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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES—SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE**

CLAUDIA STANZIOLA, individually, and  
on behalf of other members of the general  
public similarly situated and on behalf of  
other aggrieved employees pursuant to the  
California Private Attorneys General Act;

Plaintiff,

vs.

WEISS FAMILY PROPERTIES, a California  
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,  
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23STCV29203

Honorable Carolyn B. Kuhl  
Department 12

**CLASS ACTION**

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION  
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL  
OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA  
SETTLEMENT, ATTORNEYS' FEES AND  
COSTS, AND ENHANCEMENT AWARD;  
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES**

Date: February 17, 2026  
Time: 10:30 a.m.  
Department: 12

Complaint Filed: November 29, 2023  
Trial Date: None Set

1           **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on February 17, 2026, at 10:30 a.m., in Department 12  
2 of the above-entitled Court, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012,  
3 Plaintiff Claudia Stanziola (“Plaintiff” or “Class Representative”) will and hereby does move for  
4 an order granting final approval of:

5           1.       The Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement,” “Agreement,”  
6 or “Settlement Agreement”), on the grounds that the Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable  
7 because, *inter alia*:

- 8           • A Net Settlement Amount of approximately **\$505,405.02** will be fully distributed to  
9 the Class Members who do not submit a timely and valid Request for Exclusion  
10 (“Participating Class Member”); and  
11           • **No written Objections or Requests for Exclusion** were submitted to the Settlement  
12 Administrator, Simpluris, Inc. (“Simpluris” or “Settlement Administrator”);

13           2.       Awarding payment in the amount of **\$316,666.67** to Lawyers *for* Justice, PC  
14 (“Class Counsel”), representing one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, for attorneys’  
15 fees, which is reasonable and justified on a percentage-basis and also based on a lodestar cross-  
16 check;

17           3.       Awarding payment in the amount of **\$22,428.31** to Class Counsel for  
18 reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses;

19           4.       Awarding payment in the amount of **\$8,000.00** to the Settlement Administrator  
20 for Settlement Administration Costs;

21           5.       Awarding payment in the amount of **\$7,500.00** to Plaintiff, as an Enhancement  
22 Award; and

23           6.       Approving the allocation of the penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act  
24 of 2004, California Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”), in the amount of \$90,000.00 (“PAGA  
25 Penalties”), of which 75%, or \$67,500.00, will be paid to the California Labor and Workforce  
26 Development Agency (“LWDA”) (“LWDA Payment”) and 25%, or \$22,500.00 will be  
27 distributed to Aggrieved Employees on a *pro rata* basis, based on PAGA Pay Periods during the  
28 PAGA Period (“Individual PAGA Payment”).

1 This motion is made pursuant to Rules 3.764, 3.769, and 3.1113(e) of the California  
2 Rules of Court, which, respectively, require that a memorandum in support of class certification  
3 not exceed 20 pages, require approval by the Court of a class action settlement, and permit the  
4 Court to extend the page limit for memoranda, and California Labor Code section 2699(1)(2),  
5 which requires approval by the Court of a PAGA settlement. Unless otherwise specified, all  
6 citations and references to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code  
7 sections 2698, *et seq.* ("PAGA") are to the version of that statute prior to the recent amendment  
8 effective July 1, 2024; the amended statute does not apply to the Action, or the Settlement  
9 pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(v)(1), as amended, because the notice to the  
10 Labor and Workforce Development Agency was filed prior to June 19, 2024.

11 This motion is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the  
12 Declarations of Class Counsel (Ryan Slinger), Class Representative (Claudia Stanziola), and  
13 Settlement Administrator (Fatima Montanez of Simpluris) in support thereof; the pleadings and  
14 other records on file with the Court in this matter; and such evidence and oral argument as may  
15 be presented at the hearing on this motion.

16  
17 Dated: January 22, 2026

**LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC**

18  
19 By:   
20 Ryan Slinger  
21 *Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class*  
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**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

**I. SUMMARY OF MOTION**

Plaintiff Claudia Stanziola (“Plaintiff” or “Class Representative”) seeks final approval of: (1) the settlement reached between Plaintiff and Defendant Weiss Family Properties, LLC (“Defendant”) (together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”) which provides for Defendant’s payment of a Gross Settlement Amount of \$950,000.00,<sup>1</sup> (2) attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$316,666.67, which is one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, and reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses in the amount of \$22,428.31 (“Attorneys’ Fees and Costs”) to Lawyers for Justice, PC (“Class Counsel”); (3) payment in the amount of \$8,000.00 to Simpluris, Inc. (“Settlement Administration Costs”); (4) payment in the amount of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff (“Enhancement Award”); and (5) allocation of \$90,000.00 for penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA Penalties”).<sup>2</sup>

Plaintiff requests that the Court make final its preliminary certification of the class for settlement purposes. The Settlement resolves the Released Class Claims and provides relief to a class consisting of the following individuals: all current and former non-exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked for Defendant in California at any time during the Class Period (i.e., the time period of June 4, 2019, through March 24, 2025) (“Class” or “Class Members”).<sup>3</sup>

The Settlement also resolves the Released PAGA Claims pertaining to the employment of the following alleged aggrieved employees: all current and former non-exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked for Defendant in California at any time during the PAGA Period (i.e., the time period of September 25, 2022, through March 24, 2025) (“Aggrieved Employees”).<sup>4</sup>

This matter involved, and the settlement is the product of meaningful and extensive investigations, and review and analysis of a volume of information, documents, and data exchanged by the Parties in the course of litigation and mediation and settlement negotiations (which involved one full day mediation conducted by Todd A. Smith, Esq.).<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement,” “Agreement,” “Settlement Agreement”), § 3.1.

<sup>2</sup> Settlement Agreement, §§ 3.2.1-3.2.4.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*, §§ 1.4 & 1.9.

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*, §§ 1.1 & 1.34.

<sup>5</sup> Declaration of Ryan Slinger (“Slinger Decl.”) § 9.

1 This case has required 244.20 hours of attorney time by Class Counsel.<sup>6</sup> As will be  
2 demonstrated herein, the request for attorneys' fees, which represents one-third (1/3) of the  
3 Gross Settlement Amount, is fully supported by the use of the percentage-fee method. Courts  
4 have historically awarded fees of up to fifty percent (50%) of the recovery. The requested  
5 attorneys' fees are also supported under the lodestar cross-check method.<sup>7</sup>

6 The requests for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Enhancement Award, Settlement  
7 Administration Costs, and allocation for the PAGA Penalties were fully disclosed in the Notice  
8 of Class Action Settlement ("Class Notice") that was mailed to the Class Members. Most  
9 importantly, as of the date of this Motion, *no Class Member has objected to the Class Settlement*  
10 *or to the contemplated Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Enhancement Award, Settlement*  
11 *Administration Costs, or allocation for PAGA Penalties.*

12 The Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and is the product of arm's-length,  
13 good-faith negotiations by experienced counsel presided over by a highly-regarded mediator who  
14 is experienced in mediating wage-and-hour class action lawsuits. Accordingly, the Court should  
15 grant final approval of the Settlement, and award the Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Enhancement  
16 Award, Settlement Administration Costs, and allocation for the PAGA Penalties in the full  
17 amounts requested herein.

18 In order to efficiently present the Court with adequate information to determine whether  
19 to grant final approval of the Settlement, and award Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Enhancement  
20 Award, Settlement Administration Costs, and allocation for the PAGA Penalties, Plaintiff also  
21 moves for an order permitting the filing of this single consolidated memorandum, although it  
22 exceeds the page limit established by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.764, instead of filing  
23 several separate motions.

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27 <sup>6</sup> Slinger Decl., Exh. 1.

28 <sup>7</sup> Applying a modest multiplier of 1.53, the total enhanced lodestar fees are \$317,582.10 and Class Counsel seeks an attorneys' fees award of \$316,666.67 (equal to 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount).

**II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND**  
**SINCE PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

For a discussion of relevant procedural history and facts regarding this matter since preliminary approval, please see the Declaration of Ryan Slinger at paragraphs 2 to 4.

**III. THE CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES**

For the reasons previously addressed by way of Plaintiff's moving and supporting papers for the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (namely, that the relevant class certification factors are satisfied, i.e., ascertainability, numerosity, community of interest, typicality, adequacy of representation, superiority, and manageability), as well as the reasons discussed herein regarding the completion of the due process notice procedure, the Court is requested to now make final its preliminary certification of the class for settlement purposes.

**IV. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS, NOTICE PROCESS, AND PLAN**  
**OF DISTRIBUTION**

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Defendant has agreed to pay a Gross Settlement Amount of \$950,000.00 on a non-reversionary basis,<sup>8</sup> and separately the amounts necessary to pay its Employer Taxes. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the Court's Final Approval of the Settlement, Defendant shall fully fund the Gross Settlement Amount, and also fund the amounts necessary to fully pay Defendant's share of the employer payroll taxes.<sup>9</sup> Subject to approval by the Court, the Net Settlement Amount will be calculated by deducting the Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Enhancement Award, Settlement Administration Costs, and PAGA Penalties.<sup>10</sup> The Net Settlement Amount, which is estimated to be \$505,405.02, will be fully distributed to Participating Class Members in accordance with the Settlement Agreement.<sup>11</sup> The PAGA Penalties of \$90,000.00 will be distributed to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") (in the amount of \$67,500.00) and to the Aggrieved Employees (in the amount of \$22,500.00) in accordance with the Settlement Agreement.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Settlement Agreement, § 3.1.

<sup>9</sup> *Id.*, § 4.3.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* § 1.26.

<sup>11</sup> Declaration of Fatima Montanez ("Simpluris Decl."), § 16.

<sup>12</sup> Settlement Agreement, § 3.2.4.

1           Simpluris, Inc. (“Settlement Administrator” or “Simpluris”) will determine each  
2 Participating Class Member’s (i.e., Class Members who did not timely opt out of the Class  
3 Settlement) *pro rata* share of the Net Settlement Amount (“Individual Settlement Share(s)”) <sup>13</sup>,  
4 according to the following methodology: the Settlement Administrator will divide the final Net  
5 Settlement Amount by the Workweeks of all Participating Class Members to yield the “Final  
6 Workweek Value,” and multiply each Participating Class Member’s individual Workweeks by  
7 the Final Workweek Value to yield his or her estimated Individual Settlement Share.<sup>14</sup>

8           The Settlement Administrator will calculate each Aggrieved Employee’s *pro rata* share  
9 of the 25% portion of the PAGA Penalties (“Individual PAGA Payment”) as follows: the  
10 Settlement Administrator will divide the Aggrieved Employees Payment, which is \$22,500.00,  
11 by the PAGA Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period,  
12 resulting in the “PAGA Pay Period Value”, and then multiplying the PAGA Pay Period Value by  
13 the number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by each individual Aggrieved Employee during the  
14 PAGA Period to yield his or her Individual PAGA Payment.<sup>15</sup>

15           Class Members had sixty (60) calendar days from the initial mailing of the Class Notice  
16 (“Response Deadline”) to dispute the number of Workweeks and/or the PAGA Pay Periods  
17 credited to them, opt out of the Class Settlement, and/or object to the Settlement.<sup>16</sup> The Response  
18 Deadline was December 16, 2025.<sup>17</sup> ***As of the date of this motion, the Settlement Administrator***  
19 ***has received zero (0) written requests for exclusion from the Class Settlement (“Request for***  
20 ***Exclusion”) and zero (0) written objections to the Class Settlement (“Objection”) from Class***  
21 ***Members.***<sup>18</sup>

22           Each Individual Settlement Share will be allocated as follows: ten percent (10%) as  
23 wages which will be reported on an IRS Form W-2 (“Wage Portion”); and ninety percent (90%)  
24 as penalties and interest, which will be reported on an IRS Form 1099 (“Non-Wage Portion”).<sup>19</sup>

25           <sup>13</sup> Settlement Agreement, § 1.22.

26           <sup>14</sup> *Id.*, § 3.2.5.b.

27           <sup>15</sup> *Id.*, § 3.2.6

28           <sup>16</sup> *Id.*, § 1.44.

<sup>17</sup> Simpluris Decl., § 11.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.*, §§ 12-13

<sup>19</sup> Settlement Agreement, § 3.2.7.

The Settlement Administrator will withhold the employee's share of taxes and withholdings with respect to the wages portion of the Individual Settlement Share, and issue checks to Participating Class Members for their Individual Settlement Payments (i.e., payment of their Individual Settlement Share net of these taxes and withholdings).<sup>20</sup> Defendant will pay the employer's share of payroll taxes and contributions with respect to the wage portion of Individual Settlement Shares in addition to the Gross Settlement Amount.<sup>21</sup> The Individual PAGA Payments will be allocated as one hundred percent (100%) penalties, and will be reported on an IRS Form-1099, (if applicable) by the Settlement Administrator.<sup>22</sup>

The Settlement Administrator shall distribute the following payments within fourteen (14) calendar days of the funding of the Gross Settlement Amount: Individual Settlement Payments to Participating Class Members, Attorneys' Fees and Costs to Class Counsel, Enhancement Award to Plaintiff, Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved Employees, the LWDA Payment to the LWDA, and Settlement Administration Costs to itself.<sup>23</sup>

Individual Settlement Payment and Individual PAGA Payment checks will be valid and negotiable for one hundred eighty (180) calendar days from the date the checks are mailed, and thereafter, shall be canceled.<sup>24</sup> The funds associated with such canceled checks will be distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the California State Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Participating Class Member or Aggrieved Employee.<sup>25</sup> All Participating Class Member and Aggrieved Employees shall be bound by the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement regardless of whether or not they cash or otherwise negotiate their Individual Settlement Payment and/or Individual PAGA Payment checks.<sup>26</sup>

#### **V. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION PROCESS**

The Court directed Simpluris to administer and effectuate the notice and settlement administration process, as set forth in the Court's September 11, 2025 Preliminary Approval

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<sup>20</sup> Settlement Agreement, § 3.2.7.

<sup>21</sup> *Id.*, § 4.3.

<sup>22</sup> *Id.*, § 3.2.7.

<sup>23</sup> *Id.*, § 4.4.

<sup>24</sup> *Id.*, § 4.4.1.

<sup>25</sup> *Id.*, § 4.4.3.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

1 Order. Between October 3, 2025 and October 15, 2025, Simpluris received the mailing list from  
2 Defendant's counsel that contained each Class Member's last known full name, last known  
3 mailing address, Social Security Number, and information and/or data sufficient to determine the  
4 number of Workweeks and PAGA Pay Periods worked by each Class Member and/or Aggrieved  
5 Employee (collectively, "Class Data").<sup>27</sup>

6 The Class Data contained information for two hundred and seventy-two (272) individuals  
7 identified as Class Members.<sup>28</sup> The mailing addresses contained in the Class Data were processed  
8 and updated utilizing the U.S. Postal Services National Change of Address Database  
9 ("NCOA").<sup>29</sup>

10 On October 17, 2025, Simpluris mailed the Class Notice via U.S. first class mail to all  
11 two hundred and seventy-two (272) individuals identified as Class Members in the Class Data.<sup>30</sup>  
12 Sixteen (16) Class Notices were returned as undeliverable.<sup>31</sup> Simpluris skip-traced on all of these  
13 addresses and re-mailed thirteen (13) Class Notices. There are three (3) Class Notices that  
14 remain undeliverable.<sup>32</sup>

15 The Settlement Administrator has received zero (0) Objections, zero (0) Requests for  
16 Exclusion, and zero (0) Workweeks Disputes from Class Members by the Response Deadline of  
17 December 16, 2025.<sup>33</sup>

18 To date, there are two hundred and seventy-two (272) Class Members who did not submit  
19 a timely and valid Request for Exclusion ("Participating Class Members"), and who will be paid  
20 their portion of the Net Settlement Amount.<sup>34</sup> The Net Settlement Amount of approximately  
21 \$505,405.02 and the PAGA Penalties of \$90,000.00 will be distributed in accordance with the  
22 terms of the Settlement.<sup>35</sup>

23  
24  
25 <sup>27</sup> Simpluris Decl., § 6.

26 <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

27 <sup>29</sup> *Id.*, § 7.

28 <sup>30</sup> *Id.*, § 8.

<sup>31</sup> *Id.*, § 9.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *Id.*, §§ 12-14.

<sup>34</sup> *Id.*, § 15.

<sup>35</sup> *Id.*, § 16.

VI. **THE COURT SHOULD GRANT FINAL APPROVAL OF THE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT.**

In reviewing a class settlement, the court need not reach any ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law that underlie the merits of the dispute. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146. The inquiry is not whether the settlement agreement is the best one that class members could have possibly obtained, but whether the settlement, taken as a whole, is “fair, adequate, and reasonable”—and the trial court has broad discretion to determine this. *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 52-55. A settlement need not obtain 100 percent of the damages sought in order to be fair, reasonable, and ultimately, meaningful. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 251. Even if the proposed settlement affords relief that is substantially narrower than it would be if the case were to be successfully litigated, that is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding prolonged litigation. *Id.*

To determine whether the settlement is fair and reasonable, relevant factors to consider are:

the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. The list of factors is not exclusive and the court can consider different factors based on the circumstances of each case.” *Wershba* at 245. At the final approval stage, a presumption of fairness exists where, as here:

“(1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.”

*Id.* at 1802. “Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” *Dunk* at 1801.

1           A.     **The Settlement Resulted from Arm's-Length Negotiations Based Upon**  
2                   **Extensive Investigation and Informal Discovery.**

3           The Parties actively litigated the case since the action commenced on November 29,  
4 2023. Class Counsel conducted significant investigation, and extensive informal discovery into  
5 the facts of the case, to assess the veracity, strength, and scope of the claims, and was preparing  
6 for class certification and trial prior to reaching the Settlement.<sup>36</sup>

7           The Parties informally exchanged a volume of information, documents, and data  
8 throughout the course of the litigation and in connection with the mediation and settlement  
9 negotiations.<sup>37</sup> Class Counsel informally exchanged a volume of information, documents, and  
10 data obtained from Plaintiff, Defendant, and other sources, including: Class Members' time and  
11 wage records, Plaintiff's personnel records, Defendant's Voluntary Mutual Agreement to  
12 Arbitrate, Defendant's Employee Handbook, earning statements, company policy  
13 acknowledgements, and Defendant's operations and employment practice, policies, and  
14 procedures, among other information and documents.<sup>38</sup> Class Counsel had the opportunity to  
15 interview and obtain information from Plaintiff, and reviewed and analyzed a volume of  
16 information, data, and documents obtained from Plaintiff, Defendant, and other sources.<sup>39</sup> Class  
17 Counsel developed liability, damages, and penalties valuation models in the course of litigation  
18 and in connection with the mediation and settlement negotiations, and met and conferred with  
19 Defendant's counsel on numerous occasions, e.g., to discuss issues relating to the pleadings, case  
20 management, motion practice, and production of information, documents, and data in the course  
21 of litigation and in connection with the mediation and settlement negotiations, and settlement.<sup>40</sup>  
22 Other work performed by Class Counsel included, and was not limited to, case strategy and  
23 analysis; researching, drafting, reviewing, and/or revising the pleadings, motion-related papers,  
24 the mediation briefing and supporting materials, and settlement documents; and preparing for  
25 and attending court proceedings, mediation, and settlement negotiations, among other tasks.<sup>41</sup>

26 <sup>36</sup> Slinger Decl., § 6.

27 <sup>37</sup> *Id.*, § 7.

28 <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

After conducting informal discovery and investigation into the facts of the case, the Parties participated in a formal, full-day mediation conducted on September 19, 2024 by Todd A. Smith, Esq., who is well-regarded mediator experienced in handling complex labor and employment matters.<sup>42</sup> In the course of mediation and settlement negotiations, the Parties exchanged extensive information, documents, and data and discussed all aspects of the case, including and not limited to, the risks and delays of further litigation, the risks and expenses to the Parties of proceeding with class certification, manageability, off-the-clock theory, regular rates of pay, meal and rest periods (including *inter alia*, on premises breaks), expense reimbursements, recordkeeping and wage statement requirements, representative PAGA claims and penalties, and wage-and-hour law and enforcement; Plaintiff's claims and allegations, and Defendant's defenses thereto, as well as the evidence produced and analyzed; and the possibility of appeals, among other things.<sup>43</sup> During all settlement discussions, the Parties conducted their negotiations at arm's length in an adversarial position.<sup>44</sup> Arriving at a settlement that was acceptable to the Parties was not easy.<sup>45</sup> Defendant and its counsel felt very strongly about Defendant's ability to prevail on the merits and to avoid class certification and representative adjudication and prevail on the merits, while, Plaintiff and Class Counsel believed that they would be able to obtain class certification and prevail at trial.<sup>46</sup> After conducting initial disclosures, significant informal discovery and investigations, extensive settlement negotiations, and with the aid of the mediator's evaluation, the Parties agreed that this matter was well-suited for settlement given the legal issues relating to Plaintiff's principal claims, as well as the costs and risks to the Parties that would attend further litigation.<sup>47</sup>

The Settlement takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of each side's position and the uncertainty of how this matter might have concluded at certification, trial, and/or appeals.<sup>48</sup> The Settlement was based on a volume of facts, evidence, and investigation.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Slinger Decl., § 9.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Id.*, §§ 7 & 9.

<sup>49</sup> *Id.*, §§ 7 & 8.

1 Additionally, Class Counsel has extensive experience in handling complex wage-and-hour  
2 actions, including significant experience in employment class action litigation.<sup>50</sup>

3 **B. The Risks Inherent in Continued Litigation Favor Final Approval of the**  
4 **Settlement.**

5 The risks inherent in litigating the claims through certification proceedings, trial, and/or  
6 appeals, favor resolving this matter for an Gross Settlement Amount of \$950,000.00.<sup>51</sup> The  
7 Settlement was calculated using information and data uncovered through extensive case  
8 investigation, informal discovery, and the exchange of information in the context of litigation,  
9 mediation, and ongoing settlement negotiations.<sup>52</sup> Had the action not settled, Defendant would  
10 have vigorously challenged class certification, manageability, and liability. Defendant contended  
11 that individualized questions of fact predominated over any common issues, and these issues  
12 would pose challenges to certification and representative adjudication. Defendant would have  
13 likely argued again at trial, if any, that Plaintiff's claims were not appropriate for class-wide  
14 and/or representative adjudication. On the other hand, Defendant also faced the risk of the Court  
15 certifying a class and allowing a jury to decide Plaintiff's claims on a class-wide or  
16 representative basis. Also, preparation for trial would have been expensive for all Parties.

17 It is preferable to reach an early resolution of a dispute because such resolutions save  
18 time and money that would otherwise go to litigation. If this matter had settled after further  
19 litigation, the settlement amount would have taken into account the additional costs incurred, and  
20 there might have been less money available for Class Members, Aggrieved Employees, and the  
21 State of California after all was said and done. This is not just an abstract contention. The risks  
22 and expenses of further litigation outweighed any benefit that might have been gained otherwise.  
23 These risks of further litigation include a determination that the claims were unsuitable for class  
24 treatment and/or representative adjudication, failure to obtain certification, class de-certification  
25 after certification of a class, allowing a jury to decide the claims asserted in this matter, and the  
26 real possibility of no recovery after years of litigation. Additionally, the Parties were moving into

27 <sup>50</sup> Slinger Decl., §§ 14-18.

28 <sup>51</sup> *Id.*, §§ 9 & 11.

<sup>52</sup> *Id.*, §§ 6-9.

1 the phase of the litigation where they would have to conduct a significant amount of additional  
2 discovery, including and not limited to, depositions of Defendant's Person Most Knowledgeable  
3 designees, expert witnesses, and percipient witnesses, such as managers, supervisors, and other  
4 current and former employees throughout the State of California. Discovery would have  
5 certainly arisen, which would have cost the Parties additional time and money. In contrast, the  
6 Settlement provides real and significant benefits for the Class, Aggrieved Employees, and the  
7 State of California here and now, while avoiding the further expenses, risks, and delay of  
8 prolonged litigation with only the possibility of recovery.

9 It would be grossly inefficient for such a large class of current and former employees to  
10 bring individual actions to recover from Defendant for the alleged violations of wage-and-hour  
11 laws. Moreover, the potential individual recovery that could be obtained by a Class Member  
12 would not be significant enough to provide him or her with the incentive to sue. By granting final  
13 approval of the Settlement, the Court can approve a resolution that provides a certain and  
14 substantial recovery for Class Members, Aggrieved Employees, and the State of California.

15 **C. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate.**

16 The Settlement, which provides for a Gross Settlement Amount of \$950,000.00,  
17 represents a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of this matter. The Settlement was  
18 calculated using information and data uncovered through extensive case investigation, initial  
19 disclosures, informal discovery, and the exchange of information in the context of litigation,  
20 mediation, and extensive settlement negotiations. The Settlement takes into account the potential  
21 risks and rewards inherent in any case and, in particular, in this matter. Moreover, considering  
22 the facts in this matter, the Gross Settlement Amount represents a considerable recovery.

23 The Gross Settlement Amount will be fully paid out, in accordance with the terms of the  
24 Settlement. As discussed in Section IV, *supra*, each Participating Class Member will be paid a  
25 *pro rata* share of the Net Settlement Amount (which is currently estimated to be \$505,405.02),  
26 based on the number of Workweeks credited to them and each Aggrieved Employee will be paid  
27 a *pro rata* share of the 25% share of the PAGA Penalties, based on the number of PAGA Pay  
28

Periods during the PAGA Period credited to them.<sup>53</sup> The highest Individual Settlement Payment to a Participating Class Member is currently estimated to be \$2,781.34 and the average Individual Settlement Payment is currently estimated to be \$1,858.11.<sup>54</sup> The highest Individual PAGA Payment to an Aggrieved Employee is current estimated to be \$122.46 and the average Individual PAGA Payment is currently estimated to be \$82.72.<sup>55</sup> These are significant individual recoveries, particularly in light of the risks of litigation.

Class Counsel believes that the Settlement as a whole is fair, reasonable, and adequate.<sup>56</sup> Although Class Counsel's recommendations are not conclusive, the Court can properly take the recommendations into account, particularly if Class Counsel appears to be competent, has experience with this type of litigation, and significant discovery and investigation have been completed, as is the case here. Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (4th Ed., 2002) § 11.47. Accordingly, the Court should grant final approval of the Settlement.

**D. The Class Was Represented by Competent Counsel.**

Class Counsel has extensive experience in employment class action law and complex wage-and-hour litigation.<sup>57</sup> Lawyers for Justice, PC has been appointed class counsel in numerous complex wage-and-hour cases, and has recovered millions of dollars for individuals in California.<sup>58</sup> Both Parties' counsel were capable of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the Class Members' claims against Defendant and the benefits of the Settlement under the circumstances of the lawsuits and in the context of a private, consensual settlement agreement.

**E. There Are No Written Objections to the Class Settlement.**

The Settlement has been well received by the Class – *not a single Class Member objected to or opted out of the Class Settlement.*<sup>59</sup> Specifically, no objections have been made as

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<sup>53</sup> Settlement Agreement, §§ 3.2.5 & 3.2.6. The *pro rata* allocation here is a fair and reasonable way to distribute the Net Settlement Amount that is payable to the Participating Class Members and 25% of the PAGA Penalties that is payable to the Aggrieved Employees. At the final approval stage, "[a]n allocation formula need only have a reasonable, rational basis [to warrant approval], particularly if recommended by experienced and competent class counsel." *In re American Bank Note Holographics, Inc., Securities Litigation* (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 127 F.Supp.2d 418, 429-30.

<sup>54</sup> Simpluris Decl., § 17.

<sup>55</sup> *Id.*, § 19.

<sup>56</sup> Slinger Decl., § 21.

<sup>57</sup> Slinger Decl., §§ 14-18.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Simpluris Decl., §§ 12-13.

1 to the Gross Settlement Amount or contemplated Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Enhancement  
2 Award, Settlement Administration Costs, and allocation for the PAGA Penalties. California  
3 courts have consistently found that a small number of objectors indicates support for a settlement  
4 and strongly favors final approval.<sup>60</sup>

5 Here, the lack of any objections speaks volumes about the fairness, reasonableness, and  
6 adequacy of this Settlement. Accordingly, the Settlement as a whole is presumed to be fair,  
7 reasonable, and adequate, and the Court should grant final approval of the Settlement in its  
8 entirety. *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802.

9 **VII. THE ATTORNEYS' FEES REQUESTED SHOULD BE APPROVED.**

10 **A. A Fee Award of a Percentage of the Entire Fund Is Appropriate.**

11 Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will pay a Gross Settlement  
12 Amount of \$950,000.00.<sup>61</sup> The requested attorneys' fees is one-third (1/3) of the total value of  
13 the monetary settlement.<sup>62</sup> In light of Class Counsel's successful prosecution and resolution of  
14 this matter, the requested attorneys' fees are appropriate and reasonable.

15 Where the amount of a settlement is a "certain easily calculable sum of money,"  
16 California courts may calculate attorneys' fees as a reasonable percentage of the settlement. Weil  
17 and Brown, California Practice Guide, *Civil Procedure Before Trial*, Chapter 14, § 14:145; *In re*  
18 *Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.* (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 935, 942 (The percentage method  
19 is particularly appropriate where a monetary settlement has been recovered and "the benefit  
20 [recovered can be] easily quantified."); *see also Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th  
21 480, 503; *Dunk* at 1808. Courts may calculate and award attorneys' fees as a percentage of a  
22 monetary fund that has, by litigation, been preserved or recovered for the benefit of others.  
23 *Laffitte* at 486 & 506. Trial courts "retain the discretion to forgo a lodestar cross-check and  
24 [may] use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested percentage fee." *Id.* (internal  
25 quotes omitted); *see also Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App. 4th at 253.

26 Courts award fees as an economic incentive for lawyers to pursue litigation that will

27 <sup>60</sup> *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 250-51 (final approval granted despite 20 objectors); *7-Eleven Owners, supra*,  
85 Cal.App.4th at 1152-53 (final approval granted despite 9 objectors).

28 <sup>61</sup> Settlement Agreement, § 3.1.

<sup>62</sup> *Id.*, § 3.2.2

1 enhance and facilitate access to the judicial system for meritorious claims, deter wrongdoing, and  
2 address multiple similar alleged wrongs that would not be economically feasible to pursue  
3 individually, such as here. See A. Conte, *Attorney Fee Awards* (2d ed. 1993) 104, at 6.

4 The percentage fee method is preferred in representative actions because “it better  
5 approximates the workings of the marketplace than the lodestar approach.” *Lealao v. Beneficial*  
6 *Cal., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 49. California law provides that the award for attorneys’  
7 fees should be equivalent to fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace and paid in  
8 comparable litigation based on the result achieved and risk incurred. *Id.* at 47-50; *Laffitte* at 503.  
9 In cases where the settlement agreement provides that the defendant will pay the plaintiff’s  
10 attorneys a percentage of the fund created by the settlement, use of that percentage method is  
11 appropriate. *Lealao* at 32. Fee awards that are too small will “chill the private enforcement  
12 essential to the vindication of many legal rights and obstruct the representative actions that often  
13 relieve the courts of the need to separately adjudicate numerous claims.” *Id.* at 53. Therefore,  
14 fees in representative actions should approximate the probable terms of a contingent fee contract  
15 negotiated by a sophisticated attorney and client in comparable litigation. *Id.* at 48. “The ultimate  
16 goal . . . is the award of a ‘reasonable’ fee to compensate counsel for their efforts, irrespective of  
17 the method of calculation.” *Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557-58  
(quoting *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th, 1253, 1270).

18 Class Counsel’s application for attorneys’ fees in light of the facts and circumstances  
19 surrounding the case is well-within the range of reasonableness. Courts have awarded fees as  
20 high as 50% of the settlement in complex actions, depending on the circumstances of the case.<sup>63</sup>

21 Class Counsel has performed significant work in this matter, as discussed in the  
22 Declaration of Ryan Slinger with the very real possibility of an unsuccessful outcome and no fee  
23 recovery of any kind.<sup>64</sup> In the present matter, Class Counsel has borne all of the risks and costs of  
24 litigation and will not receive any compensation until recovery is obtained.<sup>65</sup> Class Counsel is

25 <sup>63</sup> See *In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.* (D.D.C. 1981) 526 F.Supp. 494 (awarding attorneys’ fees in the amount of  
26 45% of the \$7.3 million total settlement amount); *Beech Cinema, Inc. v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.*  
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 480 F.Supp. 1195 (awarding approximately 53% of the settlement as attorneys’ fees). California  
28 courts routinely approve attorneys’ fees awards “average[ing] around one-third of the recovery.” *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 n.11 (lower court found the range of contingency fees in marketplace to be 20%-40% and determined such a percentage fee was appropriate).

<sup>64</sup> Slinger Decl., § 19.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

1 experienced in complex wage-and-hour litigation and used that experience to obtain a significant  
2 settlement recovery for Plaintiff, the Class, Aggrieved Employees, and the State of California.<sup>66</sup>  
3 Considering the amount of fees requested, work performed, risks incurred, results obtained, and  
4 experience of Class Counsel in handling similar matters, Plaintiff maintains that the requested  
5 attorneys' fees are reasonable and should be awarded.

6 Compensating class counsel in class litigation on a percentage basis, as requested herein,  
7 makes good sense because: (1) it is consistent with the private marketplace where contingent fee  
8 attorneys are customarily compensated on such a basis; (2) it aligns the interests of class counsel  
9 and absent class members in achieving the maximum possible resolution of the case; and (3) it  
10 encourages the most efficient and expeditious resolution of the litigation by providing an  
11 incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement. The attorney fee request here satisfies all of these  
12 factors and should be approved on a percentage basis.

13 The percentage method is consistent with, and is intended to mirror, the practice in the  
14 private marketplace where contingent-fee attorneys typically negotiate percentage-fee  
15 arrangements with their clients. The named plaintiff's agreement to pay a contingent fee is  
16 powerful evidence of a reasonable fee. One of the best ways to demonstrate the value of  
17 counsel's work to the class is to review the consideration agreed to be paid by the named  
18 plaintiff. If the named plaintiff has employed counsel on a contingency-fee basis, it would indeed  
19 be inequitable for the members of the class, who will enjoy the benefits of the settlement without  
20 incurring the risks of bringing the claim, to pay less than the named plaintiff. In this case,  
21 Plaintiff has agreed to a contingency fee agreement of at least one-third (1/3) of the recovery.<sup>67</sup>

22 Class Counsel has obtained a substantial recovery on behalf of Plaintiff, the Class,  
23 Aggrieved Employees, and the State of California and the results achieved justify an attorneys'  
24 fees award that is the equivalent of the standard market fee and that is consistent with the  
25 contingency-fee agreement entered into by and between Plaintiff and Class Counsel. Thus, the  
26 requested attorneys' fees are appropriate.

27  
28 <sup>66</sup> Slinger Decl., §§ 14-18.

<sup>67</sup> *Id.*, § 10.

**B. The Class Counsel Fees Payment Requested Is Reasonable Based on the Factors Considered in Determination of Fee Awards.**

The factors which courts consider in determining whether fee awards are reasonable, all of which support the fee award requested by Class Counsel, are: the time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; the customary fee; whether the fee is fixed or contingent; the time limitation imposed by the client or the circumstances; the amount involved and results obtained; the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; the undesirability of the case; the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and awards in similar cases. *Camden I Condominium Association, Inc. v. Dunkel* (11th Cir. 1991) 946 F.2d 768, 772. Some of the most relevant factors to this Court's fee determination will be addressed below.

The award of attorneys' fees in the amount of \$316,666.67 (which is 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount) is commensurate with the time, effort, and expense dedicated to this matter, the contingent nature of Class Counsel's fee recovery and the risks taken, the skill and determination required, the results that Class Counsel has achieved, and the value of the settlement that Class Counsel has obtained in this matter.

**1. *Time & Labor.***

Class Counsel used its experience and skills, and dedicated the full extent of resources, to litigate and bring this matter to a successful conclusion.<sup>68</sup>

As outlined in the Declaration of Ryan Slinger, Class Counsel has fully and actively participated in litigation of this matter.<sup>69</sup> Prior to commencing the lawsuit, Class Counsel had conducted a significant amount of investigation into the factual and legal issues, Defendant's business and its operations, and employment policies, practices, and procedures.<sup>70</sup> During the litigation of this matter, Class Counsel had the opportunity to interview Plaintiff; reviewed and analyzed of a volume of information, documents and data obtained from Defendant, Plaintiff,

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<sup>68</sup> Slinger Decl., §§ 7-9.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Id.*, §§ 7-8.

1 and other sources; and prepared liability, damages, penalties, and valuation calculations.<sup>71</sup> Class  
2 Counsel also met and conferred with Defendant's counsel on numerous occasions e.g., to discuss  
3 issues relating to the pleadings, case management, motion practice, informal discovery, and the  
4 production of information, documents and data among other things, and prepared for and  
5 attended court proceedings, mediation, and settlement negotiations.<sup>72</sup>

6 The Attorney Task and Time Chart, which is attached as "EXHIBIT 1" to the  
7 accompanying Declaration of Ryan Slinger, sets forth in detail the hours that attorneys at  
8 Lawyers for Justice, PC have spent performing tasks in this matter.<sup>73</sup> Class Counsel has spent  
9 244.20 hours performing tasks and to obtain a significant recovery in this matter.<sup>74</sup> These hours  
10 were required to bring this matter to its successful conclusion. In light of the value of Class  
11 Counsel's work and the carrying of costs involved in litigating this matter, the requested  
12 attorneys' fees are fair, adequate, and reasonable.

13 **2. The Skill Required to Perform Legal Services Properly.**

14 The skill required to properly litigate this matter is evident from the results achieved, the  
15 steps necessary to reach those results, and that Defendant retained well-respected counsel to  
16 represent it.

17 Class Counsel exercised its skill to perform significant investigation, analysis, and  
18 research prior to filing the case, during the litigation, and prior to and during the mediation and  
19 settlement negotiations. Class Counsel took steps to prepare the matter for class certification and  
20 representative adjudication and had every intention of taking this matter to trial on a class-wide  
21 basis if Defendant did not offer an appropriate class-wide settlement. Despite all of the obstacles  
22 that had to be overcome, as demonstrated in the Declaration of Ryan Slinger, Class Counsel used  
23 its extensive experience in the handling of class actions and complex wage-and-hour matters in  
24 order to obtain the Settlement with maximum efficiency.<sup>75</sup>

25 ///

26 <sup>71</sup> Slinger Decl., §§ 7-8.

27 <sup>72</sup> *Id.*, § 7.

28 <sup>73</sup> *Id.*, Exh. 1.

<sup>74</sup> *Id.*, § 12; Exh. 1.

<sup>75</sup> *Id.*, §§ 14-18.

1                                    **3.        *Whether the Fee Is Fixed or Contingent.***

2            Plaintiff entered into a contingency fee agreement with Class Counsel, and the  
3 representation of the Class provided by Class Counsel has been wholly contingent.<sup>76</sup> Class  
4 Counsel has invested 244.20 hours of time to obtain relief on behalf of Plaintiff, the Class,  
5 Aggrieved Employees and the State of California.<sup>77</sup> Class Counsel has also incurred litigation  
6 costs and expenses in the amount of \$22,428.31.<sup>78</sup> Thus, Class Counsel has borne all of the risks  
7 and costs of litigation and will not receive any compensation until recovery is obtained.<sup>79</sup>

8            In determining the reasonableness of a fee award in a class action settlement, whether or  
9 not representation is provided on a contingency basis is an important factor:

10                                    A contingent fee must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they  
11 are performed. The contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal  
12 services he renders but for the loan of those services. A lawyer who both bears the  
13 risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market  
14 value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid  
15 no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.

16            *Cates v. Chiang* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 791, 823 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Class  
17 Counsel litigated this matter on a contingent basis with all of the concomitant risk factors  
18 inherent in such an uncertain undertaking. Had Class Counsel not been successful, the time that  
19 Class Counsel has devoted to litigating this matter would have been for naught, and would not  
20 have produced any fee or any reimbursement of costs or expenses. *See Vizcaino v. Microsoft* (9th  
21 Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-49 (discussing the risks of engaging in litigation without  
22 certainty of compensation).

23                                    **4.        *The Amount Involved and the Results Achieved.***

24            The Settlement represents an excellent resolution of this matter, given the risks inherent  
25 in litigating the matter through class certification proceedings, trial, and/or appeals. Had this  
26 matter not settled, Defendant would have vigorously challenged certifiability, manageability, and  
27 liability. Defendant, however, faced risks if the Court certified a class and allowed a jury to  
28 decide the claims. Additionally, preparing this matter for trial would have been expensive for the

<sup>76</sup> Slinger Decl., § 10.

<sup>77</sup> *Id.*, § 12; Exh. 1.

<sup>78</sup> *Id.*, § 19.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

Parties. The Settlement at this stage is preferred over continued litigation because such resolutions save time and money that would otherwise go to litigation. The risks and expenses of further litigation outweighed any benefit that might have been gained otherwise. The Settlement provides an immediate recovery, as opposed to an uncertain result in the future after costly, risk, and prolonged litigation involving expert discovery, trial preparation, class certification proceedings, and appellate review of those proceedings.

The results achieved, in light of the difficulties inherent in similar cases and the specific difficulties faced in this matter, are considerable.<sup>80</sup> Class Counsel obtained a settlement of \$950,000.00.<sup>81</sup> The Settlement has yielded a positive response from the Class Members—no Class Members objected to the Class Settlement.<sup>82</sup>

### 5. *The Reputation and Ability of the Attorneys.*

Lawyers for Justice, PC is a recognized class action law firm that employed its attorneys' knowledge, skills, and experience in bringing this case to a successful conclusion.<sup>83</sup> Class Counsel has years of complex and class action litigation experience, has recovered millions of dollars on behalf of thousands of individuals in California, and has successfully handled numerous significant wage-and-hour class action and complex cases.<sup>84</sup>

### C. The Lodestar Methodology Also Justifies Approval of the Requested Fees.

While the percentage-of-the-benefit approach is endorsed as the better approximation of the workings of the marketplace than the lodestar approach, courts may also use the lodestar method to “cross-check” the results of the other.<sup>85</sup> The lodestar is calculated based on reasonable hours at reasonable prevailing hourly rates for the attorneys, and counsel is entitled to compensation for every hour reasonably spent on the matter. *Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131-33. The reasonableness of hours is assessed by “the entire course of the

<sup>80</sup> Slinger Decl., §§ 7-9.

<sup>81</sup> Settlement Agreement, § 3.1.

<sup>82</sup> Simpluris Decl., § 13.

<sup>83</sup> Slinger Decl., §§ 14-18.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> *Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at 505 (explaining that “[a] lodestar cross-check is simply a quantitative method for bringing a measure of the time spent by counsel into the trial court’s reasonableness determination” and “the lodestar calculation . . . does not override the trial court’s primary determination of the fee as a percentage” and “does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the potential fee award.”); *see also, e.g., Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1050 (“[W]hile the primary basis of the fee award remains the percentage method, the lodestar may provide a useful perspective on the reasonableness of a given percentage award.”).

litigation, including pretrial matters, settlement negotiations, discovery, litigation tactics, and the trial itself[.]” *Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist.* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447.

As discussed above in Part VII.B.1, *infra*, and also discussed in the Declaration of Ryan Slinger, Class Counsel expended significant time and labor in this highly contested matter.<sup>86</sup> Class Counsel has been actively involved in the prosecution of the case, and the work performed in said case has precluded other employment.<sup>87</sup> Class Counsel bore the risk that, despite all of its efforts and skills employed, there may be no recovery.<sup>88</sup> Ultimately, Class Counsel was successful in reaching a settlement of \$950,000.00.<sup>89</sup> The Attorney Task and Time Chart sets forth in detail the numerous tasks that Class Counsel performed in this matter, and the time required for completing those tasks.<sup>90</sup> The chart demonstrates that Class Counsel has spent a total of **244.20** hours litigating this matter and finalizing the Settlement.<sup>91</sup> In light of the facts and circumstances of this matter, as well as the results that Class Counsel has achieved, Class Counsel has spent a reasonable number of hours performing work on this matter. In addition, Class Counsel will continue to perform work on this matter through the date of final approval and in connection with the implementation of the Settlement.

As set forth in the Declaration of Ryan Slinger, the professional background and experience of Class Counsel support a reasonable rate of compensation of at least \$850 per hour for services provided by Class Counsel.<sup>92</sup> Lawyers for Justice, PC has been awarded attorneys’ fees, compensating the firm at the blended rate of at least \$850 per hour for legal service performed, by courts of this state.<sup>93</sup> While the circumstances of every case are unique, the fact remains that the work performed by Class Counsel in this matter justify the requested attorneys’ fees.

It also bears noting that a court may apply a multiplier in consideration for risk, efficiency, and/or obtaining a substantial result, to enhance the lodestar for purpose of cross-

<sup>86</sup> Slinger Decl., §§ 8-9; Exh. 1.

<sup>87</sup> *Id.*, §§ 11-12.

<sup>88</sup> *Id.*, § 19.

<sup>89</sup> Settlement Agreement, § 3.1

<sup>90</sup> Slinger Decl., Exh. 1.

<sup>91</sup> Slinger Decl., § 12.

<sup>92</sup> *Id.*, § 13.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

check. See *Ketchum* at 1133-34 (holding that a risk multiplier may be applied to compensate contingency fee attorneys at a fair market rate).<sup>94</sup> The risks involved, skill required, complexity of the matter, and results obtained warrant upward enhancement of the lodestar.<sup>95</sup> In determining whether or not to enhance the lodestar, California courts take into account multiple factors, many of which were specifically addressed above in §§ VII.B, *infra*. See, *Cates* at 822-23. Multiple factors warrant enhancement of the lodestar in the case, including the following: the time and labor required; the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; the contingent nature of the fee; the amount involved and results obtained; the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; and awards in similar cases. *Ketchum* at 1134. Therefore, a multiplier of 1.53 should be applied. Applying the rate of \$850 per hour to 244.20 hours for services provided by Class Counsel results in a base lodestar value of \$207,570.00 for the work performed by Class Counsel, and applying a modest multiplier of 1.53,<sup>96</sup> the total enhanced lodestar fees are \$317,582.10.

The lodestar method as a cross-check to the percentage award sought herein, strongly supports the reasonableness of the requested attorneys' fees. The nature of the work performed, skill exercised, and the outcome in this matter—which involves an outstanding monetary recovery involving a Gross Settlement Amount of \$950,000.00 (with a Net Settlement Amount

<sup>94</sup> Courts have approved fee awards with multipliers of 2 and even higher. See, e.g., *City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 78 (affirming a 2.34 multiplier without remand); *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 255 ("Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (applying a 2.52 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (applying a 2.5 multiplier in a consumer class action).

<sup>95</sup> Even when courts have opted to award fees in settlement fund cases based on time reasonably expended on the action, courts have generally awarded these fees based on the actual time expended (the lodestar) in conjunction with a multiplier of between 2 and 4. *Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1975) 526 F.2d 67. Adjustment of the base lodestar figure to compute an award of attorneys' fees for a claim under the California Labor Code is appropriate. See *Id.*, at 1135-36; *Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49. Courts frequently apply multipliers to enhance the lodestar to reflect the risks involved, the complexity of the litigation, and the other relevant facts. *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051; *Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579 ("One of the most common fee enhancers [...] is for contingency risk."). Such an enhancement "mirrors the established practice in the private legal market of rewarding attorneys for taking the risk of nonpayment by paying them a premium over their normal hourly rates for winning contingency cases." *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051; *accord Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at 1132-33. A risk multiplier also serves to bring the financial incentives for enforcing important rights "into line with incentives [attorneys] have to undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee-for-services basis." *Ketchum* at 1132.

<sup>96</sup> Larger multipliers have been awarded in similar cases, and the total amount of fees sought by Class Counsel is also reasonable compared to fees awarded in similar cases. Courts routinely enhance lodestar amounts based on multipliers that "range from 2 to 4 or even higher." *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 255 (emphasis added); *see also, e.g., Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (approving multiplier of 2.5); *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 (approving multiplier of 3.65); *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.* (2d Cir. 2005) 396 F.3d 96, 123 (approving multiplier of 3.5); *Craft v. County of San Bernardino* (C.D. Cal. 2006) 624 F.Supp.2d 1113, 1125 (awarding multiplier of 5.2 and referring to other cases with cross-check multipliers ranging from 4.5 to 19.6).

of approximately at least \$505,405.02 to be paid to Participating Class Members (with gross Individual Settlement Payments averaging approximately more than \$1,858.11), payment of \$22,500.00 to Aggrieved Employees, and payment of \$67,500.00 to the State of California)—support the percentage fee sought. Accordingly, the Court is respectfully requested to award attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$316,666.67 to Class Counsel.

**VIII. REIMBURSEMENT OF THE LITIGATION COSTS SHOULD BE APPROVED.**

The Settlement provides for reimbursement of litigation costs of up to \$50,000.00. As set forth in the Declaration of Ryan Slinger, Class Counsel only seeks reimbursement of \$22,428.31 in litigation costs and expenses incurred in this matter.<sup>97</sup> This amount was reasonable and necessary in the prosecution of this matter and to obtain the Settlement.<sup>98</sup> The cost savings of \$27,571.69 will be part of the Net Settlement Amount, which will be distributed to Participating Class Members in accordance with the Settlement.<sup>99</sup> Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court award litigation costs and expenses in the amount of \$22,428.31 to Class Counsel.

**IX. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS SHOULD BE APPROVED.**

As set forth in the accompanying Simpluris Declaration, the total costs incurred and to be incurred by Simpluris for the notice and settlement administration process are \$8,000.00.<sup>100</sup> The costs incurred and to be incurred include, but are not limited to, establishing and maintaining a settlement fund account; establishing and maintaining a calendar of administrative deadlines and responsibilities; processing, issuing, and transmitting settlement payments; distributing notice of the Settlement to the Class; receiving and validating Request for Exclusions, Objections, or Workweeks/PAGA Pay Periods Disputes submitted by Class Members; calculating Employer Taxes and providing appropriate forms and calculations to Defendant; providing counsel with weekly reports; and other tasks as the Parties mutually agree or the Court orders Simpluris to perform.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Slinger Decl., § 19.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> Simpluris Decl., § 20.

<sup>101</sup> *Id.*, § 3.

Accordingly, the Court should grant final approval of payment to Simpluris, a necessary third-party for its handling of the notice and settlement process, in the amount of \$8,000.00.

**X. THE ENHANCEMENT AWARD SHOULD BE APPROVED.**

Plaintiff requests an Enhancement Award, in the amount of \$7,500.00, for her efforts and work spearheading the prosecution of this matter and serving as the Class Representative, as well as her broader individual waiver and release of claims with a California Civil Code Section 1542 waiver. Such enhancement awards are common, and the one requested here is reasonable.<sup>102</sup>

Plaintiff spent a substantial amount of time and effort providing the facts and evidence necessary to support the prosecution of the claims.<sup>103</sup> Plaintiff was available whenever Class Counsel needed her and actively tried to obtain, and gave, information to support the pursuit of this matter.<sup>104</sup>


Accordingly, it is appropriate and just for Plaintiff to receive \$7,500.00 as a reasonable Enhancement Award, in addition to her individual settlement payments.

**XI. CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, the Court is respectfully requested to grant final approval of the Settlement, approve and award the Attorneys' Fees and Costs to Class Counsel, the Enhancement Award to Plaintiff, Settlement Administration Costs to the Settlement Administrator, and the PAGA Penalties, in their entirety, as sought herein; and permit the filing of a memorandum that exceeds the page limit.

Dated: January 22, 2026

**LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC**

By:   
Ryan Slinger  
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class

<sup>102</sup> *Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294, 299 (Relevant factors considered by courts are the financial and other risk to, the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by, and the amount of time and efforts spent by the class representative, as well as the duration of the litigation and the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representatives as a result of the litigation; approving \$50,000 participation award to a single class representative based on such factors).

<sup>103</sup> Slinger Decl., § 20; Declaration of Claudia Stanziola ("Stanziola Decl."), §§ 3-5;

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*