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7
8 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
9 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

10 DORIS ANN NATHAN, an individual and on
11 behalf of all others similarly situated;

12 Plaintiff,

13 vs.

14 THE MULLER COMPANY, LLC, a
15 California Limited Liability Company; and
16 DOES 1 through 50;

17 Defendants.

Case No.: 23STCV24395

[Assigned for All Purposes to:
Hon. William F. Highberger, Dept. 10]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA
SETTLEMENT, CLASS
REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE
PAYMENT, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

(Filed concurrently with Supporting
Declarations and [Proposed] Order)

DATE: April 29, 2026

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

DEPT: 10

Action Filed: October 6, 2023

Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF
2 RECORD:

3 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court and
4 California Code of Civil Procedure section 382, on April 29, 2026 at 10:30 a.m. in Department 10
5 of the Los Angeles Superior Court, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012,
6 Plaintiff Doris Ann Nathan (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
7 individuals, will and hereby does move this Court for entry of an Order:

8 1. Confirming the certification of the Settlement Class for settlement purposes under
9 Section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure;

10 2. Confirming the appointment of Plaintiff as the Class Representative for settlement
11 purposes;

12 3. Confirming the appointment of William C. Sung and Tiffany L. Luu as Class
13 Counsel;

14 4. Granting final approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
15 (“Settlement” or “Agreement”);

16 5. Approving an award of \$53,333.33 in attorney’s fees to Class Counsel;

17 6. Approving an award of \$18,750.25 in costs to Class Counsel;

18 7. Approving an award of \$3,790.00 in costs to Apex Class Action LLC for its
19 settlement administration services;

20 8. Approving a service payment of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff for Class Representative
21 Service Payment;

22 9. Approving a payment of \$6,000.00 to the Labor & Workforce Development Agency
23 (“LWDA”) for its share of civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”); and

24 10. Entering final judgment in the form of the Proposed Judgment and Order Granting
25 Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement filed herewith.

26 This Motion is made on the following grounds: (1) the Class continues to meet the
27 requirements for class certification for settlement purposes under Code of Civil Procedure § 382;
28 (2) Plaintiff and Class Counsel continue to be adequate representatives of the Class; (3) the

1 Settlement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of disputed wage and hour claims; (4) the
2 requested amounts for Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs, settlement administration costs,
3 and the Class Representative service payment are all fair, adequate, and reasonable; and (5) in light
4 of the foregoing, the Proposed Judgment and Order Granting Final Approval of Class and PAGA
5 Action Settlement submitted herewith should be entered so as to give finality to, and allow for
6 disbursements from, the Settlement.

7 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion; the attached Memorandum of Points and
8 Authorities; the supporting declarations of William C. Sung, Plaintiff Doris Ann Nathan, and Stacey
9 Shim of Apex Class Action LLC, and the exhibits attached thereto; the Agreement; the pleadings,
10 and other papers filed in this Action; and on any further oral or documentary evidence or argument
11 presented at the time of the hearing.

12
13 DATED: March 19, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

14 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

15
16 By: 

17 William C. Sung
18 Tiffany L. Luu
19 Attorneys for Plaintiff Doris Ann Nathan
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Doris Ann Nathan (“Plaintiff”) submits this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class and PAGA Action Settlement (the “Motion”) with Defendant The Muller Company, LLC (“Defendant”) (collectively, the “Parties”). Under the Settlement, Defendant has agreed to pay a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of \$160,000.00 to the following Class comprised of 49 individuals: All current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant The Muller Company, LLC within the State of California during the Class Period of October 6, 2019 to August 5, 2025.

In this non-reversionary class and PAGA action settlement, all Participating Class Members will receive automatic payments without the need to submit a claim form, **resulting in an average Individual Class Payment of approximately \$1,400.54 to each Participating Class Member.** This is an excellent result for the Class, especially in light of the significant litigation risks that Plaintiff faced. Moreover, after receiving notice of the proposed Settlement and projected estimated Individual Class Payments, not a single Class Member has objected to or opted out of the Settlement, resulting in a 100% participation rate.

As explained further below, the Court should grant Plaintiff’s Motion in its entirety because (1) the Class continues to meet the requirements for certification for settlement purposes under Code Civ. Proc. § 382; (2) the Settlement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the disputed claims in this case; and (3) the requested amounts for attorneys’ fees and costs, settlement administration costs, and class representative service payment are all fair, adequate, and reasonable. In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court should enter the Proposed Judgment and Order Granting Final Approval submitted herewith.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION

A. THE PARTIES AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant is a property management company that oversees the marketing and leasing of commercial properties in Southern and Northern California. Declaration of William C. Sung (“Sung Decl.”), ¶ 9. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a non-exempt Assistant Property Manager for

1 approximately 11 years, from April 2012 to March 2023, at the Westwood Medical Plaza.

2 Declaration of Doris Ann Nathan (“Nathan Decl.”), ¶ 2.

3 On August 1, 2023, Plaintiff sent a notice letter under the California Private Attorneys
4 General Act (“PAGA”) to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and gave
5 notice to Defendant via certified mail. Sung Decl., ¶ 10. On October 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed the
6 operative Class and Representative Action Complaint alleging (1) Minimum Wage Violations; (2)
7 Overtime Wage Violations; (3) Meal Period Violations; (4) Rest Period Violations; (5) Wage
8 Statement Penalties; (6) Waiting Time Penalties; (7) Unfair Competition; and (8) Civil Penalties
9 under the California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). Sung Decl., ¶ 11.

10 On March 21, 2024, the Parties attended an initial mediation with mediator Steven Cerveris,
11 Esq., but did not reach a resolution. Sung Decl., ¶ 12. Thereafter, Plaintiff engaged in
12 precertification discovery, including propounding Special Interrogatories and Requests for
13 Production of Documents, and met and conferred with Defendant’s counsel regarding a *Belair*
14 *West* notice for class contact information. *Ibid.* Plaintiff agreed to stay formal discovery when the
15 Parties scheduled a second mediation with mediator Barry Appell, Esq., which led to this
16 Settlement. *Ibid.*

17 **B. DISCOVERY, MEDIATION, AND PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

18 In connection with mediation, the Parties engaged in extensive informal discovery. Sung
19 Decl., ¶ 13. Defendant produced (1) a class list identify employee numbers, positions, dates of
20 employment, and pay rate; (2) time and payroll records of all Class Members (not a sampling); (3)
21 Defendant’s employee handbooks and standalone policy documents; and (4) Plaintiff’s personnel
22 records and time and payroll records. *Ibid.*

23 In preparation for mediation, Class Counsel analyzed the time and payroll records and
24 conducted a comprehensive analysis and extrapolation of the payroll and timekeeping data
25 produced by Defendant to create a detailed exposure analysis for all claims at issue. Sung Decl., ¶
26 14. This discovery and analysis allowed the Parties to assess the merits and value of Plaintiff’s
27 claims, the chances of certification of Plaintiff’s claims, and Defendant’s potential defenses. *Ibid.*

28 ///

1 On June 4, 2025, the Parties participated in a full-day mediation with Barry Appell, Esq. a
2 well-respected wage and hour class action mediator. Sung Decl., ¶ 15. During mediation, the Parties
3 vigorously debated their opposing legal positions, the likelihood of certification of Plaintiff's
4 claims, and the legal basis for the claims and defenses. *Ibid.* The Parties reached a tentative class
5 and PAGA settlement at the mediation. *Ibid.* The terms of the Settlement are in the Class Action
6 and PAGA Settlement Agreement ("Settlement" or "Agreement"). *Id.*, **Exh. 1** (Agreement).

7 On September 23, 2025, Plaintiff submitted the proposed Settlement to this Court with
8 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement. Sung Decl., ¶
9 16. On November 24, 2025, this Court issued its Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class
10 Action and PAGA Settlement. *Id.*, **Exh. 2** (Order Granting Preliminary Approval).

11 **III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT AND NOTICE ADMINISTRATION**

12 **A. CLASS DEFINITION**

13 As noted, the Class is comprised of: "All current and former non-exempt employees who
14 worked for Defendant The Muller Company, LLC within the State of California during the Class
15 Period of October 6, 2019 to August 5, 2025." Order Granting Preliminary Approval, ¶ 1 (Ex. 2 to
16 Sung Decl.).

17 **B. MONETARY TERMS**

18 The Settlement provides for Defendant to pay a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount
19 of \$160,000.00. Agreement, § 3.1 (Ex. 1 to Sung Decl.). The Net Settlement Amount is the amount
20 remaining from the Gross Settlement Amount after deducting requested attorneys' fees
21 (\$53,333.33) and litigation costs (\$18,750.25), requested Class Representative Service Payment
22 (\$7,500.00), settlement administration costs (\$3,790.00), and the amount set aside as PAGA civil
23 penalties (\$8,000.00). Agreement, §§ 1.28, 3.2.1-3.2.5; Sung Decl., ¶ 17, Ex. 3. Based on these
24 requested amounts, the Net Settlement Amount is estimated at \$68,626.42. Declaration of Stacey
25 Shim ("Admin. Decl."), ¶ 14.

26 Each Individual Class Payment to Class Members will be calculated as follows: "The
27 Administrator shall pay Individual Class Payments to Class Members calculated by (a) dividing the
28 Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class

Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member's Workweeks." Agreement, § 3.2.4. In addition, 25% of the amount designated as PAGA Penalties (i.e., \$2,000.00) will be distributed to all Aggrieved Employees who worked for Defendant during the period from August 1, 2022 to August 5, 2025 (the "PAGA Period") based on the proportionate number of pay periods worked during the PAGA Period. Agreement, §§ 1.31, 1.34, 3.2.5.

All Individual Class Payments from the Net Settlement Amount will be classified as 20% wages to be reported on a W-2 form, and 80% penalties and interest, to be reported on a 1099 form. Agreement, § 3.2.4.1. Defendant's share of employer-side payroll taxes shall be paid by Defendant separate and in addition to the Gross Settlement Amount. Agreement, § 3.1.

C. SUMMARY OF THE NOTICE ADMINISTRATION

On September 19, 2025, Defendant's counsel provided the Administrator with the Class List consisting of 49 Class Members' names, social security numbers, last known mailing addresses, and dates of employment. Admin. Decl., ¶ 4. The Administrator conducted a National Change of Address ("NCOA") search to ensure the accuracy and validity of the addresses before mailing Class Notices. Admin. Decl., ¶ 6. If an updated address was found in the NCOA database, the Administrator utilized that address; if no updated address was found, the Administrator utilized the original address. *Ibid.* On December 23, 2025, the Administrator mailed the Class Notice to the 49 Class Members via U.S. First Class Mail. Admin. Decl., ¶ 7, **Exh. A** (Class Notice).

The Administrator received six returned Class Notices as undeliverable. Admin. Decl., ¶ 8. The Administrator conducted a computerized skip trace on the returned Class Notices and located three updated address and re-mailed the Class Notice. *Ibid.* Ultimately, three Class Notices was undeliverable as an updated address could not be found through a skip trace. *Ibid.*

The Administrator received no objections, requests for exclusions, or workweek disputes. Admin. Decl., ¶¶ 10-12. Thus, the participation rate by Class Member is 100%. Admin. Decl., ¶ 10. The average estimated Individual Class Payment is approximately **\$1,400.54**, with the highest estimated payment being **\$5,636.32** and lowest estimated payment being **\$15.93**. Admin. Decl., ¶ 15. Additionally, 30 Aggrieved Employees who were employed during the PAGA Period will

1 receive a portion of the \$2,000.00 penalties reserved for Aggrieved Employees. *Ibid.* The average
2 Individual PAGA Payment is approximately **\$66.67**, with the highest estimated payment being
3 **\$155.87** and the lowest estimated payment being **\$2.12**. Admin Decl., ¶¶ 16-17.

4 **D. FUNDING OF THE SETTLEMENT AND UNCASHED SETTLEMENT**
5 **CHECKS**

6 Defendant shall deposit the Gross Settlement Amount and the employer's share of payroll
7 taxes with the Administrator no later than 30 days after the Effective Date. Agreement, § 4.3.
8 Within 14 calendar days after Defendant funds the Gross Settlement Amount and employer's share
9 of payroll taxes, the Administrator will disburse all Individual Class Payments, all Individual PAGA
10 Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, the Administration Expenses Payment, Class
11 Representative Service Payment, the Class Counsel Fees Payment, and the Class Counsel Litigation
12 Expenses Payment. Agreement, § 4.4.

13 After disbursement, Class Members will have 180 days to cash their checks. Agreement, §
14 4.4.1. If any checks are returned as undeliverable, the Administrator will conduct a Class Member
15 Address Search and remail the settlement check to either a USPS forwarding address or to an
16 address ascertained through the Class Member Address Search within 7 calendar days of receiving
17 the returned checks. Agreement, § 4.4.2. Funds remaining unclaimed after 180 days shall be sent to
18 the California State Controller's Office in the Class Member's name to be held as unclaimed
19 property for the Class Member. Agreement, § 4.4.3.

20 **IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

21 **A. THE SETTLEMENT MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS**
22 **CERTIFICATION UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 382**

23 Under Code of Civil Procedure § 382, a class may be certified if: (1) it is ascertainable and
24 its members are too numerous for joinder to be practical; (2) the representative and absent class
25 members share a community of interest, and questions of law and fact common to the class
26 predominate over questions unique to individual class members; (3) the representative's claims are
27 typical of the class's claims; and (4) the representative will fairly and adequately represent the
28 class's interests. *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.

1 Here, this Court found that the Class meets all the requirements for class certification for
2 settlement purposes when it granted preliminary approval of the Settlement. *See generally* Sung
3 Decl., Exh. 2. Subsequent to the Court’s Order granting preliminary approval, no events have cast
4 doubt on the propriety of this determination, and in fact, the reaction of the Class has been
5 overwhelmingly supportive of the Settlement, with not a single objection or request for exclusion
6 submitted, resulting in a 100% participating rate. *See* Admin. Decl., ¶¶ 10-12. This Court should
7 therefore confirm its conditional certification of the Class.

8 **B. THE SETTLEMENT IS A FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE**
9 **COMPROMISE OF DISPUTED WAGE AND HOUR CLAIMS**

10 California courts have a strong policy in favor of settlement. *See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Superior*
11 *Court* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236. Unlike individual settlements, class action settlements
12 involve a court approval process that exists to prevent fraud, collusion, and unfairness to class
13 members. *Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v. Superior Court* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 573, 578-
14 79. This approval process consists of preliminary settlement approval, notice being given to class
15 members, and a final fairness and approval hearing being held, at which class members have the
16 opportunity to be heard with respect to the settlement. *Ibid.* Now that notice has been provided to
17 the Class, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court finally approve the Settlement as fair,
18 adequate, and reasonable.

19 **1. The Settlement Was Reached Through Arms-Length Negotiation by**
20 **Experienced Counsel and Presumably Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable**

21 A class settlement is presumptively fair where it is reached through arm’s-length bargaining,
22 based on sufficient discovery and investigation to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently,
23 counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and the percentage of objectors to the settlement is
24 small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802. In deciding whether to approve a
25 proposed settlement, a trial court has broad powers to determine if the proposed settlement is fair
26 under the circumstances of the case. *Mallick v. Superior Court* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438. In
27 exercising these powers, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is “fair,
28 adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted). Relevant

1 factors for the Court to consider include, but are not limited to:

2 [T]he strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of
3 further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
4 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the
proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental
participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

5 *Ibid.* These factors require balancing, are non-exhaustive and, as such, trial courts should tailor the
6 factors to each case and give due regard to "what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
7 between the parties." *Ibid.*

8 "In the context of a settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount a plaintiff
9 might have obtained at trial on the complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under
10 all of the circumstances." *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 250.

11 Because settlements inherently involve compromise, even settlements providing for substantially
12 narrower relief than likely would be obtained if the suit were successfully litigated can be
13 reasonable because "the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which
14 each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation." *Ibid.* (quoting *Air Line Stewards, etc.,*
15 *Local 550 v. Am. Airlines, Inc.* (7th Cir. 1972) 455 F.2d 101, 109). In addition, courts review the
16 discovery process and information received through it to aid them in assessing whether the parties
17 sufficiently developed the claims and their supporting factual bases before reaching settlement. *See*
18 *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129-31. Information is sufficient
19 where it allows the parties and the court to form "an understanding of the amount that is in
20 controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation." *Clark v. Am. Residential Svcs.*
21 *LLC* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 801. This requirement exists so that the parties can provide the
22 Court with "a meaningful and substantiated explanation of the manner in which the factual and legal
23 issues have been evaluated." *Kullar*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 132-33.

24 **2. The Settlement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable in Light of the Risks**
25 **Faced by Plaintiff**

26 While Plaintiff steadfastly maintains Plaintiff's claims are meritorious, Plaintiff
27 acknowledges Plaintiff's position included substantial risks and uncertainty, which justifies a
28 downward departure from the maximum exposure each claim potentially carried.

1 As detailed in Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval, there is a significant risk of non-
2 certification and/or not prevailing on the merits with respect to each of Plaintiff’s claims. Sung
3 Decl., ¶ 18. For example, as to Plaintiff’s off-the-clock work claims, Defendant argued it has
4 compliant policies that prohibit working off the clock and that Defendant’s pay statistics evidence
5 superior compliance with its policies and practices requiring all employees to receive wages for all
6 hours worked. *Ibid.* During the Class Period, Defendant paid Class Members over 1,755 overtime
7 hours totaling over \$80,000.00 in overtime wages and over 151 meal period premiums totaling over
8 \$4,500 in meal period premiums. *Ibid.* Defendant thus contended that Plaintiff’s off-the-clock work
9 claim is individualized and not suited for class certification. *Ibid.*

10 As to Plaintiff’s meal period claim, Defendant argued that it maintained compliant meal
11 period policies and practices throughout the Class Period and always provided compliant meal
12 periods in line with those policies. Sung Decl., ¶ 19. Defendant pointed to the fact that it paid
13 approximately over 151 meal period premiums totaling over \$4,500 in meal period premiums as
14 evidence of its superior meal period compliance practices. *Ibid.* As such, Defendant maintains
15 Plaintiff’s meal period claim is not suited for class certification since individual inquiries
16 predominated. *Ibid.*

17 Similarly, as to Plaintiff’s rest period claims, Defendant countered that it maintained
18 compliant rest period policies and practices and provided compliant rest periods in line with those
19 policies. Sung Decl., ¶ 20. Defendant further maintained Plaintiff’s rest period claim is not suited
20 for class certification since individual inquiries predominated. *Ibid.*

21 As to Plaintiff’s derivative claims for statutory waiting time and wage statement penalties
22 under Labor Code §§ 203 and 226(e), Defendant denied liability for waiting time and wage
23 statements, and argued that it possessed strong, good faith defenses to Plaintiff’s underlying claims,
24 thus precluding recovery of waiting time penalties that are only available for “willful” failure to pay
25 wages. Sung Dec., ¶ 21. Defendant further maintained that any alleged wage statement violations
26 were not “knowing and intentional,” and that Plaintiff cannot show the Class “suffer[ed] injury” due
27 to these alleged violations as required by Labor Code § 226(e) for the imposition of penalties. *Ibid.*
28 Defendant relied on *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.* (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056, 1065, for

1 the proposition that an employer’s good-faith defenses precludes a “willfulness” finding under
2 Labor Code § 203 and a “knowing and intentional” finding under Labor Code § 226(e) for the
3 imposition of statutory penalties. Sung Dec., ¶ 21. Defendant also claimed that Defendant’s alleged
4 exposure for waiting time and wage statement penalties was grossly inflated because not every
5 employee experienced an alleged Labor Code violation. *Ibid.*

6 Finally, as to Plaintiff’s claim for civil penalties under PAGA, since Plaintiff’s PAGA claim
7 is derivative of Plaintiff’s underlying wage claims, Defendant asserted the PAGA claim would fail
8 with those claims. Sung Dec., ¶ 22; *see Price v. Starbucks Corp.* (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1136,
9 1147 (“Because the underlying causes of action fail, the derivative UCL and PAGA claims also
10 fail.”). Defendant further maintained that, given its good faith defenses, this Court would exercise
11 its discretion to substantially reduce any PAGA penalties if it were to find Defendant liable for any
12 of Plaintiff’s claims. Sung Dec., ¶ 22; *see* Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2); *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit*
13 *Mgmt., Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 (affirming reduction of PAGA penalties); *Fleming*
14 *v. Covidien Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 WL 7563047, at *4
15 (reducing PAGA penalties by over 82% in part because employer “not aware” of violations);
16 *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (affirming PAGA civil penalty of
17 just \$5 per pay period where employer made “good faith attempts” to comply with the law).

18 These considerations not only bore heavily on the Parties’ negotiations, but also confirm that
19 the Settlement is a fair and reasonable compromise in view of the risk of further litigation. Sung
20 Dec., ¶ 23. As detailed in Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval, Plaintiff carefully vetted the
21 claims at issue and conducted a detailed statistical analysis of classwide data with the help of a
22 retained expert to arrive at the calculated damages figures. *Ibid.* Thus, while these risks are far from
23 exhaustive, they demonstrate the Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable in view of them. *Ibid.*

24 **3. The Settlement Fairly, Reasonably, and Adequately Compensates Class**
25 **Members**

26 As noted, the Individual Class Payments and Individual PAGA Payments will be calculated
27 based on the proportionate number of workweeks worked by each Participating Class Member
28 during the Class Period and based on proportionate number of pay periods worked by each

1 Aggrieved Employee during the PAGA Period, respectively. Agreement, §§ 3.2.4, 3.2.5.1. This
2 method of distribution compensates Class Members based on the estimated extent of their injuries,
3 as Class Members who worked more workweeks or pay periods would have been subject to more of
4 the alleged wage and hour violations than those who worked fewer workweeks. Thus, the formula
5 for compensating Class Members is fair, adequate, and reasonable, as it is tethered to the damages
6 and penalties that could be recovered by them.

7 **4. The Absence of Any Objections or Opt Outs Confirms that the**
8 **Settlement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable**

9 Class members' response to a settlement is relevant in evaluating whether it merits final
10 approval. *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801. The absence of objections and requests for exclusion
11 supports a fairness presumption. *See 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.*
12 (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1152-53 (finding 9 objections and 80 opt-outs from a class of 5,454
13 showed a "particularly impressive" favorable response from class members).

14 Here, not a single Class Member has objected to or opted out of the Settlement, resulting in
15 a 100% participation rate. Admin. Decl., ¶¶ 10-12. This extremely favorable response of the Class
16 further confirms that the Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

17 **C. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE REASONABLE AS A**
18 **PERCENTAGE OF THE COMMON FUND CONFIRMED BY A LODESTAR**
19 **"CROSS-CHECK"**

20 Plaintiff and the Class, as the prevailing parties in settlement, are entitled to recover their
21 attorney's fees and costs for their wage claims. An attorney's fee award is justified where the legal
22 action has produced its benefits by way of a voluntary settlement. *See e.g., Maria P. v. Riles* (1987)
23 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1290-91; *Westside Cmnty. for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo* (1983) 33 Cal.3d
24 348, 352-53; *see also* Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5. Here, Plaintiff submits that Plaintiff is entitled to
25 recover attorneys' fees under the common fund theory, as confirmed by a lodestar "cross-check."

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1 **1. Under the Common Fund Doctrine, It Is Proper to Compensate Class**
2 **Counsel Based on a Percentage of the Recovery Obtained for the Class**

3 When a settlement results in a common fund for the benefit of a class, class counsel may be
4 awarded fees as a percentage of the common fund. *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 254 (recognizing the
5 “percentage of recovery” method). The California Supreme Court confirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert*
6 *Half Int’l, Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 that “[t]he percentage of fund method survives in
7 California class action cases.” Our Supreme Court held:

8 The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of
9 calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better
10 approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it
11 provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the
litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be
denied our trial courts.

12 *Id.* at 503; *see also e.g., Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (“when a number of persons are
13 entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the
14 benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be
15 awarded attorney’s fees out of the fund.”); *Serrano v. Unruh* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 627 (in
16 awarding a fee from the common fund obtained for the benefit of all parties, the trial court acts
17 within its equitable power to prevent the other parties’ unjust enrichment.); *Rawlings v. Prudential-*
18 *Bache Properties, Inc.* (6th Cir. 1993) 9 F.3d 513, 516 (percentage of fund method more accurately
19 reflects the results achieved for the putative class and “establishes reasonable expectations on the
20 part of plaintiffs’ attorneys as to their expected recovery; and it encourages early settlement, which
21 avoids protracted litigation.”); *In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig.* (3d Cir. 2005) 396 F.3d 294, 300
22 (“The percentage-of-recovery method is generally favored in common fund cases because it allows
23 courts to award fees from the fund ‘in a manner that rewards counsel for success and penalizes it for
24 failure.’”).

25 Here, Class Counsel’s fee request of \$53,333.33 (one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount)
26 is fair and reasonable based on a percentage of the recovery. First, “regardless whether the
27 percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-
28 third of the recovery.” *Chavez v. Netflix* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11. This is also consistent

1 with Class Counsel’s experience in similar matters. *See* Sung Decl., ¶ 24. Thus, the percentage
2 sought by Class Counsel (the same percentage approved in *Laffitte*) is reasonable.

3 **2. The Fee Request Is Also Reasonable Based on a Lodestar “Cross-Check”**

4 The California Supreme Court in *Laffitte* also held that trial courts have discretion to assess
5 the reasonableness of fee awards with tools such as the “lodestar cross-check,” whereby the trial
6 court calculates counsel’s lodestar and determines whether the “lodestar multiplier” needed to bring
7 the lodestar on par with the percentage of recovery is reasonable. *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 503-06.
8 While a trial court may utilize the lodestar cross-check, it need not do so. *Id.* at 506 (“[w]e hold
9 further that the trial courts have discretion to conduct a lodestar cross-check on a percentage fee, as
10 the court did here; they also retain the discretion to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other
11 means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested percentage fee.”).

12 Under the lodestar method, the court multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended by
13 each attorney or legal staff member by their reasonable hourly rates, then enhances this lodestar
14 figure by a “multiplier” to account for a range of factors, such as the contingent nature of the case
15 and the degree of success achieved. *See Serrano*, 20 Cal.3d at 48-49; *Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24
16 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-36; *Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank* (2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 819, 834 (“There is no
17 hard-and-fast rule limiting the factors that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to increase
18 or decrease a lodestar calculation”).

19 Under California law, lodestar multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher. *See, e.g.,*
20 *Chavez*, 162 Cal.App.4th at 49-50 (approving multiplier of about 2.5); *Coalition for L.A. County*
21 *Planning etc. Interest v. Bd. of Supervisors* (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 241, 251 (approving multiplier of
22 about 12.8). In class actions such as this one, where the value of the benefit conferred to the class
23 “can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty,” the court may “adjust the lodestar in
24 comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and
25 within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.”
26 *Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.

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Here, Class Counsel's current lodestar is **\$117,685.00**, broken down as:

Name	Laffey Matrix Fee	Actual Billing Rate	Hours Billed	Lodestar
William C. Sung (14 th Year Attorney)	\$948	\$900	86.70	\$78,030.00
Tiffany L. Luu (5 th Year Attorney)	\$581	\$550	72.10	\$39,655.00
		Total	158.8	\$117,685.00

Sung Decl., ¶¶ 25-27. Class Counsel's requested fee award represents a **negative 0.45** lodestar multiplier. Sung Decl., ¶ 25. Additionally, Class Counsel estimate they will devote no less than 10 hours, although likely more time, to additional tasks, which are hours not included in the foregoing lodestar total. Sung Decl., ¶ 28. These additional hours will include time spent to obtain and monitor approval of the Settlement and requested awards, oversee the settlement administration process and distribution of funds, respond to inquiries, and communicate with Plaintiff regarding the case. *Ibid.* Class Counsel also bear the risk of taking whatever actions are necessary if Defendant fails to pay.

The amount of fees requested under the Settlement is warranted based on the contingent risk that Counsel incurred, the difficulty of the questions involved, the substantial benefit conferred on the Class as a result of the Settlement, and the skill displayed by Class Counsel. Thus, the request for attorneys' fees satisfies a lodestar check. Accordingly, the Court should find that the circumstances of the present case justify an award of 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount for attorney's fees.

The fee award requested here is justified because Class Counsel achieved a significant monetary recovery for the Class in an uncertain and risky case while bearing the substantial burdens of representation on a contingency basis, and the fees requested are in line with the market rate. *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-51 (finding that exceptional results in a contingency case, significant risk, and the absence of supporting precedents, are proper considerations in awarding attorney's fees). Class Counsel negotiated a substantial recovery for the Class, resulting in a **100%** participation rate, and not a single Class Member objected to the Settlement, including Class Counsel's requested fees.

1 In addition, the average estimated Individual Class Payment in this case of **\$1,400.54**
2 exceeds average payments in similar wage and hour class action settlements. *See, e.g., Sorenson v.*
3 *PetSmart, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. 2008) No. 2:06-CV-02674-JAM-DAD (wage and hour class action
4 settlement approved where average class member recovery was approximately \$60); *Schiller v.*
5 *David's Bridal, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) No. 1:10-cv-00616-AWI-SKO, 2012 WL 2117001
6 (finding that average payment to class members of less than \$200 was a "good" result); *Williams v.*
7 *Centerplate, Inc.* (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) No. 11-CV-2159 HKSC, 2013 WL 4525428 (granting
8 final approval of class action settlement where average recovery for each class member was
9 approximately \$108 and describing result as "very favorable"). The fact that Class Counsel
10 achieved these results in the face of serious defense challenges and in an uncertain legal landscape,
11 confirms the strength of the results achieved.

12 As noted, this case presented significant risk as to both class certification and prevailing on
13 the merits. Sung Decl., ¶ 29. Accordingly, it is fair and reasonable to account for these risks in
14 compensating Class Counsel. *Ibid.* Class Counsel should also be compensated for the risks involved
15 in undertaking this litigation and expending considerable effort, all while working on a pure
16 contingency basis. *Ibid.* Since undertaking representation of Plaintiff in this litigation, Class
17 Counsel have borne all the costs of litigation since the filing of the Action without receiving any
18 compensation to date. *Ibid.* During this time, Class Counsel have incurred litigation costs and
19 devoted substantial time to this litigation. *Ibid.*

20 Class Counsel's efforts have included: multiple meetings with the Plaintiff and review of
21 documents provided by Plaintiff; legal research and investigation into Defendants' corporate
22 structure and relevant litigation history; legal research and investigation regarding the Defendants'
23 practices at various points in the litigation; preparation and submission of Plaintiff's PAGA notice
24 letter; preparation of the Complaints and status conferences; extensive meet and confer
25 correspondence and discussions with Defendant's counsel regarding case management, two
26 mediations, and informal discovery for two mediations; analysis of the informal discovery
27 production; working with an expert data analysis and preparation of a damages model; research and
28 preparation of Plaintiff's mediation briefs and participation in mediations; drafting, negotiating, and

1 reviewing multiple drafts of the Agreement and attachments thereto; preparation, finalization, and
2 filing Motion for Preliminary Approval and Motion for Final Approval and accompanying filings;
3 preparing for and attending hearings on these Motions; overseeing the notice administration process
4 and distribution of funds; and communications with Plaintiff regarding the case.

5 Class Counsel's previous experience in litigating wage and hour class actions also supports
6 the reasonableness of the fee request. Class Counsel are well-versed in plaintiff and defense-side
7 wage and hour class action litigation, with two decades of combined experience litigating claims
8 similar to those raised in this case. *See* Sung Decl., ¶¶ 2-7. Class Counsel have been certified as
9 class counsel in a number of other cases. Sung Decl., ¶ 5. Their experience in similar matters was
10 integral in evaluating the claims against Defendant and the reasonableness of the Settlement.
11 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the
12 rapidly evolving substantive law, as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Because it
13 is reasonable to compensate Class Counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation, and
14 experience, a fee award of one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount is reasonable. Thus, Plaintiff
15 submits the requested fee award is fair, reasonable, and adequate and should be approved.

16 **D. THE REQUESTED LITIGATION EXPENSES ARE REASONABLE.**

17 Plaintiff seeks \$18,750.25 in litigation costs. Sung Decl., ¶ 17, Exh. 3. The requested
18 litigation cost award include \$18,750.25 in costs incurred to date and future estimated costs of
19 \$77.97 for filing this Motion, \$16.17 for filing any supplemental briefing and/or amended proposed
20 order for this Motion, \$146 in Case Anywhere system access fees through final approval, and
21 \$16.17 for filing the Administrator's declaration of compliance. *See id.*, Exh. 3.

22 The cost request is fair, adequate, and reasonable, as the costs were reasonably incurred, and
23 the costs Plaintiff seeks are routinely approved by courts. *See e.g., Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir.
24 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19 (counsel should recover "those out-of-pocket expenses that would normally be
25 charged to a fee paying client"); *Ashker v. Sayre* (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2011) No. 05-03759 CW, 2011
26 WL 825713 at *3 ("costs of reproducing pleadings, motions and exhibits are typically billed by
27 attorneys to their fee-paying clients"); *Trustees of Const. Industry & Laborers Health and Welfare*
28 *Trust v. Redland Ins. Co.* (9th Cir. 2006) 460 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (legal research costs

1 reimbursable); *In re Immune Response Sec. Litig.* (S.D. Cal. 2007) 497 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1177-78
2 (mediation, consultant and expert fees; legal research; copies; postage; filing fees; messenger and
3 overnight delivery costs reimbursable). In addition, not a single Class Member objected to the
4 Settlement, including Class Counsel's request of up to \$12,500.00 in litigation costs. Because these
5 costs were reasonably incurred, and no Class Member has objected to them, the Court should grant
6 the request.

7 **E. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVAL THE REQUESTED SETTLEMENT**
8 **ADMINISTRATION COSTS.**

9 Plaintiff also requests that this Court approve \$3,790.00 in settlement administration costs to
10 the Administrator. As detailed in the Admin. Decl., the Administrator performed duties that were
11 integral in effectuating the Settlement and the Notice process. Among other things, the
12 Administrator calculated each Class member's Individual Class and PAGA Payments, updated
13 addresses contained in the class data supplied by Defendant, formatted and translated the Class
14 Notice for mailing, mailed Class Notices to all Class Members, kept the Parties informed of any
15 objections or requests for exclusion, and otherwise administered the Settlement. *See* Admin. Decl.,
16 ¶¶ 3-18. For these reasons, the Administrator's requested costs are fair, reasonable, and adequate,
17 and should be finally approved.

18 **F. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED CLASS**
19 **REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE PAYMENT**

20 Courts routinely approve service payments to compensate named plaintiffs for the services
21 they provide and the risks they incur during class action litigation. *See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins.*
22 *Exchange* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (upholding "service payments" to named plaintiffs for
23 their efforts in bringing the case); *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.
24 Supp. 294 (approving \$50,000 service payment). Indeed, "[i]ncentive awards are fairly typical in
25 class action cases." *Rodriguez v. West Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958. The Court
26 may award incentive payments "to compensate [Plaintiff] for work done on behalf of the class, to
27 make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action. *Id.* at 958-59.

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1 Here, Plaintiff seeks a Service Payment of \$7,500.00 and Plaintiff and Class Counsel submit
2 that this request is reasonable given Plaintiff's efforts in this case and the risks Plaintiff undertook
3 on behalf of the Class. *See* Nathan Decl., ¶¶ 4-6; Sung Decl., ¶ 30. Plaintiff's requested Service
4 Payment is intended to recognize the time and effort Plaintiff expended on behalf of the Class,
5 including providing substantial factual information and documents to Class Counsel, discussing the
6 claims and theories at issue in the litigation, actively participating in the prosecution of Plaintiff's
7 claims, as well as the significant risks Plaintiff undertook by agreeing to serve as the named plaintiff
8 in this case. Nathan Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.

9 Plaintiff also undertook the risk of being liable for Defendant's costs if this case were lost,
10 as well as the reputational risk of being the named plaintiff in a wage and hour class action against
11 an employer. *See, e.g., Deaver v. Compass Bank* (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015) 2015 WL 8526982 at
12 *14-15 (approving incentive payment in wage and hour settlement, finding the award "particularly
13 appropriate in this wage and hour class action, where Plaintiff undertook a significant 'reputational
14 risk' in bringing this action against his former employer"). Plaintiff is also agreeing to a much
15 broader release than other Class Members, including a waiver of Civil Code § 1542. *See*
16 Agreement, § 5.1; *see also Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co.* (N.D. Cal. 2015) 306 F.R.D. 245,
17 268 (approving \$15,000 total award to named plaintiff in wage and hour class action settlement,
18 including \$10,000 incentive award plus an additional \$5,000 for plaintiff's release of claims).

19 Finally, after receiving notice of the proposed Class Representative Service Payment for
20 Plaintiff, no Class Member objected to the amount. Given Plaintiff's significant contributions to this
21 case, the risks Plaintiff undertook, and the lack of any objection from Class Members, Plaintiff's
22 requested Service Payment is appropriate and justified as part of the Settlement and should be
23 finally approved.

24 **V. CONCLUSION**

25 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court should grant
26 Plaintiff's Motion in its entirety and adopt the Proposed Judgment and Order Granting Final
27 Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement submitted herewith.

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2 DATED: March 19, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

3 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

4
5
6 By:



William C. Sung

Tiffany L. Luu

Attorneys for Plaintiff Doris Ann Nathan