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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

MARYOLIN HERNANDEZ, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAL CARTAGE WAREHOUSING &
TRANSLOADING, LLC, a limited liability
company; EMPLOYER'S OUTSOURCING,
LLC, a limited liability company; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 23STCV19093

[Hon. David S. Cunningham III, Dept. 11]

CLASS ACTION

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL
OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Date: July 17, 2026

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Courtroom: Dept. 11

Action Filed: August 10, 2023

Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 17, 2026, at 10:00 a.m., in Department 11 of the above-
3 captioned Court, located at 312 N. Spring St., Los Angeles, CA 90012, Plaintiff MARYOLIN
4 HERNANDEZ (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move this Court for an order:

5 1. Granting class certification of the Class, solely for settlement purposes pursuant to
6 Code of Civil Procedure § 382;

7 2. Preliminarily approving the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT
8 AGREEMENT AND CLASS NOTICE (“Agreement”);

9 3. Appointing counsel for Plaintiff, Moon Law Group, PC, as Class Counsel;

10 4. Appointing Plaintiff as the Class Representative;

11 5. Approving the use of the proposed notice procedure and related notice form;

12 6. Approving PHOENIX SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATORS as the third-party
13 administrator;

14 7. Directing that notice be mailed to the Class; and,

15 8. Scheduling a hearing date for motions for final approval of class action settlement
16 and awards of attorneys’ fees and costs.

17 Good cause exists to grant this Motion because: (1) the Class meets all of the requirements for
18 class certification for settlement purposes under Code of Civil Procedure § 382; (2) the Settlement
19 Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the disputed wage and hour claims asserted
20 by Plaintiff; (3) Plaintiff and Class Counsel are adequate to represent the Class; (4) the proposed notice
21 procedures and related forms comply with California Rules of Court 3.766(d) and (e), adequately apprise
22 Class Members of their rights, and fully comport with due process; and, (5) based on the foregoing,
23 notice should be directed to the Class Members and a final fairness hearing should be scheduled (Plaintiff
24 suggests about 130 days after preliminary approval is granted).

25 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 and Rule 3.1113(e) of the California Rules of Court,
26 which require approval by the Court of a class action settlement and permit the Court to extend the page
27 limit for memoranda.


28 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points

1 and Authorities, the Declarations of H. Scott Leviant, Plaintiff, and the settlement Administrator in
2 support thereof, all papers and pleadings on file with the Court in this action, all matters judicially
3 noticeable, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented in connection with the
4 hearing on the Motion.

5 Respectfully submitted,

6 Dated: January 19, 2026

MOON LAW GROUP, PC

7
8 By:  _____
Kane Moon
H. Scott Leviant
Jaeyoung Lee

10 Attorneys for Plaintiff

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	iii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE MAJOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT	1
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND	6
A. Plaintiff's Claims	6
B. Pre-Mediation Data Production and Analysis.....	6
C. Settlement.....	7
IV. CLASS DEFINITION	8
V. DISCUSSION.....	8
A. The Court Should Conditionally Certify the Class for Settlement Purposes	8
1. The Members of the Class Are Both Ascertainable and Numerous.	9
2. There Are Common Questions That Predominate Over Any Questions That May Be Unique to Individual Class Members.....	9
3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of Those of the Class.	10
4. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class.....	11
5. Proceeding as a Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions.....	11
6. The Proposed Class Notice Complies with Rule 3.766(d) and (e)	11
a) The Notice Procedure Satisfies Due Process	12
b) The Notice is Accurate and Informative	12
B. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage Claims.....	13
1. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Review and Approval.	13
2. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arms' Length Negotiations Between Experienced Counsel with the Assistance of a Highly Qualified Mediator After Sufficient Data Was Exchanged to Evaluate Settlement.	13

1	3.	The Settlement Represents a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of	
2		Class Members’ Claims Based on Defendant’s Estimated Liability Exposure	
3		Given the Risks Continued Litigation Would Entail.	14
4	a)	The Class Settlement is Fair, Adequate and Reasonable	14
5	b)	The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable.....	18
6	4.	The Proposed Method for Allocating Settlement Funds Is Fair.	20
7	5.	The Proposed Enhancement Award to Plaintiff Warrants Approval.	20
8	6.	The Proposed Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Is Also Fair, Adequate,	
9		and Reasonable and Merits Preliminary Approval.	21
10	7.	The Proposed Payment to the Administrator Is Fair and Reasonable.....	21
11	8.	No Other Cases Are Known to Exist	22
12	VI.	THE COURT SHOULD SCHEDULE A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING	22
13	VII.	CONCLUSION	22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CALIFORNIA DECISIONAL AUTHORITY

<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.</i> , 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135 (2000).....	14
<i>Amaral v. Cintas Corp.</i> , 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157 (2008).....	20
<i>Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC</i> , 69 Cal. App. 5th 521 (2021).....	21
<i>Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.</i> , 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012).....	8, 10, 17
<i>Cartt v. Sup. Ct.</i> , 50 Cal. App. 3d 960 (1975).....	12
<i>Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC</i> , 175 Cal. App. 4th 785 (2009)	21
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> , 191 Cal. App. 3d 605 (1987).....	9
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996).....	9, 14, 21
<i>Duran v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n</i> , 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014).....	15
<i>Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.</i> , 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524 (2008).....	10
<i>Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court</i> , 113 Cal. App. 4th 836 (2003)	9
<i>Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.</i> 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286 (2010).....	9, 10
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> , 168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008).....	13
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.</i> , 1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016).....	21
<i>Linderv. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> , 23 Cal. 4th 429 (2000).....	9, 11
<i>Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v. Superior Court</i> , 103 Cal. App. 3d 573 (1980).....	13
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> , 60 Cal. App. 3d 442 (1976).....	11
<i>Miller v. Woods</i> , 148 Cal. App. 3d 862 (1983)	9
<i>Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.</i> , 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021)	19
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i> , 186 Cal. App. 4th 399 (2010)	13
<i>Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.</i> , 7 Cal. 5th 955, 980 (2019).....	9
<i>Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court</i> , 34 Cal. 4th 319 (2004).....	9, 10
<i>Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.</i> , 149 Cal. App. 4th 1496 (2007).....	10
<i>Stambaugh v. Superior Court</i> , 62 Cal. App. 3d 231 (1976).....	13
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.</i> , 91 Cal. App. 4th 224 (2001)	14, 15

FEDERAL DECISIONAL AUTHORITY

<i>Miller v. CEVA Logistics U.S.A., Inc.</i> , 2015 WL 729638 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015)	18
<i>O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.</i> , 201 F.Supp.3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2016)	19
<i>Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.</i> , 563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2000)	18
<i>Willis v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC</i> , 2013 WL 6053831 (E.D. Cal. 2013)	20

STATUTES

Code of Civil Procedure § 382	8
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RULES

Rules of Court, Rule 3.766	11
Rules of Court, Rule 3.769	9, 12, 13

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Class Certification in California: SECOND INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION - FEBRUARY 2010	17
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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 3.769, Plaintiff requests that this Court preliminarily
3 approve the class action settlement set forth in the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT
4 AGREEMENT AND CLASS NOTICE (“Agreement”; “Settlement” describes the proposed disposition
5 of the Action effectuated by the Agreement and the Judgment) with CAL CARTAGE WAREHOUSING
6 & TRANSLOADING, LLC (“Defendant”).

7 After the exchange of documents and data, and an arm’s-length mediation session with mediator
8 Mike Ludwig, Esq., Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively referred to herein as the “Parties”) reached a
9 proposed class action settlement with a gross settlement amount (“GSA”) of **\$200,000.00** in compromise
10 of disputed claims asserted on behalf of the below-defined Class consisting of approximately **305**
11 members. Plaintiff believes this settlement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of disputed
12 claims for alleged wage and hour violations and penalties asserted in this case.

13 Plaintiff now submits this Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, along
14 with the Agreement (attached to the Declaration of H. Scott Leviant [“Leviant Decl.”], Exhibit 1 thereto).
15 For the Court’s convenience, below is a summary of the key provisions of the Settlement.

16 **II. THE MAJOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT**

17 The provisions of the proposed Settlement include the following:

- 18 • Defendants agree not to oppose certification for purposes of Settlement. (Agreement, ¶
19 12.1.)
- 20 • Class: All non-exempt employees employed by Horizon Personnel Services, Inc. and
21 placed to work at Defendant in California during the Class Period. (“Class Period” means
22 the period from August 11, 2019, to February 1, 2023). “Participating Class Member”
23 means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion
24 from the Class portion of the Settlement. (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.5, 1.9, 1.12, 1.34.)
- 25 • Settlement Amount: Defendants will pay a maximum of **\$200,000.00**, referred to as the
26 Gross Settlement Amount (or GSA herein), resulting in an estimated average **gross**
27 benefit per Class Member of about **\$655.74** (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.21, 3.1; Leviant Decl., ¶
28 17.)

- Escalator Clause: If the number of actual Pay Periods at the close of the PAGA Period increases by more than 10% (i.e., 4,400), Defendant may, at its election, opt to (a) increase the Gross Settlement Amount in the exact proportionate amount as to any additional pay periods above 4,400 Pay Periods or (b) end the PAGA Period on the date that the total pay periods equal 4,400 total Pay Periods. (Agreement, ¶ 8.)
- Funding of Gross Settlement Amount: Defendant shall fully fund the Gross Settlement Amount and also fund the amounts necessary to fully pay Defendant's share of payroll taxes by transmitting the funds to the Administrator no later than 5 days after the Effective Date. (Agreement, ¶ 4.1.)
- Class Size: About **305** individuals who worked about 4,135 workweeks. (Agreement, ¶ 8.)
- PAGA Group Size: About **174** individuals who worked about 4,000 workweeks. (Agreement, ¶ 8.)
- PAGA Period: Period from August 9, 2022 through the date that the Court grants preliminary approval of the Class Settlement (Agreement, ¶ 1.30.)
- Kullar/Munoz Analysis: Plaintiff addresses the claims analysis below, at Part V.B.3, and in the Leviant Declaration, at Paragraph 18.
- No Reversion: The Settlement is a ***non-reversionary*** settlement. (Agreement, ¶ 3.1.)
- Certification: Plaintiff addresses certification requisites herein, at Part V.A., and in the Declaration of Leviant, at Paragraphs 34-40.
- No Claim Form: No claim form is required. (Agreement, ¶ 3.1.)
- Class Release: All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from (i) all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts contained in the Operative Complaint and the PAGA Notice and all claims that were, or reasonably could have been alleged based on facts ascertained during the Action including, e.g., all claims for (1) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; (2) Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation; (3) Failure

1 to Provide Meal Periods; (4) Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Breaks; (5) Failure to
2 Indemnify Necessary Business Expenses; (6) Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages at
3 Termination; (7) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; and (8) Unfair
4 Business Practices (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.). Participating Class Members do
5 not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination,
6 violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability,
7 social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the
8 Class Period. (Agreement, ¶ 5.2.)

- 9 • PAGA Release: The LWDA and all Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees are
10 deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present
11 representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the
12 Released Parties from all claims for civil penalties under PAGA, based on the facts and
13 Labor Code sections that were alleged or reasonably could have been alleged, based on
14 the facts contained in the Operative Complaint and the PAGA Notice and all PAGA
15 claims that were, or reasonably could have been alleged based on facts ascertained during
16 the Action. (Agreement, ¶ 5.3.)
- 17 • Net Settlement Amount: The Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in
18 the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA
19 Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class
20 Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The
21 remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments.
22 The Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be at least **\$78,008.33**, resulting in an average
23 **net** payment per Class Member of at least **\$255.77**, before any tax withholdings. (Leviant
24 Decl., ¶ 17.)
- 25 • Tax Allocation: The Individual Class Payments distributed to Class Members will be
26 characterized as 20% alleged unpaid wages, 80% to interest and penalties. (Agreement, ¶
27 3.2.4.1.)
- 28 • Employer's Portion of Payroll Taxes Paid Separately: Defendants' portion of payroll

taxes (e.g., FICA, FUTA, etc.) owed on any settlement payments to Class Members that constitute wages will be paid *separate* and apart from the GSA. (Agreement, ¶ 3.1.)

- Settlement Administrator: The notice portion of the Settlement will be administered by a third-party Administrator, Phoenix Settlement Administrators (“Phoenix”), with the costs of administration at a flat rate of up to \$7,325.00. Phoenix’s estimate for settlement administration services in the amount of **\$7,325.00** was selected as the lowest bid from a competitive bidding process. (Agreement, ¶ 3.2.3; Moore Decl., ¶ 16.)
- Class Data for Administration: Not later than 14 days after the Court grants Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, Defendant will deliver the Class Data to the Administrator. (Agreement, ¶ 7.4.) Because Social Security Numbers (“SSNs”) for some Class Members are not known, the Administrator shall perform a pre-mailing skip trace on all Class Members’ Class Data to identify mailing addresses and SSNs for as many Class Members as possible. (Agreement, ¶ 4.2.1.) For Class Members whose SSNs are located or communicated to the Administrator, their full disbursement of Individual Class Payments and Individual PAGA Payments will proceed as described in Paragraph 4.2.2. (*Id.*) For Class Members whose SSNs are not known, but a mailing address is located, the Administrator will solicit the SSN by the Notice. (*Id.*) The Administrator will distribute any interest or penalty payment portion of the Individual Class Payment and any Individual PAGA Payment, up to an aggregate amount of \$599.00 for those Class Members whose SSN remains unknown.¹ (*Id.*) The balance of any undistributed Individual Class Payment and/or undistributed Individual PAGA Payment will be directed to the California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member. (Agreement, ¶¶ 4.2; 4.2.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.2.)
- Notice: The Administrator will mail Notices to all Class Members identified in the Class Data and the pre-mailing skip trace within 14 days of receipt of the Class Data.

¹ Tax law changes for 2026 may permit greater amounts to be issued without requiring the subsequent issuance of IRS Form 1099, which is the underlying reason for the limit specified.

(Agreement, ¶ 7.5.3.) The Notice describes how to dispute workweeks, submit an objection in writing, in person, or through an attorney, or request exclusion. (Agreement, ¶¶ 7.6 – 7.8.) Prior to mailing the Notice, the Administrator will do a skip trace of all Class Members whose information is incomplete so that the Notice may solicit required information from those Class Members.

- Notice Language: Notice will issue in English and Spanish. (Agreement, ¶ 1.11; 7.5.3.)
- Objections: Objections can be submitted in person, by attorney, or in writing to the Administrator, with no pre-requisite to being heard. (Agreement, ¶ 7.7.)
- Exclusion Requests: The procedure for exclusion requests, mailing a request to the Settlement Administrator, is the same as the procedure for submitting a written objection. (Agreement, ¶ 7.6.)
- PAGA Allocation: From the GSA, **\$20,000.00** will be allocated to settle claims brought pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 *et seq.* (“PAGA”), and seventy-five percent (75%), or **\$15,000.00**, will be paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency. (Agreement, ¶ 1.33; 3.2.5.)
- Notice to LWDA: Notice was provided prior to the filing of this Motion. Evidence is attached hereto.
- Enhancement/Service Award to Plaintiff: Defendant will not oppose the application for a Class Representative Service Payment of up to **\$10,000.00** to be paid from the GSA. (Agreement, ¶ 3.2.1.)
- Fees and Costs: Defendant will not oppose Class Counsel’s application for fees of not more than one-third of the GSA (**\$66,666.67**), and actual costs, in an amount not to exceed **\$18,000.00**, to be paid out of the GSA. (Agreement, ¶ 3.2.2.)
- Check Void Period: Settlement checks will be valid for 180 days. (Agreement, ¶ 4.2.2.)
- Uncashed Checks: Any checks that are mailed to the Class Members and remain uncashed after 180 days from issuance will be cancelled, and the moneys represented by such checks will be sent to the California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member failing to cash the check. (Agreement, ¶ 4.2.4.)

- Confidentiality Provisions: The Agreement permits Class Counsel to discuss the Settlement with Class Members. (Agreement ¶ 12.2.)

(Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 11-12 and Exhibit 1 thereto.)

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's Claims

Defendant is a logistics provider that has separate entities in various sects of transportation. Defendants is a logistics provider that has separate entities in various sects of transportation. On August 10, 2023, Plaintiff commenced this Action by filing a Complaint alleging causes of action against Defendants for failure to pay wages (minimum, overtime, and regular rate), failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and provide rest breaks, failure to timely pay final wages at termination, failure to indemnify for necessary business expenses, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and unfair business practices. On September 29, 2023, Defendant removed this action to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff sent a letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, providing notice of her intent to seek civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.* (Leviant Decl., ¶ 5.) The LWDA did not indicate that it intended to investigate the alleged violations referenced in the letter, and the 65-day time period permitted for the LWDA to provide such a notification expired. (*Id.*) On November 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint alleging an additional cause of action against Defendants for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). (*Id.*) The First Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in the Action (the “Operative Complaint.”). (*Id.*) On April 9, 2025, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the Parties’ stipulation to remand this action to state court for settlement purposes. (*Id.*)

B. Pre-Mediation Data Production and Analysis

The Parties conducted informal and formal discovery and investigation of the facts and law. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 6.) Investigation included, *inter alia*, the exchange of extensive data and discoverable information in preparation for the mediation session. The Parties have analyzed time clock, pay and other data pertaining to Plaintiff and the Class during the relevant Settlement Period, including but not

1 limited to the numbers of former and current members of the Class, average workweeks and pay periods,
2 and average rate of hourly pay. Time and pay data were used for Plaintiff's pre-mediation analysis.
3 Sampling was used to reduce costs and increase speed of data collection and review. (*Id.*) The margin of
4 error calculation for the sample of the Class in this case is as follows:

$$1.645 \sqrt{\frac{0.5(1-0.5)}{46}} \sqrt{\frac{305-46}{305-1}} = \text{margin of error}^2 = 0.1119 = 11.19\%$$

7 (*Id.*) With a random sample of data for 46 employees, the margin of error, using the population
8 adjustment factor, was no more than 11.19 percent.³ (*Id.*) In addition, Defendants also provided other
9 data pertaining to Plaintiff and the Class during the relevant Class Period, including but not limited
10 documents reflecting wage and hour policies and practices during the Class Period (*e.g.*, the relevant
11 employee handbook). (*Id.*)

12 After reviewing documents regarding Defendants' wage and hour policies and practices and
13 other information obtained during the exchange of information, and interviewing Settlement Class
14 Members, Class Counsel were able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the
15 merits, and the reasonably obtainable maximum monetary exposure for all claims. Class Counsel
16 prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law
17 regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 7.)

18 C. Settlement

19 On March 27, 2025, the Parties participated in an all-day mediation presided over by Mike
20

21 ² The term "1.645" is derived from a standard deviation table for a 90% confidence interval, known
22 as a "z-table." It is not affected by sample or population size. The margin of error is an "overestimate" of
23 the margin of error because the variance is presumed to be at its highest value, using 0.5(1-0.5) to
represent $p*q$ in the variance equation of $(p*q)/n$.

24 ³ The margin of error formula does not require an adjustment factor for extremely large populations.
25 (*Id.*) A poll of all potential voters in the United States, for example, does not require an adjustment for the
26 population size, since the second radicand in the equation (the fraction in the second radical sign) is
27 effectively equal to 1. (*Id.*) This is because the square root of a fraction that is very close to 1 is even
28 closer to 1. Consider a population of 200 million and a sample of 1,000 individuals from that population.
The second radicand is the fraction of 200 million minus 1,000, all divided by 200 million minus 1. (*Id.*)
That is equal to 0.999995. (*Id.*) The square root is 0.99999975, which is indistinguishable from 1 when
talking about a margin of error percentage even to the nearest tenth of a percent. (*Id.*) But when the
population size is much smaller, the population size has a major impact on the margin of error for a given
sample size. (*Id.*)

1 Ludwig, Esq., which led to this Agreement to settle the Action. The Parties discussed at length the
2 burdens and risks of continuing with the litigation as well as the merits of claims and defenses. After the
3 mediation, and the eventual settlement, the Parties then signed a long form settlement agreement (the
4 “Agreement”). (Leviant Decl., ¶ 8.)

5 Plaintiff and Class Counsel are aware of the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability for
6 the claims asserted in the Action, both generally and in response to Defendants’ defenses thereto.

7 Plaintiff and Class Counsel have also taken into account Defendants’ agreement to enter into a
8 Settlement that confers substantial relief upon the Class. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 9.)

9 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth
10 in this Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable Settlement and is in the best interests of the Class.
11 (Leviant Decl., ¶ 10.) Solely for the purpose of settling this case, the parties agree that the requirements
12 for establishing class action certification with respect to this class have been met and are met. (*Id.*) If this
13 Settlement is not approved by the Court for any reason, Defendants reserve the right to contest class
14 certification. (*Id.*) This Settlement, if approved, will result in the termination of the litigation through the
15 entry of the Judgment and the release of all Released Claims for all Class Members who have not elected
16 to exclude themselves from the Class. (*Id.*)

17 **IV. CLASS DEFINITION**

18 The Class is defined as follows:

19 All non-exempt employees employed by Horizon Personnel Services, Inc. and placed to
20 work at Defendant in California during the Class Period. (“Class Period” means the
21 period from August 10, 2019, to February 1, 2023). (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.5, 1.9, 1.12,
1.34.)

22 (Leviant Decl., ¶ 11 and Exhibit 1.)

23 **V. DISCUSSION**

24 **A. The Court Should Conditionally Certify the Class for Settlement Purposes**

25 The Class should be provisionally certified for settlement because: (1) the Class is ascertainable
26 and numerous; (2) there exists a well-defined community of interest; and (3) a class action is the superior
27 method of adjudication for this settlement. Code of Civ. Proc. § 382; *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.*,
28 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021 (2012); *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435 (2000); *Sav-on Drug*

1 *Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 332 (2004). For purposes of this Settlement *only*,
2 Defendant stipulates to conditional certification. (Settlement ¶ 12.1.)

3 “The certification question is ‘essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is
4 legally or factually meritorious.’” *Id.*, at 326, quoting *Linder*. Indeed, the certification question simply
5 asks whether the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class
6 treatment. *See, e.g., Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 1298 (2010). “[I]t is also well
7 established that trial courts should use different standards to determine the propriety of a settlement class,
8 as opposed to a litigation class certification. Specifically, a lesser standard of scrutiny is used for
9 settlement cases.” *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal. App. 4th 836, 859
10 (2003), citing *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1807 n. 19 (1996).

11 In view of these standards, the Class should be certified for purposes of settlement. Code Civ.
12 Proc. § 382; Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c).

13 **1. The Members of the Class Are Both Ascertainable and Numerous.**

14 Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size of
15 the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. *See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal. App. 3d
16 862, 873 (1983). A class is ascertainable when “it is defined ‘in terms of objective characteristics and
17 common transactional facts’ that make ‘the ultimate identification of class members possible when that
18 identification becomes necessary.’” *Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal. 5th 955, 980 (2019). The class
19 definition is sufficiently specific to enable the Parties, Class Members, and the Court to determine the
20 parameters of the class. *See Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.*, 191 Cal. App. 3d 605, 617 (1987). Here,
21 there were about 305 Class Members, all of whom may be identified by reference to Defendant’s
22 records. The Class is not only ascertainable, but also numerous. (Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 34-40.)

23 **2. There Are Common Questions That Predominate Over Any Questions That**
24 **May Be Unique to Individual Class Members.**

25 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of law
26 and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
27 representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1806; *Richmond*, 29
28 Cal. 3d at 473-75. A question of law or fact is common to the members of a class if it may be resolved

1 through common proof. *See, Jaimez*, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1305. As for predominance, it “is a comparative
2 concept, and ‘the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility and damages does not
3 mean individual fact questions predominate.’” *Sav-on*, 34 Cal. 4th at 334.

4 In this case, common questions include, but are not limited to: i. Whether or not Defendants paid
5 proper wages to the Class; ii. Whether or not Defendants provided meal periods to the Class; iii. Whether
6 or not Defendants provided rest periods to the Class; iv. Whether or not Defendants paid compensation
7 timely upon separation of employment to former Class Members; v. whether or not Defendants paid
8 compensation timely throughout Class Members’ employment; vi. Whether or not Defendants provided
9 accurate itemized wage statements to the Class; and, vii. Whether or not Defendants engaged in unlawful
10 or unfair business practices affecting the Class in violation of the UCL. (Leviat Decl., ¶ 37.)

11 In the Action, Plaintiff’s claims present sufficient common issues of law and fact that
12 predominate over individual issues and warrant class certification. From their review of the
13 documentation provided, Class Counsel determined that for purposes of these claims, Defendants’
14 policies and practices are either identical, or sufficiently similar, to raise the same questions of liability,
15 and applied to all Class Members. Because Class Members would have to prove the same issues of law
16 and fact to prevail, and because their potential legal remedies are identical, it would be preferable to
17 resolve all Class Members’ claims by means of the Settlement than to require each Class Member to
18 litigate his or her individual claims. Therefore, common questions predominate over questions that may
19 be unique to individual Class Members, and class-wide settlement is superior to any other resolution.

20 **3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of Those of the Class.**

21 Typicality “requires a showing that the class representative has claims or defenses typical of the
22 class.” *See, e.g., Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1534 (2008), approved
23 by *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012). California law does not require that
24 plaintiffs have claims identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class
25 representative is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on
26 conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured
27 by the same course of conduct. *Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal. App. 4th 1496, 1502 (2007).

28 In light of these standards, Plaintiff is typical of class members. Like other Class Members,

1 Plaintiff was employed by Defendant. Plaintiff worked during the Class Period. Plaintiff's claims are
2 typical of the claims of the Class proposed in this settlement. Like other class members, Plaintiff
3 experienced work under policies and procedures impacting wage and hour compliance. No unique
4 defenses applicable to Plaintiff have been identified that do not also exist as to other Class Members.
5 (Leviant Decl., ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that she and other Class Members share the same claims
6 stemming from Defendants' alleged violations of the Labor Code and relevant wage order. In addition,
7 Defendants' main defense that the wage and hour policies and practices fully comply with California
8 law, apply equally to the claims of all Class Members. Thus, Plaintiff is typical of the Class.

9 **4. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class.**

10 Adequacy is shown where the plaintiff is represented by counsel qualified to conduct the
11 litigation and the plaintiff's interest in the litigation is not antagonistic to class members. *McGhee v. Bank*
12 *of America*, 60 Cal. App. 3d 442, 451 (1976). In other words, where the plaintiff has adequate counsel,
13 the plaintiff may represent the entire class absent any disabling conflicts of interest that might hinder the
14 plaintiff's ability to represent the class. *Id.* In the Action, Plaintiff has no conflicts of interest with other
15 Class Members and has agreed to place Class interests above Plaintiff's own. (Hernandez Decl., ¶¶ 5-21;
16 Leviant Decl., ¶ 39.) Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel is experienced in wage and hour class litigation and
17 has no conflicts of interest with absent Class Members. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 39) Thus, this Court should
18 appoint Plaintiff as the Class Representatives and appoint Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel.

19 **5. Proceeding as a Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions**

20 Plaintiff contends that proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute,
21 as the Class Members and the Court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would serve as
22 the only means to deter and redress the alleged Labor Code violations. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* 23
23 Cal. 4th at 434. Furthermore, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would unduly
24 burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results, which may be avoided by class certification.

25 **6. The Proposed Class Notice Complies with Rule 3.766(d) and (e)**

26 Notice requirements are set forth in Rules of Court, Rule 3.766. In determining the manner of
27 notice, the court must consider interests of the class, relief requested, stakes of individual class members,
28 costs of notifying class members, resources of the parties, possible prejudice to class members who do

not receive notice, and the *res judicata* effect on class members. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766(e).

a) The Notice Procedure Satisfies Due Process

The proposed procedure for distributing the Proposed Notice is robust and meets the requirement that it have “a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members.” *Cartt v. Sup. Ct.*, 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974 (1975). There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the maximum number of Class Members that can be reached under the circumstances will be notified. Here, the proposed procedure includes safeguards, including, but not limited to, a pre-mailing skip trace to identify the maximum number of Class Members’ mailing addresses and tax identification numbers, mailing notice to Class Members’ last known addresses; skip tracing; searches for address changes; and the re-mailing of returned notices to any forwarding addresses. This manner of giving notice complies with Rule of Court 3.766(c) because it provides a reasonable chance that Class Notice will reach most if not all Class Members.

b) The Notice is Accurate and Informative

The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement should be approved for dissemination to the Class Members because its content complies with Rule of Court 3.766(d) in that it contains a brief explanation of the case, including the basic contentions or denials of the Parties, detailed information about Class Members’ rights to be excluded from the Settlement and object to the Settlement; a statement that the Settlement will bind all members who do not timely opt-out. Thus, the Notice also satisfies Rule of Court 3.769(f) regarding the contents of settlement notices.

The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. 3 NEWBERG § 8.39. It summarizes the proceedings and the terms and conditions of the proposed Settlement, in an informative and coherent manner, in compliance with the Manual for Complex Litigation (“MANUAL”), (2d Ed. 1993), which states that “the notice should be accurate, objective, and understandable to Class Members . . .” MANUAL, § 30.211. It makes clear that the Settlement does not constitute an admission of liability by Defendant and recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. Accordingly, the Notice complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

1 **B. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair,**
2 **Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage Claims**

3 California courts favor settlement. *See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Superior Court*, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231,
4 236 (1976). Unlike most settlements, class action settlements involve a court approval process that exists
5 to prevent fraud, collusion, and unfairness to class members. *Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v.*
6 *Superior Court*, 103 Cal.App.3d 573, 578-579 (1980). For the reasons discussed below, this Court
7 should preliminarily approve the Settlement, allow the Parties to give notice to the Class as proposed,
8 and schedule a Final Approval Hearing.

9 **1. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Review and Approval.**

10 Any settlement of class litigation must be reviewed and approved by the presiding court. Rules
11 of Court, Rule 3.769(a). Approval occurs in two steps: (1) an early (preliminary) review and (2) a
12 subsequent (final) review after notice has been distributed to the class members. The Preliminary
13 Approval Hearing and Final Approval Hearing coincide with these two steps. The present motion seeks
14 *preliminary approval* and the setting of a Final Approval Hearing.

15 To evaluate a settlement, the trial court must receive “*basic*” information about the nature and
16 magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the
17 release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.
18 App. 4th 116, 133 (2008). However, the record need *not* contain an explicit statement of the maximum
19 theoretical amount that the class could recover. *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*,
20 186 Cal. App. 4th 399, 409 (2010).

21 **2. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arms’ Length Negotiations**
22 **Between Experienced Counsel with the Assistance of a Highly Qualified**
23 **Mediator After Sufficient Data Was Exchanged to Evaluate Settlement.**

24 A settlement is presumptively fair where it is reached through arms’ length bargaining, based on
25 sufficient discovery and investigation to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, counsel is
26
27
28

1 experienced in similar litigation, and the percentage of objectors is small.⁴ *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802;
2 *In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006); *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v.*
3 *Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1146 (2000). In exercising the power to approve a settlement,
4 the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable,” *Dunk*,
5 at 1801, considering “the complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
6 action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the
7 state of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant,
8 and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. *Id.* These factors require balancing, are
9 non-exhaustive, and, as such, trial courts should tailor the factors considered to each case and give due
10 regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” *Id.*

11 Here, the Settlement resulted from thorough, arms’ length negotiations between experienced
12 counsel with the assistance of a skilled mediator, Mike Ludwig, Esq. (Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) Plaintiff
13 obtained data from Defendants and then carefully reviewed that information. Counsel for Plaintiff also
14 examined policies and interviewed witnesses about their work experiences and Defendants’ practices.

15 Based on the review of data, Plaintiff estimated potential exposure and then estimated risk factors
16 to adjust the reasonable expected outcome. The investigation that Plaintiff’s counsel conducted was
17 sufficient to provide them with enough information to intelligently evaluate the estimated exposure for
18 purposes of negotiating the Settlement in view of the risks discussed below and was sufficient to allow
19 this Court to do the same. *See, e.g., Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001).
20 A thorough data analysis was conducted.

21 **3. The Settlement Represents a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise**
22 **of Class Members’ Claims Based on Defendant’s Estimated Liability**
23 **Exposure Given the Risks Continued Litigation Would Entail.**

24 *a) The Class Settlement is Fair, Adequate and Reasonable*

25 A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at
26

27 ⁴ Because the fourth prerequisite for the presumption to arise cannot be addressed until the final
28 approval hearing, only the first three prerequisites are relevant at this preliminary stage of the settlement
approval process.

1 trial and does not have to provide 100% of damages sought to be fair and reasonable. “In the context of a
2 settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the
3 complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances.” *Wershba*, 91
4 Cal. App. 4th at 250. Accordingly, because settlements involve compromise, even one that provides for
5 substantially narrower relief than would likely be obtained if the suit were successfully litigated can be
6 reasonable given that “the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each
7 side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.” *Id.*

8 With respect to the claims asserted on behalf of the Class, there are serious risks that support this
9 compromise amount. These risks include, but are not limited to: (i) the risk that Plaintiff would be unable
10 to establish liability for unpaid wages, *see Duran v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n*, 59 Cal. 4th 1, 39 & n. 33
11 (2014) (“*Duran*”); (ii) the risk that Defendants’ meal and rest period policies might not support class
12 certification or a class-wide liability finding; (iii) the risk that uncertainties about the legality of
13 Defendants’ policies and practices could preclude class-wide awards of statutory penalties; (iv) the risk
14 that individual differences between Class Members could be construed as pertaining to liability and not
15 just damages; (v) the risk that any penalty award under PAGA could be reduced by the Court in its
16 discretion; (vi) the risk that lengthy trial or appellate litigation could ensue; and (vi) the risk that violation
17 rates could prove lower than expected; (Leviant Decl., ¶ 16.) These risks are non-exhaustive.

18 In light of the uncertainties of litigation, the GSA reflects a fair and reasonable recovery for the
19 Class Members. (Leviant Decl. ¶¶ 13-20.) The settlement amount is, of course, a compromise figure.
20 (Leviant Decl. ¶ 17.) By necessity it took into account risks related to liability, damages, and the
21 defenses asserted by Defendant. (*Id.*) Moreover, each Class Member will be given the opportunity to
22 opt-out of the Settlement, allowing those who feel they have claims that are greater than the benefits they
23 can receive under this Settlement to pursue their own claims. (*Id.*) For the approximately **305** members
24 of the Class, the average **gross** benefit is **\$655.74** per class member, and the estimated average **net**
25 recovery for each Class Member would be approximately **\$255.77**. Given that Defendant could
26 potentially defeat certification, this is a significant sum to have achieved in settlement. Moreover, a
27 Class Member who worked a greater number of weeks for Defendant will receive a larger share of the
28 Settlement than a Class Member who worked for a shorter amount of time during the class period. (*Id.*)

1 After analyzing the claims in this matter, Plaintiff has concluded that the value of this Settlement
2 is fair, adequate, and reasonable. The Gross Settlement Amount of **\$200,000.00** is about 93% of the
3 **\$214,395.81** estimate of *risk-adjusted* recovery (excluding interest) at this stage in the litigation. (Leviant
4 Decl., ¶ 18.) This assessment is based on a carefully constructed model of the current fair value of the
5 case, using estimated risks, average wage rates, numbers of employees, and the amount of time covered
6 by the class period. (*Id.*)

- 7 • A reasonably estimated exposure for unpaid off-the-clock wages was calculated, with the
8 assistance of an expert, to be approximately **\$18,706.00**, based on an assumption of three
9 minutes of off-the-clock work for every shift for every Class Member. However, with the
10 high risk factor discounts for certification and liability proof, the value of that claim is
11 estimated by Plaintiff's counsel to be approximately **\$2,244.72**, assuming certification
12 probability of 30% and merits success at 40%. The off-the-clock time resulted from
13 waiting in line before and after shifts to clock in and out, which was disputed by
14 Defendant. Here, a \$2,244.72 exposure has a value of about 12% of its maximum, given
15 a likelihood of success on both certification and the merits, which is an approximation of
16 the chain probability of certification multiplied by merits chances: $0.4 \times 0.3 = 0.12$. This
17 theory of recovery has a high degree of risk because it depends on Class Member
18 estimates of the frequency and duration and is testimony dependent.
- 19 • A reasonably estimated exposure for unpaid wages due to regular rate errors was
20 calculated, with the assistance of an expert, to be approximately **\$102.00**. However, with
21 the risk factor discounts for certification and liability proof, the value of that claim is
22 estimated by Plaintiff's counsel to be approximately **\$49.98**, assuming certification
23 probability of 70% and merits success at 70%. Defendant's data showed that overtime
24 and other applicable rates of pay were paid at below the 1.5 times the regular rate for
25 purposes of calculating overtime rate of pay, sick pay, and break premiums.
- 26 • A reasonably estimated exposure for rest break violations over the class period was
27 calculated at **\$69,769.00**, but with chances of certification and proof of liability (30% and
28 30% respectively) for a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$6,279.21**. This claim is based on class
member testimony of interrupted rest periods and time required to move between work
and rest areas which cut into the rest periods, Plaintiff estimated the exposure assuming
25% of all rest periods were missed during the Class Period – an optimistic estimation.
- A reasonably calculated exposure for meal break violations over the class period was
calculated at **\$8,721.00**, with chances of certification and liability risks (50% and 40%
respectively) resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$1,744.20**. This exposure is based
upon class member testimony that they were required to wait in line to clock back into
lunch because of the large number of employees who would clock back in at the same
time.
- A calculated exposure for unreimbursed expenses was estimated to be **\$15,250.00**, but
with chances of certification and proof of liability (40% and 30% respectively) for a risk-
adjusted exposure of **\$1,830.00**. The allegation is that employees used personal cell
phones to communicate with Defendant's supervisors and purchased various items
necessary for their jobs such as steel-toed boots. It is disputed that cell phone usage
occurred and that purchase of steel-toed boots or other items were actually necessary for
Class Members' duties.

- The risk-adjusted penalty recovery for Labor Code § 203 penalties was estimated to be approximately **\$112,664.70** on a maximum exposure of **\$1,251,830.00** (with certification and merits success chances of 30% and 30% respectively, based on the theory of unpaid wages, adjusted for the additional risk of needing to prove other elements in addition to the underlying wage claim). The need to show a knowing and intentional violation constitutes an additional risk factor.
- The risk-adjusted penalty recovery for wage statement penalties was estimated to be approximately **\$7,825.50**, on a maximum exposure of **\$86,950.00** (with certification and merits success chances of 30% and 30% respectively, based on the theory of unpaid wages, adjusted for the additional risk of needing to prove other elements in addition to the underlying wage claim). The value of this claim was just dealt a severe blow by the recent California Supreme Court decision of *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.* (May 6, 2024), which significantly strengthened the good faith defense to Section 226 penalties.
- Performing risk-adjusted valuations for all claims yields a total value in the range of **\$132,638.31**, excluding PAGA.⁵
- For the PAGA Period, the number of PAGA Pay Periods at issue is estimated to be **4,000** for the 174 Aggrieved Employees. Using the most straightforward formulation of applying the “catch-all” \$100 penalty specified in Labor Code § 2699(f)(2) to each PAGA Pay Period, the total penalty exposure is approximately **\$400,000.00**. In addition, with assistance from Plaintiff’s data consultant, and after a thorough review of evidence casting serious doubt on the viability of many of the theories of penalty recover, counsel separately estimated the plausible potential PAGA exposure to be, on a penalty-by-penalty basis, to be **\$545,050.00**, which does include some stacking. But, assuming issues with proof and cooperation of aggrieved employees, along with the Court’s power to reduce penalties, the exposure was estimated to be **\$81,757.50.00**, which is 15% of the calculated exposure assuming an ideal outcome.

(See, Leviant Decl., ¶ 18.)

This result here is fully supportable as reasonable. First, it is important to recognize the wilfulness finding required for Labor Code §§ 203 and 226 is challenging to establish. (*Id.*) Second, rest break and meal period claims have been challenging to certify for many years, even after *Brinker*. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 19.) Arbitration agreements present a very high risk to all class claims. The Judicial Council’s Class Certification in California: SECOND INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION - FEBRUARY 2010 (“Second Interim Report”), at

⁵ It is difficult to assign specific percentages to future events, but it does provide a method for attempting to reduce the concept of “very high risk” or “high risk” to a quantifiable amount. Certification of a claim is typically a binary event. One does not obtain a 20% certification; a claim is either certified or it is not. But the current expected value is best quantified by applying a risk reduction, based on the total experience of counsel. The numbers explain with math what can also be described conceptually in words.

1 page 5, states that “less than a quarter of disposed cases in the study sample were certified, either through
2 a litigated motion for certification or as part of a classwide settlement agreement.” See, Second Interim
3 Report, at 5 (emphasis added).⁶ That “*or*” is significant. The certification rates found in the study of less
4 that 25% includes *both* contested certifications and settlement certifications, which are the majority of
5 certifications. In other words, one must assume in any wage and hour class action prior to certification
6 that a contested certification motion will have a success rate of well under 25%, and probably closer to
7 10% as a starting point for risk evaluation. The facts of each case have significant bearing on these
8 percentages. But it cannot be disputed that certification is an exceptionally difficult procedural hurdle to
9 successfully overcome. Thus, it is not unreasonable to start from the proposition that a pre-certification
10 settlement that is 10% to 15% of the maximum plausible exposure is a valid starting point for valuation.
11 If roughly 10% of class actions are certified on a contested basis, then, on average, 90% of the time a
12 class will not be certified and the result for the class is *zero* dollars

13 Here, the estimated certification probabilities are *above* the average rate at which cases were
14 certified in California over the study years, based upon data available through the California Courts
15 websites. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 19.) In sum, well *under* 20% of all cases filed as proposed class actions are
16 ultimately certified by way of a *contested* motion. (*Id.*) Thus, the recovery falls within the expected
17 outcome under the likelihood of success metric. (*Id.*) It would also be appropriate to evaluate the result
18 by examining only the premium wages at issue (approximately \$97,298.00, *with no risk reduction*),
19 excluding penalties and interest.⁷ This Settlement achieves the goals of the litigation.

20 *b) The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable*

21 The ultimate decision as to the amount of penalties is always up to the discretion of the Court.

23 ⁶ The report is available at <https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/classaction-certification.pdf> (last
24 viewed March 12, 2024).

25 ⁷ The exclusion of interest and penalties from the fairness evaluation is proper because, first, PAGA
26 penalties are discretionary (*see* Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2) (the court in its discretion “may award a lesser
27 amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part...”), and, second, courts evaluate
28 the strength of a proposed settlement without taking potential penalties or interest into consideration. *See*
Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2000); *see also* *Miller v. CEVA*
Logistics U.S.A., Inc., 2015 WL 729638, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015) (court utilized calculation of a
defendant’s exposure exclusive of interest and penalties to determine whether the settlement fell within
the range of possible approval).

1 Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) states: “In any action by an aggrieved employee seeking recovery of a civil
2 penalty available under subdivision (a) or (f), a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil
3 penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do
4 otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”

5 Prior to the issuance of *Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.*, 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021), the only sources
6 of persuasive guidance as to how to assess the reasonableness of a PAGA allocation were found in
7 federal court decisions. In their view, a PAGA allocation, even if a small portion of the total settlement,
8 could be reasonable if the settlement of the wage and hour claims is robust and serves the deterrent
9 purpose of PAGA. *O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
10 (“By providing fair compensation to the class members as employees and substantial monetary relief, a
11 settlement not only vindicates the rights of class members as employees, but may have a deterrent effect
12 upon the defendant employer and other employers, an objective of PAGA.”). *Moniz* provided explicit
13 confirmation that this was an appropriate yardstick by which to measure reasonableness of a PAGA
14 settlement. *Moniz*, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 77. *Moniz*, in agreeing with federal courts that have considered
15 how to evaluate a PAGA settlement, concluded that the class action factors are appropriately considered,
16 along with a consideration of whether the settlement furthers “PAGA’s purposes to remediate present
17 labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws.”

18 As to the first set of elements (the class-type analysis), it is embodied in Plaintiff’s discussion of
19 the adequacy of the settlement generally. Here, the expense, complexity and likely duration of future
20 litigation was to some extent an unknown. However, what is certain is that to adequately establish the
21 violations that would support a substantial penalty, tremendous time and expense would be invested.

22 The second element (the PAGA purposes element) is also satisfied here. As held by *Moniz*,
23 PAGA’s purposes include (1) remediation of present labor law violations, (2) deterrence of future
24 violations, and (3) maximization of enforcement of state labor laws. Here the allocation of a major
25 portion of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of labor law violation remediation.
26 The allocation of a major portion of settlement funds to class members also deters future violations. This
27 is a \$200,000.00 settlement, a good result. Deterrence is fulfilled. Finally, allocation of a major portion
28 of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of enforcement of state labor law. This

1 settlement is, by definition, a response to alleged violations of labor laws, balanced against risks.

2 In addition, there is no evidence that a court or a commissioner had informed Defendant that its
3 conduct violated the Labor Code. *Amaral v. Cintas Corp.*, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1209 (2008); *Willis v.*
4 *Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC*, 2013 WL 6053831, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. 2013). And in *Cotter*, the court found a
5 significant reduction of the PAGA claim would be appropriate because “[t]his does not appear to be a
6 case where a company has deliberately sought to evade the law.” *Cotter*, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 941.

7 Finally, the PAGA allocation is fair. The LWDA is receiving \$15,000.00. The Class is
8 receiving, net, an estimated \$78,008.33 for the releases of *all* other claims. While the proportion is tipped
9 in favor of employees, the allocation satisfies California’s wage and hour policies.

10 **4. The Proposed Method for Allocating Settlement Funds Is Fair.**

11 The proposed method of allocating the Settlement Fund to Class Members also is fair and
12 reasonable. The Settlement Fund is to be allocated between all Class Members, based on time worked by
13 the Class Member during the Class Period, in relation to the total amount of time worked by all
14 participating Class Members. This proposed method is fair and reasonable because each Class Member’s
15 actual potential damages vary based on the number of workweeks he or she worked (e.g., Lab. Code §
16 226.7 provides for an extra hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of pay for each violation, resulting
17 in a higher potential damage when a higher number of incidents occur). A Class Member who worked a
18 greater number of work weeks will receive a larger payment under the Settlement than a Class Member
19 who worked for a shorter amount of time. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 17.)

20 **5. The Proposed Enhancement Award to Plaintiff Warrants Approval.**

21 The proposed enhancement of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff is intended to recognize substantial
22 initiative and significant efforts on behalf of the Class. Courts routinely approve incentive awards to
23 compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class action
24 litigation, often in much higher amounts than that sought here. Factors considered when awarding an
25 incentive include the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the class, the degree to which the class has
26 benefitted, the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in the litigation, the risk to the class
27 representative in commencing suit (financial and otherwise), the notoriety and personal difficulties
28 encountered, the duration of the litigation, and the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the

1 plaintiff as a result of the litigation. *Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 804
2 (2009). Here, Plaintiff contributed time to the prosecution of this matter, including bringing the case
3 forward, and providing assistance prior to the mediation with information and substantial time conferring
4 with counsel over the course of this litigation and before it was filed. (Hernandez Decl., ¶¶ 5-19; Leviant
5 Decl., ¶ 32.) The enhancement also recognizes risks Plaintiff took to be liable for costs regardless of the
6 success of the litigation, as well as the personal risk of facing intrusive discovery and potential disclosure
7 to future employers that Plaintiff sued an employer, making future employment less certain.

8 **6. The Proposed Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Is Also Fair, Adequate,**
9 **and Reasonable and Merits Preliminary Approval.**

10 The California Supreme Court removed any lingering doubt about the use of the percentage of
11 the fund method to award attorney's fees in California Courts. *Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.*, 1 Cal.
12 5th 480, 503 (2016).⁸ Thus, this Court may and, pursuant to *Laffitte*, *should* award fees to Plaintiffs'
13 counsel based upon the percentage of the fund methodology.

14 Setting *Laffitte* aside, whether the once-again-confirmed percentage of the fund method or the
15 lodestar method is used, the outcome is roughly the same: "[F]ee awards in class actions average around
16 one-third of the recovery' regardless of 'whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used.'" *Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC*, 69 Cal. App. 5th 521 (2021). This is also consistent with
17 counsels' experience in class cases. Here, Plaintiff's attorneys intend to request attorneys' fees of up to
18 \$66,666.67 (one-third of the GSA), and costs capped at \$18,000.00 (which includes payment for
19 mediations, filing fees, service of process fees, and other standard expenses). (Leviant Decl., ¶ 27.)
20 Given the efforts and risks involved in this case, as well as the results achieved, these amounts are within
21 the range of reasonableness and warrant *preliminary approval*.
22

23 **7. The Proposed Payment to the Administrator Is Fair and Reasonable**

24 Phoenix, which has been selected due to its competitive bid, states that administration can be
25

26 ⁸ The Supreme Court also corrected the misconception that *Dunk* should be viewed as expressing
27 doubt about the use of the percentage method: "The *Dunk* court, while finding the percentage method
28 inapplicable to the settlement before it due to the lack of a readily valued common fund, did not purport
to bar its usage generally in common fund cases." *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 501.

1 performed for a flat rate of \$7,325.00. In counsel's experience, based on similar wage-and-hour actions,
2 an estimated cost of \$7,325.00 is a fair and reasonable amount for administration fees and should be
3 preliminarily approved. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 33.) Phoenix has also confirmed its capabilities and security
4 protocols in the accompanying declaration.

5 **8. No Other Cases Are Known to Exist**

6 No other pending cases asserting similar claims against Defendant are known to exist. (Leviant
7 Decl., ¶ 20.) Moon Law Group, PC, does not have any other potential or actual cases against this
8 Defendant. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 20.)

9 **VI. THE COURT SHOULD SCHEDULE A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING**

10 Plaintiff requests that the fairness hearing in this case be scheduled for about 160 days after
11 issuance of the Court's Order granting preliminary approval. Under the Settlement, Phoenix will
12 conduct a pre-mailing skip trace and notice identified Class Members whose social security numbers are
13 unknown to provide the social security number, Defendant will have 14 days to provide the data it
14 possesses to Phoenix, which will then have 14 calendar days to mail out class notice. Class Members
15 have 45 days after mailing of the notice to submit exclusions or objections (with a 14-day extension
16 available for re-mailed notices). Therefore, Plaintiff proposes a final approval hearing scheduled for the
17 first available hearing date that is about 130 days after preliminary approval is granted.

18 **VII. CONCLUSION**

19 For all the foregoing reasons, because the Class meets the requirements for certification, because
20 the Settlement bears all requisite indicia of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, and because the
21 proposed notice procedure and forms comport with Rule 3.766 and due process, this Court should grant
22 this Motion for Preliminary Approval and schedule a Final Approval Hearing.

23 Respectfully submitted,

24 Dated: January 19, 2026

MOON LAW GROUP, PC

25
26 By: _____

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H. Scott Leviant
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27
28 Attorneys for Plaintiff