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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

SANDI ORTIZ CUEVAS and MARIA L. YANEZ ZEPEDA, individually, on behalf of all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the State of California and other aggrieved persons; JOSE LUIS RAMIREZ, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TMI AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS INC., a California corporation; TMI PRODUCTS, INC., a California corporation; IPC IMPORT PARTS CONNECTION INC., A California corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CVRI2304340

[Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon. Harold W. Hopp, Dept. 1]

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Preliminary Approval Hearing:
Date: January 22, 2026
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept: 1

Action Filed: August 21, 2023

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TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 22, 2026, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Department 1 of the Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, located at the Riverside Historic Courthouse, 4050 Main Street, Riverside, CA 92501, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769, *et seq*., Plaintiffs Sandi Ortiz Cuevas, Jose Luis Ramirez, and Maria Yanez Zepeda (collectively "Plaintiffs") will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiffs and TMI Automotive Products, Inc.; TMI Products, Inc.; and IPC Import Parts Connection Inc. (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiffs further move the Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice;
2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
3. Approving the Class Notice and the plan for distribution of the Class Notice;
4. Appointing Plaintiffs Sandi Ortiz Cuevas, Jose Luis Ramirez, and Maria Yanez Zepeda as Class Representatives for settlement purposes;
5. Appointing Plaintiffs' Counsel, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC; Blackstone Law, APC; and Torus LLP as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
6. Appointing Apex Class Action Administration as the Settlement Administrator; and
7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the accompanying declarations, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

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Respectfully submitted,

Dated: December 29, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: /c/ Courtney Miller
Arrash T. Fattahi
Arman A. Salehi
Emily K. Borman
Courtney M. Miller

Attorneys for Plaintiff
SANDI ORTIZ CUEVAS

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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Sandi Ortiz Cuevas, Jose Luis Ramirez, and Maria Yanez Zepeda (collectively "Plaintiffs") seek preliminary approval of a proposed $542,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendants TMI Automotive Products, Inc.; TMI Products, Inc.; and IPC Import Parts Connection Inc. (collectively "Defendants") (Plaintiffs and Defendants collectively, the "Parties"). This motion for preliminary approval is unopposed. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 148 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arm's length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Christopher M. Barnes, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed Class Notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs' Claims

This is a wage and hour class action and representative action pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq*.) (Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ["Fattahi Decl."] at ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs and putative class members were employed by Defendants in California and classified as hourly-paid non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants during the class period. (*Id.*) Defendants manufacture high-quality automotive interiors for passenger automobiles. (*Id.*)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay for all hours worked. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendants failed to reimburse business expenses. (*Id.*) Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.*)

On July 21, 2023, Plaintiff Maria Yanez Zepeda sent a notice to Defendants and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") alleging wage and hour violations pursuant to PAGA. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4, **Ex. 1** [Zepeda PAGA Notice].)

On August 21, 2023, Plaintiff Sandi Ortiz Cuevas filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Defendant TMI Automotive Products, Inc. for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) unfair business practices. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4.)

On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff Jose Luis Ramirez filed a putative class action complaint against Defendant TMI Automotive Products, Inc. for (1) violation of Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197 and 1197.1 (unpaid minimum wages); (2) violation of Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 (unpaid overtime); (3) violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512(a) (unpaid meal period premiums); (4) violation of Labor Code § 226.7 (unpaid rest period premiums); (5) violation of Labor Code §§ 204 and 210 (wages not timely paid during employment); (6) violation of Labor Code § 226(a) (failure to provide accurate wage statements); (7) violation of Labor Code §§ 201, 202 and 203 (untimely final wages); (8) violation of Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 (failure to reimburse necessary business expenses); (9) violation of Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200, *et seq*. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4.)

On September 22, 2023, Plaintiff Sandi Ortiz Cuevas sent a notice to Defendant TMI Automotive Products Inc. and the LWDA alleging wage and hour violations pursuant to PAGA. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4, **Ex. 2** [Cuevas PAGA Notice])

On September 26, 2023, Plaintiff Maria Yanez Zepeda filed a putative class action and representative complaint against Defendants for (1) failure to pay all wages; (2) failure to provide meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof; (3) failure to permit rest periods or provide compensation in lieu thereof; (4) failure to reimburse business expenses; (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6) waiting time penalties; (7) violations of the Unfair Competition Law; and (8) PAGA civil penalties. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4.)

On December 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action and Representative Complaint against Defendants in the instant action. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4.)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 5.) Defendants produced a sampling of timekeeping and payroll records for the class members. (*Id*.) Defendants also provided their written wage-and-hour policies in effect during the class period and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in their informal discovery responses. (*Id*.)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendants' employment policies and practices and analyzing Defendants' timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification and success on the merits and assess Defendants' maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id*.) Class Counsel reviewed these records and utilized an expert to prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation. (*Id*.)

C. Settlement Negotiations

On March 21, 2025, the Parties participated in a private mediation with experienced class action mediator, Christopher M. Barnes, Esq. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id*.) The Parties went into mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id*.) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses, the Parties reached a resolution, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, **Ex. 3** [Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement].)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. (Fattahi

Decl. at ¶ 13.) Based on the Parties' informal exchange of documents and information and Class Counsel's own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendants both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.*)

Indeed, the $542,000.00 Gross Settlement Amount represents approximately **160%** of the **realistic maximum recovery** of $337,722.95. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 22.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendants' maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately $3.87 million, when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendants' realistic exposure was approximately $337,722.95, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 13-26.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 22.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. (*Id.*) Based on the estimated 25% allocation to aggrieved employees of $5,000 available for individual PAGA payments and there being approximately 4,735 pay periods in the PAGA Period, the estimated PAGA period valuation for individual PAGA payments is $1.06 ($5,000.00 / 4,735 pay periods). (*Id.*) Based on these current estimates, the lowest estimated individual PAGA payment could be $1.06 ($1.06 x 1 pay period) and the highest estimated individual PAGA payment could be $71.55 ($1.06 x approximately 67.50 pay periods in the PAGA Period). (*Id.*)

D. <u>Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement</u>

The Settlement's key terms include:

1. <u>Class Definition</u>: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "all non-exempt, hourly individuals that worked for Defendants in California during the Class Period." (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. <u>Class Period</u>: "means the period from February 24, 2019, through April 20, 2025."

(Settlement, § 1.12.)

3. Class Member or Settlement Class Member: "means a member of the Class, as either a Participating Class Member or Non-Participating Class Member (including a Non-Participating Class Member who qualifies as an Aggrieved Employee)." (Settlement, § 1.9.)

4. Aggrieved Employee: "means all non-exempt, hourly individuals that worked for Defendants in California during the PAGA Period." (Settlement, § 1.4.)

5. PAGA Period: "means the period from September 22, 2022, through April 20, 2025." (Settlement, § 1.37.)

6. Gross Settlement Amount: "means Five Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Dollars ($542,000.00) which is the total amount Defendants agree to pay under the Settlement except as provided in Paragraph 9 [of the Settlement Agreement]. The Gross Settlement Amount will be used to pay Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, Class Representative Service Payments and the Administration Expenses Payment." (Settlement, § 1.25.) "Except as otherwise provided by Paragraph 9 [of the Settlement Agreement], Defendants promise to pay Five Hundred Forty-Two Thousand and Zero Cents ($542,000.00) and no more as the Gross Settlement Amount and to separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portions of the Individual Class Payments." (Settlement, § 3.1.)

7. Uncashed Checks: Any settlement checks remaining uncashed after 180 days shall be cancelled and the funds represented by such checks shall be transmitted to the California Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member. (Settlement, §§ 4.5, 4.7.)

8. Release by Participating Class Members: "The claims released against the Released Parties by Participating Class Members are all claims, rights, demands, liabilities, and causes of action alleged or which could have reasonably been alleged based on the facts alleged in the Operative Complaint. The Released Class Claims are those that accrued during the Class Period." (Settlement, § 5.5.)

9. Release by the State of California with respect to the Aggrieved Employees: "The claims released by the State of California with respect to the Aggrieved Employees are all claims

for PAGA civil penalties that are alleged or reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts alleged in the Operative Complaint and PAGA Notices that accrued during the PAGA Period." (Settlement, § 5.6.)

10. No Reversion, No Claims Made: means that "[n]one of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendants." (Settlement, § 3.1.)

11. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes $20,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs' claims under PAGA, with 75% ($15,000.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% ($5,000.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.3.1.2.) Plaintiffs' Counsel submitted the proposed Settlement to the LWDA before filing the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 9.)

12. Net Settlement Amount: "means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service Payments, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments." (Settlement, § 1.32.)

13. Distribution Formula: The Individual Class Payment will be calculated as each Participating Class Member's pro rata share of the Net Settlement Amount calculated according to the number of Workweeks worked during the Class Period (Settlement, §§ 1.26, 3.3.) As to PAGA, "[t]he Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees' 25% share of PAGA Penalties ($5,000) by the total number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee's PAGA Pay Periods. Aggrieved Employees assume full responsibility and liability for any taxes owed on their Individual PAGA Payment." (Settlement, § 3.3.1.3.)

14. Tax Allocation: 20% of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the "Wage Portion"). The remaining 80% of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for interest and penalties (the "Non-Wage Portion"). (Settlement, § 3.3.1.)

15. Class Representative Service Payment: Defendants agree not to oppose Plaintiffs' request for service payments up to $7,500.00 to each of the Plaintiffs ($22,500.00 total). (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) These payments shall be in addition to the *pro rata* recovery received by each of the Plaintiffs as part of the Settlement.

16. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendants will not oppose a fee application of up to one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently estimated to be $180,666.67), plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed $45,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

17. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Class Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service payment being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 8.4.1.) Apex Class Action Administration ("Apex"), the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the class notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the class notice to updated addresses. (*Id.* §§ 1.10, 8.4.2; Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 10, **Ex. 5** [Apex Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk,* 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc*., (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id*. at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation

1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm's-Length Negotiations

Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 ["The fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement."].)

The Settlement was reached following a full-day mediation with experienced class action employment mediator, Christopher M. Barnes, Esq. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id*.) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (*Id*. at ¶ 8.)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sampling of timekeeping and payroll records for the class members, Defendants' written wage-and-hour policies in effect during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id*. at ¶ 6.) Thus, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement.

Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with litigating wage and hour class actions. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 37-48; Declaration of Alexandra Rose in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Rose Decl.") at ¶¶ 2-8; Declaration of David Alami in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Alami Decl.") at ¶¶ 2-7.) Again, this supports the position that the terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this action.

2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' Respective Legal Positions

A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 ["Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation."].)

This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 24.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

The proposed settlement of $542,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when compared to Plaintiffs' reasonably forecasted recovery. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 13-26.) Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of $542,000.00 is well within the "ballpark" of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately $1,803.00.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Based on the estimated Net Settlement Amount available for individual class payments and there being approximately 18,078 workweeks in the Class Period, the estimated weekly valuation for individual class payments is $14.76 ($266,843.33 / 18,078 workweeks). (*Id.*) Based on these current estimates, the lowest estimated individual class payment could be $14.76 ($14.76 x 1 week) and the highest estimated individual class payment could be $4,737.96 ($14.76 x approximately 321 weeks in the Class Period). (*Id.*)

3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation

The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel. Class Counsel has a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 37-48; Rose Decl. at ¶¶ 2-8; Alami Decl. at ¶¶ 2-7.) Although Plaintiff and Class Counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

B. <u>The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved</u>

The proposed Class Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved for distribution to the class. The Class Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to submit their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Class Notice meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

C. <u>The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable</u>

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, the Parties agreed to allocate reasonable attorneys' fees of not more than one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, currently estimated to be $180,666.67, and up to $45,000.00 in costs. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.) These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Class Notice and are reasonable.

1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund" Method

California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc*. (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc*. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created." (*Id*. at p. 503.) The court explained: "The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts." (*Id*. [internal citations omitted].)

2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented." (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys' fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved "smaller" settlement funds of under $10 million].)

Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys' fees equal one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ["Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery."].) Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the attorneys' fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

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3. This Matter Involves a "Fee-Shifting" Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of "minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit." Under this section, Plaintiffs would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys' fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 35-36; Rose Decl. at ¶¶ 16-18; Alami Decl. at ¶ 7) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 35-36.) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possesses considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 37-48; Rose Decl. at ¶¶ 2-8; Alami Decl. at ¶¶ 2-7.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id*.) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. <u>The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable</u>

Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and "there is no indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other" class members, such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement. (*Id*. [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or $1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp*. (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here, the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia v. Shamrock Foods Co*. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431, at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson*, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3% or $1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc*. (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of $20,000.00, 75% percent of which ($15,000.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 25% of which ($5,000.00) to be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.3.1.2.) In good faith, the Parties negotiated to allocate approximately 3.7% of the Gross Settlement Amount to PAGA penalties, which exceeds percentages that are routinely approved. Additionally, the $20,000.00 allocation for PAGA penalties represents approximately 42% of the realistic maximum recovery for PAGA penalties ($20,000.00 / $47,350.00). (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 22.)

E. <u>The Service Payments to Named Plaintiffs Are Reasonable</u>

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits "are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class." (*Munoz, supra,* 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp*. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, "it is the policy of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions . . . ." Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has noted that "retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread," despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agreed to pay Class Representative Service Payments of up to $7,500.00 to each of the Plaintiffs ($22,500.00 total). (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) Courts routinely approve a $10,000 enhancement award for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 ["The Court concludes a $10,000 incentive award is appropriate."]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National Association* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at *4 ["The court approves awards of $10,000 for each class representative."].) Class Counsel represents that Plaintiffs devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and were frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 27-31; *see generally* Plaintiffs' declarations.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiffs generated for all class members. (*Id*.)

When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the "average award per class representative was $15,992 and the median award per class representative was $4,357." (Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev. 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of $69,850 and a median award of $31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of $12,121 and a median award of $13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the "courts' wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job." (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

IV. <u>CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED</u>

A. <u>Legal Standard</u>

The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California's wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: "when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: "(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented." (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co*. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: "(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class." (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc*. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device. (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, "Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system" particularly where the rights of consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co*. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond*, *supra,* 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

B. <u>Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for Settlement Purposes.</u>

1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous

The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable and includes approximately 148 employees of Defendant.

Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co*. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

"The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be 'many' parties to a class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally." (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) "Where a question is of common interest to 'many' persons, an action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to join them all." (*Id.*) "No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action." (*Id.*) "Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees." (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate

The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp*. (1987) 191

Cal.App.3d 605.)

Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting their employees to take rest periods; whether Defendants reimbursed employees for business expenses; and whether Defendants consequently failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements and failed to provide all wages owed upon separation of employment. Plaintiffs contend that the factual and legal issues are the same for all the identified class members, including Plaintiffs. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

3. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class

The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs were all employed by Defendant. As such, they allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated employees.

4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement

The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second, a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that previously settled. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 37-48; Rose Decl. at ¶¶ 2-8; Alami Decl. at ¶¶ 2-7.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and Plaintiffs have, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication. Plaintiffs' willingness to serve as representatives demonstrates their serious commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee*, *supra,* 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation

Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation. By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court's use of the class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra,* 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

V. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND

A. The Proposed Class Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process

Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class Members . . ." (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

B. The Class Notice is Accurate and Informative

The proposed Class Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to submit their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

The Class Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The Class Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

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