

Jonathan M. Genish (State Bar No. 259031)
jgenish@blackstonepc.com
Miriam L. Schimmel (State Bar No. 185089)
mschimmel@blackstonepc.com
Joana Fang (State Bar No. 309623)
jfang@blackstonepc.com
Alexandra Rose (State Bar No. 329407)
arose@blackstonepc.com
BLACKSTONE LAW, APC
8383 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 745
Beverly Hills, California 90211
Tel: (310) 622-4278 / Fax: (855) 786-6356

Attorneys for Plaintiff Rigoberto Tecaliz

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

RIGOBERTO TECALIZ, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated and on behalf of
other aggrieved employees,

Plaintiff,

vs.

NATIONAL RESTAURANT INC. DBA
BLACK BEAR DINER, a California corporation;
and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 37-2023-00046906-CU-OE-CTL

Honorable Matthew C. Braner
Department C-60

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF**

Date: April 18, 2025
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: C-60

Complaint Filed: October 27, 2023
FAC Filed: November 27, 2023
Trial Date: Not Set

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT** on **April 18, 2025 at 9:00 a.m.** in Department C-60 of the
3 above-captioned Court located at 330 West Broadway, San Diego, California 92101, pursuant to
4 California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, Plaintiff
5 Rigoberto Tecaliz (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move the Court for an Order granting preliminary
6 approval of the proposed class action and PAGA settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant National
7 Restaurant Inc. dba Black Bear Diner (“Defendant”).

8 Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an Order:

9 1. Preliminarily approving the Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement
10 (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) attached as Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of Jonathan M. Genish
11 in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement
12 (“Genish Decl.”);

13 2. Certifying the Class for Settlement purposes;

14 3. Appointing Plaintiff Rigoberto Tecaliz as the Class Representative for Settlement
15 purposes;

16 4. Appointing Jonathan M. Genish, Miriam L. Schimmel, Joana Fang, and Alexandra Rose
17 of Blackstone Law, APC as Class Counsel for Settlement purposes;

18 5. Approving the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”), attached as
19 Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement, to be mailed to the Class;

20 6. Approving the opt-out and objection procedures provided in the Settlement Agreement
21 and set forth in the Class Notice;

22 7. For each Class Member, directing Defendant to furnish their (1) full name; (2) last known
23 mailing address; (3) Social Security number; (4) dates worked for Defendant during the Class Period;
24 and (8) such other information as is necessary for the Settlement Administrator to calculate Workweeks
25 and PAGA Pay Periods (if applicable) to the Settlement Administrator within fourteen (14) calendar days
26 after entry of the order granting preliminary approval of the Settlement;

27 8. Approving the proposed deadlines for the settlement administration process; and

28 9. Setting a Final Approval Hearing.


1 Pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(1)(2), on March 26, 2025, a copy of the
2 Settlement was submitted to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) via
3 online submission through the LWDA’s website. (Genish Decl., ¶ 44 and Exh. 4).

4 This Motion is based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
5 Declaration of Jonathan M. Genish, the Declaration of Plaintiff Rigoberto Tecaliz, the Declaration of
6 Lisa Mullins of ILYM Group, Inc., the pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this matter,
7 and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

8
9 Respectfully submitted,

10 Dated: March 26, 2025

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

11
12 By: 

13 Jonathan M. Genish
14 Attorneys for Plaintiff Rigoberto Tecaliz
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Rigoberto Tecaliz (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation of
4 Class Action and PAGA Settlement (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) entered into between
5 Plaintiff and Defendant National Restaurant Inc. dba Black Bear Diner (“Defendant”) (together, with
6 Plaintiff, the “Parties”). (Declaration of Jonathan M. Genish in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
7 Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Genish Decl.”], Exh. 3). The Settlement
8 terms are outlined as follows:

- 9
- 10 • Class Size: Approximately 340 individuals.
 - 11 • Gross Settlement Amount: Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$639,000.00).
 - 12 • Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: Attorneys’ fees of one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount
13 (i.e., \$213,000.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$639,000.00) plus actual litigation costs
14 and expenses not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$20,000.00), to be
15 paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
 - 16 • Enhancement Payment: Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00), to be paid from the Gross
17 Settlement Amount.
 - 18 • Settlement Administration Costs: Not to exceed Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and
19 Zero Cents (\$8,500.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
 - 20 • PAGA Amount: Thirty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$30,000.00) from the Gross
21 Settlement Amount, 75% of which will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development
22 Agency (“LWDA”) and the remaining 25% to be paid to the PAGA Employees.
 - 23 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: Three Hundred Fifty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred
24 Dollars and Zero Cents (\$357,500.00) to be distributed to Settlement Class Members.

25 As set forth herein, the Settlement is the product of informed discovery and arms-length
26 negotiations, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the Class. Plaintiff therefore
27 respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminarily approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify
28 the Class, approve the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”), and set a hearing
date for final settlement approval, among other requested relief.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant operates a Black Bear Diner franchise in El Cajon, California. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an hourly-paid, non-exempt Server's Assistant/Busboy from approximately May 2021 to approximately July 2023. (Declaration of Plaintiff Rigoberto Tecaliz in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ["Tecaliz Decl."], ¶ 2).

On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff provided written notice to the LWDA by online submission and to Defendant by U.S. Certified Mail, pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2699.3, of the specified provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated by Defendant ("PAGA Letter"). (Genish Decl., ¶ 9 and Exh. 2).

On October 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint for Damages in the action entitled *Rigoberto Tecaliz v. National Restaurant Inc. dba Black Bear Diner*, San Diego County Superior Court Case No. 37-2023-00046906-CU-OE-CTL ("Action"), thereby commencing a putative class action against Defendant. (*Id.*, ¶ 10).

On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages and Enforcement Action Under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code §§ 2698 Et Seq ("Operative Complaint") in the Action. (*Id.*, ¶ 11). The Operative Complaint alleges ten (10) causes of action for violations of the California Labor Code for failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide compliant meal periods and premium payments in lieu thereof, failure to provide compliant rest periods and premiums payments in lieu thereof, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to timely pay wages upon termination, failure to timely pay wages during employment, failure to provide accurate wage statements, and failure to reimburse necessary business expenses, for violations of California Business & Professions Code Section 17200, *et seq.* based on the aforementioned California Labor Code violations, and for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2698 *et seq.* ("PAGA") based on the aforementioned California Labor Code violations. (*Ibid.*).

On September 26, 2024, the Parties participated in a formal mediation conducted by Hon. Carl J. West (Ret.) ("Mediator"), a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and hour matters, and with the assistance of the Mediator's evaluations, the Parties were able to reach an agreement to resolve this dispute on a class and representative basis. (*Id.*, ¶ 12). The Parties then worked

1 diligently to negotiate and memorialize the terms in a long form settlement agreement. (Ibid).

2 On March 25, 2025, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 13 & Exh. 3).

3 **III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

4 **A. Class Definition**

5 For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the Class shall be defined as “all
6 current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in the State of
7 California at any time during the Class Period (or if any such person is incompetent, deceased, or
8 unavailable due to military service, the person’s legal representative or successor in interest evidenced
9 by reasonable verification)” (“Class Members” or “Class”). (Genish Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement,
10 ¶ 6.b). The Class Period is defined as the period from October 27, 2019 through November 25, 2024.
11 (Genish Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.f). Based on information provided by Defendant, it is
12 estimated that there are a total of three hundred and forty (340) Class Members. (Genish Decl., ¶ 14).

13 **B. Amount of Settlement**

14 The Parties have agreed to settle the class and PAGA claims at issue in the Operative Complaint
15 for a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Dollars and Zero
16 Cents (\$639,000.00), exclusive of employer-side payroll taxes. (Genish Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement
17 Agreement, ¶ 6.q).

18 **C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Amount**

19 The Gross Settlement Amount is a common fund and therefore includes all requested costs, fees,
20 and other allocations. (Genish Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.q). The Gross Settlement Amount
21 includes: (1) Class Counsel’s fees in the amount of one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e.,
22 \$213,000.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$639,000.00); (2) Class Counsel’s actual litigation costs
23 and expenses, not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$20,000.00); (3) Settlement
24 Administration Costs, not to exceed Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents (\$8,500.00);
25 (4) Enhancement Payment in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00); and (5)
26 PAGA Amount of Thirty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$30,000.00). (Genish Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement
27 Agreement, ¶¶ 6.q, 9, 10, 11, and 12). After the above-estimated amounts are deducted from the Gross
28 Settlement Amount, the Net Settlement Amount that will be available for Class Members is currently

1 estimated to be Three Hundred Fifty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents
2 (\$357,500.00). (Genish Decl., ¶ 15). Additionally, 25% of the PAGA Amount (“PAGA Employee
3 Amount”), which is \$7,500.00 out of \$30,000.00, will be fully distributed to all current and former hourly-
4 paid and/or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in the State of California at any time
5 during the PAGA Period (or if any such person is incompetent, deceased, or unavailable due to military
6 service, the person’s legal representative or successor in interest evidenced by reasonable verification)
7 (“PAGA Employees”). (Genish Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.v, 6.x, and 11). The “PAGA
8 Period” is defined as the period from September 18, 2022 through November 25, 2024. (Genish Decl., ¶
9 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.aa).

10 The Net Settlement Amount will be distributed and paid to all Class Members who do not submit
11 a timely and valid Request for Exclusion (“Settlement Class Members”) on a *pro rata* basis based on the
12 number of weeks each Class Member worked for Defendant as an hourly-paid and/or non-exempt
13 employee in California during the Class Period (“Workweeks”). (Genish Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement
14 Agreement, ¶¶ 6.mm and 6.nn). The *pro rata* share of the Net Settlement Amount that a Class Member
15 may be eligible to receive under the Class Settlement (“Individual Settlement Share”) will be calculated
16 by the Settlement Administrator, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (Genish Decl., ¶ 16;
17 Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.t and 14).

18 The PAGA Employee Amount will be distributed and paid to all PAGA Employees on a *pro rata*
19 basis based on the number of pay periods each PAGA Employee worked for Defendant as an hourly-paid
20 and/or non-exempt employee in California during the PAGA Period (“PAGA Pay Periods”). (Genish
21 Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.cc and 11). The *pro rata* share of the PAGA Employee Amount
22 that a PAGA Employee may be eligible to receive under the PAGA Settlement (“Individual PAGA
23 Payment”) will be calculated by the Settlement Administrator, in accordance with the Settlement
24 Agreement. (Genish Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.r and 15).

25 Each Individual Settlement Share will be allocated as twenty percent (20%) wages and eighty
26 percent (80%) penalties, interest, and non-wage damages. (Genish Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶
27 16). The portion allocated to wages will be reported on an IRS Form W-2 and the portions allocated to
28 penalties, interest, and non-wage damages will be reported on an IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the

1 Settlement Administrator. (Genish Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 16). The Settlement
2 Administrator will withhold the employee's share of taxes and withholdings with respect to the wages
3 portion of the Individual Settlement Shares, and issue checks to Settlement Class Members for their net
4 payment of their Individual Settlement Share ("Individual Settlement Payment"). (Genish Decl., ¶ 18;
5 Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.s and 16). The Employer Taxes will be paid separately and in addition to the
6 Gross Settlement Amount. (Genish Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.q and 16). Each Individual
7 PAGA Payment will be allocated as one hundred percent (100%) penalties and will be reported on an
8 IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Settlement Administrator. (Genish Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement
9 Agreement, ¶ 16).

10 The Settlement Agreement is a non-reversionary and non-claims made settlement. (Genish Decl.,
11 ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.q). The Net Settlement Amount will be fully distributed to Settlement
12 Class Members and the PAGA Amount will be fully distributed to the LWDA and PAGA Employees, in
13 accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (Genish Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 14 and 15).
14 No money will revert to Defendant. (Genish Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.q).

15 Each Individual Settlement Payment and Individual PAGA Payment check will be valid and
16 negotiable for one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and
17 thereafter, shall be canceled. (Genish Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 34). Any funds associated
18 with such canceled checks shall be distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the State of California's
19 Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the Settlement Class Member and/or PAGA Employee.
20 (Genish Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 34).

21 **D. Released Claims**

22 Upon the Effective Date and full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, Plaintiff and all
23 Settlement Class Members will be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released, settled,
24 compromised, relinquished, and discharged the Released Parties of all Released Class Claims.
25 (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 35).

26 Upon the Effective Date and full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, Plaintiff, the State of
27 California with respect to all PAGA Employees, and all PAGA Employees will be deemed to have fully,
28 finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, relinquished, and discharged the Released Parties of

1 all Released PAGA Claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 36).

2 “Released Class Claims” means any and all claims and causes of action which were alleged in the
3 Operative Complaint or which reasonably could have been alleged based on the factual allegations and
4 legal theories in the Operative Complaint, arising during the Class Period, which specifically includes
5 claims for Defendant’s alleged failure to pay overtime and minimum wages, provide compliant meal and
6 rest periods and associated premium payments, timely pay wages during employment and upon
7 termination, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse necessary business-related expenses in
8 violation of California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 226(a), 226.7, 510, 512(a), 1194, 1197,
9 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802, the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order, and California
10 Business and Professions Code sections 17200, *et seq.* By virtue of this release, any claims under the
11 FLSA that are predicated on the Released Class Claims are subject to res judicata pursuant to applicable
12 law including but not limited to *Rangel v. PLS Check Cashers of California Inc.* (*Id.*, ¶ 6.ff).

13 “Released PAGA Claims” means any and all claims and causes of action for civil penalties under
14 the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 that were alleged in the Operative Complaint or
15 reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts and legal theories contained in the Operative
16 Complaint and PAGA Letter, arising during the PAGA Period, for civil penalties under the Private
17 Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code sections 2698 *et seq.*, which specifically includes
18 claims for Defendant’s alleged failure to pay overtime and minimum wages, provide compliant meal and
19 rest periods and associated premium payments, timely pay wages during employment and upon
20 termination, provide complaint wage statements, maintain complete and accurate payroll records, and
21 reimburse necessary business-related expenses in violation of California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203,
22 204, 210, 226(a), 226.7, 510, 512(a), 1174(d), 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802, and the
23 applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.gg).

- 24 • In light of the binding nature of a PAGA judgment on non-party employees pursuant to *Arias*
25 *v. Sup. Ct.* (Angelo Dairy) (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969 and *Cardenas v. McLane Foodservice, Inc.*
26 (2011)796 F.Supp.2d 1246, individuals otherwise meeting the definition of a Settlement Class
27 Member who exclude themselves from the Class Settlement shall nonetheless receive a payment
28 for the amount of each such individual’s estimated share of the PAGA Employees’ portion of the

1 PAGA Amount and shall have released the Released PAGA Claims. (Ibid).

2 “Released Parties” means Defendant, and its past and present direct and/or indirect officers,
3 directors, members, managers, exempt employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, insurers, partners,
4 investors, shareholders, administrators, parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, predecessors,
5 successors, assigns, and joint venturers. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.hh).

6 **IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

7 The settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.
8 App. 4th 1794 (1996)). “In general, questions whether a settlement was fair and reasonable, whether
9 notice to the class was adequate, whether certification of the class was proper, and whether the attorney
10 fee award was proper are matters addressed to the trial court’s broad discretion.” (*Wershba v. Apple*
11 *Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234-35 (2001) (disapproved on other grounds)).

12 The review and approval of a proposed class action settlement involves a two-step process. (*See*
13 Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c)). First, counsel submit the proposed terms of the settlement and the
14 Court makes a preliminary assessment of whether the settlement appears to be sufficiently within the
15 range of a fair settlement to justify providing notice of the proposed settlement to class members. After
16 notice is provided to the class, the Court must conduct a second inquiry into whether the proposed
17 settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (Ibid).

18 The initial evaluation of the settlement at the preliminary approval step “is not a fairness hearing.”
19 (*Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of City of Milwaukee*, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980)).
20 Rather, the limited purpose of this initial inquiry is to determine, at a threshold level, only whether the
21 proposed settlement is within the range of possible approval and, as a result, “whether there is any reason
22 to notify the class members of the proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing.” A
23 presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2)
24 investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel
25 is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*See In re Microsoft I-V*
26 *Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006)).

27 ///

28 ///

1 Preliminary approval does not require a court to make a final determination that the settlement is
2 fair, reasonable, and adequate. Rather, that decision is made only at the final approval stage, after notice
3 of the settlement has been given to the class members and they have had an opportunity to object or
4 exclude themselves from the settlement. (*See* Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(g)). In considering a
5 potential class settlement, the court need not reach any ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law
6 which underlie the merits of the dispute and need not engage in a trial on the merits. (*See Officers for*
7 *Justice v. Civil Service Commission*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)).

8 **V. THE SETTLEMENT IS PRESUMED FAIR**

9 **A. The Settlement Was Reached as a Result of Arm's-Length Bargaining**

10 California courts recognize that “a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is
11 reached through arm's-length bargaining.” (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245; *see also Clark v. Am.*
12 *Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 799 (2009)). Here, the Parties' settlement negotiations
13 were at all times made at arm's-length and were adversarial. (Genish Decl., ¶ 21). The Settlement was
14 reached following a full day of mediation with a highly respected mediator with substantial experience
15 mediating wage and hour cases. (*Ibid*). At all times, Plaintiff was willing and prepared to litigate this
16 matter through class certification and trial if the Parties had been unable to reach a favorable resolution.
17 (*Id.*, ¶ 41).

18 **B. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery by Experienced Class Counsel**

19 Courts typically assess the status of discovery in determining whether a class action settlement
20 agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801). Prior to mediation,
21 Defendant produced a random sampling of putative class members' time and pay data. (Genish Decl., ¶
22 22). This allowed Class Counsel to conduct an informed assessment and analysis of the strengths and
23 weaknesses of the claims and the potential class-wide damages. (*Ibid*). Based on information exchanged,
24 the Parties extensively briefed issues regarding class certification and liability and provided their analyses
25 to the Mediator who helped the Parties debate the strengths and weakness of their respective positions.
26 (*Id.*, ¶ 23). Additionally, settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced
27 counsel. (Genish Decl., ¶¶ 1-8). Accordingly, Class Counsel had sufficient information and experience
28 to act intelligently in negotiating the Settlement.

1 **C. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions**
2 **and Recovery Risks**

3 A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at
4 trial, nor does the settlement have to obtain 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
5 (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250). In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court
6 must consider “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further
7 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the
8 extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the
9 presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.”
10 (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)).

11 Here, the reasonableness of the Settlement is underscored by the fact that Defendant has legal and
12 factual grounds for defending the Action. Based upon Class Counsel’s experience litigating similar
13 complex matters, Plaintiff reasonably expected a vigorous and lengthy defense to both class certification
14 and the merits of the Action absent a settlement.

15 **1. Class Counsel’s Analysis of the Maximum Available Liability and Damages**

16 Class Counsel analyzed all available data and estimated Defendant’s maximum potential exposure
17 to be approximately \$2,246,825, assuming the litigation was successful at trial on all claims at issue and
18 every employee had a violation for each claim on every shift worked. (*Genish Decl.*, ¶ 25). This
19 maximum potential analysis was then reduced based on the challenges facing the likelihood of obtaining
20 class certification, prevailing at trial, and other attendant risks. (*Ibid*). This estimate is based off an
21 estimated maximum liability for all claims at issue and the total aggregate workweeks during the relevant
22 time period, less interest, and based on the analysis of the data which was extrapolated out for all class
23 members across the entire putative class period, which included: \$267,417 for meal period violations;
24 \$740,744 for rest period violations at a 100% violation rate; \$190,832 for unpaid off-the-clock work for
25 1 hour per workweek of off-the-clock work; \$3,872 for unpaid overtime wages at the required regular
26 rate of pay; \$96,540 for unreimbursed business expenses; \$675,670 for waiting time penalties; and
27 \$271,750 for wage statement penalties. (*Ibid*). Plaintiff further estimated that Defendant faced an
28 additional exposure of \$299,700 in potential, non-stacked (i.e., one penalty, per employee, per pay period

1 during the PAGA statutory period) PAGA penalties. (Ibid). Together with the PAGA penalties,
2 Defendant's maximum potential exposure totaled \$2,546,525 in damages. (Ibid).

3 **2. Class Counsel's Risk-Based Analysis and Risk-Based Adjustments**

4 While Plaintiff believes that Defendant faced significant exposure, substantial barriers to a
5 recovery existed. Defendant contended that Plaintiff's claims are not suitable for class certification
6 because individual issues and affirmative defenses would predominate should this case go to trial.
7 (Genish Decl., ¶ 27; *See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004 (2012); *Duran v.*
8 *U.S. Bank Nat. Assn.*, 59 Cal.4th 1, 35-36 (2014); *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551
9 (2011)). While Plaintiff and Class Counsel disagree with Defendant's predictions, they also recognize
10 that there is a significant risk that the Court may deny class certification. (Genish Decl., ¶ 27; *see also*,
11 *Findings of the Study of California Class Action Litigation*, 2000-2006, available at
12 <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf> (finding that only 21.4% of all class
13 actions were certified either as part of a settlement or as part of a contested certification motion)).

14 For example, Plaintiff's meal period claims, which were based on Defendant's alleged failure to
15 provide lawful meal periods, have been increasingly difficult to certify in recent years. (Genish Decl., ¶
16 28; *See Brinker*, 53 Cal. 4th at 1034-35). Plaintiff's theory of liability for meal period violations was
17 based on allegations that Defendant had failed to implement its policies and that its practices failed to
18 allow Class Members to take meal breaks in the manner required under California law. (Genish Decl., ¶
19 28; *See Bradley v. Networkers Int'l, LLC*, 211 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1150 (2012) (holding that "the lack of
20 a meal/rest break policy and uniform failure to authorize such breaks are matters of common proof.")).
21 Defendant contended that its policies and practices at all times during the Class Period were lawful.
22 (Genish Decl., ¶ 28). Indeed, Plaintiff's analysis revealed only a 40% violation rate for purported meal
23 period violations. (Ibid). Defendant further argued that the rate of purported meal period violations
24 reflected in the data would require individualized inquiry and that such inquiry would prohibit a class
25 from being certified. (Ibid). Class Counsel also had to consider the risk that the Court would find validity
26 in an individualized proof defense to certification of Plaintiff's meal period claim. (Ibid).

27 ///

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1 Additionally, a large portion of Defendant's overall liability lies in Plaintiff's rest period
2 allegations. (*Id.*, ¶ 29). As with the meal period allegations, Defendant contended that it had a lawful
3 rest period practices and policies, provided compliant rest breaks, and relieved Class Members of all
4 duties as required under California law. (*Ibid*). Additionally, this claim was even more uncertain given
5 the difficulties associated with proving the alleged rest period violations, as Defendant was not required
6 to record these breaks. (*Ibid*). Given the lack of records demonstrating rest period violations, there were
7 legitimate concerns Plaintiff would not be able to certify these claims or prove substantial damages with
8 requisite certainty, which made the estimated value of this claim subject to much challenge. (*Ibid*).

9 Plaintiff also faced challenges certifying and proving liability for his minimum wage and overtime
10 claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 30). These claims were largely based on Defendant's unrecorded, off-the-clock work
11 performed by the Class Members both before and after their shifts and during purported meal periods.
12 (*Ibid*). However, the individualized nature of why this work was performed and the individualized nature
13 of damages presented substantial concerns regarding the manageability of the case and the risk the Court
14 could find these issues prevented certification, and the estimated damages for this claim were based on
15 an assumption that all Class Members worked off the clock for at least one hour per week. (*Ibid*).
16 Additionally, Plaintiff argued that Defendant failed to apply the proper weighted average method in its
17 calculation of the regular rate for overtime payments when employees worked at two or more different
18 rates in a workweek, resulting in an underpayment of employees' overtime. (*Ibid*). However, Defendant
19 argued that it calculated the regular rate properly for overtime. (*Ibid*). Ultimately, the regular rate claim
20 was considered negligible by the Mediator. (*Ibid*).

21 Plaintiff also contended that Defendant failed to reimburse Plaintiff and the other Class Members
22 for necessary business-related expenses, such as the purchase of uniform shirts with the company's logo
23 for work related purposes. (*Id.*, ¶ 31). Defendant contended that it provided all uniform shirts for the
24 employees. (*Ibid*). Defendant further contended that it had a policy and practice of reimbursing
25 employees for necessary business-related expenses. (*Ibid*). Defendant also contended that, with respect
26 to the alleged expenses for which Plaintiff and the other Class Members never requested reimbursement
27 from Defendant, it did not know and had no reason to know that alleged business-related expenses had
28 been incurred. (*Ibid*). Defendant further contended that the reason for why a Class Member undertook

1 certain expenses, while not others, and failed to receive reimbursement for certain expenses while not
2 others, would raise individual issues that could not be certified. (Ibid).

3 There are also substantial risks associated with Plaintiff's waiting time penalties and wage
4 statement claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 32). First, these claims were derivative of Plaintiff's claims for unpaid meal
5 period premiums, unpaid rest period premiums, unpaid minimum wages, and unpaid overtime wages,
6 and if certification was denied on those underlying claims, these derivative claims for penalties would
7 also likely fail. (Ibid). Further, even if Plaintiff prevailed on his underlying claims, he would still be
8 required to demonstrate that Defendant's violations of California Labor Code section 203 were *willful*
9 violations. (Genish Decl., ¶ 32; *See, e.g., Choate v. Celite Corp.*, 215 Cal App. 4th 1460, 1468 (2013)
10 (holding that "an employer's reasonable, good faith belief that wages are not owed may negate a finding
11 of willfulness")). Wage statement claims have also seen varying treatment at the appellate level because
12 such claims have an element of discretion attached to them rather than a pure calculation of damages after
13 liability is proven. (Genish Decl. ¶ 32; *Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal.App.4th 1286 (2010) *with*
14 *Price v. Starbucks Corp.*, 192 Cal.App.4th 1136 (2011)). Accordingly, these derivative claims, which
15 comprised a substantial portion of Defendant's estimated liability, were therefore uncertain. (Genish
16 Decl., ¶ 32).

17 Class Counsel also recognized that, even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification, proving the
18 amount of wages due to Class Members would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain
19 proposition. (*Id.*, ¶ 33). In order to prove liability and damages, Class Counsel will need to request and
20 analyze thousands of pages of documents, obtain the Class Members' contact information, contact them,
21 and obtain their declarations at great expense. (Ibid). Obtaining the cooperation of current employees
22 would also be difficult, given the likely reluctance to aid prosecution of a lawsuit against a current
23 employer. (Ibid). On the other hand, Defendant would likely be able to obtain the cooperation of their
24 employees. (Ibid). Moreover, even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification and trial, possible appeals
25 would substantially delay any recovery by the Class. (Ibid).

26 Therefore, taking into account how each of the above risks potentially effected Plaintiff's ability
27 to first obtain class certification, and then prove the underlying violations, plus the cost and delay in
28 recovering the alleged potential damages, Class Counsel discounted Defendant's estimated liability based

1 on the challenges facing his ability to succeed on class certification by 50% to \$1,273,263. (*Id.*, ¶ 34).
2 The merits-based risk factors further reduced Defendant’s estimated liability by an additional 40%.
3 (*Ibid.*). This resulted in an adjusted estimated liability of \$763,958. In light thereof, the settlement amount
4 of \$639,000 is a significant settlement. (*Ibid.*).

5 Class Counsel also contemplated the risks of proceeding with the PAGA claim and potential
6 liability Defendant could face from this claim as part of the global resolution. (*Id.*, ¶ 35). Existing case
7 law makes PAGA claims subject to the same defenses and risks as Plaintiff’s underlying wage claims.
8 (Genish Decl., ¶ 35; see, *Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC*, 572 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal.
9 2008) (“Plaintiff’s claim under [PAGA] is wholly dependent upon her other claims. Because all of
10 Plaintiff’s other claims fail as a matter of law, so does her PAGA claim”)). Class Counsel also anticipated
11 that even if successful on the merits at trial, the imposition of cumulative civil penalties based on the
12 alleged wage and hour violations could be considered unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory,
13 and that Defendant would argue that it made a good faith attempt to comply with its legal obligations
14 warranting a reduction in penalties. (Genish Decl., ¶ 35).¹ Class Counsel also anticipated Defendant
15 would argue that it made a good faith attempt to comply with its legal obligations and that the violations
16 per pay period were low, warranting an additional reduction in civil penalties. (*Ibid.*). Finally, Class
17 Counsel was also mindful of the fact that PAGA is fundamentally not intended to be compensatory in
18 nature but is instead intended to facilitate enforcement of California’s labor laws by financing state
19 activities and educating and deterring non-compliance. (*Ibid.*).

20 Therefore, after considering this multitude of factors, Plaintiff and Class Counsel concluded that
21 it was in the best interest of the State of California and the PAGA Employees to enter into the Settlement,
22 and to allocate Thirty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$30,000.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount
23

24 ¹ See, e.g., *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1131 (2012) (imposition of both statutory
25 and civil penalties for same conduct is impermissible double recovery) (disapproved on other grounds); *Aguirre v. Genesis*
26 *Logistics*, 2013 WL 10936035, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“duplicative effect” of penalties is a factor in favor of “reducing ...the
27 PAGA penalty”); *Smith v. Lux Retail North America, Inc.*, 2013 WL 2932243, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2013) (declining to
28 stack penalties based on the same conduct); *Castillo v. ADT, LLC*, 2017 WL 363108, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017); *Sanchez*
v. McDonalds Restaurants of California, Inc., 2017 WL 4620746 (LA Super. Ct. July 6, 2017) (declining to stack penalties
arising out of the same conduct); *Fleming v. Covidien, Inc.*, 2011 WL 756304718, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) (reducing
PAGA penalties by 80%); *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 193 F.Supp.3d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (indicating that a substantial reduction is
warranted where good faith dispute exists in legal obligations); *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.*, 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (2018)
(approving reduction in penalties from \$50 per pay period to \$5 per pay period based on good faith attempts to comply with
obligations and minimal violations).

1 towards the PAGA claim, which represents approximately 4.69% of the Gross Settlement Amount. (*Id.*,
2 ¶ 36). This percentage of the settlement is well within the range of wage and hour settlements regularly
3 approved in both state and federal court for cases that include both a class and PAGA action. (*Ibid.*).
4 Typically, such hybrid cases allocate only 1% of the gross settlement value to resolve PAGA claims, and,
5 indeed, settlements allocations as little as 0.22% of the gross settlement amount have been approved as
6 reasonable by courts. (*Ibid.*). Moreover, the overall relief obtained by the Settlement is significant, not
7 only from a monetary perspective, but also because it fulfills the public policy objectives of PAGA—to
8 promote enforcement of California’s labor laws, provide funds to the state, and deter future non-
9 compliance by the employer. (*Ibid.*).

10 The Settlement is in the best interest of the Class Members, the PAGA Employees, and the State
11 of California and is within the accepted range of recoveries for this type of litigation given the inherent
12 risk of litigation, the risk of obtaining and maintaining class certification, and the costs of further
13 litigation. (*Id.*, ¶ 37).

14 VI. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

15 Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 provides that three basic requirements must be met in order
16 to sustain any class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class; (2) there must be a well-defined
17 community of interest in the question of law or fact affecting the parties to be represented; and (3)
18 certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e., proceeding as a class action
19 is superior to other methods. (*See Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806). Plaintiff contends that the Action,
20 which is based upon Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices, satisfies the class certification
21 requirements under California Code of Civil Procedure section 382. Defendant denies Plaintiff’s
22 allegations, but for purposes of the Settlement only, Defendant has stipulated to certification of the Class.

23 A. An Ascertainable Class Exists Which is So Numerous That Joinder of All Members is 24 Impracticable

25 Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size of
26 the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. (*See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal.App.3d 862,
27 873 (1983)). In this case, all three considerations strongly favor class certification. Here, the Class is
28 defined as “all current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant

1 in the State of California at any time during the Class Period (or if any such person is incompetent,
2 deceased, or unavailable due to military service, the person's legal representative or successor in interest
3 evidenced by reasonable verification)." (Genish Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.b). This provides
4 a clear and definite scope for the proposed class.

5 Next, the Class is sufficiently numerous. There is no magic number that satisfies the numerosity
6 requirement. Courts have certified classes with as few as ten or twenty-eight class members. (*Rose v.*
7 *City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981); *Bowles v. Superior Court*, 44 Cal. 2d 574 (1995);
8 *Hebbard v. Colgrove*, 28 Cal.App.3d 1017, 1030 (1972)). Here, the estimated Class size of three hundred
9 and forty (340) individuals meets the numerosity requirement.

10 Finally, the question of whether class members are easily identifiable turns on whether a plaintiff
11 can establish "the existence of an ascertainable class." (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.*, 67 Cal.2d 695 at 706
12 (1967)). The existence of an ascertainable class in this case can be established through Defendant's
13 payroll records, and the Class definition is sufficiently specific to enable the Parties, Class Members, and
14 the Court to determine the parameters of the Class. (*See Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.*, 191
15 Cal.App.3d 605, 617 (1987)).

16 **B. The Class Shares a Well-Defined Community of Interest**

17 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of law
18 and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives
19 who can adequately represent the class. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806). Here, all three requirements
20 are easily satisfied.

21 The commonality criterion requires the existence of common question of law or fact and is
22 generally established with the issues of predominance and typicality. (*See Daar*, 67 Cal.2d 695, 706).
23 What is required is that a common question of fact or law exists which predominates over issues unique
24 to individual plaintiffs. The existence of individual issues or facts—generally present in any case arising
25 from employment—is not a bar to class certification as long as they do not render class litigation
26 unmanageable or predominate over the common issues. (*See B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois,*
27 *Inc.*, 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1354 (1987)).

28 ///

1 Here, Plaintiff's claims present common issues of law and fact that predominate and warrant class
2 certification. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant denied compliant meal and rest periods to employees,
3 required employees to perform work off-the-clock, and failed to fully compensate employees for all time
4 actually worked. These policies and practices meant that Defendant allegedly failed to pay minimum and
5 overtime wages, and other related claims. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's policies and practices were
6 uniform as to all Class Members. Thus, class treatment is appropriate.

7 To satisfy the typicality requirement, California law does not require that plaintiffs' claims be
8 identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class representative is whether
9 other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not
10 unique to the named plaintiff, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of
11 conduct. (*See Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 (2007)). The typicality requirement
12 for a class representative refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the representative, and not to the
13 specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. (*See Ibid*).

14 Here, Plaintiff alleges that his claims are similar to that of the other Class Members and that
15 Plaintiff's claims arise out of the same alleged course of conduct giving rise to the claims of the other
16 Class Members. Because Plaintiff's claims are based upon the same alleged conduct and business
17 practices as those of Class Members, the typicality requirement has been satisfied.

18 Finally, the question of adequacy of representation "depends on whether the plaintiff's attorney
19 qualifies to conduct the proposed litigation in the plaintiff's interest or not antagonistic to the interests of
20 the class." (*McGee v. Bank of America*, 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450 (1976)). Here, these considerations are
21 satisfied. Class Counsel is well-regarded and is qualified and experienced in employment-related, class-
22 action litigation. (Genish Decl., ¶¶ 1-8). Plaintiff will vigorously, adequately, and fairly represent the
23 interests of the Class. Plaintiff has, at all times, throughout the course of the litigation considered the
24 interests of the Class and understood that he must take steps to adequately represent the Class and their
25 interests. (Tecaliz Decl., ¶ 10). Because Plaintiff's claims are typical of other Class Members and are not
26 based on unique circumstances, there is no antagonism between the interests of Plaintiff and the Class.

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1 **C. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

2 Under the circumstances, proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute,
3 as the Class Members and the Court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would serve as
4 the only means to deter and redress the alleged violations. (*See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal.4th 429,
5 434 (2000) (relevant considerations include the probability that each class member will come forward to
6 prove his or her separate claim and whether the class approach would actually serve to deter and redress
7 the alleged wrongdoing)). Further, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would
8 unduly burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results. Therefore, class action proceedings are
9 superior to individual litigation.

10 **VII. THE REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT IS REASONABLE**

11 Plaintiffs in class action lawsuits are eligible for reasonable incentive payments as compensation
12 “for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz*
13 *v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412 (2010)). Courts routinely grant approval of
14 class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representative, which are
15 necessary to provide incentive to represent the class and are appropriate given the benefit the class
16 representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See In re Online DVD Rental*, 779 F.3d 934, 947-948
17 (9th Cir. 2014) (approving incentive award 417 times larger than individual payments where incentive
18 award made up a mere .17% of the settlement); *Gaudin v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc.*, 2015 WL
19 7454183, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (finding service award of \$15,000 to be “fair and
20 reasonable”)).

21 Plaintiff initiated this litigation on behalf of his former co-workers who will now be entitled to
22 receive payment from the Settlement. Plaintiff invested substantial time and effort into litigation,
23 including his own research, reviewing documents, and extensive discussions with Class Counsel.
24 (Tecaliz Decl., ¶¶ 3-5). Further, the requested amount for Plaintiff is also reasonable given the average
25 award and the benefit gained by other Class Members. For these reasons, Plaintiff requests that an
26 Enhancement Payment of Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00) to Plaintiff be preliminarily
27 approved by the Court. (Genish Decl., ¶ 38; Tecaliz Decl., ¶ 12).

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1 **VIII. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE**

2 Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value of attorneys’ fees and their decisions will
3 “not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal, Inc.*, 82
4 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000)). California law provides that attorney fee awards should be equivalent to fees
5 paid in the legal marketplace to compensate for the result achieved and risk incurred. (*Id.* at 47). In cases
6 where class members present claims against a common fund and the defendant agrees to a percentage of
7 the fund as part of the settlement, use of the percentage method is appropriate. (*Id.* at 32).

8 Here, the requested attorneys’ fees of one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e.,
9 \$213,000.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$639,000.00) is disclosed to Class Members in the
10 proposed Class Notice. (Settlement Agreement, Exh. A). The requested fee was freely negotiated, is
11 common in the legal marketplace, and is not opposed by Defendant. The Motion for Final Approval will
12 elaborate on the nature of the legal services provided and will also support Class Counsel’s request for
13 the reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero
14 Cents (\$20,000.00). (Genish Decl., ¶¶ 39 and 41). Any portion of the requested Attorneys’ Fees and
15 Costs that is not awarded by the Court to Class Counsel shall be reallocated to the Net Settlement Amount
16 for the benefit of the Settlement Class Members. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 9).

17 **IX. THE CLASS NOTICE AND THE OPT-OUT AND OBJECTION PROCESS**
18 **MEETS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS**

19 The Parties have jointly drafted the Class Notice, which will be mailed to the Class Members.
20 (*Id.*, Exh. A). The Class Notice will include information regarding the nature of the Action, a summary
21 of the terms of the Settlement, the Class definition, information on how to object to and/or opt-out of the
22 Class Settlement and to dispute Workweeks and/or PAGA Pay Periods, and the date of the Final Approval
23 Hearing. (*Ibid.*). The Class Notice will list each Class Member’s total Workweeks and their estimated
24 Individual Settlement Share and each PAGA Employee’s total PAGA Pay Periods and their estimated
25 Individual PAGA Payment. (*Ibid.*).

26 Within fourteen (14) calendar days after entry of the preliminary approval order, Defendant will
27 provide a list in a formatted readable Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheet to the Settlement Administrator
28 containing the following information for each Class Member: (1) full name; (2) last known mailing

1 address; (3) Social Security number; (4) dates worked for Defendant during the Class Period; and (8)
2 such other information as is necessary for the Settlement Administrator to calculate Workweeks and
3 PAGA Pay Periods (collectively referred to as the “Class List”). (*Id.*, ¶¶ 6.d and 23). Within seven (7)
4 calendar days after receiving the Class List from Defendant, the Settlement Administrator will perform a
5 search based on the National Change of Address Database or other similar services available, such as
6 provided by Experian, for information to update and correct for any known or identifiable address
7 changes, and will mail a Class Notice in English and Spanish to all Class Members via First-Class U.S.
8 Mail, using the most current, known mailing addresses identified by the Settlement Administrator. (*Id.*,
9 ¶ 24.a). The Parties have agreed to use ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator. (Genish
10 Decl., ¶ 42; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.kk).

11 In determining whether to approve a settlement of a class action, a trial court has virtually
12 complete discretion as to the manner of giving notice to class members, and review on appeal is governed
13 by the abuse of discretion standard. (*See In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380
14 (2010)). Here, Class Counsel is not aware of an alternative method of providing notice to the Class which
15 would result in a higher likelihood of actual notice. (Genish Decl., ¶ 43). The original source of the
16 mailing addresses is from Class Members, who provided the information to Defendant. (*Ibid.*).

17 Class Members will have forty-five (45) calendar days from the initial mailing of the Class Notice
18 by the Settlement Administrator to submit a Request for Exclusion, Notice of Objection, and/or Dispute
19 (“Response Deadline”). (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.jj).

20 Any Class Notice returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable on or before the
21 Response Deadline will be sent promptly via First-Class U.S. Mail to the forwarding address affixed
22 thereto and the Settlement Administrator will indicate the date of such re-mailing on the Class Notice.
23 (*Id.*, ¶ 24.b). If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will promptly attempt
24 to determine the correct address using a skip-trace or other search, using the name, address, and/or Social
25 Security number of the Class Member, and perform a single re-mailing within five (5) calendar days.
26 (*Ibid.*). In the event that a Class Notice is re-mailed to a Class Member, the Response Deadline for that
27 Class Member shall be extended fifteen (15) calendar days from the original Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶
28 6.jj).

1 Class Members will have an opportunity to dispute the number of Workweeks and/or PAGA Pay
2 Periods to which they have been credited, as reflected in their respective Class Notices, by submitting a
3 timely and valid letter (“Dispute”) to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or before the
4 Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 6.j and 25). A Dispute must: (a) contain the case name and number of the
5 Action; (b) contain the Class Member’s full name, signature, address, telephone number, and the last four
6 (4) digits of the Class Member’s Social Security number; (c) clearly state that the Class Member disputes
7 the number of Workweeks and/or PAGA Pay Periods credited to the Class Member and what the Class
8 Member contends is the correct number; and (d) be returned by mail to the Settlement Administrator at
9 the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.j).

10 Any Class Member wishing to be excluded from the Class Settlement must submit a timely and
11 valid letter (“Request for Exclusion”) to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or before
12 the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 6.ii and 26). A Request for Exclusion must: (a) contain the case name
13 and number of the Action; (b) contain the Class Member’s full name, signature, address, telephone
14 number, and last four (4) digits of the Class Member’s Social Security number; (c) clearly state that the
15 Class Member does not wish to be included in the Class Settlement; and (d) be returned by mail to the
16 Settlement Administrator at the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*,
17 ¶ 6.ii). Notwithstanding the above, all PAGA Employees will be bound to the PAGA Settlement and will
18 be issued their Individual PAGA Payment, irrespective of whether they submit a Request for Exclusion.
19 (*Id.*, ¶ 26).

20 To object to the Class Settlement, Settlement Class Members must submit a timely and complete
21 written objection (“Notice of Objection”) to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or
22 before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 6.w & 27). A Notice of Objection must: (a) contain the case name
23 and number of the Action; (b) contain the objector’s full name, signature, address, telephone number, and
24 the last four (4) digits of the objector’s Social Security number; (c) contain a written statement of all
25 grounds for the objection accompanied by any legal support for such objection; (d) contain copies of any
26 papers, briefs, or other documents upon which the objection is based; and (e) be returned by mail to the
27 Settlement Administrator at the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*,
28 ¶ 27).

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BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

Jonathan M. Genish
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rigoberto Tecaliz