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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

SALVADOR PALACIOS SR. and SALVADOR
PALACIOS JR., individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CAGWIN & DORWARD; CAGWIN &
DORWARD HOLDCO INC; CAGWIN &
DORWARD, LLC; and DOES 1 through 25,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23CV046932 (Class Action)
Related Case No: 23CV055924 (PAGA Action)

Judge: The Honorable Somnath Raj Chatterjee
Dept.: 21

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF**

Date: September 1, 2026
Time: 2:30 p.m.
Dept.: 21
Reservation I.D.: 233697545249

Complaint Filed: October 10, 2023
Trial Date: Not Set

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on September 1, 2026, at 2:30 p.m. in Department 21 of the above-captioned Court located at Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, Plaintiffs Salvador Palacios Sr. and Salvador Palacios Jr. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) will and hereby do move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action and PAGA settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendant Cagwin & Dorward, LLC (“Defendant”).

Plaintiffs request that the Court enter the Proposed Order submitted concurrently herewith:

1. Preliminarily approving the Stipulation of Settlement and Release (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) attached as Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of Annabel Blanchard in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (“Blanchard Decl.”);
2. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes only;
3. Appointing Plaintiffs Salvador Palacios Sr. and Salvador Palacios Jr. as the Representative Plaintiffs for settlement purposes only;
4. Appointing Jonathan M. Genish, Barbara DuVan-Clarke, Danielle GruppChang, P.J. Van Ert, and Annabel Blanchard of Blackstone Law, APC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes only;
5. Appointing Apex Class Action, LLC as the Settlement Administrator for purposes of the Settlement;
6. Approving the proposed Class Notices, attached as Exhibits A and B to the Settlement Agreement, to be mailed to the Class;
7. Approving the opt-out and objection procedures provided in the Settlement Agreement and set forth in the Class Notices;
8. For each Class Member, directing Defendant to furnish to the Settlement Administrator, within fifteen (15) calendar days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, the name, last known mailing address, Social Security number, and weeks worked during the Class Period and/or pay periods worked during the PAGA Period for each Class Member and PAGA Aggrieved Employee (“Class Data”);
9. Approving the proposed deadlines for the settlement administration process; and

10. Setting a Final Approval Hearing.

Pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(s)(2), on July 6, 2026, a copy of the Settlement was submitted to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) via online submission through the LWDA’s website. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 48 and Exh. 4).

This Motion is based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Annabel Blanchard, the Declarations of Plaintiffs Salvador Palacios Sr. and Salvador Palacios Jr., the Declaration of the Settlement Administrator (Apex Class Action, LLC), the pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this matter, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: August 7, 2026

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

By: A. Blanchard
Annabel Blanchard
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Salvador Palacios Sr. and
Salvador Palacios Jr.

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiffs Salvador Palacios Sr. and Salvador Palacios Jr. (“Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval
4 of the Stipulation of Settlement and Release (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) entered into
5 between Plaintiffs and Defendant Cagwin & Dorward, LLC (“Defendant”) (together, with Plaintiffs, the
6 “Parties”). (Declaration of Annabel Blanchard in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval
7 of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Blanchard Decl.”], Exh. 3). The Settlement terms are outlined
8 as follows:

- 9
- 10 • Class Size: Approximately 457 individuals (as of the Class Period March 31, 2021 through
11 December 31, 2025).
 - 12 • Gross Settlement Sum: Four Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars and No Cents
13 (\$450,000.00).
 - 14 • Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: Attorneys’ fees of one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Sum
15 (\$150,000.00 if the Gross Settlement Sum is \$450,000.00) plus actual litigation costs and
16 expenses not to exceed Thirty Thousand Dollars (\$30,000.00), to be paid from the Gross
17 Settlement Sum.
 - 18 • Service Awards: Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$7,500.00) *each*, for a total of
19 Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Sum.
 - 20 • Settlement Administration Costs: Not to exceed Thirteen Thousand Dollars (\$13,000.00), to
21 be paid from the Gross Settlement Sum.
 - 22 • PAGA Payment amount: Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000.00) from the Gross
23 Settlement Sum, 75% (\$150,000) of which will be paid to the Labor and Workforce
24 Development Agency (“LWDA”) and the remaining 25% (\$50,000) to be paid to the PAGA
25 Aggrieved Employees.
 - 26 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: Approximately Forty-Two Thousand Dollars
27 (\$42,000.00) to be distributed to Settlement Class Members.

26 As set forth herein, the Settlement is the product of informed discovery and arms-length
27 negotiations, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the Class. Plaintiffs therefore
28 respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify the

Class for settlement purposes only, approve the proposed notice of class action settlement (“Class Notice”), and set a hearing date for final settlement approval, among other requested relief.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Cagwin & Dorward, LLC (“Defendant”) is a full-service landscape contractor and maintenance company based in Petaluma, California. Plaintiff Salvador Palacios Sr. was employed by Defendant as an hourly-paid, non-exempt landscaper, driver, and crew leader from approximately March 31, 2021 to approximately May 2023. (Declaration of Plaintiff Salvador Palacios Sr. in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [Palacios Sr. Decl.], ¶ 2). Plaintiff Salvador Palacios Jr. was employed by Defendant as an hourly-paid, non-exempt landscaper from approximately December 2021 to approximately July 2022. (Declaration of Plaintiff Salvador Palacios Jr. in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Palacios Jr. Decl.”], ¶ 2).

On September 26, 2023, Plaintiffs provided written notice to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) by online electronic submission and to Cagwin & Dorward, Cagwin & Dorward Holdco Inc., and Defendant Cagwin & Dorward, LLC by U.S. Certified Mail, pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2699.3, of the specific provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated by Defendant (“PAGA Notice Letter”). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 9 and Exh. 2).

On October 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint for Damages in the action entitled *Salvador Palacios Sr. and Salvador Palacios Jr. v. Cagwin & Dorward; Cagwin & Dorward Holdco Inc, et al.*, Alameda County Superior Court Case No. 23CV046932 (“Class Action”), thereby commencing a putative class action against Defendant. (*Id.*, ¶ 10).

On December 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Enforcement Action Under the Private Attorneys General Act in the action entitled *Salvador Palacios Sr. and Salvador Palacios Jr. v. Cagwin & Dorward, et al.*, Alameda County Superior Court Case No. 23CV055924 (“PAGA Action”). (*Id.*, ¶ 11).

On June 20, 2024, Plaintiff Salvador Palacios Sr. filed a First Amended Complaint for Enforcement Action (“PAGA Complaint”) in the PAGA Action. Collectively, the operative complaints in the Class Action and PAGA Action allege violations of the California Labor Code for failure to pay

1 minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide compliant meal periods and premium
2 payments in lieu thereof, failure to provide compliant rest periods and premium payments in lieu thereof,
3 failure to timely pay wages during employment, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to
4 timely pay wages upon termination, and failure to reimburse necessary business expenses, as well as
5 violations of California Business & Professions Code Section 17200, et seq., and civil penalties under
6 PAGA based on the foregoing California Labor Code violations. (*Id.*, ¶ 12).

7 13. On June 26, 2025, Plaintiffs and Defendant participated in a formal mediation conducted
8 by Kevin Barnes, Esq. (“Mediator”), a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in
9 complex wage and hour matters. The mediation did not result in a settlement of the Action on that day.
10 Following mediation, the Parties engaged in further discovery practice, case investigation, and litigation
11 activity, while also participating in further settlement discussions through the Mediator. Through those
12 further settlement discussions, as of January 7, 2026, the Parties reached a settlement in principle to
13 resolve the Action by mutually agreeing to the Mediator’s proposal, which was followed by the Parties
14 entering into a mutually binding written Memorandum of Understanding on January 16, 2026, to settle
15 the entire Action, subject to Court approval. (*Id.*, ¶ 13).

16 14. On or about May 19, 2026, the Parties executed the Stipulation of Settlement and Release
17 (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”). (*Id.*, ¶ 14 and Exh. 3).

18 **III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

19 **A. Class Definition**

20 For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the Class shall be defined as “all
21 persons who currently or formerly worked for Defendant as a non-exempt, hourly paid employee in
22 California during the Class Period and are not subject to an arbitration agreement in connection with their
23 employment with Defendant” (“Class” or “Class Member(s)”). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement
24 Agreement, § I.C). The Class Period is defined as the period from March 31, 2021, through December
25 31, 2025. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, § I.H). Based on information provided by
26 Defendant, there are a total of four hundred fifty-seven (457) Class Members, who worked a total of
27 approximately 9,811 non-arbitration workweeks during the Class Period. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 15).

28 **B. Amount of Settlement**

1 The Parties have agreed to settle the class and PAGA claims at issue in the operative complaints
2 for a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Sum of Four Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars and No Cents
3 (\$450,000.00), exclusive of employer-side payroll taxes. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement,
4 § I.P).

5 **C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Sum**

6 The Gross Settlement Sum is a common fund and therefore includes all requested costs, fees, and
7 other allocations. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement, § V.A.1). The Gross Settlement Sum
8 includes: (1) Class Counsel’s fees in an amount not to exceed one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement
9 Sum (i.e., \$150,000.00 if the Gross Settlement Sum is \$450,000); (2) Class Counsel’s actual litigation
10 costs and expenses, not to exceed Thirty Thousand Dollars (\$30,000.00); (3) Settlement Administration
11 Costs, not to exceed Thirteen Thousand Dollars (\$13,000.00); (4) Service Awards to Plaintiffs in an
12 amount not to exceed Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$7,500.00) each, for a total of Fifteen
13 Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00); and (5) a PAGA Payment in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
14 Dollars (\$200,000.00). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement, §§ V.D, V.F, V.G, V.H). After
15 the above-estimated deductions from the Gross Settlement Sum, the Net Settlement Sum available for
16 Class Members is currently estimated to be approximately Forty-Two Thousand Dollars (\$42,000.00).
17 (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 16). Additionally, twenty-five percent (25%) of the PAGA Payment (“PAGA
18 Employee Amount”), which is Fifty Thousand Dollars (\$50,000.00) out of Two Hundred Thousand
19 Dollars (\$200,000.00), will be fully distributed to “all persons who currently or formerly worked for
20 Defendant as a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee in California during the PAGA Period” (“PAGA
21 Aggrieved Employee(s)”). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement, §§ I.S, I.W, V.D). The “PAGA
22 Period” is defined as the period from September 26, 2022 through and including December 31, 2025.
23 (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement, § I.X).

24 The Net Settlement Sum will be distributed and paid to all Class Members who do not submit a
25 timely and valid Request for Exclusion (“Settlement Class Member(s)”) on a pro rata basis based on the
26 number of weeks each Class Member worked for Defendant as an hourly-paid and/or non-exempt
27 employee in California during the Class Period (“Workweeks”). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement
28 Agreement, §§ I.GG, I.HH). The pro rata share of the Net Settlement Sum that a Settlement Class

1 Member may be eligible to receive under the Class Settlement (“Settlement Payment”) will be calculated
2 by the Settlement Administrator, Apex Class Action, LLC, in accordance with the Distribution Formula
3 set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement, §§ I.JJ, I.L).

4 The PAGA Employee Amount will be distributed and paid to all PAGA Aggrieved Employees
5 on a pro rata basis based on the number of pay periods each PAGA Aggrieved Employee worked for
6 Defendant as an hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employee in California during the PAGA Period (“Pay
7 Periods”). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, §§ I.S, I.X). The pro rata share of the PAGA
8 Employee Amount that a PAGA Aggrieved Employee may be eligible to receive (“PAGA Individual
9 Payment”) will be calculated by the Settlement Administrator in accordance with the Distribution
10 Formula set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, §§ I.T,
11 I.L).

12 Each Settlement Payment will be allocated as twenty-five percent (25%) wages, ten percent (10%)
13 interest, and sixty-five percent (65%) penalties and non-wage damages. The portion allocated to wages
14 will be reported on an IRS Form W-2, and the portions allocated to interest and penalties will be reported
15 on an IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Settlement Administrator. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 19). The
16 Settlement Administrator will withhold the employee’s share of applicable taxes and withholdings with
17 respect to the wage portion of the Settlement Payments, and issue checks to Settlement Class Members
18 for their net Settlement Payment. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, § V.H). The employer’s
19 share of payroll taxes and contributions in connection with the wage portion of Settlement Payments will
20 be paid by Defendant separately and in addition to the Gross Settlement Sum. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 19;
21 Settlement Agreement, § V.A.2). Each PAGA Individual Payment will be allocated as one hundred
22 percent (100%) penalties and will be reported on an IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Settlement
23 Administrator. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 19).

24 The Settlement is a non-reversionary and non-claims-made settlement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 20;
25 Settlement Agreement, § V.A). The Net Settlement Sum will be fully distributed to Settlement Class
26 Members and the PAGA Payment will be fully distributed seventy-five percent (75%) to the LWDA and
27 twenty-five percent (25%) to PAGA Aggrieved Employees, in accordance with the Settlement
28 Agreement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, §§ V.B, V.D). No money will revert to

Defendant. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, § V.A).

Each Settlement Payment and PAGA Individual Payment check will be valid and negotiable for one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days from the date the checks are issued and thereafter shall be deemed null and void. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, § V.L). Any funds associated with such uncashed checks will be paid to a Court-approved cy pres beneficiary. Class Counsel will petition the Court to approve California Court Appointed Special Advocates (“CASA”) as an appropriate cy pres beneficiary under this Settlement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, § V.L).

D. Released Claims

Upon the Effective Date and Defendant funding the Gross Settlement Sum, Plaintiffs fully, finally, and forever release, relinquish, settle, and discharge all Settled Class Claims against the Released Parties, all PAGA Released Claims against the Released Parties, all Generally Released Claims against the Released Parties, and all Unknown Claims against the Released Parties. (Settlement Agreement, § III.1).

Upon the Effective Date and Defendant funding the Gross Settlement Sum, all Settlement Class Members fully, finally, and forever release, relinquish, settle and discharge all Settled Class Claims against the Released Parties. (Settlement Agreement, § III.2).

Upon the Effective Date and Defendant funding the Gross Settlement Sum, Plaintiffs, the State of California, and the Labor & Workforce Development Agency, with respect to themselves and on behalf of all PAGA Aggrieved Employees, fully, finally, and forever release, relinquish, settle, and discharge all PAGA Released Claims against the Released Parties. (Settlement Agreement, § III.3).

“Settled Class Claims” means any and all wage and hour claims, rights, demands, debts, liabilities, causes of action, primary rights, or claims for relief arising out of or related to work performed by Settlement Class Members during the Class Period that: 1) are alleged, were alleged, or could have been alleged in the complaint in the Class Action (including any previously filed complaint in the Class Action); or 2) arise out of, are comprised of, and/or are related to the facts, matters, transactions or occurrences alleged in the complaint in the Class Action, whether under federal, state, or common law, including, violations of the California Labor Code, the California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Settlement Agreement, § I.EE).

1 “PAGA Released Claims” means any and all wage and hour claims, rights, demands, debts,
2 liabilities, causes of action, primary rights, or claims for civil penalties arising out of or related to work
3 performed by PAGA Aggrieved Employees for any acts or omissions during the PAGA Period that: 1)
4 are alleged or were alleged, or could have been alleged in the PAGA Notice Letter (including any
5 previously submitted administrative exhaustion/notice letter); or 2) arise out of, are comprised of, and/or
6 are related to the facts, matters, transactions or occurrences alleged in the PAGA Notice Letter (including
7 any previously submitted administrative exhaustion/notice letter), including, violations of the California
8 Labor Code. (Settlement Agreement, § I.Y).

9 “Released Parties” means Defendant Cagwin & Dorward, LLC and its affiliates, subsidiaries,
10 parents, predecessors, successors, assigns, owners, shareholders, members, managing agents, officers,
11 directors, employees, attorneys, insurers, administrators, agents, representatives, heirs, estates, and
12 powers-of-attorney. (Settlement Agreement, § I.CC).

13 “Unknown Claims” means a person’s released claims which such person does not know or suspect
14 to exist in that person’s favor at the time of Settlement, including such claims which, if known by such
15 person, might have affected such person’s decision to enter into the Settlement and agree to accept the
16 releases therein. (Settlement Agreement, § I.KK).

17 **IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

18 The settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.
19 App. 4th 1794 (1996)). “In general, questions whether a settlement was fair and reasonable, whether
20 notice to the class was adequate, whether certification of the class was proper, and whether the attorney
21 fee award was proper are matters addressed to the trial court’s broad discretion.” (*Wershba v. Apple*
22 *Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234-35 (2001) (disapproved on other grounds)).

23 The review and approval of a proposed class action settlement involves a two-step process. (*See*
24 *Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c)*). First, counsel submit the proposed terms of the settlement, and the
25 Court makes a preliminary assessment of whether the settlement appears to be sufficiently within the
26 range of a fair settlement to justify providing notice of the proposed settlement to class members. After
27 notice is provided to the class, the Court must conduct a second inquiry into whether the proposed
28 settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Ibid*).

1 The initial evaluation of the settlement at the preliminary approval step “is not a fairness hearing.”
2 (*Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of City of Milwaukee*, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980)).
3 Rather, the limited purpose of this initial inquiry is to determine, at a threshold level, only whether the
4 proposed settlement is within the range of possible approval and, as a result, “whether there is any reason
5 to notify the class members of the proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing.” A
6 presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2)
7 investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel
8 is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*See In re Microsoft I-V*
9 *Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006)).

10 Preliminary approval does not require a court to make a final determination that the settlement is
11 fair, reasonable, and adequate. Rather, that decision is made only at the final approval stage, after notice
12 of the settlement has been given to the class members and they have had an opportunity to object or
13 exclude themselves from the settlement. (*See* Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(g)). In considering a
14 potential class settlement, the court need not reach any ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law
15 which underlie the merits of the dispute and need not engage in a trial on the merits. (*See Officers for*
16 *Justice v. Civil Service Commission*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)).

17 **V. THE SETTLEMENT IS PRESUMED FAIR**

18 **A. The Settlement Was Reached as a Result of Arm’s-Length Bargaining**

19 California courts recognize that a presumption of fairness exists where a settlement is reached
20 through arm’s-length bargaining. Here, the Parties’ settlement negotiations were at all times conducted
21 at arm’s length and in an adversarial manner. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 22). The Settlement was reached
22 following a full day of mediation and thereafter through continued arms-length negotiations facilitated
23 by the Mediator. (Ibid.).

24 **B. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery by Experienced Class Counsel**

25 Courts typically assess the status of discovery in determining whether a class action settlement
26 agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Prior to mediation, Defendant produced a random sampling
27 of putative class members’ time and pay records, as well as Defendant’s employee handbook and relevant
28 wage and hour policies, an exemplar of Defendant’s arbitration agreement, and information regarding the

total number of putative class members, the total workweeks worked by the putative class members, and the average rate of pay for the putative class members. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 23).

This allowed Class Counsel to conduct an informed assessment and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the potential class-wide damages. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 24). Based on the information exchanged, the Parties extensively briefed issues regarding class certification and liability and provided their analyses to the Mediator who helped the Parties debate and assess the relative strengths and weakness of their respective positions. (Id., ¶ 25). At all times, Plaintiffs were willing and prepared to litigate this matter through class certification and trial if the Parties had been unable to reach a favorable resolution. (Ibid.). Additionally, settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel. (Blanchard Decl., ¶¶ 2–8). Accordingly, Class Counsel had sufficient information and experience to act intelligently in negotiating the Settlement.

C. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions and Recovery Risks

A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to obtain 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250). In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court must consider “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)).

Here, the reasonableness of the Settlement is underscored by the fact that Defendant has legal and factual grounds for defending the Action. Based upon Class Counsel’s experience litigating similar complex matters, Plaintiffs reasonably expected a vigorous and lengthy defense to both class certification and the merits of the Action absent a settlement.

1. Class Counsel’s Analysis of the Maximum Available Liability and Damages

Class Counsel analyzed all available data and estimated Defendant’s maximum potential exposure to be approximately \$1,956,452.17, assuming the litigation was successful at trial on all claims at issue

1 and that every employee experienced a violation for each claim on every applicable shift or pay period
2 worked. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 26). This estimate is based off an estimated maximum liability for all class
3 claims at issue and the total aggregate workweeks during the relevant time period, less interest, and based
4 on the analysis of the data which was extrapolated out for all class members across the entire putative
5 class period, which included the following component claims: \$57,792.31 for meal period violations (net
6 of meal period premiums already paid); \$978,285.06 for rest period violations at a 100% violation rate,
7 based on what Plaintiffs contended was Defendant's facially unlawful written policy requiring employees
8 to remain on the worksite during rest periods; \$215,324.19 for unpaid off-the-clock work, conservatively
9 estimated at one (1) hour per workweek; \$4,562.30 for unpaid overtime wages based on Defendant's
10 failure to correctly calculate the regular rate of pay; \$73,003.17 for unreimbursed necessary business
11 expenses, estimated at \$30 per month per employee; \$360,929.14 for waiting time penalties; and
12 \$266,556.00 for wage statement penalties. (Ibid.).

13 **2. Class Counsel's Risk-Based Analysis and Risk-Based Adjustments**

14 While Plaintiffs believe that Defendant faced significant exposure, substantial barriers to a
15 recovery existed. Defendant denied and continues to deny any liability and wrongdoing of any kind
16 associated with the claims alleged in the Action and further denies that class certification is appropriate
17 for any purpose other than the Settlement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 29). Defendant contended that Plaintiffs'
18 claims are not suitable for class certification because individual issues would predominate should this
19 case go to trial. As with all class actions, these complex cases raise difficult management and proof issues
20 and, accordingly, there is a significant risk that the Court may deny class certification. (Ibid). While
21 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel disagree with Defendant's predictions, they also recognize that there is a
22 significant risk that the Court may deny class certification. (Ibid).

23 For example, plaintiff meal period claims have been increasingly difficult to certify in recent
24 years. Plaintiffs' theory of liability for meal period violations was based on allegations that Defendant
25 failed to ensure that timely, uninterrupted meal periods of the requisite length were taken, and that
26 Defendant's practices required Class Members to remain on the premises during meal periods, thereby
27 precluding compliant off-duty meal breaks. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 30). Defendant contended that its policies
28 and practices at all times during the Class Period were lawful and also disputed Plaintiffs' factual

1 contentions concerning the policy and alleged on-premises requirement. (Ibid.). Indeed, Plaintiffs’
2 analysis of approximately 63,815 individual shifts revealed a unique meal period violation rate of only
3 7.3% of shifts over five hours in length, which Defendant argued would require individualized inquiry
4 and thereby preclude class certification. (Ibid.). Class Counsel also had to consider the risk that the Court
5 would find validity in the individualized proof defense to certification of the meal period claim. (Ibid).

6 A substantial portion of what Plaintiffs contended was Defendant’s overall liability exposure
7 arises from Plaintiffs’ rest period allegations. Defendant produced multiple written policies which
8 explicitly state that employees “must remain on the facility premises or at the job site” during rest periods,
9 a facially unlawful policy under California law, which prohibits employers from imposing any restraints
10 on employees during rest periods. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 31). Notwithstanding this facially noncompliant
11 written policy, Defendant disputed Plaintiffs’ rest period allegations on both factual and legal grounds,
12 provided various documents and counter-authorities supporting Defendant’s contentions, , and overall
13 contended that Defendant provided compliant rest breaks, and relieved Class Members of all duties as
14 required under California law. (Ibid). In addition to both sides’ competing contentions and arguments,
15 this claim was also subject to heightened uncertainty from Plaintiffs’ perspective due to the inherent
16 difficulties in proving rest period violations, as Defendant was not required to, and did not, record rest
17 breaks. Defendant did not allege it paid a single rest period premium during the entire Class Period. (Ibid).
18 Given the absence of records documenting rest period violations, Class Counsel recognized legitimate
19 concerns that, notwithstanding the alleged facially unlawful policy, Plaintiffs could face challenges
20 certifying these claims or proving substantial damages with the requisite certainty, which rendered the
21 estimated value of this claim subject to substantial challenge. (Ibid).

22 Plaintiffs also faced challenges certifying and proving liability for their minimum wage and
23 overtime claims. These claims were largely based on off-the-clock work allegedly regularly performed
24 by Class Members both before and after their scheduled shifts. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 32). For example,
25 employees interviewed stated that they were often contacted off-the-clock, frequently at night, by their
26 supervisors and managers to discuss what work had been completed that day and the work plans for the
27 following day. Employees also stated they would often arrive up to 30 minutes early to perform work-
28 related tasks such as moving trucks, loading tools, and attending a daily scheduled exercise session and

1 would stay up to 30 minutes late to clean up work sites and return vehicles and tools to Defendant's
2 company location. (Ibid). However, the individualized nature of the degree to which the asserted off-the-
3 clock work was occurring, why such work was performed, and the individualized nature of any resulting
4 damages presented substantial concerns regarding the manageability of the case and created a risk that
5 the Court could find these issues precluded class certification. The estimated damages for this claim were
6 based on a conservative assumption that all Class Members worked off-the-clock for at least one (1) hour
7 per workweek. (Ibid).

8 Plaintiffs also contended that Defendant failed to reimburse Class Members for necessary
9 business-related expenses. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant failed to reimburse employees
10 for necessary tools such as scissors, gloves, protective glasses, ear plugs, work boots, and hats; mileage
11 for personal vehicles; and use of personal cell phones for work-related purposes. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 33).
12 Defendant contended that it had a policy and practice of reimbursing employees for necessary business-
13 related expenses and further contended that, with respect to expenses for which Class Members never
14 requested reimbursement, it did not know and had no reason to know that such expenses had been
15 incurred. (Ibid). Defendant further argued that the individualized reasons why a Class Member undertook
16 certain expenses and failed to seek reimbursement would also raise individualized issues incompatible
17 with class certification. (Ibid).

18 There are also substantial risks associated with Plaintiffs' waiting time penalties and wage
19 statement claims. First, these claims were derivative of Plaintiffs' claims for unpaid meal period
20 premiums, unpaid rest period premiums, unpaid minimum wages, and unpaid overtime wages, and if
21 certification was denied on those underlying claims, these derivative claims for penalties would also
22 likely fail. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 34). Further, even if Plaintiffs prevailed on their underlying claims, they
23 would still be required to demonstrate that Defendant's violations of California Labor Code section 203
24 were *willful* violations. (Ibid.). Wage statement claims have also seen varying treatment at the appellate
25 level because such claims have an element of discretion attached to them rather than a pure calculation
26 of damages after liability is proven. (Ibid). Accordingly, these derivative claims, which comprised a
27 substantial portion of Defendant's estimated liability, were therefore uncertain. (Ibid).

28 Class Counsel also recognized that, even if Plaintiffs prevailed at class certification, proving the

1 amount of wages allegedly due to each Class Member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
2 extremely uncertain proposition. In order to prove liability and damages, Class Counsel will need to
3 request and analyze thousands of pages of documents, obtain the Class Members' contact information,
4 contact them, and obtain declarations at great expense. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 35). Obtaining the
5 cooperation of current employees would also be difficult, given the likely reluctance to aid prosecution
6 of a lawsuit against a current employer. On the other hand, Defendant would likely be able to obtain the
7 cooperation of its employees. (Ibid). Moreover, even if Plaintiffs prevailed at class certification and trial,
8 possible appeals would substantially delay any recovery by the Class. (Ibid).

9 Class Counsel also separately contemplated the risks of proceeding with the PAGA claims and
10 potential liability Defendant could face from these claims as part of the global resolution. (Blanchard
11 Decl., ¶ 36). Existing case law makes PAGA claims subject to the same defenses and risks as Plaintiffs'
12 underlying wage claims. (Ibid).

13 Accordingly, after considering this multitude of factors, Class Counsel concluded that it was in
14 the best interests of the State of California and the PAGA Aggrieved Employees to enter into the
15 Settlement and to allocate Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000.00) of the Gross Settlement Sum
16 towards the PAGA claims, which represents approximately forty-four percent (44%) of the Gross
17 Settlement Sum of \$450,000.00. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 37). This allocation is well above the range of
18 PAGA settlements regularly approved by courts in hybrid class and PAGA actions. Typically, such cases
19 allocate only 1% of the gross settlement value to resolve PAGA claims, and settlements allocating as
20 little as 0.22% of the Gross Settlement Sum have been approved as reasonable. (Ibid). However, given
21 the relative size of the PAGA Aggrieved Employee group (1,032 people total), which did not exclude
22 employees who had signed arbitration agreements, the Parties agreed that a larger than usual percentage
23 of the Settlement should be allocated to the PAGA Action. Moreover, the overall relief obtained by this
24 Settlement is significant not only from a monetary perspective, but also because it fulfills the public
25 policy objectives of PAGA to promote enforcement of California's labor laws, provide funds to the State,
26 and deter future non-compliance by Defendant. (Ibid).

27 Taking into account all of the risks described above that could potentially affect Plaintiffs' ability
28 to first obtain class certification and then prove the underlying violations, the Court's broad discretion in

1 reducing civil penalties, and the costs and delays inherent in recovering the alleged potential damages,
2 Class Counsel applied a series of risk-based discounts to Defendant's estimated maximum liability. First,
3 Class Counsel discounted the total estimated class damages and penalties (excluding PAGA penalties) of
4 approximately \$1,956,452.17 by seventy-five percent (75%) to account for the challenges of obtaining
5 class certification, reducing that figure to approximately \$489,113.04. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 38). The
6 merits-based defense and risk factors including the low meal period violation rate, the absence of off-the-
7 clock records, the difficulty of establishing willfulness for derivative penalty claims, and the risk of
8 arbitration enforcement as to 457 Class Members further reduced that estimated liability by an additional
9 sixty-five percent (65%), resulting in an adjusted estimated class liability of approximately \$171,189.56.
10 (Ibid).

11 Regarding the PAGA claims, Class Counsel also anticipated that even if successful on the merits
12 at trial, the imposition of cumulative civil penalties based on the alleged wage and hour violations could
13 be considered unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory, and that Defendants would argue that it
14 made a good faith attempt to comply with its legal obligations warranting a reduction in penalties. (Ibid).
15 Class Counsel also anticipated that Defendant would argue that the violations per pay period were low,
16 warranting an additional reduction in civil penalties. (Ibid). Finally, we were also mindful of the fact that
17 PAGA is fundamentally not intended to be compensatory in nature but is instead intended to facilitate
18 enforcement of California's labor laws by financing state activities and educating and deterring non-
19 compliance. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 39). First, Class Counsel discounted the total estimated PAGA penalties
20 of approximately \$6,579,800 by eighty percent (80%) to account for the risk the Court may find the
21 claims unmanageable, reducing that figure to approximately \$1,315,960. The merits-based defense and
22 risk factors including the low meal period violation rate and the absence of off-the-clock records further
23 reduced that estimated liability by an additional seventy-five percent (75%), resulting in an adjusted
24 estimated PAGA penalty exposure of approximately \$328,990. (Ibid.)

25 When considered in light of the total estimated exposure of \$500,179.56 (including adjusted
26 PAGA penalties of \$328,990.00), the Gross Settlement Sum of \$450,000.00 represents a substantial and
27 successful recovery that accounts for the significant litigation risks involved, and in Class Counsel's
28

1 informed judgment represents a fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement for the Settlement Class
2 Members and PAGA Aggrieved Employees. (Ibid).

3 Class Counsel therefore submits that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The
4 Settlement is in the best interest of the Class Members, the PAGA Employees, and the State of California
5 and is well within the accepted range of recoveries for this type of litigation given the inherent risk of
6 litigation, the risk of obtaining and maintaining class certification, and the costs of further litigation.
7 (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 41).

8 VI. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

9 Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 provides that three basic requirements must be met in order
10 to sustain any class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class; (2) there must be a well-defined
11 community of interest in the question of law or fact affecting the parties to be represented; and (3)
12 certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e., proceeding as a class action
13 is superior to other methods. Plaintiffs contend that the Action, which is based upon Defendant's wage
14 and hour policies and practices, satisfies the class certification requirements under California Code of
15 Civil Procedure section 382. Defendant denies Plaintiffs' allegations both with respect to liability and
16 certification as a litigated matter, but for settlement purposes only, the Parties have stipulated that the
17 requisites for establishing class certification for settlement purposes have been met. (Settlement
18 Agreement, § IV.B).

19 A. An Ascertainable Class Exists Which is So Numerous That Joinder of All Members is 20 Impracticable

21 Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size of
22 the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. In this case, all three considerations strongly
23 favor class certification. Here, the Class is defined as "all persons who currently or formerly worked for
24 Defendant as a non-exempt, hourly paid employee in California during the Class Period and are not
25 subject to an arbitration agreement in connection with their employment with Defendant," which is
26 defined as the period from March 31, 2021, through and including December 31, 2025. (Blanchard Decl.,
27 ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, § I.C). This provides a clear and definite scope for the proposed class.

28 Next, the Class is sufficiently numerous. There is no magic number that satisfies the numerosity

1 requirement. Here, the estimated Class size of four hundred and fifty-seven (457) individuals meets the
2 numerosity requirement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 15).

3 Finally, the question of whether class members are ascertainable turns on whether a plaintiff can
4 establish the existence of an identifiable class. The existence of an ascertainable class in this case can be
5 established through Defendant's payroll records, and the Class definition is sufficiently specific to enable
6 the Parties, Class Members, and the Court to determine the parameters of the Class.

7 **B. The Class Shares a Well-Defined Community of Interest**

8 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of law
9 and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives
10 who can adequately represent the class. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806). Here, all three requirements
11 are easily satisfied for purposes of settlement.

12 The commonality criterion requires the existence of common question of law or fact and is
13 generally established with the issues of predominance and typicality. (*See Daar*, 67 Cal.2d 695, 706).
14 What is required is that a common question of fact or law exists which predominates over issues unique
15 to individual plaintiffs. The existence of individual issues or facts—generally present in any case arising
16 from employment—is not a bar to class certification as long as they do not render class litigation
17 unmanageable or predominate over the common issues. (*See B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois,*
18 *Inc.*, 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1354 (1987)).

19 Here, Plaintiffs' claims present common issues of law and fact that predominate and warrant class
20 certification. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant denied compliant meal and rest periods to employees,
21 required employees to perform work off-the-clock, and failed to fully compensate employees for all time
22 actually worked. These policies and practices meant that Defendant allegedly failed to pay minimum and
23 overtime wages, and other related claims. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's policies and practices were
24 uniform as to all Class Members. Thus, class treatment is appropriate.

25 To satisfy the typicality requirement, California law does not require that plaintiffs' claims be
26 identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class representative is whether
27 other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not
28 unique to the named plaintiff, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of

1 conduct. (*See Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 (2007)). The typicality requirement
2 for a class representative refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the representative, and not to the
3 specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. (*See Ibid*).

4 Here, Plaintiffs allege that their claims are similar to that of the other Class Members and that
5 Plaintiffs' claims arise out of the same alleged course of conduct giving rise to the claims of the other
6 Class Members. Because Plaintiffs' claims are based upon the same alleged conduct and business
7 practices as those of Class Members, the typicality requirement has been satisfied.

8 Finally, the question of adequacy of representation depends on whether the plaintiff's attorney is
9 qualified to conduct the proposed litigation and the plaintiff's interests are not antagonistic to the interests
10 of the class. Here, these considerations are satisfied. Class Counsel is well-regarded and is qualified and
11 experienced in employment-related, class-action litigation. (Blanchard Decl., ¶¶ 2–8). Plaintiffs will
12 vigorously, adequately, and fairly represent the interests of the Class. At all times throughout the course
13 of this litigation, Plaintiffs have considered the interests of the Class and put them before their own
14 personal interests. (Palacios Sr. Decl., ¶ 10; Palacios Jr. Decl., ¶ 10). Because Plaintiffs' claims are
15 typical of other Class Members and are not based on unique circumstances, there is no antagonism
16 between the interests of Plaintiffs and the Class.

17 **C. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

18 Under the circumstances, proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute,
19 as the Class Members and the Court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would serve as
20 the only means to deter and redress the alleged violations. (*See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal.4th 429,
21 434 (2000) (relevant considerations include the probability that each class member will come forward to
22 prove his or her separate claim and whether the class approach would actually serve to deter and redress
23 the alleged wrongdoing)). Further, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would
24 unduly burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results. Therefore, class action proceedings are
25 superior to individual litigation.

26 **VII. THE REQUESTED SERVICE AWARD IS REASONABLE**

27 Plaintiffs in class action lawsuits are eligible for reasonable incentive payments as compensation
28 “for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz*

1 v. *BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412 (2010)). Courts routinely grant approval of
2 class action settlement agreements containing Service Awards for the class representatives, which are
3 necessary to provide incentive to represent the class and are appropriate given the benefit the class
4 representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See In re Online DVD Rental*, 779 F.3d 934, 947-948
5 (9th Cir. 2014) (approving incentive award 417 times larger than individual payments where incentive
6 award made up a mere .17% of the settlement); *Gaudin v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc.*, 2015 WL
7 7454183, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (finding service award of \$15,000 to be “fair and
8 reasonable”)).

9 Plaintiffs initiated this litigation on behalf of their former co-workers who will now be entitled to
10 receive payment from the Settlement. Plaintiffs invested substantial time and effort into this litigation.
11 Each of the Plaintiffs regularly conferred with their attorneys regarding the case, searched for and
12 provided documents concerning their employment with Defendant, answered questions their attorneys
13 had about the documents, provided information regarding the company’s practices and the duties of other
14 hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees, and helped their attorneys develop a strategy as to what
15 additional documents and information they could seek to obtain from Defendant. (Palacios Sr. Decl., ¶¶
16 3–5; Palacios Jr. Decl., ¶¶ 3–5). Salvador Palacios Sr. spent approximately 50–55 hours participating in
17 this case. (Palacios Sr. Decl., ¶ 9). Salvador Palacios Jr. spent approximately 40–45 hours participating
18 in this case. (Palacios Jr. Decl., ¶ 9). Further, the requested amount for each Plaintiff is also reasonable
19 given the time and effort devoted and the substantial benefit conferred upon other Class Members. For
20 these reasons, Plaintiffs each request that a Service Award of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
21 (\$7,500.00) per Representative Plaintiff, for a total of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00), be
22 preliminarily approved by the Court. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 42; Palacios Sr. Decl., ¶ 12; Palacios Jr. Decl.,
23 ¶ 12).

24 **VIII. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE**

25 Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value of attorneys’ fees and their decisions are
26 “not to be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal, Inc.*, 82
27 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000)). California law provides that attorney fee awards should be equivalent to fees
28 paid in the legal marketplace to compensate for the result achieved and risk incurred. (*Id.* at 47). In cases

1 where class members present claims resulting in a common fund and the defendant agrees to a percentage
2 of the fund as part of the settlement, use of the percentage method is appropriate. (*Id.* at 32).

3 Here, the requested attorneys' fees are commensurate with the common fund requested. The
4 Settlement Agreement provides for Class Counsel to apply for attorneys' fees in an amount not to exceed
5 one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Sum (i.e., \$150,000.00 if the Gross Settlement Sum is
6 \$450,000.00), and actual litigation costs and expenses in an amount not to exceed Thirty Thousand
7 Dollars (\$30,000.00), both of which will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Sum, subject to Court
8 approval. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 43; Settlement Agreement, § V.F). The requested fee is disclosed to Class
9 Members in the Class Notice. Defendant agrees not to oppose Class Counsel's request for an award of
10 fees and costs as provided herein. (Settlement Agreement, § V.F). The Motion for Final Approval will
11 elaborate on the nature of the legal services provided and will also support Class Counsel's request for
12 the reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses not to exceed Thirty Thousand Dollars (\$30,000.00).
13 (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 45). To the extent any amount of the Gross Settlement Sum is requested for payment
14 of attorneys' fees and costs, and such requested amount is not awarded by the Court, then such amount
15 not awarded shall become part of the Net Settlement Sum and allocated pro rata to the PAGA Payment
16 and Settlement Class Members. (Settlement Agreement, § V.B).

17 **IX. THE CLASS NOTICE AND THE OPT-OUT AND OBJECTION PROCESS**
18 **MEETS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS**

19 The Parties have agreed to retain Apex Class Action, LLC ("Apex" or "Settlement
20 Administrator") to handle the notice and settlement administration process. The Parties respectfully
21 request that the Court appoint Apex to handle these procedures and to serve as the Settlement
22 Administrator. (Settlement Agreement, § I.FF; Blanchard Decl., ¶ 46). Defendant will provide Apex
23 with the Class Data, and Apex will calculate each Settlement Class Member's estimated Settlement
24 Payment and each PAGA Aggrieved Employee's estimated PAGA Individual Payment. Apex will also
25 receive and process Requests for Exclusion, Objections, and Disputes; will provide necessary reports and
26 declarations; will calculate, subtract, and transmit necessary taxes and withholdings with respect to the
27 wages portion of the Settlement Payments; will prepare and submit informational and other tax filings
28 and documents; will issue and transmit all payments provided for by the Settlement Agreement, including

1 mailing Settlement Payment checks to Settlement Class Members and PAGA Individual Payment checks
2 to PAGA Aggrieved Employees; and will perform any other usual and customary duties associated with
3 administering a class action settlement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 46).

4 Within fifteen (15) calendar days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, Defendant will
5 provide the Settlement Administrator with the name, last known address, and Social Security number of
6 each Class Member and PAGA Aggrieved Employee, along with their respective weeks worked during
7 the Class Period and/or pay periods worked during the PAGA Period. (Settlement Agreement, § IV.E.1).

8 Within fifteen (15) calendar days after transfer of the Class Data to the Settlement Administrator, the
9 Settlement Administrator will send the Class Notices to Class Members, by first-class mail, at their last
10 known address. Prior to mailing, the Settlement Administrator shall process the addresses in the Class
11 Data through the United States Postal Service's National Change of Address database to determine the
12 most current address of all Class Members. (Settlement Agreement, § IV.E.2). As set forth in the
13 Settlement Agreement, there are two forms of the Class Notices – Exhibits A and B. For Class Members
14 who are not also PAGA Aggrieved Employees, the proposed form of the Class Notice is attached as
15 Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement. For Class Members who are also PAGA Aggrieved Employees,
16 the proposed form of the Class Notice is attached as Exhibit B to the Settlement Agreement. (*See*
17 Settlement Agreement, § I. F, Exs. A and B).

18 Class Notices that are returned by the postmaster as undeliverable shall be re-mailed by the
19 Settlement Administrator within five (5) calendar days of receipt. If a forwarding address appears on the
20 return envelope of any returned Class Notice, then the Settlement Administrator shall re-mail the Class
21 Notice to that forwarding address. If no forwarding address appears on the return envelope, then, where
22 possible, the Settlement Administrator shall perform a skip trace using identifying information provided
23 by Defendant and re-mail the Class Notice to the Class Member's address identified by the skip trace if
24 an address is identified. The Settlement Administrator shall have no responsibility to re-mail a Class
25 Notice more than once, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. (Settlement Agreement, § IV.E.3). Class
26 Members to whom the Class Notice has been re-mailed must take any action required under this
27 Settlement before the expiration of deadlines set forth in the Class Notice, unless otherwise ordered by
28 the Court. Class Members' time period for opting out of/excluding oneself from the Settlement, or filing

1 an objection or dispute, shall not be extended for a Class Member to whom a Class Notice has been re-
2 mailed, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. (Ibid).

3 Class Members may choose to exclude themselves/opt out of this Settlement. To do so, Class
4 Members must, within sixty (60) calendar days after the Settlement Administrator first mails the Class
5 Notice, mail to the Settlement Administrator a written request to exclude themselves/opt out of the
6 Settlement which unambiguously requests to be excluded from the Settlement, including the request for
7 exclusion being signed by the Class Member, and including his/her name, address, and last four digits of
8 his/her Social Security number. (Settlement Agreement, § IV.F.2).

9 Any Class Member who does not validly exclude himself or herself from the Settlement may
10 object to the Settlement or dispute the workweek or other data used to calculate a Class Member's
11 individual Settlement Payment. Objections and disputes must be submitted within sixty (60) calendar
12 days from the postmark date of when the Class Notice is initially sent and must be signed by the Class
13 Member and provide the information specified to be provided, as indicated in the Class Notice.
14 (Settlement Agreement, § IV.F.3). If a Class Member wishes to challenge his or her individualized
15 information pertaining to his or her Settlement Payment as set forth in the Class Notice, that Class
16 Member must submit a written, signed dispute along with any supporting documents or other supporting
17 information to the Settlement Administrator within sixty (60) calendar days of the postmark date in which
18 the Class Notice was mailed to the Class Member. (Settlement Agreement, § IV.I).

19 Class Members may choose to exclude themselves/opt out of this Settlement by mailing to the
20 Settlement Administrator a written request to exclude themselves/opt out of the Settlement, which
21 unambiguously requests to be excluded from the Settlement, signed by the Class Member, and including
22 his/her name, address, and last four digits of his/her Social Security number, postmarked within sixty
23 (60) calendar days after the Settlement Administrator first mails the Class Notice. (Settlement Agreement,
24 § IV.F.2). Provided, however, with respect to the PAGA portion of the Settlement, including the release
25 of PAGA Released Claims, a Class Member that opts out of the Settlement will be bound by the
26 Settlement as it pertains to the PAGA portion of the Settlement. PAGA Aggrieved Employees (including
27 such employees who are also Class Members) may not opt out of the settlement of the PAGA Action.
28 (Ibid).

1 A Class Member who objects to the Settlement or disputes the workweek or other data used to
2 calculate a Class Member's individual Settlement Payment, may enter an appearance in propria persona,
3 or through his/her own attorney. If the Court approves the Settlement, irrespective of a Class Member's
4 objection or dispute, the Class Member will receive a Settlement Payment and will be bound by the
5 Settlement in all respects, including the release of claims provided therein. (Ibid). If a Class Member
6 submits an objection or a dispute, and a request to exclude/opt out, the exclusion/opt-out request will be
7 voided and of no force or effect and the objection and/or dispute will be treated as submitted as though
8 without a request to exclude/opt out, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. (Settlement Agreement, §
9 IV.F.4).

10 **X. CONCLUSION**

11 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff's
12 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement and the relief requested herein.

13 Respectfully submitted,

14 Dated: August 7, 2026

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

15 By: A. Blanchard
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