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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

CHANDNI SINGH, individually, on behalf of all others similarly situated, the State of California, and other aggrieved persons, *Plaintiff*, v. SHORT STORY, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, *Defendants*.	Case No.: CGC-23-609394 **CLASS AND PAGA ACTION** *[Assigned to Hon. Jeffery S. Ross, Dept. 606]* **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING Date: November 21, 2025 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept: 606 Complaint filed: September 29, 2023 FAC Filed: March 13, 2024 Trial Date: Not set.

TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 21, 2025, at 9:30 a.m., in Department 606 of the San Francisco County Superior Court, located at 400 McAllister St., San Francisco, CA 94102, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769, *et seq*., Plaintiff Chandni Singh ("Plaintiff") will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant Short Story, Inc. ("Defendant"). Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement;
2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
4. Appointing Plaintiff Chandni Singh as Class Representative for settlement purposes;
5. Appointing Plaintiff's Counsel, Tyler Woods, James Yoo, Heriberto Ponce, Ruby Carrera, Alan Wilcox of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
6. Appointing APEX Class Action Administration as the Settlement Administrator; and
7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the Declarations of Tyler J. Woods and Chandni Singh, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: October 3, 2025 WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: Tyler J. Woods

Tyler Woods
James Yoo
Heriberto Ponce
Ruby Carrera
Alan Wilcox

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Chandni Singh ("Plaintiff") seeks preliminary approval of a proposed $500,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Short Story, Inc. ("Defendant," and together with Plaintiff, the "Parties"). The Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement ("Settlement" or "Settlement Agreement") will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 288 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arm's-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, David Phillips, over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement in April 2025. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff's Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members were employed in California in a non-exempt position for Defendant during the class period. (Declaration of Tyler J. Woods in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement ["Woods Decl."], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to: provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to pay wages during employment, failure to pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate wage statements, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (Woods Decl.,¶ 3.)

On September 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Class Action alleging Defendant (1) failed to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failed to pay overtime wages; (3) failed to provide meal periods; (4) failed to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failed to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failed to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) violated California's Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code section 17200, *et seq*. On October 30, 2023, pursuant to Labor Code section 2699.3, subd. (a), Plaintiff gave timely notice to the LWDA and Defendant that Plaintiff intended to proceed with a representative action under PAGA through the PAGA Notice. On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint which added allegations relating to and a cause of action for penalties pursuant to Labor Code section 2699, *et seq*. (Woods Decl., ¶ 4.)

B. <u>Discovery and Investigation</u>

Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records for class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (Woods Decl., at ¶ 5.)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices and analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (Woods Decl., at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id*.) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id*.) This extensive investigation and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the Settlement.

C. <u>Settlement Negotiations</u>

On April 9, 2025, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class action mediator David Phillips. (Woods Decl., at ¶ 7.) With the help of the Mediator, the Parties were able to reach an agreement on general settlement terms at mediation and executed a Memorandum of Understanding thereafter. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement.)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts and law relevant to the Action. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (Woods Decl., at ¶ 14.)

Indeed, the $500,000.00 Settlement represents approximately **91.6%** of the **realistic maximum recovery** of $545,833.76 (Woods Decl., at ¶ 23.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant's maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately $4 million, when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant's realistic exposure was $545,833.76, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (Woods Decl., at ¶¶ 14-27.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. <u>Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement</u>

The Settlement's key terms include:

1. <u>Class Definition</u>: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "means all individuals employed by Defendant in the State of California in non-exempt positions during the Class Period." (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. Class Period: "means the period from April 29, 2019, through the earlier of: (a) the date the Court grants preliminary approval of this Settlement; or (b) the date on which the Total Workweeks (defined below) reaches 14,865." (Settlement, § 1.13.)

3. Participating Class Member: "means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement." (Settlement, § 1.36.)

4. Affected Employee: "means all individuals employed by Defendant in the State of California in a non-exempt position during the PAGA Period." (Settlement, § 1.4.)

5. PAGA Period: "means the period from January 8, 2023, through the earlier of: (a) the date the Court grants preliminary approval of the Settlement; or (b) the date on which the Class Period ends." (Settlement, § 1.35.)

6. Gross Settlement Amount: or "GSA" "means $500,000.00, the total amount Defendant agrees to pay under the Settlement, except as provided in Paragraph 8 [of the Settlement Agreement]. The Gross Settlement Amount will be used to pay Individual Class Payment, Class Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Service Payment, the Administrator's Costs, and the PAGA Payment." (Settlement, § 1.22.)

7. Uncashed Checks: "For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and canceled after the Void Date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b)." (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

8. Released Class Claims: "All Participating Class Members will release and discharge the Released Parties from any and all claims, rights, demands, and liabilities of every nature and description, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, arising under federal, state, or local law, that were asserted or that could have reasonably been asserted based on the facts alleged in the Action, including the initial and the First Amended Complaint, that arose during the Class Period (the "Released Class Claims")." (Settlement, § 5.2.)

9. Released PAGA Claims: "All Affected Employees, including Non-Participating Class Members who are Affected Employees, and the State of California will release and discharge the

Released Parties from any and all claims, rights, demands, and liabilities of every nature and description, whether known or unknown, for PAGA civil penalties that were asserted or that could have reasonably been asserted based on the facts alleged in the Action, including the initial and the First Amended Complaint and the PAGA Notice, that arose during the PAGA Period, including, but not limited to, claims for civil penalties for alleged violations of California Labor Code sections 201-203, 204, 226, 226.7, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1198, and 2802, and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders (the "Released PAGA Claims")." (Settlement, § 5.3.)

10. No Reversion: "The Gross Settlement Amount is non-reversionary." (Settlement, § 3.1.)

11. To the LWDA and Affected Employees: "PAGA Payment in the amount of $50,000.00 to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount, with 75% ($37,500.00) allocated to the LWDA PAGA Payment and 25% ($12,500.00) allocated to the Individual PAGA Payments." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Woods Decl., ¶ 9.)

12. Net Settlement Amount: "means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Costs Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments." (Settlement, § 1.28.)

13. Distribution Formula: "An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member's Workweeks." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: "The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Affected Employees' 25% share of PAGA Payment by the total number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by all Affected Employees during the PAGA Period, and (b) multiplying the result by each individual Affected Employee's PAGA Pay Periods. Affected Employees assume full responsibility and liability for any taxes owed on their Individual PAGA Payment." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

14. Tax Allocation: "Twenty percent (20%) of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to the Settlement of wage claims (the "Wage Portion"). The Wage Portion is subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. The remaining eighty percent (80%) of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to the settlement of claims for interest and penalties (the "Non-Wage Portion"). The Non-Wage Portions are not subject to wage withholdings and will be reported on IRS 1099 Forms. Participating Class Members assume full responsibility and liability for any employee taxes owed on their Individual Class Payment, except for employer taxes on wages, which will be paid by Defendant." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

15. Class Representative Service Award: "A payment for the Enhancement Award to Plaintiff of not more than $10,000.00 in addition to any Individual Class Payment and any Individual PAGA Payment the Class Representative is entitled to receive as a Participating Class Member. Defendant will not oppose Plaintiff's request for an Enhancement Award that does not exceed this amount." (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

16. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: "A Class Counsel Fees Payment of not more than one-third (1/3) of the GSA, which is currently estimated to be $166,666.67, and a Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment for actual costs of not more than $30,000. Defendant will not oppose requests for these payments provided that do not exceed these amounts." (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

17. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: means the Court approved Notice of Settlement and hearing date for Final Approval, to be mailed to Class Members in English with a Spanish translation in the form, without material variation, attached as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference into this Agreement. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 4.4.1.) APEX Class Action Administration, the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Woods Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 2 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk,* 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc*. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id*. at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation

1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm's-Length Negotiations

Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 ["The fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement."].)

The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of mediation with experienced employment mediator, David Phillips (Woods Decl., ¶ 7.) With the help of the Mediator, the Parties were able to reach an agreement on general settlement terms at mediation and executed a Memorandum of Understanding thereafter. (*Id.*)

In advance of mediation, Class Counsel conducted a thorough investigation into the facts and law relevant to the Action. Prior to mediation, Plaintiff also obtained and analyzed a representative sampling of time and payroll data for Class Members and the necessary policy documents through informal discovery to properly evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and engage in meaningful settlement discussions. Plaintiff's investigation was sufficient to satisfy the criteria for court approval set forth in *Dunk v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996) and *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129-130 (2008) ("*Dunk/Kullar*"). (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.)

2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' Respective Legal Positions

A settlement is not judged against what plaintiff might recover had he prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 ["Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation."].)

This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Woods Decl., ¶ 25.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

The proposed settlement of $500,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when compared to Plaintiff's reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-27.) Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, and the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of $500,000.00 is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately $819.21.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 26.)

3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation

The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel. Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Woods Decl., ¶¶ 38-53.) Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

B. <u>The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved</u>

The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $166,666.67, which is one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment for actual costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund" Method

California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc*. (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc*. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created." (*Id*. at p. 503.) The court explained: "The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts." (*Id*. [internal citations omitted].)

2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented." (*See* Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys' fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved "smaller" settlement funds of under $10 million].)

Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys' fees equal to one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ["Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery."].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys' fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A "Fee-Shifting" Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of "minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit." Under this section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys' fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Woods Decl., ¶¶ 38-53.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Woods Decl., ¶¶ 38-53.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. <u>The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable</u>

Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and "there is no indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other" class members, such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement.

(*Id*. [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or $1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp*. (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here, the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia v. Shamrock Foods Co*. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431, at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson, supra*, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3% or $1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc*. (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of $50,000.00, 75% percent of which ($37,500.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 25% ($12,500.00) to be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) The $50,000.00 settlement amount equates to approximately 10% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which far exceeds amounts that are routinely approved. The Parties negotiated to allocate 10% of the Settlement to PAGA penalties in good faith and this amount is reasonable considering that the maximum PAGA penalties were estimated at $326,700.00 (which assumed $100 per pay period). (Woods Decl., ¶ 22.)

E. The Service Award to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits "are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class." (*Munoz, supra,* 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp*. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, "it is the policy of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions . . . ." Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has noted that "retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread," despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agreed to pay Service Awards in the amount of $10,000.00 to named Plaintiff Chandni Singh. This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff's general release of all claims against Defendant. Courts routinely approve enhancement awards in excess of $10,000.00 for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 ["The Court concludes a $10,000 incentive award is appropriate."]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National Association* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at *4 ["The court approves awards of $10,000 for each class representative."].) Class Counsel represents that Plaintiff devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (*See generally* Plaintiff's declaration; Woods Decl., ¶¶ 28-32.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members. (*Id*.)

When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the "average award per class representative was $15,992 and the median award per class representative was $4,357." (Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev. 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of $69,850 and a median award of $31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of $12,121 and a median award of $13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the "courts' wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job." (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

A. Legal Standard

The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California's wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: "when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." (Code Civ. Proc., § 382). There are two requirements to section 382: "(1) [t]here must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented." (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co*. (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: "(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class." (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc*. (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device. (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, "Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system" particularly where the rights of consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co*. (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond*, *supra,* 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for

Settlement Purposes.

1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous

The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable and includes approximately 288 employees of Defendant.

Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co*. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

"The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be 'many' parties to a class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally." (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) "Where a question is of common interest to 'many' persons, an action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to join them all." (*Id.*) "No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action." (*Id.*) "Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees." (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate

The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp*. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.)

Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for paying sick time properly; whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether

Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether payment of wages during employment was timely; whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal and rest period premium wages; whether wage statements were consequently non-compliant; and whether Defendant failed to keep requisite payroll records. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class

The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff's claims are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated employees.

4. Plaintiff and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement

The adequacy of representation requirement is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second, a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that previously settled. (Woods Decl., ¶¶ 38-53.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148

Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication. Plaintiff's willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates their serious commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee*, *supra,* 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation

Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation. By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court's use of the class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra,* 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

V. <u>THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND</u>

A. <u>The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process</u>

Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class Members . . . ." (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

B. <u>The Notice is Accurate and Informative</u>

The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing on April 17, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: October 3, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: ______________________________

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