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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

NOEMI VILLAGOMEZ and ANDREA
MARTINEZ, as individuals and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MARCOS & JAVIERS, LLC, a California
limited liability company dba JAVIER'S
CANTINA & GRILL; JAVIER'S-UTC, LLC,
a Nevada limited liability company; and DOES
1 through 100,

Defendants.

Case No. 30-2020-01131297-CU-OE-CXC

*[Assigned for all purposes to the Hon. David A.
Hoffer, Dept. CX103]*

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF**

Date: June 22, 2026
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept.: CX103

Reservation No.: 74812508

Complaint filed: February 13, 2020
FAC filed: May 26, 2020
SAC filed: December 15, 2023

1 **TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, on June
3 22, 2026 at 1:30 pm in Department CX103 of the above-entitled Court, located at 751 West Santa Ana
4 Blvd, Santa Ana, CA 92701, Plaintiffs Andrea Martinez and Juana Maria Ramirez Angeles
5 (“Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, will and hereby
6 does move this Court for:

- 7 1. Preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement of this lawsuit;
8 2. Pursuant to section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, provisional certification
9 of the following Settlement Class defined as follows:

10 All current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants Marcos & Javiers,
11 LLC dba Javier’s Cantina & Grill and Javier’s-UTC, LLC who worked at any
12 time in California during the Class Period.

13 The “Class Period” is defined as February 13, 2016 through the date the Court
14 enters an Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the Settlement.

- 15 3. Preliminary appointment of Plaintiffs Andrea Martinez and Juana Maria Ramirez Angeles
16 as Class Representatives;
17 4. Preliminary appointment of Scott M. Lidman, Milan Moore, and Tiara Gose-Hardy of
18 Lidman Law, APC and Paul K. Haines of Haines Law Group, APC as Class Counsel;
19 5. The scheduling of a hearing to consider whether the Settlement should be finally approved
20 and to permit a service awards to Plaintiffs, Settlement Administration costs, civil penalties
21 payable to the California Labor Workforce Development Agency, and attorneys’ fees and
22 costs to Class Counsel;
23 6. Appointment of Phoenix Settlement Administrators (“Phoenix”) as the third-party
24 Settlement Administrator for mailing the court-approved Class Notice Packets; and
25 7. Approval of the proposed Class Notice Packet (which consists of Court Approved Notice of
26 Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final Approval, Allocation Form, Request for
27
28


1 Exclusion Form, and Objection Form) and an order that it be disseminated to the proposed
2 Settlement Class Members as provided in the Settlement Agreement.

3 This Motion is based on this notice of motion, the memorandum of points and authorities, the
4 declarations of Scott M. Lidman, Milan Moore, Tiara Gose-Hardy, Paul K. Haines, Plaintiff Andrea
5 Martinez, Plaintiff Juana Maria Ramirez Angeles and Jodey Lawrence of Phoenix Settlement
6 Administrators, and the exhibits attached thereto, the pleadings and other papers filed in this action, and
7 on any further oral or documentary evidence or argument presented at the time of hearing.

8
9 Dated: March 30, 2026

Respectfully Submitted,
LIDMAN LAW, APC

10
11
12 By:



Scott M. Lidman

13 Attorney for Plaintiffs
14 ANDREA MARTINEZ
15 JUANA MARIA RAMIREZ ANGELES
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiffs Andrea Martinez and Juana Maria Ramirez Angeles (“Plaintiffs”) brought this class
4 and representative action against Defendants Marcos & Javiers, LLC dba Javier’s Cantina & Grill and
5 Javier’s-UTC, LLC (hereinafter “Defendants”) alleging various wage and hour and related violations.
6 Plaintiffs’ primary allegations are that Defendants: (1) engaged in minimum wage violations; (2) failed
7 to pay all overtime wages; (3) engaged in meal period violations; (4) engaged in rest period violations;
8 (5) are subject to wage statement penalties; (6) are subject to waiting time penalties; (7) engaged in
9 unlawful business practices; and (8) are liable for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys
10 General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”).

11 Plaintiffs now respectfully request that this Court preliminarily approve this non-reversionary,
12 class action settlement,¹ in which Defendants have agreed to pay Three Million Dollars and Zero Cents
13 (\$3,000,000.00) to the following Settlement Class:

14 All current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants Marcos & Javiers,
15 LLC dba Javier’s Cantina & Grill and Javier’s-UTC, LLC who worked at any
16 time in California during the Class Period.

17 The “Class Period” is defined as February 13, 2016 through the date the Court
18 enters an Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the Settlement.

19 Additionally, for the purposes of this settlement only, Aggrieved Employees shall be defined
20 as:

21 All current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants Marcos & Javiers,
22 LLC dba Javier’s Cantina & Grill and Javier’s-UTC, LLC who worked at any
23 time in California during the PAGA Period.

24 The “PAGA Period” shall mean the time period between February 13, 2019
25 through the date the Court enters an Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the
26 Settlement.

27 ¹ The Stipulation of Class and PAGA Action Settlement (“Settlement”) is attached to the Declaration
28 of Scott M. Lidman as Exhibit 1. The Notice Packet (which is comprised of the Notice of Pendency of
Class Action and Proposed Class and PAGA Settlement, Notice of Individual Settlement Award,
Request for Exclusion Form, and Objection Form) is attached to the Settlement as Exhibit C. All
defined terms in this motion have the same definitions as used in the Settlement.

1 Significantly, Settlement Class Members do not need to file a claim to participate; they will
2 automatically receive a payment unless they affirmatively opt-out. After deducting administration
3 costs, Plaintiffs' service awards, attorneys' fees and costs, and PAGA civil penalties, the remaining Net
4 Settlement Amount ("NSA") of approximately \$1,598,500 will be distributed to all Settlement Class
5 members who do not opt-out of the Settlement. There are approximately 1,183 Settlement Class
6 members, which means the average payment to each Settlement Class member is currently expected to
7 be approximately \$1,351.23, which does not include the \$62,500.00 PAGA Amount to PAGA
8 Employees. The lowest estimated amount is approximately \$12.02 for a Settlement Class Member that
9 worked 1 week during the relevant time period and the highest estimated amount is approximately
10 \$6,490.80 based on a Settlement Class Member working the entire Class Period and the Court granting
11 preliminary approval on June 22, 2026.

12 This proposed Settlement is well-within the range of possible approval in light of the significant
13 legal and factual obstacles that Plaintiffs faced, the risks and costs of further litigation, and the tangible
14 monetary benefits to be received by the Settlement Class. For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiffs
15 respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement.

16 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

17 **A. THE PARTIES, PROCEDURAL HISTORY, DISCOVERY, AND ARMS- 18 LENGTH NEGOTIATIONS**

19 **1. The Parties**

20 Defendants are two high end Mexican restaurants owned by the same owners. Declaration of
21 Scott M. Lidman ("Lidman Decl."), ¶ 10. Plaintiff Martinez worked as a non-exempt Cocktail Waitress
22 for Defendants at both the la Jolla and Irvine locations. See Declaration of Andrea Martinez ("Martinez
23 Decl."), ¶ 2. Plaintiff Ramirez Angeles, a former non-exempt employee, worked at Defendants' Irvine
24 location from approximately 2012 through approximately May 2023 as a Cocktail Server. *Id.*

25 **2. Procedural History**

26 On February 13, 2020, Plaintiff Martinez and another plaintiff, Noemi Villagomez, filed a class
27 action lawsuit in the Orange County Superior Court against Defendants in the matter entitled *Noemi
28 Villagomez, et al. v. Marcos & Javiers, et al.*, Case No. 30-2020-01131297-CU-OE-CXC. Declaration

1 of Scott M. Lidman (“Lidman Decl.”), ¶ 10. The initial complaint alleged the following putative class
2 action claims against Defendants: (i) failure to pay all minimum wages owed; (ii) failure to pay all
3 overtime wages owed; (iii) failure to provide meal periods; (iv) failure to authorize and permit rest
4 periods; (v) failure to timely pay all wages upon termination; (vi) failure to provide accurate, itemized
5 wage statements; and (vii) unfair competition. *Id.*

6 By letter dated February 13, 2020, Plaintiff Andrea Martinez and another plaintiff, Noemi
7 Villagomez, gave written notice by certified mail to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency
8 (“LWDA”) and Defendants of the specific provisions of the California Labor Code that Plaintiffs
9 alleged Defendants violated. *Id.* On May 26, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
10 adding a cause of action under the California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) based on the
11 Labor Code violations alleged in their February 13, 2020 letter to the LWDA. *Id.*

12 On December 31, 2020, the Court, pursuant to a request by Noemi Villagomez, dismissed her
13 from the Action without prejudice. By letter dated August 23, 2023, Plaintiff Juana Maria Ramirez gave
14 written notice by certified mail to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and
15 Defendants of the specific provisions of the California Labor Code that Plaintiff Juana Maria Ramirez
16 alleged Defendants violated. *Id.*

17 On December 15, 2023, with permission from the Court after a contested Motion, Plaintiffs filed
18 a Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter, the “Operative Complaint”) which added Juana Maria
19 Ramirez as a named plaintiff in the Action. *Id.* Therefore, Plaintiffs alleges that Defendants: (1)
20 engaged in minimum wage violations; (2) failed to pay all overtime wages; (3) engaged in meal period
21 violations; (4) engaged in rest period violations; (5) are subject to wage statement penalties; (6) are
22 subject to waiting time penalties; (7) engaged in unlawful business practices; and (8) are liable for civil
23 penalties under the PAGA. *Id.*

24 On July 15, 2025, Plaintiffs were filed their motion for class certification and was set to be heard
25 on October 17, 2025. Subsequently, the Parties participated in private mediation and reached a class-
26 wide settlement, subject to this Court’s approval.

27 **3. Discovery**

28 In the instant action, the Parties have engaged in formal discovery. Lidman Decl., ¶ 11. The

1 Parties served and responded to multiple sets of written discovery, including without limitation, Special
2 Interrogatories, Form Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents. *Id.* Over the course
3 of several years, Defendants produced thousands of pages of documents and excel spreadsheets. *Id.*

4 The *Belaire-West* notice process was completed and the contact information for the putative
5 class members who did not opt out was provided on September 7, 2021. Lidman Decl., ¶ 11.

6 Plaintiffs also took 4 depositions of Defendants' Persons Most Qualified and Defendants took
7 the deposition of Plaintiff Ramirez Angeles. *Id.*

8 After the detailed review of the Defendants' discovery responses, deposition transcripts,
9 document production, and motion for class certification, Class Counsel drew on their extensive
10 experience in similar cases to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' case. Lidman Decl., ¶
11 11. This discovery allowed the parties to assess the merits and value of Plaintiffs' claims and
12 Defendants' defenses thereto, if a settlement could not be reached. *Id.*

13 4. Arms-Length Negotiations

14 On August 11, 2025, a mediation was held with Michael D. Young, Esq. a well-respected wage
15 and hour mediator. Lidman Decl., ¶ 12. During mediation, the Parties vigorously debated their
16 opposing legal positions, the likelihood of certification of Plaintiffs' claims, the expiration of the 5 year
17 rule, and the legal basis for the claims and defenses. *Id.* As a result of the mediator's proposal, the
18 parties reached a settlement in principle *Id.* In the weeks that followed, the parties finalized the terms
19 of settlement and executed the Stipulation of Class and PAGA Action Settlement ("Settlement"). *Id.*

20 III. ARGUMENT

21 A. CLASS CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES

22 California Rule of Court 3.769 conditions settlement of a class action on court approval, which
23 is generally evaluated under the federal standards applicable under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
24 Civil Procedure. *See Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322 requires trial
25 court to determine "that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned"; *Hanlon v.*
26 *Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 requires the trial court to determine "whether a
proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable").

27 //

1 As further explained below, the Settlement Class satisfies the criteria for certification of a
2 settlement class under California law because: (1) the Settlement Class is so numerous that joinder
3 would be impractical; (2) common questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions
4 such that class certification is the most efficient and desirable way to maintain this litigation; (3)
5 Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of absent Settlement Class members; and (4) Plaintiffs and
6 their counsel will fairly and adequately represent Settlement Class members' interest. *See* Cal. Civ.
7 Proc. § 382.

8 **1. Numerosity is Satisfied.**

9 Here, the proposed Settlement Class consists of approximately 1,183 members, and is therefore
10 sufficiently numerous as to make joinder impracticable. *See* Lidman Decl., ¶ 14; *See, e.g., Bowles v.*
11 *Sup. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574 (holding a class representing 10 beneficiaries of a trust sufficiently
12 numerous). Thus, numerosity is satisfied.

13 Further, a class is "ascertainable" where the members "may be readily identified without
14 unreasonable expense or time by reference to official [or business] records." *See Sevidal v. Target*
15 *Corp.* (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 916 (alterations in original). Here, the proposed Settlement Class
16 is defined as "all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants Marcos & Javiers, LLC dba
17 Javier's Cantina & Grill and Javier's-UTC, LLC who worked at any time in California during the Class
18 Period." Lidman Decl., ¶ 14. Here, the proposed Settlement Class is ascertainable through Defendants'
19 personnel files and employee records maintained in the regular course of business. *Id.*

20 **2. Commonality is Satisfied.**

21 The focus in a certification dispute is not the merits, but rather on what types of questions,
22 "common or individual," are likely to arise in the action. *See Sav-On Drug Store, Inc. v. Superior*
23 *Court (Rocher)* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 327.

24 Here, Plaintiffs contend that Settlement Class Members' claims arise from Defendants'
25 common, uniform policies and practices that applied to Settlement Class members during the class
26 period. Lidman Decl., ¶ 16. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants' common and uniform
27 policies and practices resulted in the following violations: (1) minimum wage violations; (2) failure to
28 pay all overtime wages; (3) meal period violations; (4) rest period violations; (5) wage statement

1 penalties; (6) waiting time penalties; (7) unfair competition; and (8) liability for civil penalties under
2 the PAGA. *Id.* As a result of the common and uniform policies and practices that applied to all
3 Settlement Class Members, their claims involve common questions of law and fact, including but not
4 limited to:

- 5 1. Whether Defendants' timekeeping policies and/or practices resulted in the failure to
6 properly compensate non-exempt employees minimum and overtime wages for all hours
7 worked;
- 8 2. Whether Defendants provided all legally compliant meal periods;
- 9 3. Whether Defendants authorized and permitted all legally compliant rest periods;
- 10 4. Whether Defendants provided meal and/or rest period premium payments for non-
11 compliant meal and/or rest periods;
- 12 5. Whether Defendants furnished legally compliant wage statements; and
- 13 6. Whether Defendants' policies and/or practices for the timing and amount of payment of
14 final wages at the time of separation from employment were unlawful.

15 These alleged practices result in common questions as to the affected Settlement Class
16 Members. *See e.g., Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc.* (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701, 726.

17 3. **Typicality is Satisfied.**

18 The typicality requirement is satisfied where class representatives have claims that are typical
19 of those of the rest of the class. *B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d
20 1341, 1347 (finding typicality satisfied where named Plaintiff purchased the same goods as the putative
21 class in a consumer class action).

22 Here, Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those held by the members of the proposed Settlement
23 Class. First, Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants during the Class Period as a non-exempt
24 employees and were subject to Defendants' wage and hour policies at issue in this case. *See* Martinez
25 Decl., ¶ 2; *See* Ramirez Angeles Decl., ¶ 2. Second, Plaintiffs were allegedly injured by the same
26 challenged policies that allegedly injured the Settlement Class as a whole. For example, Plaintiffs
27 assert that they, like the members of the Classes, were not provided all legally required minimum and
overtime wages, were not provided all legally compliant meal periods, were not authorized nor

1 permitted to take all legally required rest periods, were not paid all wages upon separation of their
2 employment with Defendants, and were not provided with accurate, itemized wage statements. *See*
3 Martinez Decl., ¶¶ 3-7; *See* Ramirez Angeles Decl., ¶ 2. Given that Defendants’ policies and practices
4 applied to all non-exempt employees, Settlement Class Members possess a similar interest and have
5 suffered similar alleged injuries as Plaintiffs. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs’ claims and those of the
6 Settlement Class all arise from the same conduct, typicality is satisfied.

7 **4. Adequacy is Satisfied.**

8 The adequacy requirement examines conflicts of interest between named parties and the
9 class(es) they seek to represent. *Capital People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services* 155
10 (2007) Cal.App.4th 676, 697.

11 Here, Plaintiffs contend there are no conflicts of interest between Plaintiffs and the Settlement
12 Class she seeks to represent. Martinez Decl., ¶ 14; Ramirez Angeles Decl., ¶ 14. Plaintiffs’ interests
13 are aligned with those of the Settlement Class Members, as they all seek monetary relief under the same
14 facts and legal theories. Additionally, Class Counsel does not have any conflict of interest with the
15 Settlement Class. Lidman Decl., ¶ 37; *See McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442,
16 450-51 (adequacy satisfied where there was no indication that Class Counsel were not qualified and
17 the named plaintiff had no interests antagonistic to those of the proposed class). Class Counsel have
18 extensive experience in wage and hour class action litigation and have vigorously litigated this case.
19 *See* Lidman Decl., ¶¶ 2-8; Declaration of Milan Moore (“Moore Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-5; Declaration of Tiara
Gose-Hardy (“Gose-Hardy Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-3; Declaration of Paul K. Haines (“Haines Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-8.

20 **B. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE**
21 **PROPOSED CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT BECAUSE IT IS FAIR,**
22 **ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE**

23 Settlement is the preferred means of dispute resolution, particularly in complex class action
24 litigation. *See In re Syncor ERISA Litig.* (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 1095, 1101. The Court’s role in
25 evaluating a proposed settlement is limited to ensuring that the agreement taken as a whole is fair. *See*
26 *e.g., Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at 1027. There is an initial presumption of fairness where, as here, the
27 Settlement agreement was negotiated at arm’s length by class counsel and with the assistance of an

1 experienced wage and hour class action mediator. *See e.g. Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008)
2 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130.

3 **1. The Preliminary Approval Standard is Met**

4 To make a fairness determination, the Court should consider several factors, including: “the
5 strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the
6 risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of
7 discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, [and] the experience and views of counsel.”
8 *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. “The list of factors is not exclusive and the
9 court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of the factors depending on the circumstances of
10 each case.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 230, 245. As discussed below,
11 the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable in light of the overall balance of factors in this
12 case.

13 **a. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case**

14 Although Plaintiffs maintains that their claims are meritorious, Plaintiffs acknowledge that there
15 were substantial risks and uncertainty in proceeding with litigation. As described below, Defendant
16 presented multiple defenses to Plaintiff’s claims, both on the merits and class certification. Thus, while
17 Plaintiffs were prepared to litigate these claims through certification, and ultimately trial, success was
18 far from certain, especially in light of the expiration of the 5 year rule.

19 **b. Risk, Expenses, Complexity, and Duration of Further Litigation**

20 Although Plaintiffs filed for class certification, they faced the prospect of appeals in the wake
21 of a disputed class certification ruling for Plaintiff and/or an adverse summary judgment. Lidman Decl.,
22 ¶ 34. Even if the classes sought to be certified by Plaintiff were in fact certified, the parties would incur
23 considerably more attorneys’ fees and costs through a possible decertification motion, trial, and possible
24 appeal. *Id.* This Settlement avoids those risks and the accompanying expense. Thus, this factor
25 supports preliminary approval.

26 **c. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status**

27 Plaintiffs had filed their motion for class certification but, the extent to which Plaintiffs’
28 proposed classes were certifiable was not certain. This is especially true given the expiration of the 5

year rule. Absent settlement, there was a risk that there would not be a certified class at the time of trial.

d. Overview of the Settlement Agreement

If the Court approves this Settlement, Defendants will pay a Gross Settlement Amount (“GSA”) of \$3,000,000.00.² Lidman Decl., ¶ 13, Exh. 2 (Settlement, ¶ 4). Significantly, this Settlement is **non-reversionary**, and no Settlement Class member will have to submit a claim form to receive a Settlement Award. *Id.* (Settlement at ¶ 4.). Each Settlement Class member will automatically receive a Settlement Award unless he or she affirmatively opts out of the Settlement. *Id.* The monetary terms of the Settlement are summarized below:

Gross Settlement Amount (“GSA”):	\$3,000,000.00
Minus Court-approved attorneys’ fees (1/3 of GSA):	\$1,000,000.00
Minus Court-approved, verified costs (up to):	\$115,000.00
Minus Court-approved Class Representative Service Awards (up to):	\$20,000.00
Minus Settlement Administration Costs:	\$16,500.00
Minus PAGA Civil Penalties:	\$250,000.00
Net Settlement Amount (“NSA”):	\$1,598,500.00

Defendants shall deposit the Gross Settlement Amount (including any increase to the Gross Settlement Amount pursuant to the Escalator Clause if such increase is triggered pursuant to Section 4(F), below and Defendants make the election to increase the GSA) and Defendants’ share of all payroll taxes within thirty (30) days after the Effective Date.³ *See* Settlement, ¶ 4.C.

After deducting amounts for the Court-approved attorneys’ fees and verified costs, Service Awards to Plaintiffs, Settlement Administrator costs, and the PAGA Civil Penalties, the Settlement

² Defendants represent that there are approximately 1,183 Class Members who worked approximately 132,946 workweeks between February 13, 2016 and August 11, 2025, the date of the Parties’ mediation. If the actual number of workweeks during the Class Period is more than 10% greater than this figure (i.e., there are more than 146,241 Workweeks worked by the Class Members), Defendants will either, at their option: (1) increase the Gross Settlement Amount by a proportional amount above the 10% figure (i.e., if there was 11% increase in the number Workweeks during the Class Period, Defendants would agree to increase the Gross Settlement Amount by 11%); *or* (2) elect to shorten the Class Period, PAGA Period, and release periods to end on the date on which the aggregate workweeks is closest to without exceeding 146,241 Workweeks worked by the Class Members. Settlement 4.F.

³ This Settlement shall become effective on the “Effective Date” which is defined as the latter of: (a) the Court’s final approval of the Settlement if no objections by or on behalf of Class Members have been filed; (b) the time for appeal has expired if an objection has been filed and no appeal has been filed or withdrawn; or (c) the final resolution of any appeal that has been filed. *See* Settlement, ¶ 4.B.

1 requires Defendant to pay a Net Settlement Amount (“NSA”) of at least \$1,598,500.00 to all Settlement
2 Class members who do not timely opt out. Lidman Decl., ¶ 13. This amount does not include the
3 \$62,500.00 PAGA Amount to be paid to the Aggrieved Employees.

4 According to Defendants, there are approximately 1,183 total Settlement Class members.
5 Lidman Decl., ¶ 14. From the Net Settlement Amount, the Settlement Administrator will calculate each
6 Settlement Class member’s Settlement Award based on the following formula:

7 Each participating Settlement Class Member shall receive a proportionate settlement share based
8 upon the number of workweeks worked during the Class Period, the numerator of which is the
9 Settlement Class Member’s total workweeks worked during the Class Period, and the denominator of
10 which is the total Workweeks worked by all Settlement Class Members who worked during the Class
11 Period. Settlement, ¶ 6.B. Thus, the average Individual Settlement Award is projected to be
12 approximately **\$1,351.23**. Lidman Decl., ¶ 14. There are approximately 132,946 workweeks during
13 the Class Period, which means the net value per workweek is \$12.02 (\$1,598,500 NSA / 132,946
14 workweeks). *Id.* Therefore, the lowest estimated individual payment for a Settlement Class member is
15 \$12.02, while the highest estimated individual payment for a Settlement Class member is \$6,490.80
(\$12.02 x 540 workweeks). *Id.*

16 In addition, Sixty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents (\$62,500.00), of the
17 Gross Settlement Amount will be allocated to the Individual PAGA Payments. Settlement, ¶ 6.C. Each
18 PAGA Employee shall receive a portion of the PAGA Amount proportionate to the number of pay
19 periods that he or she worked during the PAGA Period, and which will be calculated by multiplying the
20 PAGA Amount by a fraction, the numerator of which is the PAGA Employee’s number of pay periods
21 worked during the PAGA Period, and the denominator of which is the total number of pay periods
22 worked by all PAGA Employees. Lidman Decl., ¶ 15. The average PAGA Payment to Aggrieved
23 Employees is \$67.86. *Id.*

24 Settlement Class members will have 60 calendar days from the mailing of the Notice Packet to
25 opt-out or object to the Settlement, thereby providing ample time to review the Notice Packet without
26 unduly delaying the Settlement. *See* Settlement, ¶ 11.C. Those Settlement Class Members who do not
27 opt-out of the Settlement will be bound by its terms and will release all claims against Defendants

1 included within the Settlement, for the period of February 13, 2016 through the date the Court enters an
2 Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the Settlement. *See* Settlement, ¶ 3.

3 **e. The Parties Engaged in Fair and Honest Negotiations.**

4 This Settlement was a result of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations with the assistance
5 of a mediator. As part of formal discovery, Defendant produced time records and payroll data and
6 other documents and policies. Lidman Decl., ¶¶ 11. Additionally, a total of 5 depositions were taken.
7 Class Counsel drew on their extensive experience in similar cases to assess the strengths and
8 weaknesses of Plaintiff's case. *Id.* This discovery allowed the parties to assess the merits and value
9 of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses thereto, if a settlement could not be reached. *Id.*

10 On August 11, 2025, the parties participated in full-day mediation with Michael D. Young, a
11 wage and hour class action mediator. Lidman Decl., ¶ 12. During mediation, the parties vigorously
12 debated their opposing legal positions, the likelihood of certification of Plaintiffs' claims, the legal
13 basis for the claims and defenses. *Id.* As a result of the mediator's proposal, the parties reached a
14 settlement in principle. *Id.* Since mediation, the Parties finalized the terms and executed the
15 Settlement. *Id.*; Exhibit 2.

16 Thus, the proposed Settlement is entitled to an initial presumption of fairness as it is the result
17 of factual investigation and data analysis; the exchange of information and class data, including
18 timekeeping and payroll records; arm's length negotiations by counsel; and mediation before an
19 experienced wage and hour class action mediator. *See* Lidman Decl., ¶¶ 11-12; *See Kullar, supra*, 168
20 Cal.App.4th at 130.

21 Further, there are no deficiencies in the Settlement. The Settlement does not grant preferential
22 treatment to the class representative or segments of the class, and is within the range of possible
23 approval, as discussed in detail below. The Settlement will provide monetary relief to Settlement Class
24 Members. The amounts proposed for Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs, and service award are
25 all reasonable and appropriate based on the facts of this case. Because the Settlement is devoid of
26 obvious deficiencies, this factor supports preliminary approval.

27 **f. Amount Offered in Settlement Given Realistic Value of Claims**

28 The Settlement provides a fair and reasonable monetary recovery for the Settlement Class in

1 the face of disputed claims. Plaintiffs' analysis of the maximum and realistic expected recoveries for
2 each of the theories of liability pled is set forth below:

3 Miscalculation of The Regular Rate of Pay: Plaintiffs alleges Defendants failed to include the
4 bonuses for purposes of calculating the regular rate of pay. Lidman Decl., ¶ 17. Specifically, Plaintiffs
5 allege that Defendants paid their non-exempt employees either incentive pay, auto-gratuity and/or other
6 forms of pay not properly excludable as a matter of law when calculating an employee's regular rate of
7 pay (hereinafter the aforementioned forms of pay are collectively referred to as "Incentive Pay"). *Id.*
8 Despite Defendants' payment of Incentive Pay to Plaintiff and non-exempt employees, Plaintiffs contend
9 that Defendants failed to include all forms of Incentive Pay when calculating Plaintiff's and non-exempt
10 employees' regular rate of pay, thereby causing Plaintiffs and other non-exempt employees to be
11 underpaid for all of their overtime wages. *Id.* Based on the data produced throughout the litigation, over
12 2,700 of the pay periods are affected by this regular rate issue. Therefore, although Defendants'
13 exposure may be minimal compared to the other claims, it still triggers derivative claims for wage
14 statement violations, waiting time penalties and PAGA penalties. *Id.*

15 Defendants contend that any additional compensation received by non-exempt employees was
16 discretionary and therefore not required to be included when calculating the regular rate of pay for the
17 purposes of sick pay. Lidman Decl., ¶ 18. Defendants further contend that they have always properly
18 calculated the regular rate of pay, and have produced pay data demonstrating that the regular rate was
19 calculated correctly. *Id.* Defendants further asserts that Plaintiff would be unable to certify this class
20 given the individualized inquiries that would be required. *Id.*

21 Meal Period Violations: Plaintiffs allege that they and the Settlement Class Members were not
22 provided with all legally-compliant meal periods beginning before the end of the fifth hour of work, nor
23 were they provided second meal periods when working shifts longer than 10.0 hours. Lidman Decl., ¶
24 19. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendants' supervisors were responsible for scheduling meal periods
25 and Plaintiffs and Settlement Class members were not permitted to take their meal periods unless and
26 until their supervisor affirmatively relieved them from their duties. *Id.* As a result of this human-
27 controlled process for providing meal periods, and the nature of the restaurant business, Plaintiffs

1 contend that Settlement Class members were not provided with a meal period until after the fifth hour
2 of work had concluded. *Id.* Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Defendants failed to provide second
3 meal periods for shifts that were over 10.0 hours. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiffs calculated Defendants'
4 alleged exposure on the meal period claim at \$3,539,735. *Id.*

5 Defendants counter that they have always maintained a lawful meal period policy and provided
6 non-exempt employees with an opportunity to take all legally compliant meal periods, and any non-
7 compliant meal periods reflected in employee timekeeping records were solely the result of employee
8 choice, rather than any policy or practice of Defendants. Lidman Decl., ¶ 20. Defendants also contend
9 that their pay records demonstrate payment of meal period premiums to putative class members. *Id.*
10 Defendants points out that under *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 1004,
11 they are only required to “provide” the opportunity to take meal periods, not “ensure” meal periods are
12 taken, and that they have always done so. *Id.*; *Brinker, supra*, 53 Cal.4th at 1038 (rejecting “ensure”
13 standard). Finally, Defendants contends Plaintiffs’ meal period claim is not suited for class
14 certification, given that individual inquiries would be required to assess which employees took non-
15 compliant meal periods, how many meal periods were non-compliant or missed, and the reasons why
16 a particular employee took a non-compliant meal period or missed a meal period during a particular
17 shift. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiffs discounted the maximum exposure by 50% for the risk of non-
18 certification, and an additional 60% to account for Defendants’ defenses on the merits to arrive at an
19 estimated exposure of \$707,947. *Id.*

20 Rest Period Violations: Plaintiffs allege that they and Settlement Class Members were also not
21 authorized and permitted to take all required rest periods due to Defendant’s rest period policies and
22 practices. Lidman Decl., ¶ 21. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that due to the nature of the restaurant
23 business and supervisors being responsible for releasing employees for rest periods, Plaintiffs and
24 Settlement Class members were unable to take any required rest periods. *Id.* Thus, Plaintiffs allege that
25 they and other non-exempt employees experienced at least one rest period violation on every shift
26 worked in excess of 3.5 hours. *Id.* Therefore, Plaintiffs calculated Defendants’ maximum potential
27 exposure for the alleged rest period violations at approximately \$11,166,358. *Id.*

1 Defendants contend they have always maintained and enforced lawful rest period policies and
2 practices, and that Settlement Class Members were authorized and permitted to take all off-duty rest
3 periods in compliance with California law. Lidman Decl., ¶ 22. Defendants argue that they have
4 breakers to ensure employees take their breaks. *Id.* Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs' rest period
5 claim is inherently unsuited for class treatment as it requires an individualized inquiry into whether each
6 Settlement Class Member was in fact authorized and permitted to take a compliant rest period, which
7 would devolve into an unmanageable series of mini-trials. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiffs discounted the
8 maximum exposure by 65% for the risk of non-certification, and an additional 65% to account for
9 Defendants' defenses on the merits to arrive at an estimated exposure of \$1,367,878.86. *Id.*

10 Wage Statement Violations: Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants issued inaccurate wage
11 statements in violation of Labor Code § 226 as a result of the alleged unpaid wages and meal and rest
12 period premium wages described above. Lidman Decl., ¶ 23. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that this
13 conduct violated Labor Code § 226(a) because the wage statements issued to Settlement Class Members
14 did not include all hours worked and the rate at which they were being paid. *Id.* Plaintiffs calculated
15 Defendants' maximum potential exposure for wage statement violations at approximately \$4,981,250.
16 *Id.*

17 Defendants argue that their alleged wage statement violations could not be shown to be "knowing
18 and intentional," and that Plaintiffs cannot show that they or any other employee "suffer[ed] injury" as
19 a result of the alleged wage statement violations, as required by Lab. Code § 226(e) for imposition of
20 penalties. Lidman Decl., ¶ 24. Defendants also argue that recovery of wage statement penalties as a
21 derivative claim for other alleged violations (such as unpaid wages or meal/rest periods) is an unlawful
22 double recovery prohibited under binding California law, including *Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc.*,
23 22 Cal. App. 5th 1308 (2018) and *Soto v. Motel 6 Operating, L.P.*, 4 Cal. App. 5th 385 (2016). *Id.* As
24 such, Plaintiffs discounted the calculated exposure by 45% for a risk of non-certification and an
25 additional 50% for a risk of being unsuccessful on the merits, to arrive at an estimated total of
approximately \$1,369,843.75. *Id.*

26 Waiting Time Penalties: Plaintiffs alleges that Defendants are also liable for waiting time
27 penalties under Labor Code section 203 as a result of its failure to pay all wages. Lidman Decl., ¶ 25.

1 Based on the data provided by Defendants, there were approximately 701 Settlement Class Members
2 who have separated their employment with Defendants during the relevant time period who could be
3 entitled to waiting time penalties. *Id.* Therefore, Plaintiffs calculated Defendants' maximum potential
4 exposure for waiting time penalties at approximately \$3,120,852. *Id.*

5 Defendants assert they have strong defenses to the waiting time claim because there exist good-
6 faith disputes as to Plaintiffs' underlying claims, precluding imposition of penalties. Lidman Decl., ¶
7 26; *See also* 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 13520 (a "good faith dispute that any wages are due will preclude
8 imposition of waiting time penalties"); *Kao v. Joy Holiday*, 12 Cal.App.5th 947, 963 (2017) (holding
9 that "good faith dispute" over whether employee was exempt precluded imposition of waiting time
10 penalties over contested wages owed). Accordingly, Plaintiffs discounted the maximum exposure by
11 45% for the risk of non-certification, and an additional 40% to account for Defendants' defenses on the
12 merits, to arrive at an estimated exposure of approximately \$1,029,881.16. *Id.*

13 PAGA Civil Penalties: Plaintiffs also seek civil penalties under the PAGA as a result of the
14 foregoing alleged Labor Code violations. Lidman Decl., ¶ 27. Plaintiffs calculated Defendants'
15 potential exposure at \$4,996,300.00 based on the initial violation rate. *Id.*; *see Amaral v. Cintas Corp.*
16 *No. 2* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1207 (finding "initial" violation rate applies until employer is
17 notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision).

18 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' PAGA claim will fail for the same reasons that her underlying
19 claims will fail. Lidman Decl., ¶ 28; *see Price v. Starbucks Corp.* (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1147
20 ("Because the underlying causes of action fail, the derivative UCL and PAGA claims also fail.").
21 Defendants also maintain that, given their good faith defenses, this Court would exercise its discretion
22 to substantially reduce any PAGA penalties if it were to find Defendants liable for any of Plaintiffs'
23 claims. *See* Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2); *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt., Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
24 1112, 1135 (affirming reduction of PAGA penalties); *Fleming v. Covidien Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2011) Case
25 No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 WL 7563047, at *4 (reducing PAGA penalties from \$2.8
26 million to \$500,000). Therefore, Plaintiffs discounted the maximum exposure figure by 60% for a risk
27 of being unsuccessful on the merits, and an additional 55% to account for the possibility of this Court
28 reducing penalties, to arrive at an estimated exposure of \$899,334. *Id.*

1 **g. The Settlement Is Within the Range of Possible Approval**

2 Using these estimated figures for each of the claims described above, Plaintiffs predicted the
3 realistic total recovery for the Settlement Class would be at least approximately \$5,374,884.77. Lidman
4 Decl., ¶ 29. The proposed settlement of \$3,000,000.00 therefore represents approximately 55% of the
5 reasonably forecasted recovery for the Settlement Class. *Id.* Preliminary approval is appropriate as the
6 settlement will provide tangible monetary relief to Settlement Class members and will still provide an
7 average recovery to Settlement Class members of over \$1,300.00, which is a great result given the
8 expiration of the five year rule. *Id.*

9 The proposed settlement reflects approximately 55% of the estimated recovery the Settlement
10 Class could reasonably expect in light of the significant litigation and collection risks, and will provide
11 tangible monetary compensation for hotly disputed claims. Indeed, the percentage of the liability
12 exposure recovered in this case exceeds percentages routinely approved by courts. *See, e.g., Glass v.*
13 *UBS Finan. Servs.* (N.D. Cal. 2007) Case No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL 221862, *4 (approving
14 settlement representing 25% to 35% of potential damages); *Dunleavy v. Nadler* (9th Cir. 2000) 213
15 F.3d 454, 459 (approving settlement representing about one-sixth of potential recovery); *Nat'l Rural*
16 *Telecomm. Coop. v. DirecTV, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (“it is well-settled law that a
17 proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction of the potential
18 recovery that might be available to the Settlement Class members at trial”). Thus, Plaintiffs submit
19 that the proposed settlement is within the range of possible approval, such that notice should be
20 provided to the Settlement Class so that they can consider the Settlement. The Court will have the
21 opportunity to again assess the reasonableness of the Settlement after the Settlement Class has had the
22 opportunity to opt-out or object.

23 **h. The Experience and Views of Counsel**

24 “Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a
25 settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in litigation.” *In re Pacific Enterprises*
26 *Securities Litigation* (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 378. Here, Plaintiff is represented by competent,
27 experienced counsel who possess extensive experience prosecuting and defending wage-and-hour class
28 actions, and who have been appointed as class counsel in numerous cases alleging similar claims. *See*

1 Lidman Decl., ¶¶ 2-8; Moore Decl., ¶¶ 2-5; Gose-Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Haines Decl., ¶¶ 2-8. Class
2 Counsel conducted an in-depth review of Defendants’ policies and timekeeping and payroll records,
3 and drew on their extensive experience in similar cases to assess the strengths and weaknesses of
4 Plaintiff’s case. *See* Lidman Decl., ¶¶ 11, 17-32. The Settlement was also reached with the assistance
5 of an experienced wage and hour class action mediator. Lidman Decl., ¶ 12. This factor strongly
6 supports preliminary approval of the Settlement. *See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130.

7 **i. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs**

8 California courts recognize an appropriate method for awarding attorneys’ fees in class actions
9 is to award a percentage of the “common fund” created as a result of a settlement. *See e.g., Laffitte v.*
10 *Robert Half Int’l, Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (holding “the percentage of fund method survives in
11 California class action cases”). Class Counsel’s request for fees of one-third of the GSA is well within
12 the range of reasonableness and, indeed, is considered the typical rate for common fund settlements.
13 Historically, courts have awarded percentage fees in the range of 20% to 50%, depending on the
14 circumstances of the case. *See* 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 14.6 (4th Ed. 2013).

15 Here, Class Counsel will also apply for an attorneys’ fees award of one-third of the GSA, which
16 is currently estimated to be \$1,000,000.00, and up to \$115,000.00 in verified costs reimbursement. *See*
17 Lidman Decl., ¶ 30 and Exh. 3 (Settlement, ¶ 4). Plaintiffs submit the requested fee is fair compensation
18 for undertaking complex, risky, expensive, and time-consuming litigation on a purely contingent fee
19 basis. Lidman Decl., ¶ 30. Further, Plaintiffs have provided written approval of the split of attorneys’
20 fees in this action. Lidman Decl., ¶ 31. Class Counsel has incurred substantial attorney fees conducting
21 pre-filing investigation, analyzing Plaintiff’s claims, conducting legal research, propounding multiple
22 sets of written discovery, responding to written discovery, lengthy meet and confer conferences with
23 defense counsel, participating in the *Belaire-West* opt out notice mailing, reviewing thousands of pages
24 of Defendant’s documents and policies, preparing and taking 4 PMQ depositions, preparing and
25 defending Plaintiff Ramirez Angeles’ deposition, analyzing Plaintiff’s timekeeping data and payroll
26 records, drafting and filing a Motion for Class Certification, preparing for and attending mediation,
27 negotiating and revising the long-form Settlement, preparing this Motion, and otherwise litigating the
28 case. Lidman Decl., ¶ 30. Class Counsel expects to expend additional attorney time in attending the

1 hearing on this Motion, overseeing the Notice process, fielding questions from Settlement Class
2 members, preparing the final approval papers, and attending the Final Approval hearing. *Id.*

3 Class Counsel submits that the request for attorneys' fees is reasonable when viewed as an
4 overall percentage of the settlement in light of the substantial risks, significant work undertaken, the
5 positive results obtained for the class, and the efficiency with which the Parties conducted the litigation.
6 Should the Court grant preliminary approval, Class Counsel will seek an award of attorneys' fees and
7 verified litigation costs at the time of seeking final approval of the Settlement, which will include a
8 lodestar analysis.

9 **j. Administration Costs**

10 Phoenix Settlement Administrator's fees and expenses are estimated not to exceed \$16,500.00.
11 See Declaration of Jodey Lawrence in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval filed
12 concurrently herewith ("Lawrence Decl."). This request is reasonable in light of the proposed class size
13 of approximately 1,183 Settlement Class Members and the costs and expenses associated with
14 administering the Notice Packets and distributing the awards, including translating the documents to
15 Spanish by a Court certified translator.

16 **k. Class Representative Service Awards**

17 "[I]ncentive awards are fairly typical in class action cases . . . and are intended to compensate
18 class representatives for work done on behalf of the class [and] to make up for financial or reputational
19 risk undertaken in bringing the action." *In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
20 1380, 1393-94.

21 Here, as part of the Settlement, Plaintiffs will separately apply for a service awards at the time
22 of seeking final approval of the proposed class action settlement in the amount of \$10,000.00 each for
23 their services to the Settlement Class. Lidman Decl., ¶ 32, Exh. 3 (Settlement, ¶ 4); Martinez Decl., ¶
24 15; Ramirez Angeles Decl., ¶ 15. As will be fully briefed at the time of final approval, Plaintiffs'
25 requested service award is intended to recognize the time and effort Plaintiffs expended on behalf of
26 the Settlement Class, including providing substantial factual information and documents to Class
27 Counsel, multiple conferences with Class Counsel to discuss the claims and theories at issue in the
28 litigation, responding to written discovery, sitting for a deposition, as well as the significant risks

1 Plaintiffs undertook by agreeing to serve as the named plaintiff in this case, and the fact that Plaintiffs
2 have agreed to a general release of all claims subject to a waiver of Civil Code § 1542. *See* Lidman
3 Decl., ¶ 36; Martinez Decl., ¶¶ 3-15; Ramirez Angeles Decl., ¶ 3-14.

4 **I. PAGA Civil Penalties**

5 The parties have agreed to a PAGA award of \$250,000.00 and in accordance with California
6 Labor Code section 2699(i), the LWDA will receive 75% of the amount attributable to PAGA penalties
7 – or \$187,500. Settlement ¶ 3.2(d). This \$187,500.00 represents 6.25% of the \$3,000,000.00 Gross
8 Settlement Amount and is within the range approved by Courts. *See, e.g., In re M.L. Stern Overtime*
9 *Litig.*, No. CV 07-0118 BTM (JMAx), 2009 WL 995864, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009) (approving
10 PAGA settlement of 2 percent, or \$20,000); *Hopson v. Hanesbrands, Inc.*, No. CV 08-0844 EDL, 2008
11 WL 3385452, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009) (approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3 percent, or \$1,500);
12 *Nordstrom Comm’n Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 589 (2010) (approving settlement of wage and hour
class action claims and PAGA claims under which no money was allocated to the PAGA claims).

13 **m. Payroll Taxes and Tax Allocation**

14 The Settlement provides that the employer’s share of payroll taxes shall be paid separately from,
15 and in addition to, and the Gross Settlement Amount. Settlement ¶ 4.E.

16 **n. Uncashed Funds**

17 The Settlement provides that Settlement Class members will have 180 days from the date the
18 Settlement Administrator mails the checks to cash any and all payments. Settlement ¶ 6.F. Any funds
19 remaining after 180 days escheat to the California Secretary of State-Unclaimed Property Fund under
20 the unclaimed property laws in the name of the Settlement Class member. Settlement ¶ 6.F. As all
21 settlement funds will be distributed to the Settlement Class members, there will be no residue and
22 therefore it is unnecessary to designate *cy pres* recipients.

23 **C. SETTLEMENT IS DEVOID OF OBVIOUS DEFICIENCIES**

24 Preliminary approval of the Settlement is also warranted because there are no obvious
25 deficiencies. The Settlement will provide monetary relief to participating Settlement Class Members.
26 The amounts proposed for Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs, and service awards are all
27 reasonable and appropriate based on the facts of this case. Because the Settlement is devoid of obvious

1 deficiencies, this factor supports preliminary approval.

2 **D. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPOSED**
3 **NOTICE TO SETTLEMENT CLASS MEMBERS**

4 Before the final approval hearing, the Court requires adequate notice of the settlement be given
5 to all class members. This Court should order distribution to the Settlement Class of the proposed
6 Notice Packet by first-class regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, using last known mailing address
7 information provided by Defendant, as updated by the Settlement Administrator through the National
8 Change of Address database. *See* Settlement, ¶ 11. The Notice Packets, which shall include the Court
9 Approved Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final Court Approval, Allocation
10 Form, Request for Exclusion Form and Objection Form, will be mailed in both English and Spanish.
11 This manner of giving notice is the “best notice practicable” under the circumstances because it
12 provides “individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” *See Eisen*
13 *v. Carlisle & Jacquelin* (1974) 417 U.S. 156, 173. Here, Plaintiff proposes that the Settlement be
14 administered by Phoenix Settlement Administrators (“Phoenix”), an experienced class action
15 settlement administrator. *See generally* Lawrence Decl. and attached exhibits. Settlement Class
16 Members’ addresses will be ascertainable through Defendant’s personnel and payroll records, which
17 Defendant will provide to Phoenix within 20 days of preliminary approval of the Settlement. *See*
18 Settlement ¶ 11.A. Within 10 business days of receipt of the Settlement Class Members’ addresses,
19 Phoenix will run the addresses through the United States Postal Service Notice of Change of Address
20 database (which provides updated addresses for any individual who has moved in the previous four
21 years and has notified the U.S. Postal Service of a forwarding address) and mail the notices to
22 Settlement Class members. *See* Settlement ¶ 8.4(b). To the extent that any notices are returned, within
23 5 business days after receipt of any Class Notice returned as undelivered, Phoenix will re-mail the
24 Class Notice using any forwarding address provided by the U.S.P.S. or conduct a Class Member
Address Search to track any Class Member’s current mailing address. *See* Settlement ¶ 11.F.

25 The content of the proposed Notice Packet satisfies California Rule of Court 3.766(d) because
26 it advises Settlement Class members of the nature of the claims, basic contentions and denials of the
27 parties, and the key terms of the Settlement, the 60-day deadline to opt-out or object to the Settlement

1 and the procedures by which to do so, explains the recovery formula and expected recovery amount
2 for each Settlement Class Member, provides them the opportunity to contest their total workweeks
3 included in the notice, and advises them that they will be bound by the terms of the Settlement if they
4 do not opt-out. *See* Lidman Decl., Exh. 2 (Settlement, Exh. A). The proposed Notice Packet will also
5 notify Settlement Class members of the final approval hearing date and provides Settlement Class
6 Members the contact information for Class Counsel and advises Settlement Class members that they
7 may enter an appearance through counsel if they wish to. This manner of giving notice satisfies
8 California Rule of Court 3.766(e) as the most reliable and cost-effective method of reaching Settlement
9 Class members.

10 **E. THE COURT SHOULD SET A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING**

11 Finally, this Court should set a hearing for final approval of the Settlement on November 2,
12 2026 at 1:30 p.m., following the deadline by which Settlement Class members must file objections to
13 the Settlement or opt-out. *See* California Rule of Court 3.769.


14 **IV. CONCLUSION**

15 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court preliminarily approve
16 the proposed Settlement, provisionally certify the Settlement Class, and enter the Proposed Order
17 Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement submitted concurrently herewith.

18
19 Dated: March 30, 2026

Respectfully Submitted,
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