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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

KAION SMITH, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

SILGAN CONTAINERS MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, a corporation; SILGAN
CONTAINERS LLC, a limited liability
company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 23STCV17946

CLASS ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Carolyn
B. Kuhl, Dept. 12]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

[Filed with the Declaration of Peter J.
Horton, Declaration of Kaion Smith,
Proposed Order, and Proof of Service]

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: July 23, 2025

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Dept: 12

Complaint filed: July 31, 2023

Trial date: Not set

TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 23, 2025 at 10:00 a.m., in Department 12 of the Los Angeles Superior Court, located at 312 Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Kaion Smith (“Plaintiff”) will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendants Silgan Containers Manufacturing Corporation (“Silgan Manufacturing”) and Silgan Containers LLC (“Silgan Containers”, and collectively with Silgan Manufacturing, “Defendants”). Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action Settlement Agreement;
2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
4. Appointing Plaintiff Kaion Smith as Class Representative for settlement purposes;
5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Tyler Woods, Peter J. Horton, Alan Wilcox, and Bradford Smith of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
6. Appointing Apex Class Action as the Settlement Administrator; and
7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the Declarations of Peter Horton and Kaion Smith, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: May 9, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: 

Tyler Woods
Peter Horton
Alan Wilcox
Bradford Smith

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kaion Smith (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$200,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendants Silgan Containers Manufacturing Corporation (“Silgan Manufacturing”) and Silgan Containers LLC (“Silgan Containers”, and collectively with Silgan Manufacturing, “Defendants” or “Silgan”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 83 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, David Phillips, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants’ defenses, the Parties reached a settlement on November 8, 2024. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class action. Plaintiff and putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendants during the class period. Defendants are the largest provider of metal food packaging in the United States. (Declaration of Peter J. Horton in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Horton Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendants failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, and unfair business practices. (*Id.* at ¶

3.)

On July 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a putative wage-and-hour class action complaint against Defendants for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802); and (8) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq.). Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) on August 22, 2023. (Horton Decl., ¶ 4.)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the Complaint, the parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. Defendants produced a sample of time and pay records for class members. Defendants also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices, analyzing Defendants’ timekeeping and payroll records, and interviewing Class Members, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendants’ maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

C. Settlement Negotiations

On November 6, 2024, the parties participated in private mediation with experienced class action mediator David Phillips, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional

manner, were adversarial. The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendants’ defenses, the Parties reached a settlement the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 1 [Class Action Settlement Agreement].)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendants both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 16.)

Indeed, the \$200,000.00 Settlement represents **71% of the realistic maximum recovery** of \$279,759.75. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendants’ maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$1.5 million, when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendants’ realistic exposure was \$279,759.75, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-28.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Parties used the Los Angeles Superior Court’s Form Class Action Settlement Agreement and Class Notice. The Settlement’s key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons employed during the Class Period by Silgan at its Antioch, California plant and classified as non-exempt.” (Settlement, § 1.4.)

1 2. Class Period: “means the period from July 31, 2019, to December 31, 2024, or such
2 earlier date as determined by Silgan upon exercise of its election under section 8 of this
3 Agreement.” (Settlement, § 1.11.)

4 3. Participating Class Members: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid
5 and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.26.)

6 4. Gross Settlement Amount: “means \$200,000.00 which is the total among Silgan
7 agrees to pay under the Settlement except as provided in Paragraph 8 below. The Gross Settlement
8 Amount will be used to pay Individual Class Payments, Class Counsel Fees, Class Counsel
9 Expenses, Class Representative Service Payment and the Administrator’s Expenses. (Settlement,
10 § 1.21.)

11 5. Uncashed Checks: For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check
12 is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented
13 by such checks to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class
14 Member thereby leaving no “unpaid residue” subject to the requirements of California Code of
15 Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

16 6. Release: “All Participating Class Members employed during the Class Period by
17 Silgan at its Antioch, California plant and classified as non-exempt, on behalf of themselves and
18 their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators,
19 successors, and assigns, release the Released Parties from all claims that were alleged, or
20 reasonably could have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative
21 Complaint and/or ascertained in the course of the Action solely with regards to persons employed
22 by Silgan at its Antioch, California plant. Other than Plaintiff, Participating Class Members do not
23 release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of
24 the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security,
25 workers’ compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period or claims by
26 persons who were not employed during the Class Period by Silgan at its Antioch, California plant.”
27 (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release will be deemed effective on the date when Defendant fully funds
28

the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments. (Settlement, § 5.)

7. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Silgan.” (Settlement, § 3.1.)

8. Net Settlement Amount: “means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court. Class Representative Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments.” (Settlement, § 1.24.)

9. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.)

10. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 10% wages, 90% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

11. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$5,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is for Plaintiff’s time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general release of all claims, known or unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement, § 5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed between the participating Settlement Class Members on a pro-rata basis. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

12. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 35% (\$70,000.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$25,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

13. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service award being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations

are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. 1, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 7.4.) Apex Class Action Administration, the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Horton Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 3 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

///

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation

1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm's-Length Negotiations

Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.”].)

The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of mediation with experienced employment mediator, David Phillips, Esq. (Horton Decl. ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendants' defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (Horton Decl. ¶ 8.)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the Litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendants' policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages

1 paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation,
2 Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the
3 litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in
4 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

5 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
6 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 39-49.) Again, this supports the position that the
7 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
8 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
9 action.

10 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’** 11 **Respective Legal Positions**

12 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor
13 does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
14 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
15 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
16 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
17 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
18 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

19 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Horton
20 Decl., ¶ 26.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate controversy exists
21 as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages
22 due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

23 The proposed settlement of \$200,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
24 compared to Plaintiff’s reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-28.) Because of the proposed
25 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
26 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
27 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
28 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$200,000.00 is within

1 the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed,***
2 ***each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately***
3 ***\$1,132.53.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 27.)

4 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

5 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
6 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
7 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Horton Decl., ¶¶ 39-49.)
8 Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
9 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

10 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

11 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
12 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
13 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
14 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
15 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
16 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

17 **C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

18 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendants agree to pay Class
19 Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in amount of \$70,000.00, which is 35% of the gross Settlement
20 Amount, and up to \$25,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the
21 proposed Notice and are reasonable.

22 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund”** 23 **Method**

24 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created
25 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that “when a number
26 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
27 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
28 may be awarded attorneys’ fees out of the fund.” (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,

1 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

2 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/ common
3 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all
4 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v.*
5 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995)
6 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in
7 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
8 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
9 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
10 that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought
11 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

12 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
13 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
14 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
15 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
16 fund created." (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: "The recognized advantages of the percentage
17 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
18 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
19 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
20 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts."
21 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

22 2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

23 According to a leading treatise on class actions, "No general rule can be articulated on what
24 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
25 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
26 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
27 are not unprecedented." (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
28 Attorneys' fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty

1 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also
2 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
3 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
4 million].)

5 Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to 35% of the Settlement Amount, which is in
6 line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and
7 is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66,
8 n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar
9 method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)
10 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated
11 by the parties and requested herein.

12 3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code

13 Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
14 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
15 section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover his actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
16 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in
17 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing
18 Defendants while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by
19 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class
20 Counsel. (Horton Decl., ¶¶ 37-38.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent
21 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the
22 Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class
23 ahead of all other concerns.

24 4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the 25 Requested Fee Award

26 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
27 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Horton
28 Decl., ¶¶ 39-49.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class

1 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class
2 counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee
3 award is supported here.

4 Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
5 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendants and the reasonableness of the settlement.
6 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
7 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
8 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
9 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
10 is reasonable and fair.

11 **D. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable**

12 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
13 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
14 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
15 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
16 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
17 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.* (9th Cir.
18 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

19 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
20 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
21 codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously
22 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to
23 work under substandard unlawful conditions”). Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court
24 has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is
25 widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*
26 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for
27 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
28 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

1 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
2 a Service Award in the amount of \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff. This amount is also in exchange for
3 Plaintiff’s general release of all claims against Defendants. Courts routinely approve a \$5,000.00
4 enhancement award for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium*
5 *Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [“The Court concludes a
6 \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, N.A.* (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11,
7 2024), No. 18-cv-01202-LB, 2024 WL150721 at p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for
8 each class representative.”].) Class Counsel represent that Plaintiff devoted a great deal of time
9 and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation
10 and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the
11 mediation. (Horton Decl., ¶¶ 29-33.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the
12 substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members. (*Id.*)

13 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
14 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive
15 award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class
16 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg
17 & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev.
18 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class
19 actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named
20 plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median
21 award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in
22 employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
23 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
24 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

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1 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

2 **A. Legal Standard**

3 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
4 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
5 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
6 prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when
7 the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
8 numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
9 for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1)
10 There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest
11 in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow*
12 *Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the
13 California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the
14 community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of
15 law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
16 representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29
17 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

18 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
19 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
20 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
21 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the
22 appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*,
23 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

24 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
25 **Settlement Purposes.**

26 **1. The Classes Are Ascertainable and Numerous**

27 The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable and includes
28 approximately 83 employees of Defendants.

1 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
2 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
3 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
4 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
5 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

6 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
7 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
8 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action
9 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
10 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class
11 action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a
12 trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
13 574; see also, *Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
14 Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

15 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

16 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
17 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
18 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
19 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
20 Cal.App.3d 605.)

21 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendants had legally compliant
22 policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendants had legally
23 compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods;
24 whether Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including
25 overtime wages; whether Defendants reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether final
26 payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal period premium
27 wages, and rest period premium wages; and whether the wage statements were consequently non-
28 compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified

1 class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for,
2 the same alleged injuries.

3 **3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

4 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
5 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
6 typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and
7 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that
8 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly
9 situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they
10 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
11 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendants; as
12 such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
13 employees.

14 **4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

15 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
16 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
17 a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
18 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

19 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel
20 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
21 previously settled. (Horton Decl., ¶¶ 39-49.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified,
22 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
23 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel,
24 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing his dedication. Plaintiff's
25 willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates his serious commitment to bringing about the
26 best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

27 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

28 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class

1 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
2 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
3 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
4 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-
5 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
6 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
7 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457-62; *Leyva v.*
8 *Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the
9 superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

10 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

11 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

12 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
13 Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
14 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
15 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
16 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
17 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
18 Members” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
19 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

20 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

21 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
22 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
23 terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
24 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
25 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

26 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
27 *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms
28 and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes

1 clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
2 Defendants, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
3 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
4 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
5 combined settlement-certification class notice.

6 **VI. CONCLUSION**

7 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary
8 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing in December 2025 or the
9 Court's earliest convenience thereafter.

10 Respectfully submitted,

11 Dated: May 9, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

12 By: 

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