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individually, and on behalf of Aggrieved Employees
pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO**

EMMANUEL RICARDO OVIEDO,
individually, and on behalf of Aggrieved
Employees pursuant to the California Private
Attorneys General Act,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

HOTCAKES NO. 7, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 25,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 37-2023-00045723-CU-OE-CTL

Honorable Gregory W. Pollack
Department C-71

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT,
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS, AND
SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS**

Date: October 30, 2026
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Department: C-71

Complaint Filed: October 20, 2023
Trial Date: Not Set

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on **October 30, 2026** at **9:30 a.m.** in Department C-71 of the above-captioned Court located at Hall of Justice, 330 West Broadway, San Diego, California 92101, Plaintiff Emmanuel Ricardo Oviedo (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move the Court for an Order granting approval of the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”) settlement. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an Order:

1. Granting approval pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(s)(2) of the Private Attorneys General Act Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement,” “Agreement,” or “Settlement Agreement”) attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of James S. Winn Jr. in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, and Settlement Administration Costs (“Winn Decl.”);
2. Directing the distribution of the Gross Settlement Amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$50,000.00) pursuant to the terms of the Agreement;
3. Approving the Net Settlement Amount, estimated to be Twelve Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars and Sixty-Eight Cents (\$12,833.68), of which seventy-five percent (75%) will be distributed to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and twenty-five percent (25%) of which will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees;
4. Approving an award of reasonable attorneys' fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$17,500.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$50,000.00) to Plaintiff's Counsel;
5. Approving the amount of Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Sixteen Dollars and Thirty-Two Cents (\$16,716.32) to Plaintiff’s Counsel for reimbursement of actual litigation expenses payment pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(k)(1);
6. Appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
7. Approving an award of up to Two Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents (\$2,950.00) in anticipated costs to ILYM Group, Inc. for its settlement administration

1 services.

2 In accordance with California Labor Code sections 2699 *et. seq.*, on July 22, 2026, a copy of
3 the proposed Settlement Agreement was submitted to the LWDA via online submission through the
4 LWDA's website. (Winn Decl., ¶ 13 and Exh. 3).

5 This Motion is based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
6 the Declarations of James S. Winn Jr., Plaintiff Emmanuel Ricardo Oviedo, and the Settlement
7 Administrator (Lisa Mullins of ILYM Group, Inc.), the pleadings and other records on file with the
8 Court in this matter, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive
9 at or before the hearing.

10 Respectfully submitted,

11 Dated: August 14, 2026

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

12 By: James S. Winn Jr.
13 James S. Winn Jr.
14 Attorneys for Plaintiff Emmanuel Ricardo Oviedo
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Pursuant to the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code
4 sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”), Plaintiff Emmanuel Ricardo Oviedo (“Plaintiff”) seeks approval of
5 the Private Attorneys General Act Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement,” “Agreement,” or
6 “Settlement Agreement”) entered into with Defendant Hotcakes No. 7, Inc. (“Defendant”) (together,
7 with Plaintiff, the “Parties”), which is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of James S. Winn Jr. in
8 Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, and
9 Settlement Administration Costs (“Winn Decl.”).

10 **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

11 Defendant operates IHOP store No. 3101 in Escondido, California. (Winn Decl., ¶ 2).
12 Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, non-exempt Cook from approximately October 2022
13 to May 2023. (Ibid).

14 On August 15, 2023, Plaintiff provided written notice by electronic submission to the
15 California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and by U.S. Certified Mail to
16 Defendant, pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, of the specific provisions of the California
17 Labor Code alleged to have been violated by Defendant (“PAGA Notice”). (Winn Decl., ¶ 3 and Exh.
18 1).

19 On October 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Enforcement Action Under the Private
20 Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698 *Et Seq.* (“Operative Complaint”) in the action entitled
21 *Emmanuel Ricardo Oviedo v. Hotcakes No. 7, Inc.*, San Diego County Superior Court Case No. 37-
22 2023-00045723-CU-OE-CTL (“Action”). (*Id.*, ¶ 4). The Operative Complaint asserts a single cause
23 of action for civil penalties under PAGA for violations of multiple provisions of the California Labor
24 Code and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order. (Ibid).

25 On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff propounded formal written discovery onto Defendant (specifically,
26 Form Interrogatories - General (Set One), Form Interrogatories - Employment Law (Set One), Special
27 Interrogatories (Set One), Requests for Admission (Set One), and Requests for Production of
28 Documents (Set One)) and served a proposed Belaire-West notice. (*Id.*, ¶ 5).

1 On August 27, 2024, Defendant served responses to Plaintiff's written discovery requests
2 (specifically, Form Interrogatories – General (Set One), Form Interrogatories – Employment Law (Set
3 One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Requests for Admission (Set One), and Requests for
4 Production of Documents (Set One)). (*Id.*, ¶ 6).

5 On June 5, 2025, the Parties participated in a formal mediation conducted by Marc Feder, Esq.,
6 a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and hour matters, which
7 did not result in a settlement at that time. (*Id.*, ¶ 7). However, after further negotiations and with the
8 aid of the mediator's evaluation, the Parties were able to reach an agreement to resolve the Action in
9 its entirety. (*Ibid.*).

10 On May 5, 2026, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 8 and Exh. 2).

11 During the course of informal discovery in the Action, Plaintiff's Counsel conducted an intense
12 investigation into the facts of the Action. (*Id.*, ¶ 9). This included obtaining data, information, and
13 documents relating to the underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff's
14 employee file, a sampling of Aggrieved Employees' time and payroll data, relevant wage and hour
15 policies, and Aggrieved Employees' data points so that Plaintiff could assess the number of alleged
16 potential violations and value of the recoverable penalties, as well as evaluate the strengths and
17 weaknesses of his claims. (*Ibid.*).

18 Based on the data, information, and documents received, as well as thorough discussions with
19 Defendant's counsel, Plaintiff's Counsel was able to (i) determine the total number of distinct
20 individuals falling within the definition of "Aggrieved Employees" for the relevant statutory period,
21 (ii) the number of affected pay periods at issue among them, and (iii) construct a damages model that
22 calculated the maximum realistic amount of PAGA penalties that could be levied against Defendant
23 within the relevant statutory period. (*Id.*, ¶ 10). Defendant, however, disputed Plaintiff's claims and
24 disputed both the existence of and extent of liability as alleged by Plaintiff, which allowed Plaintiff's
25 Counsel to further assess the strength of Plaintiff's claims. (*Ibid.*). Plaintiff's Counsel's experience in
26 litigating similar representative wage and hour claims, the degree of investigation that was conducted
27 here, and the amount of data, information, and documents that was obtained, was sufficient to
28 determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of these claims for

1 purposes of settlement. (Ibid).

2 The Parties believe the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Id.*, ¶ 11).
3 The Parties understand, acknowledge, and agree that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a
4 compromise of Plaintiff's PAGA claims, and that it is the desire and intention of the Parties to affect
5 a final and complete resolution of the Action. (Ibid).

6 Defendant denies all of the claims in the Action, and does not waive, but rather expressly
7 reserves, all rights to challenge all such claims and allegations upon all legal, procedural, and factual
8 grounds should the Settlement Agreement not become final. (*Id.*, ¶ 12). The Settlement Agreement
9 reflects a compromise reached to end litigation in the Action. (Ibid). Following significant
10 investigation and extensive settlement negotiations, Plaintiff now seeks approval of the proposed
11 Settlement Agreement, which will resolve all representative claims alleged in the Action. (Ibid).

12 **III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

13 **A. Definition of the Aggrieved Employees**

14 For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the "Aggrieved Employees" shall
15 be defined as "all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant
16 within the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period." (Winn Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement
17 Agreement, ¶¶ 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5)). The "PAGA Period" is the period from August 15, 2022 through
18 February 28, 2026. (Winn Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(5)). There are approximately
19 eighty-five (85) Aggrieved Employees. (Winn Decl., ¶ 14).

20 **B. Gross Settlement Amount**

21 The Parties have agreed to settle the PAGA claims at issue in the Action for a non-reversionary
22 Gross Settlement Amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$50,000.00). (Winn Decl., ¶ 15;
23 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)). The Gross Settlement Amount is a common fund and therefore
24 includes all requested costs, fees, and other allocations. (Winn Decl., ¶ 15). The Gross Settlement
25 Amount includes: (1) attorneys' fees in the amount of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement
26 Amount (i.e., \$17,500.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$50,000.00); (2) attorneys' actual
27 litigation costs and expenses in the amount of Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Sixteen Dollars and
28 Thirty-Two Cents (\$16,716.32); (3) Settlement Administration Costs, not to exceed Two Thousand

1 Nine Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents (\$2,950.00). (Winn Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement,
2 ¶¶ 3(a)(1) and 3(a)(2)).

3 After the above-estimated amounts are deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount, the Net
4 Settlement Amount will amount to approximately Twelve Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three
5 Dollars and Sixty-Eight Cents (\$12,833.68), of which seventy-five percent (75%), or Nine Thousand
6 Six Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars and Twenty-Six Cents (\$9,625.26), will be paid to the LWDA
7 (“LWDA Payment”) and twenty-five percent (25%), or Three Thousand Two Hundred Eight Dollars
8 and Forty-Two Cents (\$3,208.42), will be distributed and paid to Aggrieved Employees (“Employees’
9 Portion”) on a *pro rata* basis based on the number of pay periods they each worked during the PAGA
10 Period (“Pay Periods”). (Winn Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 3(a)(4), 3(a)(5), and 5(b)).

11 No later than seven (7) calendar days after the Court’s order granting approval of the
12 Settlement, Defendant shall provide the Settlement Administrator with a list of all Aggrieved
13 Employees containing each Aggrieved Employee’s (i) first and last name; (ii) last known address; (iii)
14 last known telephone number; (iv) Social Security number; and (v) dates worked during the PAGA
15 Period (collectively, “Aggrieved Employees List”). (Winn Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement, ¶
16 5(c)(1)).

17 Within twenty-one (21) calendar days of the Court’s order granting approval of the Settlement
18 Agreement, Defendant will transmit the Gross Settlement Amount to a qualified settlement account
19 established by the Settlement Administrator. (Winn Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(a)).

20 No later than ten (10) business days after the Settlement Administrator receives the Aggrieved
21 Employees List and Gross Settlement Amount, the Settlement Administrator will distribute the
22 Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA Payment, the Settlement Administration Costs, and the
23 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. (Winn Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 5(c)(3), 5(c)(5) - 5(c)(7)).

24 Each Individual PAGA Payment check will be valid and negotiable for one hundred and eighty
25 (180) calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and thereafter, will be canceled. (Winn Decl.,
26 ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(c)(4)). Any funds associated with such canceled checks will be
27 distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the State Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property
28 Division in the name of the Aggrieved Employee(s) at issue and in the amount of their respective

1 Individual PAGA Payment(s). (Winn Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(c)(4)).

2 The Aggrieved Employees are estimated to have worked approximately 2,220 pay periods
3 during the period August 15, 2022 to June 5, 2025. (Winn Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶
4 3(a)(6)). If the actual number of Pay Periods is more than ten percent (10%) above 2,220, the Gross
5 Settlement Amount will be increased by the percentage that the actual number exceeds 2,442 Pay
6 Periods. (Winn Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(6)).

7 **IV. STANDARD FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT**

8 The settlement of a PAGA claim requires court approval. (California Labor Code (“Lab.
9 Code”) § 2699(l)). Although the California Labor Code does not set forth the criteria by which a
10 PAGA settlement is to be evaluated, it is presumed that a reviewing court may take into consideration
11 some of the factors that courts use when reviewing a class action settlement. However, “a PAGA
12 claim asserted on a non-class representative basis...is not considered a class action but a law
13 enforcement action, and therefore does not have to meet the requirements of [a class action].” (*Casida*
14 *v. Sears Holdings Corp.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9302 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012)).

15 A court’s review of a PAGA settlement necessarily implicates the following unique features
16 that render the approval process distinct from approval of a class action settlement under Code of Civil
17 Procedure Section 382 and California Rules of Court Rule 3.769. First, in evaluating the adequacy of
18 the settlement amount, the Court’s focus is not concerned with the amount aggrieved employees are
19 to receive, but rather, must focus on the total settlement amount in achieving PAGA’s objective.
20 Indeed, “[t]he remedy sought in a PAGA suit consists of civil penalties, not individual or class
21 damages,” and while a “[PAGA] action is ... designed to protect the public and penalize the employer
22 for past illegal conduct,” a reviewing court must be mindful of the fact that settlement of a PAGA
23 claim involves a compromise. (*Mendez v. Tween Brands, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66454 at *11
24 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2010)). “Unlike class actions, these civil penalties are not meant to compensate
25 unnamed employees because the action is fundamentally a law enforcement action.” (*Ochoa-*
26 *Hernandez v. Cjaders Foods, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32774 at *12 (Apr. 2, 2010)). The Court
27 should not lose sight of the fact that, “[u]nlike a class action seeking damages or injunctive relief for
28 injured employees, the purpose of PAGA is to incentivize private parties to recover civil penalties for

1 the government that otherwise may not have been assessed and collected by overburdened state
2 enforcement agencies.” (Ibid).

3 Second, consistent with the fact that unnamed employees have no property interest in a PAGA
4 claim, “[u]nnamed employees need not be given notice of the PAGA claim, nor do they have the
5 ability to opt-out of the representative PAGA claim.” (*Ochoa-Hernandez*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6 32774 at *13). Indeed, “[PAGA] does not create property rights or any other substantive rights” as
7 “[i]t is simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover civil penalties – for
8 Labor Code violations – that otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies.”
9 (*Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 (2009)). This
10 renders the approval process of a PAGA settlement distinct from a class action settlement, as there is
11 no need for the Court to employ the “two-step approval process” required under California Rules of
12 Court Rule 3.769.

13 Finally, unlike class action settlements, the scope of release permitted in a PAGA settlement
14 is limited. While “judgment in [a PAGA] action is binding not only on the named employee plaintiff
15 but also on government agencies and any aggrieved employee not a party to the proceeding...the
16 nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to
17 be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*Arias v.*
18 *Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 969, 985-87 (2009)). Thus, the scope of a release in a PAGA settlement is
19 confined to the PAGA penalties alleged in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA
20 and to the claims that were, or could have been, alleged pursuant to PAGA based on the factual
21 allegations in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA. In the case at hand, as the only
22 claims at issue are PAGA claims, those will be the only claims extinguished through the Settlement.

23 **V. THE AGREEMENT IS FAIR AND SHOULD BE APPROVED**

24 **A. The Agreement is Presumed to Be Fair**

25 California courts recognize that “a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is
26 reached through arm’s-length bargaining.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224,
27 245 (2001); *see also Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 799 (2009)). Here,
28 the Agreement is presumptively fair because: (1) it occurred after counsel for the Parties engaged in

1 significant investigation to evaluate the strength and potential value of the PAGA claims, and the risks
2 of litigating these claims through trial; and (2) it was negotiated at great length and effort by counsel
3 with significant experience in similar complex labor and employment matters. (Winn Decl., ¶ 22).

4 **B. The Agreement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' Respective**
5 **Legal Positions and Recovery Risks**

6 In deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, a trial court has broad powers to
7 determine if it is fair given the circumstances of the case. (*Mallick v. Sup. Ct.*, 89 Cal.App.3d 434,
8 438 (1979)). In exercising these powers, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement
9 is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted)). In
10 evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court must consider “the strength of plaintiffs’
11 case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining
12 class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed
13 and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental
14 participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.”¹ (*Kullar v. Foot Locker*
15 *Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)). Even though a *Kullar* analysis is not required for
16 approval of a PAGA settlement, a brief analysis is included to support approval of the Settlement
17 Agreement. (See Winn Decl., ¶¶ 29-42).

18 1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

19 In order to prevail at trial, Plaintiff would have to prove violations of the California Labor
20 Code underlying his PAGA claims, demonstrate that Aggrieved Employees suffered, and demonstrate
21 that Defendant’s conduct gives rise to penalties. (See *Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC*, 572
22 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2008) [“Plaintiff’s claim under [PAGA] is wholly dependent
23 upon her other claims. Because all of Plaintiff’s other claims fail as a matter of law, so does her PAGA
24 claim.”]).

25 Here, Plaintiff’s core allegations are that Defendant systematically violated the California
26 Labor Code by, *inter alia*, failing to properly pay wages for all hours worked, failing to pay overtime

28 ¹ As this is not a class action, the *Kullar* factors pertaining to the risk of maintaining class action status through trial and the reaction of class members to the proposed settlement are inapplicable.

1 at the correct rate, failing to provide compliant meal and rest periods, failing to pay premiums at the
2 correct rate of pay, failing to timely pay wages during employment and upon termination, failing to
3 maintain accurate payroll records, failing to provide accurate wage statements, and failing to reimburse
4 necessary business expenses. (Winn Decl., ¶ 23).

5 Defendant maintained several defenses to Plaintiff's theories of liability, which, if successfully
6 argued and proven, had the potential to eliminate or substantially reduce recovery. (*Id.*, ¶ 24).
7 Throughout this litigation, Defendant maintained, and continues to maintain, that it had, and continues
8 to have, compliant employment policies and practices throughout the time period at issue. (*Ibid.*).
9 Defendant denies that it ever violated any provision of the California Labor Code, including, but not
10 limited to, those sections for which Plaintiff seeks penalties under PAGA. (*Ibid.*). Defendant further
11 denied, and continues to deny, that the lawsuit is appropriate for representative treatment for any
12 purpose other than settlement. (*Ibid.*). Defendant also challenged Plaintiff's standing as an aggrieved
13 employee and denied that any of Defendant's other employees whom Plaintiff seeks to represent are
14 aggrieved. (*Ibid.*).

15 Defendant also argued that an important feature of PAGA is that the Court retains discretion
16 to lower the penalties if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise
17 would result in an award that is "unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory." (*Ibid.*; Lab. Code
18 § 2699(e)(2); *see also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1136
19 (2012) [holding that a court may reduce the amount of PAGA penalties awarded to an employee based
20 upon discretionary factors]).

21 Even if violations of the California Labor Code occurred, which Defendant denies, Defendant
22 contended that said violations would only be considered "initial violations" and thus heightened
23 "subsequent violation" penalties were not warranted. (Winn Decl., ¶ 25; Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2); *see*
24 *also Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1208-09 (2008) ["Until the employer has
25 been notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision [...], the employer cannot be presumed to be
26 aware that its continuing underpayment of employees is a 'violation' subject to penalties."]).

27 Defendant also contended that, with respect to PAGA claims, the Court was unlikely to assess
28 cumulative penalties for the maximum number of possible, separate California Labor Code violations,

1 because it would be unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, and/or confiscatory, especially where certain conduct
2 may be regulated by multiple provisions of the California Labor Code that are interrelated and work
3 in tandem. (Winn Decl., ¶ 26). While the PAGA does provide the potential for a heightened penalty
4 for subsequent violations, courts are often hesitant to award a heightened penalty where there is no
5 prior citation by the Labor Commissioner, as is the case here. (*See Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc.*, 3
6 F.4th 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding no heightened penalty where defendant was not notified by
7 Labor Commissioner or any court that it was subject to the California Labor Code)).

8 While Plaintiff maintains that his PAGA claims have merit, in reaching the Agreement,
9 Plaintiff and his counsel took into account the strengths and weaknesses of each side's position, and
10 the uncertainty of how the case might have concluded as litigation continued, at trial, and/or upon
11 appeal. (Winn Decl., ¶ 27). Based on these disputes, which had the potential to completely eliminate
12 Plaintiff's recovery, the range of realistic "litigation outcomes" on Plaintiff's PAGA claims was
13 defined by a "maximum possible liability" amount of approximately \$222,000 and a "risk-adjusted
14 realistic value" amount of approximately \$55,500. (*Id.*, ¶ 42). In light thereof, the Gross Settlement
15 Amount of \$50,000 is a significant settlement. (*Ibid.*).

16 2. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

17 Approval of the Settlement Agreement is also appropriate in light of the risk, expense, and
18 complexity of further litigation. As discussed above, the Settlement Agreement takes into
19 consideration the specific factual and legal hurdles faced by Plaintiff in establishing Defendant's
20 penalty-liability in this case, which may have resulted in a net-zero recovery. Any recovery on these
21 claims is not certain. And even when liability is found, PAGA claims are discretionary, such that the
22 Court could decline to award their full value. Some of Plaintiff's claims are also derivative, and as
23 such, Plaintiff must prevail on his underlying California Labor Code claims in order to prevail on the
24 derivative claims. These risks – when balanced with the fact that the Agreement achieved a very
25 significant recovery (as demonstrated below), and that further litigation posed a risk of diminishing
26 such recovery by increasing litigation expenses – weigh strongly in favor of settlement approval.

27 3. The Benefits Conferred by the Agreement Balance in Favor of Approval

28 The Settlement Agreement provides a *significant* monetary benefit that falls well within the

1 range of an acceptable settlement under the circumstances, which is the standard on which the instant
2 Agreement must be judged.

3 The Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be Twelve Thousand Eight Hundred
4 Thirty-Three Dollars and Sixty-Eight Cents (\$12,833.68). After the deductions are made from the
5 Gross Settlement Amount for the Attorneys' Fees and Costs and the Settlement Administration Costs,
6 Nine Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars and Twenty-Six Cents (\$9,625.26) (i.e. 75% of the
7 Net Settlement Amount) will go to the LWDA, and Three Thousand Two Hundred Eight Dollars and
8 Forty-Two Cents (\$3,208.42) (i.e. 25% of the Net Settlement Amount) will go to the Aggrieved
9 Employees, as required by California Labor Code § 2699(i) in effect at the time of this matter ("civil
10 penalties recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 75 percent to the Labor
11 and Workforce Development Agency . . . and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees."). (Winn Decl.,
12 ¶43). There is no reason to doubt the fairness of the proposed plan of allocation of the Net Settlement
13 Amount as it fully complies with California Labor Code section 2699(i). (Ibid).

14 The Settlement Agreement is a compromise of highly disputed claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 44). Plaintiff
15 and his counsel recognize the expense and length of continued proceedings necessary to litigate the
16 matter through trial and any possible appeals. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel have also taken into
17 account the uncertainty and risk of the outcome of further litigation, and the difficulties and delays
18 inherent in such litigation. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel are also aware of the burdens of proof
19 necessary to establish liability, both generally and in response to Defendant's defenses thereto, and
20 the difficulties in establishing Defendant's liability for, and the right to recover, penalties on behalf of
21 Plaintiff, the State of California, and other Aggrieved Employees. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel
22 have also taken into account Defendant's agreement to enter into a settlement that confers significant
23 relief upon the Aggrieved Employees and the State of California. (Ibid). Considering all of the facts
24 in this case, Plaintiff and his counsel have determined that the Agreement represents a fair, adequate,
25 and reasonable resolution of the PAGA claims, and that it is in the best interests of the Aggrieved
26 Employees and the State of California. (Ibid).

27 The result achieved in this case is well within the range of what is considered an acceptable
28 settlement under the circumstances, especially when compared to the settlement of PAGA claims in

1 other cases. (*Id.*, ¶ 45). (*See, e.g., DCH Auto Wage and Hour Cases*, Los Angeles Superior Court,
2 Case No. JCCP4833 (May 2017) [approving \$15,000 out of \$4 million toward settlement of PAGA
3 claims]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160052, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
4 2012) [approving \$10,000 out of \$3.7 million toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Schiller v. David's*
5 *Bridal, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80776, at *40 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) [approving \$7,500 out of
6 \$518,245 toward settlement of PAGA claims]). Here, the value obtained for settlement of the PAGA
7 claims is significant, and it will be distributed in accordance with and in fulfillment of the objectives
8 of the PAGA statute.

9 4. The Scope of the Release is Narrowly Tailored

10 As discussed above, the California Supreme Court has concluded that in the context of PAGA
11 “the nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity
12 to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*See Arias*,
13 46 Cal. 4th, at 987). Thus, the scope of the limited release provided in exchange for the foregoing
14 consideration is limited to the civil penalties asserted in the Operative Complaint and the PAGA
15 Notice, under California Labor Code §§ 2698 *et seq.* (*See Settlement Agreement*, at ¶ 6).

16 As such, this factor balances strongly in favor of approval of the Agreement.

17 5. Experience and Views of Counsel Favor Approval

18 Plaintiff's Counsel is experienced in complex representative and class action wage-and-hour
19 litigation. (Winn Decl., ¶ 51). In the view of Plaintiff's Counsel, the benefits conferred by the
20 Agreement are eminently fair and reasonable, and in the best interests of the State of California and
21 the Aggrieved Employees in light of the risk, delay, and uncertainty of continued litigation and the
22 substantial monetary benefits provided for by the Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 46). Furthermore, courts have
23 acknowledged that “the interests of a plaintiff, counsel, and other potentially aggrieved employees are
24 largely aligned. All stand to gain from proving as convincingly as possible as many Labor Code
25 violations as the evidence will sustain[.]” (*Williams v. Superior Court*, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 548-549 (2017)
26 [citing Labor Code § 2699(g)(1)(i)]).

27 6. The Extent of Discovery and Stage of Proceedings Favor Approval

28 Here, the extent of informal discovery conducted was sufficient to enable Plaintiff's Counsel

1 to evaluate the strength and value of the PAGA claims for purposes of settlement. (Winn Decl., ¶ 47).
2 Prior to mediation, Defendant provided Plaintiff with data, information, and documents relating to the
3 underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff's employee file, a sampling of
4 Aggrieved Employees' time and payroll data, relevant wage and hour policies, and Aggrieved
5 Employees' data points. (*Id.*, ¶ 9). As discussed above, Plaintiff's Counsel's investigation was
6 sufficient to, among other things, tabulate with precision the total number of alleged California Labor
7 Code violations at issue during the relevant statutory period and identify the total number of
8 individuals falling within the definition of "Aggrieved Employees" for the relevant statutory period.
9 (*Id.*, ¶ 10).

10 Based on Plaintiff's Counsel's experience litigating wage and hour claims, such investigation
11 was sufficient to determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of
12 these claims for purposes of settlement. (*Ibid.*).

13 **VI. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE**

14 As the prevailing party in settlement, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys' fees for bringing
15 his PAGA claims. (Lab. Code § 2699(k) ["Any employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled
16 to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs."]). Plaintiff's Counsel is also entitled to attorneys'
17 fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5(a), as the instant action has resulted in the
18 enforcement of important rights benefitting the public and secures monetary recovery for the State of
19 California as well as the Aggrieved Employees.

20 While trial courts have discretion to apply either a lodestar method or percentage-of-the-fund
21 method, the California Supreme Court has taken the position that trial courts also "retain the discretion
22 to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested
23 percentage fee." (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016); *see also Wershba*, 91
24 Cal.App. 4th at 253). Courts award fees to serve as an economic incentive for lawyers to undertake
25 litigation, and thereby enhance and facilitate access to the judicial system for adjudication of
26 meritorious claims, and to deter wrongdoing. This is especially true in situations where multiple
27 similar alleged wrongs would not be economically feasible to pursue individually, such as here. Trial
28 courts have "wide latitude" in assessing the value of attorneys' fees and their decisions will "not be

1 disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.*, 82
2 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000); *see also Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506 [holding that “trial court did not abuse its
3 discretion in using [the percentage of fund method], in part to approve the fee request”]). Indeed, it is
4 long settled that the “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services
5 rendered in his court.” (*Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (2001)).

6 The percentage method is particularly appropriate where a monetary settlement has been
7 recovered and “the benefit [recovered can be] easily quantified.” (*In re Bluetooth Headset Prods.*
8 *Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011)). Where the amount of a settlement is a “certain or
9 easily calculable sum of money,” California courts may calculate attorneys’ fees as a reasonable
10 percentage of the settlement created. (Weil and Brown, California Practice Guide, *Civil Procedure*
11 *Before Trial*, Chapter 14, section 14:145; *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1808). The percentage fee
12 method is preferred in representative actions because “it better approximates the workings of the
13 marketplace than the lodestar approach.” (*Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 49). California law
14 provides that the award for attorneys’ fees should be equivalent to fees freely negotiated in the legal
15 marketplace and paid in comparable litigation based on the result achieved and risk incurred. (*See*
16 *Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 47-50; *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th 480 at 503). In cases where the settlement
17 agreement provides that the defendant will pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys a percentage of the fund created
18 by the settlement, use of that percentage method is appropriate. (*Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 32). Fee
19 awards that are too small will “chill the private enforcement essential to the vindication of many legal
20 rights and obstruct the representative actions that often relieve the courts of the need to separately
21 adjudicate numerous claims.” (*Id.* at 53). Therefore, fees in representative actions should approximate
22 the probable terms of a contingent fee contract negotiated by a sophisticated attorney and client in
23 comparable litigation. (*Id.* at 48). “The ultimate goal ... is the award of a ‘reasonable’ fee to
24 compensate counsel for their efforts, irrespective of the method of calculation.” (*Consumer Privacy*
25 *Cases*, 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557-58 (2009) [quoting *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra*,
26 126 Cal.App.4th at 1270]).

27 Plaintiff’s Counsel’s application for attorneys’ fees in light of the facts and circumstances
28 surrounding the case is within the range of reasonableness. Historically, courts have awarded fees as

1 high as fifty percent (50%) of the settlement in complex actions, depending on the circumstances of
2 the case. (*See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.*, 526 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1981) [awarding attorneys'
3 fees in the amount of 45% of the \$7.3 million total settlement amount]; *Beech Cinema, Inc. v.*
4 *Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.* 480 F.Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) [awarding approximately 53%
5 of the settlement as attorneys' fees]).

6 Here, Plaintiff's Counsel's request of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement
7 Amount (i.e., \$17,500.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$50,000.00) is fair and reasonable based
8 on the percentage of the recovery method. Plaintiff's Counsel has vigorously litigated this case since
9 it was commenced, with the very real possibility of an unsuccessful outcome and no fee recovery of
10 any kind. (Winn Decl., ¶ 48). Counsel for Plaintiff undertook significant investigation and invested
11 a significant amount of time analyzing relevant documents and data to evaluate the nature and extent
12 of the alleged underlying California Labor Code violations and calculation of the potential monetary
13 recovery as they relate to Plaintiff's PAGA claims under PAGA. (*Id.*, ¶ 52). Plaintiff's Counsel
14 possesses combined extensive experience litigating wage and hour and other complex litigation
15 matters, and the attorneys who worked on this matter have been approved as class counsel and/or have
16 had their billable rates approved in the settlement of other class and PAGA actions, numerous times.
17 (*Id.*, ¶ 51).

18 In the present case, Plaintiff's Counsel has borne all of the risks and costs of litigation and will
19 not receive any compensation until recovery is obtained. (*Id.*, ¶ 49). Plaintiff's Counsel is experienced
20 in complex wage-and-hour litigation and used that experience to obtain a favorable result for Plaintiff,
21 the Aggrieved Employees, and the State of California. (*Ibid.*). Considering the amount of fees
22 requested, work performed, risks incurred, and experience of Plaintiff's Counsel in handling similar
23 matters, Plaintiff maintains that the requested attorneys' fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross
24 Settlement Amount (i.e., \$17,500.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$50,000.00) are reasonable
25 and should be awarded. (*Ibid.*).

26 **VII. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' COSTS AND EXPENSES ARE FAIR AND**
27 **REASONABLE**

28 The Agreement provides for reimbursement of Plaintiff's Counsel's actual litigation costs and

1 expenses up to the amount of Thirty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$30,000.00). (Winn Decl., ¶
2 54; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(1)). However, Plaintiff's Counsel only seeks reimbursement of a
3 total of Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Sixteen Dollars and Thirty-Two Cents (\$16,716.32) in
4 litigation costs and expenses. (Winn Decl., ¶ 54 and Exh. 5). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel
5 respectfully requests that the Court reimburse it for actual litigation costs and expenses in the amount
6 of Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Sixteen Dollars and Thirty-Two Cents (\$16,716.32).

7 **VIII. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE FAIR AND**
8 **REASONABLE**

9 As set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the Parties have agreed to retain, subject to approval
10 by the Court, ILYM Group, Inc. to handle the administration of the Agreement. (Winn Decl., ¶ 55;
11 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(2)). The fees and expenses of the Settlement Administrator are
12 estimated not to exceed Two Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents (\$2,950.00).
13 (Winn Decl., ¶ 55; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(2)). These costs include, but are not limited to,
14 expenses for preparing, printing, and mailing the Cover Letter and Individual PAGA Payment checks
15 to the Aggrieved Employees, re-mailing the returned Individual PAGA Payment checks to any new
16 addresses obtained, and handling inquiries from Aggrieved Employees regarding the Agreement,
17 among other things. (Winn Decl., ¶ 55). Accordingly, the Court should grant approval of the
18 Settlement Administration Costs in the amount of up to Two Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Dollars
19 and Zero Cents (\$2,950.00) to ILYM Group, Inc., a necessary third-party for handling the settlement
20 process. (Ibid).

21 **IX. CONCLUSION**

22 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff's
23 Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and Settlement Administration
24 Costs and grant the relief requested herein.

25 Respectfully submitted,

26 Dated: August 14, 2026

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

27 By: James S. Winn Jr.
28 James S. Winn Jr.

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