
9 experienced, neutral, class action and PAGA mediator. Sung Decl., ¶ 15; Otkupman Decl., ¶ 15.  
10 The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner,  
11 were adversarial. *Ibid.* The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a  
12 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and  
13 appeal if a settlement had not been reached. *Ibid.*

14         The Parties did not reach a settlement at mediation on May 1, 2025. Sung Decl., ¶ 16;  
15 Otkupman Decl., ¶ 15. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and  
16 weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses, the Parties eventually reached a  
17 settlement of the Actions on June 26, 2025, the material terms of which are encompassed within the  
18 Settlement. *Ibid.*

### 19         **C.       KEY TERMS OF THE PROPOSED PAGA SETTLEMENT**

20         The Settlement covers all current and former California hourly or non-exempt direct-hire  
21 employees employed by Baxter, or staffing employees employed by Defendant Kelly and staffed at  
22 Defendant Baxter during the PAGA Period. Agreement, § I.2. The PAGA Period is August 25,  
23 2022, through the approval of the Settlement or August 26, 2026, whichever date is earlier.  
24 Agreement, § I.11. The Agreement provides an Escalator Clause up to 32,241 Pay Periods and, if  
25 the number of Pay Periods exceeds 32,241 by more than 11% (i.e., more than 35,788 Pay Periods),  
26 Defendants may elect to proportionally increase the Gross Settlement Amount or adjust the PAGA  
27 Period end date so the number of Pay Periods stay within 35,788 Pay Periods. Agreement, § III.3.  
28 Defendants shall verify the number of Pay Periods and make its election, if applicable, no later than

1 30 days prior to the hearing on this Motion. *Ibid.*

2 The Gross Settlement Amount of the Settlement is \$420,000.00. Agreement, § I.8. Plaintiffs  
3 seek attorney's fees of \$140,00.00 (33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount). Agreement, § III.4.a.  
4 Plaintiffs' litigation costs are approximately \$22,415.50, including estimated future costs in filing  
5 this Motion and supporting papers (\$77.97), supplemental filings for this Motion (\$77.97), and  
6 filing of the Administrator's declaration of compliance (\$13.66). Sung Decl., ¶ 17; **Exh. 5** – *Nguyen*  
7 Itemized Costs; Otkupman Decl., ¶ 25, **Exh. 3** – *Lucea* Itemized Costs.

8 The Administrator will be paid administration costs not to exceed \$8,500.00. Agreement, §  
9 III.4.b. The Parties jointly selected CPT Group as the neutral entity to administer this Settlement  
10 based on its bid of \$8,500.00. Sung Decl., ¶ 18; *see also* Declaration of Julie Green of CPT Group  
11 ("Admin. Decl."), ¶ 8, **Exh. B** – Administrator Bid.

12 The Settlement provides for service awards for Plaintiffs in the amount of \$5,000.00 each,  
13 totaling \$10,000.00, for their service to the LWDA and the Aggrieved Employees and the risk they  
14 undertook by attaching their names to this Action, plus Individual PAGA Payments that Plaintiffs  
15 are entitled to receive as Aggrieved Employees. Agreement, § III.4.c. Based on the number of Pay  
16 Periods worked during the PAGA Period, Plaintiff Nguyen is estimated to receive approximately  
17 \$51.91 in Individual PAGA Payment and Plaintiff Lucea is estimated to receive \$66.74 in  
18 Individual PAGA Payment. Sung Decl., ¶ 19. Via separate settlement agreements, the Parties have  
19 settled each Plaintiff's individual, non-PAGA wage and hour claims, along with a general release of  
20 all claims and waiver of Code of Civil Procedure § 1152, for \$15,000.00 each. *Ibid.*

21 After deducting Plaintiffs' counsel's attorney's fee and cost awards, service awards for  
22 Plaintiffs, and payment to the Administrator, in the amounts approved by the Court, the remainder,  
23 called the Net Settlement Amount, will be distributed as 75% to the LWDA and 25% to Aggrieved  
24 Employees. Agreement, §§ I.9.; III.5. The amount estimated in the Net Settlement Amount for the  
25 LWDA payment and the Aggrieved Employee payment is **\$239,084.50**. Sung Decl., ¶ 20  
26 Accordingly, approximately **\$59,771.13** (25% of the Net Settlement Amount) will be paid to the  
27 estimated 536 Aggrieved Employees on a pro-rata basis based on the number of pay periods each  
28 Aggrieved Employee worked during the PAGA Period, and the raw average payment to Aggrieved

1 Employees is estimated at **\$111.51**. *Ibid.* All Individual PAGA Payments will be classified as 1099  
2 payments. Agreement, § IV.3.

3 Defendants will fund the Gross Settlement Amount within 15 business days of the Effective  
4 Date, which is the date that the Court enters a final order and judgment approving the Settlement.  
5 Agreement, §§ I.5; III.2. Within 15 calendar days of the Effective Date, Defendants will provide the  
6 Administrator with a PAGA list of all Aggrieved Employees, including their full name, last known  
7 mailing address, social security number, and number of Pay Periods worked during the PAGA  
8 Period or dates of employment. Agreement, § IV.2. Upon receipt of the PAGA list, the  
9 Administrator will perform a search on the National Change of Address database to update the  
10 Aggrieved Employees' addresses. Agreement, § IV.3. Within 15 calendar days of the Settlement  
11 being fully funded, the Administrator will mail copies of the Explanatory Letter, attached as  
12 **Exhibit A** to the Agreement, and translated into Spanish, along with Individual PAGA Payments to  
13 all Aggrieved Employees; and distribute the 75% share of PAGA penalties to the LWDA, court-  
14 approved attorney's fees and cost awards to Plaintiffs' counsel, court-approved service awards to  
15 Plaintiff, and court-approval administration costs to itself. Agreement, §§ IV.3., IV.5.

16 Any checks for Individual PAGA Payments returned as non-deliverable will be remailed to  
17 the forwarding address affixed thereto or address obtained through skip-tracing. Agreement, § IV.4.  
18 Funds represented by checks returned as undeliverable after a re-mailing, and funds represented by  
19 checks remaining un-cashed for more than 180 days after issuance, will be tendered to the State  
20 Controller's Office under the unclaimed property fund laws in the names of the Aggrieved  
21 Employees to whom the checks were issued. *Ibid.*

22 Upon entry of an Order approving the Settlement and full payment by Defendants of the  
23 Gross Settlement Amount, all Aggrieved Employees, including Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves  
24 and their respective former and current representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators,  
25 successors, and assigns, and the State of California, will release any and all PAGA Released Claims  
26 (defined as "all claims for PAGA civil penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been  
27 alleged based on any of the facts stated in the Complaint or any of the LWDA Letters") against the  
28 Released Parties (defined as "Defendants Baxter Healthcare Corporation and Kelly Services Global,

1 LLC, and Kelly Services, Inc. and any of their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, predecessors or  
2 successors, and any and all of their agents, employees, officers, directors, and attorneys”) that relate  
3 to or arose during the PAGA Period. Agreement, §§ I.12; I.17; III.6.

### 4 **III. DISCUSSION**

#### 5 **A. AVAILABILITY OF CIVIL PENALTIES**

6 The LWDA and its constituent departments and divisions are authorized to assess and  
7 collect civil penalties for specified violations of the Labor Code committed by an employer. With a  
8 stated goal of improving enforcement of existing Labor Code obligations, the California Legislature  
9 adopted PAGA, permitting, as an alternative, an aggrieved employee to initiate a private civil action  
10 “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees . . .” Lab. Code § 2699(a).  
11 The penalties collected in these private civil actions are to be distributed 75 percent to the LWDA  
12 and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees. Lab. Code, § 2699(m). However, before an employee  
13 may file an action seeking to recover civil penalties, he or she must comply with the Act’s  
14 administrative procedures as set forth in Labor Code § 2699.3(a), which include providing notice to  
15 the LWDA and the employer of the alleged Labor Code violations, and then waiting a prescribed  
16 period of time. *Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 370; *see*  
17 *also Dunlap v. Superior Court* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 330.

18 Here, in compliance with Labor Code section 2699.3, Plaintiffs provided notice to the  
19 LWDA and Defendants on August 25, 2023, October 3, 2023, and March 22, 2024. Sung Decl., ¶ 9;  
20 Otkupman Decl., ¶ 12. Plaintiffs’ administrative exhaustion periods expired without the LWDA  
21 indicating its intent to investigate the allegations. *Ibid*.

#### 22 **B. THE SETTLEMENT WARRANTS APPROVAL**

23 Settlement of PAGA claims must be approved by a Court. Lab. Code § 2699(s)(2). Here, the  
24 circumstances weigh heavily in favor of approval, as explained below.

##### 25 **1. The Relief is Genuine, Meaningful, and Consistent with the Underlying** 26 **Purpose of the Statute to Benefit the Public**

27 Plaintiffs’ counsel have conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Sung  
28 Decl., ¶ 21; Otkupman Decl., ¶¶ 10-11, 14, 16-18. Based on the foregoing discovery and on their

1 own independent investigation and evaluation, Plaintiffs’ counsel is of the opinion that the  
2 Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. *Ibid.* Furthermore, considering all known facts and  
3 circumstances, the risk of significant delay, trial risk, appellate risk, the defenses that could be  
4 asserted by Defendants on the merits, the Settlement is in the best interests of the Aggrieved  
5 Employees and the State. *Ibid.* The Settlement avoids the risks, burdens, and the accompanying  
6 expense of further litigation. *Ibid.*

7       Based on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s analysis of the time and payroll records provided by  
8 Defendants and on information from Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ counsel evaluated Defendants’ maximum  
9 and risk-adjusted potential exposure. Sung Decl., ¶ 22. Based on Defendants’ disclosures, there  
10 were approximately 536 Aggrieved Employees who collectively worked approximately 32,241 pay  
11 periods. *Ibid.*

12       Plaintiffs’ assessment of potential recovery of PAGA penalties in this Motion is limited to  
13 \$100 initial penalties because, to Plaintiffs’ knowledge, Defendants have not been subject to any  
14 prior court judgments or Labor Commissioner order placing it on notice of any violation pertaining  
15 to the claims Plaintiffs asserted and the heightened subsequent violation penalty should not apply.  
16 Sung Decl., ¶ 23; *see* Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2)(B). Plaintiffs’ counsel’s valuation of each theory of  
17 liability is set forth below.

18       As to all claims, Defendants argue the Court will exercise its discretion to reduce PAGA  
19 penalties. Sung Decl., ¶ 24; Otkupman Decl., ¶ 17. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(e)(2), the Court  
20 can decline to award the full amount of PAGA penalties where “. . . if, based on the facts and  
21 circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise, would result in an award that is unjust,  
22 arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” Indeed, courts have affirmed the reduction of PAGA  
23 penalties in the past. As shown in *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 517,  
24 the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s reduction of PAGA penalties by 90%, citing the  
25 employer’s good-faith attempt at complying with the law. *See also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit*  
26 *Mgmt., Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 (affirming reduction of PAGA penalties); *Fleming*  
27 *v. Covidien Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 WL 7563047, at \*4  
28 (reducing PAGA penalties by over 82% in part because employer “not aware” of violations). Here,

1 Defendants argue that based on their compliant policies and practices, their defenses on Plaintiffs’  
2 theories of liability on the merits, and the hyper technical nature of the regular rate and rounding  
3 claims, the Court will significantly reduce any award of PAGA penalties based on its good-faith  
4 compliance with the Labor Code. Sung Decl., ¶ 24.

5 Unpaid Wages Due to Rounding and Regular Rate Violations. Plaintiffs alleged Defendants  
6 failed to pay all minimum and overtime wages due to unlawful rounding of employee time punches.  
7 Sung Decl., ¶ 25. Plaintiffs’ expert found minimum wage violations in 9.79% of pay periods due to  
8 Defendants’ rounding practice. *Ibid.* Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants failed to factor in all  
9 non-discretionary renumeration into the regular rate of pay. *Ibid.* Plaintiffs’ expert found overtime  
10 violations in 12.05% of pay periods due to Defendants’ rounding and regular rate practices and  
11 8.25% of pay periods had a paid sick leave violation arising from regular rate issues. *Ibid.* Based on  
12 the expert’s analysis and extrapolating the violation rates, Plaintiffs estimated Defendants’  
13 maximum liability for civil penalties are \$315,540.77 for minimum wage violations, \$194,291.37  
14 for overtime violations, and \$266,124.35 for paid sick leave violations. *Ibid.*

15 In response, Defendants argued their rounding policies/practices were lawful, since it was  
16 both neutral on its face and resulted, over time, in employees being paid for all hours worked. Sung  
17 Decl., ¶ 26. Defendants also contended that multiple Courts of Appeal have found rounding  
18 mechanisms to be lawful under similar circumstances. *Ibid*; see, e.g., *Ferra v. Loews Hollywood*  
19 *Hotel, LLC* (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1254; *AHMC Healthcare, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2018) 24  
20 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1028. As to the regular rate theory, Defendants argued it properly factored most  
21 incentives into the regular rate and vigorously opposed any regular rate liability. Sung Decl., ¶ 26.  
22 Defendants further argued that, even if there were underpayment of wages as a result of their  
23 rounding and regular rate practices, any underpayment were “dollars and cents,” significantly  
24 disproportionate to their penalty exposure, and the Court will dramatically reduce penalties as a  
25 result. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiffs discounted Defendants’ maximum exposure by 50% to account for the  
26 risk of the Court reducing penalties and the risk of being unsuccessful on the merits or failure to  
27 recover the full amount sought, to arrive at a realistic exposure of **\$157,770.38** for minimum wage  
28 violations, **\$97,109.69** for overtime violations, and **\$133,062.17** for paid sick leave violations. *Ibid.*

1        Meal Period Violations. Plaintiffs alleges that they and other employees sometimes did not  
2 receive compliant meal breaks. Sung Decl., ¶ 27. Plaintiffs’ expert analyzed the records and found a  
3 net 24.42% violation rate by pay periods after applying meal period premiums (i.e., 24.42% of pay  
4 periods had one or more shifts without compliant meal period punches). *Ibid.* Plaintiffs’ expert  
5 estimated Defendants’ maximum exposure for regular violations to be approximately \$787,391.62.  
6 *Ibid.* In response and in addition to the penalty reduction defense, Defendants countered that they  
7 have maintained compliant meal period policies and practices throughout the PAGA Period and  
8 always provided compliant meal periods in line with those policies. *Ibid*; see *Brinker Rest. Corp. v.*  
9 *Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1040-1041 (holding employers need only “provide” meal  
10 periods to employees and are not obligated to “police” meal periods). Defendants point to the fact  
11 that the sampling time records showed superior meal period compliance rate (Plaintiffs’ expert  
12 found only 17% of shifts had a facial meal period violations) and that it paid approximately over  
13 4,300 meal period premiums as evidence of its superior meal period compliance practices. *Ibid.* As  
14 such, Defendants maintained Plaintiffs’ meal period claim is unmanageable since individual  
15 inquiries would be needed to assess which employees, if any, took non-compliant meal periods,  
16 how many meal periods were non-compliant, and the reasons why a particular employee did not  
17 take a meal period on a particular shift and a meal period premium was not paid. *Ibid.* Thus,  
18 Plaintiffs discounted Defendants’ maximum exposure by 80% to account for the risk of the Court  
19 reducing penalties and the risk of being unsuccessful on the merits or failure to recover the full  
20 amount sought, to arrive at a realistic exposure of **\$157,478.32**. *Ibid.*

21        Rest Period Violations. Plaintiffs allege that they and other employees sometimes were  
22 unable to take their rest breaks. Sung Decl., ¶ 28. Any rest period violations would not be reflected  
23 in the time or payroll records. *Ibid.* Estimating that Aggrieved Employees did not receive compliant  
24 rest breaks in approximately 20% of pay periods, Plaintiffs’ expert estimates Defendants’ maximum  
25 penalty exposure for rest period violations to be approximately \$644,820.00. *Ibid.* In response,  
26 Defendants counter that they have maintained compliant rest period policies and practices  
27 throughout the PAGA Period and always provided compliant rest periods in line with those policies.  
28 *Ibid.* As such, Defendants maintain Plaintiffs’ rest period claim is unmanageable since individual

1 inquiries would be needed to assess which employees, if any, took non-compliant rest periods, how  
2 many rest periods were non-compliant, and the reasons why a particular employee did not take a  
3 rest period on a particular shift. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiffs discounted Defendants’ maximum exposure  
4 by 80% to account for the risk of the Court reducing penalties and the risk of being unsuccessful on  
5 the merits or failure to recover the full amount sought, to arrive at a realistic exposure of  
6 **\$128,964.00.** *Ibid.*

7 Wage Statement Penalties. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to issue accurate itemized  
8 wage statements to Aggrieved Employees in violation of Labor Code § 226(a) because its wage  
9 statements stated the incorrect double time rate. Sung Decl., ¶ 29. Plaintiffs’ expert found  
10 Defendants’ maximum exposure for inaccurate wage statements to be \$1,041,599.96. *Ibid.* In  
11 response, Defendants argued that, even if the double time rates were incorrect, the amount of double  
12 time premiums paid were correct and Aggrieved Employees suffered no actual damages. *Ibid.*  
13 Therefore, Defendants contended that the Court will significantly reduce civil penalties. *Ibid.* Thus,  
14 Plaintiffs discounted Defendants’ maximum exposure by 80% to account for the risk of the Court  
15 reducing penalties or failure to recover the full amount sought, to arrive at a realistic exposure of  
16 **\$208,319.99.** *Ibid.*

17 Waiting Time Penalties. As a result of the unpaid wages and meal and rest period premiums  
18 described above, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants failed to comply with its final pay obligations  
19 set forth in Labor Code §§ 201 to 202 to former employees. Sung Decl., ¶ 30. Thus, the claims for  
20 waiting time penalties are derivative of the underlying claims. *Ibid.* There were 162 former  
21 employees, and at \$100 per former employee, Defendants realistic exposure is **\$16,200.00.** *Ibid.*

22 Maximum Exposure and Realistic Recovery at Trial. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’  
23 counsel believes Defendants’ maximum exposure for PAGA penalties is \$3,263,196.07 and their  
24 realistic recovery at trial on these claims to be **\$898,904.56.** Sung Decl., ¶ 31. The \$420,000.00  
25 settlement is a fair result and amounts to “genuine and meaningful” relief “consistent with the  
26 underlying purpose of the statute to benefit the public” as it represents approximately **46.72%** of  
27 Plaintiffs’ realistic recovery. *Ibid.*; see *Villalobos v. Calandri Sunrise Farm LP* (C.D. Cal., July 22,  
28 2015, No. CV 12-2615 PSG (JEMx)) 2015 WL 12732709, at \*5; see also *O’Connor v. Uber*

1 *Technologies, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135. This is a fair and equitable result,  
2 particularly because, under the Settlement, Aggrieved Employees will receive timely, guaranteed  
3 relief and will avoid the risk of not being able to recover anything. Sung Decl., ¶ 31; Otkupman  
4 Decl., ¶ 18.

5 **C. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COST AWARD SHOULD BE**  
6 **APPROVED**

7 For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs request that the Court approve an attorney's fee  
8 award of \$140,000.00 and cost award of \$22,415.50 to Plaintiffs' counsel.

9 **1. Plaintiffs' Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the Common**  
10 **Fund Method**

11 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by  
12 counsel in pursuing claims on behalf of a class. *See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25. The  
13 Supreme Court has held, "when a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund, and an  
14 action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of  
15 that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorney's fees out of the fund." *Id.* at 34.

16 Plaintiffs' counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common  
17 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionately among all the  
18 beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." *Vincent v. Hughes Air*  
19 *W., Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769. In *Quinn v. State of Cal.* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 162, 167 the  
20 Supreme Court stated, "one who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from  
21 which others derive benefits, may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation  
22 costs." Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 110-111, the  
23 Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California  
24 when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons[ ] are entitled to share."

25 The percentage approach is preferable to the lodestar because: (1) it aligns the interests of  
26 class counsel and absent class members; (2) it encourages efficient resolution of the litigation by  
27 providing an incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement; and (3) it reduces the demands on  
28 judicial resources. *Id.* at 1378-1379. California Courts now routinely use the percentage of the

common fund approach to determine the award of attorney's fees. *See, e.g., In re Pac. Enter. Sec. Litig.* (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 378-379 (approving attorneys' fee award of 33%).

## **2. The Requested Fee is in Line with Typical Cases**

"No general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented." Newberg on Class Actions (3rd ed. 1992) § 14.03. Attorneys' fees that are 50% of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with 30–40% commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. *Ibid.*; *see also Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294, 297 (stating that most cases where 30–50% was awarded involved "smaller" settlement funds of under \$10 million).

Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys' fees equal to 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established under California case law and in academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ("Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.").

## **3. The Matter Involves a Fee and Cost Shifting Provision under PAGA**

Labor Code section 2699 provides for the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees as well as costs of suit. Lab. Code § 2699(k)(1). Specifically, it states: "Any employee who prevails in any [PAGA] action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs . . ." *Ibid.* This fee/cost-shifting provision reflects the understanding that PAGA Counsel must accept significant risk of substantial expenses and consumption of time, energy, and other resources in litigating a PAGA claim, and thus, that PAGA Counsel is not only permitted, but entitled, to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if successful in litigating a PAGA claim.

This Settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendants while at the same time rewarding Plaintiffs' counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. Sung Decl., ¶ 32. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Plaintiffs' counsel. *Ibid.* Plaintiffs'

1 counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. *Ibid.*  
2 Once Plaintiffs’ counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Aggrieved Employees, they  
3 committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing their fiduciary duty to the Aggrieved Employees  
4 ahead of all other concerns. *Ibid.*

5                   **4. The Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Plaintiffs’ counsel Support**  
6                   **the Requested Fee Award**

7           As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class and representative actions on  
8 behalf of employees, Plaintiffs’ counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class action and  
9 representative matters. Sung Decl., ¶¶ 2-6; Otkupman Decl., ¶¶ 6-7, 24; Farishta Decl., ¶¶ 6-9.  
10 Plaintiffs’ counsel have been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in a multitude of class and  
11 representative actions resulting in beneficial results to class members and aggrieved employees in  
12 California. Sung Decl., ¶ 4; Otkupman Decl., ¶¶ 6-7, 24; Farishta Decl., ¶¶ 6-9. Because it is  
13 reasonable to compensate Plaintiffs’ counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation, and  
14 experience, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s requested fee award is supported here.

15           Plaintiffs’ counsels’ experience in wage and hour class and representative actions was  
16 integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendants and the  
17 reasonableness of this Settlement. Sung Decl., ¶ 33. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour  
18 litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and  
19 federal), as well as the procedural law of representative action litigation. *Ibid.* Based on these and  
20 other factors, Plaintiffs’ counsel have recently received fee awards based on a percentage of the  
21 gross recovery. *Ibid.* Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

22                   **5. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases,**  
23                   **the Court May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees**

24           “Despite its primacy, the lodestar method is not necessarily utilized in common fund cases.”  
25 (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 27. Courts have criticized the lodestar  
26 method as a drain on the judicial system and a disincentive on attorneys to take on high-risk,  
27 challenging cases. *Ibid.* at p. 29. Indeed, the lodestar approach: “(1) ‘increases the workload of an  
28 already overtaxed judicial system,’ (2) is ‘insufficiently objective and produce[s] results that are far

1 from homogenous,’ (3) ‘creates a sense of mathematical precision that is unwarranted in terms of  
2 the realities of the practice of law,’ (4) ‘is subject to manipulation by judges who prefer to calibrate  
3 fees in terms of percentages of the settlement fund or the amounts recovered by the Plaintiff or of  
4 an overall dollar amount,’ (5) ‘encourages lawyers to expend excessive hours, and . . . engage in  
5 duplicative and unjustified work,’ (6) ‘creates a disincentive for the early settlement of cases,’ (7)  
6 deprives trial courts of ‘flexibility to reward or deter lawyers so that desirable objectives, such as  
7 early settlement, will be fostered,’ (8) ‘works to the particular disadvantage of the public interest  
8 bar,’ and (9) results in ‘confusion and lack of predictability.’” *Ibid.* (quoting Third Circuit Task  
9 Force, *Court Awarded Attorney Fees* (1985) 108 F.R.D. 237, 246-249).

10         Although California courts support the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be  
11 used to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit  
12 can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to ‘cross-check’ or adjust the lodestar in  
13 comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and  
14 within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” *In re*  
15 *Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557. Applying the lodestar method is a two-  
16 step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable  
17 hourly rate, and the second step is to apply a multiplier to the lodestar to account for various factors.  
18 *Id.* at 556. “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular  
19 action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent  
20 risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order  
21 to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” *Ibid.* “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar  
22 calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” *Id.* at 556-557.

23         Under California law, lodestar multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher. *See, e.g.,*  
24 *Chavez v. Netflix* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 49-50 (approving multiplier of about 2.5); *Coalition*  
25 *for L.A. County Planning etc. Interest v. Bd. of Supervisors* (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 241, 251  
26 (approving multiplier of about 12.8). In representative actions such as this one, where the value of  
27 the benefit conferred to the representative group “can be monetized with a reasonable degree of  
28 certainty,” the court may “adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to

1 ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal  
2 marketplace in comparable litigation.” *Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.

3 Moreover, the use of a multiplier is permitted in a PAGA action. PAGA provides that “[a]ny  
4 employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and  
5 costs.” Lab. Code § 2699(k)(1). Although PAGA does not provide a specific standard for  
6 evaluating attorney’s fees in connection with a settlement of PAGA claims, California Courts have  
7 employed a lodestar analysis and use of multipliers for this purpose. “Where a settlement produces  
8 a common fund for the benefit of the entire class, courts have discretion to employ either the  
9 lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery method. . . To guard against an unreasonable result,  
10 the Ninth Circuit encourages district courts to “cross-check[] their calculations against a second  
11 method. . . . Accordingly, the Court calculates attorneys’ fees in the instant case using the  
12 percentage-of-recovery method and then cross-checks its calculations against the lodestar method.”  
13 *Hermosillo v. Davey Tree Surgery Co.* (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2021, No. 18-CV-00393-LHK) 2021 WL  
14 2826697, at \*1 (quoting *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.* (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 935,  
15 942, 944-945). The court in *Hermosillo* granted, in part, a plaintiff’s counsel’s unopposed motion  
16 for attorney’s fees and costs in a PAGA-only settlement, wherein 33.33% of the gross settlement  
17 fund was requested for fees. *Id.* at \*1–3.

18 Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s current lodestar is **\$161,120.00**, broken down as:

| Name                                                                             | Actual Billing Rate | Hours Billed  | Lodestar            |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------------|
| Justice for Workers, P.C.<br>William C. Sung<br>(14 <sup>th</sup> Year Attorney) | \$850               | 79.40         | \$67,490.00         |
| Justice for Workers, P.C.<br>Tiffany L. Luu<br>(5 <sup>th</sup> Year Attorney)   | \$500               | 48.90         | \$24,450.00         |
| Otkupman Law Firm<br>Roman Otkupman<br>(18 <sup>th</sup> Year Attorney)          | \$950               | 56.40         | \$53,580.00         |
| Otkupman Law Firm<br>Nidah Farishta<br>(9 <sup>th</sup> Year Attorney)           | \$600               | 26.00         | \$15,600.00         |
|                                                                                  | <b>Total:</b>       | <b>210.70</b> | <b>\$161,120.00</b> |

1 Sung Decl., ¶¶ 34-38, **Exh. 6** – William Sung Timesheet, **Exh. 7** – Tiffany Luu Timesheet;  
2 Otkupman Decl., ¶ 21, **Exh. 2**. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s requested fee award of \$140,000.00 represents  
3 a **negative 0.87** lodestar multiplier. Sung Decl., ¶ 34. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ counsel estimate they  
4 will devote no less than 10 hours, although likely more time, to additional tasks, which are hours  
5 not included in the foregoing lodestar total. Sung Decl., ¶ 39. These additional hours will include  
6 time spent to obtain and monitor approval of the Settlement and requested awards, oversee the  
7 settlement administration process and distribution of funds, respond to inquiries, and communicate  
8 with Plaintiffs regarding the case. *Ibid.*

9 Plaintiffs’ counsel also bear the risk of taking whatever actions are necessary if Defendants  
10 fail to pay. The amount of fees requested under the Settlement is warranted based on the contingent  
11 risk that Counsel incurred, the difficulty of the questions involved, the substantial benefit conferred  
12 on the Aggrieved Employees and State of California as a result of the Settlement, and the skill  
13 displayed by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Thus, the request for attorneys’ fees satisfies a lodestar check.  
14 Accordingly, the Court should find that the circumstances of the present case justify an award of 33  
15 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount for attorney’s fees.

#### 16 **6. Plaintiffs’ Counsels’ Costs Are Reasonable and Actually Incurred**

17 Plaintiffs’ counsel are entitled to recover the out-of-pocket costs and expenses they  
18 reasonably incurred in investigating, prosecuting, and settling a case. *Staton v. Boeing Co.* (9th Cir.  
19 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 974; Lab. Code § 2699(g)(1). Under the proposed Settlement, Plaintiffs’  
20 counsel may request reimbursement of costs up to \$40,000.00. Agreement, § III.4.a. Plaintiffs’  
21 litigation costs are approximately \$22,415.50 (\$11,467.35 incurred by Plaintiff Nguyen’s counsel  
22 and \$10,948.15 incurred by Plaintiff Lucea’s counsel). Sung Decl., ¶ 17; Exh. 5; Otkupman Decl., ¶  
23 25, Exh. 3. These expenses were reasonably necessary to the litigation and were actually incurred.  
24 Moreover, these expenses are below the maximum amount (\$40,000.00) allowed in the Settlement,  
25 and the remainder will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount. Therefore, costs should be  
26 reimbursed in full, up to the maximum amount allowed in the Settlement.

27 ///

28 ///

1           **D.       THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE SETTLEMENT**  
2                   **ADMINISTRATION FEES**

3           Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement, the fees and costs of the Administrator, are to be  
4 paid out of the common fund. Agreement, § III.4.b. The settlement administration fees are based on  
5 a flat-sum amount of \$8,500.00. *Ibid.*; Admin. Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. B. The Administrator’s duties  
6 include, but are not limited to, receiving and analyzing the Aggrieved Employee list, processing  
7 Aggrieved Employees’ names and addresses against the NCOA prior to mailing, setting up and  
8 managing a QSF Escrow Account, calculating Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved  
9 Employees, disbursing settlement payments to Aggrieved Employees, the State of California, and  
10 Plaintiffs’ counsel including necessary tax forms (i.e., 1099 Forms) and PAGA settlement  
11 explanatory letter, tendering funds from uncashed checks to the Unclaimed Property Fund to be  
12 held in the name of the Aggrieved Employee, and submitting final accounting to the Court. Admin  
13 Decl., ¶¶ 7-8, Exh. B; Agreement, §§ IV.1-IV.7. All of these duties are included in the agreed-upon  
14 flat fee of \$8,500.00. Thus, the Administrator’s fees should be approved.

15           **E.       THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUESTED PLAINTIFFS’**  
16                   **SERVICE AWARDS**

17           Courts routinely approve service payments to compensate named plaintiffs for the services  
18 they provide and the risks they incur during class action litigation. *See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins.*  
19 *Exchange* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (upholding “service payments” to named plaintiffs for  
20 their efforts in bringing the case); *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.  
21 Supp. 294 (approving \$50,000 service payment). Indeed, “[i]ncentive awards are fairly typical in  
22 class action cases.” *Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958. The Court  
23 may award incentive payments “to compensate [Plaintiff] for work done on behalf of the class, to  
24 make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action. *Id.* at 958-59.

25           Here, Plaintiffs seek a service award of \$5,000.00 each and Plaintiffs and their counsel  
26 submit that this request is reasonable given their efforts in this case and the risks they undertook on  
27 behalf of the State and Aggrieved Employees. Nguyen Decl., ¶¶ 2-6; Lucea Decl., ¶¶ 9-13.  
28 Plaintiffs expended substantial time and effort on behalf of the State and Aggrieved Employees,

1 including providing factual information and documents to counsel, attending meetings with counsel  
2 to discuss the claims and theories at issue in the litigation, and otherwise actively participating in  
3 the prosecution of his claims. Nguyen Decl., ¶¶ 2-6; Lucea Decl., ¶¶ 9-13. As a result of Plaintiffs'  
4 efforts, they have helped the State recover over \$179,313.38 in civil penalties and 536 Aggrieved  
5 Employees recover on average \$111.51 in civil penalties per person. Sung Decl., ¶ 20.

6 **F. PROOF OF SERVICE ON THE LWDA AND OTHER PENDING MATTERS**

7 The Parties are not aware of any other cases that may be impacted by the Settlement. Sung  
8 Decl., ¶ 40; Otkupman Decl., ¶ 27; Farishta Decl., ¶ 11; the Declaration of Yesenia M. Gallegos in  
9 Support of Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement ("Gallegos Decl."), ¶¶ 2-4; the Declaration of  
10 Jennifer A. Riley in Support of Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement ("Riley Decl.").

11 On May 13, 2026, Plaintiffs' counsel gave notice of this Settlement to the LWDA by filing a  
12 copy of the fully executed Agreement, Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, supporting  
13 declarations, and Proposed Judgment and Order with the LWDA via uploading through its website.  
14 Sung Decl., ¶ 41, **Exh. 8** - LWDA Filing Confirmation.

15 **IV. CONCLUSION**

16 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully request that the Court grant approval of the  
17 proposed Settlement, sign and enter the Proposed Judgment and Order submitted herewith, and set a  
18 Compliance Hearing Re: Status of Distribution.

19  
20 Respectfully submitted,

21 DATED: May 13, 2026

**JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

22  
23 By: 

24 William C. Sung  
25 Tiffany L. Luu  
26 Attorneys for Plaintiff  
27 DAVID NGUYEN  
28

1 DATED: May 13, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

2 **OTKUPMAN LAW FIRM**

3  
4 By: 

5 Roman Otkupman

6 Nidah Farishta

7 Attorneys for Plaintiff CZARMAN LUCEA