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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE**

KENNETH WARTA JR. and MICHAEL
MUNOZ, individually, on behalf of all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the State of
California and other aggrieved persons,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LOZANO PLUMBING SERVICES,
INCORPORATED, a corporation; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CVRI2304541

*[Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon.
Harold W. Hopp, Dept. 1]*

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Preliminary Approval Hearing:

Date: July 7, 2026

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept.: 1

Reservation ID: 119201875815

Action Filed: August 29, 2023

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 7, 2026, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 1 of the Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, Riverside Historic Courthouse, located at 4050 Main Street, Riverside, California 92501, Plaintiffs Kenneth Warta Jr. and Michael Munoz (collectively “Plaintiffs”) will and hereby do move this Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the proposed Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement”);
2. Conditionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes only;
3. Appointing Plaintiffs Kenneth Warta Jr. and Michael Munoz as class representatives;
4. Appointing John G. Yslas, Arrash T. Fattahi, Arman A. Salehi, and Courtney M. Miller of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel;
5. Appointing ILYM Group Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
6. Setting a final approval hearing date.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(d) and (e), this Motion is made on the grounds that the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary approval and falls well within the range of reasonableness. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm’s length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral, and Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class.

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This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of John G. Yslas, the Declarations of Plaintiffs Kenneth Warta Jr. and Michael Munoz, the Declaration of Lisa Mullins, and on all records and documents on file, together with such oral and documentary evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: May 29, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: /s/ Courtney M. Miller

Courtney M. Miller
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiffs seek preliminary approval of a class action settlement of wage and hour claims as well as representative claims brought under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), against Defendant Lozano Plumbing Services, Incorporated (“Defendant”) (Plaintiffs and Defendant collectively, the “Parties”). The proposed Class is defined as all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as an hourly-paid non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant (“Class Members”) during the period from August 29, 2019, until Preliminary Approval (“Class Period”). The main terms of the Settlement are as follows:

1. A Gross Settlement Amount of \$800,000.00, which will be distributed to approximately 289 Class Members on a pro rata basis according to the total workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period;
2. Attorneys’ fees of up to one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently \$266,666.66) and up to \$35,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs to Plaintiffs’ Counsel;
3. A Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$10,000.00 to each of the Plaintiffs (\$20,000.00 total);
4. Costs of settlement administration of up to \$7,500.00; and
5. Allocation of \$40,000.00 to PAGA penalties, seventy-five percent (75%) of which (\$30,000.00) will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), and twenty-five percent (25%) of which \$10,000.00 will be paid to all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as an hourly-paid non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant (“Aggrieved Employees”) during the period from September 22, 2022, to Preliminary Approval (“PAGA Period”).

The Settlement meets all criteria for preliminary approval and falls within the range of reasonableness given the risks and expenses of further litigation. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm’s length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of

1 an experienced neutral. As such, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant preliminary approval of the
2 Settlement, conditionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only, appoint Plaintiffs as Class
3 Representatives, appoint Plaintiffs' Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint ILYM Group Inc. as the
4 Settlement Administrator, authorize the Settlement Administrator to administer notice of the
5 Settlement to the Class, and set a final approval hearing date.

6 **II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

7 On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff Kenneth Warta Jr. ("Plaintiff Warta") filed this putative class
8 action against Defendant alleging: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure
9 to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest
10 periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized
11 wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) unfair business
12 practices ("Class Action"). Declaration of John G. Yslas in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
13 Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("MPA") ("Yslas Decl.") at ¶ 3.

14 On September 22, 2023, Plaintiff Kenneth Warta Jr. ("Plaintiff Warta") provided written
15 notice to the LWDA and Defendant of the specific provisions the Labor Code alleged to have been
16 violated, including the facts and theories in support. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 4, Exhibit 1. The LWDA did
17 not notify Plaintiff Warta that it intended to investigate within 65 days of this written notice. Yslas
18 Decl. at ¶ 4.

19 On January 14, 2025, Plaintiff Michael Munoz ("Plaintiff Munoz") provided written notice
20 to the LWDA and Defendant of the specific provisions the Labor Code alleged to have been
21 violated, including the facts and theories in support. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 4, Exhibit 2. The LWDA did
22 not notify Plaintiff Munoz that it intended to investigate within 65 days of this written notice. Yslas
23 Decl. at ¶ 4. Therefore, on May 19, 2025, Plaintiff Munoz filed a representative action against
24 Defendant for civil penalties under PAGA in the Superior Court of California, County of Riverside,
25 Case No. CVRI2502669 ("Munoz PAGA Action"). *Id.*

26 On November 4, 2025, the Parties participated in a private full-day mediation with
27 mediator, David Phillips. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 5. The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm's
28 length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients. *Id.* The

1 Parties accepted the mediator’s proposal and agreed upon general settlement terms. *Id.*

2 The Parties negotiated the terms of the Settlement over the next few months and fully
3 executed the Settlement in March 2026. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6, Exhibit 3 (“Settlement Agreement”).
4 On May 29, 2026, Plaintiffs submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement to the LWDA. Yslas
5 Decl. at ¶ 6, Exhibit 4.

6 On May 11, 2026, the Parties submitted a Joint Stipulation in this Class Action requesting
7 that Plaintiff Warta be granted leave to amend to file a First Amended Complaint that will add a
8 cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA and add Plaintiff Munoz as a named plaintiff. Yslas
9 Decl. at ¶ 7. After Preliminary Approval is granted in this Class Action, Plaintiff Munoz intends
10 to dismiss the Munoz PAGA Action without prejudice. *Id.*

11 **III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

12 **A. Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

13 The Parties have agreed to settle the claims alleged in this Class Action and the PAGA
14 Action for a Gross Settlement Amount of \$800,000.00. Settlement Agreement at § 1.22. Subject
15 to Court approval, the following payments will be deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount:
16 (1) a class representative service payment of up to \$10,000.00 to each of the Plaintiffs (\$20,000.00
17 total); (2) attorneys’ fees of up to one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently
18 \$266,666.66) and reimbursement of litigation costs of up to \$35,000.00 to Plaintiffs’ Counsel; (3)
19 costs of settlement administration of up to \$7,500.00 to ILYM Group Inc.; (4) individual class
20 payments to Class Members; and (5) PAGA Penalties in the amount of \$40,000.00, which will be
21 allocated 75% to the LWDA (\$30,000.00) and 25% to Aggrieved Employees \$10,000.00). *Id.* at
22 §§ 3.1, 3.2. After all requested deductions are made, the portion of the Net Settlement Amount
23 available for individual class payments is currently estimated to be \$430,833.34. Yslas Decl. at ¶
24 19.

25 Individual class payments will be calculated based on the number of workweeks worked
26 by each Class Member during the Class Period. Settlement Agreement at § 3.2.4. For tax purposes,
27 the individual class payments will be allocated 20% to wages and 80% to interest and penalties.
28 *Id.* at § 3.2.4.1. Defendant will separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes owed on the wage

positions of the individual class payments separate from the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.* at § 3.1.

Individual PAGA payments to Aggrieved Employees will be calculated based on the number of pay periods worked by each Aggrieved Employee during the PAGA Period. *Id.* at § 3.2.5.1. For tax purposes, the individual PAGA payments will be allocated 100% to penalties. *Id.* at § 3.2.5.2.

Any deductions not approved by the Court will be retained by the Settlement Administrator in the Net Settlement Amount. *Id.* at §§ 1.28, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.5.2. Funds from any uncashed checks will be transmitted by the Settlement Administrator to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue." *Id.* at § 4.4.3. None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant. *Id.* at § 3.1.

B. Proposed Settlement Administration

The Parties' proposed class notice complies with the requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766(d). *See* Exhibit A to Settlement Agreement. It provides information regarding the nature of this lawsuit, a summary of the settlement terms, the formula used for calculating individual class and PAGA payments and instructions to dispute the calculations, instructions on how to opt-out of or object to the Settlement, the date, time, and location of the final approval hearing, and the amounts sought for the class representative service payments, attorneys' fees and litigation costs, and settlement administration costs. *See generally, id.* The class notice also notifies Class Members that they do not need to submit a claim in order to participate in the Settlement and receive a payment. *See id.* The Settlement Administrator will mail Class Members the class notice by first-class mail in English and in Spanish. Settlement Agreement at §§ 1.11, 7.4.2.

If a class notice is returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will re-mail the class notice within three (3) business days to the forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal Service. *Id.* at § 7.4.3. If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will conduct a Class Member Address Search and re-mail the class notice to the most current address obtained. *Id.* The deadline to opt-out of the Settlement or to submit an objection or dispute will be extended by 14 days for all Class Members whose class notice was remailed. *Id.* at § 7.4.4.

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1 **C. Proposed Releases**

2 Released Class Claims: Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the Gross
3 Settlement Amount and all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual
4 Class Payments, “Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective
5 former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and
6 assigns, release Released Parties from (i) all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have
7 been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint including, e.g.,
8 Failure to Pay Minimum and Straight Time Wages, Failure to Pay Overtime Wages, Failure to
9 Provide Meal Breaks, Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods, Failure to Timely Pay Final
10 Wages at Termination, Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements, Failure to
11 Indemnify Employees for Expenditures, and Unfair Business Practices. Except as set forth in
12 Section 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims,
13 including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and
14 Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers’ compensation, or
15 claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period.” Settlement Agreement at § 5.2.

16 Released PAGA Claims: Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the Gross
17 Settlement Amount and all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual
18 Class Payments, “The claims released by Aggrieved Employees on behalf of themselves and their
19 respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors,
20 and assigns are all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been
21 alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the Operative PAGA Complaint and the PAGA
22 Notice, including, e.g. Failure to Pay Minimum and Straight Time Wages, Failure to Pay Overtime
23 Wages, Failure to Provide Meal Breaks, Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods, Failure to
24 Timely Pay Final Wages at Termination, Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements,
25 and Failure to Indemnify Employees for Expenditures.” Settlement Agreement at § 5.3.

26 “Released Parties” means Defendant and each of its former and present directors, officers,
27 members, and investors. Settlement Agreement at § 1.41.

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1 Only Plaintiffs will agree to a general release and a waiver of Civil Code § 1542. Settlement
2 Agreement at §§ 5.1, 5.1.1.

3 **IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MEETS ALL CRITERIA FOR**
4 **PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

5 **A. Provisional Certification of the Class is Appropriate**

6 Class certification is appropriate when there is: (1) an ascertainable and sufficiently
7 numerous class; (2) a well-defined community of interest among class members; and (3) substantial
8 benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives. *Brinker*
9 *Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (2012). Although courts still need to
10 review and consider each element for certification, a lesser standard can be used to provisionally
11 certify a settlement class. *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal.App.4th
12 836, 859 (2003).

13 **1. The Proposed Class is Numerous and Ascertainable**

14 “Ascertainability” is determined by examining the class definition and the size of the class,
15 and may also involve examining the means available to identify class members. *Noel v. Thrifty*
16 *Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal.5th 955, 980-981, 985-986 (2019). As the settlement eliminates the need for
17 trial, “the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be
18 confronted.” *Global Minerals*, 113 Cal.App.4th at 859. Further, under California law, there is no
19 minimum number of class members for maintenance of a class action. *Hendershot v. Ready to Roll*
20 *Transp., Inc.*, 228 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1222 (2014). Class sizes as small as 10 have been permitted.
21 *Rose v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981), disapproved on other grounds by *Noel*,
22 7 Cal.5th at 986.

23 The class here consists of all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified
24 as an hourly-paid non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant during the Class Period. *See*
25 Settlement Agreement at § 1.5. The Class is also readily ascertainable from Defendant’s business
26 records, because all Class Members are or were employees of Defendant. *Id.* Defendant’s records
27 show there are approximately 289 Class Members, making joinder of all Class Members
28 impracticable. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 9.

2. A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists

The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Brinker*, 53 Cal.4th at 1021.

a. Common Questions Predominate

In determining whether common issues “predominate,” courts consider both plaintiff’s legal theories and defendant’s affirmative defenses. *Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n*, 59 Cal.4th 1, 28-29 (2014). The “predominate common questions” factor does not require that all class members have identical claims. *Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.*, 59 Cal.4th 522, 530 (2014). Rather, the focus is on whether issues shared by the class members are sufficiently uniform to permit class-wide assessment, and whether individual variations in proof on those issues are manageable. *Id.*

Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant maintained common employment policies and/or practices that unlawfully deprived Class Members of wages, meal periods, rest periods, reimbursements for business expenses, accurate wage statements, and timely payment of wages upon separation of employment. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 10. These allegations present common factual and legal questions of, *inter alia*, whether Defendant applied the same scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, and reimbursement policies to all Class Members, whether these policies and practices resulted in Labor Code violations, whether Defendant’s conduct was intentional, and whether Class Members are entitled to damages and/or penalties. *Id.* These common questions could be resolved using Class Members’ time records, payroll records, testimony from Defendant’s designated representative(s), and Class Members’ testimony. *Id.* Therefore, the Court can and should exercise its discretion to grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes.

b. Plaintiffs are Typical of the Class

Typicality does not require that the representative plaintiff’s claims and those of the class members be identical or perfectly aligned. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 228 (2001), disapproved on other grounds by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.*, 4 Cal.5th

260, 269-280 (2018). Typicality does not require that a plaintiff's claims be identical to those of other class members, only that their claims and the defenses applicable to them are sufficiently similar to those of other class members that a named plaintiff is able to adequately represent the class and focus on common issues. *Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood*, 166 Cal.App.4th 89, 99 (2008).

Plaintiffs have alleged that they and Class Members were employed by the same Defendant and injured by Defendant's common wage and hour policies and practices, including Defendant's scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, and reimbursement policies. *See* Yslas Decl. at ¶ 10. Through informal discovery, Plaintiffs confirmed that these challenged policies and practices applied to Plaintiffs and other Class Members alike. *See id.* at ¶ 8. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims and Class Members' claims arise from the same challenged employment policies and practices and are based on the same legal theories.

c. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class

Certification requires adequacy of both the proposed class representative and of the proposed class counsel. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382. "Only a conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative status." *Richmond v. Dart Industries*, 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (1981). Only conflicts that are "irreconcilable" can defeat adequacy. *Nat'l Solar Equip. Owners' Ass'n v. Grumman Corp.*, 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1286 (1991). The proposed representative Plaintiffs and proposed Class Counsel present no such conflict.

Plaintiffs' interests are coextensive with Class Members' interests. Declaration of Kenneth Warta Jr. in Support of Plaintiffs' MPA ("Warta Decl.") at ¶ 6; Declaration of Michael Munoz in Support of Plaintiffs' MPA ("Munoz Decl.") at ¶ 6. Plaintiffs have demonstrated an ability to advocate for the interests of Class Members by initiating these lawsuits, providing information to their attorneys, meeting with their attorneys to discuss their claims, and reviewing the proposed Settlement. Warta Decl. at ¶ 7; Munoz Decl. at ¶ 7.

Likewise, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC has expended considerable time and effort on this case and will continue to do so through final approval. *See generally*, Yslas Decl. Therefore, Plaintiffs

1 should be appointed class representatives, and their counsel should be appointed Class Counsel.

2 **3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multitude of Individual Lawsuits**

3 Courts have held that class treatment of wage and hour claims is clearly “superior to the
4 other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” *Dean Witter*
5 *Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 211 Cal.App.3d 758, 772-773 (1989). This is so because “[p]ublic
6 policy has long favored the ‘full and prompt payment of wages due an employee.’” *Sav-On Drug*
7 *Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 340 (2004). Here, a class action is superior to a
8 multitude of individual lawsuits. Given the size and amount of each Class Members’ claim, Class
9 Members have little incentive to litigate their claims on an individual basis because the out-of-
10 pocket expenses and personal commitment necessary to litigate each claim likely outweigh any
11 potential recovery. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 9. Therefore, a class action is the superior method for seeking
12 relief.

13 **B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval**

14 The moving party must demonstrate that “the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.”
15 *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 126 (2008). “In determining whether a
16 class settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors,
17 such as the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further
18 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement,
19 the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of
20 counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
21 proposed settlement.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 244-245 (internal quotations and citations
22 omitted).

23 **1. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness**

24 A settlement is entitled to “a presumption of fairness . . . where: (1) the settlement is reached
25 through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel
26 and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the
27 percentage of objectors is small.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996).
28 The Settlement here satisfies the first three factors. Plaintiffs will analyze the fourth factor at final

1 approval after Class Members have been notified of the Settlement and provided with an
2 opportunity to object.

3 **a. The Settlement is the Result of Arm's Length Negotiation**

4 Courts have recognized that the involvement of a respected mediator provides a high degree
5 of assurance that the settlement is the result of arm's length bargaining. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*,
6 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 52-53 (2008). The Settlement in this matter was the product of a full-day
7 mediation session with a respected mediator. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 5. The negotiations were adversarial,
8 conducted at arm's length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their
9 clients. *Id.*

10 **b. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery Have Been Conducted**

11 Prior to attending mediation, Plaintiffs' Counsel thoroughly investigated the claims,
12 applicable law, and potential defenses. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 8. Plaintiffs' Counsel assessed the value to
13 the class claims using the data and documents Defendant produced in informal discovery. *Id.* The
14 data and documents produced by Defendant included the estimated number of Class Members, the
15 number of workweeks in the Class Period, the estimated number of Aggrieved Employees, the
16 number of pay periods in the PAGA Period, the average rate of pay, Defendant's employee
17 handbooks, Defendant's written wage-and-hour policies, and a sampling of Class Members' time
18 and payroll records. *Id.* Plaintiffs' Counsel also engaged an expert consultant to quantify the
19 potential exposure using the time and payroll records, and then assessed the risks associated with
20 each claim meriting reductions in the likely success at class certification and likely recovery at
21 trial. *Id.*

22 **c. Plaintiffs' Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation**

23 Plaintiffs are represented by Wilshire Law Firm, PLC. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 1. Plaintiffs'
24 Counsel has extensive experience litigating wage-and-hour class actions on behalf of employees.
25 *See id.* at ¶¶ 21-31. Plaintiffs' Counsel has been involved as counsel in numerous class actions that
26 have resulted in millions of dollars in recovery. *See id.*

27 ///

28 ///

1 **2. The Settlement is Reasonable Given the Strengths of Plaintiffs’**
2 **Claims and the Risks and Expense of Further Litigation**

3 A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered fair
4 and reasonable. *See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Although
5 the exposure Plaintiffs’ Counsel calculated is substantial, the various risks at succeeding at class
6 certification and through trial affected the valuation of the claims for settlement purposes. Yslas
7 Decl. at ¶ 11.

8 Minimum and Overtime Wages: Plaintiffs’ unpaid minimum and overtime wage claims
9 were based on the allegation that Defendant required Class Members to perform work duties while
10 off the clock, without compensation. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 12. For example, Plaintiffs alleged that
11 Defendant regularly required them and other Class Members to work off the clock and required
12 them to remain on call while off the clock in the event of plumbing emergencies, all without
13 compensation. *Id.* Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs’ Counsel conservatively estimated that
14 Class Members worked one (1) hour off the clock per week in calculating potential exposure for
15 these claims to be approximately \$686,700.83 (23,063 workweeks x \$19.85 average hourly rate of
16 pay x 1.00 hour/workweek x 1.5 overtime rate of pay). *Id.* Because this claim would have relied
17 heavily on Class Member testimony and would not be evidenced in Defendant’s time and payroll
18 records, the risk of succeeding at class certification was substantial. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
19 Counsel applied a risk discount based on a 40% chance of succeeding at class certification and a
20 40% chance of succeeding at trial on the merits, yielding a realistic damage estimate of
21 approximately \$109,872.13 (\$686,700.83 x 40% x 40%). *Id.*

22 Meal Periods: Plaintiffs’ meal period claim was based on the allegation that Defendant
23 failed to provide Class Members with legally compliant meal periods or pay meal period premiums
24 in lieu thereof. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 13. For example, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant regularly failed
25 to provide them and other Class Members with duty-free meal periods. *Id.* Additionally, Plaintiffs’
26 Counsel’s expert found a facial violation rate of approximately 45.1% in Defendant’s time and
27 payroll records for shifts greater than five (5) hours after accounting for paid meal premiums. *Id.*
28 Therefore, potential liability for the meal period claims is approximately \$853,534.95 (95,342

1 shifts greater than 5 hours x \$19.85 hourly rate x 45.1% violation rate). *Id.* After taking into account
2 the difficulty of certifying and proving meal period claims, as well as Defendant's contention that
3 the claim lacks merit and that a 45.1% violation rate is unrealistic, Plaintiffs' Counsel discounted
4 this figure based on a 50% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 40% chance of
5 succeeding at trial on the merits, yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately
6 \$170,706.99 ($\$853,534.95 \times 50\% \times 40\%$). *Id.*

7 Rest Periods: Plaintiffs' rest period claim was based on the allegation that Defendant failed
8 to provide Class Members with legally compliant rest periods or pay rest period premiums in lieu
9 thereof. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 14. For example, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant prohibited them and
10 other Class Members from taking rest periods. *Id.* Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs' Counsel
11 applied a 100% violation rate to all shifts of 3.5 hours or longer. *Id.* Therefore, potential liability
12 for the rest period claims is approximately \$1,987,838.55 (100,143 shifts of 3.5 hours or longer x
13 \$19.85 hourly rate x 100% violation rate). *Id.* However, Plaintiffs' Counsel discounted this figure
14 to account for the difficulty of certifying and proving rest period claims, particularly because rest
15 periods do not have to be recorded, and to account for the possibility of Class Members voluntarily
16 choosing to forego a rest period. *Id.* Because this claim would have relied exclusively on Class
17 Member testimony, Plaintiffs' Counsel discounted this claim based on a 30% chance of succeeding
18 at class certification and a 20% chance of succeeding at trial, yielding a realistic damage estimate
19 of approximately \$119,270.31 ($\$1,987,838.55 \times 30\% \times 20\%$). *Id.*

20 Reimbursements: Plaintiffs' reimbursement claim was based on the allegation that
21 Defendant failed to indemnify Class Members for expenses incurred as a direct result of performing
22 their job duties for Defendant. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 15. For example, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant
23 failed to reimburse them and other Class Members for mandatory use of their personal cell phones
24 and to purchase their own plumbing tools and supplies for work-related purposes. *Id.* For purposes
25 of calculating Defendant's liability based on a best-case scenario for Plaintiffs and the Class,
26 Plaintiffs' Counsel estimated that Defendant were liable to each class member for \$100 per month,
27 or \$25.00 per workweek, in unreimbursed expenses, for a total amount of approximately
28 \$576,575.00 ($\$25.00 \times 23,063$ workweeks). *Id.* Plaintiffs' Counsel discounted this figure based on

1 an evaluation of a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 30% chance of succeeding
2 at trial to account for the difficulty of certifying and proving expense reimbursement claims,
3 yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$51,891.75 ($\$576,575.00 \times 30\% \times 30\%$). *Id.*

4 In sum, Plaintiffs' Counsel estimated that Plaintiffs' maximum recovery for the off-the-
5 clock claim, meal period violations, and rest period violations (i.e., the wage claims) is
6 approximately \$7.1 million, but after factoring in the risk and uncertainty of certification and
7 prevailing at trial, Plaintiffs' Counsel estimates that Plaintiffs' realistic estimated recovery for
8 these non-penalty wage claims is approximately \$399,849.43. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 16.

9 Derivative Penalties: Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of Defendant's failure to pay all
10 wages owed, Defendant owed waiting time penalties and wage statement penalties. Yslas Decl. at
11 ¶ 17. With respect to Plaintiffs' derivative claims for statutory penalties, Plaintiffs' Counsel
12 estimated that Defendant's realistic potential liability is approximately \$109,094.48. *Id.*
13 Defendant's maximum potential liability for waiting time penalties is approximately
14 \$1,090,241.40 ($[184 \text{ employees} \times \$19.85 \text{ hourly rate} \times 8.00 \text{ hours/day} \times 30 \text{ days}] + [184 \text{ employees}$
15 $\times \$19.85 \text{ hourly rate} \times 1.30 \text{ hours of overtime/day} \times 1.5 \text{ overtime rate} \times 30 \text{ days}]$) based on
16 approximately 184 formerly employed class members during the 3-year statute of limitations
17 period and an average shift length of 9.30 hours. *Id.* Defendant's maximum potential liability for
18 inaccurate wage statements is approximately \$728,000.00 ($182 \text{ employees} \times \$4,000.00 \text{ statutory}$
19 maximum) based on approximately 182 class members who worked during the 1-year statute of
20 limitations period and approximately 12,169 pay periods in that statutory timeframe. *Id.* In light of
21 the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Counsel believes that it would be unrealistic to expect the Court to award
22 the full \$1,818,241.40 in statutory penalties given Defendant's defenses, the contested nature of
23 Plaintiffs' claims, the challenges of establishing willfulness as applicable, and the discretionary
24 nature of penalties. *Id.* Considering that the underlying wage claims are realistically estimated to
25 be approximately \$399,849.43, such a disproportionate award would also raise due process
26 concerns. *Id.* As such, Plaintiffs' counsel discounted these figures to account for the risk and
27 uncertainty of obtaining class certification and prevailing at trial, resulting in a realistic evaluation
28 of approximately \$65,414.48 for waiting time penalty claims ($\$1,090,241.40 \times 30\% \times 20\%$), and

1 approximately \$43,680.00 for wage statement penalty claims ($\$728,000.00 \times 30\% \times 20\%$), or
2 approximately \$109,094.48 total for statutory penalties. *Id.*

3 PAGA: For the PAGA claim, Plaintiffs' Counsel determined that Defendant's potential
4 exposure could potentially reach \$1,191,800.00, assuming the initial \$100 penalty would apply for
5 each of the 11,918 pay periods in the PAGA Period. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 18. However, even assuming
6 success on the merits of each claim, PAGA gives the Court discretion to reduce penalties for a
7 variety of reasons, including where to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary
8 and oppressive, or confiscatory. *Id.* As such, Plaintiffs' counsel discounted this figure to account
9 for the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at trial, resulting in a realistic evaluation of approximately
10 \$119,180.00 for PAGA penalties ($\$1,191,800.00 \times 10\%$). *Id.* The settlement allocates \$40,000.00
11 of the Gross Settlement Amount to PAGA, therefore the PAGA allocation amounts to 5% of the
12 Gross Settlement Amount and approximately 34% of the realistic maximum damages for PAGA
13 penalties ($\$40,000.00 / \$119,180.00$). *Id.*

14 Using these estimated figures, Plaintiffs' Counsel predicted that the realistic maximum
15 recovery for all claims, including penalties, would be approximately \$680,015.66. Yslas Decl. at
16 ¶ 19. This means that the gross settlement figure represents approximately 118% of the realistic
17 maximum recovery ($\$800,000.00 / \$680,015.66$). *Id.* Considering the risk and uncertainty of
18 prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. *Id.* Indeed,
19 because of the proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will
20 avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. *Id.*

21 Based on the figures in the Settlement Agreement, the Net Settlement Amount available for
22 class settlement payments is currently estimated to be \$430,833.34 for approximately 289 Class
23 Members. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 20. As a result, each Settlement Class Member would be eligible to
24 receive an average net benefit of approximately \$1,490.77. *Id.* Based on the estimated Net
25 Settlement Amount available for individual class payments and there being approximately 23,063
26 workweeks in the Class Period, the estimated weekly valuation for individual class payments is
27 \$18.68 ($\$430,833.34 / 23,063$ workweeks). *Id.*

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1 **C. The Requested Service Payments Are Reasonable**

2 Plaintiffs each seek a class representative service payment of up to \$10,000.00 (\$20,000.00
3 total) for accepting the responsibilities of representing the interests of the class and potential costs
4 that were not borne by any other Class Member. Settlement Agreement at § 3.2.1. A named plaintiff
5 is eligible for payment that reasonably compensates him or her for undertaking and fulfilling a
6 fiduciary duty to represent absent class members. *See Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186
7 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393 (2010); *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (2004).

8 Throughout this case, Plaintiffs assisted counsel in providing information necessary to
9 prosecute the claims, met with counsel regarding the claims, and reviewed the Settlement to ensure
10 it was fair to the Class. Warta Decl. at ¶ 7; Munoz Decl. at ¶ 7. No action would likely have been
11 taken by Class Members individually and no compensation would have been recovered for them,
12 but for Plaintiffs’ services on behalf of the class. By actively pursuing this action, Plaintiffs
13 furthered the California public policy goal of enforcing California’s wage and hour laws. *See Sav-*
14 *On*, 34 Cal.4th at 340. The requested class representative service payments are reasonable and
15 should be preliminarily approved.

16 **D. The Requested Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

17 The purpose of an attorneys’ fee award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who
18 invested in a case despite the risk of non-payment and achieved a substantial positive result for the
19 class. California courts routinely award attorneys’ fees equaling one third or more of the potential
20 value of the common fund. *See Chavez*, 162 Cal.App.4th at 66, fn. 11 (“Empirical studies show
21 that, regardless of whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in
22 class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”).

23 Additionally, courts utilize “multipliers” to account for the risk of taking on cases where
24 there is no guarantee of recovery, uncertainties as the amount that will be recovered, uncertainty
25 as to the cost of litigating the case (both in effort and expenses), and uncertainty about how much
26 time will pass before the recovery is obtained. *Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33 (2001);
27 *see also Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49 (1977) (approving the adjustment of the lodestar
28 figure based on factors specific to the case to ensure fair market value for legal services provided

1 on a contingency basis). Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is
2 brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. *Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at 1133.

3 Generally, “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” *Wershba v. Apple*
4 *Computers, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 (2001); *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*,
5 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class
6 action); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 60 (2008) (applying a 2.5 multiplier on a
7 lodestar cross-check); *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002)
8 (“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0); *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l*, 231
9 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82 (2004) (affirming a 2.13 multiplier after finding that “2 to 4” is a
10 reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check). *See also Bronshteyn v. State of California –*
11 *Department of Consumer Affairs*, 114 Cal.App.5th 537 (2025) (court did not abuse its discretion
12 by awarding 1.75 multiplier for fees incurred up to and including the jury verdict and a 1.25
13 enhancement for hours worked after the verdict where hourly rates for plaintiff’s five senior
14 attorneys were \$1,100.00 and \$1,000.00); *Tran v. Golden State FC LLC, et al.* (LASC Case No.
15 BC699931), Fee Order filed April 8, 2022 (approving hourly rate of \$1,300.00 for plaintiff’s 32-
16 year attorney).

17 Plaintiffs seek appointment of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel. The attorneys
18 performed significant work and expended litigation costs in prosecuting this matter with no
19 guarantee of payment. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 21. Plaintiffs’ Counsel seeks preliminary approval for not
20 more than one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is currently estimated to be
21 \$266,666.66, and up to \$35,000.00 in reimbursement of actual litigation costs. Settlement
22 Agreement at § 3.2.2. Given the work performed in this matter, the extensive information
23 exchange, and the substantial recovery obtained on behalf of the class, Plaintiffs’ Counsel achieved
24 a settlement through efficient and diligent work. *See generally*, Yslas Decl. At final approval,
25 Plaintiffs’ Counsel will fully brief the merits of its request for the award of attorneys’ fees and
26 litigation costs.

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1 **V. CONCLUSION**

2 The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable settlement of the class claims in light of
3 the risks presented in this case. Plaintiffs have presented the materials and information necessary
4 to demonstrate that the requirements for preliminary approval have been met, and therefore
5 respectfully request that the Court preliminarily approve the Settlement and schedule a date for the
6 final approval hearing.

7 Respectfully submitted,

8 Dated: May 29, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

10 By: /s/ Courtney M. Miller

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12 Courtney M. Miller
13 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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