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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

MICHAEL PEREIRA, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

RODE MICROPHONES, LLC, a limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23STCV17940

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. William
F. Highberger, Dept. 10]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: July 17, 2025

Time: 1:30 p.m.

Dept: 10

Complaint filed: July 31, 2023

FAC filed: July 3, 2024

Trial date: Not set

1 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION**

2 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on July 17, 2025 at 1:30 p.m., in Department 10 of the Los
4 Angeles County Superior Court, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012,
5 Plaintiff Michael Pereira (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move for an order as follows:

- 6 1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
- 7 2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given
8 notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to
9 the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
- 10 3. Appointing Plaintiff Michael Pereira as a Class Representative for settlement purposes, and
11 approving a Class Representative Service Award of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff Michael Pereira;
- 12 4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Tyler Woods, Alan Wilcox, and Bradford Smith of Wilshire
13 Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes, and approving payment of
14 \$73,333.33 in attorneys’ fees, which is 33 and 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount;
- 15 5. Approving costs in the amount of \$16,408.39 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
- 16 6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement
17 Administrator in the amount of \$4,990.00;
- 18 7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
- 19 8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the
20 Parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or
21 enforcing the terms of the judgment.

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
1 This Motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
2 the Declarations of Tyler Woods, and Ryan McNamee, and such oral argument as may be heard
3 by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

4
5 Dated: June 24, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

6 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

7
8 By: _____



Tyler Woods
Alan Wilcox
Bradford Smith

10 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Michael Pereira (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a proposed \$220,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Rode Microphones, LLC (“Rode” or “Defendant,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 37 class members. Indeed, upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$2,616.02*, with the *highest individual net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$9,764.94*. (Declaration of McNamee with Respect to Settlement Administration and Notice [“McNamee Decl.”], ¶ 16.)

As set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery, which allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage and hour litigation. As of filing this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Motion”), there are **no objections to the settlement** and **no requests for exclusion**, thus showing a 100% participation rate. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11-12.) Accordingly, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-

1 paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant is a global
2 leader in audio technology with its products designed in their headquarters in Sydney, Australia,
3 expanding into the United States in 2001. (Declaration of Tyler Woods in Support of Plaintiff's
4 Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement ["Woods Decl.,"] ¶ 2.)

5 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
6 resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours
7 worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally
8 compliant meal and rest periods and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on
9 these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements,
10 failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under
11 the PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

12 On July 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against
13 Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194,
14 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure
15 to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest
16 periods (Labor Code § 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code
17 §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); and
18 (7) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*). On July 22,
19 2023, Plaintiff sent notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development
20 Agency ("LWDA") alleging wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA. On July 3, 2024,
21 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding a cause of action for civil
22 penalties under PAGA. (Woods Decl., ¶ 4.)

23 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

24 Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
25 information before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records
26 for the class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and
27 practices during the class period and information regarding the total number of current and former
28 employees in its informal discovery responses. (Woods Decl., ¶ 5.)

1 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices
2 and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
3 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum monetary
4 exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding
5 the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and
6 prepared a damage analysis assessing Defendant’s potential liability prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

7 **C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement**

8 On May 14, 2024, the Parties participated in a private mediation with experienced class
9 action mediator, Christopher E. Panetta, Esq. (Woods Decl., ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted
10 via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a
11 professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore
12 the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their
13 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive
14 negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and
15 Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are
16 encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, at ¶¶ 7-9, **Ex. 1** [Class Action and PAGA
17 Settlement Agreement and Class Notice].)

18 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
19 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
20 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
21 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
22 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
23 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

24 **D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement**

25 The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
26 Settlement on March 10, 2025. (Woods Decl., ¶ 9.) The deadline for class members to opt out
27 or object to the Settlement was June 15, 2025. (*Id.*) The reaction of the Class to the settlement
28 has been overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, **no Class Member**

1 **has opted out of the settlement and no Class Member has objected to the settlement.** (*Id.*;
2 *see also* McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 11-13.)

3 **E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

4 Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will pay \$220,000.00 to resolve this
5 litigation. The key terms include:

6 1. Settlement Class: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, the Parties
7 agree to the certification of the classes pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382
8 defined as: “all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as hourly-paid or
9 non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

10 2. Class Period: “means the period from February 3, 2019 to July 14, 2024.”
11 (Settlement, § 1.12.)

12 3. Participating Class Member: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid
13 and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

14 4. Aggrieved Employees: means a person employed by Defendant in California and
15 classified as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant during the
16 PAGA Period. (Settlement, § 1.35.)

17 5. PAGA Period: means the period from August 22, 2022 to July 14, 2024.
18 (Settlement, § 1.31.)

19 6. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$220,000.00, for all claims, including
20 Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class
21 Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Service Payment, and the
22 Administrator’s Expenses. (Settlement, § 1.22.)

23 7. Uncashed Checks: If a settlement check is returned to the Settlement
24 Administrator as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator shall promptly attempt to obtain
25 a valid mailing address by performing a skip trace search and, if another address is identified,
26 shall mail the check to the newly identified address. Any settlement checks remaining uncashed
27 after one hundred and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to the California Controller’s
28 Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no “unpaid residue”

subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

8. Release by Participating Class Members: “All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint, including, any and all claims involving any recovery of unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1198), failure to provide meal and rest periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512), failure to provide accurate wage statements (Cal. Lab. Code § 226), failure to pay all wages due at separation (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203), and violation of Unfair Business Practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.). Except as set forth in Section 6.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers’ compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release will be deemed effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments.” (Settlement, § 5.)

9. Release by Aggrieved Employees: “All Non-Participating Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Release Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint, and the PAGA Notice, including, any and all claims involving any alleged failure to pay minimum wages or overtime, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all wages due at separation, including Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 210, 216, 223, 225.5, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 245-248.5, 256, 432, 432.5, 510, 558, 558.1, 1024.5, 1174, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1198.5, 1199, 2699, 2699.3, 2810.5 during the PAGA

Period. Aggrieved Employees only release these claims for the duration of the PAGA Period.”
(Settlement, ¶ 5.3.)

10. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant.”
(Settlement, § 3.1.)

11. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$20,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s
claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$15,000.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25%
(\$5,000.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 1.34.) Class Counsel
submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA on January 30, 2025 before filing the MPA.
(Woods Decl., ¶ 11.)

12. Net Settlement Amount: The “Net Settlement Amount” is the amount that remains
and that shall be paid to Settlement Class Members after the following amounts are subtracted:
Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service
Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the
Administration Expenses Payment. (Settlement, § 1.28.)

13. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing
the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class
Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate
each Individual PAGA Payments by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25%
share of PAGA Penalties \$5,000.00 by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked
by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period (b) multiplying the result by each
Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

14. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be
allocated as 10% wages and 90% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

15. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be
paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$7,500.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for
Plaintiff’s time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general
release of all claims, known and unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, §

5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

16. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 33 and 1/3% (\$73,333.33) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$20,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

17. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. A.) Class Members were notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (*Id.* ¶ 7; Settlement, § 7.4.) Apex Class Action Administration, the Settlement Administrator, undertook its best efforts to ensure that the notice was provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 3-10.)

III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL

The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: "(1) the settlement is reached through arm's length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small." (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial court's broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give

1 “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk*
2 *v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent
3 necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or
4 overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a
5 whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

6 **A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise**

7 A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had he or she prevailed
8 at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and
9 reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and
10 necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
11 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
12 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
13 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

14 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or
15 some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Woods Decl., ¶ 10.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his
16 claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognizes that
17 proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming,
18 and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification of all or some
19 of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and
20 would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

21 Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief
22 and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the
23 uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish
24 liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of
25 \$220,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and settlement approval is appropriate.

26 ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit of approximately***
27 ***\$9,764.94, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$2,616.02.***
28 (McNamee Decl., ¶ 16.)

1 **B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following**
2 **Formal and Informal Discovery**

3 The Settlement was reached following a mediation session with experienced class action
4 mediator, Christopher E. Panetta, Esq. (Woods Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at
5 arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties
6 went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each
7 side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had
8 not been reached. (*Id.*)

9 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
10 the claims set forth in the litigation, including, exchange of documents relevant to Plaintiff's
11 claims, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendant's policies
12 and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance
13 of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as information regarding the
14 number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates
15 in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶
16 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the
17 applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and
18 his counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement.
19 (*Id.*)

20 **C. Plaintiff's Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience**

21 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
22 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Woods Decl., ¶¶ 27-40.) Class Counsel has substantial
23 experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion,
24 appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on behalf of
25 employees and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling
26 responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

27 Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class
28 Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of

Defendant’s defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant’s defenses on the merits, and the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 [“The court undoubtedly should give considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms’ length transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct”].)

D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement

No class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class member has requested exclusion from the Settlement. (McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 11-12.) The overwhelmingly positive response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the “class members overwhelmingly support[ed] the settlement” where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in the settlement, “only nine objections were submitted”, and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, “these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23”], *citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the “fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

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1 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF**
2 **FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.**

3 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class
4 Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of \$73,333.33, which is 33 and 1/3% of the Gross
5 Settlement Amount, costs up to \$20,000.00 for litigating this action, and an enhancement award of
6 \$7,500.00 to named Plaintiff Michael Pereira. Defendant has also agreed that they would not
7 oppose an application for these payments addressed above, and no class member has objected to
8 these amounts.

9 In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for
10 calculating attorneys' fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed
11 by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, the California
12 Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage and hour class action
13 settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court
14 explained:

15 As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we
16 emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override***
17 ***the trial court's primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common***
18 ***fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the***
19 ***potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-
20 check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the
21 percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a
22 justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an
23 adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time
24 counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable
25 percentage to apply.

26 (*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017
27 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

28 **A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard**

According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on
what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages

are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to forty percent*** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also* *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

The settled-for 33 and 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions. Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the attorneys’ fees requested herein.

B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees

Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate

1 for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be
2 enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

3 Detailed timesheets are not necessary to a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that
4 an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed
5 time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) As the
6 California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

7 With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts
8 conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely
9 scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on
10 attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award
11 appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.”
12 (5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v.*
13 *Integrated Resources, Inc.*, *supra*, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a
14 mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively
15 scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales*
16 *Practice Litigation Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with
17 district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it
18 was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”];
19 *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.* (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451
20 [“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method,
21 it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s
22 hours.”].)

23 (*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

24 Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$65,750.00 based on approximately 76.1 hours of work
25 performed thus far. (Woods Decl., ¶¶ 18-19.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$73,333.33 is
26 reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 1.12. To be sure, trial courts have
27 substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v.*
28 *Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano v. Priest* (1977)
20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even
21 higher.” (*See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp.
22 at p. 298 [“[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex
23 class action litigation.”].) Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel.
24 (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB,
25 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm, PLC’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light
26 of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1 **1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts**

2 Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of
3 the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate
4 determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are
5 satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps*
6 *Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their
7 hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

8 **2. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate**

9 Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other
10 “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seeks a modest multiplier
11 of 1.12 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request is underscored by the fact that a
12 significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

13 Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently
14 with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A
15 lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the
16 fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid
17 no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.)
18 Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important
19 rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a
20 windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-
21 level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment
22 or delay in payment of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

23 “Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at
24 p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512
25 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162
26 Cal.App.4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft*
27 *Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier
28 of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11, *citing a*

1 study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and
2 finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be “per se reasonable.”) The intermediate court in
3 *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check,
4 affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82.)
5 The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new
6 decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

7 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
8 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
9 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
10 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
11 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
12 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a
13 multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

14 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
15 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
16 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
17 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
18 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133,
19 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter
20 and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel’s
21 outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

22 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have had
23 success in wage and hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent lawyers
24 and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant’s contentions underscore the risk of
25 prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented
26 recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of
27 this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals.
28 Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so

1 many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other
2 meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but
3 were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to
4 achieve favorable results. (Woods Decl., ¶ 25.) Considered against the risks of continued
5 litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief
6 provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

7 **C. Costs Are Reasonable**

8 As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$16,108.39 in costs,
9 and they anticipate incurring at least \$300 in combined additional costs up to the time the Court
10 enters a judgment in this action and schedules a hearing on distribution. (Woods Decl., ¶ 26.)
11 Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$16,408.39 in costs.
12 Notably, Defendant has agreed that they will not oppose any cost award request up to \$20,000.00.
13 The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of Tyler Woods, and these
14 costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

15 Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee
16 paying client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial
17 subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills,
18 meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir.
19 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval.
20 (*See Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018,
21 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL
22 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying,
23 long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation,
24 exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

25 **D. The Enhancement Payment to the Plaintiff is Reasonable**

26 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
27 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
28 members of the class.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186

Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiffs should therefore be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff a Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff. These amounts are also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general releases of all claims against Defendant. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration demonstrating his devotion to this case, including his efforts assisting counsel in the case and at mediation, communicating with counsel frequently for litigation, and providing and reviewing case-related documents. (*See, generally*, Declaration of Plaintiff, filed on January 30, 2025.)

When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno, supra*, 2021 WL 3673845 at *3 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez, supra*, 2024 WL 150721 at p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

“Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive

awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at p. 806.) “An incentive award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’” (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394, *quoting Clark*, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394-95.) Plaintiff’s declaration describes how each of the five *Cellphone Termination* factors are present here.

E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved

Apex Class Action Administration, the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will incur a total of \$4,990.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 19.) These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and Class Member payment processing.


V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed settlement.

Dated: June 24, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC



Tyler Woods
Alan Wilcox
Bradford Smith

Attorneys for Plaintiffs