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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF MADERA**

KELLY SCHARTON and CHRISTA HORN,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the State of California
and other aggrieved persons,

Plaintiffs,

v.

OAKHURST NURSING AND REHAB
CENTER, LLC, a California limited liability
company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: MCV090222

*Assigned for All Purposes to:
Hon. Michael Jurkovich
Dept. 411B*

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING:

Date: March 16, 2026
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: 411B

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on March 16, 2026, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter
3 as the matter may be heard in Department 411B of the above-entitled Court, located at 200
4 South "G" Street, Madera, CA 93637, Plaintiffs Kelly Scharton and Christa Horn ("Plaintiffs")
5 will and hereby does move this Court for an Order:

- 6 1. Granting preliminary approval of the proposed Class Action and PAGA Settlement
7 Agreement ("Settlement");
8 2. Conditionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes only;
9 3. Appointing Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives;
10 4. Appointing Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel;
11 5. Appointing Apex Class Action LLC as the Settlement Administrator; and
12 6. Setting a final approval hearing date.

13 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(d) and (e), this Motion is made on the
14 grounds that the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary approval and falls well
15 within the range of reasonableness. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm's length
16 bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral, and
17 Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class.

18 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of
19 Points and Authorities, the Declaration of John G. Yslas, the Declaration of Kelly Scharton, the
20 Declaration of Christa Horn and on all records and documents on file, together with such oral
21 and documentary evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: February 20, 2026

24 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

25 By: Lisa B. Iturriaga
26 Lisa B. Iturriaga
27 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
28

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiffs Kelly Scharton and Christa Horn seek preliminary approval of a class action settlement of wage and hour claims, including representative claims brought under the Private Attorneys' General Act of 2004 ("PAGA"), against Defendant Oakhurst Nursing and Rehab Center, LLC ("Defendant"). The proposed Class is defined as all persons who worked for any Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee ("Class Members") at any time during the Class Period of August 1, 2020 to May 1, 2024 ("Class Period"). The main terms of the Settlement are as follows:

1. A Gross Settlement Amount of \$352,500.00, which will be distributed to approximately 251 Class Members on a pro rata basis according to the total workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period;
2. Attorneys' fees of up to one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently \$117,500.00) and up to \$28,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs to Plaintiffs' Counsel;
3. Class representatives service payments of up to \$7,500.00 to each Plaintiff;
4. Costs of settlement administration of up to \$7,500.00; and
5. Allocation of \$18,000.00 to PAGA penalties, seventy-five percent (75%) of which (\$13,500.00) will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA"), and twenty-five percent (25%) of which (\$4,500.00) all persons who worked for any Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at any time during the PAGA Period of August 21, 2022 to May 1, 2024 ("Aggrieved Employees").

The Settlement meets all criteria for preliminary approval and falls within the range of reasonableness given the risks and expenses of further litigation. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm's length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral. As such, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only, appoint Plaintiffs as the

Class Representatives, appoint Plaintiffs’ Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint Apex Class Action LLC (“APEX”) as the Settlement Administrator, authorize the Settlement Administrator to administer notice of the Settlement to the Class, and set a final approval hearing date.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff Scharton filed this action as a putative class action against Defendant Oakhurst Nursing and Rehab Center, LLC (“Defendant”) alleging: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; (8) failure to produce requested employment records; and (9) unfair business practices. Declaration of John G. Yslas in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (“Yslas Decl.”) at ¶ 3.

On August 21, 2023, Plaintiff Scharton provided written notice to the LWDA and Defendant of her intention to file a PAGA claim (LWDA-CM-976544-23). Yslas Decl. at ¶ 4, **Exhibit 3**. The LWDA did not notify Plaintiff Scharton that it intended to investigate within 65 days of this written notice. *Id.* Therefore, on October 20, 2023, Plaintiff Scharton filed a separate action alleging a claim under PAGA, Case No. MCV090574 (the “PAGA Action”). *Id.*

The Parties subsequently participated in a private all-day mediation with mediator Katherine J. Edwards on September 22, 2025. *Id.* at ¶ 5. The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm’s length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients. *Id.* Subsequently, the Parties accepted a mediator’s proposal and reached an agreement on general settlement terms. *Id.* The parties negotiated the terms of the Settlement over the next several months, which was finalized in January 2026. *Id.* at ¶ 7, **Exhibit 1** (“Settlement Agreement”). On January 28, 2026, Plaintiffs submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement to the LWDA. *Id.* at ¶ 8, **Exhibit 2**.

On October 9, 2025, Plaintiff Scharton filed a First Amended Class & PAGA Representative Action Complaint (“FAC” or “Operative Complaint”), adding Christa Horn as a

1 named plaintiff. *Id.* at ¶ 6. The PAGA representative claims asserted in the FAC related back to
2 the filing of the PAGA Action. *Id.*

3 **III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

4 **A. Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

5 The parties have agreed to settle the claims alleged in this case and the related PAGA Action
6 for a Gross Settlement Amount of \$352,500.00. Settlement Agreement at § 3.1. Subject to Court
7 approval, the following payments will be deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount: (1) class
8 representatives service payments of up to \$7,500.00 to each Plaintiff; (2) attorneys' fees of up to
9 one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently \$117,500.00) and reimbursement of
10 litigation costs of up to \$28,000.00 to Plaintiffs' Counsel; (3) costs of settlement administration of
11 up to \$7,500.00 to APEX; (4) individual class payments to Class Members; and (5) PAGA
12 penalties in the amount of \$18,000.00, which will be allocated 75% to the LWDA (\$13,500.00)
13 and 25% to Aggrieved Employees (\$4,500.00). *Id.* at § 3.2.1-3.2.5. After all requested deductions
14 are made, the remaining Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be \$166,500.00.

15 Individual class payments will be calculated based on the number of workweeks worked
16 by each Class Member during the Class Period. *Id.* at § 3.2.4. For tax purposes, the individual class
17 payments will be allocated 20% to wages and 80% to penalties, interest, and reimbursement of
18 expenses. *Id.* at § 3.2.4.1. Defendant will separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes owed
19 on the wage positions of the individual class payments separate from the Gross Settlement Amount.
20 *Id.* at 3.1.

21 Individual PAGA payments to Aggrieved employees will be calculated by (a) dividing the
22 amount of the Aggrieved Employees' 25% share of PAGA Penalties of \$4,500.00 by the total
23 number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA
24 Period, and (b) multiplying the result by each individual Aggrieved Employee's PAGA Pay
25 Periods. *Id.* at § 3.2.5.1. For tax purposes, the individual PAGA payments will be allocated 100%
26 to penalties. *Id.*

27 Any deductions not approved by the Court will be retained by the Settlement Administrator
28 in the Net Settlement Amount. *Id.* at § 3.2, *et seq.* Funds from any uncashed checks will be

transmitted by the Settlement Administrator to California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund. *Id.* at § 4.4.3. None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant. *Id.* at § 3.1.

B. Proposed Settlement Administration

The parties' proposed Class Notice complies with the requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766(d). *See Exhibit A* to Settlement Agreement. It provides information regarding the nature of this lawsuit, a summary of the settlement terms, the formula used for calculating individual class and PAGA payments and instructions to dispute the calculations, instructions on how to opt-out of or object to the Settlement, the date, time, and location of the final approval hearing, and the amounts sought for the class representative service payment, attorneys' fees and litigation costs, and settlement administration costs. *See generally, id.* The Class Notice also notifies Class Members that they do not need to submit a claim in order to participate in the Settlement and receive a payment. *See id.* The Settlement Administrator will mail Class Members the Class Notice by first-class mail in English and in Spanish. Settlement Agreement at § 7.4.2.

If a Class Notice is returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will re-mail the Class Notice within 5 calendar days to the forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal Service. *Id.* at § 7.4.3. If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will conduct a Class Member Address Search and re-mail the Class Notice to the most current address obtained. *Id.* The deadline to opt-out of the Settlement or to submit an objection or dispute will be extended by 14 days for all Class Members whose Class Notice was remailed. *Id.* at § 7.4.4.

C. Proposed Release

All Participating Class Members will release all claims, rights, demands, liabilities, and causes of action, alleged or which could have reasonably been alleged based on the facts alleged in the operative Complaint. The Released Class Claims are those that accrued during the Class Period. Settlement Agreement at § 5.2.

All Aggrieved Employees will release all claims for PAGA civil penalties that are alleged or reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts alleged in the operative Complaint and/or the operative PAGA notice letter to the LWDA. The Released PAGA Claims are those that accrued

1 during the PAGA Period. *Id.* at § 5.3. Only Plaintiffs will agree to a general release and a waiver
2 of Civil Code § 1542. *Id.* at § 5.1.

3 **IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MEETS ALL CRITERIA FOR** 4 **PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

5 **A. Provisional Certification of the Class is Appropriate**

6 Class certification is appropriate when there is: (1) an ascertainable and sufficiently
7 numerous class; (2) a well-defined community of interest among class members; and (3) substantial
8 benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives. *Brinker*
9 *Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (2012). Although courts still need to
10 review and consider each element for certification, a lesser standard can be used to provisionally
11 certify a settlement class. *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal.App.4th
12 836, 859 (2003).

13 **1. The Proposed Class is Numerous and Ascertainable**

14 “Ascertainability” is determined by examining the class definition and the size of the class,
15 and may also involve examining the means available to identify class members. *Noel v. Thrifty*
16 *Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal.5th 955, 980-981, 985-986 (2019). As the settlement eliminates the need for
17 trial, “the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be
18 confronted.” *Global Minerals*, 113 Cal.App.4th at 859. Further, under California law, there is no
19 minimum number of class members for maintenance of a class action. *Hendershot v. Ready to Roll*
20 *Transp., Inc.*, 228 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1222 (2014). Class sizes as small as 10 have been permitted.
21 *Rose v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981), disapproved on other grounds by *Noel*,
22 7 Cal.5th at 986.

23 The Class here consists of all persons who worked for any Defendant in California as an
24 hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at any time during the Class Period. *See* Settlement
25 Agreement at §§ 1.5, 1.13. The Class is also readily ascertainable from Defendant’s business
26 records, because all Class Members are or were employees of Defendant. *Id.* Defendant’s records
27 show there are approximately 251 Class Members, making joinder of all Class Members
28 impracticable. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 10.

2. *A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists*

The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Brinker*, 53 Cal.4th at 1021.

a. Common Questions Predominate

In determining whether common issues “predominate,” courts consider both plaintiff’s legal theories and defendant’s affirmative defenses. *Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n*, 59 Cal.4th 1, 28-29 (2014). The “predominate common questions” factor does not require that all class members have identical claims. *Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.*, 59 Cal.4th 522, 530 (2014). Rather, the focus is on whether issues shared by the class members are sufficiently uniform to permit class-wide assessment, and whether individual variations in proof on those issues are manageable. *Id.*

Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant maintained common employment policies and/or practices that unlawfully deprived Class Members of wages, meal period, rest periods, reimbursements for business expenses, accurate wage statements, and timely payment of wages upon separation of employment. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 11. These allegations present common factual and legal questions of, *inter alia*, whether Defendant applied the same scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, and reimbursement policies to all Class Members, whether these policies and practices resulted in Labor Code violations, whether Defendant’s conduct was intentional, and whether Class Members are entitled to damages and/or penalties. *Id.* These common questions could be resolved using Class Members’ time records, payroll records, testimony from Defendant’s designated representative(s), and Class Members’ testimony. *Id.* Therefore, the Court can and should exercise its discretion to grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes.

b. Plaintiffs are Typical of the Class

Typicality does not require that the representative plaintiff’s claims and those of the class members be identical or perfectly aligned. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 228 (2001), disapproved on other grounds by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.*, 4 Cal.5th

1 260, 269-280 (2018). Typicality does not require that a plaintiff's claims be identical to those of
2 other class members, only that their claims and the defenses applicable to them are sufficiently
3 similar to those of other class members that a named plaintiff is able to adequately represent the
4 class and focus on common issues. *Medraza v. Honda of North Hollywood*, 166 Cal.App.4th 89,
5 99 (2008).

6 Plaintiffs have alleged that they and Class Members were employed by the same Defendant
7 and injured by Defendant's common wage and hour policies and practices, including Defendant's
8 scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, and reimbursement policies. *See* Yslas
9 Decl. at ¶ 11. Through informal discovery, including the production of thousands of documents by
10 Defendant, Plaintiffs confirmed that these challenged policies and practices applied to Plaintiffs as
11 well as Class Members. *See id.* at ¶ 9. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims and Class Members' claims
12 arise from the same challenged employment policies and practices and are based on the same legal
13 theories.

14 *c. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel Will Adequately Represent the*
15 *Class*

16 Certification requires adequacy of both the proposed class representative and of the
17 proposed class counsel. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382. "Only a conflict that goes to the very subject
18 matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative status." *Richmond v. Dart*
19 *Industries*, 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (1981). Only conflicts that are "irreconcilable" can defeat adequacy.
20 *Nat'l Solar Equip. Owners' Ass'n v. Grumman Corp.*, 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1286 (1991). The
21 proposed representative Plaintiffs and proposed Class Counsel present no such conflict.

22 Plaintiffs' interests are coextensive with Class Members' interests. Plaintiffs have
23 demonstrated an ability to advocate for the interests of Class Members by initiating and/or
24 participating in this lawsuit, gathering documents and information, being available on the day of
25 mediation to answer questions, meeting with their attorneys to understand the claims and theories
26 of liability at issue, assisting their attorneys in preparation for mediation, communicating with their
27 attorneys for regular updates, and reviewing the proposed Settlement. *See generally*, Declaration
28 of Kelly Scharton in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA

1 Settlement (“Scharton Decl.”); Declaration of Christa Horn in Support of Motion for Preliminary
2 Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (“Horn Decl.”).

3 Likewise, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC has expended considerable time and effort on this case
4 and will continue to do so through final approval. *See generally*, Yslas Decl. Therefore, Plaintiffs
5 should be appointed Class Representatives, and their counsel should be appointed Class Counsel.

6 **3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multitude of Individual Lawsuits**

7 Courts have held that class treatment of wage and hour claims is clearly “superior to the
8 other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” *Dean Witter*
9 *Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 211 Cal.App.3d 758, 772-773 (1989). This is so because “[p]ublic
10 policy has long favored the ‘full and prompt payment of wages due an employee.’” *Sav-On Drug*
11 *Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 340 (2004). Here, a class action is superior to a
12 multitude of individual lawsuits. Given the size and amount of each Class Members’ claim, Class
13 Members have little incentive to litigate their claims on an individual basis because the out-of-
14 pocket expenses and personal commitment necessary to litigate each claim likely outweighs any
15 potential recovery. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 10. Therefore, a class action is the superior method for seeking
16 relief.

17 **B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval**

18 The moving party must demonstrate that “the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.”
19 *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 126 (2008). “In determining whether a
20 class settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors,
21 such as the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further
22 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement,
23 the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of
24 counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
25 proposed settlement.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 244-245 (internal quotations and citations
26 omitted).

27 ///

28 ///

1 ***1. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness***

2 A settlement is entitled to “a presumption of fairness . . . where : (1) the settlement is
3 reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow
4 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4)
5 the percentage of objectors is small.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996).
6 The Settlement here satisfies the first three factors. Plaintiff will analyze the fourth factor at final
7 approval after Class Members have been notified of the Settlement and provided with an
8 opportunity to object.

9 ***a. The Settlement is the Result of Arm’s Length Negotiation***

10 Courts have recognized that the involvement of a respected mediator provides a high degree
11 of assurance that the settlement is the result of arm’s length bargaining. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*,
12 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 52-53 (2008). The Settlement in this matter was the product of a full-day
13 mediation session with a respected mediator. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 5. The negotiations were adversarial,
14 conducted at arm’s length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their
15 clients. *Id.*

16 ***b. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery Have Been Conducted***

17 Prior to attending mediation, Plaintiffs’ Counsel thoroughly investigated the claims,
18 applicable law, and potential defenses. *Id.* at ¶ 9. Plaintiffs’ Counsel assessed the value to the class
19 claims using the documents and data Defendant produced in informal discovery, including a 25%
20 sampling of class data providing the number of Class Members, the number of workweeks in the
21 Class Period, and the number of pay periods in the PAGA Period, Plaintiffs’ personnel files,
22 employment handbook and policies, job descriptions, and time and payroll records. *Id.*

23 ***c. Plaintiffs’ Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation***

24 Plaintiffs are represented by Wilshire Law Firm, PLC. *Id.* at ¶ 19. Plaintiffs’ Counsel have
25 extensive experience litigating wage and hour class actions on behalf of employees. *See id.* at ¶¶
26 20-30. Plaintiffs’ Counsel have been involved as counsel in numerous class actions that have
27 resulted in millions of dollars in recovery. *See id.*
28

1 **2. The Settlement is Reasonable Given the Strengths of Plaintiff's Claims**
2 **and the Risks and Expense of Further Litigation**

3 A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered fair
4 and reasonable. *See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Although
5 the exposure Plaintiffs' Counsel calculated is substantial, the various risks at succeeding at class
6 certification and through trial affected the valuation of the claims for settlement purposes. Yslas
7 Decl. at ¶ 12.

8 Minimum and Overtime Wages: Plaintiffs' unpaid minimum and overtime wage claims
9 were based on the allegation that Defendant required Class Members to perform work duties before
10 clocking, in lieu of meal periods and/or rest breaks, and after clocking out. *Id.* at ¶ 13. Based on
11 Plaintiffs' estimate that they worked a total of 1 hour off-the-clock each week, Plaintiffs' Counsel
12 assumed each Class Member worked 1-hour off-the-clock per week in calculating potential
13 exposure to be approximately \$530,653.50 for these claims. *Id.* However, Defendant argued that
14 any off-the-clock time was undocumented and unknown to Defendant, and that Defendant was
15 therefore not obligated to pay for this time. *Id.* Because this claim would have relied heavily on
16 Class Member testimony and would not be evidenced in Defendant's time and payroll records, the
17 risk of succeeding at class certification was substantial. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Counsel
18 applied a risk discount based on a 40% chance of succeeding at class certification and succeeding
19 at trial on the merits, yielding a realistic estimate of approximately \$63,678.42 (\$530,653.50 x 40%
20 x 40%), or approximately 18% of the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.*

21 Meal Periods: Plaintiffs' meal period claims were based on the allegations that Defendant
22 failed to maintain a policy and/or practice of providing meal periods and/or paying meal period
23 premiums when its time records showed Class Members' meal periods were late, short, or missed.
24 *Id.* at ¶ 14. Plaintiffs' Counsel found a violation rate of approximately 40.7% in Defendant's time
25 and payroll records and calculated potential exposure on this claim to be approximately
26 \$555,826.41. *Id.* However, Defendant argued that Class Members signed meal period waivers,
27 including for second meal periods. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Counsel applied a risk discount
28 based on a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 20% chance of succeeding at trial

1 on the merits, yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$88,932.23 ($\$555,826.41 \times$
2 $30\% \times 20\%$), or 25% of the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.*

3 Rest Breaks: Plaintiffs' rest break claims were based on the allegations that Defendant
4 failed to maintain a policy and/or practice of providing rest breaks and/or paying rest break
5 premiums when Class Members' rest breaks were late, short, or missed. *Id.* at ¶ 15. Plaintiffs'
6 Counsel applied a 100% violation rate to all shifts over 3.5 hours and calculated a potential
7 exposure of \$1,365,666.85 for this claim. *Id.* However, Defendant argued that a 100% violation
8 rate was unrealistic and that its handbook provided a rest break policy. *Id.* Because this claim
9 would have relied exclusively on Class Member testimony, Plaintiffs' Counsel applied a risk
10 discount based on a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 20% chance of
11 succeeding at trial on the merits, yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$81,940.01
12 ($\$1,365,666.85 \times 30\% \times 20\%$), or approximately 23% of the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.*

13 Reimbursements: Plaintiffs' reimbursement claim was based on the allegation that
14 Defendant required Class Members to use their personal cell phones to communicate with
15 supervisors and/or managers for work related purposes. *Id.* at ¶ 16. Based on Plaintiffs' estimate
16 that they incurred approximately \$30 in unreimbursed expenses per month, Plaintiffs' Counsel
17 assumed each Class Member incurred \$30 in unreimbursed expenses per month in calculating
18 potential exposure to be approximately \$105,750.00 for this claim. *Id.* However, Defendant argued
19 that these expenses were not required by Defendant, and that it could not have known that these
20 expenses were being incurred. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Counsel could not attribute any value to
21 this claim in terms of settlement value. *Id.*

22 Derivative Penalties: Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of Defendant's alleged failure to pay
23 all wages and meal and rest period premiums owed, Defendant owed waiting time penalties and
24 wage statement penalties. *Id.* at ¶ 17. However, Defendant argued that it had good faith defenses
25 that made the imposition of these penalties unwarranted. *Id.* Moreover, Plaintiffs could not recover
26 these penalties if they failed to prove the underlying claims. *Id.* Although Plaintiffs' Counsel
27 calculated that potential exposure for the waiting time penalty claim was approximately
28 \$1,100,146.32 and approximately \$752,000.00 for the wage statement penalty claim, Plaintiffs'

1 Counsel could not attribute a high value to these claims, and so, Plaintiffs' Counsel applied a risk
2 discount based on a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 20% chance of
3 succeeding at trial on the merits for each claim, yielding a realistic damage estimate of
4 approximately \$66,008.78 ($\$1,100,146.32 \times 30\% \times 20\%$) for the waiting time penalty claim and
5 \$45,120.00 ($\$752,000.00 \times 30\% \times 20\%$) for the wage statement penalty claim. *Id.*

6 PAGA: For the PAGA claim, Plaintiffs' Counsel determined that Defendant's potential
7 exposure could potentially reach \$297,300.00, assuming the initial \$100 penalty would apply for
8 each of the 2,973 pay periods in the PAGA Period. *Id.* at ¶ 18. However, even assuming success
9 on the merits of each claim, PAGA gives the Court discretion to reduce penalties for a variety of
10 reasons, including where to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and
11 oppressive, or confiscatory. *Id.* Therefore, the settlement allocates \$18,000.00 of the Gross
12 Settlement Amount to PAGA. *Id.*

13 **C. The Requested Service Payments Are Reasonable**

14 Plaintiffs seek class representatives service payments of up to \$7,500.00 to each Plaintiff
15 for accepting the responsibilities of representing the interests of the Class and potential costs that
16 were not borne by any other Class Member. Settlement Agreement at § 3.2.1. A named plaintiff is
17 eligible for payment that reasonably compensates her for undertaking and fulfilling a fiduciary
18 duty to represent absent class members. *See Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th
19 1380, 1393 (2010); *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (2004).

20 Throughout this case, Plaintiffs assisted counsel in gathering evidence necessary to
21 prosecute the claims, maintained regular contact with counsel, was available on the day of
22 mediation to answer questions, and reviewed the Settlement to ensure it was fair to the Class. *See*
23 *generally*, Scharton Decl.; *also see* Horn Decl. No action would likely have been taken by Class
24 Members individually and no compensation would have been recovered for them, but for Plaintiffs'
25 services on behalf of the Class. By actively pursuing this action, Plaintiffs furthered the California
26 public policy goal of enforcing the State's wage and hour laws. *See Sav-On*, 34 Cal.4th at 340. The
27 requested class representatives' service payments are reasonable and should be preliminarily
28

1 approved. Plaintiffs will provide additional information as requested or required by the Court at
2 final approval.

3 **D. The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

4 The purpose of an attorneys' fee award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who
5 invested in a case despite the risk of non-payment and achieved a substantial positive result for the
6 class. California courts routinely award attorneys' fees equaling one-third or more of the potential
7 value of the common fund. *See Chavez*, 162 Cal.App.4th at 66, fn. 11 ("Empirical studies show
8 that, regardless of whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in
9 class actions average around one-third of the recovery.").

10 Additionally, courts utilize "multipliers" to account for the risk of taking on cases where
11 there is no guarantee of recovery, uncertainties as to the amount that will be recovered, uncertainty
12 as to the cost of litigating the case (both in effort and expenses), and uncertainty about how much
13 time will pass before the recovery is obtained. *Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33 (2001);
14 *see also Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49 (1977) (approving the adjustment of the lodestar
15 figure based on factors specific to the case to ensure fair market value for legal services provided
16 on a contingency basis). Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is
17 brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. *Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at 1133.

18 Generally, "[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher." *Wershba v. Apple*
19 *Computers, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 (2001); *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*,
20 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class
21 action); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 60 (2008) (applying a 2.5 multiplier on a
22 lodestar cross-check); *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002)
23 ("most" common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0); *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l*, 231
24 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82 (2004) (affirming a 2.13 multiplier after finding that "2 to 4" is a
25 reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check). *See also Bronshteyn v. State of California –*
26 *Department of Consumer Affairs*, 114 Cal.App.5th 537 (2025) (court did not abuse its discretion
27 by awarding 1.75 multiplier for fees incurred up to and including the jury verdict and a 1.25
28 enhancement for hours worked after the verdict where hourly rates for plaintiff's five senior

attorneys were \$1,100.00 and \$1,000.00); *Tran v. Golden State FC LLC, et al.* (LASC Case No. BC699931), Fee Order filed April 8, 2022 (approving hourly rate of \$1,300.00 for plaintiff's 32-year attorney).

Plaintiffs seek appointment of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 19 The attorneys performed significant work and expended litigation costs in prosecuting this matter with no guarantee of payment. *Id.* Plaintiffs' Counsel seek preliminary approval for \$117,500.00 in attorneys' fees, which is up to one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, and up to \$28,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs. Given the work performed in this matter, the extensive information exchange, and the substantial recovery obtained on behalf of the Class, Plaintiffs' Counsel achieved a settlement through efficient and diligent work. *See generally*, Yslas Decl. At final approval, Plaintiffs' Counsel will fully brief the merits of its request for the award of attorneys' fees and litigation costs.

V. CONCLUSION

The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable settlement of the class claims in light of the risks presented in this case. Plaintiffs have presented the materials and information necessary to demonstrate that the requirements for preliminary approval have been met, and therefore respectfully request that the Court preliminarily approve the Settlement and schedule a date for the final approval hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: February 20, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: 
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